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This extensive volume contains separate studies on the politics, government, education, labor, migration, and culture of Puerto Rico. It also includes reports on the contemporary Federal-regional relationship in Puerto Rico and on Puerto Rico's relationship with the United States. One study deals with the Dutch, French, and British areas of the Caribbean. There is also an inventory which lists (1) the agencies of the United States Government with offices in Puerto Rico and (2) the departments of the Executive Branch of the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico. (LB)

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STATUS OF PUERTO RICO

SELECTED BACKGROUND STUDIES

PREPARED FOR THE

UNITED STATES-PUERTO RICO COMMISSION

ON THE

STATUS OF PUERTO RICO

1966

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U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH, EDUCATION & WELFARE
OFFICE OF EDUCATION

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PUBLICATIONS OF THE COMMISSION

- Selected Background Studies
- Hearings—Senate Document No. 108
  - Volume 1. Legal-Constitutional
  - Volume 2. Social-Cultural
  - Volume 3. Economic
- Commission Report

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[2] Resigned May 3, 1966.
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[4] Replaced Senator Kenneth B. Keating of New York on Jan. 12, 1965.
[5] Replaced Representative Jack Westland of Washington on Jan. 12, 1965.

PREFACE

The 10 studies contained in this volume form part of the documentary record of the work of the United States-Puerto Rico Commission on the Status of Puerto Rico.

The Commission's broad statutory mandate to "study all factors which may have a bearing on the present and future relationship between the United States and Puerto Rico," required that the Commission develop several background studies where these were necessary for a better understanding of the factors affecting the United States-Puerto Rico relationship. Accordingly, the program of studies adopted by the Commission in March 1965, included the outlines of ten proposed background studies.

The studies were carried out during the remainder of 1965 and were thereafter distributed to the Commission members for their use in the preparation of the Commission report. Since the studies constitute a significant addition to the literature on the relationship between Puerto Rico and the United States, the Commission decided to publish them along with the verbatim transcripts of the public hearings conducted by the Commission and the Commission's final report.

The authors of the studies will be recognized by those who have followed United States-Puerto Rico relations as authorities in the subjects on which they have written. They received some editorial assistance from the Commission staff, but the final version of each study is that of the author himself. It should be added, of course, that the views and interpretations expressed in the studies are exclusively those of the authors and are not to be taken as expressing the views or opinions of any Commission member or any member of the staff.

In presenting these studies to the public the Commission wishes to express its gratitude and appreciation to the authors. All of them took time from their busy schedules to collaborate with the Commission out of their deep interest in the progress of United States-Puerto Rico relations.

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THE PUERTO RICAN POLITICAL MOVEMENT IN THE 19TH CENTURY

by

LIDIO CRUZ MONCLOVA

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Professor Monclova is an authority on Puerto Rican history. His published works include "La Historia de Puerto Rico (XIX Century)," 3 volumes; "Muñoz Rivera (10 Años de su vida política);" "Historia del año de 1897;" and several other co-authored works.

INTRODUCTION*

The history of Puerto Rico can be divided into two major periods: the organic era comprising the 16th, 17th, and 18th centuries, and the critical era beginning with the 19th century and extending to the present.

The initial period of colonization in Puerto Rico reflected the powerful impact of Spanish mercantilism on her colonial possessions. The strict control exercised by Spain vis-à-vis Puerto Rico, however, served to create a common setting within which a conscious awareness of a Puerto Rican identity began to emerge. Unrest and revolution on the continent at the turn of the 19th century provided an impetus for political reform both in the peninsula and on the island. The resulting combination of events in the Old World as well as in the Americas marked the transition from a traditional policy of colonial administration to a system of assimilation in which colonial possessions were granted direct participation in national affairs.

Puerto Rican liberalism in the 19th century manifested two trends of thought: From 1808 to 1823, the liberals advocated the assimilation of Puerto Rico as a juridical equal of the peninsular provinces; beginning in 1823, a radical shift in liberal thought put emphasis on an autonomous system of government rather than on the process of assimilation. Thus began a protracted campaign for political autonomy, waged both on the island and on the peninsula, which culminated in the granting of a Charter of Autonomy for Puerto Rico in 1897.

***The original manuscript by Dr. Cruz Monclova was submitted in Spanish. Its presentation in English as well as this introduction were prepared by the Commission staff.**

The charter marked the end of a period of political expression in which the dominant voices had argued for recognition of the basic differences which prevailed between island and peninsula. The new beginning promised by the charter was short-lived; the advent of the Spanish-American War several months later severed the political relationship between Spain and Puerto Rico. The abrogation of the political base established in the 19th century, however, could not erase the experience of that era; it is this progression of events and ideas which are traced in the following pages.

☆ ☆ ☆

On August 12, 1508, 15 years after the discovery of America, the first group of Spanish settlers, proceeding from Santo Domingo, arrived at the southern coast of Puerto Rico. Following the Conference of Guaynía with the Indian Chief Agueybana, the Spaniards moved up to the north coast where, after preliminary exploration, they started a small settlement on the southern bank of the bay of San Juan, which they called Caparra. An additional group of settlers came a year later, bringing the first white women to the island, including the wife and daughters of the founding captain as well as some of the first women to settle in Santo Domingo immediately following Columbus' third trip.

Although the Guaynía conference represented an act of cordial coexistence, rather than one of territorial surrender, the Spaniards immediately proceeded to establish a general government headed by Ponce de León, with the idea of controlling the island as a whole. They also established a local or municipal government in order to protect the interests of the small settlement. The nature and extent of the powers of the first governor and the first municipal government have yet to be estimated. But if the prerogatives of the governor were extensive and inclusive, those of the municipium must have been very limited, considering that its establishment coincided with the beginning of the absolute personal regime of their Catholic Majesties, and with them, of the first rulers of the House of Austria in Spain.

Using the small settlement of Caparra as a basis of operations, the Spaniards went out to seek that vital soil which would assure their welfare and means of livelihood. If gold extraction was the main objective of the majority, there were others who cultivated the land or raised cattle from the stock imported years before by Captain García Alonso and his assistant Martín García de Salazar, and by Ponce de León himself, according to the instructions of the colonist Vincente Yañez Pinzón.

During the initial process of expansion, the colonists clashed frequently with the Indians, with whom Columbus and his followers had not achieved a basis for communication. In order to fulfill the needs of labor in the insular wilderness, the settlers were authorized by the King to make use of Indian labor following the "encomienda" system—claimed by some to be derived from the medieval "comenda" or "commendati" by which the services performed by knights and nobles were rewarded. This system was adopted by the Spaniards during the War of Reconquest, and was used in their first experiment at colonization in the Canary Islands in 1475. From the Canaries their ships sailed across the Atlantic to America, the islands serving as a supply center of soldiers and farmers for the new lands, as well as for the colonization of Santo Domingo in 1496.

By royal decree the Indian was to be considered a free person and respected as such; as has so often happened throughout history, however, passion proved stronger than right. Lust for wealth and the prejudice of racial superiority led the settler to judge the native as pagan, irrational, and barbarian. The colonist used the royal order in Puerto Rico, as had been done in the Canaries and in Santo Domingo, to separate the Indian from his natural environment. Forced to labor beyond his physical strength, ill-fed, ill-clothed, ill-housed, deprived of his wife and children, the native population was subject to countless abuses, injuries, and mistreatment. Unwilling to sacrifice his birthright, the Indian turned to warfare in an attempt to preserve his rightful culture.

The battle proved bloody and harsh; the Indian, despite his intimate knowledge of the territory, his numerical superiority, and other resources, was overpowered by his enemy's use of more advanced weaponry, including the sword, armor, the lance and pick, the round shield and knife, and the harquebuse, as well as the horse and the dog. The decisive factor was the Spaniard's military experience derived from his campaigns in the peninsula, the Canaries, and Santo Domingo. The Indian was thus defeated, and driven to seek shelter in the heart of the island's forests, a traditional habitat and refuge since the beginning of man.

> In the forest expanse [writes Schwidetezky] primitive tribes found refuge when displaced from better regions. The forest, particularly in the tropics, offers means of survival, especially to small groups with few demands. Its density is an obstacle for those who try to go through it, but it is also a barrier against pursuers, who would have the advantage on clear territory.[1]

But the tropical forest of Puerto Rico, given its small proportions, offered the Indian only partial protection. Deprived of an easier means of subsistence and in the face of urgent needs which he could not satisfy, the Indian was constantly forced into poorer regions, pur-

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NOTE.—Footnotes follow at end of study, p. 46.

sued by the conquerors. The King decreed the death penalty for the principal Indian rebels; Ponce de León ordered that the captured fugitives be made slaves, branded on the forehead with an "F" and sold to the highest bidder. Caught in a cycle of persecution and punishment, the Indian sought an escape from a life that had become a living hell. Many left the island; others resorted to suicide.

The triumph of the conquerors destroyed the political and social organization of the Indian, putting an end to the development of the Indian state. Notwithstanding, the Indian population did not disappear. On the contrary, many factions resigned themselves to a life of submission or scattered throughout the island, thus preserving the purity of Indian blood until the beginning of the 19th century.

Dissatisfied with Indian labor, the conquerors sought the solution in Africa for their colonial enterprise.

> It all seemed to indicate that nature had decreed the destiny of Africa to be that of submission to other continents. Separated from Europe by the vast Sahara, the great mass of Africa remained for centuries isolated from the natural course of history. Its inhospitable coasts and the absence of ports, the cataracts of its great rivers and its deadly tropical climate made exploration difficult and unattractive. And if, according to an ancient legend, in some corner of its dark interior were to be found limitless treasures, the difficulty in reaching them and developing trade in an impenetrable country with a primitive population repelled the European trade pioneers. To them, Africa was little more than a gigantic obstacle on the way to Asia.

Nevertheless the need for labor in order to exploit the potential wealth of the New World could not be ignored. Such labor was lacking in America. The Indians in the north were not ready to exchange their buffalo hunts for agricultural pursuits; the weaker southern Indians were unsuitable for hard labor.

> The same Portuguese tradesmen who had found something besides gold in Africa thought of an answer to the labor problem. The initial shipment to Lisbon organized by the first European company for the exploitation of western Africa consisted of 200 black slaves; if the Negroes could work in Portugal, they could also work in Brazil. Simpleminded and childlike creatures, hot-blooded but docile under the lash, adapted to the tropical heat, strong and coarse, the African slaves seemed created especially to meet the needs of the colonial planters, and it was neither difficult nor dangerous to obtain them. In fact, a slave could be more easily acquired and with greater profit than gold or ivory.
>
> Thus, the dilemma was rapidly solved, as men, women and children of western Africa were transported across the ocean by the thousands and hundreds of thousands. It may well be said that the life of America was saved by virtue of a blood transfusion from Africa.[2]

The employment of slaves was certainly no novelty to the conquerors who, in order to supply labor to landowners of Andalucía and the southern part of the peninsula, had been importing black slaves from

Africa since the middle of the 15th century. Soon afterwards they were taken to the Canaries, and in 1503 black slavery was introduced in Santo Domingo. No sooner had the colonization enterprise begun in Puerto Rico than it, too, became a destination for slave labor.

Nor did the African resign himself to the loss of his freedom and heritage; the result was rebellion in defense of his rights. In the face of defeat, he too sought refuge in the forest, uniting with Indian fugitives to establish "palenques" or protection quarters which soon became centers of miscegenation or ethnomorphosis. Nevertheless, under the constant pressure of persecution and hostility, the African's fate, like that of the Indian, was to unite with the conqueror. The latter, following the path of least resistance, continued his settlement of the lowlands, the starting point from whence he gained gradual access to the entire island.

In the beginning most of the conquerors, headed by the military and the bureaucrats, paid scant attention to the cultivation of the land, as the extraction of gold was considered to be the quickest means of gaining wealth. Throughout the island, north and south, emphasis was placed on the mining of precious metal, the brunt of hard labor falling upon the Indian and the Negro.

The tillers of the land faced greater difficulties and hardships. They not only had to redeem the land from the dense and exuberant forest in order that the soil might be made productive, but they had to plant and sow, a difficult and complicated task inasmuch as they lacked knowledge and experience as to what to plant in order to obtain a good yield—an adventure and an unpredictable risk for these pioneers. The magnitude of the hardships and disappointments of the early farmers can be appreciated, given a decree of 1513 by which they were ordered to plant four trees of each variety of pomegranates, pears, apples, peaches, apricots, walnuts, and chestnuts within a period of 2 years. The failures must have been numerous; on frequent occasions, their reserve provisions exhausted, both farmer and miner were pressed to seek from the Indians the means of subsistence, until the arrival of ships with additional supplies of food and merchandise.

All in all, such experiences did not prove fruitless. Spurred on by necessity, profiting from the experiments carried out at the Granja Agrícola in the lowlands of the Toa, and from an exchange of experiences with Indians and Africans, the farmer gained intimate knowledge of insular fauna and of the land, enabling him to grow different fruits from seeds which were brought from abroad, principally from Santo Domingo—an experimental station of plants and animals from Spain and other lands since the time of Ovando.

Commerce was developed by several individuals closely related to high officials in the peninsula, who became agents or representatives of the Spanish producers and who, in order to counteract the risks involved in the unlimited power of the Governor, obtained, in exchange for their support of the latter, personal immunity as well as protection for the wealth they had managed to amass.

In time, however, mineral production began to decline. Between 1528 and 1530, profits in mining virtually disappeared, creating a crisis in the economic structure which had been based on the mining industry of the colony. The great disappointment of the goldseekers was matched by that of those who had come dreaming of the conquest of treasure-laden cities and of fabulous wealth from ransom payments of infidel captives. Discouraged by a picture of reality so different from their expectations, many began the exodus to Peru, seeking the dazzling opulence of El Dorado.

In the face of the desperate situation which had placed the colony in imminent danger of being wiped out, Governors don Antonio de la Gama and don Francisco Manuel de Lando were persuaded by the King to confront the crisis by substituting a new agricultural base for the bankrupt mineral economy—a process full of alternatives and fluctuations which reflected the changes and transformation of the colonial policy of the metropolis.

By the end of the 18th century the colonial rule of Puerto Rico was of an administrative type, forged in the fire of the mercantile system and based upon the Code of the Laws of the Indies (1691), the greater part of its provisions dating from the time of Phillip III, and from the revised code of Spanish law (1795), a legal document which consecrated royal absolutism in its most unfavorable form. Their political significance was reflected in the strict supervision exerted by the Crown in all matters pertaining to the colony, and the centralization of power under its representatives, particularly the military.

Within such a system, all power rested with the Governor who, under the provisions of book III of the "Laws of the Indies," was virtually omnipotent. He was in charge of promulgating decrees and insuring execution of the law, thus exerting both executive and legislative authority; as military captain he was head of the army and navy; as intendent he was at the head of Treasury affairs; as Supreme Judge he took part in the administration of justice; as Royal Vicepatron he participated in the administration of the church, thus exercising ecclesiastical authority. The colonists, on the other hand, had no representative at the metropolitan center. They even lacked freedom of movement from town to town, permission being required from municipal authorities until the mid-19th century. They did not participate in the enactment of laws nor did they have a representative organ which could control the Governor's excesses. An obvious need of such a system was for the helm of the colonial ship to be in the hands of men of superior talent and motivation. But nature is not overly lavish in providing such individuals, nor is military service the best school in which to learn civil administration. Time and time again the colony bore witness to the fact that those accustomed to arbitrary military power and to implicit obedience[3] imperiled the most elementary forms of good government.

The existing economic regime, inspired by a mercantile system which held the colony to be a mere dependency or factory which the metropolis would operate to its own advantage, was no more advantageous to the island than the political structure was advantageous to the individual. Under such a system, the islanders could do very little to influence either the causes or effects of economic depressions. Given the commercial theory that the chief wealth of a country is a favorable balance of trade, commerce became a monopoly of Spain, the Crown maintaining exclusive rights to the import needs of the colony as well as rigorous control, to the extreme of limiting the traffic lane with the peninsula first to Seville and then to Cádiz, and on the island, to the port of San Juan. At this rate insular production was frequently subject to heavy charges and strong restrictions, giving the colony a "sui generis" status of foreign territory with respect to the metropolis. Such trade never reached extraordinary proportions, but the profits principally benefited the Spanish producers and their agents in the island, which in turn constituted a group capable of exerting vast influence. Inasmuch as local agriculture and industry could supply only a small part of local needs, the island had to import clothing, tools, agricultural implements, paper, flour, oil, and the thousand and one indispensable articles needed for subsistence.

Commerce began to develop with foreign countries, however, after having been prohibited for almost three centuries. This development was possible because of certain provisions which the metropolis was forced to adopt in response to pressing circumstances, such as the ordinance of 1778 by which Spain granted authorization to neutral nations to trade with its colonies for the duration of the war with England. Similar provisions included the Royal Decree of November 18, 1797, which opened colonial markets to foreign traffic while the new war with England lasted, in order to counteract the isolation of the colonies created by the English naval power; the Royal Decree of 1801, instituting a system of special licenses providing access to Spanish colonial ports; and the Royal Decree of 1804 reestablishing commerce with neutrals as a result of the new war between England and France. The United States came to be the main beneficiary under this system. From mid-November 1796, to mid-July 1801, 15 North American ships gained admittance to San Juan, and 14 more were admitted in the brief 3½-month span immediately following. In 1807, 18 ships arrived at the port of Philadelphia from Puerto Rico.

Agriculture, in spite of the high fertility of the soil and the importance of the island, the possession of which—according to Raynal—would have enhanced the fortune of an active nation,[4] was in a sad state, its productive capacity held back by numerous restrictions and prohibitions, such as those imposed upon ginger (1602–03), on wheat and tobacco (1614) and by an avalanche of various duties. Under such conditions the only industry that had gained some stature besides coffee was sugarcane, which had begun to develop shortly after the destruction and ruin in the Haitian Colony of Guarico.

Such events brought old demands to the surface. In Puerto Rico and the other West Indies colonies, interest became manifest in the development of sugar production for the purpose of replacing Guarico. The rise in the price of sugar from 4 to 25 silver coins per unit was an attractive incentive in addition to exchange benefits with the countries which had been supplied by Guarico. The United States, in particular, was seeking new sources of supply of tropical fruits, given her own lack of colonies and her exclusion from the markets in the British colonial empire. The farmers and landowners of Puerto Rico took advantage of the circumstances under the license system to deal with those foreigners authorized by the Governors. In 1803, Puerto Rican sugar exports to the United States reached a total of 263,200 pounds valued at $15,790.

The industrial field, however, was limited to the manufacture of sugar. The balance of the industries of the island consisted of some small factories for the manufacture of straw articles, pottery, woodwork, saddle and leather implements, wax candles, tanned leather, tobacco, and snuff. The metropolis, through the protection of its national industries, the stabilization of salaries in the peninsula and the monopoly on consumption, restricted the industrial expansion of the island, the latter suffering from the vagaries of legislation passed without its participation. Restrictions fell on the most promising industries—such as sugar, which, since 1544 had been subject to burdensome taxes. Rum also was affected and on occasion prohibited, an industry which, if freely developed, according to Father Abbad,[5] would be sufficient for the welfare of the island, despite such heavy taxation as Spain might choose to impose. But this industry languished because of the heavy tax on extraction and distillation, making it impossible for the island to compete with the imported wines, even in her own domestic market. The cattle industry, which had enjoyed periods of delayed prosperity, was in a precarious situation due to the tax of forced supply.

The condition of the public treasury, as a consequence of the restricted growth of productive resources, was lamentable. Inasmuch as the value of insular production amounted to only $70,000 per year, the treasury had a continuous deficit which, with more or less regularity, was absorbed by the "Situado" fund established in 1582. The administrative apparatus was in a state of complete disorganization, and treasury business was being conducted with great irresponsibility. Employees remained at half pay for as long as 75 months. To ascertain the rate of production in each branch of industry was a major undertaking. Accounts were not settled; and in the rare case of a settlement, the purpose was more likely that of covering up the evidence of waste rather than of direct payment. Bankruptcy was frequent, and many items paid were not entered in the books.

A result of such administration was a widespread lack of public works and services. The roads on the island—affirmed a contemporary of the time—were so rough, swampy, narrow, and dangerous that they seemed more fit for birds than for men.[6] Sanitation services were very deficient; public cultural institutions were few. In 1797, according to the illustrious botanist Pierre Ledrú and confirmed by Bishop Juan Bautista Zengotita, 70 percent of the population was illiterate as a result of the scarcity of schools. In 1805, Governor Montes complained of the lack of elementary schools, and hence the sorrowful neglect of the education of the island's youth.[7] In San Juan, in 1808, in spite of its being the capital, there were only two local government-operated elementary schools along with a few privately run schools.

Secondary education was in the hands of the convents of Santo Domingo and San Francisco in San Juan, and higher education was limited to the College and Culture Center of Santo Tomás within the Convent of Santo Domingo, where philosophy and theology courses were accredited in Spain by Royal Decree as of August 24, 1788. But as the latter had academic value for ecclesiastic students only, the majority of the island's youth had to study in Spain, Santo Domingo, Mexico, and Venezuela.

The tax system was a labyrinth of confusion because of the multiplicity of taxes as well as the lack of proportionality in distribution. The administration of justice in the interior depended upon so-called lieutenants of war, a kind of inferior judge appointed by the Governor, generally having scanty educational or judicial background; judicial appeals belonged within the jurisdiction of the "Audiencia" of Cuba, thus constituting an expensive, slow, and deficient system.

The saddest picture presented by the island was its social order. Puerto Rico at this time had a population of 158,000 inhabitants—less than 3 persons per square league. But as a result of existing conditions, the greater part of the population struggled under the weight of an environment whose possibilities for progress and incentives for achievement were severely restricted. The apex of the social order was dominated by a small group of privileged individuals who, due largely to their Spanish origin, held public office and were adept at taking advantage of the meager reality of the colony. The initial advantages of this merchant community were enhanced through the cooperation proffered by the colonial bureaucratic element. With the incorporation of wealthier and more cultured members, the organization perfected itself until it became a closed circle representing stability and prominence; no longer satisfied with mere protection of wealth and property, they sought to influence and to participate in public affairs in exchange for their support of the colonial regime, representing a necessary factor in the maintenance of the Governor's authority.

In this way, the monopoly of a group of Spaniards, most of whom were Catalans, became a source of political power. According to Governor Meléndez Bruna, the only effective counterweight to such a corporation would be a similar one composed of native merchants and laborers with equal resources. The Puerto Ricans, however, seldom dedicated themselves to this type of enterprise due to a lack of funds. Thus the money of the Spanish corporation did not circulate beyond commercial circles, controlled by those who neither worked the land, nor established haciendas, nor married on the island.[8] For those individuals, as with the first seekers of gold, the main goal was profit and power. Thus monopolized business became an artificial and antisocial process, and according to Mumford, as such activity becomes the very center of life and the exclusive instrument of utility and power, the hierarchy of human values becomes perverted and displaced.

At the base of the social pyramid were the great masses of people, composed of the native-born Puerto Ricans and subdivided into two levels: that of the well-to-do and that of the poor. On the first level were the landowners and the professionals, as well as the small farmers, cattleowners, industrialists, and native merchants. On the second was the vast proletariat, largely composed of free agricultural workers who had suffered multiple hardships since the beginning of the colonial experiment.

About mid-16th century, with mining exhausted and migration increasing in the direction of the continent, the population of Puerto Rico had decreased rapidly. Meanwhile herds of wild cattle had multiplied in the fertile zone of the island. Such potential wealth quickened the interest of the "criollo" who, with no fixed occupation, lived impoverished in the interior of the island. Pressed by necessity, he dedicated himself to the arduous task of rounding up the cattle, which were destined to supply the local leather market. Under such difficult conditions, the country dweller came to appreciate good horsemanship, canine companionship, and lastly, the versatility of the machete, which was essential not only in terms of daily survival and the protection of his private interests, but as a deadly weapon in the defense of the island against foreign invasion. Thus, they fought on an equal footing against the French, the English, and the Dutch, cooperating with the Spanish authorities or under the leadership of fellow countrymen such as don Juan de Amézquita Quijano and don António de los Reyes Correa, who distinguished themselves in combat for their bravery and courage.

However, with the appearance of new settlements and the establishment of land rights, the scope of action of these farmer groups became increasingly limited. Vigilante forces put an end to their restless wandering, dispersing them throughout the countryside, until either through generosity or convenience, the landowners would offer a subsistence return in exchange for working the land. The result was the loss of those qualities basic to their formerly independent existence as they settled into a state of dependency as tenants on the land of another.

Finally, on the last rung of the social ladder was the African slave, who, whether in the settlement or in the field, was used for every task.

This division of insular society, in evidence since the beginning, was discussed in a letter by attorney don Miguel de Zuazo addressed to Monsieur Xèvres on January 22, 1518.

> * * * and in order to protect their interests in the West Indies those landowners in a position of authority entrusted their plantations to the treasurer Pasamonte; the latter handled things on his own, since to address himself to your Highness meant that such affairs would be taken care of by Conchillos, for whom he had little use. This kind of partiality created a schism on the island and in other provinces; those who supported the treasurer were termed loyal and those who were servants or close to Columbus were considered disloyal. Such terminology was the basis for taking Indians away from whoever had them, resulting in a redistribution among the cities and haciendas, which today are largely owned by single individuals.

Examining this letter much later, don Francisco Cepeda Taborcías commented:

> The loyalists, then, were those who wanted to distribute Indians and "*encomiendas*" at will; those who wanted everything done according to the pattern traced by Columbus and Queen Elizabeth were considered disloyal.
>
> Those gentlemen who were undermining the interests of Spain by calling themselves loyalists did as they pleased, since they could count on the support of the island's authorities; and in cases where complaints about their behavior reached the throne, they defended themselves with the argument that all acts were performed in defense of His Highness' interests:
>
> *Your magnanimous lordship may see the services which these judges and treasurer and officials have performed; the basic division reflects, as I have mentioned above, the issues of loyalty and disloyalty * * *.*

Such a regime was founded on fear and deep distrust; an effective spy system was the means used to keep the balance. The Viceroy spied upon the Audiencia; the Audiencia, which included among its duties direct contact with the council of the Indies, spied in turn on the Viceroy; the latter spied upon the local mayors or native chiefs; the Spaniard spied on the criollo, the Negro spied on the Indian, the civil authorities on the ecclesiastic, and the Bishop on both Viceroy and the Audiencia. And above them all loomed the inquisition, extending its network to include all levels of government and private life.

As for the criollos, Cepeda added, who were considered to be inferior to the Spaniards, the supreme authority kept its iron fist ready to crush the least sign of protest. The initiative of the government could not be extended to allow freedom of public expression and action, but was tied to the policy of Phillip II, based on the philosophy that time resolves all issues.

If the so-called loyalists were chiefly concerned with enhancing their individual interests while maintaining themselves aloof from involvement or identification with the island, such was not the case with those who were ironically labeled as disloyal.

Bound to the land by virtue of their labor and hopeful of reaping the fruit of their efforts, the latter felt a strong desire to possess the land, accepting the responsibility for its improvement. This, then, served from the early period as the basis for the creation of a collective society.

The effort of improved transport and communication stimulated a sense of closeness among the island's inhabitants. The establishment of corporations, too, served to bring a civilizing influence to the hinterland of the island, underscoring the growing sense of solidarity and interdependence, reducing frictions and cementing ties among families.

Meanwhile, the wealth of experiences acquired in a common setting was the basis for an awareness of aspirations shared by the criollo element and molded by an intellectual elite whose acquaintance with Western thought and ideals stemmed from direct contact with Spain, and was stimulated by students who had returned to the island following their study abroad, as well as via the medium of commerce.

The result of three centuries came to be reflected in the creation of a criollo physiognomy. The fundamental elements which had contributed to its formation, such as race, language, customs, norms of conduct, and ideas, were of noble Hispanic stock. But if the process of intermarriage which had taken place on the island had resulted in the loss by the Indian and the African of some of their unique characteristics, they nevertheless exerted a decisive and permanent influence in the outlining of the collective Puerto Rican personality. In fact, it was precisely this tendency toward interchange and cooperation among groups of different racial backgrounds which served to integrate the community as a whole, incorporating characteristics and contributions from each group.

A number of scholars have maintained the thesis that sociologically, the Puerto Rican people are the product of the Hispanic, the Indian, and the Negro races. These scholars include don José Pablo Morales Miranda, don Francisco del Valle Atiles, don Salvador Brau Asencio, don Ramón Ruíz Arnau, don Augustín Nevarrete, and Mr. Trumbull White. Don José de Diego shared the same point of view, maintaining that a visit to the mountainous zone is sufficient evidence of the strong Indian influence in Puerto Rico.[9]

If the criollo society was not conscious of itself by the end of the 18th century, it was not long before a succession of important events served to awaken a sense of identity.

With the invasion of the peninsula by Napoleon Bonaparte, the Spanish people, following the heroic example set in Madrid on May 2, 1808, launched the struggle to redeem national independence. Memorable for its spontaneity, given the profound patriotic feeling of the Spanish people as the determining factor, the war of independence soon became the vehicle for a powerful political reform movement directed against the inveterate abuses of an absolute monarchy, as well as a struggle against the foreign invasion.

According to one eminent Spanish historian, the thought of political reform was inspired by a series of considerations, among them: the reorganization of the war and the small triumphs of the Spaniards; the concept of a political constitution, and the crucial importance of the involvement of the entire nation in the struggle to assure that once independence had been won, there would be popular demand for changes in the policies governing the franchise and individual rights.[10] If indeed the heroism and sacrifices of the Spanish people were not to be lost, the leaders of the national movement realized that such a national effort demanded reforms as an integral part of independence. To attain their goals, the Spanish nation spared no effort, taxing their resources to the limit. But the harsh realities of the struggle against such an experienced adversary forced Spain to look to the American Colonies for assistance. It was not long before the New World began to feel the powerful impact of events on the Spanish peninsula.

Puerto Rico's initial involvement in the peninsular crisis occurred with the arrival on July 24, 1808, of sloop-of-war *Intrepida*, bringing Captains Manuel Francisco Jáuregui and Juan Jabat to the port of San Juan as representatives of the Junta of Seville, the first of the provincial Spanish juntas to declare war against Napoleon and to raise the banner of political reform. Delivering various official dispatches to Governor Montes, the two commissioners gave notice of the events on the peninsula, requesting Montes' personal intercession in order to obtain economic aid from the islanders in the cause of the mother country. The result of the Governor's enthusiastic response came the following day, as the declaration of war against Napoleon by the Junta of Seville was proclaimed throughout the city. A solemn oath of allegiance to Ferdinand VII was made, and in a special appearance by the Governor and the two commissioners in the central square, the people were exhorted to lend their support to the Spanish cause. The pronouncement was followed by cheers, cannon volleys, and the peal of church bells as the island prepared to join the effort for Spanish independence.

The end of August 1808, witnessed the arrival of the Marquis of the Royal Treasury in San Juan, who, having requested financial assistance once again, proceeded to describe the events and decisions which had led to the Spanish resistance to Bonaparte, the ensuing struggle in defense of King and honor, and the advantages gained in Zaragoza, Valencia, and Bailen; the news was published immediately in a special edition of the Gaceta de Puerto Rico at the request of the Governor and was circulated profusely throughout the island.

Shortly thereafter the various provincial juntas were replaced by a Supreme Council or Junta of Spain and the Indies, and in January 1809, in recognition of their support and assistance, the colonies were declared to be an integral part of the Spanish monarchy, with the right of representation in the Supreme Council.

This decree, expression of the reformist tendency embraced by the leaders of the war of independence, reflected the generous modifications of the traditional concept of colonial rights, praised in England by Bacon, Smith, Wilberforce, and Fox; in France by Montesquieu and Rousseau; in Holland by Dirk van Hagendrop; and in Spain herself by the Count Aranda, the Marquis of Sonora, don Bernardo Ward, and don Gaspar Melchor de Jovellanos. It was this line of thinking which marked the passing of the ancient colonial system of the administrative type, by which the colony was run for the benefit of the metropolis, and its replacement by a new system of assimilation, by which the colony was to become an integral part of the metropolis, operating within a juridical framework which would insure direct participation of the colony in the central government.

Under the circumstances it was no wonder that the great majority of the islanders as well as some of the more generous Spaniards received the 1807 decree with such enthusiasm. The clear-cut imbalance between harsh reality and the concessions and promises formulated by the Supreme Junta, as well as the psychological tendency already at work in Puerto Rico to seek higher goals of culture and progress, were sufficient to stimulate the island to immediate action. The hope was that the new Spanish policy was directed toward establishing justice as well as the recognition of equal rights in both colony and metropolis, and equal participation in the government of the island.

At the end of April 1809, Governor Montes released an extensive memorandum discussing the contents of the decree and exhorting the five municipal governments—San Juan, San Germán, Aguada, Arecibo, and Coamo—to fulfill their responsibilities, including that of electing an island representative to the Supreme Council. In the election held the following June, don Ramón Power Giral, a liberal, was the victor. A Puerto Rican soldier who was born in San Juan in 1775, had studied in France and Spain, and traveled extensively throughout America, Power's reformist ideas were well known.

At the time of his election, Power Giral was in Santo Domingo, fighting in the war between the Spanish and the French. He was immediately recalled to Puerto Rico by the new Governor, Meléndez Bruna, who, despite his own conviction that the attainment of distinction by criollo leaders was a potential threat to the Crown, congratulated the young Power on his fine qualities which would serve him well in his new position.

The victory of Palo Hincado was still fresh when Power Giral returned to San Juan; his reception by both the people and the authorities was that accorded a true leader. "Hymns, feasts, arches of triumph, and allegorical and commemorative paintings," says a contemporary, "were an expression of the general rejoicing." [11]

Power responded warmly to such manifestations. He was invited to a meeting in La Fortaleza and attended a session of the municipal government during which he was accorded an official title. A short time later, in return for a farewell visit to the Council of Ecclesiastics at San Juan, a public ceremony was offered in his honor. For Power, it was an opportunity to express his determination to represent the interests and welfare of the island, and attitude which received full support and encouragement from Bishop Arizmendi, the first native-born clergyman to occupy the bishopric of Puerto Rico. [12] It was this ceremony, attended by leading figures of both Spanish and local origin, which represented the awakening consciousness of a Puerto Rican identity, a unique society born of three centuries of a common insular existence. It was at this time that Puerto Rico could no longer be considered a mere collection of ethnographic elements and began to manifest traits of social coherence. The pronoun "we" acquired a national sense throughout the island, that spirit of unity being manifested which is termed by Montesquieu l'esprit de nation. (Ranke calls it, "a spiritual breeze which airs everything." Stuart Mill calls it, "mutual sympathy." Gidding calls it, "conscience of affinity." Gumplowiec calls it, "syngenism." Sumner calls it, "ethno centrism." Pareto calls it, "persistence of unity." Mosca calls it, "national cult." Pillburg calls it, "conscience of unity." Kohn calls it, "the will of a living and active corporation." Cooley calls it, "us-sense." Brinton calls it, "territorial grouping." Geyl calls it, "a sense of belonging together.") When calling oneself and feeling oneself Puerto Rican takes shape as a sense of being a people, we become conscious of a common history, and the cult of the native land acquires a broad reach and finds many deeply felt expressions.

It is this devotion to the cause of "Puerto Ricanness" that in 1810 spurred don Pedro Irazarri, as it spurred Power and Arizmendi before, to call Puerto Rico the "beloved fatherland" and to hold it to be a sacred duty of the Puerto Rican to labor for its good and its happiness. It is this devotion which in 1814 moved the Reverend Father don José Antonio Bonilla to state, "My design is to serve my fellowmen, the Puerto Ricans." It is this devotion which in 1822 impelled don José Andino Amezquita to request the voting citizens to support Puerto Rican candidates. It is this which, at the same time, led some native writers to sign their works with such pseudonyms as, "A Son of the Country" and "The Puerto Rican," and others to direct their writings to "the Puerto Rican people" and to "my Puerto Rican compatriots."

It is this which inspired the lawyer, don Juan Mauricio Ramos, when, upon presenting a petition to be given a copy of the Act of Beatification of St. Rose of Lima, justified his interest by adding that each aspires to praise his country and has a contracted obligation with the land that sheltered him at birth, to do it honor and to augment its achievements and greatness. It is this that moved doctor don Emigdio Antique when he offered to give a course in medicine in "the desire to be useful to my country." It is this that carried doña María Mercedes Barbudo, on the eve of political exile, to call Puerto Rico "the beloved country." And it is this which, during a reception feast celebrated at the Philharmonic Society, incited don Francisco Pastrana to greet the despotic Governor, General don Juan Prim, "on behalf of this land which proudly I call my Country * * *."

Henceforth, Puerto Ricans defined their country in terms of its geography. For don José Julián Acosta, don Manuel Corchado Juarbe, don José Ramón Freyre, don Francisco Mariano Quiñones, don Mario Braschi Rodríguez, and don Salvador Carbonell Toro, Puerto Rico was the native land, our country, the beloved countryland; for don Bonocio Tió Segarra, don Antonio Ruíz Quiñones, don Julio Vizcarrondo Coronado, don Luis Padial Viscarrondo, don José Facundo Cintrón, don Manuel María Sama, don José María Monge, and don Antonio Cortón Toro, the beloved native land, the beloved island, our Boricuan country. And, for don Román Baldorioty de

Castro, don Ramón Emeterio Betances, don Eugenio María de Hostos, don Salvador Brau Asencio, don Rosendo Matienzo Cintrón, don Mariano Abril Ostaló, don José de Diego, don Luís Muñoz Rivera, and many other representative personalities, Puerto Rico was the sacred native soil, the idolized country. Consequently, the personality or identity of Puerto Rico is recognized by natives and foreigners as a real and true entity.

In the light of an emerging self-consciousness, the relationship which was to prevail between Spain and Puerto Rico constituted an important topic of concern. According to a bill presented (and subsequently passed) in the Spanish Cortes in March 1823, by José María Quiñones of Puerto Rico, in conjunction with the Cuban representatives, recognition of the fundamental difference between metropolis and colony was seen as basic to the relationship. This concept was echoed in 1837 when don Augustín Arguelles noted that the physical, material, and ethical differences between Cuba and Puerto Rico on the one hand, and Spain, on the other, made a system of special laws necessary for the islands. According to don Manuel Corchado Juarbe, the Puerto Rican personality has its own unique characteristics, although a descendant of Spain. Don Cristóbal Martín de Herrera called attention to the fact that, in the economic as well as in the sociopolitical sphere, Puerto Rico represents certain conditions not found in the rest of the peninsula or in the outlying provinces. Don Manuel de Elbaburu pointed out the existence of a Puerto Rican race. José Martí, of Cuba, maintained that reality itself was the proof of a national soul. Don Práxedes Mateo Sagasta, a leader of the Spanish liberals, and don Buenaventura Abarzuza admitted that the Puerto Rican social complex differed in certain reports from that of the Spanish provinces. Muñoz Rivera and Salmeron Alonso were to refer to the Charter of Autonomy of 1897 as a further recognition of the juridical and social personality of Puerto Rico. Numerous others have distinguished the Puerto Rican personality from that of Spain, referring to the existence of a nation-soul as well as an individual and distinct society and race. Indeed the trajectory of 19th century thought and expression reflected an increasing tendency to see the island as a unique entity, possessing the fundamental characteristics of a nation.

Possessed of a common heritage and destiny, the Puerto Rican society set itself the task of developing, besides its laws and its economy, various cultural aspects which had not found the conditions necessary for their earlier development. As don Marvelino Menéndez y Pelayo indicates, "the arts of inspiration are delicate plants which rarely open their buds without the warmth of peace" and, as is pointed out by don José Carlos Mariátegui, "the culture of a people is nurtured and upheld by its own political and economic base;" [13] this peace and substratum were almost completely missing during that formative epoch.

Such efforts were to bear fruit, however, for the 19th century was to prove an era of profound changes and progress despite certain unfavorable circumstances. The Puerto Rican people achieved the development of a culture as the result of integrating a variety of necessities, as well as relationships, not only with Spain, but with other nations of Europe and America. Thus, did the island come to share in the great entity of Western culture without inhibiting a sense of regional awareness.

In effect, a Puerto Rican style of painting was articulated by such artists as Campeche, Cuchy, Marín, Oller, and Frades. Contributions to the art of music were to be found in every genre of composition from song to opera, and the danza criolla was a creative expression of the island itself. The masters of this art form included Gutiérrez Espinosa, Aranzamendi, Ramos, Morel Campos, Tavárez, Dueño, Balseiro, and Quintón. The literature of Puerto Rico covered a broad spectrum of genres, responding to the same tendencies which had stimulated the literature of Europe and America. Recognized by the outstanding Spanish critic at the turn of the century as a crystallization of an historic consciousness, the literary gallery is represented by such figures as Alonso Pacheco, Padilla, Sama, Gautier Benítez, Brau, Zeno Gandía, Cortón Toro, Bonafoux, and Muñoz Rivera.

Puerto Rican talent was evident, not only in the arts, but in the field of scientific research as well. In the mathematical sciences were such prestigious names as don Olimpo Otero Vergés and don Esteban Antonio Fuertes. The outstanding figures in the natural sciences included don Ramón Emeterio Betances, don Agustín Stahl, don Antonio, don Alberto Suárez de Mendoza, don Fermín Tanguis, and don José Ferrán. In the anthropological sciences important accomplishments were achieved by don Segundo Ruíz Belvis, don José Julián Acosta, don Salvador Brau Asencio, don Francisco del Valle Atiles, and don Cayetano Coll y Toste. Don Alejandro Tapia Rivera, don Eugenio María de Hostos, don Rafael López Landrón, and the priests don Manuel García, don Francisco Antonio Pimentel, and don Domingo Romeu Aguayo were distinguished men in the field of the philosophical sciences. In the applied sciences, and especially in such areas as chemistry, aerostatics, and surgery, outstanding contributors were don Baltasar Vigo, don Rodulfo Dávila Ramírez, don Eduardo Texidor, don Lorenzo Ramos, don Juan Francisco Terreforte, don Isidro Padial, don José Avellaneda, don Nicolás Mulet, and don Emilio Cabrero.

In another realm, the organization of the liberal and separatist sectors, born under the influence of the Spanish Independence War and the Venezuelan struggle for emancipation, created within the Puerto Rican society the necessary instruments to give expression to its political, economic, and social aspirations.

The Puerto Rican liberal movement was comprised of two major phases: During the initial period of insular liberalism, from 1808 to 1823, the liberals championed the assimilation of Puerto Rico as a juridical equal of the peninsular provinces. It must be remembered that Spain herself was in a state of revolution, determined not only to defeat the expansionist ambitions of Napoleon Bonaparte, but to replace the old absolute monarchy with a liberal or constitutional monarchy, and that it had been the interim government of Spain, represented by the Supreme Council, which had proclaimed the decree of January 22, 1809, recognizing the colonies as an integral part of the Spanish monarchy with the right to representation in the council.

When the Supreme Council was replaced by the Regency Council, the latter hastened to reaffirm the colonial policy of its predecessor; in February 1810, a decree was promulgated which reiterated the status of Puerto Rico as a part of the monarchy, granting the island a representative with voice and vote in the Spanish Cortes, and recognizing its citizens as having the same rights as those of the peninsula.

The significance of such resolutions was not lost on the leaders of the incipient liberal sector, and the instructions given to Power Giral, the first elected deputy, were accompanied by a statement on the need for reform of the existing colonial regime, including a declaration of their aspirations and ideals.

On the political front, the liberals expressed their deep attachment to the Spanish nation. Nevertheless, speaking out with valiant integrity against the arbitrary and tyrannical system which prevailed in the island, they charged their deputy to demand its immediate reform; "a burden and an obstacle to progress, the chains must be broken—that is the law of humanity." Thus did the Puerto Ricans affirm their existence as free human beings, entitled to a life of reason and conscience. The leaders from San Germán went further, instructing Power to assert that, if as a result of the divine will the Supreme Council were to be destroyed and the peninsula lost to Bonaparte, Puerto Rico should be considered free to elect the means best suited to the preservation of peace and the Christian religion for the inhabitants of the island.

The liberals took this opportunity to state numerous recommendations in a variety of areas. In order to improve the intellectual environment of the island, Power Giral was requested to emphasize the development of public education and the establishment of a university of humanities and sciences, insofar as the education of youth was seen as the foundation on which the state is built. Public sanitation was also an issue at hand, and the establishment of hospitals and health centers were considered to be essential to the proper functioning of a civilized community. The creation of a school of mechanic arts with rehabilitation facilities for both sexes was suggested as one answer to the problem of delinquency, since preventive laws tend to be far more effective than penal ones. To foster internal communications and thereby overcome another major obstacle to the prosperity of the island, it was recommended that Power request construction of roads and bridges to replace the grossly unsatisfactory conditions for transport. To help raise the moral and material level of the workers as well as to create a useful class of workers, Power's instructions included a request for the division and distribution of untilled land belonging to the state, and the foundation of guilds with appropriate rules and statutes. In order to improve the administration of justice, popular election of the lieutenants of war and their seconds, the major sergeants, were to be requested instead of having them appointed by the Governor, as well as the separation of Puerto Rico from the jurisdiction of the Cuban "Audiencia" and its incorporation into that of Venezuela, given its proximity and accessibility.

In the case of agriculture, the principal source of income, it was Power's role to demand the abolition of the tax on forced supply of meats and to repeal the prohibition on the growing of wheat, as well as a reduction of various duties and the free importation of agricultural tools from abroad. On behalf of insular industry, he was to solicit the right to distill and export rum, in addition to a franchise for the island's commerce, freedom of trade with foreign nations for a period of 15 or 20 years, and the establishment of new ports. Freedom to export was seen as a means to protect the cattle industry, and a system of proportional taxation was added to the list as well. Finally, in order to break the tight circle which kept "criollos" from attaining official positions, Power was to defend the claim that native-born Puerto Ricans be given preference for public posts on the island. The foregoing reflects the impact of various sociopolitical ideas of liberal theologians and jurists in Spain during the preceding centuries, as well as the influence of the democrat chartists of North America and European reformers—an effective demonstration that the Enlightenment had not bypassed the current of island liberalism.

The political aspirations of the Puerto Rican liberals soon became a reality; on July 14, 1812, Governor Meléndez Bruna promulgated a circular by which he declared the Spanish National Constitution, approved by the Cortes on March 19, to be effective in Puerto Rico. According to the articles of this Constitution—the first of its kind to be approved in Spain, representing a victory of liberalism over absolutism—the island of Puerto Rico was declared to be an integral part of the monarchy. It granted Spanish citizenship to all white Puerto Ricans together with the right of inviolability of home, personal property, work, and welfare. It confirmed their right to name a deputy with voice and vote in the Cortes, the legislative power of the nation, by means of a process of universal indirect suffrage in which all citizens over 25 years of age might participate.

The Constitution also created a corporation, semirepresentative in origin and of an administrative character, which was called the provincial assembly, and was composed of nine members: two official members—the Governor, who acted as its president, and the intendent—in addition to seven land-holding members and three alternatives, chosen on an elective basis. It was the principal responsibility of this assembly to establish the basis for proportional taxation, to examine the accounts of the townships and regulate the investment of public funds, to propose public works, to protect the interests of welfare and religious institutions, and to promote agriculture, industry and commerce, as well as public education. As for everything else, on executive as well as administrative levels, the island of Puerto Rico was assimilated within the existing political framework of the Spanish peninsula, a process which was completed following the triumph of the Revolution of Riego in Spain in 1820.

A short time later, however, a radical change took place which marked the beginning of a new evolutionary phase in the course of Puerto Rican liberalism. On March 4, 1823, the deputy of Puerto Rico, Dr. don José María Quiñones, with Cuban support, presented for the consideration of the Cortes a bill relating to the economic and political government of the overseas provinces. The basis of this bill was, naturally, the Constitution of 1812, the suitability of which was unquestioned except in the areas with which the project itself dealt. Of greater significance, however, was the fact that this bill represented an attempt by the overseas provinces to amend the Spanish Constitution. In reality, what it proposed was a new Constitution, for if the original remained unchanged with reference to the political organization which assured the island's inhabitants their individual rights, such was not the case with respect to the administrative order.

Basically, the bill was concerned with the governorship, the town governments, and the provincial assembly. According to its terms, the Governor had the power to assure public tranquillity; to protect individuals and property; to execute the laws, decrees, and orders of the Cortes and of the government; to preside, with a vote, over the provincial assembly and, with no voting privileges, over the municipal governments; to resolve the problems and questions relating to the municipalities whenever the provincial assembly was not in session; to suspend employment and salary payments to all public servants, except for the judgeships; to impose fines up to 500 pesos as a penalty for disobedience to his authority; to give final approval to municipal budgets; and to propose to the national government whatever amount it deemed necessary for the development of agriculture, industry, commerce, and other aspects of island affairs. In addition, he was empowered to appoint a secretary as well as those official assistants considered necessary for the proper dispatch of public business. However, the number and salaries of these employees were to be determined by the national government, based on a proposal made by the Governor and the provincial assembly, whose consultation he also needed in order to appoint interim judges or to suspend any law, decree, or order of the national government.

The townships, for their part, enjoyed a large measure of independence in the management of local affairs, under close supervision of the provincial assembly. The latter, which was the central organ of the bill, was authorized to revise the accounts of the townships; to supervise public works; to impose fines on those townships which had neglected their obligations; to take the census and prepare local statistics; and to regulate welfare and religious organizations. Other responsibilities included the organization of the militia; the sale, exchange, or transfer of municipal properties; the parceling out of uncultivated public lands in the creation of small privately owned holdings; overseeing the use of funds for municipal elections; the presentation of a list from which to select interim judges; acceptance or rejection of the suspension of any law, decree, or provision or of any official which had been decreed by the Governor; proposal of funds for the construction of public works; drawing up of the budget for the province and for the assembly itself; the promotion of public education; representing the King and Cortes; and, finally, the formulation of certain responsibilities for the Governor.

Just as the decree of the Supreme Council of January 22, 1809, had marked the transition from a colonial system of an administrative nature to that assimilation, so the Quiñones-Varela proposal marked the transition from a system of assimilation to one of autonomy. "In this proposal," according to don José María Chacón y Calvo, "a basic principle in the concept of autonomy was established: the fundamental difference between Cuba (and Puerto Rico) with respect to the metropolis as well as the consequences of that difference."[14]

The authors themselves defined the aims of the proposal in clear and categorical terms. "It is undeniable," they asserted, "that nature herself, having caused the separation of the two hemispheres, has hindered the fortune of those inhabitants (of the Antilles) and created obstacles to a political union; such barriers can be removed only by entrusting the implementation of the laws to those who, whether through birth or adoption, have identified their welfare with that of the country."[15]

The intellectual antecedents of this proposal are to be found in a variety of settings: Montesquieu's theory, for example, that laws should originate in the country where they are to be enacted, thus relating to the topography, the climate, and the society; the proposal presented before the Continental Congress of 1773 by Joseph Calloway, establishing an imperial relationship with England while preserving specific political and administrative powers to the North American Colonies; the plan of don Antonio Nariño of Bogotá, for the organization of the continental Hispano-American colonies into autonomous entities under the Spanish flag; in Hegel's political philosophy; in the ideas of self-government put forward by Brougham and others in England. Other examples are furnished by jurisdiction enjoyed by the Province of Viscaya and extended to the other Basque Provinces in 1792; the proposal of constitutional law of 1783 for the Antilles drawn up by the Count of Aranda, whose essential formula could be summarized as political association and autonomous administration; in the autonomous state created in Haiti in 1790; in the Constitution of 1800 drawn up by Napoleon, according to which the colonies would be governed by special laws adapated to their particular conditions; in the proposal of 1810 for Cuban autonomy by don Francisco Arango Parreño; in that submitted in 1820 for the consideration of the Duke of Frías by don Francisco Antonio Geo, based on the theory that, through the attraction and concentration of Hispanic Americans to the metropolis, a strong federal empire would be created on the same principle as that on which the universe is built;[16] and finally, the proposal put before the Spanish Cortes in 1821 by the Mexican deputy don Francisco Fagoaga to divide the Spanish-American colonies into three autonomous provinces.

The Quiñones-Varela proposal corresponded to the prevailing tendency of the liberal school that, given the examples of the United States, France, and Spain, a constitution of fundamental laws comprised the essence of a rational system of government. Thus, the breakdown in identification between two totally different areas, the ineffectiveness of the reforms envisioned by the Constitution of 1812, the difficulties encountered in representation at the Cortes due to distance, and the desire to escape the vagaries of peninsular politics—these factors served to discourage the previous tendency toward assimilation and equalization of province and colony within the monarchy, and gave impetus to the theory which recognized autonomy as the vehicle for the affirmation of the Puerto Rican personality and the expression of a regional spirit.

The Overseas Commission considered and accepted the proposal, and with its approval by the Cortes in March 1823, the last hurdle appeared to have been overcome. The final decree necessary for the introduction of a charter of autonomy for Puerto Rico, however, was never promulgated. On April 7 of the following year the Duke of Angouleme invaded Spain, thus fulfilling the terms of an agreement signed in 1822 by the representatives of the Quadruple Alliance at the Congress of Verona with the secret consent of Ferdinand VII, the objective being the restoration of the absolute regime in Spain.

In spite of its fate, the Quiñones-Varela proposal was of exceptional importance. In contrast to the events leading to the decree of January 1809, Puerto Rican liberalism had taken the initiative in the determination of the course of island politics. This trend was reinforced when, in April 1837, the Spanish Cortes once again confirmed the doctrine accepted in 1823, that of extensive autonomy for colonial governments. Years later, on November 25, 1865, don Antonio Cánovas del Castillo, Overseas Minister in the O'Donell Cabinet, published a decree, requesting that the representatives of Puerto Rico and Cuba come to Madrid in order to propose to the government these special laws to which both islands were entitled under the Spanish Constitution.

The decision to explore insular conditions received a direct stimulus in a declaration made by general Francisco Serrano Dominguez on his return from Cuba, in which he emphasized the need for reform in the Spanish Antilles. The newspapers, too, played an important role. Demands for reform appeared in such papers as the Revista Hispano-Americana and La Patria in Spain; El Siglo in Cuba and El Fomento of Puerto Rico, written by distinguished intellectuals and politicians of both the peninsula and the Antilles.

The Commission sessions began toward the end of October 1866; the liberal commissioners from Puerto Rico, don José Julián Acosta, don Segundo Ruiz Belvis, and don Francisco Mariano Quiñones, proceeded to submit three reports. One dealt with the social question, petitioning immediate abolition of slavery with or without indemnization or work regulations. Another report on the economic question stated as one of the first objectives, trade between Puerto Rico and the peninsula, and free entry of foreign shipping to Puerto Rico. If granted, the commissioners proposed that a maximum of 6 percent of the net product of agricultural, commercial, and professional incomes be added to the system of direct taxation as a substitute for customs duties. Or, in the absence of free trade, the commissioners demanded reforms in the following areas: a substantial reduction of the tariffs as well as exemptions for the basic necessities, *primo in capite*, such as wheat and grain; equal navigation rights; the abolition of licensing and of all merchant privileges; greater freedom in the realms of load-ing and unloading of goods, and fishing and marine industry; the unlimited purchase and repairing of ships from abroad.

The third report dealt with the political question. Noting the special circumstances of the island, its distance from the peninsula, and the differences to be expected in its form of government, the report pointed out that the new order must be based on recognition of equal rights for Puerto Ricans as enumerated in the Spanish Constitution: inviolability of human dignity, of home and property, and freedom of expression and opinion, of assembly, of petition, and of labor. It went on to propose the bases for an autonomous form of government in Puerto Rico, following the general outline of the Quiñones-Varela proposal of 1823, and influenced by the principles which had formed the backbone of the political transformation of Canada since 1849 and were to achieve total acceptance in the British North America Act of 1867.[17] This trend was to continue practically unchanged, except for brief periods in 1870, 1873, and 1883 when the liberals were forced to accommodate their position to the assimilationist tendency proclaimed by the governments of the metropolis.

Toward the middle of February 1886, a group of noted leaders from the southern part of the island, concerned with the increasingly precarious situation of the liberal party, began to reorganize the liberal forces under the banner of autonomy with Baldorioty de Castro as their spokesman. The concept of autonomy was not new to Baldorioty. In 1869 he had favored autonomy of the Canadian type as a resolution of the colonial problem of Puerto Rico, advocating free trade and the abolition of slavery in accordance with the position taken by the Puerto Rican liberals on the Commission of Madrid. He wrote:

> In the question of the public interest as in an issue of private interests, compromises are frequently necessary. We seek solutions which are both practical and possible. However, we will never accept the colonial system, which places the province in humiliating conditions of inferiority in contrast with the harmony of equality enjoyed by other provinces of the nation; nor will we accept a system based on slavery, whether overt or veiled, nor one which can permit, as has been the case up to now, the ruinous abuses of an irresponsible administration.
>
> Such is and continues to be the colonial system which reigns in Puerto Rico; contrary to the true interests of the nation, this traditional regime represents blind opposition to cultural, economic and political progress of the island. We have protested against the colonial system and we will continue to do so, accepting as an honor the calumny and vicious rumors perpetrated against our cause.[18]

The following year, in 1870, Baldorioty again referred enthusiastically to the autonomous system of Canada as the definitive system of the future.[19] In 1881, having been pressed into service as the director of the newspaper La Crónica, Baldorioty began a formidable campaign which favored the formula which British wisdom had devised for Canada, and supported the efforts of the Cuban paper El Triunfo, an organ of the Cuban Autonomous Party.

Baldorioty pointed out after reproducing an article from El Triunfo:

> Insofar as we share the ideas presented in this article, we welcome it to our pages, while lamenting the censorship of this island which prohibits our wholehearted support of this editorial. For this daily from our sister island is one of the most out-spoken and determined apostles of the system of government by which Canada was able to achieve liberty without tears or bloodshed, giving England the unprecedented glory of having its American colony reject her offer of emancipation.[20]

Later, in a more concrete expression of his proposals, Baldorioty de Castro recommended the attainment of a type of self-government within which most of the vital elements of Puerto Rico might be incorporated with the greatest possible liberty. In the political sphere, this meant that the individual rights of man, characteristic of the liberal era, took highest priority. With reference to the island's economy and administration, Baldorioty favored extensive decentralization, a budget determined by the island, direct taxation, and complete freedom in the areas of commerce, of industry, and of education. The prevailing historical sense of national unity, according to Baldorioty, would constitute an effective limitation on the abuse of such rights.[21]

Baldorioty's campaign had an immediate impact on the liberals. Among the journalists to take up the banner of autonomy were don Luis R. Velázquez, editor of La Civilización of San Juan; don Bonocio Tió Segarra, editor of La Patria of Mayaguez; and don Hemeterio Colón Warrens, editor of La Abeja of Humacao. The liberal group from Ponce quickly called a meeting, resulting in a declaration in favor of autonomy and naming Baldorioty as honorary president. A similar meeting was held in Mayaguez which included such liberals as don Salvador Carbonell Toro, don Bartolomé Esteva, don Pedro M. Ruíz, don José Rivera Rodríguez, don Emilio Castro and don Manuel Pagan. In Cabo Rojo and throughout the island, demonstrations were held in favor of the liberal cause.

Opposition to Baldorioty's campaign took several forms. First there were those liberals who continued to uphold the concept of assimilation, such as Pablo Morales Miranda, who, under the pseudonym of "a liberal reformer," had a series of articles published in the Agente in support of assimilation as the liberal position, and recommending that the partisans of autonomy found their own party. A group of assimilationist liberals from Utuado shared a similar viewpoint. Baldorioty's convictions regarding autonomy also brought a rapid-fire reaction from conservative forces.

Don José Pérez Moris, editor of the Boletín Mercantil wrote:

> La Crónica is no longer talking about reform; it is singing the praises of the sainted autonomy of Canada, and identifying with the autonomist doctrines of El Triunfo and of Labra—in short, a partisan and defender of autonomy. Nevertheless, clarification of issues has strong merit, in that the parties in question may begin to act on the basis of their political positions. In other areas, however, it is a well-known fact that the Irish have been agitating for autonomy for more than a century, and England, aware of the feeble ties between itself and Canada, has denied a similar system to Ireland on the basis that Irish independence would follow immediately on the heels of autonomy.
>
> The democratic doctrines of liberty, of equality before the law, of inviolability of the home, and of tolerance, are very attractive, but down deep they represent a deceptive means of seducing the people. Serving to destroy the present system, they later may be used as a ladder to raise the so-called redeemers of oppression to the highest positions of power. The doctrine of democracy does not depend on right, but on might; not on law, but on the majority-of-one system of voting. It is possible that the destinies of nations be entrusted to unwitting votes of a multitude so blind that a socialist who offers its distribution of the lands of the rich has a greater impact than anyone else? Can a family exist with many members simultaneously in charge? Impossible. Just as there are specialists in the fields of oratory, literature, the arts, warfare, commerce, agriculture, and the sciences, are there not also those with a special aptitude for government? It is undeniable that unknown talents can direct the complicated mechanism of the administration of a people; the problem lies in the discovery of such men, and universal suffrage has a poor record on this score. The ability to understand the capacity of others at first sight is a divine gift granted to a privileged few. Democracy is the raw force of numbers substituted for that of justice. Was not Jesus Christ condemned by democratic acclaim?[22]

If the Boletín's editor did not begrudge Baldorioty an occasional word of praise, it was only as an introduction to such labels as idealist and quixotic, in an exhortation to the liberals to repudiate his doctrine.

Pérez Moris wrote—

> That the most advanced political principles of our era are being proclaimed in this country of ardent emotions and of diverse population, is a utopia which reflects far less maturity than that which we attribute to Mr. Baldorioty. It is very clear that he has not governed nor even touched, as indeed Castelar has, the realities of practical politics.
>
> We applaud, however, the frankness with which he again takes part in journalistic competition with a full-masted banner, the excellent style of his writing, the respect shown for ideas contrary to his own convictions; but we do not believe that what remains of the Reformist party, instructed by past experience, will follow along his dangerous and adventurous road.
>
> His program, undoubtedly written with sincerity and care, is that of an idealist living in the realm of fantasy, rather than of an individual dedicated to the realities of the troubled history of modern man. We are faced, then, with a Quixote of radical democracy, and it is our belief that the Puerto Rican liberals are sufficiently sensible not to follow don Baldorioty along such a precarious path.[23]

Such courtesies were merely a prelude. Two or three days afterwards, editor Pérez was requesting that the authorities suppress the writings of Baldorioty de Castro as an infringement of article 16, paragraph 4 of the printing law, attaching criminal status to any direct or indirect attack against the integrity of the country, its national unity or its basic institutions.[24]

Despite the attacks from the Boletín, Baldorioty did not cease his campaign, convinced that only a radical change of doctrine could give new life and cohesion to the dispersed liberal forces. The Boletín, a jealous defender of the vast power which conservatism had enjoyed since 1874, refused to remain on the sidelines. Alert to the possible gains to be obtained by a skillful application of the motto "divide and rule," El Boletín challenged Baldorioty on the similarities between his concept of autonomy and that which appeared in the Cuban paper El Triunfo entitled "Our Doctrine," on May 22, 1881, by don Antonio Gavin Torres.

> If this is the type of autonomy envisioned by La Crónica and its followers, if they aspire only to propose the general budget of the island with no executive voice, since the governor may or may not accept a project, we could achieve autonomy as defined by the Cubans by authorizing the Provincial Assembly of Puerto Rico to make up a budget proposal. But this in reality is not autonomy as enjoyed by Canada, so often spoken of in La Crónica, nor is it in any way similar to it.
>
> Again we inquire, [he concluded,] is it a different kind of autonomy which our adversaries claim? What kind of autonomy do the people here want?[25]

Baldorioty de Castro faced the issue squarely in a later edition of La Crónica, asserting that the type of autonomy he advocated was not that espoused by the Cubans, but that which the Canadians possessed. Baldorioty's formula thus represented an affirmation of the growing sense of a Puerto Rican identity, as well as a great step forward as regards the actual program of the Liberal party. In contesting the latter's proposed goal of assimilation, Baldorioty emphasized the desirability of autonomy, or decentralization, as the prime objective—in other words, the pursuit of local control in the areas of individual rights and economic and administrative affairs, within the overall framework of Spanish national unity. The result was a more advanced concept than either the Quiñones-Varela project of 1823 or the Ruíz Belvis-Quiñones-Acosta project of the Commission of 1867, reaching down to the very roots of the potential strength of the liberals on the island.

Nevertheless, the clear definition of the terms of his formula touched off a predictably intense resistance from the opposition. Among the opposition to a Canadian type of autonomy was don Manual Fernández Juncos, a leading figure who advocated support for the doctrine espoused in the aforementioned Cuban article "Our Doctrine," which had since been adopted as the program of the Cuban Autonomist Party.

> Our firm purpose is to strengthen the ties of nationality between this province and the rest of the provinces by means of assimilation or identity with fundamental laws and organs as well as political traditions; it is this message, these patriotic aspirations, which El Agente, as a Puerto Rican newspaper, desires to convey. As for the economic question, we advocate the greatest degree of decentralization possible within the framework of national unity.[26]

One of the earliest exponents of the above formula, favoring a mixture of administrative autonomy and political assimilation, was don Félix de Bona. In 1861, pointing out the political maturity of the Antilles, Bona wrote:

> Those who are concerned with the question of liberal reform of the overseas maritime policy are divided between those who favor special legislation and others who favor assimilation * * *. Nevertheless, let the partisans of special legislation not be surprised that I do not wish for Cuba and Puerto Rico that autonomy achieved by the English colonies. I am, I repeat, a Spaniard, who can no more desire separation from the Spanish provinces than a good brother can accept the thought of separation from his brothers.[27]

On another occasion, despite an admission that it was impossible to maintain two separate criteria for political and economic freedom, Bona advocated: "in the political realm, a concession of individual rights as found in title I of the Spanish Constitution of 1869; in the economic, the greatest possible municipal and provincial decentralization." [28]

Don José de Escoriaza Cardona, don Manuel Corchado Juarbe, and don Rafael María de Labra expressed similar ideas regarding potential harmony between assimilation and autonomy:

> The system of assimilation [Labra wrote] attempts to fuse the political and social elements of the colony and the metropolis, tending at the highest level to extend the concept of nationality, despite physical obstacles, great distances, character differences, and historical opposition. In order to achieve this end, however, individuality becomes the victim and centralization occurs, thus running the risk of becoming a suffocating tyranny.
>
> The system of colonial autonomy is born of the basic need to respect the individuality of the colony, while providing the latter with the spirit of the metropolis, and the energetic tutelage of a central power. It tends to harmonize, rather than fuse, the political and social elements of several areas. It is more sympathetic towards federation than towards the nationalism of the fifteenth century, and in the face of the aim it pursues, it runs the conscious risk of separation and anarchy.
>
> Assimilation is the vehicle by which all the institutions of the metropolis are brought to the colonies, bringing colonial representation and the metropolitan capital on an equal footing with the other provinces which constitute the nation. The assimilative process carries its demands to the point of putting administrative authority in the hands of men educated in Europe, and residing thousands of leagues away from the site and subjects of their administrative duties.

> Autonomy, having denied colonies the right to reform the general basis of national life, leaves them to themselves and their affairs, and authorizes them to create its legislatures and thus a true political movement, reserving supreme governing power to the Mother Country.

Pointing out that the Canadian solution was not included in his program as yet, Labra went on to define his position as favoring the mixed doctrine of political assimilation and of administrative autonomy. Other well-known insular politicians supported this view, including some who had initially responded to Baldorioty's campaign in La Crónica.

The Boletín Mercantil was delighted to indicate the state of disunity which had begun to prevail within the bosom of island liberalism.

> We were quite correct [its editor commented] in judging that these reformists who are not such close friends of don Baldorioty will continue to advocate administrative decentralization within a framework of national unity. It is this concept of autonomy which is espoused by El Triunfo, voice of the Cuban liberals, who are less demanding than the Puerto Ricans led by don Baldorioty.

Thus Pérez-Moris summed up the existing differences among the autonomists of the island—the reformers of the South requesting by means of La Crónica politico-administrative autonomy, and those of the North advocating political identity with the peninsula and administrative autonomy.

Nevertheless, conservative concern was not abated. Despite the doctrinaire character of the autonomist publicity, despite the fact that the Liberal Party had not yet undertaken any change in program, and notwithstanding its own declaration with respect to the Cuban formula, El Boletín launched an open attack on all partisans of autonomy, disregarding any differences in approach. The campaign launched by El Boletín challenged the legality of the autonomist doctrine, attacking autonomy as equal to independence, as disloyalty and treason, and as a sure path to the absorption of the Antilles by the United States, topping off the issue by asking that the government prohibit the autonomist campaign for support, and authorize the civil guard to reestablish order.

Such were the general circumstances when, with the completion of the preparatory papers in mid-November of 1886, the liberals from Ponce sent the program for the reorganization of the party to press. Article 7 of the plan contained the structure of government for Puerto Rico, one which specified municipal autonomy, incorporating the greatest degree of political and administrative power possible within the framework of national unity—exactly the formula proposed by Baldorioty de Castro.

Meanwhile a number of speeches favoring autonomy were delivered in the Cortes by Cuban deputies, and served as a stimulus to the evolution of the autonomist position. Among the speakers were don Rafael Montoro, don Miguel Figueroa, don Alberto Ortiz, and don Rafael Fernández de Castro, as well as the Marquis of Valdeterrazo who advocated administrative decentralization, and don Germán Gamazo Calvo who defended decentralization and self-government. Don Segismundo Moret Prendergast also went on record in favor of special legislation for the oversea territories, with emphasis on decentralization.

Additional stimuli to the Ponce liberals were the activities of such groups as the National Democratic Society, founded in Madrid by Rafael María de Labra and Julio Vizcarrondo Coronado, whose objective was the reform of the colonial regime toward the goal of autonomy, as well as the increasingly well-known work of the Cuban Autonomist Party, and that of the groups which favored autonomy for the Basque Provinces; the success of the autonomous system in Canada; and the home rule measures for Ireland presented by Charles Stuart Parnell and Prime Minister Gladstone. Equally promising were the possibilities suggested by a coalition of liberal forces which took place in Spain on May 23, 1880, under the leadership of don Práxedes Mateo Sagasta and the banner of the Liberal Fusionist Party.

In late January 1887, in accordance with the Ponce program, Baldorioty cabled the Cuban deputies asking if they might be able to stop in Ponce en route to Madrid from Havana, to attend an assembly of the Liberal Party and to collaborate in the task of reorganization. The Cubans declined, however, stating among other reasons that although many Puerto Ricans supported the program of Cuban autonomy, many others had accepted the Plan of Ponce, "* * * which differs very much from our own."

On February 19, Baldorioty gave notice of the coming assembly to be held March 7–9. From this meeting emerged the Autonomous Puerto Rican Party with a program inspired by Rafael María de Labra and the San Juan delegation, in which it was determined that the formula of political identity and administrative autonomy was to be the aim of the party. Aware of the importance of cooperative action, Baldorioty accepted the compromise, thus assuring the existence and unity of the new party.

In the ensuing period, those Puerto Rican and Cuban deputies favoring autonomy undertook the presentation in the Cortes of a number of proposals containing the basic points of their common program. In the political order, the demands for reform included the extension to the island of the rights enjoyed by the citizens of the peninsula—either an expansion of the electoral laws which governed the islands or application of those viable in Spain, as well as the separation of civil and military authorities on the island, according to the Spanish pattern. In addition, a number of liberals continued their suport of Baldorioty's concept of political autonomy, asking that it be incorporated by the party into its program.

Numerous petitions were formulated by the autonomist deputies for the reform of the economic order. They advocated the establishment of a new financial arrangement between the metropolis and the colony—

> since the basis of the existing relationship was contrary to sound principles regarding political rights, colonialism and taxation. On the one hand, the relationship was a contradiction of the principle of State unity; on the other, in purely local matters, the islands were deprived of the necessary autonomy to develop their wealth and way of life. Finally the ratio between tax revenues and public obligations exceeded all rational and just proportion.

Another area of proposed reform was that of the tariff system of the islands, including free trade; reduction of taxes on imports; elimination or reduction of the taxes paid on insular sugar, honey, rum, tobacco, and coffee in Spanish markets; reduction in those budget items prepared by the National Cortes for the islands; and temporary authorization to introduce resources for industrial development into the island.

The question of improvements within the administrative order dealt principally with the establishment of an island government of an autonomous nature; such an arrangement would give the Puerto Ricans, represented in the provincial assembly, control over local and internal affairs, as well as the authority necessary to handle public works, public education, health, welfare, agriculture, seaports, water resources, local budgets, taxes, tariffs, and commercial treaties, with the latter subordinated to the national government.

But autonomist activities were suddenly paralyzed by the introduction of the "compontes," a torture instigated by the enemy and upheld by the despotic Governor, General Palacio González. The consequence of such unjust persecution was the near collapse of the new party.

A turn of events, however, was in the making; on February 11, 1891, don Luís Muñoz Rivera, from the editorial columns of his newspaper, La Democracia, began to publish a series of articles in which he proposed the negotiation of a pact between the Puerto Rican Autonomist and the Spanish Liberal Fusionist Parties led by don Práxedes Mateo Sagasta. The alliance was seen as a means to a double objective: to convert the Autonomist Party into a government party and to fulfill the party's aspirations for the benefit of the country. Muñoz Rivera requested that his colleagues use practical and positive criteria in judging his project, thus indicating his preference for the second part of the age-old alternative between doctrine and empirical policies, between theory and practice, between the policy of principles and that of compromises. He wrote:

> We are not bent on fighting useless battles or pursuing the impossible. For those who cherish beautiful ideals, let us inquire whether the ideal is possible, and then make haste to follow its luminous path. If it cannot become a reality, let us limit our desire to the dictates of reason, rather than waste our energies in fruitless combat. We are men of our times, eminently positive in the noble and generous sense of that phrase. Today's world is not one of dreams and mirages. Platonism leads nowhere in our era.[29]

A long and bitter struggle ensued within the party regarding the question of political affiliation, insofar as a group of Muñoz' own followers preferred a pact with the Republican Centralist Party of the peninsula. Five years later, however, a sovereign assembly of the Autonomist Party, after hearing reports from a commission sent to Madrid, ratified and approved the pact as proposed by Muñoz Rivera, with a majority of 79 votes in favor, 28 abstentions and 17 against.

With the death of Cánovas, the Regent Queen Doña María Cristina of Hapsburg entrusted the government in early October 1897 to a cabinet headed by Sagasta, in which don Segismundo Moret Prendergast had the portfolio of Overseas Minister.

Contrary to the claim of Sagasta's critics that he promised much while a member of the opposition and delivered little while in power,[30] once in the government, Sagasta confronted the colonial issue without delay. In accordance with a previous statement that only his party was in a position to modify the Antilles statute without it seeming that the Spanish Government was giving in to humiliating outside influences, he was ready to grant autonomy to the Antilles as soon as he came to power.[31]

Sagasta's original idea was to present the legislation dealing with autonomy to the Cortes when the latter reconvened the following month, given his longstanding conviction that such laws should be approved by Congress. However, the long delay in resolving the situation had caused a poor impression in Washington, according to the thesis that the rights of the colonies, more than a matter of private right, were a question of international law.[32] In addition, Pope Leo XIII had specifically recommended to the Spanish Ambassador to the Vatican that all possible reforms be granted to the Cuban and Puerto Rican Governments.[33] In the wake of such pressures and reinforced by other influential opinions, Sagasta decided to act immediately, and without waiting for the Cortes, he gave Moret the task of drawing up the laws of reform. These, then were the events which culminated in a cablegram to San Juan on November 9, 1897, announcing that the Council of Ministers had recently given unanimous approval to three decrees for the establishment of an autonomous regime in Puerto Rico.

The first of these decrees stated the following:

> *Article 1*
>
> Spaniards residing in the Antilles will enjoy in the same manner as those residing in the peninsula, the rights granted in Title 1 of the Constitution of the Monarchy as well as the same guarantees with regard to the execution of the laws of the kingdom.
>
> Toward this end and in accordance with Article 89 of the Constitution, the complementary laws, and especially those of criminal trial, public order, compulsory expropriation, public education, those of the press, of assembly and of association as well as the code of military justice, will be enforced throughout the islands of Cuba and Puerto Rico, so that Article 14 of the Constitution may be fulfilled.
>
> *Article 2*
>
> In time of war, the Law of Public Order will be enforced in the Antilles, under the restrictions and terms established in Article 17 of the Constitution.
>
> *Article 3*
>
> The Minister of Overseas Affairs, in consultation with the Council of State, will review the legislation of the Antilles and the proclamations published by the Governors-General since the promulgation of the Constitution, and will publish the results of the review so that henceforth, neither in the governing nor in the administration of justice in those territories will an order be invoked or applied by mistake, which might contradict the letter and the spirit of the Constitution of the Spanish monarchy.[34]

The second decree extended the electoral law of 1896 from the peninsula to Puerto Rico with certain regulatory modifications in order to adjust it to the special conditions of the island. According to this law, electoral status was given to all Spaniards over 25 years of age who were in full enjoyment of their civil rights, and were either members of a township or had at least 2 years of residency. Members of army or naval troops would be unable to vote while in military service. The same was true for those engaged in other branches of the armed services, whether national, provincial, or municipal.

Voting was by secret ballot. Under no circumstances were any military personnel to enter the polls except in the case of the disruption of public order, and then only upon the request of the official in charge of the election. The electors determined article 25 of the senatorial electoral law of the peninsula, regarding the appointment of administration councilors.

The third decree conceded an autonomous regime to Puerto Rico, given the capacity and maturity which the island had attained. In essence, the proposed system of government was to lead to harmony and mutual assistance between the rights and interests of the metropolis and the colony, thus counteracting any dead-end dilemmas and clashes between the two.

> Above all, what was proposed [the decree states] was a clear assertion of the autonomist principle, allowing it room for integral development in an attempt to guarantee its success. For when it comes to the question of self-direction for those who have reached maturity, one should either not mention autonomy, or one should grant it completely, on the basis that the better road is that without inherent limitations or obstacles. Nationality may be defended by repression and force, or entrusted to a partnership of feelings and traditions, and reinforced by a system of government which is capable of demonstrating to the colonies that under no other government would they be able to achieve a higher degree of well-being, security and importance.
>
> Thus presented, there was no problem regarding an autonomous government for a Spanish territory, settled by the Spanish race and civilization. Autonomy was bound to develop within the framework of the ideas and program carried forward by Spain in the Antilles, without eliminating any of its content, nor altering its spirit, but rather offering harmony and a fuller guarantee of stability, convinced of the advantages of its own system. The issue of an autonomist constitution, therefore, brought three major aspects to the fore.
>
> In the first place, there were the sacred interests of the metropolis, which desired above all that the change about to occur would strengthen and affirm the ties of sovereignty, and that in a peaceful setting, the interests of its offspring which, although perhaps different, should be in harmony and capable of development on a basis of free choice.
>
> Secondly we have the aspirations and the needs of the colonial peoples, anxious to be treated as less fortunate daughters rather than be destroyed as enemies, attentive to a familial appeal and as Spaniards, rebellious against the brutal imposition of an annihilating force, expecting from their metropolis a mold for their initiatives, and a procedure authorizing them to govern their own interests.
>
> And, lastly, there is that vast and interesting unit of relationships and interests, a consequence of a lengthy past which a government is least allowed to ignore or forget. Thus, the preservation and development of this heritage involves the realization of our destiny in America, and the glory of the Spanish banner in those lands discovered and civilized by our ancestors.
>
> *The proposal of autonomy responds to these three considerations* * * *.

To the first, or metropolitan, point of view belong the questions concerning sovereignty, in the hands of the highest organs of the Spanish nation. The command of the army and navy, the administration of justice, the diplomatic understandings with America, the relationship between colony and metropolis, the political pardon, the defense of the Constitution—these would remain entrusted to the Governor-General representing the King and under the direction of the Council of Ministers. Nothing which is essential to sovereignty is forgotten; the authority of a central power is not diminished or lessened.

The insular aspect is developed, in turn, as a model of central, provincial, and municipal autonomy such as the most demanding leaders could have imagined, as well as the strict application of the parliamentary system. Insular authority is noted in the congressional structure and the creation of a responsible government, headed by the Governor-General, responsible through his ministers for the development of the colony and serving as the primary link between island and national affairs.

> **And the third aspect, the crucible within which the history of the colonial relationship in synthesized and within which the process of development will occur, is defined by a series of arrangements of a permanent character linking the two executive powers, the insular and the national, and facilitating the pursuit of mutual assistance and common interests.**
>
> **This system, complex without being confused, is made workable by a series of guarantees and links, by continuing agreements and public discussions, which will eradicate in the foreseeable future the possibility of insolvable differences or clashes between the colony and the metropolis.**

In accordance with the above, the Government of Puerto Rico was composed of: (1) the Governor General; (2) a parliament divided into 2 bodies which were the house of representatives and the Administrative Council; (3) a president and 5 ministers: those of justice and state; of internal affairs; of education; of agriculture, industry, and commerce; and of public works and communications; (4) a provincial assembly; (5) the municipal governments; (6) 16 deputies and 3 senators in the Spanish Parliament.

The Governor General was appointed by the King on the recommendation of the Council of Ministers. He was responsible for the maintenance of public order and security in the colony, and other insular authorities were subordinate to him. The duties of the governorship included: selection of his staff; enforcement of laws, decrees, treaties, and international agreements from both the legislative and executive powers, the latter being brought to his attention by those ministries of which he was a direct representative on the island (state, war, navy, and overseas); authority to suspend the publication and enforcement of any resolutions of His Majesty's government which he deemed harmful to the general interests of the nation or the island, informing the respective ministry as to his reasons; the suspension of capital punishment; suspension of constitutional guarantees in accordance with articles 4, 5, 6, and 9 and the first three paragraphs of article 13 of the Spanish Constitution; maintenance of public order and authority to take the necessary steps for the preservation of peace on the island upon consultation with the council of secretaries; the effective administration of justice; and direct contact with the representative diplomatic agents and consuls of Spain and America in matters related to external affairs.

In addition, it was the Governor's responsibility to protect the rights, powers, and privileges of the colonial administration as well as to approve and publish the agreements of the insular parliament, to be submitted to him by the president and secretary of the respective houses. If, in his opinion, an agreement by the insular parliament exceeded its authority, threatened the rights of the citizens as recognized in title I of the National Constitution, or jeopardized the interests of the colony or of the state, he was to remit the agreement to the

Council of Ministers of the Kingdom; if 2 months went by with no response from the central government regarding the agreement, then it was up to the Governor to act according to his discretion.

The appointment of judiciary officials as well as the administration of justice was under the jurisdiction of the Governor in council with his Cabinet, who in turn had been appointed by the Governor and might be dismissed by him at will. Nevertheless, the Governor's orders as chief executive had to be seconded by a Cabinet member, except in such cases as the treaties of the insular Cabinets—especially when he questioned their constitutionality or legality—the enforcement of public laws, and the laws of the realm as sanctioned by His Majesty and extending throughout the Spanish territory.

The Governor's office was also responsible for presenting the budget to the cabinet prior to January of each year. The budget was to be divided into two parts: the income necessary for expenses of the national government and the expenses and income corresponding to the colonial administration. Finally, in cases of legislation resulting from ministerial or parliamentary initiative which the Governor adjudged as affecting the national interests, the chief executive could postpone implementation or discussion of said projects pending a decision by the central government. In both cases, the correspondence between colonial and central governments was to be passed on to the legislature and published in the record.

Any jurisdictional conflicts among the different municipal, insular, or provincial assemblies or with the executive powers which, given their nature, were not to be referred to the central government, were to be submitted to the tribunals of justice. The Governor was entitled to register an appeal before the territorial court ("audiencia") to settle jurisdictional disputes between the executive and legislative bodies, without affecting title V.

Furthermore, if any matter of jurisdiction arose between the insular parliament and the Governor which, upon petition of the former, was not submitted to the Council of Ministers of the Kingdom, each of the two parties would be able to submit the case to the supreme tribunal which would offer a definitive judgment. The decisions would then become part of the insular legislation.

The secretaries in the Cabinet, five in all, constituted a corporation of an executive nature; its members were named by the Governor-General from among the members of the majority party in parliament, and were responsible for their acts before parliament, as opposed to being heads of a department and responsible solely to the Governor. Any member of the house of representatives or of the Administration Council could be appointed as secretary, but although he might take part in the discussions of both bodies, he could vote only in the one to which he belong. Each Cabinet position had its own field of action and authority.

The President dealt with relations among the departments and in the enforcement of agreements.

The departments of justice and state handled the magisterial and judicial bodies, judicial appointments, and administration, including that of the prison and jails; selection of sites for correctional institutions; the public order and the police system; appointments of mayors; the press, censorship of the theater, local elections, and appeals; as well as dealing with such areas as welfare, health, ship doctors, hospitals for contagious diseases, and public sanitation.

The treasury department dealt with the various branches of taxation—land, commercial, industrial, and professional; royal rights; national wealth; stamped goods; customs revenue; and the auditing of government services and expenses.

The department of public education dealt with all matters related to the Provincial Institute, those private schools in conjunction with the institute, normal schools, and the teaching profession in the island.

The department of public works and communications was responsible for such services as roads, lighting, railroads, the construction and maintenance of public buildings, and the postal and telegraph systems.

The departments of agriculture, industry, and commerce handled the research and development of agricultural, cultural, industrial, and commercial resources; land grants; banking institutions; the chambers of commerce; weights and measures; patents; and the development of mining resources.

The Administration Council, a kind of senate, was composed of 15 members, 7 of whom were designated by the Governor-General and 8 elected. To be a member of the Administration Council it was necessary to be a native of Puerto Rico or to have resided in the island during 4 consecutive years; to have never been processed for criminal matters; to have the full political rights; to have received for 2 or more years a private yearly income of no less than 4,000 pesos; and to have had no contracts with either the National Government or that of the island.

The members of the Administration Council could not legally hold another position when the council was in session although both the local and national governments might delegate additional tasks to them within their respective fields of public service. Those councilors appointed by the Governor were named by special decree and held their positions for life. As regards the elective aspect of the council, half of the seats were up for reelection every 2 years, elections in which all individuals over 25 years and in full possession of their civil rights were entitled to vote.

The administration councilors were granted political immunity as regards the free expression of their opinions and votes; they could not be indicted nor arrested without a previous council resolution except when found "in fraganti," or when the council was not in session. Any case involving the councilors was under the jurisdiction of the territorial "Audiencia." The above-mentioned guarantees were not applicable, however, in those cases in which the councilor was declared to be the author of articles, pamphlets, or books instigating military insurrection, or slandering or attacking the integrity of the nation.

The house of representatives was composed of 32 members, who were elected according to the conditions prescribed by the electoral law. Requirements for membership in the house included that of a secular status, as well as having been born on the island or having maintained continuous residency for a period of 4 years, and no criminal record. Representatives were elected for 5-year terms and could be reelected indefinitely. Any additional pensions, employment, or paid commissions conferred upon a representative by the government had to be declined within a 2-week period or he would lose his representative status. This regulation did not apply, however, to those representatives who became Cabinet secretaries.

The house of representatives met annually, convoked in the King's name by the Governor General who also had the power to suspend or close its sessions, and to dissolve both the house and the Administration Council separately or simultaneously, with the obligation of reopening the session within 3 months.

The sessions of the house and the council were to be simultaneous, except when the council was performing judicial functions. Colonial legislation could be initiated by either the house, the council, or the Governor, with the exception of those statutes dealing with taxation and public credit, which could be initially presented only in the house. Members of the house enjoyed protection and immunity similar to that of the council, except in such cases as sedition or slander.

In accordance with the theory of the division of sovereignty between the national and local governments, the Charter of Autonomy recognized the insular parliament to have specific powers, as opposed to the North American Constitution which granted to the individual States the residual sovereignty not belonging to the Federal Government.

The insular congress had the power to legislate on matters relating to the Cabinet departments; in addition, it had access to information regarding purely local affairs and thus could legislate on administrative organization, including provincial, municipal, and judicial divisions; on sanitation; on public credit, banks, and the monetary system—all without encroaching on the powers which corresponded by law to the executive power of the colony. The insular parliament could also regulate certain laws voted in the Cortes of the Kingdom. Thus, right from the beginning it could regulate the electoral procedure, the formation of the census, voting qualifications, and the voting system, as long as it recognized the basic rights of the citizen as designated in the electoral law.

The insular parliament had a voice regarding certain measures and regulations with respect to the administration of justice in the local tribunals of the island or in those in which Puerto Ricans were practicing law. It also had exclusive authority regarding the local budget in terms of expenses as well as the income necessary to cover the island's share of the national budget. However, both houses were prohibited from considering the colonial budget until they had voted on that part relevant to its national obligations.

Other parliamentary powers included receiving the Governor's oath to uphold the constitution and the guarantees of colonial autonomy; requiring responsible action of the Cabinet secretaries; presenting its proposal regarding actual or potential legislation to the central government by means of the Governor; requesting executive resolutions from the Governor on colonial matters; and finally, the setting of tariff duties and import-export taxes.

Mercantile relations between Spain and Puerto Rico were to be governed in the following manner:

> 1. No duty, whether of a fiscal character or established for import or export, could have a differential injurious effect on insular or peninsular production;
>
> 2. The two governments would form a list of articles of direct national origin to which would be assigned, by common agreement, a differential duty over similar ones of foreign origin, and a list of products of direct insular origin which were to receive preference in the peninsula as well as the kind of differential duties, which in no case were to exceed 5 percent. Given an agreement between the two governments on the contents of the lists and the protective duties, said lists would be considered authoritative and put into effect. In the case of disagreement, the discrepancy would be handled by a commission of deputies of the Kingdom, with Spain and Puerto Rico equally represented. This commission would name its own president, who, in case of a lack of agreement, would be the eldest member. The valuation tables for the articles included in the above lists would be fixed accordingly and revised every 2 years; any modifications made with regard to the customs duties were obligatory for both governments.

Furthermore, the insular parliament was empowered to negotiate commercial treaties with foreign countries. The negotiation of said treaties, however, had to be arranged by the central government assisted by special delegates as authorized by the insular government, and presented to the Cortes. The same process was used with regard to treaties initiated by the central government and affecting the interests of the island. Commercial treaties negotiated by the Cortes, on the other hand, were to be submitted to the insular government as soon as they became law, and that government was to declare within a 3-month period whether or not it desired to adhere to its stipulations.

The provincial assembly was an elected body with exclusive insular authority as regards the establishment and staffing of educational and welfare institutions, the island's transportation system, and the responsibility of drawing up its own budget and appointing the staff. The assembly selected its own president. Its membership, whose number was proportional to the population of the island, was elected in such a way as to allow legitimate representation of the minority groups. To qualify as a provincial representative one had to be a native of the island or to have 4 years of continuous residency, as well as to fulfill the qualifications necessary for the position of representative to the Cortes. In addition, the provincial representatives were responsible for any damage or harm resulting from their actions.

The "Ayuntamiento" constituted the town government and could legislate within its proper jurisdiction on public education, transportation, health, a budget, and the appointment of its own staff. The Ayuntamiento could also contract municipal loans; a recommendation by one-third of the councilmen would result in a referendum, which would then need a simple majority for passage.

The position of councilman in those municipalities exceeding a thousand inhabitants was open to those voters with 4 years of residency in the municipality who were among the upper third on the list of those paying land, industrial and commercial taxes. In the municipalities of between 400 and 1,000 inhabitants, eligibility was extended to those in the upper four-fifths of the tax lists; in the towns of under 400, all voters were eligible. Finally, special provisions for eligibility were granted to those having an academic or professional degree, or credit discount on property wealth. In the meantime, until the parliament dealt with the matter, the municipal law would continue to be in effect in all areas not superseded by the above provisions or by the electoral law.

Finally, in article 2 of the Charter of Autonomy the Spanish Government recognized the unalterable and irrevocable nature of the form of government granted to Puerto Rico until such time as a concrete petition for a change was forthcoming from the insular parliament.

The promulgation of the Charter of Autonomy was received by Puerto Rican liberals with great rejoicing. For don Luís Muñoz Rivera it signified unhampered development of self-government, as

Puerto Rico began to feel master of its present and its future.[35] Shortly afterwards he repeated that the declaration of autonomy in 1897 recognized the personality of Puerto Rico more amply than England had recognized that of Canada and Australia, given the continued representation in the Congress of Madrid.

According to Muñoz, autonomy brought with it both legislative bodies and a responsible executive cabinet. The national representative, more nominal than executive, was a Governor who reigned but did not govern, in much the same way as the sovereigns of parliamentary monarchies. For the present, autonomy represented complete liberty and exclusive control; for the future, it was something else—independence without violence or confusion.[36]

Thus, the efforts of Baldorioty de Castro and Muñoz Rivera were lauded as having inspired the achievement of autonomy, resulting in a proclamation which, according to José de Diego, represented the most important event in the Antilles since its discovery and settlement.[37] The granting of the Charter of Autonomy indicated a profound and unequivocal change in Spanish colonial policy. Thus the old concept of unlimited, all-embracing power of the metropolis vis-a-vis the colony was replaced by a concept of moderate and relative power, establishing the principle that the colony was entitled to a recognition of well-being and happiness on the basis of human rights. The purely reformist ideas initiated by such men as Las Casas, Vitoria, Rabelais, Montaigne, and Bacon, and pursued by most liberal theoreticians, were superseded by the concepts of harmony, partnership, and association as concerned the rights and interests of both metropolis and colony.

The historical perspective for such a view can be seen in the writings of the Inca Garcilaso de la Vega who, in his "History of Peru" (1600), asserts that relations between Governor and governed could be based on the concept of mutual assistance; don José del Campillo Cossío, in a book entitled "New Systems of Government for America" (1743), had recommended that colonial legislation be adapted to the specific circumstances. Turgot, in his "Memorandum" (1776), had advocated that the status of subjugated colonies be changed to that of allied provinces. In his "Dictionary of the Social Sciences," Juan Francisco Robinet clearly expressed the concept that the relationship between Governor and governed rests on the principle of association. In 1797, Kant proposed the doctrine that the relationship between metropolis and colony could be justified only by means of a pact or union. In 1801, Charpentier de Cassigny, formulating a colonization project in Madagascar, declared his intention to transport civilization to its shores and thereby to join a valiant peasant people to the French nation. In 1803, John Baptiste Say maintained that the life of the colonies was composed of two successive phases: the first being that of an association between metropolis and colony while the latter was in need of protection and development; and the second, that of emancipation of the colony once she had achieved maturity and experience.

Somewhat later the Count of Laborde, in a book entitled "The Spirit of Association in the Community" (1821), praised the concept of a pact between mother country and colony. In 1836, the explorer and geographer Domeny de Rienzi expressed a desire that the peoples of the Pacific be taken and won over through the means of association. The following year the famous economist the Count of Rossi, in his "Course on Political Economy," presented a broad discussion of the doctrine of association as a model for the colony-metropolis relationship. From 1840 on, Enfantin, the leading disciple of Saint-Simon, as well as Auguste Compte, Fourier, Edgar Quinet, Victor Hugo, Julio Boussiere, and others, made manifest their support of the theory of association.[38]

This, then, is the doctrine behind the plea made by don Segismundo Moret Prendergast in 1885 when he argued for a policy of liberal concessions in order to reinforce the close relationship between the peninsula and her colonies; it is the doctrine that served as the basis for the aims expressed in the preamble of the Charter of Autonomy, in which the desire to create a system which would facilitate harmony, mutual support, and free accord, given the rights and interests of the metropolis and (those of) the colony, thus making clashes and insoluable dilemmas obsolete, is reiterated.

With respect to the future, the Charter of Autonomy left all roads open, since from the hierarchical association between unequals which it embodied, Puerto Rico could move towards egalitarian association or even towards independence.

On July 17, 1898—after various incidents caused by the union of the liberal and orthodox parties into which the autonomist groups had divided after the assembly in San Juan on February 11, 1897; after the constitution of the first composite Cabinet; after the failure of the liberal-orthodox union, and the election of April 10, 1898 [39]—the insular Parliament of Puerto Rico opened. And 4 days later, by virtue of the first statute approved by Parliament the day before, the autonomous cabinet was reorganized under the Presidency of don Luís Muñoz Rivera. And with the creation of a homogeneous liberal Cabinet, all paths were open for the development of its own policies.

Briefly explaining the fundamental aspects of his governmental program, Muñoz Rivera had declared he would exercise power fairly and energetically. He would decrease the imperfections and bad habits of colonialism; he would build on our freedoms; suppress the abuse of jailing peaceful citizens on mere suspicion; stop the concealment of punishable actions and lawbreaking; advance programs of public hygiene; regulate police services; guarantee equity in tax assessment; organize a competent government administration; encourage integrity as the basis for obtaining public employment; extend unlimited opportunity to the sons of the island; activate all reforms favoring moral, intellectual, and economic betterment of the working class; and sponsor the founding of a university as the center of a broad and complete educational system.

Before, in its inaugural session, the first mixed cabinet had reformed the payroll of the departments of the autonomous government. In the second session it voted to include in the budget a credit of 1,000 pesos annually for her lifetime for the widow of Baldorioty de Castro. Later it passed an order making it unnecessary for the newspapers to submit three copies to the government as the printing law had required. Another provision named don Francisco García Molinas, don Rafael María de Labra, and don Melquiades Cintrón as delegates in the drawing up of a trade treaty among Puerto Rico, Cuba, Spain, and the United States, and to study the possibilities of trade between Puerto Rico and Canada. Another provision prescribed a study of reform of the tariff system of the island. Thus the cabinet successively adopted these other resolutions in order to deal with the issues of the moment. All such activity, however, was to vanish from sight as the result of the Spanish-American War.[40]

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Just as the Spanish War of Independence gave rise to the birth of the Liberal Party at the turn of the 19th century, resulting in the eventual success of the autonomous movement, so too did a momentous event in the New World determine the appearance of a new party which would serve as the vehicle for the political aspirations of another part of insular society. The rampant unrest which pervaded Spain in early 1810 following the dissolution of the Supreme Council had a strong impact on different parts of Spain's colonial empire. In Venezuela the partisans of independence did not hesitate to take advantage of the situation. The municipality of Caracas became a revolutionary junta; Spanish functionaries were deposed from office. On the 19th of the following April, 3 days after the election of Power Giral as representative to the Cortes, Venezuela was proclaimed independent from Spain.

The first news of the above events to arrive in Puerto Rico came via reports of the Spanish military in Venezuela, giving official details of the situation and requesting assistance for the Spanish cause. Shortly thereafter, a more concrete expression of the revolt arrived in San Juan: on the one hand came Spanish soldiers, officials, and the ex-Governor don Toribio Montes, who had been banished by the insurrectionists, and on the other, three members of the revolutionary junta in Caracas, who were immediately incarcerated in El Morro by the Spanish authorities. Meanwhile, in response to a number of urgent petitions, the then Governor of the island, Brigadier Meléndez Bruna, hastened to send a military expedition to Venezuela, composed of the freighter *Cornelia*, two brigs, a sloop-of-war, three schooners, and a thousand men with the objective of taking Cumaná.

The Venezuelan revolutionaries did not lose time. Anxious to include the island in the movement towards independence as well as to forestall the strategic advantage which the island's geographical position could offer the metropolis, the Venezuelans immediately sought to gain Puerto Rican support. Special envoys were given the mission of gaining the sympathy of influential persons and arousing the island to fight for independence. Meanwhile, the councils of Caracas, and later of Cartagena and Coro, were urging San Juan to join the insurrection against Spanish control.

The municipality of San Juan, having recently sworn loyalty to the King, Fernando VII, flatly refused the demands of the Venezuelan revolutionaries. With the election of Power, the island had, in effect, declared its support for reform of the colonial system. Nevertheless, the ardent Venezuelan propaganda caught fire in some Puerto Rican souls, crystallizing a sector of separatist tendencies. Given the so-called doctrine of illegal parties, however, the separatists unlike the liberals were not recognized as a juridical entity.

The separatists chose to seek the inalienable and inviolable natural rights of man, not within the structure of the Spanish Government, as did the liberals, but rather in a separate and independent state. If, in fact, the people are the source of power, it is up to them to determine their own government. The criterion that every colony was destined to prosper and prepare itself for an independent existence had been maintained by such thinkers as Bentham, Mill, and Turgot. For the separatists, then, the island of Puerto Rico had become a social, economic, and cultural unity, a nation justified in seeking a sovereign political unity. Unlike the liberals, however, the separatists did not indicate any proposals as regards a specific legal system for the society; such details were to be worked out after the establishment of the new state. Meanwhile, their tactic was to utilize the revolutionary way as the only means, under the existing circumstances, of making their aspirations a concrete reality. The fact that the island had become a base of Spanish operations against the revolutionary movement of the continent, however, severely hampered their activities. Despite such drawbacks, the separatists—in 1822, 1838, 1868, and 1897—defied Spanish authority. Less fortunate than the liberals, they were unable to dislodge Spain from the island of Puerto Rico.

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These are the facts. Considering, then, the evolutionary political process of Puerto Rico throughout the 19th century, the evident trends and aspirations were toward the establishment of a system of government, whether or not under Spanish control, which would allow for the development, integration, and consolidation of the individuality, the identity, and the personality of the Puerto Rican people.

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[1] Isle Schwidetzky, "Etnobiología," Mexico, 1955, p. 39.

[2] Sir Reginald Coupland, "Wilberforce," London, 1945, p. 61.

[3] Fr. Iñigo Abbad y Lasierra, "Historia Geográfica, Civil y Política de la Isla de San Juan Bautista de Puerto Rico," Madrid, 1788, ch. XXV; and in the edition by don Jose Julian Acosta y Calbo, "Notas," Puerto Rico, 1866, p. 258.

[4] Guillaume Thomas Francis Raynal "Historia Política de los Establecimientos Ultramarinos de las Naciones Europeas," Madrid, 1784–90, vol. IV, p. 16.

[5] Abbad y Lasierra, *op. cit.*, ch. XXVIII; and in Acosta y Calbo, "Notas," p. 337.

[6] Pedro Irizarri, "Informe dado al Ayuntamiento de San Juan," in Rafael W. Ramírez de Arellano, "Instrucciones al Diputado don Ramón Power," Río Piedras, 1936, p. 21.

[7] "Ayuntamiento de la Capital," Actas 1803–09, folios 350 and 355. See Lidio Cruz Monclova, "Historia de Puerto Rico (Siglo XIX)," vol. I, Santurce, 1952, p. 20.

[8] "Archivo General de Indias (Sevilla)," sec. 5, Santo Domingo, Legajo 2327. See Cruz Monclova, I, 43.

[9] "Puerto Rico Ilustrado," año IV (1913), núm. 185.

[10] Juan Rico y Amat, "Historia Política y Parlamentaria de España," Madrid, 1860, vol. I, p. 155.

[11] Alejandro Tapia Rivera, "Noticia Histórica de don Ramón Power," P.R. 1873, p. 19; and San Juan, P.R., 1946, p. 59. See Pedro de Angelis, "Biografía de Ramón Power," Bayamón s.a., p. 27. See Cruz Monclova, I, 27.

[12] "El Aviso de la Habana," Thursday, Oct. 19, 1809, in Justo Zaragoza, "Las Insurrecciones de Cuba," Madrid, 1892, vol. I, p. 712. See Cruz Monclova, I, 27.

[13] "Siete Ensayos de la Realidad Peruana," Lima, 1929, p. 177.

[14] "El Padre Varela y la Autonomía Colonial," in "Homenaje a José Enrique Varona," La Habana, 1935, p. 451; and prologue to "Ideario Autonomista" by Rafael Montoro, La Habana, 1938, p. 8. See Cruz Monclova, I, 196.

[15] "Archivo General de Indias" (Sevilla), Sección Indifferente, Legajo 1523. See Cruz Monclova, I, 196.

[16] Enrique de Gandía, "Nueva Historia de América," Buenos Aires, 1946, p. 281.

[17] Cruz Monclova, I, 506–558.

[18] Lidio Cruz Monclova, "Historia de Puerto Rico (Siglo XIX)," Madrid, 1957, vol. II (Primera Parte), pp. 34–35.

[19] Cruz Monclova, II (Primera Parte), pp. 34, 35; and Cruz Monclova II (Segunda Parte), pp. 534–538 and 575–576.

[20] Cruz Monclova, II (Segunda Parte), p. 534.

[21] Cruz Monclova, II (Segunda Parte), p. 535.

[22] Boletín Mercantil," año XXXIII, núm. 139. See Cruz Monclova, II (Segunda Parte), p. 539.

[23] Boletín Mercantil," año 41, núms. 79, 93, 107, 108, 113, and 126. See Cruz Monclova, II (Segunda Parte), pp. 540–541.

[24] Cruz Monclova, II (Segunda Parte), p. 540.

[25] "Boletín Mercantil," año 43, núms. 53, 57, 58, 60, and 87. See Cruz Monclova, II (Segunda Parte), p. 575.

[26] Quote from "Boletín Mercantil," año 43, núm 81. See Cruz Monclova, II (Segunda Parte), p. 578.

[27] Félix de Bona. "Cuba, Santo Domingo y Puerto Rico," Madrid, 1861, p. 50.

[28] Cruz Monclova, II (Segunda Parte), pp. 579–580.

[29] "La Democracia," año II, núm. 321. See Lidio Cruz Monclova, "Historia de Puerto Rico (Siglo XIX)," Madrid, 1962, vol. III (Primera Parte), p. 351.

[30] Sánchez Campomanes, in "Diario de las Sesiones de Cortes-Congreso de los Diputados-Legislatura de 1887," vol. II, p. 1015.

[31] Cruz Monclova, III (Tercera Parte), p. 86.

[32] Ibid.

[33] Cruz Monclova, III (Tercera Parte), p. 87.

[34] "Diario de las Sesiones de Cortes-Congreso de los Diputados-Legislatura de 1898," vol. I, p. 51. See "Gaceta de Puerto Rico," año 1897, núm. 296. See Cruz Monclova, III (Tercera Parte), pp. 96–99.

[35] "Puerto Rico Herald," año I (1901), núm. 1. See Cruz Monclova, III (Tercera Parte), p. 110.

[36] "Puerto Rico Herald," año I (1902), núm. 32.

[37] "El Liberal," año I, núm. 2. See Cruz Monclova, III (Tercera Parte), pp. 110, 111, and 116.

[38] "Réné Maunier, "The Sociology of Colonies," London, 1949, vol. 1, pp. 299, 301–394, and 340. See Manual Fernández Juncos, "Crónica de la Semana," in "La Correspondencia de Puerto Rico," año VII, núm. 2414. See Cruz Monclova, III (Tercera Parte), pp. 118–119.

[39] For details regarding these events, see Cruz Monclova, III (Segunda Parte), pp. 394–402; 406–408; 413–429 and 442–457; and Cruz Monclova III (Tercera Parte), pp. 87–94; 119–138; 142–144; 151–156; 170–195.

[40] Cruz Monclova, III (Tercera Parte), pp. 155–168 and 251–257.

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HISTORICAL SURVEY OF THE PUERTO RICO STATUS QUESTION, 1898–1965

by

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PART I. FROM SPANISH COLONY TO UNITED STATES CITIZENSHIP

A. PUERTO RICO UNDER THE SPANISH

When the army of the United States made its uneventful landing on the south coast of Puerto Rico, the people of the island were not in revolt against Spain as the citizens of neighboring Cuba had been. In fact, the nearly 1 million inhabitants of Puerto Rico had no serious political grievance against Spain, for they had recently been granted a large measure of self-government.

Puerto Rico had been a colony of Spain for nearly 400 years prior to the Spanish-American War. Although the island had been governed until 1897 under authoritarian practices as a province-beyond-the-sea, there had been only periodic, isolated revolutionary outbursts. In the early years of the 19th century, Puerto Rico became a haven for Spanish loyalists who fled the revolutions against the mother country which swept Central and South America. Many of these fervent Spanish citizens had settled permanently on the island, contributing to its loyalty and closeness to Spain. Attempts to extend a greater measure of local autonomy to Puerto Rico met a series of frustrating reversals during the first half of that century, mirroring the upheavals, international wars and civil disturbances alike, which tormented Spain. Representation in the Cortes, the Spanish legislature, was given to the island in 1809, only to be rescinded a few years later. That right was renewed in 1820 and lost again in 1823. Again in 1869, they elected representatives to the Cortes, but continued instability in the Spanish government made further liberalization unlikely.

The result of this checkered and frustrating pattern was the growth of a powerful home rule movement in Puerto Rico which sought to maintain strong ties with Spain, yet also to secure a broader participation for the islanders in the administration of their own affairs. Another result was the encouragement of a smaller, but not insignificant separatist movement which, drawing comfort and intellectual direction from the revolutionary ferment in neighboring Cuba, engaged in isolated but violent uprisings and ardent propagandizing. These activities brought about an era of severe repression marked by the suspension of civil liberties, the exile of a number of prominent Puerto Rican intellectuals, and even reprisals against the persons and property of suspect individuals.

But it is clear that the majority of politically active Puerto Ricans were committed to legal procedures for obtaining greater local autonomy without any disruption of firm cultural and international connection with the Spanish Nation. This element formed a political movement, and later a political party, the Liberal Reformist Party, to present the island's case before the Spanish Government. Despite the suppressions of the 1870's, the Liberal Reformists continued to gain new adherents and to pursue legal means to attain their goals. In 1887, this party suffered an internal division, but both new parties resulting from it maintained home rule as their goal, differing mainly over methods and personalities.

Finally, in 1896, Puerto Rican home rule advocates achieved an agreement with the Spanish Liberal Party, then in the role of opposition. Through an abrupt series of developments in the Spanish Government, the Liberal Party came to power, and faithful to their agreement with the Puerto Rican Autonomy Commission of 1896, arranged for the declaration of an autonomous charter for the island. The preamble to the decree of November 25, 1897, which established the new constitution, stated its liberal intent in these words: "When it is proposed to intrust the direction of their affairs to peoples that have attained their majority, either autonomy should not be offered to them at all, or it should be given to them complete. * * *"[1]

The changes proposed by the autonomous charter promised a very different sort of government. Before 1897, the Government of Puerto Rico was basically an authoritarian regime, with a Governor General appointed by the Crown possessing broad executive and military powers. Except for their membership in the Cortes, islanders did not elect representatives with legislative powers. Laws were either enacted in the mother country or decreed by the appointed executive officials. Some municipal self-government was provided, but its effectiveness was often negated when Governors virtually handpicked candidates for local office. The number of persons permitted to vote and serve in public office was sharply limited by rigid educational and property qualifications. It is clear that for most of the period of Spanish rule, opportunities for political expression and for a voice in the affairs of government were negligible for a vast majority of the people of Puerto Rico.

The charter of 1897 offered major reforms. Not only would Puerto Ricans elect delegates with full voting rights to both houses of the Cortes, they would also elect the members of an insular chamber of representatives and 8 of the 15 members of the council of administration (senate). The Governor General, who would continue to be appointed by the Crown, would select the remaining seven councilors. The powers of the Governor were reduced by the initiatives allowed to the legislature, but he retained the right to suspend civil rights and to refer insular legislation to the Council of Ministers of Spain if he felt it to be detrimental or unconstitutional. The legislature was given power to pass on all matters of purely insular importance, to fix the budget and determine tariffs and taxes, as well as to accept or reject commercial treaties concluded by the home government without Puerto Rican participation.

The autonomous charter was decreed in November 1897; in February of 1898, the first Puerto Rican cabinet was appointed; in March, general elections were held for the legislature; in April, the Spanish-American War was declared; and in July 1898, American troops occupied Puerto Rico. The autonomous charter, the result of nearly 20 years of patient petitioning and planning by Puerto Rican politicians, was in actual operation for only 4 months when the Spanish-American War ended the experiment. Its short life had allowed no opportunity for the masses to develop interest or ability in self-government, and even the elected officials and cabinet members had no real opportunity to gain experience in public administration. Nevertheless, the Charter of 1897 became a symbol of minimum expectations to which Puerto Rican leaders and political parties would frequently point. No matter how liberal the reforms which the United States might offer, islanders could always compare them with the virtually untried, but theoretically liberal provisions of the autonomous constitution. It became a yardstick of liberality which the United States must match or exceed, for failing to do so would brand the new relationship as inadequate. Furthermore, the long fight for autonomy had created a small but exceptionally able nucleus of political figures who commanded party machinery and coteries of followers. Chief among these were Luis Muñoz Rivera, who had led the Autonomy Commission of 1896, and José Celso Barbosa, who had broken with Muñoz over the methods employed by that Commission. Their political enmity was to carry over well into the American era—another legacy of the struggle for autonomy under the Spanish which would pose difficulty for the coming American regime.

B. THE MILITARY GOVERNMENT

The military operation in Puerto Rico was brief and easy. The people were calm and cooperative, and the "invasion" was quickly completed. The American officers turned their attention to economic and social conditions, perceiving immediately that a gigantic rehabilitation task was before them. Most Puerto Ricans were hopeful, even expectant, that the presence of the United States would result in a rapid improvement in their lives. Aside from a comparatively small, educated aristocratic class who lived the "good life," the island was already a vast slum. Society was rigidly stratified into a tiny upper class, a relatively small middle class, and an extensive laborer or peon group. Virtually all of the 300,000 Negroes and mulattoes were in the latter class. Spanish was universally spoken. According to the last Spanish census, taken in 1897, only 13 percent of the million inhabitants could read and write. With 300,000 children of school age, only 27,000 were receiving some form of education. Less than $35,000 was being spent annually for education. Gen. George W. Davis, as military governor of the island, characterized nine-tenths of the population as being poor beyond anything Americans could imagine. According to a report prepared for the U.S. government in

1899, many families had only one scanty meal each day, only one-fifth of the people owned a pair of shoes, and wages, if work was available, were less than 50 centavos a day. Most of the people were drinking from streams and wells judged unsafe by American officials. Homes, often devoid of furniture, were crude 1-room affairs of board and thatch, set on poles. Only 175 miles of hard-surfaced road existed. There were few bridges or roads worthy of the name, with interior communications being along paths and trails.

A census ordered by the U.S. War Department in 1899 served to corroborate the initial impressions of military occupation officials. This census stressed the depressed conditions of the masses and the total neglect of public facilities for education, sanitation, health, and transportation. It also revealed a land distribution imbalance which was already serious, for it showed that less than 2 percent of the 39,000 farms contained 70 percent of the island's land under cultivation. Certainly the economic and social conditions as perceived by U.S. officials were shocking and would require much attention and money if progress toward marked improvement were to be made.

The 2-year period (1898–1900) of military occupation of Puerto Rico was fruitful in many ways. While it was soon apparent that there was a lack of planning and purpose in the U.S. policy for the island, responsible military officers proceeded immediately to take steps to improve the economic and social circumstances. A board of health, a bureau of education, and a bureau of public works were created and were delegated the task of correcting the most glaring deficiencies. Drastic reforms in the judicial system, designed to bring the administration of justice in line with procedures in mainland courts, were instituted. Public elections for local officials in the island's municipalities were held under the supervision of American officers. In these elections a mayor, a vice judge, a town council, and a group of school trustees were chosen from candidates nominated in political conventions.

In the midst of the military occupation, while officials struggled with the novel circumstances of their new charge, a disastrous hurricane struck the island on August 8, 1899. Although the U.S. Weather Bureau at San Juan had some advance knowledge of the storm, poor communication and transportation facilities resulted in a failure to warn many of the communities and people of the danger. The storm broke over the south coast near the port city of Ponce and swept northwest, leaving death and destruction in its wake. When the storm's total cost was finally assessed, it was found that 3,000 people had been killed, two-thirds of them in the Ponce area. The homes and possessions of 250,000 people, one-fourth of the population, were wiped out. Thousands of head of cattle were destroyed; roads and bridges were obliterated; sugar and coffee crops were decimated. Perhaps the most serious long-range effect of the disaster was the uprooting of the shade trees so necessary for the protection of the coffee bushes. At best, these would take 5 years to restore. The storm had struck an appalling blow to a people and an island which were already in bleak circumstances. The task confronting those who sought rapid betterment now would be infinitely more difficult.

Puerto Rico's economy had never been healthy. Poverty and unemployment had become a way of life for much of the population. Dislocations of the war and invasion, a complete upset in traditional trade and commercial patterns, and uncertainty about the future had caused further deterioration. To these negative circumstances the frightful damage of the hurricane was added. While emergency food, clothing, and medicines were sent from the United States through disaster relief agencies, far more money was needed. General Davis appealed to Congress to allow the island to float a $10-million bond issue and to establish a tax structure which could service the debt. Ultimately Congress appropriated $200,000 for the relief of the hurricane sufferers, but this came many months after the disaster.

C. THE FORMATION OF CIVIL GOVERNMENT: THE FORAKER ACT

While military occupation officials were seeking to cope with the staggering economic and social problems and were making significant adjustments in local governmental procedures, they awaited major political decisions which were expected to come from the Congress and the McKinley Administration. Puerto Ricans were growing restive under the continuation of military rule. While they were grateful for efforts made on their behalf and for the compassionate approach Americans had demonstrated, they could not understand the lack of a decisive policy concerning their relationship with the United States. In the articulate and educated circles of the island, rumors were spreading that Puerto Rico was not to become an integral part of the United States, as they had originally supposed. Pressure was gradually brought to bear upon a somewhat reluctant Republican Administration in Washington for action which would bring an end to the military occupation and prescribe a permanent formula of government and status for the island.

In late 1898, President McKinley had appointed prominent clergyman Henry Carroll to head a special investigatory commission. After holding hearings and talking informally with many Puerto Ricans, Commissioner Carroll decided that the island people were moral, industrious, intellectually able, obedient, and respectful of the law. He stated that they were eager to govern themselves in local matters: Indeed, they would be deeply disappointed if the opportunity were denied them. Despite the fact that only a small minority of the people were educated and experienced in government, Carroll averred that he had "* * * no hesitation in affirming that the people have good claims to be considered capable of self-government." He was convinced that they possessed the qualities necessary to develop a "high type of citizenship." [2]

Commissioner Carroll recommended that territorial status be granted along with all the usual perquisites thereof; that a fully elective bicameral legislature be established; and that judicial reform, mass education, and the reform of the social system be undertaken, but with careful sensitivity to the valuable and valued elements of the Spanish tradition. Carroll's perceptive and sympathetic viewpoint was to be overruled by the cautious pessimism of the War Department when plans for civil government were drawn up. Despite the failure of his recommendations, his liberalism was shared by many other Americans. Time was to prove the accuracy of his judgment and the wisdom of his recommendations.

The officials of the military occupation had been sympathetic to the islanders' economic plight and had instituted numerous reforms to improve conditions, but generally they were not in favor of liberal grants of autonomy. General Davis, who had been the most important occupation official, appeared at congressional hearings and was widely quoted as a vigorous opponent of too much immediate power for Puerto Ricans. He urged a government built around the appointive powers of the President, with a U.S. governor and a cabinet containing some Puerto Ricans. This group would exercise both legislative and executive functions. Davis agreed that some day an elected legislature might be feasible but he was vigorously opposed to placing such powers in the hands of an untrained, uneducated people. He argued that they needed much more experience which could best be acquired in the municipal governments being established. In commenting upon the capacity of the islanders for immediate self-government, General Davis said: [3]

> The people generally have no conception of political rights combined with political responsibilities. Privileges they all desire, but they seem to have very little conception of political responsibility and the obligation of all to bow to the will of the majority.

As it became obvious that the Puerto Rican question would be considered by the 56th Congress in its session beginning in December, 1899, Puerto Rican and U.S. spokesmen began addressing their attention to the important decisions which would be made. For the United States the issue of how to treat the newly acquired island with its backward economy, its alien population speaking a foreign language, and its virtually complete inexperience in democratic arts was a dilemma. Military occupation had proceeded along improvised humanitarian principles and the assumption that Puerto Rico would be duly incorporated as a territory of the Union. But no really solid guidelines had been established. Vastly differing territories, in far-flung regions of the seas, had been acquired recently. A policy was needed for the newly annexed Hawiian Islands, for Guam, for the Philippine Islands, and for Puerto Rico.

Early in December, 1899, Secretary of War Elihu Root recommended that Puerto Rico be given a government in which the decisive and controlling roles would be allotted to Americans appointed by the President. He spoke of elastic provisions to allow for enlarged native participation when it was found to be safe, feasible, and desirable. A few days later President William McKinley's message to Congress proposed an end to military occupation and the creation of a temporary government for Puerto Rico. His recommendations closely followed those suggested by Root, for he talked of an appointed legislative council composed of Americans and Puerto Ricans whose actions would be subject to the approval of the governor and either the Congress or the President before they became effective. Certainly President McKinley was not advocating a liberal grant of local autonomy in these proposals. Undoubtedly he was basing his views on advice of the War Department and its occupation officials.

While both Secretary Root and President McKinley were reluctant to offer extensive privileges in government to the island, they clearly urged that the island's goods be granted free entry into the American market without tariff application. The dual issue of finding sufficient operating revenues to meet the numerous needs of Puerto Rican government and the treatment of the island in regard to U.S. tariff laws had consistently loomed as important to occupation officials. Root regarded economic well-being as paramount to a people's contentment and docility. He admitted that circumstances since the U.S. occupation "have not resulted in an increase of prosperity, but the reverse." Claiming that the economic success of the island depended upon its ability to sell its coffee, sugar, and tobacco, Root concluded:[4]

> So long as the island was a part of the Spanish possessions there was substantially free trade with Spain and Cuba. The total exports from Puerto Rico for the four years preceding 1897 averaged $16,000,000, less than 1/6 to the United States, and about 1/2 to Spain and Cuba. Immediately after the transfer of sovereignty, Spain and Cuba erected tariff barriers against Puerto Rican goods, while the United States retained its existing restrictions * * *. It is plain that it is essential to the prosperity of the island that she should receive substantially the same treatment at our hands that she received while a Spanish colony and that the United States' markets be open to her.

Again following the lead of the War Department in its views, President McKinley's message to Congress in December 1899, had made his position on tariffs emphatically clear when he said that all customs tariffs between the United States and Puerto Rico should be abolished and Puerto Rican products should enjoy free access to our markets.

When congressional committees held hearings on proposals for Puerto Rican Government and policies, they also were largely influenced by War Department officials and reports. Puerto Ricans representing tobacco and sugar interests appeared in behalf of free trade, while others urged full territorial status and provisions for universal manhood suffrage despite mass illiteracy. Puerto Ricans urging a liberal grant of local autonomy pointed to the proclamation made by Maj. Gen. Nelson Miles on July 29, 1898, upon invading Puerto Rico. This proclamation, which was widely circulated, was frequently cited as sufficient reason to expect liberality from the Americans. It stated:[5]

> In the cause of liberty, justice, and humanity, its [the United States] military forces have come to occupy the island of Puerto Rico. They come bearing the banner of freedom, inspired by a noble purpose. * * * They bring you the fostering arm of a nation of free people, whose greatest power is in justice and humanity to all those living within its fold. We have not come to make war upon the people of a country that for centuries has been oppressed, but on the contrary, to bring you protection. * * * to promote your prosperity, and to bestow upon you the immunities and blessings of the liberal institutions of our Government.

Following the hearings, the reports issued by congressional committees ranged over the whole gamut of issues relative to the island. Such things as the constitutionality of acquiring the territory, the extension of the Constitution of the United States to the island, the legal status of Puerto Ricans, the nature of a civil government, and the pros and cons of extending internal revenue laws and tariff duties to the island were cited as basic considerations in the problem. The Senate report proposed that 25 percent of existing U.S. tariffs should be levied and that Federal internal revenue laws should apply; however, all receipts from these sources would be channeled into the Puerto Rican treasury for governmental purposes. Also claiming an abundant precedent for withholding the provisions of the U.S. Constitution from Puerto Rico, the report argued that congressional action specifically extending all or any part of the Constitution was valid. This committee wanted Congress to withhold the Constitution so it would not be bound in legislating for the territory. The Senate report expressed a boldly autocratic view of the powers of Congress over the island when it stated:[6]

> [Congress] can limit or restrict its inhabitants [Puerto Rico's] in any * * * personal or public quality, privilege, or right, and may therefore tax them as

> other citizens, or tax them more or tax them less than others; it may give them free markets in the United States or levy impost duties as it may seem fit * * *. On the question of power, therefore, to enact the provisions of this bill, there is nothing open to controversy. The sole question is one of expediency, what is right, and what is best.

While Congress prepared to consider the numerous issues relative to legislating on behalf of Puerto Rico, the insular press devoted daily attention to the important matter. Puerto Rican delegations in Washington and interested people on the island were divided about what position to take. They vacillated between accepting what Congress seemed willing to offer—a drastically reduced tariff and a share in a restricted civil government—and objecting vigorously to anything less than free trade and full territorial status. Convinced that Congress was seriously divided on what to do, La Correspondencia advised holding out for free trade and territorial status. The newspaper's editors argued that the United States seemed to be changing its position from historic expansionism to imperialism in the interest of pressure groups such as sugar and tobacco trusts. Opinions were voiced that even if Congress carried out the Republican decision to treat the island differently from all previous territorial acquisitions, the Supreme Court would overrule such actions. La Correspondencia commented with these words: "The American people could not possibly give their assent to an immoral proposition." [7]

The momentous congressional debate on Puerto Rican issues commenced in the House of Representatives on February 20, 1900. Despite an obvious need for an end to military government, the bill introduced by Representative Saveno E. Payne simply called for the extension of federal internal revenue laws to the island and the application of 25 percent of the Dingley tariff rates, with receipts being channeled into the Puerto Rican treasury. Originally the Payne Bill had called for the inclusion of Puerto Rico in the U.S. market, in accordance with the publicly stated views of President McKinley and Secretary of War Root, but within a month the bill was drastically altered by Administration forces.

When the debate opened on the revised Payne Bill, a wave of protest from opposition Democrats, Puerto Ricans, and U.S. newspapers greeted the proposals. The New York Times editorialized frequently on the injustice of the decision and hinted that the Republican switch in intentions had been inspired by pressure from special interest groups and the spectre of Philippine Island competition if all the new acquisitions should be treated as traditional territories. Puerto Rican petitions and memorials complained of the continued military occupation, a "crushing tariff system," and the stagnation of the economy, which was growing steadily worse.

With typical eloquence one memorial posed some very basic questions for the Congress:[8]

> [The United States has not been fair to those] who gave their hand to their redeemer, * * * who turned their backs upon the old conditions and accepted the new, only to discover themselves cut off from all the world—a people without a country, a flag almost without name, orphans without a father * * *. Who are we? What are we? * * * Are we citizens or are we subjects? Are we brothers and our property territory, or are we bondmen of a war and our island a crown colony?

Other Puerto Rican petitioners argued that sufficient revenue could be raised for the insular government by other means than the proposed tariff.

In a sense the House debate on the first piece of Puerto Rican legislation to come before it reflects the preoccupation of Congressmen with tariff and trust topics, typical of the political issues of that time. Many Members of Congress apparently failed to see the great, fundamental constitutional issues at stake in the Payne Bill and in the entire Puerto Rican question. Nevertheless, some members did examine the constitutional aspects of the bill's proposal for a tariff, claiming that it violated the "uniform duties, imposts, and excises" clause of the Constitution, and that congressional power to make rules and regulations for the government of the territories must be exercised within the limits of the Constitution.

Republican forces resented charges that the bill was a protectionist measure, insisting instead that it was generous and inspired by humanitarian impulses to enable the island to build schools and other public facilities rapidly. Soon a decision was made to reduce the proposed 25 percent of Dingley tariff rates to 15 percent. This decision was explained as being a result of new revenue estimates based on huge volumes of goods being held in insular warehouses.

Aside from the tariff interest, the House debate on Puerto Rico soon ranged into the whole broad problem of the acquisition of an empire and how to rule it. Tempers grew short; speeches were acrimonious and bitterly partisan. Applause, jeers, and catcalls punctuated the telling points. Occasionally the galleries erupted in partisan demonstrations. One Congressman asked the bill's sponsors:[9]

> * * * Are you ready to present to the world the anomaly of a government restrained by the Constitution in one quarter of the globe, and yet possessed of despotic power in all other regions of the earth? * * * [The Constitution] was ordained to limit the powers of this government in all places and over all men. * * *

Others argued that self-interest had to be the principal concern of the United States. Representative Richardson, in the discussions regarding Hawaii in 1898, had made a statement which was now cited again to the Congress:[10]

> Nations have always acted, and should govern themselves at all times, upon principles entirely different from those which actuate individuals * * *. Governments must base their action upon purely selfish considerations. In looking at the question * * * of any foreign territory, the only question that should enter into consideration by us is the one question: is it best for the United States? The weal or woe, the misery of happiness, the poverty or prosperity of the foreigner or those to be annexed is not involved. * * *

Another interesting question examined in the House debate concerned the status of the people of Puerto Rico. Some members insisted that the Constitution was automatically extended to Puerto Rico the moment the Treaty of Paris ceded the island to the United States. Others claimed only direct legislative action could assign political status or extend the Constitution or any of its parts to the island. Democrats wanted a clear admission that Puerto Ricans were citizens of the United States, covered and protected by the Constitution. Despite the vigorous efforts of opponents to change drastically the Payne Bill, it passed the House by a nearly straight party vote of 172 to 160 on February 28, 1900.

Three days after House passage, the Senate took up consideration of the Puerto Rican bill. Immediately Senator Joseph Benson Foraker, Republican of Ohio, Chairman of the Committee on Pacific Islands and Puerto Rico, proposed an amendment which substituted a more comprehensive measure for the House-approved bill. Thus, in the Senate debate, the tariff issue was subordinated to matters of governmental structure and the status of the island and its people. The military occupation was to be replaced by a civil government. The 15 percent tariff provision of the House bill would expire on March 1, 1902, after which free trade would exist, Puerto Ricans would be granted a civil government restricted and controlled so that the United States would retain final authority over its actions. The Foraker Bill provided for a presidentially appointed governor who would serve a 4-year term, an appointive Executive Council of 11 men, and a House of Delegates of 35 popularly elected persons who would serve 2-year terms. The Executive Council would have both executive and legislative duties, serving as the governor's cabinet and department administrators, and sharing in legislative functions as the coequal upper house. All laws would be subject to the governor's veto and Congressional annulment. The executive council would have some Puerto Ricans but a majority of Americans. The proposal called for a restricted male suffrage and property and educational qualifications for office holders. The island would be entitled to a nonvoting delegate to the U.S. House of Representatives. The judicial structure would remain essentially the same as under military occupation but a U.S. district court would be established, the island would become part of the 2d district for appeals purposes, and appeals would go directly from the Supreme Court of the island to the Supreme Court of the United States.

Democrats in the Senate immediately renewed the fight they had lost in the House. They deplored the tariff feature, criticized the restrictive nature of the government proposals, and took up again the issue of whether the Constitution follows the flag and whether Puerto Ricans were thus citizens of the United States covered by the guarantees of the Bill of Rights. Democratic pressure led Foraker to admit that he regarded Puerto Rico as a dependency of the United States for which Congress could legislate as it saw fit without restriction. He emphasized that his "generous, unique, humanitarian" proposals were strictly temporary. To reenforce his point he cited a provision for a three-member civilian commission to make recommendations to Congress for the island. Foraker argued that Puerto Ricans needed time to gain experience in self-government. The Senator rationalized his position by claiming that many members of his committee had held out for even more restrictions and controls, so the bill before the Senate actually represented a middle-of-the-road approach which granted neither too little nor too much control.

When Democrats vigorously attacked nearly every feature of the Foraker Bill, its sponsor professed to be surprised and hurt. He felt that it was inconceivable that a bill "with such generous provisions" could be regarded as illiberal or parsimonious. Foraker claimed that this proposed legislation was an unparalleled example of generosity and liberality. In answering the criticism of the tariff feature, Foraker probably revealed the true nature of the Administration's fears when he said:[11]

> I do not think there is any better philanthropy than that which seeks to protect the wage-earner and capital of this country from unjust competition from abroad. We fear no competition from Puerto Rico * * * but * * * there * * * may come a competition which would be prejudicial.

Because opponents claimed that a Puerto Rican tariff on goods imported from the United States was, in effect, an illegal export tax, Foraker asserted that Congress received the implicit right to control and regulate trade for territories from its plenary power to legislate for territories. Furthermore, he made it clear that he regarded Puerto Rico as a dependency of the United States, belonging to but not an integral part of this nation.

Vigorous newspaper opposition to the tariff portion of the legislation continued. The pro-Administration Washington Evening Star repeatedly urged through leading editorials that a grave mistake should be rectified while there was yet time. Claiming that the tariff feature was a result of pressure brought to bear by interest groups such as Connecticut River Valley tobacco growers and Southern beet sugar growers, the newspaper called for "justice and fair play for the people of Puerto Rico."[12] La Correspondencia in San Juan claimed that only a single word from the White House reenforcing President McKinley's message of December, 1899, would be needed to kill the tariff feature. It lamented the fact that McKinley apparently intended to stand behind the House Ways and Means Committee rather than to see justice done to Puerto Rico.

Despite general public opposition, memorials and petitions from the Puerto Ricans, and a virtually unanimous press opinion against the Puerto Rican bill, the Republican leadership moved the legislation into position for final passage. Beating down Democratic efforts to amend the bill in favor of free trade, the Senate passed the legislation on April 4, 1900, and returned it to the House of Representatives. Soon it was apparent that an effort would be made to hurry the drastically different Senate version through the House to avoid the buildup of further opposition pressure. The Evening Star editorialized on the situation in this manner:[13]

> The leaders of the House have decided to jam the Puerto Rican bill through that body. They are afraid to delay, afraid of discussion. Some of them have views of their own about civil government for the island, but the Senate having made that matter a feature of the bill under consideration, they feel bound to accept the Senate's action as to that, as the Senate felt bound to accept their action as to the tariff. The Senate held the House up on the one proposition, and now the House must hold the Senate up on the other. All or nothing is the choice.

Puerto Rican delegations in Washington were confident, however, that significant revisions would be made in the bill when the House considered it anew.

Soon it was apparent that little chance would be given for pertinent changes in the Senate version of the bill. The House Committee on Rules report proposed a rule which would allow only 20 minutes debate on each side and prohibit any motion to amend, or recommit the bill. The House would be asked to accept the Senate amendments in toto, rather than to consider each item on its merits. The House galleries were packed with spectators when the consideration of the special rule for guiding the final debate on the Puerto Rican bill commenced. A Democratic motion to recommit the bill to the Committee on Rules was declared out of order. Then on a party-line vote to adopt the special rule, the Republican majority stood firmly together in a vote of 158–142.

In the debate on the adoption of the Senate amendments, House Democrats complained that the House Insular Committee had never been allowed to consider a bill for the civil government of the island. They referred to "some power behind the throne" which had thwarted every effort to get a bill for a civil government before the Insular Committee. They claimed this had been a deliberate decision because it would be easier to pass the tariff bill if there were no responsible government in the island. Their concern was that the House was being rushed into a decision on the bill without any opportunity to hold hearings, debate its merit, or amend its features.

As the time approached for final House action on the bitterly disputed measure, both parties sent out urgent pleas for all members to return to Washington for the crucial vote. The final vote came on April 12, 1900, only 1 day after the Senate package containing 20 pages of amendments had been reported to the House floor. The Republican margin of 161 to 153 was greater than anticipated. That same evening the Foraker Act was signed into law by President McKinley.

Following the bitter struggle over the passage of the Foraker Act in April 1900, the Congress turned its attention to other matters. To all intents and purposes it quickly forgot the territory over which it had debated so long and acrimoniously. Now that Puerto Rico had provisions for a civil government, it was up to the executive department to implement the act. The next congressional debate on Puerto Rico would occur in 1909. The American press, which had followed the Puerto Rican legislation with avid interest, likewise turned to other topics.

In 1901 another important development in relation to Puerto Rico was the confirmation of the congressional actions by the U.S. Supreme Court. In a series of decisions popularly known as the Insular cases, the court, in effect, endorsed the right of Congress to legislate for the island in the manner that had been accomplished.[14] The vigorously disputed principle that the Constitution could be extended to the territories, in whole or in part, at the discretion of the Congress, was validated by the court. The idea that Congress could legislate for these territories, could withhold citizenship and the Bill of Rights from them, and could tax them without constitutional restraint was also tacitly affirmed. In fact, the entire position of the Republican majority in the great debate over the Puerto Rican legislation was upheld by these decisions. The distinction between incorporated and unincorporated territory was thus drawn, with the Court holding that by explicit, conscious action the Congress had chosen not to extend the Constitution to the island and had demonstrated a determination to treat Puerto Rico differently from traditional territory. Thus, the island fell into a new classification of unincorporated territory, with the implication that its destiny was not yet charted but was subject to the future decisions of Congress.[15]

D. STATUS POLITICS IN PUERTO RICO: THE CRISIS OF 1909; THE DICKINSON REPORT

The preceding historical review of the events which carried Puerto Rico from her status as a Spanish colony to the 1900 Foraker Act has touched only in a minor way on Puerto Rican aspirations. Because the topic of ultimate political destiny has been so significant in the political evolution of the island, some emphasis upon the emergence of the status issue seems necessary.

It seems clear that most Puerto Ricans who were politically interested and articulate in 1898 were hopeful, even confident, that what happened to their island and its people under American leadership would be good. Evidence of this appeared in their friendly reception of the U.S. Army and the enthusiastic cooperation the Puerto Ricans gave to the new authorities. Most of the people made the logical assumption that the United States, dedicated to democratic principles and liberal institutions, could do nothing less than extend such principles and institutions to those who came under their jurisdiction. For those who thought at all about the new relationship, there seems to have been a concern that the island should be granted broad provisions for local self-government within the framework of traditional territorial status under the American flag.

The Orthodox Autonomy Party of the Spanish era, led by José C. Barbosa, which had opposed the methods employed by Louis Muñoz Rivera's Liberal Party in obtaining the charter of 1897, dissolved itself in March of 1899. It then reconstituted itself under the name of Puerto Rican Republican Party and declared that its

> aims, programs and methods [have been] completely different from those which must now be established in view of the change in nationality the country is undergoing.[16]

The new party favored immediate incorporation of Pureto Rico as a territory, rapid Americanization, the broadening of the suffrage, and cooperation with the authorities. Its manifesto declared: [17]

> We are convinced that for our country, because of its small size and its slight political experience to date, independence would be a mistake.

Similarly, the Liberal Party, led by Muñoz Rivera, met, declared itself disbanded, and immediately constituted the American Federalist Party. The new Federal Party explained that it had chosen this name because,[18]

> nowhere else in the world is there autonomy so broad and indestructible as that which the American patriarchs created when they wrote the codes governing the States and Territories.

The Federalists affirmed their aspiration for self-government. They asked for a unique sort of territorial status under which Puerto Rico would have all the privileges of statehood except voting congressional representation. They would elect all of their officials including the Governor, and the acts of the Puerto Rican Legislature would be final, with no power of review vested in the U.S. Federal authorities.

There was, thus, a broad area of consensus between the two parties. Their differences were more of degree and attitude than of dogma. The Federals were more aggressive and specific in their demands for automony, and they were more resistant to Americanization in cultural and social affairs.

Under the military governors there had been some bitter exchanges between the two parties over policies relating to the appointment of officials. In the municipal elections directed by the American military government, campaigning had been bitter, but Liberals emerged the victors by a 2-to-1 margin.

Upon the passage of the Foraker Act, five Puerto Ricans were appointed to the executive council: two Federalists, two Republicans, and one nonpolitical figure. One of the first duties of the executive council was to establish the districts for the elections to the house of delegates to be held in November of 1900. A violent quarrel erupted over this issue, which eventually led to the resignation of the two Federalist members of the council. In party conventions held during the late summer, the attitudes of the two parties were clearly demonstrated. The Republicans endorsed the Organic Act and the Governor, although it seems clear that they were disappointed in the limited amount of self-government extended under the Foraker Act. The Federalists, on the other hand, attacked the Organic Act, charged the Governor with favoritism, and even endorsed the Presidential candidacy of William Jennings Bryan, an act not calculated to soothe the Republican-appointed island administration. On November 4, just two days before elections, the Federal Party informed the executive council that it was withdrawing its slate of candidates. Although the ballots carrying the names of both slates of candidates were already printed and could not be replaced, Federalist discipline held and the boycott was carried out. All 35 members of the house of delegates elected were Republicans, as was the Resident Commissioner.

In 1902, the Federalists contested the elections, but lost to the Republicans. By this time, however, a new political structure was evolving. Rosendo Matienzo Cintrón, a Republican member of the executive council, resigned his post and dedicated himself to the formation of a new political movement. Luis Muñoz Rivera, who had been in self-imposed exile in New York, returned to the island to join with Matienzo in the formation of the new party movement. The two men were disturbed by the deep partisan rivalry which divided the island. They believed that such partisanship served only to alienate Puerto Ricans from one another, to confuse public opinion, and to perpetuate their colonial status. In 1904, the new party was formed and took the name of Union of Puerto Rico. In its platform, the party declared that it would be automatically dissolved when Puerto Rico came to be constituted under a definitive status. In the fifth point of their platform the party defined an acceptable definitive status as being either statehood, independence, or self-rule under the American flag. The inclusion of independence as an alternative marked a major departure. It was the first time that independence was officially suggested as a possible solution, and also indicated a drift from insistence upon territorial incorporation to a consideration of various status possibilities. The membership of the new party was made up primarily of Federalists, as that party had dissolved itself in 1904 upon the creation of the union. A number of Republicans also joined, feeling that the union would be a better vehicle for petitioning for reform of the Organic Act.

The Union Party was to dominate Puerto Rican politics from its formation in 1904 until 1920. It was this party which would lead the fight for the extension of greater self-government to Puerto Rico. As the years passed, and it became clear that the "temporary" Foraker Act was becoming permanent, the Union Party became more militant, and its independence wing grew increasingly stronger. Even though the Governors, beginning with Beekman Winthrop in 1905, petitioned the Congress for the extension of American citizenship to Puerto Ricans, and even though the house of delegates sent tides of memorials, letters, and delegations to plead for a broadened base of participation for Puerto Ricans in their own government, the Congress failed to turn its attention to any reform of the island's political structure.

Finally, in 1909, the growing tensions resulted in the first real government crisis in Puerto Rico. The house of delegates, made up completely of Union Party members, determined to force Congress to consider reforms by producing an artificial crisis. Throughout the 60-day legislative session of 1909, the Union Party organ, La Democracia, accused Governor Régis Post and his executive council of deliberately thwarting the will of Puerto Ricans and of discouraging any moves for reform. The house of delegates passed a number of bills which they correctly assumed the executive council would reject. Then in the last hour of the last day of the legislative session, they prepared a memorial to the Congress and the President, complaining of the "unjust organic law which makes it impossible for the people's representatives to pass the laws they desire." The legislators also informed the Government of their intention to adjourn without taking action on the budget and other vital appropriations bills. Governor Post warned that if action on the budget were not forthcoming, he would refer the matter to Congress. Because a congressional airing of their problems was precisely what the Puerto Ricans desired, the delegates remained adamant in their refusal to act upon the money bill. Thus, the stage was set for transferring the basic dispute to Washington.

The crisis was not occasioned simply by disagreement upon specific bills under consideration; it was, in effect, an attack upon the whole structure established by the Foraker Act. The real issue at stake was whether Puerto Ricans should have legislative freedom or continue to be dominated by the mainland-controlled executive council. Opinion in the island was solidly behind the house of delegates and their rebellion against the system. But most Americans regarded the actions of the Puerto Ricans as bordering on anarchy.

A special message to Congress by President Taft on May 10, 1909, outlined the situation, proposed a course of action, and presented an extensive collection of documents relative to the dispute. Taft minced no words in blaming the whole crisis upon the selfish and capricious actions of the house of delegates. He then recommended that the Foraker Act be amended by providing that, in any year that appropriations bills were not passed, sums equal to the appropriations of the previous year would be paid out to operate the government.

President Taft used part of his special message to review the 11-year history of the United States association with the island. He compared Puerto Rico's position to that of "favored daughter" upon whom the father has lavished his generosity. The President cited coastal surveys, harbor improvements, 2,400 new schools, 624 miles of newly paved roads, and mass innoculations of the population against smallpox and other epidemic diseases. His conclusion was: "There never was a time in the history of the island when the average prosperity was higher, when opportunity was greater, or when liberty of thought and action was more secure." [19]

The Presidential message ended with a somewhat ambivalent suggestion that Congress might wish to consider some liberalization of the Foraker Act, but that it should not do so as long as the house of delegates had "the power of absolute control over appropriations." However, in the next paragraph Taft cast doubt upon the wisdom of any extension of self-government by saying: "The present development is only an indication that we have gone somewhat too fast in the extension of political power to them for their own good." [20]

Puerto Rican reaction to Taft's message to Congress was sarcastic and bitter. The Union Party paper, La Democracia, claimed that the President had been completely deceived by the American officials in Puerto Rico and the executive council. It belabored the theme that the President had demonstrated passionate dislike, injustice, and antidemocratic leanings. He was characterized as "a colonial politician who is openly and frankly imperialistic." [21]

In contrast to the denunciation of the President's position by the Puerto Rican press, editorial comment by American newspapers praised the message and condemned the "contentious leaders ambitious for political power." The Washington Post claimed the Puerto Ricans had proven themselves unfit for the democratic opportunities given to them. Likewise the Washington Evening Star concluded that the Puerto Ricans had already been given too much liberty for their own welfare. It suggested that some of the political opportunity ought to be withdrawn.

Soon Congress responded to the President's message by taking up consideration of H.R. 9541, known as the Olmsted bill, which embodied the recommendations of the President for meeting the financial crisis. The debate again divided the Congress into imperialist and anti-imperialist factions, causing tempers to flare anew. In the debate on the Foraker Act, Puerto Rico had had no voice. Now Resident Commissioner Tulio Larrínaga, a member of the Unionist Party which had precipitated the legislative crisis, was there to explain his view of the situation. Wholeheartedly in accord with the actions taken by the house of delegates, Larrínaga claimed that from the inception of civil government the executive council had consistently dictated policy and forced its own views. He said that the Puerto Rican House of Delegates had repeatedly been forced to back away from its own positions on legislation because the American-dominated council had adopted a "no compromise" attitude. They had constantly threatened to go before Congress to have that body take away elections and legislative power altogether.

Resident Commissioner Larrínaga said he had no illusions about the temper and tendency of the Congress on this issue. He foresaw at the outset that the Congress would vote for the restrictions the President had suggested. Nevertheless, he wanted the record to show that there was a very good case for the losers in the dispute. He concluded by claiming that the real way to solve the problem was a liberalized system which would end the dual executive-legislative function of the executive council. Larrínaga implored Congress to hold in abeyance the Olmsted bill and consider at once needed revisions in the Foraker Act.

During the remainder of the sharp debate on the Puerto Rican crisis, angry speakers charged the house of delegates with "anarchy, bordering on revolution," while others defended them as being justified by long frustration and guilty of nothing reprehensible. Some

Congressmen warned that Puerto Rico was seething with open talk of independence. Democrats generally claimed that the legislative deadlock merely helped to illustrate that the Foraker Act was very unsatisfactory to a majority of the people.

Many members of Congress were angered by a pamphlet widely circulated in Washington by the Union Party delegation. On the flyleaf of the appeal appeared the words: "One million souls are living in Puerto Rico in an unbearable state of tyranny under the folds of the American flag." [22] The pamphlet also emphasized that the action taken had been designed to attract the attention of Congress to the need for reforms. Representative Olmsted refuted the pamphlet's charges as being grossly unfair and full of ingratitude. Claiming that the island had been given a "joy ride" for 9 years, he concluded: [23]

> There never was a charge more unjust or more baseless. The people of Puerto Rico never in their lives were so far from servitude as they are today.

Both Houses of Congress moved swiftly in 1909 to pass the Olmsted bill in order to forestall chaos in the island. But the whole affair had revealed the effectiveness of the Union Party strategy. Growing sentiment for major changes in the Foraker Act was revealed; hearings would be held to inquire into the relationship between mainland and the island; the movement for reform was underway. Although ultimate revision was still 8 years away, the turning point in the Puerto Rican drive came in the apparent rebuff of 1909, for Congress had again become acquainted with Puerto Rico.

As a direct result of the episode of 1909, President Taft sent Secretary of War J. M. Dickinson and Gen. Clarence R. Edwards to Puerto Rico in December 1909, to inquire into the island's economy, administration, and health. In his report to the President, Dickinson wrote: [24]

> It is clear that there is a general and almost universal desire and demand of all classes, interests, and political parties for American citizenship for all the people of Puerto Rico as a whole; for an elective upper house, so that, with no check but a veto by the governor, full legislative power shall be lodged in American citizens. [There is also a general demand] for the separation of executive and legislative functions.

After reporting the Puerto Rican desires, Dickinson proceeded to make his own recommendations, which were rather fundamentally different. He was convinced that such concessions would be disastrous to the island, would jeopardize investments, retard development, and result in further crises. He claimed that the stage of the people's education and experience did not warrant the drastic revisions proposed. In every respect the Secretary of War's recommendations for change reflected his distrust of the popular will and the fear of going too far. The people wanted a grant of citizenship, en masse: Dickinson proposed voluntary applications, individual oaths, and a restricted suffrage based upon citizenship. He also suggested denying the universal male suffrage already in practice for a decade by returning to literacy tests and tax receipts as conditions for voting. His response to the plea for an end to the executive council was a suggestion for an upper house composed of eight appointed and five elected members.

Evidently President Taft agreed with Dickinson's views. He submitted the Dickinson report to Congress with recommendations that the Foraker Act be revised along the lines proposed in the report. The whole tenor of his message leaned toward a more restricted exercise of self-government rather than the liberalizations the Puerto Ricans expected. Puerto Rican reaction to Taft's recommendations was that of anger and stunned disbelief. They had confidently expected that the 1910 session of Congress would result in the enactment of the proposals which had wide popular support on the island.

H.R. 23000 was introduced in the House of Representatives in response to Taft's proposals. Although committee hearings had revealed bitter Puerto Rican complaints against the Dickinson report, the bill was designed in accord with the recommendations made in that document. However, a vigorous minority report signed by seven members accompanied the favorable report by the Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs. This minority report described the proposed legislation as "ungenerous, restrictive, and reactionary." Claiming the island's government to be already more autocratic than democratic, it considered the proposed legislation to be a step backward.

The fate of H.R. 23000 illustrated again the difficulty of achieving action on Puerto Rican legislation. In 1909, in response to a crisis situation, Congress had completed action on the Olmsted amendments in less than 2 months. This time, despite a Presidential message and favorable reports in both Houses, successful passage was denied. Although the House of Representatives passed H.R. 23000 on June 10, 1910, the Senate never took up consideration of the legislation. Their failure to act did not result from animosity toward the bill, but from the fact that other items of higher political priority took precedence.

Puerto Ricans continued to put pressure upon Congress for changes in the Foraker Act, with greatest emphasis being upon the demand for an elective upper chamber. Bills were introduced again in 1912, with the House of Representatives again acting favorably upon a citizenship grant on March 4, 1912, but an elective Senate was not considered.

Efforts were then made to marshal support for Senate action. Both Gov. George R. Colton and President Taft issued endorsements of the citizenship proposals. Nevertheless, the legislation again failed to reach the Senate floor for debate or action. Indifference and lack of familiarity with the problems and concerns of the island people were the chief reasons for the inertia.

E. STATUS CHANGE UNDER WILSON: THE JONES ACT

The election in 1912 of Democrat Woodrow Wilson as President and Democratic majorities in both Houses of Congress stirred new hope in Puerto Rico for passage of liberal revisions of the Organic Act. But even with the sympathetic concern of the President and the Congress, the Puerto Rican problem was to be overshadowed by the more pressing concerns growing from the European crisis.

Before Woodrow Wilson took office, he announced that he favored citizenship and the extension of home rule for the island. Despite these sentiments, however, it was not until March, 1914, a full year after the Wilson Administration took office, that a Puerto Rican bill was reported out of a Congressional committee. In reporting H.R. 14866 to revise the organic act and grant citizenship, the House Insular Affairs Committee frankly criticized preceding Congresses for their long delay in granting revisions in what had been originally called a temporary government. It rebuked the Senate for having twice failed to act on major improvements passed by the House. The new bill by William Jones represented a more liberal approach than any previously reported. It included a bill of rights, a collective conferral of citizenship, and an elective Senate of 19 members totally divorced from any executive functions or from interference by appointed Americans. A similar bill with only minor variations was introduced in the Senate in July. But as Puerto Ricans waited hopefully, the attention of the world, and naturally of Congress, shifted dramatically as the result of the outbreak of World War I in the summer of 1914. In 1915 a flow of appeals for home rule action came from the island. Gov. Arthur Yager accompanied a delegation of Puerto Ricans who made the rounds of Washington officials trying to mobilize support for action. The New York Times, long a friend of the island, editorialized repeatedly in favor of prompt action, urging that the island be organized as a territory.

Having failed for 3 years to get a bill before Congress for consideration, the Democrats in 1916 were determined to fulfill their promises before the national elections. In January, 1916, the House Insular Affairs Committee reported H.R. 9533, virtually the same bill reported in March, 1914.

After many years of maneuvering, false starts, and frustrated hopes, the stage was thus set for the second great evolutionary action in the Puerto Rican-United States relationship. The "temporary" Foraker

Act of 1900 was about to be superseded by a new law. But H.R. 9533 would undergo a thorough scrutiny and a penetrating debate in each House before its successful passage. Grave doubts had to be allayed, and contradictory testimony from Puerto Ricans made that task even more difficult.

In the hearings on the Jones bill, delegations from the majority Unionist Party of Puerto Rico had expressed a preference for the designation of "citizen of Puerto Rico." They claimed that a substantial number of their fellow citizens would reject American citizenship if it were offered. During the floor debate, Resident Commissioner Muñoz Rivera expressed the same point of view, and suggested that a plebiscite be held to determine whether or not Puerto Ricans still desired American citizenship. Congressmen were understandably mystified and perplexed. An explanation of this seeming reversal of Puerto Rican opinion requires some consideration of the internal pressures of the insular political parties. It will be remembered that the Union Party's original platform had considered statehood, independence, or full local autonomy under the American flag as acceptable status choices. As the years passed and reform seemed impossible to obtain, the once-small independence wing of the Unionist Party, led by fiery orator José De Diego, gained strength. The stinging rebukes flung at the island during the 1909 legislative crisis and the continued indifference of the Administration to Puerto Rican demands piqued the latent nationalism of even the most moderate islanders. Many came to feel that both the cultural and political integrity of the island required that American influence be kept at arm's length. One manifestation of this point of view was to resist American citizenship.

When Muñoz Rivera, the Union Party leader and a dedicated moderate, was elected to the Resident Commissioner post in 1910, independentist De Diego was left a free hand in island affairs. In 1913, the Unionists dropped statehood from their list of acceptable alternatives. From Washington, Muñoz directed an endless stream of letters urging moderation and patience. Always perceptive, the Resident Commissioner had developed an amazingly accurate sense of what Congress might be expected to do, and he was convinced that the Wilson Administration would fulfill its promises to Puerto Rico. Finally, by 1914, he determined that independence agitation had to be controlled, not only for the protection of his own standing in the Union Party, but also because the more extreme statements of the De Diego wing were having a negative impact in Washington. Accordingly, at a convention held at Miramar, Santurce, a set of standards for party activities was adopted. These rules, the "Reglas de Miramar," reiterated that independence, preferably under the protection of the United States, was the ultimate goal of the Union Party; however, its immediate program was to obtain major reforms to the Foraker law by orderly, legal action. Finally, in direct rebuke to De Diego, the rules specified that even in defense of the ideal of independence, no Union member would be permitted to "* * * make any statement or commit any act which would jeopardize the party program. * * *" of the pursuit of immediate reforms.[25] When the "Reglas de Miramar" were upheld at another convention 1 year later, De Diego realized that he had been temporarily defeated, and he sailed for Spain, where he continued his agitation, but with far less influence.

By his victory at Miramar, Muñoz not only banished his rival: he also succeeded in holding the party together and in obtaining [illegible] mandate to continue his work for organic reform, a fact which he often cited in his speeches to the Congress. Nevertheless, the wily Muñoz was too good a politician to forget that the independence element had to be mollified, and there is much to suggest that his fiery criticisms of the Jones Bill were more designed for "home consumption" than for influencing his fellow Congressmen.

Perhaps even more basic to the confusing testimonies on the citizenship feature of the Jones bill was the fact that over the years, Congress had been partially misinformed regarding Puerto Rican feelings on this issue. The Republican Party of Puerto Rico and the labor movement (which organized the Socialist Party in 1915) were ardent supporters of American citizenship. Both of these groups had strong friends in Washington who supplemented the procitizenship memorials sent by the islanders. But the Republicans and the Labor-Socialist groups clearly constituted a minority in insular politics. They did not win an islandwide election from 1904 through 1920, and their few representatives in the House of Delegates were unable to check the activities of the overwhelming Union majorities. Thus, while the procitizenship parties received much attention in Washington, they spoke for only a minority of the people of the island. While some Unionists also favored American citizenship, the major complaint of that party had always been directed against the combined executive and legislative functions of the American-controlled Executive Council. Their primary demand was for an elective, native Senate, and for the delegation of all legislative powers to the insular legislature. But the American governors of the island paid little heed to this demand in their reports. They stressed the desire for citizenship, but until Arthur Yager became governor in 1913, none of them offered an accurate emphasis on the strength of the sentiment for a reformed legislative structure.

Thus, while Congressmen were confused and dismayed by objections to the extension of American citizenship to Puerto Rico, indications of that viewpoint had existed for some time. Congress was a victim of inaccurate reporting by American officials, and of its own ignorance of the political trends of Puerto Rico.

Other critics of the Jones bill questioned proposed restrictions upon the right to vote, the right to hold office, and time limitations upon accepting or rejecting citizenship. Requirements that a voter be an American citizen and prove that he was literate or was a taxpayer produced dissent, particularly since unrestricted male suffrage had been in effect for 16 years. The logic of such restrictions was hard to reconcile with the vastly improved literacy of the population and the desire to extend self-government. Nevertheless, efforts to amend such features were defeated, and the House approved the Jones bill on May 23, 1916, without a recorded vote. In this debate, unlike previous ones on Puerto Rico, there had been no determined party fight. Individuals had quarreled with specific features of the bill, but there was overwhelming support for the general intention of granting additional self-government. On the other hand there was no vigorous dissent from the technique of governing the island as an unincorporated territory whose status was still indeterminate.

The Senate Committee on Pacific Islands and Puerto Rico soon issued a favorable report on the bill, despite admitting that Puerto Rican positions on it had been so diverse as to be thoroughly confusing. The Senate version proposed amendments to eliminate the objectionable suffrage restrictions of the House bill.

On two previous occasions the Senate had neglected to act upon Puerto Rican bills passed by the House. For a time it seemed that the same fate would befall the Jones bill, H.R. 9533, for it failed to come to the Senate floor during the remainder of the 1916 session. But in his State of the Union Message opening the new session on December 5, 1916, President Wilson placed the Puerto Rican situation in the moral framework which had become his hallmark:[26]

> The argument for the proposed amendments to the Organic Law of Puerto Rico is brief and conclusive. The present laws governing the Island and regulating the rights and privileges of its people are not just. We have created expectations of extended privileges which we have not justified.

The Senate finally opened debate on the Jones bill on January 13, 1917. Chairman John F. Shafroth of the Committee on Pacific Islands and Puerto Rico managed the floor fight. He explained the reasons for hard core opposition to the citizenship provisions, but insisted that such objections were subsiding. He hoped that the Senate would amend the House position on suffrage restrictions. Shafroth experienced difficulty in getting the Puerto Rican legislation on the Senate calendar, so considerable time elapsed between each brief look at the Jones bill. New proposals on voting were made by Puerto Rican delegations. These suggested that all voters presently eligible should continue to qualify if they accepted citizenship, while all future registrants would have to prove literacy or tax payments. Property qualifications for membership in the legislature would be eliminated.

Some Senators were unsympathetic with the liberal proposals made for the Puerto Rican Organic Act. For example, Senator Albert Fall of New Mexico protested that the bill was about to grant more legislative rights than had ever been accorded any territory. Despite opposition and delaying actions, Shafroth's patience was finally rewarded when the Senate completed action on H.R. 9533 on February 20, 1917, and requested a conference on the bill.

In the Senate there had been 94 amendments to the original House bill. The conference committee asked the House to accept 65 of these, and requested that the Senate agree to delete 18 of its proposals, while both houses were asked to approve other amendments worked out by the conferees. Although there was some grumbling, the House approved the compromise version of the bill and the Senate followed suit. On March 2, 1917, President Wilson signed the Jones-Shafroth Act into law.

Another significant milestone in the United States-Puerto Rican relationship had at last been achieved. Seventeen years of economic and political evolution had finally resulted in U.S. citizenship for the islanders and liberalized governmental opportunities. Puerto Ricans now had a two-house legislature consisting of coequal bodies—the 19-member Senate and the 39-member House of Delegates, both chosen by universal male suffage, although a veto power was vested in the appointed governor and the President of the United States, and the Congress retained the power to annul acts of the legislature. The economic arrangements and other features of the relationship enacted in 1900 were left virtually intact. The question of ultimate or final political status was left unanswered. Puerto Rico was still an unincorporated territory of the United States. Puerto Rico had won some coveted gains. These had not come easily. Some persons darkly predicted that chaos and anarchy would surely follow. Others hopefully claimed that all talk of independence would now cease, and the island at last would be satisfied and content.

Part II. The Struggle for Internal Self-Government, 1917–1948

A. ADJUSTMENT TO THE JONES BILL: REORIENTATION AND DISSATISFACTION

With the passage of the Jones Act, two long-standing demands of Puerto Rico had been met. The people were given the right to elect all members of a legislative body with substantial powers, and U.S. citizenship was extended to them. Congressmen felt that for the moment, at least, the Puerto Rican situation had been corrected and could be set aside. They expected a respite from the barrage of delegations, memorials, and representations for Organic Act reform which had characterized the preceding 15 years. But such was not to be the case. Almost immediately, the whole process of complaint, petition, charge and countercharge began anew.

In the long fight for reform of the Foraker Act, status became the predominant issue of insular politics. Intense feelings had developed. The Republicans, suffering from 15 years of defeats in island campaigns, clung tenaciously to the demand for territorial status followed by statehood; the Unionists, who had led the fight for the Jones bill reforms, lost some of their impetus when that goal was achieved, and sharp division between independentists and pro-United States "Americanizers" threatened to destroy the party. Muñoz Rivera and De Diego were dead, and Barbosa was an old man, soon to die. The existing tensions were worsened by the internal struggles for power among the new political generation. Many of these young men had been children at the time of the Spanish-American War. They were products of the new environment, brought up in a political atmosphere in which status was the great—almost the only—issue. It is not surprising that they were more radical, less flexible and conciliatory, than the earlier generation. Infected by nearly 20 years of status oratory, disappointments, and frustrations, they held strong and impatient viewpoints. Most members of the generation of Muñoz Rivera and Barbosa had considered that there might be two or three acceptable status solutions. For the "young Turks," there could be only one. They no longer supported a choice between statehood or independence, autonomy or independence. They were either independentistas or autonomistas or estadistas, and this intransigence lent a bitterness and intensity to both inter- and intra-party strife which had not been so evident in earlier days.

For such men, the Jones bill was not enough. The permanent status of Puerto Rico was still unresolved. Its resolution seemed as far away as ever. Despite the provisions for a popularly elected legislature, there was still a veto power vested in a mainland-appointed governor, in a president in whose election they played no part, and in a U.S. Congress in which they had no vote. They were subject to be drafted to fight in a war to make the world safe for democracy, to secure the right to self-determination for others, when they felt they lacked these privileges for themselves.

Another problem was bothering Puerto Rican political leaders, one which they talked about a great deal among themselves, but rarely revealed to mainland authorities. In 1915, Santiago Iglesias and his growing labor movement founded the Socialist Party. Iglesias, a close friend and admirer of Samuel Gompers, had worked tirelessly for the extension of American citizenship to Puerto Rico because he believed that the insular labor movement could only grow and prosper under the individual freedoms and civil rights guaranteed by the U.S. Constitution. The new Socialist Party's platform concentrated on economic and social reform: Industrial safety, child labor legislation, insurance for workers, vocational education. The choice of the name "Socialist" was unfortunate. The party was not socialistic; its demands, even for the epoch, were relatively conservative. Iglesias himself was deeply committed to democratic government, and particularly to the United States. He gloried in his nickname of "Mr. Liberty," given him by U.S. soldiers during the Spanish-American War, and even gave his children names suggestive of his loyalty: América, Libertad, Justicia. He has been described as a pragmatic man, with no knowledge of Socialist or Communist dogmas, motivated by a "sincere, almost primitive sense of social justice." [27] On the question of status, the new party refused to take a doctrinaire stand. They felt that any solution should be the result of a democratic consultation with the people of Puerto Rico, but that the raging status oratory was made up of "conventional lies" designed to detract attention from the grievous economic and political ills of the island. In the first election in which they participated, the Socialists won one-seventh of the popular vote, sent Iglesias to the Senate and another member to the House. In 1920, they doubled their popular vote and needed only a few thousand votes to displace the Republicans as the second-largest insular party. Both Republicans and Unionists were deeply concerned at the appearance of this new and growing force.

Within a year after the passage of the Jones bill, all of these factors—dissatisfaction with the extent of the reforms, desire for a decision on ultimate status, and the growing strength of the Socialists—drove Puerto Rican leaders to a renewed campaign for a status commitment from Congress.

Typical American responses were those of annoyance and hurt that the islanders should be criticizing and complaining when they never had better conditions of freedom, political opportunity, or economic well-being in their entire existence. For example, Representative Joseph G. Cannon of Illinois, visiting the island with a congressional committee in 1919, spoke bluntly to the Puerto Rican Legislature about their attitude when he said: [28]

> Why are you worrying about Statehood or Independence? You will get either or both just as soon as you are ready. Do not get the idea that we are lying awake nights trying to do you an injustice. It is a lie, a misrepresentation.

During the national election campaign of 1920 the successful Republican candidate, Warren G. Harding, went on record as being unalterably opposed to Puerto Rican independence. Nevertheless the Union Party leader, Antonio R. Barceló, soon visited Harding to urge him to bring about a settlement of the question of status for all time.

Finally the persistent Puerto Rican pressure and independence talk irritated even those on the mainland who were most inclined to be friendly and sympathetic to the island's causes. For instance, Chairman Horace M. Towner of the House Insular Affairs Committee had received so many cablegrams, memorials, and letters expressing bitter anti-American sentiment he felt called upon to address the following letter to each house of the Puerto Rican Legislature:[29]

> Friends of Puerto Rico will soon find it difficult to help the island if this propaganda is continued. I assure you that there is not now, and there is not likely to be, any considerable sentiment in this country for the independence of Puerto Rico. There is a legitimate ground for a larger measure of self-government, but that has been greatly injured by the active independence propaganda.

Towner also appealed to the Union Party to renounce its often-voiced belief in independence on the ground that it would be much easier to win congressional approval of additional liberal reform if the independence issue were put to rest.

Soon additional discord appeared in the insular-United States relationship. In 1921 President Harding appointed as Governor of Puerto Rico E. Montgomery Reily, a Kansas City businessman to whom he owed a political debt. In his tactless inaugural address, the new governor completely alienated both Unionists and Socialists. In a barely veiled reference to respected Santiago Iglesias, he said:

> I * * * feel a thorough contempt for any leader or socialist agitator whose only ability is to promote contention and discord among his laboring comrades * * * I have observed that usually, labor agitators "toil not, neither do they spin."[30]

His attack on the Union was even stronger. After saying that any talk of independence was a cause for "deep anguish" to President Harding and his Administration, he avowed that there was not the least sympathy for Puerto Rican independence in the United States:

> Neither, my friends, is there any room on this island for any flag other than the Stars and Stripes. So long as Old Glory waves over the United States, it will continue to wave over Puerto Rico.[31]

This challenge to the Union Party position was further emphasized when Reily addressed a letter to the party leader, Barceló, on the subject of patronage. In this he stated:[32]

> I have just started to clean house. While discussing appointments, I want you to fully understand that I shall never appoint any man to any office who is an advocate of independence. When you publicly renounce independence and

break loose from your pernicious and un-American associates, then I will be glad to have your recommendations.

This vigorous, uncompromising stand by the island's newly appointed Governor touched off a wave of open warfare between the executive branch and the Union Party, which dominated the insular legislature. For nearly 2 years the battle ebbed and flowed, with bitter recriminations being hurled by both sides. Finally in February 1923, Reily resigned despite President Harding's consistently staunch support.

During the stormy dispute between Reily and Barceló, the New York Times ran a long analysis of the independence issue. It pointed out that while American citizenship and Puerto Rican independence seemed incompatible, many islanders naively expected to cling to both. While party leaders were probably aware of the true meaning of separation, their followers regarded independence as synonymous with freedom or liberty. Many Puerto Ricans were asking for independence while they were thinking in terms of home rule or local autonomy. Even those who urged separation wanted United States military and diplomatic protection. It was clear that independence meant many things to different people.

For the Union Party, an even more difficult concept to define was autonomy. Party chieftain Barceló, who had been Muñoz Rivera's faithful lieutenant, desired to see the traditional home rule platform carried forward. But the Jones bill reforms had fulfilled many of the demands which the Union considered basic to autonomy or home rule. The home rule faction was left adrift, uncertain of its next step and unable to define quite what it now meant by "autonomy."

In 1922, in a frantic attempt to hold the crumbling Union together, Barceló tried to provide a fresh approach to insular autonomy. He proposed the formation of a free state: *Estado Libre de Puerto Rico.* Actually, the idea was not new. Its general outlines had been set forth by Representative Horace Towner 5 years earlier during debate on the Jones bill. Much of Barceló's proposal also seemed to be modelled on the recently established Irish Free State. A Union Party delegation sent to Washington in 1922 persuaded Representative Philip Campbell, chairman of the Rules Committee, to introduce H.R. 9995 proposing the creation of the free State. The bill provided for the Governor to be selected by the legislature rather than through Presidential appointment. The Governor in turn would appoint his own Cabinet and members of the insular supreme court with the advice of his senate. The bill suggested two Resident Commissioners instead of one, and the appointment of a U.S. Commissioner to Puerto Rico.

The Union Party claimed that the idea of a free state was a splendid solution for the status question, and made a valiant effort to whip up enthusiasm for the new proposal. A new Union platform adopted in 1922 stated that the party had always favored "the creation * * * of a free state * * * associated with the United States," a solution which would "honorably, satisfactorily, and finally solve the pending problem of the relations between the two peoples." It was further noted that a "permanent and indestructible bond" between the island and the mainland was desirable and would insure liberty for the island.[33]

The insular Republican Party, still clinging to statehood as a goal, issued a manifesto describing the Campbell bill as a cunning effort by the Union Party gradually to separate Puerto Rico from the United States. The New York Times saw in the proposal a desire "far in advance of ambitions to become the 49th State of the United States." [34] Editorially, the Times took the position that only statehood ought to be Puerto Rico's destiny. Despite the hopes of the Unionists, the Campbell bill died in committee.

B. THE TWENTIES: GROPING FOR NEW SOLUTIONS

After the resignation of Governor Reily, his successor, the Chairman of the House Committee on Insular Affairs, Horace M. Towner, soon succeeded in smoothing ruffled feelings in Puerto Rico and bringing the competing political factions into a far more harmonious and cooperative relationship. Towner promised to work for liberal reforms as conditions seemed to warrant them. Nevertheless, he was firm in his assertion that Puerto Rico should remain a permanent part of the United States. He asked the islanders to retain their individuality, their vigorous cultural traits, and their ideals, but to bend their efforts toward adjusting to a permanent relationship with the American Union. Several months later, in June 1923, Towner enlivened Puerto Rican hopes when he addressed the legislature with this message: [35]

> I am not authorized to speak for Congress or the Administration, but I do not hesitate to express my own firm belief and desire that eventually Puerto Rico should become a State of the Union. I am in favor, also, of a constantly increasing measure of self-government until statehood is obtained.

Although Horace Towner frequently clashed with one or the other of the political parties on the subject of patronage, he was almost universally popular with the Puerto Ricans. His willingness to understand their problems and to work with them did much to smooth over the distrust which had grown up under Governor Reily.

As the 1924 election approached, traditional party lines began to blur and blend. Ostensibly to form a united front to petition Congress for further status concessions, the Union Party and a sector of the Republican Party formed a new political movement, the Alliance. An unspoken, but major reason for the new arrangement was fear that the Socialists would steal the election from the two older parties. As had occurred when the Union was formed in 1904, the Alliance split the Republican Party, with more than half of the members refusing to join forces with their traditional foes, the antistatehood Unionists. This group of Republicans took the unwieldy name of "Constitutional Historic Party" and formed a loose arrangement, popularly known as the Coalition, with the Socialists.

Governor Towner enthusiastically endorsed the Alliance. Following a resolution adopted by the Puerto Rican legislature, the Alliance urged Congress to declare its intentions on status, to remove restrictions on purely local matters, and to allow popular election of the Governor. The decision to press for the elective-governor feature initiated a new liberalizing principle which became a basis for agitation for many years thereafter. In both the Senate and House hearings held on the Puerto Rican proposals, a rare unanimity of opinion was heard urging adoption of the elective-governor principle. Governor Towner joined Resident Commissioner Córdova Dávila, Barceló, and others in their collective praise of the proposal. As a result, the Insular Affairs Committee of the House issued a favorable report, emphasizing the success of the quarter century of American presence in Puerto Rico. It considered that the progress made was unequaled by any other area of the world in a comparable length of time. At the same time, the report reassured the Congress that the proposed reform would not weaken the essential relationship between the island and the mainland. A War Department communiqué approved the reform, but suggested the possibility of waiting until a specific level of literacy had been attained before granting it. Soon afterwards, the bill was also approved by the Senate Committee on Territories and Insular Affairs after harmonious hearings. For the first time in many years, Puerto Rico's leaders and parties were pulling together. Their delegations to Washington had made favorable impressions. The people of the island were enthusiastic. Independence talk had subsided. The insular press exuded confidence that a significant reform was about to be adopted.

But in spite of the vigorous approval from the island and the endorsements of the congressional committees, the bill failed to get Administration support, and was never acted upon. Again the hopes of Puerto Rican devotees of liberalization were frustrated.

Although most attention was concentrated upon political reforms, some Puerto Ricans consistently voiced concern over economic and social conditions, too. Santiago Iglesias urged that steps be taken to alleviate poverty, malnutrition, and disease. He petitioned President Coolidge to grant Federal aid for the relief of the island's unemployed. His appeal claimed that four-fifths of the working class was without permanent employment; that children were suffering from anemia, tuberculosis, and malnutrition; and that educational opportunity was still denied to 50,000 children of proper age. Illiteracy was still hovering near 50 percent. The population was increasing rapidly and unemployment grew accordingly. While annual reports by American governors demonstrated statistical prosperity and progress in terms of external trade, insular gross product, and rising government revenues, it was becoming obvious that these figures did not reflect the whole situation. Much of the population was not benefiting from this apparent progress.

During the years of Horace Towner's tenure in La Fortaleza, political agitation about status had been virtually muted. But in 1928 an unfortunate controversy arose which even drew the President of the United States into the center of the status maelstrom. The incident started innocently enough. Puerto Rican leaders persuaded Col. Charles A. Lindbergh, visiting on a good will tour, to deliver a message from the insular legislature to President Calvin Coolidge. The message, addressed to the American people, was simply stated: "Grant us the freedom that you enjoy, for which you struggled, which you worship, which we deserve, and you have promised us." [36] To reenforce the statement delivered by Lindbergh, Puerto Rican leaders cabled an additional complaint to Coolidge. Calling attention to grave economic conditions and demanding the creation of a free state, the cablegram said: [37]

> Puerto Rico feels humiliated because of the inferior condition she is subjected to in spite of the hopes the Treaty of Paris woke in us; in spite of the unfulfilled promises * * * and repeated legitimate demands in favor of a regime that may enable our island to exercise her own sovereignty over internal affairs and * * * solve the grave economical situation.

President Coolidge decided that the charges and views expressed in the messages should not go unchallenged. In a long letter to Governor Towner, later released to the public, Coolidge labeled the ideas as "based largely on a complete misunderstanding of concrete facts." The President called the existing government the most liberal in the island's history and denied that promises had ever been made which were unfulfilled. He claimed that Puerto Rican control over its internal affairs already exceeded that of any State or Territory of the United States. To the Puerto Rican charge that theirs was a "subjugated colony," Coolidge answered with bitter irony:

> Certainly giving * * * greater liberty than it has ever enjoyed and powers of government for the exercise of which its people are barely prepared cannot * * * be said to be establishing therein a mere subjugated colony.[38]

Coolidge's letter claimed that major progress in health, education, sanitation, and government had been made in a land which had been poor and distressed prior to the American arrival. He concluded:

> We are certainly entitled to a large part of the credit for this situation.[30]

Predictably, President Coolidge's vigorous response was denounced in Puerto Rico. Election year always brought an upsurge in anti-American propaganda and stronger stands by insular political parties on status and reform. In part the uproar over the Coolidge letter had been related to this increased activity. Then in April 1928, some of the ex-Union members of the Alliance renewed their long-dormant demands for independence. Resident Commissioner Córdova Dávila replied to Coolidge on the floor of the House and asked for passage of the elective-governor bill and an investigation of economic conditions.

C. THE EARLY THIRTIES: POLITICAL UNREST; ECONOMIC PLANNING

In May, 1929, Horace Towner resigned as Governor after 6 years in office and President Hoover named Theodore Roosevelt, Jr., as his successor. The appointment received cordial comment in the insular press. But the new Governor was assuming his position at a time of economic and political unrest almost unprecedented in the island. Despite Roosevelt's energetic attempts to relieve the most hard-hit areas, conditions worsened as the cumulative effects of the worldwide depression took their toll.

The political system, too, was undergoing a crisis. The Alliance, a creature of expediency from the beginning, had collapsed. It won by only a slender margin in the 1928 election. In 1929, Antonio Barceló led most of the ex-Unionists out of the Alliance. They reconstituted the Union Party with a platform demanding reform of the Organic Act and a plebiscite between independence and statehood. When as a result of a long legal battle, the Unionists were denied the right to use their name and symbols, they took the name of Puerto Rican Liberal Party. The remnants of the Alliance joined with the Constitutional Historic Party under the name of the Republican Union, in effect reuniting the fragments of the old Republican Party. Under the leadership of Rafael Martínez Nadal, the Republican Union sought and achieved an electoral arrangement with the Socialist Party.

Another political movement, insignificant before this time, underwent an ominous transformation. In 1920, Unionists José Alegría and José Coll Cuchí, disappointed with the failure of their party to espouse independence as its sole status goal, formed the Nationalist Association. The Nationalists entered partial slates, primarily for local offices, in 1924 and 1928, but their main activities were directed toward stirring independence sentiment through rallies, lectures and the like. Their membership was small, and while they were anti-American, their activities were open, usually legal, and certainly non-violent. But when Barceló reconstituted the Union in 1929, and renewed the traditional demand for an immediate plebiscite, Alegría and Coll Cuchí and many other moderate Nationalists returned to their original loyalty to the Union. Into the leadership vacuum stepped Pedro Albizu Campos, a bitterly anti-American lawyer. At a Nationalist convention, in May of 1930, Albizu Campos was elected party president. Unlike his predecessors, he felt no commitment to legal process. The Nationalists took part in one election under him, that of 1932. Their showing was poor, and after that time, they refused to participate in "colonial elections." They embarked upon an increasingly hostile program which soon became a terrorist crusade. Early in 1932, a group of Nationalists marched on the insular Capitol to protest against a bill for the adoption of an official flag for Puerto Rico. They forced their way into the building. In the ensuing scuffle, a stair railing collapsed, killing one demonstrator and injuring a number of others. A great hue and cry ensued in which the dead youth was depicted as a martyr. Several legislators claimed to have received letters threatening them with assassination. Shortly afterwards, a Nationalist youth attacked and attempted to beat the Supreme Justice of the insular Supreme Court. This was but a prelude to the incidents this group was to precipitate in the years ahead.

The 1932 election was bitterly contested. The Republicans, although urging statehood, emphasized a demand for reforms including a popularly elected governor. The Liberals declared that Puerto Rico was morally sovereign, and portrayed the U.S. authorities on the island as members of a de facto regime. The Liberals claimed that they would cooperate with this de facto government solely to seek reforms which would pave the way for recognition of Puerto Rico's inherent right to independence. Although the Socialists continued to label all status debate as sterile, they made the demand for an elected governor the first plank of their platform.

The 1932 elections were indecisive. The Liberals won 60,000 more votes than any other single party; but as a result of their arrangement, the Socialists and Union Republicans were able to dominate the insular legislature. Their combined margin of victory was only 30,000 votes. The Liberals made it clear that they expected to obtain a major share of patronage, since the Republicans and Socialists had retained their individual identities, and were thus technically minority parties.[40]

Serious trouble was brewing in Puerto Rico. Economic, political, and social unrest were near their all-time crest. Franklin D. Roosevelt had been victorious in the national elections of 1932 and would soon launch his New Deal on the mainland and the island. But Puerto Rican status politics were near the boiling point. Both statehood and independence factions desired to press their status positions upon the national administration. And the shadow of Nationalist violence hovered over the economically stricken land.

The majority coalition of Republicans and Socialists made the first move in the continuing status struggle in 1933 when Senator Martínez Nadal proposed that the Puerto Rican legislature should ask Congress to authorize a constitutional convention in the island as a preliminary step toward statehood. When the talk of reviving the statehood status issue reached the mainland, the New York Times editorially urged Puerto Ricans to put off their request for a constitutional convention until the numerous economic problems had been dealt with. The Times agreed that Puerto Rico had made steady progress toward fitness for statehood and should not be asked to wait indefinitely, but the moment did not seem propitious. The question was also raised, as it would be again and again in succeeding years, whether statehood would be too costly for the island.

In addition to the Republican statehood resolution, another topic which attracted Puerto Rican attention was the pending choice of a new governor as a result of the change in national administration. Some people urged the appointment of a native Puerto Rican,[41] while most others urged granting the island the privilege of electing its own governor. But insular hopes of a significant new opportunity were soon shattered when Roosevelt nominated Robert H. Gore of Florida and the Senate confirmed his appointment.

Like E. Montgomery Reily, Governor Gore seemed to possess a knack for becoming involved in unpleasant quarrels with Puerto Rican politicians. He had no experience or previous knowledge to prepare him for the post. Perhaps part of the trouble was the very nature of explosive political climate. In any case, within 2 months floods of letters and cables were petitioning his ouster, university students were on strike, his home was bombed, and people talked about civil rebellion if he remained. Six months after he assumed office, Gore decided that a combination of political ill will and his own ill health were sufficient causes for resignation. The general feeling in Washington was that the Puerto Rican situation was nearly out of hand. As a result, Maj. Gen. Blanton Winship, an experienced and conservative administrator, was named to replace Gore. Unfortunately, the situation called more for statesmanship than administrative capacity, as future events would prove. For the moment, however, many Puerto Ricans were jubilant over the ouster of Gore.

Puerto Ricans soon returned to their favorite topic, the island's political status. Because rumors indicated that a determined statehood bid would be made by the coalition and that a countermovement by the Liberals could be expected, Senator Millard Tydings of Maryland had some words of advice. Visiting the island in December 1933, the Chairman of the Committee on Insular Possessions spoke sharply concerning status. He told the islanders that the United States wanted to know the truth about their status aspirations. If a political party issued a platform urging independence, Tydings asked that the platform be a sincere affirmation rather than one veiled by numerous devious intentions. Many felt that he was specifically trying to pin down Antonio Barceló.

The Union Republicans continued their statehood efforts. Because the majority Socialist-Republican coalition held 30 of 39 House seats and 14 of 19 Senate seats, the resolution petitioning Congress to authorize a constitutional convention passed easily. In addition to the request for statehood the coalition resolution spelled out 12 specific reforms needed as temporary extensions of autonomy while statehood was being awaited. Among these were proposals for the election of a governor, a legislative override of his veto, Puerto Rican legislative approval of all congressional action concerning the island, exemption from coastwise shipping laws, and modification of U.S. custom laws to benefit the island.

Insular politics frequently followed the scientific precept that every action begets a reaction. The Liberal Party now felt called upon to demonstrate its sincerity. While the coalition pleas for change languished in a Congress overwhelmed with crushing domestic burdens, the Liberal Party renewed its independence drive. Late in 1934 Barceló Muñoz Marín, and Walter Mck. Jones appeared in Washington to submit a memorandum to President Roosevelt. The proposal stressed the need for economic reconstruction of the island as a prelude to peaceful separation.

While the insular political parties continued to concentrate their oratory on ultimate status, there were also signs of deep concern with economic rehabilitation. With the onset of the depression, proposals for solutions to the economic plight of Puerto Rico had come from many quarters. James Bourne, director of the Puerto Rican Emergency Relief Administration (PRERA), presented a significant group report. Muñoz Marín urged the full extension of the New Deal to the island. He asked all political factions to join forces to obtain such economic reforms as agricultural diversification, industrialization, and the creation of subsistence farms. The need for a coordinated plan for economic recovery was reiterated in many quarters. The insular Chamber of Commerce urged such action. In March of 1934, Mrs. Eleanor Roosevelt and others, including Assistant Secretary of Agriculture Rexford G. Tugwell visited the island. Their stay in Puerto Rico was concluded by a roundtable discussion of 28 persons including key American and Puerto Rican officials. Particularly provocative suggestions were made by Dr. Carlos Chardón, Chancellor of the University of Puerto Rico. He suggested government purchase of a large sugar-producing property which would be redistributed to selected farmers, as well as government operation of a sugar mill as a yardstick for comparison and as a challenge to existing private enterprise.

Tugwell was so alarmed by the seriousness of the economic plight of Puerto Rico which he had witnessed that he took vigorous steps to promote reform as soon as he returned to the mainland. Machinery was set in motion to coordinate Federal efforts at permanent as well as temporary solutions. He outlined numerous proposals to be explored, some of them potentially controversial. Included in this category was the possibility of nationalizing the entire sugar industry under a government corporation and operating it through collectives. There was also a proposal for population control through dissemination of birth control information. Other plans mentioned were the development of commercial fishing, cotton planting, growing of foodstuffs, and the creation of various industries for the manufacture of bottles, cement, rum, rayon, cellulose, and furniture. Soon a group of Puerto Ricans began meetings at the Department of Agriculture to formulate a policy and a plan.[42]

At the time this group was preparing its plan, other Administration actions in regard to Puerto Rico were taken. After having been discussed for several years, jurisdiction over the territories and insular possessions was transferred from the War Department to the Interior Department. Also in June, 1934, Roosevelt created the Interdepartmental Committee on Puerto Rico to analyze the so-called "Chardón Plan" and to study the whole Puerto Rican situation.

The Puerto Rican Policy Commission submitted its "Chardón Plan" to the Roosevelt Administration in late June, 1934, and the President indicated approval "in principle."[43] The plan contained four basic objectives: (*a*) Reduce chronic unemployment; (*b*) break up land monopolies and lessen hardship caused by absentee ownership; (*c*) reduce outflow of money to the mainland in the form of interest and dividends, thus raising insular purchasing power and living standards; and (*d*) emancipate the island from the evils of a one-crop economy. The heart of the plan was the creation of a public corporation to carry out the proposals concerning redistribution of land holdings and control over production of sugar. Soon a host of voices was raised in a crescendo of opposition to various features of the plan.

Those Puerto Ricans who expected some magical transformation to take place simply because plans were underway to correct evils which had accumulated over several centuries were due for disappointment. Progress in implementing the initial proposals would be painstakingly slow.

Franklin Roosevelt made a triumphal visit to the island in July 1934, where he again affirmed his support for economic rehabilitation. Insular cooperation was promised in an all-day, all-night meeting of representatives from every municipality on the island. They sent a memorial to the President asking for prompt action concerning the island's problems.

Because of administrative delay in getting plans transformed into action, Puerto Ricans grew restive. In Washington a steady flow of visitors from the island kept pressure upon the Roosevelt Administration.

Muñoz Marín returned to Puerto Rico in December 1934, after his 3-month lobbying sojourn in Washington. Claiming the situation had noticeably deteriorated while the impoverished island waited in vain for action, he wrote to President Roosevelt in this way:[44]

> Public order hangs today by a thread * * *. Puerto Ricans are now going through more hell than it has ever been their fate to experience before * * *. One million, two hundred thousand are in need of relief. My appeal to you, Mr. President, is for reassurance to my people. * * * of such a nature that it will remove all doubts, so they can tighten their belts and wait for justice * * *. Only your personal words will be regarded as the equivalent of deeds.

Roosevelt's reply authorized the young senator to translate the President's message into Spanish and to broadcast it to the people. On December 22, 1934, the Liberal Party set up loud speakers in every town plaza and Muñoz Marín read Roosevelt's message:[45]

> Let me assure you that the delays in initiating the reconstruction policy have occasioned much regret to me * * * as they have caused anguish in Puerto Rico * * * I can and do assure you of my complete good will and firm determination that permanent reconstruction shall be initiated at the earliest possible moment on the basis of the Chardón Plan, the principles of which have received my approval.

Despite the assurance that help was soon forthcoming, additional delays lay ahead. Factional quarrels within the Roosevelt Administration were partly responsible. There was strong opposition to the Chardón Plan among insular Republicans and Socialists. Because Chardón was identified with the Liberal Party, his rumored appointment as regional director of the Puerto Rican Reconstruction Administration (PRRA) angered groups who felt their control of the Puerto Rican legislature entitled them to be the medium through which aid and programs should flow. By late May 1935, the personnel and machinery for reconstruction were being assembled. But launching a massive rehabilitation program for 2 million people would take additional time, hard work, and patience. Long-range results were intended rather than spectacular immediate ones. Much time would pass before success or failure could be determined.

While most Puerto Ricans struggled for their precarious existence and waited resignedly for the plans germinating in Washington to bear fruit, the island's politicians returned to the issue of status. U.S. Senators Tydings and King had recently made statements to the effect that Puerto Ricans could have their independence "if the people seriously desire it."[46] Frightened by such talk from U.S. officials, the Coalition decided to renew its demands for statehood and liberal reforms which had been presented twice previously to no avail. In May and June, 1935, the House Committee on Territories finally commenced hearings on such a bill, H.R. 1394, introduced by Resident Commissioner Santiago Iglesias. However, the island's leaders did not speak with a united voice at those hearings. Coalition witnesses described the overwhelming vote in favor of the insular statehood resolution of 1934. They claimed that this "first statehood legislation" was the logical culmination of public opinion in favor of statehood which had been building since 1898. Miguel A. García Méndez listed the Federal Party, Republican Party, Unionist Party, Historical Constitutional Party, the Alliance, and the Union Republican Party as political groups which had campaigned through the years on statehood platforms. The Jones-Shafroth Act, granting citizenship, had "confirmed our beliefs that we were destined for ultimate statehood as an inalienable right," he concluded.[47]

After the coalition leaders had spoken so emphatically in favor of statehood, Liberal Party leaders such as Barceló and Muñoz Marín appeared as witnesses unalterably opposed to the bill. Muñoz Marín opposed it principally on practical grounds. He foresaw economic ills greater than potential political gains. His fear was that loss of customs receipts and other Federal internal revenues would deal a devastating blow to many services now operated by the insular government. He also expressed concern that statehood would "perpetuate the present single-crop sugar economy dominated by a handful of absentee corporations."[48] Muñoz Marín appealed for a prompt, emphatic denial of statehood rather than the usual practice of quietly shunting aside Puerto Rican legislation without any action. In his view, such a definite decision would bring united efforts to prepare the island for independence.

Santiago Iglesias and the coalition were dismayed at the vigorous opposition expressed by fellow Puerto Ricans. Their strategy was to belittle these voices as atypical and not representative of mass sentiment.

A New York Times interview with Interior Secretary Harold Ickes during the period of the House hearings revealed administration thinking about the statehood proposals. Ickes listed considerations which Congress must ponder on its decision about statehood. Among these were: (*a*) That statehood would establish a precedent by including in the Union a sovereign state which was noncontiguous with others; (*b*) that for the first time there would be a state wholly different in culture, tradition, and language; (*c*) that admission of a state while there was substantial opposition would set another precedent; and (*d*) that Puerto Ricans must be made aware that statehood, once gained, was permanent.[49]

The House hearings only served to convince a Congress, which was reluctant in the first place, that the status issue was potentially explosive. It was apparent that Puerto Rico was hopelessly divided. Since there was little sincere sentiment in Congress for taking action and the whole issue had been raised by external pressure, the status legislation was again quietly shelved.

Almost coinciding with the confusion raised by the babel of political voices on insular status was a parallel confusion on the proposed economic rehabilitation. The "Chardón plan" had been publicly endorsed by President Roosevelt on several occasions. The Interdepartmental Committee which had been named to consider and analyze this plan reported its findings in mid-1935. Many of the basic assumptions and specific proposals made by the Chardón group were rejected or questioned seriously by the Federal bureaucracy. This was particularly true of the land reform proposals and the implications of a socialist experiment in public ownership which the Chardón plan had suggested. The Federal report argued that the sugar industry was the healthiest member of the Puerto Rican economy and to attack this industry and make it the "whipping boy" and victim of "brain-trusters" experiments might prove to be disastrous. The Interdepartmental Committee then put forth a long list of suggestions for improvement in the Puerto Rican economy, many of them drastically different from the Chardón proposals. Finally, the report insisted that existing agencies at work in the island had the personnel and know-how to accomplish the task of rehabilitating so a new organization such as the PRERA was unnecessary.

It was in the midst of this confusion of conflicting opinions, both economic and political, that the effort to rehabilitate the island was launched in August and September 1935. Men of vision from the island and mainland had cooperated to draw plans to reshape a society of more than 2 million people. But inevitably internal jealousies, political differences, and ideological conflicts had resulted. The drastic experiments, claimed by many to be on the fringes of socialism, were bound to arouse criticism and protest. And to make the task more difficult and the results less likely to be spectacularly successful, the original estimate of the cost was pared from $100 to $40 million for the initial investment.

Suddenly in the mid-1930's the almost insignificant Nationalist Party launched a campaign of terror designed to dramatize the cause of independence. Probably nothing in its history ever hurt the island and the reputation of its people as much as the events which followed in this campaign. The first serious violence occurred on the campus and streets of the University of Puerto Rico in Río Piedras in October 1935. There an altercation between police and Nationalists resulted in five deaths and numerous injuries. Then in February 1936, another act in the tragic drama followed. This time the insular police chief, Col. Francis E. Riggs, an American friend of Governor Winship and Senator Millard Tydings, was the victim of two young Nationalist assassins. Later that day the killers were lynched by the police who had taken them into custody.

These acts of terror, coupled with bitter denunciations of police brutality, threw the island into great turmoil. Puerto Ricans were divided in their sympathies. Some condemned the lawlessness and murders. Others claimed the Nationalists were justified and blamed everything on Governor Winship and his administration. Investigations were launched and a Federal grand jury was convened which resulted in indictments for Albizu Campos and eight of his accomplices. They were charged, not with murder, but with sedition, illegal recruiting of soldiers, and conspiracy to incite rebellion.

Almost overnight, attitudes in the United States about Puerto Rico and its people changed. Few Americans understood that the violence had been perpetrated by a small group who had very little support from the mass of islanders. Most Americans only knew that there had long been agitation for separation in Puerto Rico. Now debate had been converted into action, easily giving the impression to a misinformed public that discipline had broken down and that violence was spreading.

D. THE LATE THIRTIES: THE TYDINGS BILL; NATIONALIST VIOLENCE; COALITION POLITICS

Repercussions from the Riggs' assassination were soon apparent in the political arena. In April 1936, Senator Tydings introduced a bill in the U.S. Senate to grant independence to the island.[50] For many,

many years responsible American officials had been proclaiming that the United States flag would never come down in Puerto Rico; that Puerto Rico's destiny was permanent union, probably in statehood. Then in the early thirties ripplings of sentiment for independence had come from various Washington sources, but no really serious effort in that direction had ever been undertaken before. Puerto Ricans were generally unaware that an independence bill was being quietly prepared in Washington.

Immediately speculation arose as to the motives and intent behind Tydings' independence proposal. Some saw it as an act of vindictiveness. Independence would be a quick and easy solution to the Puerto Rican problem which was recognized as chronic and deepening. Others thought the bill was a bold effort to call the bluff of those political groups which for years had used independence as a "cause célèbre" around which to rally support. Now that it was openly offered and within their grasp, would they accept it? Still others reasoned that the Tydings bill was entirely in keeping with the overall policy of the Roosevelt administration. Various officials had publicly stated that independence, if sincerely desired, would be granted. The "good neighbor policy" had redefined the position of the United States toward Latin America. The Tydings-McDuffie bill for the independence of the Philippine Islands had passed, and the United States had abrogated the Platt amendment, thus renouncing the right to intervene in Cuba. Was a forthright offer of independence to Puerto Rico not a natural sequence in this series of actions which seemed to acknowledge that the tide of empire was ebbing?

The Tydings bill provided for a referendum in Puerto Rico in November 1937, on the simple question: "Shall the people of Puerto Rico be sovereign and independent?" A majority vote in favor would result in the calling of a constitutional convention whose work would be submitted to the President of the United States for his approval. The people of Puerto Rico would then vote to ratify or reject the proposed document. A 4-year transition period as an autonomous commonwealth would ensue for Puerto Rico, during which time United States jurisdiction and control would gradually be withdrawn. Tariffs would be applied in 25 percent increases each year until full application would occur simultaneously with independence. Other U.S. grants and benefits would be terminated on the same basis.

The Tydings bill, coming as it did as a surprise to most Puerto Ricans, provoked an outburst of debate and no little confusion. The immediate reactions of the parties were, in many instances, quite unexpected. The Socialists applauded the opposition to colonialism implied by the bill, but argued for a plebiscite offering three alternatives: independence, statehood, and a transitory type of home rule which would allow a later choice between independence and statehood. In the most surprising about-face, the Union Republicans initially stated that if statehood were out of the question, they would urge their members to vote in favor of independence. The Liberal Party, traditionally in favor of independence or autonomy, was the most deeply divided. Antonio Barceló announced that he would accept the Tydings proposal, even if it meant starvation for the island. Young leader Luis Muñoz Marín who had always been an outspoken advocate of independence, objected to the harsh economic terms of the Tydings bill.

While the Muñoz-Barceló debate raged in the Liberal camp, the Union Republicans and Socialists began to have second thoughts: 1936 was also an election year, and the coalition realized that they would have to remain together if they were to defeat the Liberals again. Rafael Martínez Nadal, the Union Republican leader, had actually made a statement in favor of the Tydings independence proposal, but he later reversed himself and renewed the demand for statehood. The Socialists, while they never flatly opposed the idea of independence, traditionally leaned more toward statehood, and they continued to insist that a plebiscite should be limited to the acceptance or rejection of a single status alternative.

The Nationalists and other intransigent independentist groups began to campaign for an immediate constitutional convention, to be held before or even in place of the plebiscite proposed by Senator Tydings.

But it was in the Liberal Party that the truly significant arguments over the Tydings bill took place. Muñoz argued that the immediate and uncushioned independence offered would ruin Puerto Rico. He felt that Puerto Rico's economy was geared to its colonial status, and that it was a duty for the United States to provide adequate transitional guarantees to allow a reorientation of the economy which would make independence viable. Barceló was aware of the severe economic adjustment which immediate independence would demand, but his sentimental attachment to independence, and not incidentally, his fear of the growing power of Muñoz in the party made him firm in his support of the bill. As the election drew near, another factor entered the picture. If the Liberals, traditionally the supporters of the independence ideal, ran on a pro-Tydings bill platform and lost, as they were likely to do, it could be interpreted as a rejection of independence. Muñoz felt that this would result in an immediate demise for the Tydings proposal, and would, furthermore, be pointed to in years to come as proof that Puerto Ricans did not really desire independence. He suggested that the Liberals should boycott the election and work for revisions in the Tydings bill which would ease the economic transition and spread it over a longer period of time. Barceló agreed that the independence issue should be toned down in campaign oratory, but refused to withdraw from the election. In a showdown meeting, the motion to abstain from the election lost by a single vote. Although Muñoz Marín and Barceló made a great show of reconciliation, the difference was too deep to be so easily resolved. Muñoz Marín refused to be a candidate for office, a move extremely damaging to the party. Not only did this dramatize his opposition to the party's course, it also removed one of the most popular figures from the Liberal slate. A long series of confrontations and maneuverings ensued. Although Muñoz Marín and Barceló did not split formally until shortly after the election, the Liberals were badly divided during the campaign.

Strangely, the status issue was not as dominant in the campaign as had been expected. The Socialist-Union Republican coalition felt that the split in the Liberal Party could provide them with the margin of victory. In order to avoid any act which might tend to reunify the warring Liberals, the coalition parties minimized the status issue in their platforms. The Republicans even included the provision that if statehood were unattainable, independence was preferable to an indefinite, colonial status. In order to deemphasize their own internal differences, the Liberals also minimized status oratory. Another factor partially responsible for the muted debate of the 1936 campaign was the general tension which prevailed. At a rally in Mayagüez, a Nationalist youth attempted to assassinate Santiago Iglesias, who was seeking reelection as Resident Commissioner on the coalition slate. Fortunately, Iglesias escaped with minor injuries, but the incident was a sobering indication of the potential for violence which could be unleashed by unrestrained status debate.

The election gave no party a clear mandate. The coalition again dominated the elected offices; but the Liberals remained the single largest party, winning 48 percent of the popular vote. This outcome would have been indecisive in any case; but since the parties had carefully refrained from depicting the election as a status referendum, the desires of the people of Puerto Rico regarding status in general and the Tydings proposal in particular were more inscrutable than ever.

Despite the excitement engendered in Puerto Rico by the offer of independence in the Tydings bill, Congress never seriously considered passing it. In committee the bill was replaced by resolutions calling for a thorough study of conditions affecting the political and economic climate of the island. In the next few years, there were occasional rumors of a revival of the Tydings bill, but nothing came of them until the early forties.

On the status front, the remaining years of the thirties were deceptively quiet. Resident Commissioner Santiago Iglesias introduced a bill in 1937 which called for full territorial status for Puerto Rico, but it was shelved quietly. Behind the scenes, political maneuvering reached a new low. Puerto Rican politicians and Federal administrators used one another in attempts to gain or assert control over the use of relief and reconstruction funds. The indecisive 1936 elections made all parties cautious. Younger leaders were challenging the entrenched party chiefs: Muñoz and his followers had been separated from the Liberal Party, but less-publicized struggles were also underway in the Socialist and Republican ranks.

The only open indications of status conflict during the last years of the 1930's involved the Nationalists. The first of these was the "Ponce Massacre" of March 21, 1937. Ever since Albizu Campos and his cohorts had been sentenced following the Riggs assassination, Nationalists had held parades and rallies to dramatize their protests and to raise funds for legal appeals. They applied for a permit to stage such a parade in Ponce on Palm Sunday of 1937. The permit was first refused; then granted; then, at the last moment revoked on orders from the insular administration. The Nationalist demonstrators, mostly young people, decided to proceed with the parade. As they lined up in the square, they were faced by armed police. Suddenly, a shot rang out, and a police officer fell, wounded. The police then began firing wildly into the unarmed crowd. Nineteen were killed, including two policemen, and more than 100 were injured. Reports of the event were contradictory. Who fired the first shot is not known. Whether a result of panic or design, however, the police reaction was needlessly brutal. Most of the dead were little more than children; none were armed; many were shot in the back while seeking refuge. The overall result was a storm of wrath directed against Governor Winship and his administration. The American Civil Liberties Union investigated the affair, and while they did not discount the possibility that the first shot might have come from a Nationalist hidden in the crowd, they, too, roundly castigated the police and the island administration.

Two other events involving Nationalists followed, but they were clearly terrorist affairs which were widely condemned both in Puerto Rico and on the mainland. In June, two young men tried to shoot Federal Judge Robert A. Cooper, in whose court Albizu Campos had been tried and convicted. A year later, in July of 1938, an attempt was made to assassinate Governor Winship. During a parade celebrating the 40th anniversary of the United States landings on Puerto Rico, Nationalists fired nearly 80 shots at a reviewing stand. A Puerto Rican bodyguard was injured, and Colonel Luis Irizarry of the insular National Guard was killed by a stray bullet as he led his troops before the reviewing stand. Nine Nationalists were indicted for murder as a result of this episode.

The unexpected offer of independence in the Tydings bill, described earlier, coupled with the sporadic Nationalist violence, dealt serious setbacks to the economic development program so hopefully launched by the New Deal. Serious doubts were soon expressed about the wisdom of pouring massive sums of money into an island which might soon be independent and where contempt and hatred for the United States seemed so widespread. In addition, serious internal dissension among the leadership of the PRRA created further confusion and loss of prestige for the economic program. The fundamental idea in the Chardón Plan had been the purchase of sugar lands in excess of 500 acres held by corporations and the creation of government-operated sugar centrales. But this had proven to be slow and difficult to accomplish. Interminable court litigation lay ahead. Political attacks on the "socialistic" tendencies of the rehabilitation program also continued. As a result of this combination of problems, congressional appropriations for PRRA were drastically cut from 1937 on, so the economic revolution never reached its projected potential. By the end of 1938 the total expenditure for 5 years of New Deal operations amounted to $57 million, and results were discouraging.

In politics, comparative calm prevailed in Puerto Rico throughout 1938 and 1939. Governor Winship, firmly committed to closer ties between the island and mainland, repeatedly stressed his faith in statehood as Puerto Rico's obvious destiny. As a result of another legislative resolution urging Congress to grant statehood, Santiago Iglesias introduced another Puerto Rican statehood bill in the House of Representatives in June 1939. But as war approached in Europe, the Congress seemed in no mood to dabble with insular status problems.

After more than 5 hectic years as Governor of Puerto Rico, Blanton Winship resigned in June 1939, and was replaced by Admiral William D. Leahy. By the time Leahy took office in September 1939, Puerto Rican political activity was already warming up for the 1940 campaign. The coalition of Republicans and Socialists which had controlled the legislature for 8 years seemed on the verge of disintegrating. Santiago Iglesias, who had led the Socialists for 40 years, was in ill health and preparing to retire. A struggle for the role of heir apparent divided the younger members of the party. Iglesias designated his son-in-law, Senator Bolívar Pagán, as his successor. Opposition to the new leader caused a schism which weakened the party almost to the point of dissolution. The Republicans were similarly divided as a result of a leadership contest.

As the "terrible thirties" came to a close, Puerto Rico was on the verge of an exciting, creative era which would see the island move forward economically and politically; but there was little to suggest it at the time. Poverty seemed a chronic thing, and even the good intentions of the Roosevelt Administration seemed unlikely to change it. The island still had too many people, too few jobs, and unlimited problems. Life for most of the population, whether landless sugar workers, hill people, or city slum dwellers, was still as hard and hopeless as it had always been.

Politics had grown tiresome through the endless rehashing of the same old formulas, the same issues, and the same accusations. While Puerto Rico's politicians tried to breathe new life into tiresome, shopworn platforms, Congress remained largely indifferent to insular pleas and proposals. Even the Tydings independence bill, which had brought a flurry of excitement to the status debate, seemed to have been just another sterile exercise. The old political generation seemed as tired and lifeless as their ideas: Santiago Iglesias had died; Antonio R. Barceló had grown old and lost his fire; Albizu Campos was in an Atlanta penitentiary; the coalition directed by Martínez Nadal was crumbling around him. Those who had been young and eager seemed helpless: Muñoz Marín had been relegated to apparent political oblivion, and even the New Deal experimenters had for the most part lost hope and interest. It would have taken a reckless oracle, indeed, to predict that a new Puerto Rico would soon emerge.

Shortly after the 1938 election, the separation of Muñoz Marín and his followers from the Liberal Party became final. Although the Muñoz group commanded some following among other dissident Liberals, they were faced with a need to convert large numbers of voters to their cause. For the most part, they concentrated their efforts among the rural workers, the jíbaros. When the new movement chose the name Popular Democratic Party for itself, it selected a profile of a jíbaro wearing the traditional straw hat—the pava—as its vignette.

Muñoz Marín had three factors in his favor: (1) As the son of Muñoz Rivera, he had a "political name"; (2) although his followers were few in number, they included some of the ablest men and women on the island; and (3) the traditional parties had rarely, if ever, conducted a true grassroots campaign. The simple fact that the leaders of the Popular Democrats, and particularly Muñoz himself, were willing to speak anywhere, to anyone, about problems meaningful to the country people usually won a sympathetic audience. Muñoz hammered away on his central theme—that the 500-acre land-holding limit for corporations must be enforced, that land should be redistributed to the landless, and that economic rehabilitation rather than ultimate political status must be the primary concern.

With the political spadework completed and the necessary signatures obtained, the Popular Democratic Party was ready to contest an election in 1940. The party held its initial constituent assembly in July 1940, attended by 3,500 delegates from every municipality on the island. The delegates endorsed independence, achieved through plebiscite, or statehood as of equal dignity. But the key difference between the new Popular Democratic approach and the time-honored party statements appears in this pledge in the party platform: "The Popular Democratic Party declares that the final political status of Puerto Rico is not an issue in these elections. Any vote cast for this party will not be interpreted as a vote in favor of any given political status."[51]

Another example of political acumen was presented by the new political party when its leaders drafted a series of bills aimed at solving the unfortunate social and economic conditions. These bills were widely publicized as exact copies of those which would be introduced in the legislature by the Popular Democrats after the 1940 elections. In a huge party rally at Santurce in September 1940, every party candidate for the legislature took a solemn oath that he would vote for these bills regardless of the United States attitude toward them.

During the campaign the Union Republicans and Socialists continued to press their claims for statehood and enlarged home rule. The Resident Commissioner, representing the coalition in Congress, again presented bills to carry out its program. But it was clear that the real enthusiasm and initiative in the campaign were provided by the infant Popular Democratic Party.

When the final results were tabulated, the Popular Democrats had made an amazing showing for a new party. They polled 214,000 votes, compared to the 224,000 received by the coalition of Republicans and Socialists. Popular Democrats received 10 of 19 Senate seats and 18 of 39 House seats. Since another new party, Unification, had won three House seats, judicious bargaining would give the Populares a narrow majority in both Houses of the Legislature despite the fact that this party polled only 38 percent of the total vote. The election had been a startling demonstration of the magic of a political name and of the public yearning for new approaches to old problems.

Although some critics protested bitterly that the Popular Democratic victory had been too narrow to claim any kind of mandate, the Popular Democrats immediately set to work on solutions to economic ills which they had promised during the campaign. The bills pledged by the party were duly introduced in the Legislature. While the proposals called for the creation of various public utilities, the real heart and soul of the program was the creation of a controversial land authority to carry out the 500-acre restriction. Ultimately an industrial development company, a sewer authority, and a development bank were contemplated.

Meanwhile, the Roosevelt administration watched the unfolding Puerto Rican legislative program with interest. The American Governor, Guy J. Swope, would face a decision to sign or veto the laws. Roosevelt and Ickes sent Rexford G. Tugwell to the island as head of a committee to study the Land Reform bill and its implications. Actually the Puerto Rican legislature had voted in 1935 to implement the landholding restriction which had been written into the Organic Act in 1900 but never enforced. Then in March 1940, the U.S. Supreme Court had upheld the Puerto Rican legislation in the case of *Puerto Rico* v. *Rubert Hermanos, Inc.* Since the electorate, the courts, and the Roosevelt administration had previously given their sanction to implementing the land law of 1935, the bill to create the controversial Land Authority moved quickly through the legislature and was signed into law on April 12, 1941, by Governor Swope upon the recommendation of the Tugwell committee.

The movement toward land reform was a tremendously complex one, filled with economic and political implications. Estimates were the purchase price of the land in question might be $175 million. Rumors even circulated that Congress would make the money available. Sugar corporations objected that the action was unwarranted confiscation of private property. Others complained that the division of land into numerous tiny holdings would result in serious fragmentation and a drastic loss of production. But the greatest fear was that the Puerto Rican Government would insist upon public operation. This specter of a socialist experiment weighed heavily upon the minds of members of congressional committees which dealt with the island's problems. Political opponents of the Populares urged that Congress should do something to prevent the implementation of the Puerto Rican Land Reform Law.

E. THE DRIVE FOR AN ELECTED GOVERNOR

While the controversial Puerto Rican legislation was still a hot political issue both on the mainland and the island, a new item of concern arose in July 1941, with the resignation of Governor Guy Swope after less than 6 months in office. When President Roosevelt named Tugwell to the Governor's post it touched off a roar of protest from some Puerto Ricans and many U.S. Congressmen. Bolívar Pagán, the Socialist Party's President and Resident Commissioner, was an outspoken critic of the appointment. He and many other hard-core opponents of New Deal planning saw sinister implications in Tugwell's nomination. The possibilities of a Muñoz Marín-Tugwell alliance in carrying out other "socialistic tendencies" caused certain groups in Puerto Rico to be panic stricken. That Tugwell was enthusiastic about the Popular Democratic legislative program was well known. In addition, many felt that he would be sympathetic to a liberalization of the Organic Act.

In the Senate hearings on Tugwell's appointment, most of the witnesses from Puerto Rico were members of the Republican-Socialist coalition or representatives of the great sugar corporations who vigorously opposed the appointment. On the other hand, Muñoz Marín appeared and wholeheartedly endorsed Tugwell, who had recently been elected as chancellor of the University of Puerto Rico by a unanimous vote. Despite the opposition to the appointment, Tugwell was confirmed as Governor on August 25, 1941.

Tugwell's inaugural speech on September 19, 1941, reflected his basic philosophy and his sympathy for the planned economy already underway in the Popular Democratic program. Certainly the address did nothing to relieve the fears of the political opposition. Among the topics he touched upon, Puerto Rico's poverty received primary consideration.[32]

> To bettering the condition of the poor I shall bring every resource I am able to find. * * * I will be the friend of every man or woman who helps; I will be the opponent of every one who hinders. * * * Whatever needs changing for this purpose must be changed. * * * The time is past when absentee capitalists can expect to extract extravagant percentages of gain, using the needs of the people * * * to force acceptance of usurer's terms. * * * *Puerto Rico is a good testing ground:* I am sure her leaders realize quite clearly their role in the great drama which is unfolding. * * * I join you in the campaign against two enemies: poverty and slavery.

Soon it was apparent that Tugwell and Muñoz Marín were united in the economic rehabilitation program. Plans for a San Juan Transportation Authority, a Government-operated cement company, wider opportunities for the Water Resources Authority, and stepped up relocation of landless agricultural squatters were announced.

When the United States entered World War II, the island of Puerto Rico went to war, too. Not only did it send its sons and daughters, but it also became a significant military base. For a time, at the height of the German submarine assault on Caribbean and Atlantic shipping, the island suffered severe shortages of necessities and experienced economic dislocations. Food and fuel shortages were accompanied by soaring prices and rising unemployment. On the other hand, the war produced certain favorable effects upon the island. Thousands of American servicemen based in Puerto Rico poured money into the economy. Huge expenditures were made for defense installations where Puerto Ricans held well-paid jobs. Others who went to the mainland to work or serve in the armed forces sent their paychecks back to their families. When imports of foreign liquors were cut off by the war, Americans began to purchase Puerto Rican rum. Sales skyrocketed and internal-revenue taxes poured into the island's treasury. This money began to accumulate in such amounts that the Government was able to push its land acquisitions and its public authorities much more rapidly than had been thought possible.

Despite the war, political sniping went on. While Muñoz Marín praised Tugwell as the first American Governor ever to join the island's liberal forces in attacking misery and poverty, others circulated rumors of his imminent dismissal. Bolívar Pagán in Washington stepped up his attacks upon the alliance of Tugwell and the Popular Democrats by branding their work as the creation "of a fascist state designed to regiment the total life of Puerto Rico."[53] Senator Arthur Vandenberg of Michigan even went so far as to introduce a bill calling for Tugwell's removal as Governor and containing a stipulation that all future Governors of Puerto Rico would be limited to a 2-year term.

In February of 1943, the Puerto Rican legislature passed a resolution petitioning Congress for additional local autonomy including the popular election of the Governor. The resolution also contained an endorsement of the policies and activities of Governor Tugwell. The next day, Governor Tugwell expressed the following position on the status question to the legislature:[54]

> I have worked toward the resumption of progress toward autonomy without knowing whether it is to be within or without the sisterhood of States, feeling that this question will have its answer in time's fullness. That seems to me something about which Puerto Ricans should have a say equally with other citizens. Besides, it is incontestable that new and fresh ideas are beginning to stir which take something away from the importance of such questions. The old antithesis between sovereignty and subjection is giving way to something very like the old Christian concept of brotherhood . . . Independence . . . may indeed become little more than a remembered word . . . It is no secret that I believe Puerto Ricans should be allowed to elect their own governor. That is the next logical step toward your political destiny.

Unlike innumerable other petitions for action by Puerto Rican legislators and administrators, these were answered promptly and in encouraging terms. On March 9, 1943, President Roosevelt sent a special message to Congress proposing basic reform of the Organic Act and certain basic changes in the essential character of the island-mainland relationship. In his message the President said:[55]

> It has long been the policy of the Government of the United States progressively to reinforce the machinery of self-government in its territories and island possessions. Puerto Rico has universal suffrage and an elective legislature which considers and enacts measures governing its internal affairs. * * * I recommend to the Congress that it consider as soon as possible an amendment to the organic law of Puerto Rico to permit the people * * * to elect their own Governor and to redefine the functions and powers of the Federal Government and the government of Puerto Rico, respectively.

The President then explained that he had already named a committee to consider and make recommendations of changes needed in the Organic Act in addition to his basic proposal favoring the election of the island's Governor. The committee proposed would have an equal number of Puerto Ricans and Americans, with Interior Secretary Harold Ickes acting as chairman.

Roosevelt's proposals touched off a wave of speculation and excitement. Senator Tydings argued that the President's approach would settle none of the island's problems. Instead, he said: "I would like to see the Puerto Ricans given their freedom and the right to determine in full their own destiny." Tydings added that arrangements should be made for the United States to have the use of military and naval bases, but aside from that, independence was the only solution. "Otherwise," he claimed, "Puerto Rico will remain a perpetually unsolved problem always dangling before Congress."[56] In his bitterness against the Tugwell-Muñoz Marín alliance, Resident Commissioner Bolívar Pagán commented that the President's interest was gratifying but it would have done far more good had he announced the dismissal of Tugwell as governor.

There was wide speculation concerning the President's motives for making his proposal. Some observers felt that it was merely an attempt to forestall a new independence drive. Others interpreted the message as the first step toward independence so the United States could get rid of a seemingly perpetual burden. Puerto Rican politicians saw Roosevelt's actions as a method of holding off their pressure for an open plebiscite on status, an escape from the dilemma of choosing between statehood and independence. The New York Times argued that the message was a natural step forward and a demonstration to Latin America and the world that the United States renounced imperialism and had no selfish motives for retaining the island.

Not long after the President's message, Senator Tydings introduced another of his independence bills. Few persons took his proposals seriously, however. The special committee announced by Franklin Roosevelt in his March 1943, message to Congress held its first meeting on July 19, 1943. It was called the Committee on the Revision of the Organic Act of Puerto Rico. It met daily until August 7, 1943. It was composed of Harold Ickes, Secretary of the Interior, Chairman; Abe Fortas, Undersecretary of the Interior; Governor Tugwell and Father R. A. McGowan from the mainland; and Senator Celestino Iriarte, Senator Luis Muñoz Marín, Supreme Court Judge Martín Travieso, and José Ramírez Santibáñez, from Puerto Rico.

At the first session of the President's committee, Secretary of the Interior Harold Ickes discussed the events which had led to the convening of the group. Although Ickes stated that he did not personally believe that political changes could solve or alleviate chronic economic problems, the committee should feel free to recommend political changes which would remove all unnecessary restrictions upon the island's internal freedom. Ickes also suggested that no disclosures to the press would be allowed until decisions were actually reached, for he expressed the fear that piecemeal rumors and haphazard information in the newspapers might destroy chances for success. Instead he promised a daily press release approved by the group.

In the daily round of discussions which followed, a pattern was soon apparent. The Puerto Ricans were eager to obtain every possible concession. Each Puerto Rican member regarded himself as a representative and spokesman of a political party whose view he had to express and to which he would have to keep faith. On the other hand, the U.S. representatives on the committee acted as a restraining force, cautioning against seeking too much for fear that nothing would result. Commencing with the opening session, Luis Muñoz Marín was the aggressive, dynamic idea man. He was determined to get a positive commitment on the part of Congress to take up the issue of ultimate status at some specific time. He feared that approval of the elective-governor idea would be an excuse to put off for another quarter of a century any further changes. Muñoz Marín warned that the island would not wait that long. In regard to this concern, the committee minutes quote him thus:[57]

> My idea is to have the germ of the thing in legislation now, something that the President may set in motion at some definite time under the terms of this bill. Maybe we could provide for a constitutional convention in Puerto Rico to propose to Congress a definite and permanent constitution for the purpose of settling the problem completely, and presumably forever.

From the record of the informal discussions which ensued it seems apparent that Muñoz Marín was already formulating the approach to the status problem which his political party successfully used 7 years later. Again he reiterated his belief that statehood, although acceptable and honorable, was economically unfeasible for the island. On the other hand, he had obviously forsaken his earlier emphatic independence views as well, and was groping for some middle ground. For instance, the minutes report this rambling, but revealing argument by the Popular Democratic leader:[58]

> * * * the people of Puerto Rico are completely and unalterably opposed to continuation beyond the term that may be strictly necessary of the colonial system of goverment. Whether they want statehood, whether they want independence, whether they want something else—I mean, those are not the only two forms of sovereignty in the middle of the twentieth century—but they want an end to the colonial system by some kind of sovereignty, some kind of full internal self-government that is not revokable except at their own initiative.

Senator Iriarte, the statehood representative, also voiced a very strong opinion. He stated that he was wearied and chagrined by the fact that every few years a different Congressman, whether motivated by a desire for notoriety, gross misinformation, or misguided good intentions, came along with a "hare-brained" idea to make the island independent. Iriarte feared that some day the American people might become convinced that independence was what the island's people really desired and force it upon them. He warned that such a move would be a great tragedy. The statehood advocate claimed that Senator Tydings' misguided independence offers in 1936 and thereafter had precipitated the violence of the later 1930's and had done irreparable harm. Iriarte urged that the President's committee should get a firm commitment from Congress never to turn the island loose as an independent nation.

Throughout the meetings held by the revision committee, the members from the mainland cautioned the Puerto Ricans not to seek or expect too much, or they would likely get nothing. Tugwell and Fortas were both concerned that Congress might be hard to convince concerning the important idea of electing the governor of Puerto Rico. They did not wish to burden the chance of getting this concession by attaching status commitments to the bill. In fact, Fortas argued that the committee's function was to suggest Organic Act revisions, so any mention of political status would be an overstepping of bounds. He also feared that a status plebiscite might produce a Puerto Rican choice which Congress would be unwilling to grant.

Despite the caution urged by the American members, Muñoz Marín was not convinced that their position was wise or valid. He asked: "Are we going to let something that is an improvement but is not a solution create a psychological situation which will postpone for years the final solution?"[59] As a result of the difference of opinion about the inclusion of a status commitment in the bill, the committee wrangled through session after session. Finally Muñoz Marín proposed that a provision be included to the effect that as soon as World War II should end, a constitutional convention would be authorized for the island. This convention would have the task of drafting a final status solution to be submitted to Congress. However, after a thorough debate on this proposal, a vote resulted in a 4–4 deadlock in which the mainland members and Puerto Rican members voted on opposite sides. Then Fortas proposed an alternative which called for a joint advisory council on Puerto Rico to study and periodically to report to the President and to Congress on the subject of the island's status. A stipulation was also included that any future action by Congress on the political relationship should have approval of the Puerto Rican people before it became effective.

At its final session every member agreed to sign the bill[60] which had been drafted by the committee for submission to the President. Its chief features were: (*a*) That commencing in November 1944, Puerto Ricans would elect their own governor, who would have broadened administrative responsibilities in local affairs; (*b*) that an elected government secretary would replace the appointive executive secretary and that this elected official would succeed to the governorship in case of a vacancy; (*c*) that the Governor would appoint all Puerto Rican cabinet officers and supreme court justices; (*d*) that it was the declared intention of Congress that no further changes in the Organic Act would be made without the concurrence of the people of Puerto Rico or their elected representatives; (*e*) that the Presidential power to nullify Puerto Rican legislation would extend only to those bills which threatened the security of the United States, impaired the international relations of the United States, or impaired its relations with Puerto Rico under the Organic Act; (*f*) that a Federal officer, to be called the United States Commissioner General in Puerto Rico, would be appointed to execute laws of the United States and coordinate Federal activities in Puerto Rico; and (*g*) that a joint advisory council consisting of the Secretary of Interior, the Commissioner General, the Governor of Puerto Rico, four appointees of the President, and five appointees of the Puerto Rican Governor would be named to advise the President and Congress on further changes.

President Roosevelt accepted the report submitted by the committee. He then transmitted it to Congress with recommendations that the draft bill prepared by the committee be used as a guide for the suggested legislation. In his message, the President reviewed the Puerto Rican economic situation and showed how the island had become virtually dependent upon mainland markets and suppliers. He also referred to the increase in population, the rise in wages, improved literacy, and strategic importance of the island. Forseeing probable congressional objections, Roosevelt took special efforts to reassure the Congress that its ultimate power to legislate for the island would not be affected by this bill, but that it would gratify the Puerto Ricans if they were guaranteed that the Organic Act would not be altered without their consent.

The draft bill was then submitted as Senate Bill 1407 in October. Some of the proposals were too controversial to appeal to legislators who were annoyed by the acts of Puerto Rican extremists, haunted by fears of socialism, or committed to other status formulae. If the bill had involved only the elective-governor proposal, it is likely that it would have moved rapidly toward approval. But since it was so laden with additional provisions, it was inevitable that it would encounter heavy opposition.

While press and public reaction to the Presidential message was generally favorable, the bill ran into trouble almost at the outset of the Senate hearings in November 1943. Interior Secretary Ickes appeared to testify. He stressed the "unique genesis" of the legislative proposals as a new milestone in dealing with territorial problems. But the proposals did not please many members of the U.S. Senate. The provision that Congress would declare its intention that all future changes in the relationship must be concurred in by the people of Puerto Rico was regarded as unconstitutional because it would bind future Congresses.[61] The Senators also objected to the idea of a U.S. Commissioner General who was likely to become a supergovernor or a competitor of the Governor for power and prestige. They found fault with the governor's appointing supreme court justices, the attorney general, and the commissioner of education; they criticized the proposed election of the government secretary.

Another problem which confronted the proposed legislation was that predicted earlier by Abe Fortas. The issue of ultimate status completely subordinated the elective-governor need. Senator Tydings' pending independence bill, S. 952, gave new hope to those who wanted separation. These independence advocates suggested that S. 1407 be amended by stating that the actions were being taken as a first step toward independence. Even many prominent members of the Popular Democratic party, although pledged to postpone the status debate in favor of economic rehabilitation, could not resist the chance to voice opinions in behalf of independence. Nevertheless, Muñoz Marín steadfastly supported the bill as the President's committee had proposed it. He urged the Senate not to decimate it by removing the principle of consultation with the Puerto Rican people.

When the Senate Committee on Territories and Insular Affairs finally issued its report on S. 1407 in February 1944, the bill was no longer recognizable. Significant changes included: (*a*) Retention of the Organic Act's section 34 allowing Congress to annul any act of the Puerto Rican Legislature; (*b*) rejection of the Joint Advisory Council to advise on future political status; and (*c*) rejection of the requirement that Congress never alter the political relationship without obtaining the consent of the people of Puerto Rico. The Senate Committee had virtually rewritten the bill.

Since the Senate Committee had removed nearly all the controversial items except the principle of the elective-governor, the bill moved rapidly through the routine of Senate business and was approved on February 15, 1944, without serious opposition. But the legislative fight was far from over. The House of Representatives was in no hurry. A special investigating committee headed by C. Jasper Bell of Missouri had been designated in 1943 to make recommendations concerning Puerto Rican affairs. The House leadership decided to hear the report of this committee before acting on the Senate-approved elective-governor bill. Representative Bell was generally regarded as an opponent of reforms for Puerto Rico.

The Bell Committee failed to issue its report during the remainder of the second session of the 78th Congress. Even a personal letter from Roosevelt to Bell failed to persuade the committee chairman to endorse the elective-governor bill, which therefore remained firmly buried in the House committee throughout 1944.

In their nominating conventions in 1944, both the Popular Democrats and Union Republicans reaffirmed their support for S. 1407 as it had passed the Senate. Again the Popular Democrats took the position that a decision on ultimate status should be delayed until economic rehabilitation had been achieved. A vote for their party would not be interpreted as support for any particular status. Actually, the insular elections which took place in November 1944, were not nearly as exciting and dramatic as they had been in 1940. The Populares' dynamic leadership and vigorous economic program had blunted the appeal of the other political forces. Besides, both the Nation and the island were deeply involved in World War II. Although a nonpolitical independence movement was underway, no party had been formed to contest the election. Therefore a thorough sweep of the elections by the Popular Democrats came as no particular surprise. Polling 383,000 votes compared to the 208,000 of the combined opposition, the Popular Democrats won 17 of the 19 senate seats and 37 of 39 house seats. Sugar planter Jesús T. Piñero was elected Resident Commissioner.

Since the elective-governor bill had failed in the 1944 session of Congress, Puerto Ricans tried a new approach in 1945. Their legislature petitioned Congress to allow a plebiscite on status alternatives for which economic arrangements would be clearly specified. Senator Tydings responded by introducing another independence bill, S. 227, and holding hearings on it. Tydings' proposal this time was for a 21-year transition period in which the island would receive special treatment from the United States as it adjusted to independence. The people would not have a choice of status, but rather would vote on delegates to a constitutional convention committed in advance to independence. Although the Popular Democrats still insisted that the party was uncommitted, 22 of the 39 house members and 11 of the 19 senate members subsequently endorsed the Tydings Bill. Nevertheless, Muñoz Marín urged Tydings to withdraw his bill and present one more in keeping with the petition of the Puerto Rican Legislature asking for a vote on status alternatives. Tydings' reply was that there was absolutely no sentiment in the United States for statehood for Puerto Rico and the people should be told that statehood was not a valid, legitimate hope.

Following the Tydings' hearings, the next development came in May 1945 when the Bell Committee finally issued its report. While admitting to congressional shortcomings in its dealings with the island, the Bell report, in general, was a sharply worded indictment of much of the Popular program. The report attacked the enforcement of the 500-acre law, spoke against the alleged attempt to make the sugar industry the "whipping boy," and claimed that Puerto Rican actions since 1940 had been deliberate assaults upon the tradition of free enterprise. In reference to the island's political status, the Bell report conceded that there was widespread dissatisfaction on the island but no real consensus on a solution. Statehood was said to be acceptable to a vast majority, but the congressional committee feared drastic economic consequences if special Federal arrangements were terminated and the island were made to bear a greater share of national expenses.

The Populares' developing economic and legislative program, achieved with Governor Tugwell's cooperation and administrative help, occupied most of the Bell Committee's attention. The report was thoroughly critical of land reforms, public authorities, and industrial development schemes. The Puerto Rico Planning Board was described as being symbolic of the effort to wipe out private enterprise in favor of a corporate state. The report warned that "all Puerto Ricans who are working will be working directly under the domination of political appointees far removed from democratic controls."[62] The threat of a dictatorship and an economic pattern similar to that which had occurred in Fascist Italy was claimed as a distinct possibility for Puerto Rico.

The Bell Committee report was probably the most severe indictment of Puerto Ricans ever published by a U.S. Government agency. Never had an entire congressional committee report so thoroughly and completely found fault. Warning of all manner of dire results if the present directions were pursued, the Committee recommended that Congress should seriously review the whole series of Puerto Rican laws fundamental to the Populares' rehabilitation program.

The bitter nature of the Bell report precluded favorable House actions on the elective-governor bill. Despite overwhelming Puerto Rican sentiment for change and the Presidential efforts since 1943 to achieve governmental reforms, the status situation remained essentially as it had been since 1917.

When Franklin D. Roosevelt died in April 1945, Puerto Ricans were stunned by loss of their powerful friend. But insular hopes for sympathetic concern from the Truman administration were soon stimulated. When Governor Tugwell conferred in Washington with President Harry Truman in August 1945 the island of Puerto Rico buzzed with excited rumors that Truman would propose a plebiscite.

Therefore, it was no great surprise when Truman sent a special message to Congress in October 1945 asking that the Puerto Rican people be allowed to settle for themselves their political future. The President listed four courses which he felt that the Congress might offer to the island. These were (*a*) an elective-governor and enlarged local autonomy; (*b*) statehood; (*c*) complete independence; and (*d*) a dominion status.

The United States, aware of the developing worldwide opposition to colonialism, wanted to end all claims that Puerto Rico was being held against her will. Administration leaders were hopeful that independence clamor and unfavorable world opinion could be silenced by a popular choice of some status ending the semblance of colonialism. Truman was convinced that Muñoz Marín could lead and dominate the Puerto Rican expression of opinion. He apparently felt that the Popular Democratic leader, although long an advocate of independence, would not want to see economic rehabilitation jeopardized by a choice which the island could ill-afford.

Because the Truman message had been presented late in the congressional session, the President reiterated his position in the State of the Union message in January 1946. In due time, Resident Commissioner Jesús Piñero prepared and introduced legislation in Congress to fulfill the President's suggestions for a referendum. Before Congress ever got around to acting on Truman's proposals, the Puerto Rican Legislature passed a bill of its own providing for such a plebiscite. Because Truman wanted Congress to make the offer and to feel committed to fulfill the choice, he got Tugwell to veto the Puerto Rican legislation. When the veto was overridden, Truman exercised his own absolute veto over Puerto Rican legislation.

While Puerto Ricans awaited action by a Congress burdened with [illegible] Presidential maneuver occurred. Rexford Tugwell resigned as Governor on June 29, 1946. He had tried unsuccessfully since 1941 to get Congress to pass the elective-governor bill. Tugwell was convinced that Congress was still in no mood to grant the privilege of electing a Governor, so he persuaded President Truman that the next best choice was to appoint a Puerto Rican as his successor. Consequently, on July 21, 1946, Jesús T. Piñero was appointed as the first native Governor of the island of Puerto Rico.

The choice of Piñero was generally approved as a courageous step in the right direction. Many Congressmen were pleased to be rid of Tugwell. Puerto Ricans were flattered with the precedent-shattering action. A foreign governor, perhaps the most obnoxious symbol of a colonial situation, would no longer affront them. Piñero's choice was a logical one, since he had been the highest Puerto Rican official chosen-at-large in the preceding election. Never regarded as a professional politician, Piñero was respected for his calm and dependable judgment. He was considered generally sympathetic to the needs of the masses and to Muñoz Marín's economic reform movement. Most people considered this appointment as a prelude to further opportunities for the island.

Developments in the Puerto Rican situation came in clusters in 1947. Another independence bill was proposed by Tydings, and this was countered by a statehood bid. A newly created political force, the Independence Party, appealed to the United Nations to consider the plight of the island. H.R. 3309, another elective-governor bill, was introduced by Fred Crawford of Michigan. While the House of Representatives had been the stumbling block in 1944, this time an entirely different atmosphere prevailed. Tugwell's departure and a change in committee leadership worked wonders. Crawford, as chairman of the Subcommittee on Territories and Insular Possessions, was wholeheartedly in favor of advancing self-government. He was unalterably opposed to allowing any group of American citizens to withdraw voluntarily from the Union. While Interior Secretary Julius Krug endorsed the elective-governor bill, he also urged Congress to hold the plebiscite on status for which Truman had asked in 1945. Governor Piñero urged passage of the bill, claiming that it was the next logical step in Puerto Rico's evolution.

In May 1947 the House Committee issued a report solidly endorsing the elective-governor bill, but at the same time reassuring the Congress that the basic political and fiscal relationship would remain the same and that congressional authority to legislate for Puerto Rico was still intact.

The bill encountered almost no opposition in the House. Senator Hugh Butler's companion bill moved easily through the Senate. On making it possible for Puerto Rico to become the first territory in United States history to elect its own governor. The elective-governor act received widespread acclaim in Puerto Rico and the United States, but an emotional minority in the island regarded it as a threat to the independence movement. Incendiary speeches by Pedro Albizu Campos, recently returned to the island from his imprisonment and exile, soon stirred up students at the University of Puerto Rico. After numerous incidents and suspensions, Chancellor Jaime Benítez finally ordered the university closed temporarily in April 1948.

Following the successful passage of the elective-governor act, President Truman was determined to work for additional changes in the relationship. In a message to Congress on February 2, 1948, he again urged that the people be allowed to choose their own form of government. Later that month, Truman visited Puerto Rico, where he was warmly received. Puerto Ricans appreciated his vigorous support for the reforms already achieved and for his advocacy of a status plebiscite. He repeated his determination to get action on the status issue.

The election of 1948 loomed as the most significant ever held in Puerto Rico. For the first time in history, the insular political parties would be competing for the governor's office as well as for legislative control. The race got underway early as party strategists mapped their plans for capturing the biggest prize ever. This time the new Independence Party was entered, along with the Popular Democrats and the Republicans and Socialists in coalition. The Popular Democrats unveiled their new approach to the status problem by presenting the commonwealth plan.

The idea of an autonomous, self-governing commonwealth was not exactly new in 1948. References to similar concepts had appeared throughout the debate since 1898. In 1922 the Liberal Party's "associated free state" principle had been advanced. Horace Towner, as U.S. Representative and as Puerto Rican Governor, had advocated a constitutional amendment to allow for unique "overseas states." Men had occasionally suggested a dominion concept such as Canada practiced. In 1943, during the deliberations of the President's committee, both Abe Fortas and Muñoz Marín had used the word "commonwealth" in their discussions of alternatives. Finally, in the summer of 1948, as the Popular Democrats campaigned, they outlined the commonwealth plan.

Some insight to the Popular Democratic approach was provided in May 1948, by Dr. Antonio Fernós-Isern, candidate for reelection as Resident Commissioner. At a lecture delivered at the Woodrow Wilson School of Public and Foreign Affairs at Princeton University, Dr. Fernós-Isern stated:[63]

> There is a fundamental difference between the status of Puerto Rico and that of a State of the Union. The local governmental structure of Puerto Rico rests upon an Organic Act, a statute stipulated unilaterally by the sovereign for a dependent people. * * * There exists the plenary legislative authority of Congress over the Island, without constitutional limitations. * * * [But let us suppose] a government * * * founded on a constitution adopted by the people and that they alone shall be empowered to amend * * * and that [the Federal Government] cease in the exercise of its plenary powers; that all these conditions form the basis for a new and bilateral organic pact which could be amended only through mutual consent rather than unilaterally. Without doubt such changes would mean for Puerto Rico a status of democratic sovereignty, since its government would rest upon the will of the people, who would have duly adopted their own constitution and their pattern of relations with the Federal Government.

This statement neatly summarized the proposals which the Popular Democrats were planning to make. Dr. Fernós-Isern emphasized that he was not suggesting this as a final solution, but as an interim plan to allow the island to work out her serious economic difficulties. He frankly admitted that there would be those who would challenge the proposals on constitutional grounds, and others would hesitate because the action was unprecedented. He argued that either statehood or independence would be easier to attain from this commonwealth stage of development.

The next step in the development of the commonwealth idea came in a Fourth of July speech by Muñoz Marín, the Popular Democratic Party's candidate for governor. He began with the usual objections to colonialism and requests for full home rule. But he then suggested that the Congress authorize the legislature of Puerto Rico to call a plebiscite between statehood and independence whenever the Puerto Rican legislature might decide that the economic development of the island warranted it. The significant element in this proposal was the idea that the people of Puerto Rico not only had the right to determine a final status, but through their elected representatives, also to declare their readiness to make such a determination.

The platform of the Popular Democratic Party, issued in the summer of 1948, followed the general outlines of the speeches by Fernós-Isern and Muñoz Marín. The party promised that if its candidates were successful in the election, Congress would be asked to pass a law granting the reforms called for in the platform.

As expected, the Popular Democrats swept to victory in November 1948. Obtaining 392,000 votes against the 346,000 of the combined opposition groups, the Popular Democrats received 63 percent of the total vote.

Puerto Rico, as a result of a half century of debate and continuous pressure for additional autonomy, had moved by gradual steps from the military occupation of 1898 through the intermediate relations established by the Foraker Act of 1900, the Jones-Shafroth Act of 1917, and the elective-governor act of 1947. With the choice of the island's first elected governor, another stage in the evolutionary process from military occupation to greater self-government had been reached. Muñoz Marín and Fernós-Isern hailed the election results as a mandate to proceed toward the commonwealth they had promised the people.

PART III. THE COMMONWEALTH AND THE CONTINUING STATUS DEBATE

A. THE PASSAGE OF PUBLIC LAW 600

The 1948 election was a historical landmark for Puerto Rico. For the first time in its long history, the island possessed an entirely popularly elected government. While there was not general satisfaction with the sphere of responsibility allotted to the insular government, there was an expectation that a popularly elected governor, working with legislative support, could become a force in the effort to achieve further status change. This expectation proved to be correct.

One of the pressing problems of the new administration would be to acquaint the Congress with the proposals made during the election campaign and to convince that body of the wisdom of the proposals. Muñoz Marín visited Washington in July 1949, and again in February 1950. There he appealed for legislation which would fulfill the campaign pledges of 1948. He emphasized that he was seeking to have "the law catch up with practice,"[64] that the really significant change had already occurred in the passage of the elective-governor act. The drawing up of a Puerto Rican constitution, he said, "is actually a much shorter step than the one already taken."[65]

The legislation designed to accomplish the Puerto Rican proposals was introduced as H.R. 7674 on March 14, 1950, by Dr. Fernós-Isern. A few weeks later, on March 31, 1950, a companion bill, S. 3336, was sponsored in the Senate by Senators O'Mahoney and Butler. In an extension of his remarks at the time of the bill's introduction, Dr. Fernós-Isern characterized its purpose as "to duly recognize the principle of government by consent." He referred to the proposed status as "a Commonwealth of American citizens," and noted that a new form of federal relationship was developing.[66]

The terms of H.R. 7674 and S. 3336 were explained in the hearings by Dr. Fernós-Isern. He stated that all existing fiscal, economic, and political arrangements between the United States and the island were being restated and reenacted in a section called the Statute of Federal Relations. The remainder of the bill's provisions spelled out the procedure for drafting a constitution. The people of the island would elect delegates to a constitutional convention, would ultimately vote to approve or reject the finished document, and would then submit it to the President and Congress for approval.

In contrast to the indifference to Puerto Rican legislation often displayed by the Congress in the past, both Houses moved promptly to schedule hearings for mid-May 1950. Considering the uniqueness of the legislation and the implications contained in it, the congressional hearings were not extensive. They produced controversy, however, that foreshadowed future problems; for later on there would be conflicting opinions about what had been intended and what had been accomplished by the legislation.

In the congressional hearings on the commonwealth proposal, Puerto Rico's opposition political parties raised protests and warnings. Neither independence nor statehood advocates were opposed to the principle of consent or to enlarged opportunities for self-government, but both were disturbed by the interpretations being attached to the proposals. The Independence Party and the Statehood Party were unwilling to accept commonwealth as the final answer in the status debate; they feared, however, that this might be the intention of the Popular Democrats. Although they had been constantly reassured that such fears were groundless, expressions by Muñoz Marín and Fernós-Isern praising the proposed status as "a new kind of state" or claiming commonwealth to be "equal to but different from statehood" had aroused their distrust and wariness.

The Independence Party president, Dr. Gilberto Concepcíon de Gracia, wrote to the House Committee on Public Lands to express his party's unyielding opposition to the developing proceedings. In his letter he charged that undue haste had been evidenced in setting up the hearings, that there was a deliberate intent to prevent opposition by holding hearings only in Washington, and that the bill itself was a fraud and a sham in violation of the promises made in 1948. The Statehood Republican Party also expressed its disapproval, but for different reasons. They objected to "misrepresentations" concerning the extent and significance of the reforms, and false claims of public support for the commonwealth idea. Resident Commissioner Fernós-Isern and other Popular Democrats had claimed that the election of 1948 had been virtually a referendum on status in which the ideas embodied in H.R. 7674 and S. 3336 had received overwhelming approval from the people of Puerto Rico. The Statehood Republicans replied that this was a misrepresentation. They charged that the proposed constitutional convention had been presented during the campaign as an open one at which any form of government or political status might be considered. The Republicans argued that there would have been little enthusiasm for a convention had the people realized that it would be confined to drafting a constitution reaffirming and undergirding the existing colonial relationship. In the Republican viewpoint, the sort of plebiscite proposed would offer only a choice between a few minor reforms and no reforms at all. They demanded that the misleading commonwealth label be removed from the bills, and that they be described simply as Organic Act reform projects.

It is curious that the independence advocates claimed that the Popular Democrats were seeking to perpetuate subservience to the United States while the statehood advocates claimed that this was merely a devious scheme to lead the island toward independence. The statehooders were particularly wary of the words in the bill which described the proposed action as being "in the nature of a compact." They urged Congress to ponder seriously the meaning and implications of these words.

The bitterest opposition to passage of S. 3336 in Congress did not come from Puerto Ricans or from congressional conservatives who traditionally opposed liberalizing trends. Instead it came from Congressman Vito Marcantonio, an American Labor Party representative from a part of New York City heavily populated by Puerto Ricans. Marcantonio, fiercely in favor of independence, called the bill a supine reaffirmation of the status quo, a continuation of subservience under the guise of liberalization.

Some indication of the prevailing understanding of the proposed Puerto Rican legislation by Truman administration officials was revealed in a letter to the House and Senate committees from Assistant Secretary of State Jack K. McFall. This letter clearly indicated that State Department officials felt no substantial change in the relationship would result from passage of the legislation. McFall's letter stated:[67]

> The Department of State believes it to be of the greatest importance that the Puerto Rican people be authorized to frame their own constitution * * * *in order that formal consent of the Puerto Ricans may be given to their present relationship* to the United States. * * * In view of the importance of "colonialism" and "imperialism" in anti-American propaganda, the Department of State feels that S. 3336 would have great value as *a symbol of the basic freedom enjoyed by Puerto Rico within the larger framework* of the United States. [Italics added.]

The favorable report on S. 3336 by the Senate Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs was issued early in June 1950. According to the report the bill represented a logical step in the process of political freedom and economic development, since it would allow an expression of will and creation by the Puerto Rican people. The Senate report clearly stated that the bill was neither a statehood nor an independence move, and that the proposed action would not preclude some future determination of Puerto Rico's political status.

In sharp contrast to the long and thorough floor debates in the Senate on earlier Puerto Rican legislation, when S. 3336 came up for Senate action on June 13, 1950, there was very little discussion. In fact, the only proposed change was presented by the bill's managers, it being an amendment to prevent automatic approval of the Puerto Rican constitution by default if Congress did not act on it within a specified time. A portion of Senate Report 1779 was inserted in the Record in response to one Member's desire to show clearly what was being proposed. The Senate, by voice vote, approved the measure unanimously. The whole process took less than a half-hour.

Shortly after the Senate gave its endorsement to S. 3336, the House Committee on Public Lands issued its report praising the legislation. The report stressed the overwhelming support for the bill in Puerto Rico. Apparently the committee interpreted the 1948 election results as a mandate for the bill, discounting the opposition to this analysis offered by independence and statehood spokesmen during the hearings. The House committee went on record expressing its understanding of the extent of the commitment involved:[68]

> The bill under consideration would not change Puerto Rico's fundamental political, social and economic relationship to the United States * * * [It] does not commit the Congress, either expressly or by implication, to the enactment of statehood legislation * * * in the future. Nor will it in any way preclude a future determination by the Congress of Puerto Rico's ultimate status.

The committee added, however, that the bill offered an advancement in self-government and would make "a fundamental contribution to the art and practice of the government and administration of territories under the sovereignty of the United States."[69] Significantly, neither the Senate nor the House report attempted to clarify the meaning of the words, "in the nature of a compact," which would eventually lead to so much controversy.

The House debate on the measure was brief. Representative Marcantonio opposed the bill as a ruse to lure the people of Puerto Rico into endorsing a continuation of their colonial position. Others protested that the scope of the referendum offered was too narrow, that it should encompass statehood and independence as well. Some emphasized that essential powers remained with the Congress; others, that Puerto Rico would gain important powers. Less than 2 hours were consumed in the total debate. The conflicting interpretations evident in many of the comments indicate that most Congressmen chose to understand for themselves what their votes implied: that indeed, there was no single, lucid position or motivation involved. The bill was voted through with only Marcantonio dissenting.

On July 4, 1950, President Truman signed into law the Puerto Rican Commonwealth Act, Public Law 600.[70] The swiftness and ease of passage was a striking departure from the slow, tortuous progress of most Puerto Rican legislation in the past.

B. REFERENDUM AND CONSTITUTION

Late in August 1950, the Puerto Rican Legislature set June 4, 1951, as the date for the referendum on Public Law 600. Immediately, a lively discussion of the merits of the alternatives began.

The Nationalists denounced the referendum and urged that the people abstain from registering to vote. To dramatize their stand, they launched a terroristic campaign more daring than any they had undertaken before. On October 30, five insurrectionists tried to shoot their way into La Fortaleza, the Governor's palace. One policeman and four Nationalists were killed in the melee. Simultaneous uprisings in Peñuelas, Ponce, Jayuya, Utuado, Arecibo, and Naranjito left

27 dead and 90 wounded. A post office was burned and a police station was bombed.

Two days later, on November 1, 1950, two Puerto Ricans, residents of New York, tried to assassinate President Truman at Blair House. A White House policeman and one of the assassins were killed. The other assailant denied that the Nationalist movement had been behind the attempt, but a note signed by Albizu Campos was found in his pocket. Albizu and a number of other Nationalists received long prison sentences for complicity in this week of violence.

Governor Muñoz and the Puerto Rican press expressed their sorrow at these events, but emphasized that the violent Nationalists represented a small minority with which the vast majority of Puerto Ricans had little sympathy. Most mainland newspapers also urged that the Nationalist uprising be kept in its proper perspective: that there was no cause for condemnation of all Puerto Ricans, or for any reconsideration of the provisions of Public Law 600.

Although the Nationalists had overshadowed the legitimate campaigning in the headlines, the real debate on the Commonwealth status went on. The Popular Democrats, of course, urged approval of the new status. The Socialists, while denying that the Commonwealth represented a final solution to the status question, urged their members to vote in favor of the new relationship because it represented an expansion of democratic process for the island. The Independence Party campaigned for a boycott of the referendum on the grounds that it did not offer any real solution to the status problem, that it only involved a choice between two colonial situations. The Statehood Party was deeply divided, and although the party leaders agreed that the proposed changes could not be considered a permanent solution, they were unable to arrive at a full accord as to what immediate attitude the party should assume. Therefore, the party Central Committee passed a resolution leaving the matter to the conscience of the individual party members.

On June 4, 1951, 506,000 of the 776,000 persons registered cast their votes. Of these, 387,000 voted in favor of approving Public Law 600 and 119,000 voted against. Although there were charges of irregularities, these were not proved. Opponents of the measure continued to insist that the Commonwealth would not be a permanent status solution; but by and large, it was accepted that democratic processes had been observed, and that the Commonwealth, whether temporary or permanent, would soon become a reality.

Following the referendum, delegates were chosen to the constitutional convention. Again the Independence Party declined to participate, but the other 3 parties chose 92 delegates of whom 70 were Popular Democrats, 15 were Statehood Republicans, and 7 were Socialists.

The delegates represented a reasonable cross-section of the professional and occupational groups on the island.

The first session of the Puerto Rican constitutional convention was held on September 17, 1951. Dr. Antonio Fernós-Isern was named president and Miss María Libertad Gómez, a schoolteacher and farmer, was vice president. The convention met on 62 working days over a 5-month period. The Constitution of the United States and various modern State constitutions were used as models. Vigorous debates occurred on the merits of each item proposed for the document. Minority members were particularly concerned that the wording of significant passages should make it clear that Puerto Rico intended eventual union with the United States. For example, it was upon their insistence that in the preamble of the constitution the words, "we now create within our union with the United States", replaced the phrase "our association."

On February 6 the delegates voted on the document they had prepared. Of the 92 delegates chosen, 91 voted, 88 for and 3 against. Over a million copies of the constitution were printed in Spanish and 30,000 were prepared in English.[71] These were widely distributed. Public meetings were arranged where the document was discussed and explained. Finally, on March 3, 1952, another referendum was held in which the electorate approved the constitution by a vote of 374,000 to 82,000.

Almost from the moment that the new constitution was adopted, a debate began over the nature and intent of the new relationship. The opposition parties claimed that the people of Puerto Rico had little comprehension of the true implications of the arrangement. They argued that the voters acted on the Popular Democratic Party's version of the meaning of Public Law 600, a version not necessarily in harmony with the intent of Congress or the provisions of the U.S. Constitution. It was charged that the public saw the referendum as a vote of confidence for Governor Muñoz and the Popular Democrats—that they were responding to personal magnetism and voicing approval of the general undertaking of the administration, many of which had no relevance to the status issue. The Popular Democratic Party, of course, categorically denied all these arguments.

Following the referendum approving the constitution in Puerto Rico, attention shifted back to Washington. There the approval of the President and Congress was necessary. Since the authorization for the whole process had been obtained easily in 1950, little difficulty was anticipated. But the 2-year interval between the passage of Public Law 600 and the submission of the Puerto Rican constitution produced a surprising change in attitude upon many Members of Congress.

President Harry Truman found no fault with the work of the convention. On April 22, 1952, he sent a message to Congress commending the constitution and expressing pride that he had been a party to the procedure. In part, Truman said:[72]

> The people of the United States and the people of Puerto Rico are entering into a new relationship that will serve as an inspiration to all who love liberty and hate tyranny. * * * Those who truly love freedom know that the right relationship between a government and its people is one based on mutual consent and esteem. The constitution of the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico is a proud document that embodies the best of our democratic heritage.

The Presidential message singled out for praise the constitution's bill of rights and a section concerning the existence of human rights which could be realized only when the agricultural and industrial conditions were improved. This section was later subjected to severe congressional criticism and demands for its deletion.

Dr. Fernós-Isern submitted a resolution proposing approval of the Puerto Rican Constitution on which the House Interior and Insular Affairs Committee held a brief hearing. Again the atmosphere was one of friendly understanding. The question was raised as to whether the Congress was expected to scrutinize the Puerto Rican document line by line or merely to make an overall judgment of its worth. The prevalent view in the committee was that Congress should vote the constitution up or down on its overall merits. Although some committee members pointed to specific items which they personally would not have wanted in a constitution, they voted unanimously to approve the document as submitted.

In its report to the House, the committee reiterated its 1950 statement that the fundamental relationship remained unaltered, but that now the people of Puerto Rico had given a resounding approval to the relationship. The report urged prompt House acceptance of the constitution because it complied with the terms of Public Law 600, it was a worthy document, and it would benefit the international reputation of the Nation.

Meanwhile, the Senate Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs had begun its deliberations on the Puerto Rican constitution. This time the Senators were inclined to be cautious. Numerous Puerto Rican protests had been voiced and pertinent questions had been raised. On the first day of the Senate hearings Muñoz Marín and Dr. Fernós-Isern appeared. The Puerto Rican Governor was lavish in his praise for what had occurred in Puerto Rico. He described it as "a creative act of statesmanship." In his statement were these words:[73]

> We can proclaim * * * to the world that the last juridical vestiges of colonialism have been abolished in the relationship. * * * There has been lacking the basic moral element of freedom, which is consent based upon free agreement.

> * * * The principle of compact contained in Public Law 600 * * * fully wipes out the moral lack. We are not engaged in taking another step in self-government—this is self-government.

Fernós-Isern again emphasized the continuance of the long-standing ties between the island and the mainland. He appeared to be denying that any drastic changes had occurred.

Muñoz Marín answered numerous questions addressed to him by committee members. These questions had probably resulted from pressure by dissident political voices in Puerto Rico, for they contained the usual implications that a dictatorship existed, that a devious plot was afoot to achieve independence in this manner, or that Congress had been told one thing and the people of Puerto Rico another. Muñoz Marín emphatically denied all allegations that he or his party had misrepresented the true nature of Public Law 600. He concluded by asserting that the political status inherent in Public Law 600 was "a new alternative, equal in dignity, although different in nature, to independence or federated statehood."[74]

At a second session convened a week later, an atmosphere of suspicion and doubt prevailed. Senator Malone of Nevada was concerned about the extent of power allocated to Puerto Rico. He asked if approval of the new constitution would prohibit the Congress from ever making unilateral changes in the relationship. Chairman Joseph O'Mahoney replied:[75]

> I think it may be stated as fundamental that the Constitution of the United States gives the Congress complete control and nothing in the Puerto Rican Constitution could affect or amend or alter that right * * *. I find nothing in it which goes beyond the scope of local self-government which we by law expressly authorized.

In another response, Irwin Silverman, legal counsel for the Department of Interior, said this:[76]

> The paramount power over our Territories is in the Congress * * *. The Congress could, at any time, determine what course of action it would wish to take. We now solemnly enter into a compact * * *. It would be in the nature of contractual obligations. It is our hope * * * not to interfere with that relationship * * * nevertheless, the basic power inherent in the Congress * * * which no one can take away, is in the Congress.

When asked if this meant that Congress still had the right to annul Puerto Rican laws, Silverman thought that it did.

But the doubts and suspicions of certain Senators were not easily allayed. The deeper they probed and the more they pondered the implications of Public Law 600, the more hesitant they became about approving the Puerto Rican Constitution as it was submitted. For example, one of the things which made them hesitate was a statement read into the record which had appeared in El Mundo during the campaign for choosing delegates to the Puerto Rican Constitutional Convention. Alleged to have been the words of José Trias Monge, former Attorney General of Puerto Rico, the statement said this:[77]

> Once the compact is formalized, the constitution of Puerto Rico may not be amended except in the manner provided for by the constitution itself, the local laws shall not be subject to derogation by Congress, neither the Statute of Federal Relations nor law 600 may be amended without the consent of the people of Puerto Rico.

Such a bold interpretation of the compact theory frightened those Senators who were inclined to protect the supremacy of Congress. Senators Gordon, Long, and Malone sharply disagreed with the theory that Congress could be legally bound to consult with the people of Puerto Rico on all future changes in the relationship. They lamented the fact that the words "in the nature of a compact" had ever been allowed to creep into Public Law 600. In addition to the serious doubts which were registered concerning the fundamental meaning of the events of the previous few years, the Senators raised objections to specific items in the Puerto Rican Constitution.

The report issued by the Senate committee reflected this new attitude of doubt and distrust. It recommended that the Puerto Rican Constitution should receive final approval only after the constitutional convention had been reconvened and had certified changes desired by the U.S. Senate. Specifically, the Senate committee objected to article II, section 20, concerning basic human rights, and article II, section 5, which dealt with compulsory attendance at elementary schools. Referring to these provisions as "unrealistic, confusing, and misleading," the report urged their deletion from the document. In fact, the Senate report took issue with the repeated use of such terms in the Puerto Rican Constitution as "democratic system," "democratic heritage," and "the people in a democracy," for committee members had seen in them an effort to modify the requirement in Public Law 600 that the constitution must be republican in form.

Finally, the Senate Report carried a blunt warning to future Puerto Rican legislatures concerning the supremacy of Congress when it stated:[78]

> Any act of the Puerto Rican legislature in conflict with the Puerto Rico Federal Relations Act or the requirements of the Constitution of Puerto Rico as set forth in Public Law 600 or the Constitution of the United States * * * would be null and void.

The report also stated that Federal authority in the island could never be nullified by future amendments to the Puerto Rican Constitution. Despite the obvious efforts of the Senate committee to go on record concerning possible eventualities, there were no references to the important questions of whether Congress could continue to annul any insular legislation, or whether it could alter Public Law 600 unilaterally.

In the House, despite the committee report unanimously recommending blanket approval, an objection by Representative Charles Halleck had resulted in the Interior and Insular Affairs Committee offering an amendment to eliminate section 20 from the bill of rights. Other questions brought up on the floor of the House but left unanswered were whether Congress retained the power to veto future amendments to the Puerto Rican Constitution and whether Public Law 600 could be construed as an irrevocably delegation of authority. The overall debate in the House seemed to indicate that Congress did not intend to bind itself from any future interference in Puerto Rican affairs. Finally the House voted without a roll call to approve the constitution as amended by the deletion of section 20.

The Senate debate opened on June 23, 1952, with an explanation by Senator O'Mahoney as to why his committee insisted upon deleting section 20 from the bill of rights. It was his claim that the "expression of aspirations might be confused with enforceable rights."

In addition to deleting section 20 and changing section 5, on school attendance, the Senate inserted a provision that the constitution could not be amended without the approval of Congress. The Senate then voted without a recorded vote to accept the constitution as thus amended.

The leaders of the Popular Democratic Party protested against the so-called Johnston amendment requiring congressional approval of all constitutional amendments. Muñoz Marín cabled his view that the amendment was totally unacceptable and Congress might as well drop the whole process right where it was if the island were to be made to accept such a provision. His cable stated: [79]

> People here are dismayed with amendment that nullifies the significance of the whole constitutional process. To the limitations rightfully imposed * * * the amendment adds an obvious colonial touch. The people of Puerto Rico * * * had no idea that they were consenting to any trace of colonialism * * * I fear that if the matter cannot be remedied in conference great moral harm will be done.

Because the House and Senate versions of the resolution to approve the Puerto Rican Constitution were different, a conference committee was arranged. The House members flatly refused to accept the Johnston amendment which they claimed violated the whole spirit of Public Law 600 and jeopardized all the statements that colonialism and paternalism had ended. The conference committee struck the Johnston amendment and inserted language limiting the scope of congressional review of amendments. The House and Senate readily accepted the conference committee's revisions and President Truman signed the joint resolution, now Public Law 447, on July 3, 1952. The constitutional convention reassembled July 10, 1952, for the formality of ratifying the changes insisted upon by Congress. Later that year the people of Puerto Rico agreed to the alterations by a vote of 420,000 to 58,000.

The lengthy legislative struggle which had begun in the political campaign of 1948 was finally over. Puerto Rico had a constitution of her own choosing. Whether the Commonwealth really satisfied the political aspirations of the people and represented an acceptable alternative to statehood or independence, only time could tell.

C. THE CONTINUING STATUS DEBATE

If either Washington or San Juan officialdom anticipated that status discussions would end for another generation, they were mistaken. The creation of the Commonwealth or Associated Free State resulted in renewed interest in the Puerto Rican situation. On the island the status debate continued with unbridled vigor. Popular Democratic leaders embarked on an educational campaign to popularize the Commonwealth as a dynamic new concept, and their opponents counterattacked with the claim that the island was still in an essentially colonial status. Outside the island there was a growing academic interest in what had been accomplished. Jurists, political scientists, and journalists began asking searching questions about the real nature of the reforms and the legality of the legislation. When the island's new status came before the United Nations, the whole world engaged in a heated controversy about it.

The international review of the Commonwealth occurred because the United States insisted that a significant change had taken place in the relationship between the nation and the island. Under Article 73e of the United Nations Charter, the United States had been obligated to submit periodically information concerning economic, social, and educational conditions in its non-self-governing territories. Since 1946 the United States had submitted such information regarding Puerto Rico. In March 1953, however, the United States announced that it was no longer necessary to report on Puerto Rico since its new political status removed it from the non-self-governing category. A memorandum to the United Nations transmitted by Henry Cabot Lodge, Jr., stated:[80]

> By the various actions taken by the Congress and the people of Puerto Rico, Congress has agreed that Puerto Rico shall have, under that Constitution, freedom from control or interference * * * in respect of internal government * * *. Those laws which directed or authorized interference with matters of local government by the Federal Government have been repealed.

3

Although the United States had no intention of debating such issues as how permanent the grant of authority was, or how extensive self-government might be, these issues were raised by Puerto Rican independence advocates before the Committee on Information From Non-Self-Governing Territories. The Communist bloc nations seized upon this as another way of embarrassing the United States, and forced a United Nations discussion of the whole question. Claiming that Congress still retained the power to revoke the grant of self-government, the anti-American delegates presented resolutions to the General Assembly charging that the term non-self-governing territory still applied to Puerto Rico.

The Trusteeship Committee of the General Assembly held hearings on the U.S. position. There Mason Sears, Dr. Fernós-Isern, and Frances P. Bolton defended the assertions that Puerto Rico was now governed locally by a constitution of her own choosing and that the relationship between island and mainland was embodied in a compact which could not be amended unilaterally. Following the hearings the Committee, by a narrow 22 to 18 vote, upheld the U.S. position. By a 24–17 vote, it authorized the cessation of transmission of information concerning the island.

During the discussion at the United Nations, Ambassador Lodge had announced that President Dwight Eisenhower had authorized him to say that if Puerto Ricans really desired independence, the President would support their bid to obtain it. This statement touched off a new wave of independence fervor. Supporters of independence asked for a special session of the legislature to launch such a drive. Unsuccessful in this request, the Independence Party introduced a proindependence resolution in the regular legislative session of January 1954. The statehood and commonwealth legislators defeated the measure soundly.

In early 1954, another terrorist attack occurred, possibly as a reaction to the Eisenhower pronouncement. On March 1, while 243 members of the U.S. House of Representatives stood for a vote on a routine issue, four Puerto Rican Nationalists in the galleries shouted "Viva Puerto Rico" and began to shoot into the crowded well of the House. When the assailants were disarmed, five Congressmen were found to be wounded. Seventeen Puerto Ricans were implicated in the plot and were indicted on charges of conspiracy. After trial, 13 were found guilty.

Encouraged by the doubts and questions raised about the new status, the Puerto Rican opposition parties increased the tempo of their attacks on the Commonwealth. It was denounced as unrealistic, colonial, a political device. In the face of persistent doubt and criticism, Governor Muñoz Marín decided to seek support for his party's interpretation of Public Law 600, and at the same time, to correct some flaws in the arrangement.

In an address in April of 1955, the drive for revision and clarification of the status law was launched. Muñoz Marín called upon Congress to consider modifications, the scope of which he described thus:[81]

> All that restricts the authority of Puerto Rico in Puerto Rico without any appreciable advantage to the Union and without being essential to the principle of association through common citizenship, should be in some proper manner at some proper time removed from the compact.

Muñoz acknowledged the need for Federal control over defense, wage policy, currency, internal security, and international political relations. But he suggested that Puerto Rico might effectively exercise autonomy in nonpolitical international matters and in a number of internal administrative areas in which Federal control or lack of it is irrelevant to the maintenance of the essential character of the relationship.

In 1956 political campaigns in the island temporarily overshadowed the movement to clarify the meaning of commonwealth. After the usual thorough rehashing of status positions during the campaign, the Popular Democrats again demonstrated great power at the polls, winning 62 percent of the total vote. The only significant development in the election was a shift in the relative position of the Independence Party and the Statehood Republicans. The latter more than doubled its 1952 total by polling 172,000 votes, while the Independence Party dropped from 1952 high of 125,000 to 85,000.

The ideal of statehood for the island of Puerto Rico had been cherished by various groups since 1898, and one political party had continuously advocated it. Nevertheless, serious expectations of statehood were constantly sobered by the failures of other supplicants who appeared to have superior claims. Then in 1958 came the dramatic decision to admit Alaska to statehood. The formidable argument against admitting noncontiguous territories as States had evaporated. It was now virtually certain that Hawaii would also be granted statehood. That action would wipe out another powerful barrier by admitting an island with a mixed population substantially composed of people of non-Anglo-Saxon origins as a full partner in the Union.

From the moment of Alaska's admission to statehood, status agitation in Puerto Rico increased noticeably. Statehood advocates were inspired to press their claims anew. Congress, influenced by anticolonial movements around the world, appeared receptive to changes. New precedents now existed; old barriers were swept away. In response to the renewed pressure of the Statehood Party the Popular Democrats and the Independence Party were bound to make new efforts.

In some respects the political campaign of 1960 opened early in 1959. The Populares took the initiative by requesting the legislature to pass a resolution urging Congress to approve modifications and clarifications in Public Law 600. The legislature quickly passed the resolution, and in March 1959, Resident Commissioner Fernós-Isern introduced H.R. 5926 embodying the required changes. Introduced also were other bills, one designed to grant outright independence and another requiring a referendum on statehood.[82]

Seven years had passed since the establishment of Commonwealth. Now Congress was under heavy pressure to consider major revisions or a new status altogether. Letters, cablegrams, and visits by delegations deluged congressional committees as Puerto Rican political activity moved into high gear. While there were numerous suggestions that a plebiscite be held on status, the Governor doubted the wisdom of such action. He reluctantly agreed to such a plebiscite if it would end the "eternal bickering" which was causing setbacks in the overall development of the island.

It was at first anticipated that the "modifications and clarifications" as they appeared in H.R. 5926 would receive easy passage through the Congress. However, before long it became obvious that the Commonwealth theory and H.R. 5926 were destined for serious review from many quarters. In a 1-day Senate hearing before Interior Committee in June 1959, on S. 2023, the duplicate of H.R. 5926, some Senators turned again and again to the constitutional issues inherent in the Popular Democratic views of Public Law 600. Witnesses were asked where one might find in the Constitution of the United States the authority for Congress to enter into a binding compact with a group of American citizens, delegating in perpetuity power previously retained by Congress. There was not so much a challenge to granting the "modifications" in governmental arrangements, but rather to the theory that by compact such changes required bilateral approval rather than mere congressional approval.

In addition to the views of some of the senators, many of the executive departments of the U.S. Government sent comments to the committee which expressed unfavorable reactions to features of the bill and raised basic questions of constitutionality. Thus the Commonwealth, which had been practiced for 7 years without serious challenge from the courts, came under sharp scrutiny by the legislative and executive branches of the Federal Government.

The political excitement created by the introduction of the numerous status bills in the 86th Congress, was calmed somewhat by an announcement of the House Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs that it proposed holding lengthy public hearings in Puerto Rico before considering any action. All parties began to prepare their cases for another full-scale airing.

In September 1959, before the House hearings were held, Dr. Fernós-Isern introduced H.R. 9234, a revised version of his original H.R. 5926. The bill was carefully designed to counter the objections of critics both in the island and mainland. Where serious opposition had been focused, revisions were made. A significant new feature provided that at some future time, when the per capita income of Puerto Rico would equal that of the poorest State in the Union, special new fiscal relationships would be considered and the political relationship would be decided by a plebiscite.

The House of Representatives hearings held in December 1959, in several cities on the island, delved into industrial development, economic progress, housing, education, health and welfare, achievements under Commonwealth, and the status issue.

One of the interesting issues raised during the hearings was the question of what economic effects significant status changes might create. Under Commonwealth, the island was benefiting to varying degrees from Federal grant programs. Puerto Ricans were not subject to any form of Federal taxation. All tariffs collected on shipments to the island were turned over to the insular treasury. Obviously both statehood or independence would cause revisions in these fiscal arrangements. But the actual cost to Puerto Rico, in dollars and cents, if she became a State, was a controversial matter. The Puerto Rican treasury had estimated that it would amount to a net loss of $124 million, but statehood advocates refuted these figures by insisting that tax costs would be offset by increased Federal grants. A United States Bureau of the Budget study released just prior to the House hearings reenforced the Popular Democrats' contention that statehood would cost $188 million. The significance of this figure can be seen when it is compared to the total revenue of the Commonwealth government of $203 million for fiscal 1958. Statehood advocates gathered impressive statistics and studies of their own to refute the implications that statehood would result in financial disaster.

Other economic repercussions of status decisions were discussed. Officials of the Puerto Rican Economic Development Administration, charged with attracting new industries to Puerto Rico, testified that statehood could harm the industrial development program. Between 1948 and 1958, 600 factories employing 42,000 had been established on the island. A large percentage of them had been attracted to the island by exemptions from Federal taxes. Statehood would probably end the practice of offering this sort of tax advantage.

The holding of a plebiscite on status was also discussed, but as in the past, there was basic disagreement regarding the form and procedures to be followed. Statehood advocates wanted a federally sponsored plebiscite in which the commonwealth status would not be included, since they considered it a purely transitory relationship. Independence spokesmen claimed that status was a moral issue, based upon a clear American obligation stemming from the nature of the conquest of the island; and that any plebiscite conducted under a colonial status could not be considered a valid expression of the popular will.

Representatives O'Brien and Aspinall, veterans of the long statehood battles of Hawaii and Alaska, suggested that the legislature of Puerto Rico could arrange a plebiscite on status at any time for the guidance and information of Congress. They also advised the statehood advocates to set a reasonable, practical goal or target date and arrange their program to meet this goal. They warned that talk of immediate statehood was naive; that statehood could only come through hard work and careful planning.

These public hearings provided much insight for the congressional committee. Its members were made keenly aware of the existence of a strong statehood movement. They also learned that a significant number of Puerto Ricans were determined to cling to the ideal of permanent separation, looking toward a Puerto Rican republic or a West Indies confederation. Their adamant insistence that no other status—even statehood—would satisfy or mollify them was a sobering position. And perhaps just as important was the subtle evidence that a number of Popular Democrats still sentimentally held separation as their ideal. The hearings had served to emphasize the lack of concensus regarding status and therefore the controversial nature of any action which might be taken.

In May 1960, the Popular Democrats sponsored legislation in the Puerto Rican legislature providing for a plebiscite on status. The proposal provided that a petition by 10 percent of the electorate for any particular status would assure its inclusion on the ballot. Any status choice not so supported would be excluded. Despite charges by the Independence Party that this was a trick to pressure Congress into passage of H.R. 9234, and Statehood Republican efforts to change the plebiscite into a simple expression for or against statehood, the proposal was approved as introduced, to remain in effect until some party petitioned for a plebiscite.

The remainder of 1960 was enlivened by a vigorous political campaign marked by the entry of the newly formed Christian Action Party. The Popular Democrats polled 58 percent of the 800,000 votes cast. The Statehood Republican Party received some 250,000 votes representing 32 percent of the total. The Independence Party, with only 3 percent of the vote, and the Christian Action Party, with about

6 percent, failed to qualify as official political groups since each received less than the required 10 percent of the total vote.

As has frequently happened after a vigorous Puerto Rican political campaign, the status issue was temporarily pushed aside. But Muñoz Marín himself revived it in July 1962, when he wrote to President John F. Kennedy expressing his intention of bringing about a status plebiscite which he hoped would result in perfecting the Commonwealth principle. Although no political party had responded to the 1960 legislation allowing a plebiscite, Muñoz Marín had decided to continue his 1959 quest for reforms. In his letter to the President he said:[83]

> Ten years ago it [the Commonwealth Act] was a pioneering effort in the world to terminate colonialism by substituting for it not nationalism or independence, but freedom within the framework of a close and mutually beneficial association between a smaller and a larger community * * * . We have become increasingly, and now acutely aware, that the arrangement was not perfect * * * . The moral and juridical basis of the Commonwealth should be further clarified * * * . The governmental power and authority of the Commonwealth should be complete and reservations and exceptions not an indispensable part of the arrangement for permanent association should be eliminated.

Muñoz Marín's letter also indicated that he wanted independence and statehood advocates to have a chance to express their desires, too, "so that no doubt whatever may be entertained in Puerto Rico, in the United States or elsewhere that the basic principles of self-determination has been thoroughly carried out."[84]

Vice President Lyndon Johnson, in San Juan to help celebrate the tenth anniversary of the Commonwealth government, delivered President Kennedy's reply. In this letter Kennedy said:[85]

> Puerto Rico has furnished an example to the world of the benefits that can be achieved by close collaboration between a large and smaller community within the framework of freedom and mutual agreement. * * * I am aware that the relationship is not perfected. I welcome your statement that the people of Puerto Rico are about to begin consideration of this * * * . I agree that this is a proper time to recognize the need for growth and, both as a matter of fairness to all concerned and of establishing an unequivocal record, to consult the people of Puerto Rico. * * * so they may express any other preference, including independence.

Muñoz Marín followed the exchange of letters with an island-wide radio address on August 16, 1962, in which he explained his intention of creating "a more perfect Commonwealth which would fix beyond all doubts the permanence and irrevocability of the union between Puerto Rico and the United States."[86] He indicated the possibility that a unique arrangement could be included to allow the islanders to vote for President even though retaining the commonwealth status. He also made it clear that most of the changes sought unsuccessfully in 1959 would be included in his newest effort at perfection.

The Puerto Rican legislature, after lengthy hearings, passed a bipartisan Joint Resolution on December 3, 1962, asking that Congress promote a prompt settlement of the status issue. On April 30, 1963, a number of identical bills which were supposed to implement the proposals made by the Puerto Rican legislature were introduced in the House of Representatives. One of the proposed bills, H.R. 5945, called for the creation of a United States-Puerto Rico compact commission which would consider the relationship and draft proposals for perfecting a permanent compact between the mainland and the island. The bill called upon the commission to present recommendations which would: (*a*) Recognize and reassert the sovereignty of the people of Puerto Rico; (*b*) make permanent and irrevocable the union; (*c*) specify the powers of the United States in the island and reserve all others to the people of Puerto Rico; (*d*) provide for Puerto Rican approval in matters in which the Congress legislates for the island; and (*e*) adopt a formula by which the island would begin contributing to the general expenses of the U.S. Government. Under the terms of the bill, the compact commission would also make proposals for a new compact which Congress could then incorporate in legislation to be submitted to a referendum of the Puerto Rican people. Alternatives to accepting the compact submitted to them would be statehood or independence. In the event that a majority should choose either of the alternatives, Congress would be free to act as it saw fit.

In the hearings on H.R. 5945, the Statehood Republicans argued that the bill did not conform with the terms of the bipartisan resolution. Their objections were that the words "ulterior final" political status had been deleted from the statement of purpose of the bill, apparently deliberately eliminating the impression that this was an effort to determine the final status. In addition, the statehood spokesmen claimed that they had supported the idea of submitting proposals to the people for a vote on three final status formulas, with nothing in the resolution which could be interpreted as an endorsement of commonwealth. To their dismay, the House bill seemed to take commonwealth for granted and called upon the United States-Puerto Rico Commission to draft a perfected compact. Another change which bothered the statehood advocates was that the Puerto Rican resolution had asked that the winning formula in the referendum be established, but the congressional version only provided for such action as Congress might consider appropriate if either statehood or independence should win. In the words of Senator García Méndez, this meant simply: "if commonwealth wins, it wins; if statehood wins, it doesn't win."[87]

As a result of the vigorous criticisms of certain features of the bill during the hearings, the House committee made significant changes in the bill which it sent to the floor. The amended version provided for a United States-Puerto Rico Commission on Status which would consist of seven members named by the United States and at the option of Puerto Rico, Puerto Rican members. Instead of calling upon the Commission to draft a proposed compact, the amended bill authorized a study of all factors bearing upon the present and future relationship. While the committee's bill called for the Commission to formulate and draft legislative recommendations in the light of its study, the final form of the bill merely called for the Commission to render a report.

As a result of the adjustments made in the original bill, the proposals were more palatable. The amended bill, therefore, moved through the House and Senate without serious opposition, with the proposals becoming law on February 20, 1964.[88] The Puerto Rican legislature agreed to participate in the Commission's work, voting to allow the Popular Democrats to name three members, the Statehood Republicans two, and the Independence Party one. The allocation was roughly proportionate to respective party strengths in recent elections.

This historical study of the relationship between Puerto Rico and the United States must necessarily terminate at this point. It is possible that the next few years may be climactic. If the newly created Commission can arrive at a set of recommendations which are acceptable to the Congress and to the people of Puerto Rico, the end of the long evolutionary struggle for final status may be in sight. However, excessive optimism concerning a conclusion of the status issue is quite unwarranted. Any attempt to resolve so complex an issue of such long duration is a formidable assignment.

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[1] "Preamble to the Constitution Establishing Self-Government in the Island of Puerto Rico by Spain in 1897," in Documents on the Constitutional History of Puerto Rico, 2d ed., revised (Washington: Office of the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, 1964) p. 22.

[2] Henry K. Carroll, "Report on the Island of Porto Rico" (Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1899), p. 57.

[3] U.S. Congress, Senate, Committee on Pacific Islands and Puerto Rico, Senate Miscellaneous Document No. 147, 56th Cong., 1st sess., Hearings, February 1900, p. 58.

[4] U.S. War Department, "Annual Report of the Secretary of War, 1900," vol. I, pt. 1, "Annual Reports of the War Department for 1900" (Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1900), p. 31.

[5] George W. Davis, "Report of the Military Governor of Porto Rico on Civil Affairs," vol. I, pt. 13, "Annual Reports of the War Department, 1900" (Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1900), pp. 19–20.

[6] U.S. Congress, Senate, Committee on Pacific Islands and Porto Rico, *Report No. 249*, 56th Cong., 1st sess. "Temporary Civil Government for Porto Rico," Feb. 5, 1900, pp. 13–14.

[7] La Correspondencia (San Juan), Feb. 12, 1900.

[8] U.S. Congressional Record, 56th Cong., 1st sess., Feb. 26, 1900, p. 2231.

[9] U.S. Congressional Record, 56th Cong., 1st sess., Feb. 27, 1900, p. 2342.

[10] *Ibid.*, Feb. 26, 1900, p. 2266.

[11] U.S. Congressional Record, 56th Cong., 1st sess., Mar. 8, 1900, p. 2651. This statement seems to confirm the suspicions of those who argued that Puerto Rico's tariff provisions were designed to establish a precedent when legislation for the Philippine Islands should come up for consideration.

[12] The Evening Star (Washington, D.C.), Mar. 10, 1900, p. 4; Mar. 13, 1900, p. 4.

[13] The Evening Star (Washington, D.C.), Apr. 6, 1900, p. 6.

[14] The Insular cases which primarily affected Puerto Rico were: *De Lima* v. *Bidwell*, 182 U.S. 1 (1901); *Downes* v. *Bidwell*, 182 U.S. 244 (1901); and *Dooley* v. *United States*, 183 U.S. 151 (1901).

[15] *Downes* v. *Bidwell*, 182 U.S. 244 (1901).

[16] Bolívar Pagán, "Historia de los partidos políticos puertorriqueños," vol. I (San Juan: Libreria Campos), p. 32.

[17] *Ibid.*, p. 34.

[18] Bolívar Pagán, "Historia de los partidos políticos puertorriqueños, vol. I (San Juan: Libreria Campos, 1959), p. 45.

[19] U.S., Congress, S. Doc. 40, 61st Cong., 1st sess., "Affairs in Porto Rico: A message from the President Inviting the Attention of Congress to the Legislative Difficulties in Porto Rico," May 10, 1909, pp. 7–8.

[20] *Ibid.*, p. 8.

[21] La Democracia (San Juan) May 17–28, 1909.

[22] U.S. Congressional Record, 61st Cong., 1st sess., June 7, 1909, p. 2918.

[23] U.S. Congressional Record, 61st Cong., 1st sess., June 7, 1909, p. 2919.

[24] U.S. Congress, H. Doc. 615, 61st Cong., 2d sess., "Conditions in Porto Rico," January 1910, p. 4.

[25] La Democracia (San Juan), Sept. 7, 1914.

[26] U.S. Congressional Record, 64th Cong., 2d sess., Dec. 5, 1916, p. 17.

[27] Robert W. Anderson, "Party Politics in Puerto Rico" (Río Piedras: University of Puerto Rico Center for Social Science Research, 1958), p. 50.

[28] New York Times, Apr. 19, 1919, page 3.

[29] La Democracia (San Juan), Mar. 8, 1921.

[30] La Democracia (San Juan), July 31, 1921

[31] *Ibid.*

[32] La Democracia, Aug. 18, 1921; New York Times, Aug. 18, 1921, p. 17.

[33] La Democracia (San Juan), Feb. 13, 1922.

[34] Twenty-eight years later, the creation of the Estado Libre Asociado, the Free Associated State or Commonwealth of Puerto Rico would revive at least in name the proposal made and quietly rejected in 1922.

[35] La Democracia (San Juan), June 14, 1923; New York Times, June 20, 1923, p. 28.

[36] U.S. Congressional Record, 70th Cong., 1st sess., Apr. 12, 1928, p. 6348.

[37] *Ibid.*, p. 6347.

[38] U.S. Congressional Record, 70th Cong., 1st sess., Apr. 12, 1928, p. 6335.

[39] *Ibid.*, p. 6336.

[40] In this election young Luis Muñoz Marín, son of Muñoz Rivera, was elected Senator-at-Large on the Liberal ticket. In the 1920's he had been closely associated with Iglesias and the Socialists, but his leanings toward independence later led him into the Liberal Party.

[41] President Roosevelt apparently gave some consideration to the idea of appointing a Puerto Rican, for he inquired about Judge Martín Travieso and Dr. José Padín in a letter to retiring governor, James Beverley. National Archives, War Department, Bureau of Insular Affairs. Confidential File B, letter from Franklin Roosevelt to James Beverley, Mar. 18, 1933.

[42] New York Times, May 6, 1934, p. 25; June 17, 1934, sec. IV, p. 8. The group convened included R. Menéndez Ramos, Commissioner of Agriculture, F. Fernández García, a chemist, and Dr. Carlos Chardón. Muñoz Marín was allowed to sit in as an unofficial observer.

[43] New York Times, June 21, 1934, p. 23; The Evening Star (Washington, D.C.), July 7, 1934, p. 6.

[44] La Democracia (San Juan), Dec. 23, 1934.

[45] La Democracia (San Juan), Dec. 23, 1934. Although Roosevelt's message was heartening, its unusual method of delivery was disconcerting to the majority coalition. For the President of the United States to use a first term senator of a minority party as his medium of communication was an unheard of departure from protocol. El Mundo (San Juan), Dec. 26–31, 1934.

[46] New York Times, Apr. 20, 1935, sec. IV, p. 8.

[47] U.S., Congress, *House Hearings*, 74th Cong., 1st sess., June 4, 1935, pp. 38–39.

[48] U.S. Congress, *House Hearings*, 74th Cong., 1st sess., June 18, 1935, pp. 43–45.

[49] New York Times, June 2, 1935, p. 11.

[50] The genesis of the Tydings bill is somewhat obscure. On Mar. 13, 1936, Gruening and Tydings discussed the idea. In part it was related to Tydings' grief over the death of his close friend, Riggs. Gruening was torn between two positions: (1) he foresaw chaos and anarchy if the island were turned loose; (2) he considered a grant of independence an act of statesmanship in keeping with Roosevelt policies reversing imperialism. National Archives, Interior Department, Division of Territories and Insular Possessions, 9–8–68, "Memorandum from Gruening to Ickes," Mar. 13, 1936. Ickes agreed to have such an independence bill prepared by his Department for Tydings if the administration

was not connected with it. "Memorandum from Ickes to Gruening," Mar. 19, 1936.

[51] La Democracia (San Juan), July 22–24, 1940.

[52] La Democracia (San Juan), Sept. 20, 1941.

[53] New York Times, Dec. 13, 1942, sec. IV, p. 10.

[54] U.S. Congress, *House Hearings*, 78th Cong., 1st sess., April 1943, p. 50; also in La Democracia (San Juan), Feb. 12, 1943.

[55] U.S. Congressional Record, 78th Cong., 1st sess., Mar. 9, 1943, p. 1686.

[56] New York Times, Mar. 10, 1943, p. 3.

[57] U.S. Department of Interior, "Minutes of the President's Committee to Revise the Organic Act," July–August 1943, appearing as appendix in Senate Hearings, 78th Cong., 1st sess., November–December 1943, p. 491.

[58] U.S. Department of Interior, "Minutes of the President's Committee to Revise the Organic Act," July–August 1943, appearing as appendix in Senate Hearings, 78th Cong., 1st sess., November–December 1943, p. 494.

[59] U.S. Department of Interior, "Minutes," p. 496.

[60] The Puerto Rican members stipulated, however, that the record of the meetings must be made available to the public so that each party spokesman could prove that he had taken a specific position on certain issues and had been outvoted.

[61] Seven years later this same provision concerning the consent of the Puerto Rican people was a key feature of the legislation creating the Commonwealth, but surprisingly, the Senate scarcely questioned it that time. However, since 1950 the issue has touched off vociferous debate on occasion.

[62] U.S. Congress, House Rept. No. 497, 79th Cong., 1st sess., May 1, 1945, pp. 20–22.

[63] Antonio Fernós-Isern, La Significación de la Reforma (Washington, 1948), a lecture delivered at Princeton University, May 5, 1948, pp. 8–9.

[64] U.S. Congress, *Senate Hearings*, 81st Cong., 2d sess., Mar. 13, 1950, before Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs, pp. 3–8.

[65] *Ibid.*, pp. 7–8.

[66] U.S. Congressional Record, 81st Cong., 2d sess., vol. 96, pt. 14, appendix, Mar. 14, 1900, pp. A1898–A1899.

[67] U.S. Congress, *S. Rept. 1779*, 81st Cong., 2d sess., June 6, 1950, pp. 8–9.

[68] U.S. Congress, *H. Rept. 2275*, 81st Cong., 2d sess., June 19, 1950, from Committee on Public Lands to accompany S. 3336, p. 3.

[69] *Ibid.*, p. 4.

[70] U.S. Statutes at Large, vol. 64, p. 319.

[71] Resolution No. 22 of the convention explained that the new body politic would be called El Estado Libre Asociado de Puerto Rico in Spanish and The Commonwealth of Puerto Rico in English. The literal translation of "Estado Libre Asociado" would be "Free Associated State," which the convention feared might be confused with a State of the Union.

[72] U.S. Congress, H. Doc. No. 435, 82d Cong., 2d sess., Apr. 22, 1952, submitted as a message from President Harry S. Truman to the Congress, p. 4.

[73] U.S. Congress *Senate Hearings*, 82d Cong., 2d sess., Apr. 29, 1952, before Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs on S.J. Res. No. 151, p. 13.

[74] U.S. Congress *Senate Hearings*, 82d Cong., 2d sess., Apr. 29, 1952, p. 19.

[75] *Ibid.*, p. 40.

[76] U.S. Congress, *Senate Hearings*, 82d Cong., 2d sess., Apr. 29, 1952, pp. 43–45.

[77] *Ibid.*, pp. 48–50; see El Mundo (San Juan), July 1, 1951.

[78] U.S. Congress, S. Rept. No. 1720, 82d Cong., 2d sess., June 10, 1952, from Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs to accompany S.J. Res. No. 151, p. 6.

[79] U.S. Congressional Record, 82d Cong., 2d sess., vol. 98, pt. 6, June 24, 1952, p. 7924.

[80] "Puerto Rico's New Self-Governing Status Transmitted to Secretary-General," U.S. Department of State Bulletin 28, Apr. 20, 1953, p. 587.

[81] "Address delivered by the Honorable Luis Muñoz Marín, Governor of the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, at the University of Kansas City on the occasion of receiving the Honorary Degree of Doctor of Law," Apr. 23, 1955. Mimeographed, p. 8.

[82] The independence bill was H.R. 1868, 86th Cong., 1st sess., introduced Jan. 9, 1959, by Morgan Moulder of Missouri. The statehood bill was H.R. 7003, introduced May 7, 1959, by Victor Anfuso of New York. Then in July 1959, Senator Dennis Chaves introduced S. 2396 to hold a referendum as a source of information for Congress with no commitment implied.

[83] New York Times, July 26, 1962, p. 1 and p. 8. Actually Muñoz Marín's letter was written on July 10 but was not released until the President's reply was published on July 26.

[84] *Ibid.*, p. 8.

[85] New York Times, July 26, 1962, p. 8; "Consulting the People," Time Aug. 3, 1962, p. 25 ff.

[86] New York Times, Aug. 19, 1962, p. 6.

[87] U.S. Congress, *House Hearings*, 88th Cong., 1st sess., May 16, 1963, pp. 65–67.

[88] Public Law 271, 88th Cong., 2d sess., Feb. 20, 1964; U.S. Statutes at Large, vol. 78, p. 17.

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SIGNIFICANT FACTORS IN THE DEVELOPMENT OF EDUCATION IN PUERTO RICO

by

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I. SOME SIGNIFICANT FACTORS IN THE DEVELOPMENT OF EDUCATION IN PUERTO RICO [1]

INTRODUCTION

It is easy and possible to write a report about education in Puerto Rico and limit its content to comments on official documents, to written objectives, stated purposes, constitutional provisions, prescribed courses, and the usual problems facing education at a given point. But education cannot be adequately discussed in isolation, in terms of mere expressions of high sounding aims and purposes; the frame of reference of the historical, social, economic, geographic and political factors that affect it must be taken into account. There must be objective appraisal, sound evaluation, and knowledgeable understanding of the milieu. It would be helpful to look at education as one of the most potent means of uplifting people and to single out and examine some of the significant factors which have affected and conditioned its development, considering both the attainments it has achieved and the shortcomings that have hindered it, in order to decide what reorientations are inevitable and which challenges we face, to make viable what remains to be accomplished.

A noble point of departure could be President John Fitzgerald Kennedy's words to the U.S. Congress on January 29, 1963:

> Education is the keystone in the arch of freedom and progress. Nothing has contributed more to the enlargement of this Nation's strength and opportunities than our traditional system of free, universal elementary and secondary education, coupled with widespread availability of college education.
>
> For the individual, the doors to the schoolhouse, to the library, and to the college lead to the richest treasures of our open society: to the power of knowledge—to the training and skills necessary for productive employment—to the wisdom, the ideals, and the culture which enrich life—and to the creative, self-disciplined understanding of society needed for good citizenship in today's changing and challenging world.
>
> A free nation can rise no higher than the standard of excellence set in its schools and colleges. Ignorance and illiteracy, unskilled workers and school dropouts—these and other failures of our educational system breed failures in our social and economic system: delinquency, unemployment, chronic dependence, a waste of human resources, a loss of productive power and purchasing power, and an increase in tax-supported benefits.[2]

Years before Governor Luis Muñoz Marín had expressed similar inspiring thoughts:

> There can be no greater emergency than that of providing education for those whom nature has endowed with power of mind and spirit * * * I earnestly believe that except for the most pressing human wants, education shall constitute our supreme consumption, not only in Puerto Rico and America, but in every part of the world. I speak of education not in the sense of a ration which is merely served to children and youngsters. I mean education which

is fed to all through a lifetime as an urgent need and a source of joy for the spirit. I refer to that form of education which will endow democracies with a deeper sense of their true significance. This is the only way to conquer poverty and to achieve a state of undisturbed peace throughout the world.[3]

THE NEED FOR A PHILOSOPHY OF EDUCATION

A philosophy of education serves as guidelines to a school system. It provides a body of ideas about man, society and the school; ideas which in turn determine and affect the curriculum which regulates the educational processes. It offers avenues for accomplishment and points to the desirable results. Such a philosophy of education should be based on the culture of the community where it is to operate and should know the culture so as to be able to serve it effectively, preserve, enrich, or change some aspects of it when advisable after thorough evaluation of the rationality of such changes. Philosophy may serve to organize the results of the various sciences to show their relationships, or it may structure a system of principles to guide the practical affairs of man; in the specific sphere of education, to guide policies and programs. These principles are the foundations of all knowledge. They give man an integrated, unified view of the world in which he lives, and as they are derived from the philosophical processes they give the person increased ability to think clearly and logically.

A school system without a philosophy of education is limited in the sense that the teachers, students and directors are not able to establish a rational conception of their community or of the universe through an autoanalysis of their own appraisal functions, be they theoretical or practical.

Especially in Puerto Rico, where material civilization has changed the external conditions of living so rapidly that essential beliefs and ideas have become tangled and confused, a sound, workable philosophy of education is necessary. Its formulation should no longer be delayed, because "the people of Puerto Rico, and especially the teaching profession of Puerto Rico, will move forward effectively in their great educational enterprise only as they understand the conditions which have brought about these strains between belief and practice, these conflicts among ideas, and this economic, social, political, religious and moral confusion which confronts them."[4]

The school is the agent used by society, directly or indirectly, to preserve and transmit its culture, to explain, interpret, increase, modify or criticize it; to change it if need be or to integrate and give significance to it when divided, in disharmony or in conflict, or when it is subjected to tension. People need to understand, evaluate and criticize the processes of acculturation; processes which are constantly, indiscriminately and obviously taking place. Each culture molds its people according to its own norms, establishing national differences. That is why, as is so well explained by George S. Counts, "education is always a function of some particular civilization at some particular time in history"; [5] or as Theodore Brameld prefers to say: "Every culture possesses some kind of value orientation, just as every culture possesses some kind of configuration." [6] But we have been shifting educational processes and programs, as if to avoid giving reality to a reasonable philosophy of education; processes which are not in keeping with our culture and the needs of association in common citizenship with the United States. These shifts have been made at the discretion of all-powerful commissioners or secretaries of education or for political expediency.

This is where confusion creeps into the interpretation of the educational and cultural processes in Puerto Rico. The fact that we subscribe, endorse, and live according to the most well-known principles and values of western civilization does not deny our particular way of being, our particular reality in history, in personality, in customs and geography. It does not deny either the processes of acculturation, assimilation and confusion that have and are taking place. Thus, although some of our problems are similar to those of other peoples, we maintain an integrity which makes us unique in many respects.[7] This was stressed by the International Institute of Teachers College in their *Survey of the Public Educational System of Porto Rico:* "The Puerto Rican people have a unique personality that should be preserved and their culture should be developed and passed on through a curriculum peculiar to it." [8] This uniqueness has been denied in the past and is still denied by some historians and social scientists.[9]

Our school system has frequently confused procedures, methods, techniques and political expediency with principles, values and philosophy. That has been the glaring case of gearing the school system predominantly and persistently to a policy of Americanization, extension (quantitatively) of the school system, and the teaching of English. Or as exemplified by the letter sent by President Franklin D. Roosevelt in 1937 to Commissioner José M. Gallardo in which he made, according to the way Brameld summarizes them, three revealing statements:

1. "It is an indispensable part of the American policy that the coming generation of American citizens in Puerto Rico grow up with complete facility in the English tongue. It is the language of our Nation."

2. But "it is obvious that they (Puerto Ricans) always will and should retain facility in the tongue of their inherited culture, Spanish."

3. Therefore it is necessary "that the American citizens of Puerto Rico should profit from their unique geographical situation and the

unique historical circumstance which has brought to them the blessings of American citizenship by becoming bilingual." [10]

A language policy, politically combined with Americanization, has traditionally substituted for a philosophy of education. In the process the genuine interest of the Puerto Ricans in learning the best English possible has suffered, and not infrequently an image of friction and force has emerged.

More recently the concept that there is no need to formulate philosophical principles for our educational system has been developed. These will emerge as we advance, in fact they will be part of the advancement. Again, this is confusing the changing reality of a dynamic society with movement for the love of locomotion. The word of caution formulated by Logan Wilson is pertinent. "As changes take place, however, we shall need to remind ourselves constantly that doing things differently does not necessarily mean doing them better." [11] It is precisely in a dynamic and changing community, where two cultures are interacting constantly, where old values are challenged, where new values are uncertain, where ambivalence on unresolved issues menaces the security of people; that philosophical guidelines should be an essential component of the educational system, and for that matter, of the culture and society in general. A school system in a changing society cannot be a drifting ship; it moves but not where it is necessary to go.

This is where philosophy, a unifying force, a supplier of important background and points of reference upon which to think clearly and logically, is an invaluable resource for guidance on spiritual and practical affairs. This is what our school system has lacked and still lacks. This explains, in part, what has been characterized as the staggering "zig-zags of [sixty-seven] years."

When procedures, methodological and technical aspects of an educational problem, are turned into a political football, the tasks of the schools are unnecessarily complicated. "In a highly political society such as Puerto Rico, where it sometimes seems as though nothing but politics were important, one encounters among the most thoughtful intellectuals an insistence upon politicizing all issues; * * * but we would argue that to the extent that political considerations have not been allowed to dominate all issues and have been rendered secondary in many of the important processes of change, social energies appropriate to orderly social change have been more effectively utilized. At the same time, political energies which might otherwise be evoked under more dramatic circumstances of social change have been diminished and rendered relatively irrelevant." [12]

The best way to help the people cope with rapid change is to give them more opportunities for education; education with a purpose, with clear but flexible philosophical tenents. This is not to be interpreted as clinging to outmoded values and customs, neither does it mean assimilation of everything exotic, foreign or coming from an economically dominant culture.[13]

Regardless of these changes in orientation, of the movements for the pleasure of locomotion, of the clear confusion of procedure with principles, there is no denying the fact that "the single most effective reducer of past inequalities has been the system of free public education."[14] In our efforts of development, exemplified by Operation Bootstrap, there is ground for optimism and recognition of a task well done but also a word of warning is pertinent and necessary for those responsible for the future destiny of this society: "* * * education works in two apparently opposite ways in Puerto Rican society. On the one hand, it is the single best indicator of differential social position, from which a host of other differences result. It is, in short, the most effective stratifier or producer of class differences. On the other hand, and for the very same reasons, education is the single most effective way to reduce the distance among existing classes. The educational system is the most effective point of leverage in the total social system."[15] (The facts that are included in this report will support this statement.) As scientific knowledge is organized to show relationships, the clearer the truths are revealed, the more understandably the guiding principles are stated and explained, the more effectively the values underlying knowledge are presented; the better the position of strength of a culture will be to preserve and enrich its own heritage and adapt and assimilate values from other cultures, enriching in the process the lives of the people.

To cope with what social anthropologists call major social changes (movement from an agricultural to an industrial society, from a rural to an increasing urban society, etc.), with the emergent new class structures, with tensions and dualities, with acculturation and at times assimilation of certain forms and values, with future opportunities of uplift and release, we need to continue opening new avenues for more, better, and broader education to utilize the diversity of talents, interests, and motivations of the individuals that education must serve. This is probably one of the best ways, if not the best, of arriving at a state of mental serenity, a true aim of educational philosophy.

We must remember that by having good educational planning, and that even by drifting, "we are triggering sequences of events which may reach far into the future."

Regardless of this shortcoming in orientation, public education in Puerto Rico has been free, egalitarian, democratic (although its highly centralized structure is, in a sense, a negation of democratic organization and function), coeducational, and secular. It has been inspired by an unquenchable zeal to view people as individuals, as human beings and not as objects of exploitation. It has had a strong faith—at times even a frustrating faith—in education as the key to the solution of all imaginable problems. In reality, education has been the principal agent of fermentation, release, and uplift. But there should be no denying that there is still a long, long way to go and a need for a definition of goals, though with adequate flexibility; goals closely tied to the political issue. (The body of this report will attest to our generalizations on philosophy and to the role played by education in our society.)

THE PUERTO RICAN SCHOOLS DURING THE SPANISH REGIME [16]

During most of its history the island was a colony, first of Spain and later of the United States, and its destiny was linked to the political movements and changes of both countries. In educational matters the island has copied, without much adaptation, first the educational system of Spain and then that of the United States. During the 400 years of Spanish rule in Puerto Rico, the philosophy implicit in the educational system was to make Puerto Ricans loyal subjects to the Spanish crown and obedient sons of the church. Education was looked upon—at least in practice—as a privilege of the upper classes and not as a right of each subject. It should be pointed out that the concept of a free, universal and compulsory public education, prevailing today in democratic countries, took a long time to develop.

It is true the royal orders sent to the island showed the concern of the Spanish rulers for the spiritual and temporal education of the Indians and later of the Africans imported to the island as slaves and, in any case, that of the sons of Spaniards and Puerto Ricans. But the royal decrees were one thing and the interpretations by the governors sent by the kings to rule the colony were quite a different thing. However, it must be made clear, while not justifying the educational evils that the island suffered for more than 400 years, that education in the colony, both as to its philosophy and the opportunities it offered, was not very different from education in Spain or in most of the countries in the New World.

During the centuries of Spanish conquest and colonization, education was almost entirely a job of the church although there were also a few private schools both secular and religious. At the elementary and secondary levels, the educational institution par excellence was the parochial school.

Lack of schools was not caused, to any important extent, by the indolence of Governors or church officials, but by the lack of means that was always a characteristic of the island's economy during the period of Spanish colonialism and, until recently, under the American Government.

The prevailing methodological practice in all schools—parochial, public, and/or private—was the rote memorization of curriculum subjects. Evaluation was limited to measurement through yearly tests of the mastery of the knowledge acquired with the help of mnemonic devices. Respect for the teacher was proverbial and obedience was a rule often reinforced with corporal punishment, a practice then generally accepted. The curriculum, meager and foreign to the surrounding reality, eminently classical and theoretical, gave importance almost exclusively to subject matter. At the elementary level, it consisted of the fundamentals of reading and writing, arithmetic, Spanish history and geography, religion, and—for girls—needlework.

EDUCATION AT THE END OF THE SPANISH RULE

At the end of the Spanish rule, there were on the island 380 elementary schools for boys, 138 for girls, 26 secondary schools, and one school for adults. In all, these 545 schools served only 47,861 students. From 79 to 85 percent of the total population of the island was illiterate. We must make it clear, as Cuesta Mendoza says,[17] that the educational task of the school during the Spanish colonial period was shared by the home and the church and there were frequent cases of families in which the children studied under private tutors. Usually the father, the mother, or one of the older children acted as teacher for the family. No census showed the number of such persons who received private instruction at home.

Vocational instruction was mainly in charge of the parents. As a general rule, the eldest son followed either his father's occupation or one which his father chose for him; the other children, especially if the family was of limited economic means, received instruction under the apprentice system that prevailed at that time. Girls' education, which in past centuries never received very much attention in any country, was in the mothers' charge at home and its purpose was to prepare girls to be good wives, mothers, and housekeepers. At schools, girls were taught reading, writing, and arithmetic, but most importance was given to domestic arts (especially needlework), religion, and etiquette.

At the end of the Spanish regime in Puerto Rico, the island had developed an educational system based upon public and private schools, secular and religious, in which boys and girls were taught separately. In spite of acknowledged limitations, the country had schools in every municipality.[18]

THE FIRST FOUR DECADES OF THE 20TH CENTURY: THE NORTH AMERICAN INFLUENCE

With the change of government in the island in 1898, the North Americans became immediately interested in the education of the Puerto Rican people. However, they did not make a study of the educational conditions of the island which was broad enough to determine if there was a basis upon which the foundations of an educational system, in harmony with the needs of the country, could be laid.

> The educators who organized the system of public education in Puerto Rico after the American occupation were entirely inexperienced in colonial administration and pitifully ignorant of the educational needs of the Island. Proud as they probably were of the achievements of education in the United States, they could think of no better plan than to try to transplant to Puerto Rico the standards and methods with which they were familiar on the Continent.[19]

On the other hand, the sudden change in government which the island underwent and the lack of experience the people had in school administration did not permit the Puerto Ricans in positions of leadership to see clearly what was more convenient for the country. The conflict of ideals between the Spanish culture and traditions and the new, practical, and pragmatic orientation shown by the new government brought about a temporary, predictable maladjustment from which originated some of the educational problems we still have not been able to solve completely. One such problem is doubt as to the principles, techniques and methodology that must guide the teaching of a second language. Another is the inadaptability of the North American school to the Puerto Rican cultural environment. For the first time American educational pragmatism—which at the time and in its instrumentalist form was propagated by John Dewey and was dominating the North American pedagogical scene—met Spanish idealism. Conflict developed between the prestige of the new system, the bewilderment it caused, the practical, and the conservative traditional; between a stronger, younger, more technical, more aggressive culture, and another, less dominant, less arrogant but equally sure of its values. As it has frequently happened in such cases, at first the new system simply tried to supplant the old one.

To American educators who came to Puerto Rico at the beginning of the new century, several problems deeply related to education were evident. Among them were the high percentage of illiteracy, the low level of public health, the lack of trained teachers, school buildings, and teaching equipment, the bad state of rural transportation, and the dire poverty suffered by most of the population. All of these factors affected school attendance and thus academic achievement.

A program of construction of school buildings was begun in the rural and urban zones, and it was hoped that all the school age population and even many illiterate adults could be enrolled.

Democratic procedures in teaching were instituted, and such subjects as industrial arts and physical and natural sciences were included in the secondary school curriculum.

A corresponding change was introduced in methodology. We have seen that during the time of the Spanish Government on the island much importance was given to the acquisition of knowledge through memorization. Emphasis now changed to the experimental method by which it was hoped to develop mental habits that use knowledge to solve everyday problems. But in spite of these initial steps the school's content and objectives continued to be foreign to Puerto Rican values, ideals, and culture.

Uncertainty as to the final solution of the political status of the island has interferred with the task of formulating a reasonable, precise and convenient educational policy for Puerto Rico. The plans and objectives to make Puerto Rico a bilingual country, and the political connotations attached to the teaching of English degenerated into a subject of party politics when it should have been from the beginning exclusively a pedagogical problem.

The North American commissioners of education sent to Puerto Rico after 1899 were determined to make the island a bilingual country. This aim placed the teaching of English in a position of primary importance in the educational system.

> The effect of this situation on the school system has been paralyzing: objectives have remained indefinite; courses of study have been left inchoate; methods of instruction have not crystallized into a defensible system; teacher training has lacked directness; the preparation of suitable textbooks has been discouraged; and the development of an autochtonous philosophy of education has been blocked.[20]

Both the lack of a philosophical orientation of the school system and its unawareness of the culture and life of Puerto Rico are further emphasized by Dr. Juan José Osuna, the principal architect of the College of Education of the University of Puerto Rico, when he states:

> It would be very difficult to point out a fundamental philosophy of education which might have served as a guiding principle for the educational system of Puerto Rico since the American occupation. In fact the main difficulty with the school system of the Island has been the lack of a philosophy, orienting the activities of the commissioners and those sharing with him the responsibilities for the administration of the school system. As a general rule new commissioners introduced changes without any fundamental principles to guide them and without a continuous orientation in accordance with the demands of the environment.

> Were we to mention objectives before 1930, perhaps we could point out three which seemed to be common to all commissioners, these being: Americanization, Extension of the school system, and the Teaching of English. Outside of these three objectives, we might say that the school system of Puerto Rico, like the political status, has been like a ship without a haven to anchor in, roaming the seas with no definite home port in view. Of course, reading, writing and arithmetic were taught, the school grew somewhat like Topsy, many good things were done, but it has lacked so far a fundamental philosophy pointing to goals and ends to achieve. The system has not known where it is going.[21]

The truth of the matter is that nobody can speak of development of education in Puerto Rico since 1898 up to the present without realizing that the central theme has been the language problem. This problem was created since the turn of the century as the result of an ill-advised and short-sighted policy of Americanization.

For the new government established in 1898, the language problem was by far the thorniest in the educational field: Not only was it the least understood, but—due to lack of competent personnel—the most difficult to tackle. The misunderstandings, misinformation, lack of experience in administration of colonial territories, and overoptimism over the success of the American type of public, universal, and free school system led the first U.S. officials to commit some mistakes in policies from which the Puerto Rican school system has been unable to recover. Manuel and Fife, referring to the language policies express doubt "whether its difficulties were appreciated by anyone who undertook to create an educational system for the Puerto Ricans".[22]

When we come to realize that the teaching of Spanish and English have taken up from one-fifth to one-half of the school program, we may easily see that our school curriculum has been and still is language oriented. The curriculum has been overloaded with linguistic studies.

The first American educators who came to the island thought that the Spanish spoken in Puerto Rico was not an appropriate vehicle to transmit the culture the people already had and much less the culture the educators intended to introduce. Their experience at this time in Hawaii and the Philippine Islands, where there was no common language to serve as depository and transmitter of the cultures of the people of those islands made the Americans believe that the Spanish language in Puerto Rico, taken by some for a patois, should be replaced by English. Dr. Victor S. Clark, misinformed and mistaken, made the following statement:

> There does not seem to be among the masses the same devotion to their native tongue or to any national ideal that animates the Frenchman, for instance, in Canada or the Rhine provinces. Another important fact that must not be overlooked, is that a majority of the people of this island does not speak pure Spanish. Their language is a patois almost unintelligible to the natives of Barcelona and Madrid. It possesses no literature and little value as an intellectual medium. There is a bare possibility that it will be nearly as easy to

educate this people out of their patois into English as it will be to educate them into the elegant tongue of Castille.[23]

In the following remarks Cebollero concurs with Osuna:

> In making such a hasty generalization about the quality of the Spanish spoken by the Puerto Ricans, Dr. Clark was unaware that the Castillian form of Spanish is not spoken in Spain itself outside of the province of Castille, and that the difference between Castillian and Spanish as spoken in most of Spain and in the Spanish countries of America is a matter of the pronunciation of a few letters and of a certain rhythm and inflection. His reference to Barcelona as a place where the Puerto Rican brand of Spanish would not be understood is particularly unfortunate because the native of Barcelona does not speak Spanish but Catalán, one of the principal dialects of Spain. That the Spanish spoken in Puerto Rico is as good as that spoken in most of Spain and better than the Spanish spoken in many provinces of Spain itself has been attested by Dr. Tomás Navarro Tomás, a noted Spanish philologist from the University of Madrid, who recently made a study of spoken Spanish in Puerto Rico.[24]

Dr. Cebollero, in his doctoral dissertation, adds:

> In justice to Dr. Clark it should be said that he modified his judgment shortly afterwards. In 1900 he prepared a manual for the elementary school teachers of the Island from which the following quotation is taken:
>
> "The justification for the study of the two languages (Spanish and English) lies in the fact that one is the mother tongue of the great majority of the pupils of this island and is doubless destined to be the household tongue of the people for many years to come. To exclude its study is to allow it to degenerate into vulgar and ungrammatical patois, which, while it would not loosen its tenacious hold upon popular sympathy, would cease to be an active force in the culture and enlightenment of the people." [25]
>
> This early recognition of the need for the study of the two languages thus marks the appearance of the language problem in the Puerto Rican school system.[26]

President McKinley enjoined Gov. Charles A. Allen to prepare the Puerto Ricans for Statehood as rapidly as possible. Thus Commissioner of Education Martin G. Brumbaugh—and those who succeeded him—became more set in the determination to make Puerto Ricans a bilingual people. This was the first time under the American Government that the President of the Nation expressed himself on a specific political solution for Puerto Rico.[27]

Since the order issued by President McKinley, several policies have been developed in favor of bilingualism. This is an instance in which the educational philosophy, at least insofar as language is concerned, has followed clear and specific political objectives. The different commissioners of education, appointed by the Presidents of the United States and responsible only to them and to Congress (which ratified their appointments) varied in their attitudes in regard to the teaching of English with changes in instruction from Washington, and of course, with changes in the political administration in the United States.

Seven different phases of the teaching of English in Puerto Rico are clearly defined from 1900 to the present.

1. The first phase prevailed between 1900 and 1905. It was begun by the first commissioner of education of Puerto Rico under the American Government, Victor S. Clark, who, with Dr. John Eaton, was in charge of the reorganization of the school system of the island in 1899. His policy established English as the sole medium of instruction.

2. Commissioners Martin G. Brumbaugh and Samuel McCune Lindsay adopted a policy of bilingualism, directed at the conservation of Spanish and the acquisition of English. Spanish was the language of instruction in the elementary school and English was used for teaching in the secondary schools (grades 9–12).

3. During the administrations of Commissioner Falkner and his successors (1905–16), English was used as the medium of instruction in all the grades of the school system. This reverted to the original Clark policy which reached its peak during the years of 1905 to 1913. Commissioners Dexter and Barlow carried the policy of the teaching of English to its extreme; Dexter decreed that reading in English be taught in the first grade before children were taught to read Spanish.[28]

During these years, motivated in part by the excesses of these commissioners, a period of separatist sentiments arose in Puerto Rico. Those in favor of English as the language of instruction were identified as American *asimilistas*,[29] and those in favor of Spanish as *separatistas*.[30] To this day the teaching of English has never been able to free itself from a certain political involvement. Sometimes it has even had the characteristics of an issue; this has made very difficult the development of a well-oriented methodology to teach English.

4. During the administration of Commissioners Paul G. Miller and Juan B. Huyke (1916–34) and even during the first years of Dr. José Padín's administration (1934–37) Spanish was the language of instruction in grades 1–4 and English in grades 6–8. The fifth was a grade of transition: half of the subjects were taught in English and half in Spanish. In the secondary schools, only English was used for instruction.

In spite of the renewed efforts to intensify the teaching of English, the study carried on by the International Institute of Teachers College of Columbia University in 1925 found that the achievement of students in English at the end of the third grade did not justify the effort, the time and the money devoted to its teaching, and that even less justified was the denial of opportunities to the rest of the subjects in the curriculum. The study made by the institute recommended that

English be taught from the fourth grade on instead of beginning its teaching in the first grade. However, the sensible recommendations made on the basis of the findings of the teachers college survey were disregarded, and until 1934 the English language continued to be taught from the first grade.

5. The first commissioner of education who faced the problem of the teaching of English in Puerto Rico, critically and experimentally, was Dr. José Padín. In 1916 he had carried out the first study of the teaching of English according to the plan of Commissioner Falkner (most of the subjects of the curriculum were taught in English). The study conducted by Dr. Padín showed that at the end of 8 years of contact with English, students did not master any of the four fundamental phases that constitute the learning of a language: oral production, oral reception, reading, and writing.

When Dr. Padín took charge of directing the educational tasks of the Department of Education he decreed, on the basis of his experiment and other observations, that Spanish be used as the medium of instruction in all the grades of the elementary school. English was given special attention (double periods daily and well-prepared teachers), but it was taught as a subject and as a foreign language.

6. Dr. Padín was succeeded by Dr. José M. Gallardo in 1937. During Dr. Gallardo's administration, the Government of the United States, which had never expressed itself publicly in regard to the educational policy to be followed on the island, made declarations concerning the problem of the teaching of English. In a letter sent by President Roosevelt to Dr. Gallardo it was stated clearly that it was the policy of the American Government that Puerto Ricans should acquire a thorough knowledge of the English language so that Puerto Rico could become a bilingual country. The letter makes no reference to the question of which language is to be used as the language of instruction.

Because of the relevance of this letter, it is herewith quoted:

> THE WHITE HOUSE,
> *Washington, April 8, 1937.*
>
> Dr. JOSÉ M. GALLARDO,
> *College of Charleston,*
> *Charleston, S.C.*
>
> MY DEAR DR. GALLARDO: I have decided to appoint you Commissioner of Education for Puerto Rico and have sent your name to the Senate.
>
> I desire at this time to make clear the attitude of my administration on the extremely important matter of teaching English in Puerto Rico. Puerto Rico came under the American flag 38 years ago. Nearly 20 years ago Congress extended American citizenship to Puerto Ricans. It is regrettable that today, hundreds of thousands of Puerto Ricans have little and often virtually no knowledge of the English language. Moreover, even among those who have had the opportunity to study English in the public schools, mastery of the

language is far from satisfactory. It is an indispensable part of American policy that the coming generation of American citizens in Puerto Rico grow up with complete facility in the English tongue. It is the language of our Nation. Only through the acquisition of this language will Puerto Rican Americans secure a better understanding of American ideals and principles. Moreover, it is only through thorough familiarity with our language that the Puerto Ricans will be able to take full advantage of the economic opportunities which became available to them when they were made American citizens.

Puerto Rico is a densely populated Island. Many of its sons and daughters will desire to seek economic opportunity on the mainland or perhaps in other countries of this hemisphere. They will be greatly handicapped if they have not mastered English. For it is obvious that they always will and should retain facility in the tongue of their inherited culture, Spanish. Clearly there is no desire or purpose to diminish the enjoyment or the usefulness of the rich Spanish cultural legacy of the people of Puerto Rico. What is necessary, however, is that the American citizens of Puerto Rico should profit from their unique georgraphical situation and the unique historical circumstance which has brought to them the blessings of American citizenship by becoming bilingual. But bilingualism will be achieved by the forthcoming generation of Puerto Ricans only if the teaching of English throughout the insular educational system is entered into at once with vigor, purposefulness and devotion, and with the understanding that English is the official language of our country.

Sincerely yours,

(S) FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT.[21]

The substance of this message lead Dr. Gallardo to abandon Padín's policy and try out different procedures.

> After various changes up to 1942, he finally estalished Spanish as the medium of instruction from the first to the sixth grades. [This was going back to the Padín's policy.] Junior high schools had now been established, and here English was the principal medium of instruction, with some subjects taught in Spanish. In the senior high schools, both English and Spanish were used.[22]

Influential in changing the Gallardo policies was Dr. Algernon Coleman.

In February 7, 1939, Dr. Algernon Coleman, professor of French at the University of Chicago, was invited to Puerto Rico with the purpose of looking over the "teaching of English" on the island, as a member of the committee on modern languages of the American council on education. After his visit he wrote the following letter to the Secretary of the Interior:

April 3, 1939.

Hon. HAROLD L. ICKES,
Secretary of the Interior,
Washington, D.C.

DEAR MR. SECRETARY: This letterhead explains in part the topic of this letter and why it interests me. I may add that problems of language teaching have occupied me for several years and that I have published a number of things in the field.

I spent a month in Puerto Rico, February 7 to March 7, and during that time took occasions to talk unofficially with a number of persons in regard to the educational problem there in general, and particularly about the teaching of English. Furthermore, I observed classes in English in several schools in San Juan and in one or two outlying towns. As a result of this quite informal and unofficial exploration of the question, I have come tentatively to certain conclusions with which you, Mr. Secretary, should be acquainted, in view of the responsibility of your department for insular affairs. I know that the Commissioner of Education for Puerto Rico is appointed by the President, but I am confident that your judgment carries much weight in all matters coming under the purview of your department.

The most striking fact in regard to the teaching of English in Porto Rico is, perhaps, that during the 40 years since we came to the island, there is no evidence that current scientific tendencies in the study of educational problems have made any impression. No systematic study has been undertaken of the results of the various plans for the teaching of English that have been put into effect—no examination of objectives, methods, materials and results on which a long-time program could be based. The changes that have been made whenever a new commissioner has taken office have usually been based on "feeling" rather than on knowledge: on the desire to do something different, rather than on purely educational considerations.

It has recently fallen to my lot to inquire into the teaching of English to Spanish-speaking children in the continental United States. I could naturally look to Porto Rico as a laboratory where data might be secured. It speedily became clear, however, that no evidence of value could be found in the history of teaching English on the island, although that has been the dominant educational problem in Porto Rico for 40 years. I do not deny that much devoted labor and intelligent effort have been given to this problem, but as no records of the results remain, no evidence is available on which successive administrations may build, even if by some miracle they proved to be eager to profit by the labors of their predecessors. Porto Rico has therefore contributed nothing to the solution of the problem that I was commissioned to study, except perhaps an example of how not to do it.

In Porto Rico policies have shifted with the opinions of individuals or as a result of pressure upon various groups. Teachers have felt and now feel largely at sea in regard to aims and procedures, and pupils have suffered. For example, data are at hand to show that in rural areas, from which come more than three times as many school children as from urban areas, more than 72 percent have dropped out of school before the end of the fourth grade. The question naturally arises whether it is wise to expend much effort in teaching these pupils English, since they have only three grades in which to gain a knowledge of the fundamental operations in their vernacular, and since the English that they will carry away from instruction at this period will be of small service. This is only one—but a not unimportant one—of the problems that present themselves to a person who has had some first-hand contact with the situation, and who considers it only from an educational point of view. I am not prepared on the basis of my brief experience in the island to propose a policy in regard to the question formulated above or to any other of the serious aspects of the educational problem, but it is clear that such facts as the one mentioned above must be taken into account by those on whom the responsibility rests.

There has been much talk of an educational program whereby the children of the Island ought to be made really bilingual. Such a purpose seems wholly unreal to one who is ever so little expert in these matters. We know, for example, what has been the outcome of the long-time effort of the British to accomplish this in India. Spanish will continue to be the mother tongue of all Porto Ricans. Even the relatively few who learn English quite well and have frequent occasion to speak it and to write it in business and in social situations revert to Spanish in the home and to express their intimate thoughts. Few of our theorists on the subject seem to realize the small number of opportunities that most Porto Ricans have for speaking English in any continuous fashion as a genuine vehicle of intercourse with others. It would be much more practicable to make of English a supplementary language for a large number of the islanders, a language to be read easily, to be written with fair ease and to be spoken intelligibly on the relatively rare occasions when the majority of Porto Ricans have occasion to use another language than their own.

It seems to me that too little attention has been given to formulating and applying useful criteria for choosing textbooks in most Porto Rican schools. It is fallacious to assume that the same criteria may be applied in selecting textbooks for children in Massachusetts, Illinois, Georgia and in Porto Rico. The experiential background, the intellectual background, the vernacular background of the island group must be taken into account. I do not mean that children in the Island should see books based only on the flora, the fauna, the traditions, the customs, the history of their own territory. At present, however, the current sets quite the other way, and the textbooks in use are almost wholly foreign to the background in which the young islanders live. For example, I observed high-school classes in which, following the textbook, teachers were laying stress on the avoidance of linguistic errors common among English-speaking people on the continent. Such language lessons are of small use in correcting the errors prevalent among Spanish-speaking people when using English.

I have said enough to indicate the main sources of the drifting, the confusion, the absence of definite aims and procedures, that impress a professional observer so forcibly and that have so greatly discouraged some of the best friends of English teaching in the island. When some of these have contended for a somewhat restricted but perhaps realizable goal, they have been accused of "anti-Americanism" by persons who look upon the teaching of English from other than an educational point of view.

The teaching of English has for the last 40 years absorbed most of the financial resources of the school system of Porto Rico. Those of us who are interested in the problem should be able to look in that direction for light. We find none; and with all due respect, Mr. Secretary, I insist that your Department is not properly discharging its duty to the island in regard to the teaching of English.

Let me conclude by saying that my interest in the matter is purely professional. It is probably because of the unofficial nature of my modest inquiry that well-informed and competent persons were willing to express themselves freely and thus to supplement what I saw with my eyes and heard with my ears in the classroom. Let me add that I expect to be in Washington for a meeting of the Committee on Modern Languages on April 16th and possibly the 17th. If you think the matter of sufficient importance, I should be glad to call on you and present the situation somewhat more in detail.

Yours very truly,

ALGERNON COLEMAN,
Professor of French.[33]

Dr. Gallardo's changes in policies brought about a stern letter from the Honorable Harold L. Ickes, Secretary of the Interior of the United States. This letter reads:

THE SECRETARY OF THE INTERIOR,
Washington, March 31, 1943.

MY DEAR DR. GALLARDO: I have before me a transcript of your testimony before the Chavez subcommittee on the question of the schools of Puerto Rico with reference to the teaching of English.

I say with regret that the evidence that you gave fails to impress me that there has been assiduity on your part in carrying out my distinct understanding with you on the subject of teaching English. Moreover, you seem to have paid little attention to the specific instructions from the President. I think you know that I would not have recommended you to the President for this post if I had not been assured that you realized as much as I did the obligation to teach English in the Puerto Rican schools. I am equally confident that the President would not have tendered you the appointment if he had not had my assurance and yours that this would be the keystone of your school policy. I am gravely disappointed, and I shall, of course, fulfill my obligation to advise the President as to my feelings.

Sincerely yours,

(S) HAROLD L. ICKES,
Secretary of the Interior.[34]

This letter from Mr. Ickes, prompted the resignation of Dr. Gallardo. To the Gallardo letter of resignation Mr. Ickes answered:

MY DEAR DR. GALLARDO: Following my letter to you of March 31, you tendered your resignation as Commissioner of Education for Puerto Rico. As I stated to you in the course of our conversation here, I did not intend by my letter to invite your resignation, and I am pleased that, at my request, you have withdrawn it.

The question of teaching English in Puerto Rico is easily misinterpreted both here on the mainland and in Puerto Rico. This is largely because any pronouncement on the subject immediately raises fears in Puerto Rico that there is to be some official attempt to deny the use of Spanish and, contrariwise, fear in the mainland that all efforts to increase the use of English in Puerto Rico are to be abandoned completely.

I believe that there is no difference between us as to objectives with respect to the teaching of English in Puerto Rican schools. These objectives were clearly stated by President Roosevelt in his letter to you on April 8, 1937. This letter set a goal that is not easy to achieve. But when you accepted the President's appointment you also accepted the obligation of striving for that goal. In his letter the President stated: "It is an indispensable part of American policy that the coming generation of American citizens in Puerto Rico grow up with complete facility in the English tongue." At the same time, the President made it clear that there would be no attempt to deny the people of Puerto Rico the use of Spanish: "Clearly there is not desire or purpose to diminish the enjoyment or the usefulness of the rich Spanish cultural legacy of the people of Puerto Rico."

On May 13, 1937, I wrote to Mr. Francisco M. Zeno, editor of *La Correspondencia* of San Juan, and stated, "I understand that it is proposed to use Spanish as medium of instruction for basic subjects in the primary grades and to teach English as a foreign language in those grades. In the higher grades the use of

> English will be given increasing emphasis so that by the time the Puerto Rican children leave the elementary school it is hoped that they will have sufficient knowledge of the English language to permit of greater economic and social relationship with their fellow Americans on the mainland." These excerpts were indicative of the policy in 1937. There has been no change in the policy since that year.
>
> * * * It is my desire that an increasingly large number of American citizens in Puerto Rico have a working knowledge of the English language. This, I know, is an objective that is shared by you. In other words, practical bilingualism is possible.
>
> Naturally, American citizens should be able to speak English. Each succeeding generation of the island's residents should have the opportunity of sharing in the cultural, social, and economic progress of the Nation as a whole. Puerto Rico is attacking its problems on all fronts; language is not the exclusive factor in question. However, the lack of facilities to learn English, or any policy tending to decrease these facilities, would constitute an obstacle with which I do not believe Puerto Ricans should have to contend.
>
> From communications I have received from Puerto Rico I gather that the overwhelming opinion is in favor of continuing and increasing the facilities for learning English. From your recent conversation with me I understand that you are in agreement with this objective. My own opinion is that practical bilingualism is desirable and can be achieved.
>
> * * * It seems to me that [the] program may well result in having an increasingly large body of Puerto Ricans speaking and understanding English, who, at the same time, lose none of their proficiency in the use of Spanish * * *
>
> *Sincerely yours,*
>
> (S) HAROLD L. ICKES,
> *Secretary of the Interior.*[35]

POLICY OF THE SUPERIOR EDUCATIONAL COUNCIL ON THE TEACHING OF ENGLISH

In June 1945 the superior council on education formulated a series of principles for a school language policy for Puerto Rico. Among them we find the following: English should be the second language of Puerto Rico, Spanish should be the medium of instruction in the elementary school, and in secondary school it should be used as the medium of instruction in all or most of the subjects taught. It was pointed out, though, that it is possible that in relation to those matters that are less closely associated with the local environment it might be more convenient to use both languages as means of instruction.

At the end of 1947 Professor Mariano Villaronga became commissioner of education after an interim period of over a year and a half had elapsed since the final resignation of Dr. Gallardo. In his address to the annual meeting of the teachers' association immediately after he took office, Commissioner Villaronga stated his views concerning the language of instruction that should be used in Puerto Rico. Villaronga expressed himself thus:

> It is obvious * * * that in order to obtain the best results English should be taught in all levels of the school system; but if this teaching is to be effective it

> should consider English as a subject and not as the medium of instruction through which all the other subjects are taught.[36]

Commissioner Villaronga resigned June 30, 1947, because his confirmation was withheld indefinitely probably due to his views on the teaching of English. He was appointed commissioner again on January 3, 1949, by the first elected Governor of Puerto Rico, Luis Muñoz Marín.

Commissioner Villaronga, in a circular letter sent to the school districts on August 6, 1949, declared that:

> * * * Spanish will be the vehicle of instruction in the high school. This change, which responds to a long-felt need, extends definitely the use of the vernacular as the teaching means until the last year of high school.[37]

In an article in the San Juan Review of June 1965, Adrian Hull describes the Villaronga policy as follows:

> Under the Villaronga policy, an English section was created in the Department of Education whose function was to produce teaching materials and to supervise English teaching in the public schools from the 1st grade through the 12th. Whereas three general supervisors had formerly been responsible for the supervision of all English teaching in the public schools, the staff was augmented to include a director, seven general supervisors, and some curriculum technicians. A corps of local supervisors was created, known as zone supervisors of English. English was to be taught as one of several subjects of the curriculum, but with the status of a preferred subject. A new approach to the teaching of English was initiated, based on the principles of linguistic science. It recognized the radical difference in teaching English as a second language from teaching it as a native language.
>
> * * * The policy in effect today is still, for all practical purposes, the Villaronga policy. However, English no longer enjoys the preferential status envisioned by that policy, but is ranked alongside the other principal subjects of the curriculum.[38] The application of the principles of descriptive linguistics to the teaching of English as a second language is still fundamental to the methodology employed and to the production of materials for use in the English classes.[39]

As has been shown, during the decades of American Government on the island the policy to be followed in the teaching of English has claimed a great part of the attention of commissioners, teachers, and supervisors. Everything else in the educational system has seemed to be subordinated to the teaching of English. Commissioners Padín and Villaronga, although they gave preferential treatment to English, did not believe that all other subjects should be subordinated to the teaching of this subject.

ENGLISH TEACHERS

In the 1960 "Study of the Educational System of Puerto Rico" it was found that more than 60 percent of the 333 English teachers in the elementary school level had a preparation of a 2-year normal school training or less. The rest of the teachers have a bachelor's degree. Of 560 English teachers in the junior high school level, 43.8 percent did not have a bachelor's degree; 35.4 had a normal school training and 8.4 percent had an academic preparation of high school only. More than half (53.7 percent) had a bachelor's degree and 1.4 percent had a master's degree. In the senior high school out of a total of 183 English teachers, 10.9 percent had a normal school preparation or less (8.7 had normal school training and 2.2 percent were high school graduates); 80.3 percent had a bachelor's degree and 7.7 percent a master's degree.[40]

There are now (1965, first semester) 1,910 English teachers of whom 593 are at the elementary level and 1,317 at the secondary level. Among these 1,910 teachers, there are 10 North Americans who have come to the island by themselves and 19 who have come as part of the exchange programs (operation understanding, apprentice program and teacher exchange program). There are, in the island, 82 positions for English field assistants or zone supervisors of which four are vacant. Of the persons occupying the other 78 positions 60 have a master's degree and 18 have begun work toward a master's degree.

PUERTO RICANS' KNOWLEDGE OF ENGLISH

We may use two indexes to determine the knowledge of English Puerto Ricans have: (1) The percent of the population of children 10 years old and over, as indicated in the census taken every 10 years, states whether they know how to speak English, and (2) the results of comparative tests that have been administered periodically.

According to the 1960 census, the percent of persons 10 years old and over able to speak English is 37.7. This percentage has increased by 1964 to 45.9 percent according to a recent sample survey (September 1964) carried out by the bureau of statistics of the planning board. Table I included here indicates the increase in the number of persons since the 1910 census who know how to speak English. There has been a consistent increase from decade to decade, except in the period 1940–50. If we examine the percentage by age groups (tables II, III, and IV), we will notice that in this decade the percent in the 10–14 age group decreased considerably, while in higher age groups the tendency of constant increase continued. What could have been the causes for this decrease in the 10–14 age group? Most certainly the constant changes in policies and programs with the changes of commissioners of education. During this decade (1940–50) there were also several changes in the programs for the teaching of English. Let us take a look at these.

TABLE I.—*Percentage of persons 10 years old and over with ability to speak English, by sex and by zone—census years 1960 to 1910 (Puerto Rico)*

	1960	1950	1940	1930	1920	1910
Total	37.7	26.1	27.8	19.4	9.9	3.6
Male	39.5	28.0	29.6	20.6	10.6	(1)
Female	35.9	24.2	25.9	18.2	9.2	(1)
Urban	49.0	36.5	42.2	(1)	(1)	(1)
Rural	28.0	18.3	20.8	(1)	(1)	(1)

[1] Data not available.

Sources of information:

1. U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census. "U.S. Census of Population: 1960." "Puerto Rico General Social and Economic Characteristics." PC 1-53C, table 43, pp. 53-121.
2. U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census. "1950 United States Census of Population, Puerto Rico, Detailed Characteristics." PC 53, table 57, pp. 134-135.
3. U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census. "16th Census of the United States: 1940. Puerto Rico: Population, Occupations and other Characteristics by Age," Bull. No. 3, table 13, pp. 35-36.

TABLE II.—*Percentage of persons 10 years old and over with ability to speak English, by age, years 1960, 1950, and 1940 (Puerto Rico)*

Age group	Puerto Rico: total			Age group	Puerto Rico: total		
	1960	1950	1940		1960	1950	1940
Total, 10 years and over	37.7	25.9	27.8	30 to 34 years	45.1	31.1	24.8
10 to 14 years	35.6	19.2	41.8	35 to 44 years	36.9	22.9	17.7
15 to 19 years	51.5	41.1	42.7	45 to 54 years	27.6	16.4	10.0
20 to 24 years	51.4	35.8	33.1	55 to 64 years	19.2	9.0	4.8
25 to 29 years	50.1	35.5	29.5	65 to 74 years	10.4	4.0	2.4
				75 years and over	4.6	2.1	1.6

TABLE III.—*Percentage of persons 10 years old and over with ability to speak English, by age and sex, years 1960, 1950, and 1940 (Puerto Rico)*

Age group	Male			Female		
	1960	1950	1940	1960	1950	1940
Total, 10 years and over	39.5	28.0	29.6	35.9	23.8	25.9
10 to 14 years	33.1	19.1	41.8	38.2	19.3	41.8
15 to 19 years	49.1	41.4	44.2	54.0	40.9	41.4
20 to 24 years	54.4	37.6	34.8	48.7	34.1	31.5
25 to 29 years	56.8	41.2	32.4	44.7	30.1	26.8
30 to 34 years	52.6	36.8	28.3	38.6	25.3	21.3
35 to 44 years	43.8	26.3	21.6	30.5	19.2	13.8
45 to 54 years	31.4	19.9	13.2	23.4	13.6	6.4
55 to 64 years	21.4	11.1	6.6	16.9	6.6	2.7
65 to 74 years	11.8	5.3	3.2	8.9	2.8	1.6
75 years and over	5.4	2.6	2.2	3.9	1.7	1.2

The 1940-41 "Annual Report of the Commissioner of Education" states the following about the teaching of English:

> The teaching of English in the elementary schools has been marked during the past year (1940-41) by the introduction of a new distribution of time allotted to instruction in English and Spanish. All teaching in grades one and two was made in Spanish, except for a period in simple English conversation. The mechanics of English reading began in the second grade. In grades three, four, five and six the school day was divided into two sessions, one devoted to the

Table IV.—*Percantage of persons 10 years old and over with ability to speak English, by age and by zone, years 1960, 1950, and 1970 (Puerto Rico)*

Age group	Urban			Rural		
	1960	1950	1940	1960	1950	1940
Total, 10 years and over	49.0	36.5	42.2	28.0	18.3	20.8
10 to 14 years	43.5	22.5	58.0	30.6	17.3	35.7
15 to 19 years	62.6	52.6	60.9	43.5	33.4	34.1
20 to 24 years	63.2	48.4	51.2	40.4	25.5	24.2
25 to 29 years	62.5	48.6	47.9	36.8	22.8	19.7
30 to 34 years	59.2	43.9	42.2	30.0	20.1	15.5
35 to 44 years	51.4	35.4	32.7	22.9	12.8	10.0
45 to 54 years	41.6	27.6	19.8	14.9	7.3	5.0
55 to 64 years	30.4	15.9	9.9	8.6	3.4	2.2
65 to 74 years	16.9	7.2	4.9	4.2	1.5	1.2
75 years and over	7.1	3.8	3.1	2.1	.7	.9

teaching of subject matter in Spanish, the other was devoted to English as related to subject-matter.[41]

A special feature of the curriculum in English was the establishment in 1942–43 of an extra 45-minute period for English in grades three to six. This period was called the English project period. The aim of the project was to intensify the teaching of English.

The teaching of a basic vocabulary was emphasized. There was an attempt to coordinate the English work in the elementary and secondary schools by concentrating efforts on the basic vocabularies at the various levels.

In 1948–49 there was a shift in language policy. Spanish became the medium of instruction in the junior high schools. New language courses were introduced in both elementary and secondary schools. These language courses "were characterized by much aural-oral training in the beginning stages and by materials which stress the essential features of sound and structure of the language being taught."[42] All these changes in policy and programs, no doubt, produced the negative results mentioned and which affected the age group 10–14 during the 1940–50 decade.

TESTS RESULTS

In 1925 the Educational Survey Commission of the International Institute of Teachers College, Columbia University, made a survey of the Puerto Rico educational system. The commission stated:

> * * * a speaking knowledge of English is desired by Porto Ricans in addition to Spanish because of the social and economic advantage which it gives. The schools are teaching English not to compel unwilling people to accept a new idiom but because Puerto Ricans wish to learn and to have their children learn to speak and read English.[43]

The testing program of the commission centered around the language program and large numbers of students were tested both in

English and Spanish. English tests began in the fifth grade. They intended to test general reading ability and ability to understand oral English. The commission's report of the measurement results stated that:

> In the primary schools those children who remain to the fifth grade do develop marked ability to comprehend spoken English * * * In the second place those who remain five or more years learn to speak English with sufficient clearness to make themselves be understood either by other Porto Ricans or by Americans.[44]

The commission believed, though, that Puerto Rican schools were deficient in the teaching of reading:

> In the fifth grade Porto Rican children read about as well as American children do in the third grade; the sixth grade corresponds approximately to the fourth in continental United States; the seventh and eighth grades show but slightly more skill. In fact, beginning with grade seven the lag in reading ability as shown by the test for reading difficult paragraphs amounts nearly to three years.[45]

Besides, it reported a very meager growth in reading ability from the eighth grade to the fourth year in high school.

In 1941 Manuel and Fife as representatives of the American council's committee on modern languages began a study of the teaching of English in Puerto Rico. As part of this study some 80,000 tests were administered to nearly 20,000 children and youths in the schools and colleges of Puerto Rico. All grades from the first year of the elementary schools to the first year of college were included, and both public and private schools and colleges were represented. In the summary and interpretation of the results the authors concluded that:

> As expected, the average Porto Rican pupil reads English with much less efficiency than the average continental pupil of the same grade. There is evidence that he reads material from the natural sciences with relatively more efficiency than he reads material from the social studies or non-specialized material.
>
> As a kind of general average it may be said that in the high school the average Porto Rican pupils read English at the level of efficiency of a continental English speaking pupil two and one-half of three grades below the level at which the Porto Rican pupil is enrolled; that from 15 to 20 percent of Porto Rican high school pupils read English as well as or better than the average continental pupil of the same grade; and that at the end of the high school 10 to 15 percent of the pupils read English as well as they read Spanish.[46]

In 1948–49 the Institute of Field Studies of Teachers College, Columbia University, made a curriculum survey of the Puerto Rican public schools at the request of Acting Commissioner Francisco Collazo.

The survey staff did not measure, through tests, the results of English instruction. It made, though, an appraisal of the use of the linguistic approach in the teaching of English. The staff noted, among other aspects, the following features of the program:

> Pupils and teachers seemed to find the classes both enjoyable and worthwhile.
>
> The English which observers heard in these classes sounded like English.
>
> The practice of the controlled fundamentals of English communication was observed to be improving the English of the teachers as well as that of the pupils. It seemed to be effecting a kind of in-service education without removing the teachers from their classrooms.
>
> When pupils read from the blackboard the material which had been orally presented, they read in sentence units rather than in word units.
>
> Observers who looked at the notebooks of pupils commented upon the neatness and accuracy of the work, since pupils had learned the satisfaction that comes with complete mastery of the materials orally presented.[47]

The survey staff recommended "that only the oral use of English be taught in grades 1 and 2, since it is in these grades that pupils are learning to read and write in the vernacular. Beginning with grade 3, it is important that the English program include suitable emphasis on the skills of reading and writing, not only because the use of these skills is essential to 'civilized' society, but also because reading and writing reinforce the oral-aural skills. Thus, it is recommended that reading be considered secondary to speaking, but *second only in terms of chronology*, that is, not second in terms of importance."[48]

In the 1958 survey of the educational system a test was prepared to evaluate the results of oral English instruction and another one to measure results of English language instruction. The former was administered in grades six and nine and the latter in grades six, nine and twelve. The results of the oral English comprehension test show that in both sixth and ninth grades:

> Some students answered correctly all the exercises while others got a score lower than the one that could be obtained by merely guessing. In other words, some students understood practically nothing, while others understood everything—at least they were able to answer all the items correctly.
>
> * * * In the language test the highest possible score was 91 and some students did get this score * * *. One percent of the sixth grade students who obtained the highest scores in the public schools have scores of 85 and more, while one percent of the lower limit of the distribution got scores of 17 or less. Some 12th grade students in public schools obtained almost perfect scores, but 25 percent of the students answered correctly not more than 55 out of the 91 questions, which were based on the first three books of Fries American English Series.[49]

There is no denying the fact that there are constantly new changes and socioeconomic and political developments that stress the ever increasing need for Puerto Ricans to learn more and better English as a second language. Among these is the constant movement of people between Puerto Rico and the mainland; the remarkable increase in tourism during the last years; the rapid industrialization of the Island; the compulsory military service and the increase in the number of Puerto Rican enlistees in the Army due to the two World Wars, the Korean war and the conflict in Viet Nam; the substantial number of university students who go through ROTC; the effects of the educational programs for veterans; the ever increasing number of civic, economic, and social organizations from the States which establish chapters in Puerto Rico, and the new Federal laws approved by the U.S. Congress on education, housing, and medicare, among others. Above all these undeniable facts, the elimination of the imposition of English as the medium of instruction did away, considerably, with the psychological blocking which so hampered the learning of English by the Puerto Ricans. The increased understanding by Washington officials, the breakthrough in better political relations, and the desire of the majority of the people for permanent association with the United States have developed a better climate for the acquisition of English as an instrument of culture, association, and ever-increasing understanding and good will among people who are so closely bound by a common citizenship and by a core of democratic ideals and principles.

THE NEED TO LEARN ENGLISH

The teaching of English in the schools of Puerto Rico is and will continue to be a matter of great importance. We feel that some observations are in order in relation to this problem. As we continue our association with the United States by mutual consent, by bonds of citizenship, and by commercial relations of mutual convenience (as long as both countries by common consent do not decide something else) English should continue gaining importance as a second language for all the citizens of the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico. But we must continue cultivating Spanish with great care because it is not only our vernacular but the basic tool of association with, and understanding of, the Hispanic world, to which we are associated historically and culturally.

The Puerto Rican who migrates to the United States must be equipped with enough knowledge of the English language to be able to feel at ease in any community of the United States where he may go to work or to live. Those migrants with a lesser or no knowledge of English are frequently the most exposed to exploitation, delinquency, and discrimination. They also have to accept the most disagreeable and poorly paid jobs. Furthermore, upon reduction of personnel, they are the first to be laid off. Even when Puerto Ricans go to the United States for pleasure or to shop or for medical reasons, it is of the utmost importance that they know enough English to benefit the most from these trips. And as those Puerto Ricans who stay here will need more English daily to do better in their businesses, their professions, and their studies, as well as for personal satisfaction and cultural enjoyment, it is the duty and the responsibility of the school to continue to provide the citizens of the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico with the knowledge of and skill in English. Certainly neither Spanish nor its use as a medium of instruction for other subjects in the curriculum should be sacrificed just to give an exaggerated emphasis to the teaching of English. On the contrary, the teaching of Spanish should be strengthened. Aside from political and other relations with the United States the great value of English, as a powerful modern language, cannot be disregarded.

Professor August B. Hollingshead, distinguished sociologist of Yale University, wrote to us on this matter:

> Puerto Rico, as a free commonwealth in association with the United States of America, will undoubtedly continue to play an important part in the social, cultural, and economic life of the United States. The experience we have gained from our close association with Puerto Rico in the years since World War II indicates that there will be continuous migration, of some numbers, of persons from the United States to Puerto Rico each year but larger number of persons from Puerto Rico to the mainland. As the years pass, more Puerto Ricans might migrate to the mainland. Even though the numbers remain approximately what they have been since 1945, I believe my point regarding the educational system of Puerto Rico is important. It is this: Puerto Ricans who migrate to the mainland have been handicapped in their adjustment to life in the United States by their limited knowledge of the English language. Their lack of knowledge of the English language has handicapped them in their search for jobs, housing, and participation in the social life of the communities where they have settled. If Puerto Ricans who migrate knew English well they would be able to command better jobs. This would enable them to raise their standard of living and adjust to American conditions more readily. In sum, the inclusion of English in the curriculum of the Public Schools of Puerto Rico from the elementary grades on through high school is indicated. The need to learn English, of those migrating to the mainland, is a primary one.
>
> It is possible that the lack of knowledge of the English language among Puerto Rican migrants will slow down the process of assimilation a generation or more. Their problems of adjustment in the United States are magnified by linguistic differences. The native ability of Puerto Ricans has been demonstrated by the remarkable way in which they have moved from an agricultural economy into the urbanized industrial life characteristic of our generation in Puerto Rico and the United States. A knowledge of English would help those who migrate to capitalize upon their inherent native ability.[80]

Nevertheless, no matter how important the above considerations might be, it must be made clear that the educational system of Puerto Rico should not have as its goal education for migration or for the export of human beings. The greatest effort should be made to equip the Puerto Rican people well, including offering them the training necessary for the mastery of English, to educate them in the best possible way, and in so doing, to help them to be good, capable citizens wherever they go.

We must insist on certain basic ideas when we get to the theme of the teaching of English:

1. The technical and pedagogical problems of the teaching of English should not again become a political issue. No one in Puerto Rico at this moment denies the need of having all skillful, capable persons learn good English. Dissent will mainly concern the methods and techniques that will help attain this goal. This is a technical matter to be solved by competent persons and one which requires research work and experimentation not yet done.
2. The phrase "the teaching of English will be intensified" lends itself to confusion. The policy to be followed and reasons for it should be explained clearly, along with the psychological, pedagogical, and linguistic reasons that justify its adoption. Reports should be made specifically on what is being done and to what degree of effectiveness, in order to intensify the teaching of English. There should be frequent evaluation directed to correct deficiencies and strengthen those aspects that deserve it.
3. English is not the most important subject in the school curriculum. It is important, but not so much as to justify the deterioration of Spanish or the dearth of resources used for the teaching of other subjects like science, social studies, mathematics, and the arts. In evaluating school achievement we must take into consideration the fact that almost half of the school time is used in the teaching of English and the vernacular.
4. The learning of languages is expensive both in money and in time, even among those who are well-endowed intellectually. It must be more expensive when dealing with education of masses. We cannot expect from all individuals a uniform proficiency in the *mastery of a second language—or even of the vernacular. Not* everyone learns languages with the same facility, and this is more true when there exist marked differences in opportunities at home, in the social environment and even in the school itself.
5. The policy of taking the whole island as an area of experimentation when a change in language policy is contemplated should be avoided. Nobody has yet found the best and only way to teach a second language: In our case, the best way to teach English. The changes in policy with each new administration have proven to be expensive, and one cannot be sure that the present policy is the right answer to the educational problem. The frequent changes, made many times without reasonable experimentation, lower the morale of the teaching body, stimulate incredulity, and cause a decrease in the enthusiasm of those who must adapt them-

selves to new practices without having been convinced beforehand of their value, usefulness or justification.

6. One of the obstacles faced by the teaching of English is the deficient way in which Spanish is being taught. If fourth and fifth grade students cannot read or write satisfactorily their own language, reading and writing in English should not be introduced to them: If the student does not have an adequate knowledge of his own language, it will be more difficult for him to learn a second language. So Spanish must be learned well not only for itself and because of what this learning means in terms of logical, free, spontaneous thought processes, aesthetic enjoyment, and appreciation of our own culture, but also because in order to learn English we must learn better Spanish.

7. In teaching both English and Spanish, the fact must be kept in mind that aside from the educational opportunities offered in the school there is very little opportunity to hear or speak English outside the classroom. If the constructive linguistic opportunity is meager in the school and very scarce and poor out of it, this is an important factor that must be considered when judging the planning of the language teaching program in the country.

8. As we are now free from outside interference to determine the language policy to follow in Puerto Rico, full responsibility falls on the educational leadership of this country. That is, we must accept as ours the attainments and the errors. Giving opinions and repeating experiences cannot substitute for experimentation, no matter how extensive and difficult it may be.

9. The recommendation made in the report by Fife and Manuel, the "Teaching of English in Puerto Rico," that every child in Puerto Rico should be given the opportunity of learning some English is still valid, with the exceptions made above (see Number 4). This would mean that each student should be provided an opportunity for linguistic development to the limit of their ability.

We have already said that in the teaching of languages "the best method" or "the only method" does not exist. "In reality there is no universal 'best method', since method depends on a number of variables: objective, age, group ability, duration of instruction, are among them."[51] We would add: In Puerto Rico any method would be conditioned also by the quality and training of the teachers, the provision of teaching materials adapted to the environment and to the students, and by the effectiveness of supervision.

Drs. Manuel and Fife in their study of the "Teaching of English in Puerto Rico" state guiding principles which should have been taken into consideration:

> The ideal of English for all Puerto Ricans must be interpreted realistically, i.e., the mastery of English will be an objective to be attained only so far as the practical situation permits and the balance among competing educational needs shows to be wise. Action will have to be determined, not by the failure to recognize the need of English, but by the amount of English that can be learned with the time and energy which can be given to it without neglecting other educational objectives. A survey of these makes it apparent that now and so far in the future as the Department needs to plan, it would be fantastic to expect that the majority of the Puerto Ricans can be made efficient in English with any school program that can be put into operation. The overwhelming number of young Puerto Ricans will learn Spanish at home and English, if it is learned at all, outside the home. The mastery of English except in the natural situation, where it is learned by association with those speaking the language, is a difficult task, to be conquered only by the more gifted or the more persistent students. The cultural handicap of so many Puerto Rican children, the short school life of so great a proportion and the part-time school day to which they are restricted, particularly in the rural districts, are severely limiting factors. The result is that while the use of English will continue to be an objective for the people of the Island, effective mastery at an advanced level can be a practical objective only for those who have high ability and a long school life or those who have opportunity for acquiring it in a natural situation.
>
> In establishing goals of English instruction it must be realized that many pupils will stop at relatively low levels of achievement. This should not lead, however, to a denial of the opportunity to learn nor to an over-emphasis of English in a futile effort to achieve skills beyond normal expectation. In general, children may be expected to make progress in English in proportion to their general ability, their opportunities, their motivation, and their mastery of the native language. Even if a child can learn only a little English in three or four years, the answer is not to be found in intensifying the effort to teach English with the sacrifice of other important subjects but in longer schooling.[52]

The above quotation was taken from a report by Dr. Manuel and Dr. Robert H. Fife, published in 1951 and the most thorough study on the matter which had been made till that time.[53] Unfortunately this report is little known, even in educational circles; if it had been read and used in a professional spirit, undoubtedly it would have contributed in a significant way to the advancement of the best practices in the teaching of English as a second language.

There is one more idea expressed by Dr. H. T. Manuel in a special report prepared for the "Study of the Educational System," an idea which needs to be emphasized:

> In improving language teaching, what Puerto Rico most needs is a program of experimentation to produce materials and to try out the products of experimentation without unsettling schools by sudden shifts from one program to another which is untried. Problems of this magnitude cannot be solved overnight by the opinions of "experts", and certainly not by experts whose attention

> is too narrowly limited. The program of experimentation should be broadly conceived, adequately financed, and carried forward over a period of years.[54]

Dr. Ralph B. Long, professor of English from the University of Texas and currently head of the three departments of English at the University of Puerto Rico, in a report which he submitted as part of the overall study of the educational system of Puerto Rico after 10 months of intensive study of the problem, expressed himself thus:

> It is important to the healthy development of English in Puerto Rico that the primary importance of Spanish be recognized at once. This is a Spanish-speaking island. Puerto Ricans are citizens of the United States, like Texans and residents of the District of Columbia; but their citizenship does not involve any requirement that they speak English. Furthermore it is more and more apparent that the United States must demonstrate to the world a respect for variety in language comparable to the respect it has long shown for variety in religion. Even among its citizens, the United States must accept varieties in language just as—and the granting of statehood to Hawaii is significant here—it has to accept varieties in cultures and in racial origins. Political arguments for favoring English above Spanish in Puerto Rico are out of date. It is fortunate that this is so.
>
> Everything possible should be done to strengthen the teaching of Spanish in the schools of Puerto Rico. Satisfactory spelling, punctuation, and sentence structure should be established in Spanish; skill in reading and in composition should be established in Spanish. These are difficult tasks for mass education both in Spanish and in English. It is a constant complaint of universities on the continent that entering students are deplorably weak in these basic skills in their home language, English, and that for this reason, as Howard Mumford Jones phrased it in a 1957 Newsletter of the America Council of Learned Societies—"the greater part of the time and energy of the largest single fraction of the staff of the American university is spent in doing, not what the high school should have done, but what the grade school should have done."
>
> Habits of accuracy and system in the reading and writing of Spanish are of the very greatest importance in Puerto Rico. Better work in almost every subject taught in the schools, and certainly in English, can be expected to result from strengthening the teaching of reading and composition in Spanish. As Fife and Manuel wrote, the problem is to find out—"how two languages may best be learned with maximum reinforcement one of the other and with minimum interference."
>
> It was predictable that Fife and Manuel's study should show that generally "ability to read English varies with ability to read Spanish."[55] Even the vocabularies employed in the two languages overlap greatly: first, because English has borrowed so extensively from Latin and its modern descendants; second, because much of the new vocabulary of science and technology is truly international and interlingual; third, because the Spanish of Puerto Rico, like the English of the continent, is hospitable to new vocabulary at the same time that it maintains its phonological and grammatical integrity.
>
> Reports of teachers and supervisors alike make it clear that many children in the third and fourth grades, and some in even higher grades, still cannot read Spanish. It would seem wise to avoid having Puerto Rican children who cannot read Spanish begin work on written English. Reportedly in the high schools there is very little coordination of the work of English teachers with

> that of Spanish teachers. It would seem that both languages would gain from a certain amount of coordination at all levels. The teaching of grammar in both languages, for example, would gain if agreement on terminology could be reached.
>
> It is clear that materials for teaching English are better developed and better distributed than those for teaching Spanish. Obviously this should not be the case. More than a decade ago, in "Problemas de educación en Puerto Rico" (1947) and again in "Problemas de lectura y lengua en Puerto Rico" (1948), Rodríquez Bou and his collaborators pointed out the need of more and better Spanish readers, basic and supplementary, for the schools of Puerto Rico; and their monumental "Recuento de vocabulario español" provides one of the basic tools for use in the making of readers in Spanish. Beresford L. Hayward has more recently urged that materials for use in the teaching of reading in Spanish should be developed as rapidly as possible.[56]
>
> It is difficult to escape a strong impression that Spanish teaching in the schools of Puerto Rico suffers also from the prevalence of mistaken ideas about what Puerto Rican children need to learn in their work in Spanish. Thus it is disturbing to find one second-grade teacher, in a remote rural school, devoting precious time to drilling her children on pronouncing the *s* of *trajes* and not pronouncing the *h* of *hijo*, and even more disturbing to be told by a teacher in a private school that her children needed to be taught pure Castillian Spanish first of all. In Spanish in Puerto Rico as in English on the continent, what is needed is not elegance or direct attacks on the dialect of the home and the community, but ability to read materials of increasing difficulty and to write with increasing effectiveness. Puerto Rico is fortunate in having available advanced training of the very highest quality in Spanish grammar and related subjects, but some of those who teach Spanish in the schools show no evidence of exposure to anything of the kind.
>
> Spanish should be granted the primacy, clearly and honestly. But at the same time it should be remembered always that English does have exceptional importance in Puerto Rico, and will continue to have exceptional importance. Even an independent Puerto Rico, like an independent Cuba or Mexico, would look north as well as south—partly because of the predictable growth of such businesses as tourism, and party because many Puerto Ricans are already settled in the States and would remain there.[57]

Besides these views Dr. Long added in the same report:

> A series of English readers, with teaching aids, should be made. These should be carefully thought out, with attention given to interest, value of content, and effectiveness of style, not merely to vocabulary and grammatical structure.
>
> There should be experimentation with the use of recordings, motion pictures, and television as methods of bringing satisfactory models of spoken English to children in the lower grades. Here again the language should be used to communicate subject matter of genuine interest to the listening children, very possibly in the form of short plays with child actors the age of the listeners. The use of English-language films as supplementary materials should be encouraged in the higher grades of the elementary schools and in high school.[58]
>
> Changes should be made cautiously, and experimentation should always involve the collaboration, as Fife and Manuel urged, of psychologists and specialists in language.[59] Any appearance of sudden reversal of direction in the program is always undesirable: it is of extreme importance that what has been built up laboriously with many years of effort be utilized. The problems to be solved are complex ones. The attack made on them should be energetic but never reckless. A considerable degree of humility is necessary.[60]

II. OTHER SIGNIFICANT FACTORS IN THE DEVELOPMENT OF EDUCATION IN PUERTO RICO AND THEIR RELATIONSHIP TO THE UNITED STATES

PEOPLES' FAITH AND INTEREST IN EDUCATION

The attitudes of the people in the development of a free public school system are determining factors in its orientation. Care should be taken, when passing judgment on these expressions, that they represent the voice of the enlightened citizens and the majority of the people and not that of the most vocal or articulate minorities.

Twelve days after the American Flag had been raised at the Fortaleza the first step in behalf of public education was taken by a number of representative citizens who met in assembly at the San Juan theater October 30, 1898.

"As regards public education, the best means of advancing our people would be kindergartens and normal schools as established in the United States. Our elementary and superior schools should be transformed and graded according to modern pedagogic methods. Secondary instruction should be a continuation of the primary and a preparation for the superior and collegiate. Universal education should be introduced on the best models of the United States. There should be established schools for adults, Sunday schools, schools of arts and trades, libraries, museums, academies of fine arts and literary clubs. Education must be obligatory and gratuitous and it must be compulsory on every municipality to sustain its own schools, the number being fixed by law with reference to the population. If the municipality be unable to support all the schools, the State should establish the necessary ones. Grades of instruction should be three—the fundamental or that given by the public schools; the secondary, which should give positive notions on scientific, civic and technical subjects; the professional, which comprehends the knowledge of jurisprudence, medicine, engineering, and technology, the universities to diffuse general knowledge of science for purpose of high culture. For the formation of a competent body of teachers, it is necessary to establish normal schools for teachers of both sexes, normal schools for professors, normal schools for university teachers, and military and naval schools." [a]

These high hopes did not take into consideration that there were no adequate economic and human resources to put them into operation and that there were but very few trained teachers, extremely inadequate physical facilities, no textbooks or teaching materials, and that by the mere fact of a change in colonial government these hopes could not be changed into a plan of action.

THE FIRST SCHOOL LAWS

The first school laws of Puerto Rico under the Government of the United States, as they were an attempt to organize a system of public, free, compulsory schools need to be summarized here.

A law of May 1, 1899:

(*a*) Established school boards. The military government tried unsuccessfully to establish school boards in 1898, but the attempt was given up in favor of the present highly centralized school system, with practically no citizen participation. (We refer to this topic again in topic number 3 below.)

(*b*) Defined public schools, rights of pupils, the school year and its divisions.

(*c*) Abolished the fee system.

(*d*) Made the public schools entirely free to pupils of all classes and degrees.

(*e*) Established a graded system of schools in towns.

(*f*) Prescribed a legal course of study.

(*g*) Determined the legal qualifications of teachers in the primary and secondary schools, and the university, and payment of the same.

(*h*) Authorized the provision of free textbooks for the public schools.

(*i*) Defined the relation of the municipalities to the public schools.

(*j*) Authorized the establishment of high schools, a normal school and the organization as a professional school of the University of Puerto Rico.

(*k*) Provided rules and regulations governing the finances and accounts of the bureau of education.

ESTABLISHMENT OF INSULAR BOARD OF PUBLIC INSTRUCTION, AUGUST 2, 1899

The system of school boards was a complete failure. There was no tradition of public and civic participation in solving community problems, or in school management. The Spanish tradition was paternalistic and hierarchical as exemplified by the key institutions at work—family, Government, church, army, landowners each of whom functioned as a big "pater familiae". Somebody above "solved" the problems, somebody below asked "a father" to solve the problems.

Dr. J. J. Osuna, thus states the problem of the two cultures coming together so suddenly:

> The aim of the American educators should have been to establish a system of public schools, based on local psychology, adapted to local needs; a system of public schools embracing American ideals of education and yet adapted to a Latin American civilization, and capable of being put into operation in such a civilization. But on the contrary the representatives of the United States, transplanted the American school system to Puerto Rico irrespective of conditions differing from those of the States.[62]

Dr. Pedro A. Cebollero, in his doctoral dissertation, refers to this period in our educational development pointing to the fact that Commissioner Brunbaugh thought that the school system would be a proper instrument to prepare the Puerto Ricans for Statehood and that "patriotic exercises held in the schools could foster the attainment of the aim."

> With a rather naive faith in the efficacy of such means for the promotion of Americanization, he made the following report to the Governor of Puerto Rico:
>
> "In almost every city of the island, and at many rural schools, the children meet and salute the flag as it flung to the breeze * * * The pupils then sing America, Hail Columbia, The Star Spangled Banner, and other patriotic songs. The marvel is that they sing these in English. The first English many of them know is the English of our national songs. The influence is far-reaching * * * Washington's Birthday exercises were proposed and outlined by this Department in a circular letter to the supervisors * * * The exercises were a fitting occasion to display their patriotism and their school training. In each case the exercises consisted of patriotic songs and speeches on Washington and on patriotism by the people * * * At least 25,000 children participated in these exercises and perhaps 5,000 citizens joined in the patriotic demonstration. These exercises have done much to Americanize the island, much more than any other single agency. The young minds are being molded to follow the example of Washington * * * These exercises more than any other agency will aid in the speedy advance of these people to statehood."[illegible]

TEACHERS SENT TO THE UNITED STATES TO STUDY

(*a*) During the summer vacation of 1899, 48 Puerto Rican teachers were granted Government transportation to the United States in order that they might study the English language and American school methods.

(*b*) The States of New York, Vermont, New Hampshire, and Minnesota offered free tuition to Puerto Rican students in their normal schools, and the Chautauqua Assembly granted a like privilege.

(*c*) Picked youths from the public schools were sent to preparatory schools in the United States. By the summer of 1901, 219 pupils had been sent north.

(*d*) In addition, some English teachers were brought to Puerto Rico.

(*e*) Teachers conferences and meetings were organized.

(*f*) Professional reading courses were instituted.

(*g*) Study and travel in the States was provided (1904).

(*h*) Commissioner Lindsay made arrangements with the presidents of Harvard and Cornell University to have about 500 teachers study in their universities during a summer school of 6 weeks. He also made arrangements with the War Department to have them transported to the United States at a charge of $1 a day while on the Government transport.

COEDUCATION

The Americans came to Puerto Rico from a country where the boys and girls went to school together, where women enjoyed greater freedom than in many other countries of the world, and where there was no appreciable difference of intellectual, social, and moral standards between men and women. They came into a civilization where it was thought morally wrong (and socially inconvenient) for boys and girls to go to school together, where woman by tradition was destined to submit herself to the will of man and where there was a marked contrast between the intellectual, social and moral status of men and women.

To establish an American coeducational system of public education in such a society was to accomplish that which Spain and even all Europe had not yet accomplished; it was to step in a day over centuries of Old World traditions, prejudices, and customs. But the coeducational system was established, and for the best, in only two decades it has so raised the intellectual, economic, social, and moral status of women that they are becoming more and more the equal of men economically, while every bit their equal intellectually and socially.[64]

IMPORTANCE OF STUDIES REQUIRING MANUAL ACTIVITIES

The traditional professions in Puerto Rico and in most European and Latin American countries were law, medicine, the priesthood, and pharmacy for men, and teaching services, and embroidery for girls. There was high regard for learning and learned individuals, especially those interested in literature and the fine arts, who came to be classed as "intellectuals." This lead to highly humanistic, verbalistic, formal intellectualized curricula. There was scant scientific tradition, and professions which required technical or vocational skills were held in low esteem. With such occupational distinctions, any work requiring manual activity was barred from an upper class society of means, as a general rule, and it was considered not proper for the sons or daughters of the rich even to get their hands dirty in the perfomance of a manual task. Hence it was important to institute studies of manual training, home economics and agriculture, not only as a means of bringing about better home conditions, but also to transform the viewpoint of the people on manual labor, to exalt the dignity of labor and to show that in these "humble" occupations lie hidden possibilities of professions as honorable as any of the traditional ones and in some cases more remunerative.

TEXTBOOKS AND PRINTED MATERIALS

One of the main features of American education is the preoccupation with the constant revision of the school curriculum. Part of this revision includes the importance attached to books and written materials and their adequate utilization.

> On the arrival of the American school authorities, they found such textbooks as "Epitome of Spanish Grammar;" "Grammar of the Spanish Royal Academy;" pamphlets on the rules of syntax and orthography, several catechisms of the church; several books on Bible history, mostly in catechism form; a small geography of Puerto Rico and a general geography of Palucia; a short history of Spain in catechism form and several readers such as Juanito and Carreño. Such books could not be used with the establishment of the new public school system.
>
> * * * one of the first things American publishers did was to have standard American textbooks hastily translated into Spanish. For lack of something better many of these were adopted, but none of them had been prepared with special view of the needs of the Island.
>
> * * * Readers with stories on sleighing and skating parties could not be appreciated by the children as well as if they had treated of swimming parties or even picnics * * * and problems of arithmetic on apples, peaches, pears, bushels, and what not, could not be appreciated by the children as if they had been on bananas, nísperos, aguacates, oranges, and fanegas or quintales.[illegible]

From 1906 to 1911 a slow development for the production of books adapted to the insular environment was started. But most of the books continued to be American texts. The tendency was to copy, adapt, and imitate. The report of the International Institute of Teachers College, Columbia University, 1926, states:

> Both the Spanish and English books reflect continental culture. Indeed, the whole course of study has been patterned on the curriculum of the schools of continental United States. It is the judgment of the Commission that this practice should be modified. The materials inculded in the reading books should be constructed to fit Porto Rican conditions. The children are living in an environment which is unlike that of most of the children of continental United States. Social customs are almost foreign. The Porto Rican people have a unique personality that should be preserved and their culture should be developed and passed on through a curriculum peculiar to it. That means that, instead of adopting reading books made on continental models the character of the material included in the reading books should be determined completely by the modes of living and the problems and conditions of the Porto Rican people.[illegible]

In 1947 the research division of the superior council on education made a study of the textbooks in use in the schools of Puerto Rico. Although there had been some improvement, still old translated or adapted books were too much in use, the quantity and quality was deficient, and most books and reading materials were the same as those used in the States—not adapted to the interests, experiences, attitudes, ideals, and customs of the children of Puerto Rico.[87]

The Institute of Field Studies of Teachers College, Columbia University in its survey of 1948–49 on "Public Education and the Future of Puerto Rico: A Curriculum Survey," reports:

> Information on the printed materials for instruction purchased by the Insular Department of Education for that year (1946–47) shows that 267,611 books were purchased by the department; that 145,808 or 56 percent of these, were in

> Spanish; that 121,808, or 44 percent were in English. They had originally been prepared for continental pupils.[illegible]

This report further adds:

> These books written in Spanish, like those prepared in English, do not in most cases deal with the culture and life of Puerto Rico * * *
>
> The books dealing with citizenship and science were largely in English and were published by textbook companies for the schools on the Continent. * * * The books used by the high school students, except those for Spanish classes, are usually written in English and published in the United States.[illegible]

In 1948–49 more materials were developed, but—

> * * * approximately one-third of the printed materials used in the elementary and junior high schools are written for children on the Continent, while with the exception of the books used in Spanish classes, all high school texts are prepared for youth in secondary schools in the United States.
>
> Puerto Rican children spend much time reading about little boys and girls in the United States riding tricycles, playing in boats, and having luxurious doll houses in spacious playrooms. At the only time during which thousands of the children will have an opportunity to learn how to live better lives in Puerto Rico, they are spending long hours of each school year reading about haystacks, steam shovels, skating on the ice, and sliding down hill in the snow.
>
> In the urban junior and senior high schools through the Island * * * youth have printed materials in social studies which deal only with the history and government of the United States and with the trends in world government. The pupil reads materials dealing with the colonists' arrival in America, the establishment of the new country, the rivalry between the North and the South, and the emergence of the United States as a world power. Because of the relationship existing between Puerto Rico and the United States, and because of the importance today of world understanding, materials dealing with the government and history of the Continent should be available to these children, it is true. However, it is unrealistic to expect an educational program to meet the needs and abilities of children in Puerto Rico unless most of the materials deal with the development of Puerto Rico, its culture, its government, its socio-economic problems, its relationship with the United States, and its role among Latin American nations.[illegible]

So it goes in science materials, in public health, and all other fields.

The problem of textbooks prepared for the United States is further complicated by their grade-level designation. Books prepared for a certain grade level in the United States are not suited for those levels in Puerto Rico. If used in lower grades the interest level will not be appropriate.

These are the same difficulties reported in the "Study of the Educational System" published in 1961, especially in relation to textbooks used in English classes.

(*a*) The situations, experiences, activities presented are scarcely related to the Puerto Rican environment.

(*b*) Most books are not written for Puerto Rican children.

(*c*) The vocabulary, according to grade placement, is too difficult for our children.

(*d*) The topics, when books are placed in lower grades, result in very little interest for children.

(*e*) Similar shortcomings are found in books assigned to the intermediate and high schools—in science, social studies, history, etc.

Nonetheless there has been considerable progress in preparing books with vocabulary control, better illustrations, written in series, and closer to children's interests and experiences. Still there is a long way to go.

SEPARATION OF CHURCH AND STATE

When the American troops occupied Puerto Rico in the year 1898, they brought with them the principle of the separation of church and state and the religious freedom which is implied in the Constitution of the United States. The public schools were freed from religious influence, the Insular Government was forbidden to spend public money for religious purposes, and Protestant missionaries followed in the wake of the troops to undertake religious campaigns and to make converts.[71] Protestantism in Puerto Rico has been considered both as a liberalizing influence on the humble people and at the same time regarded by many as a significant factor in Americanization. It has been egalitarian, an important factor in education, social welfare, and a positive influence on the upbringing of children and youth. From the beginning, protestant sects and missions emphasized education and health, as exemplified by some of the institutions they founded.

MILITARY SERVICE AND EDUCATION

As American citizens the Puerto Ricans are bound to military service. During the First World War some 18,000 Puerto Rican soldiers were enlisted. Of these, 13,733 went through Selective Service. The Second World War saw 65,034 persons enlisted, of whom 59,415 went through Selective Service. The Korean conflict enlisted 43,434 of whom 37,654 went through Selective Service. Ninety-two percent of these persons enlisted voluntarily. These persons were under the rules and regulations, discipline, language, and procedures of the American Army. There is no need to specify the habits, attitudes, values, and cultural influences they were subjected to.

From the time the Universal Military Training and Service Act first went into effect and up to 1963, 350,702 Puerto Ricans have been registered with the Selective Service. Of these a total of 81,205 inductees have served their term in the service, and there were 7,625 on active duty as of the end of the year 1963. These considerable numbers of persons have been in direct conflict with and under the inevitable influence of the North American culture. The same influences affect the university students who enter the ROTC.

From 1940–41 to 1964–65, the yearly enrollment of university students of military and air sciences in the University of Puerto Rico ROTC totals 38,854. During the same period a total of 1,991 commissions were granted.

Besides these direct influences the civil population was also affected by the war efforts. The First World War brought about an intensification of the teaching of home economics, agricultural instruction, health programs, and extracurricular activities mainly centered around athletics. It is to be remembered that the first soldiers who arrived in Puerto Rico after the Spanish American War introduced many ideas on physical education, recreation and athletics in general. During the Second World War these same influences were intensified. Also during the First World War the schools participated in selling war savings and thrift stamps and liberty bonds. The Victory Boys and Junior Red Cross left a permanent impact in school extracurricular activities. Certainly civic activities, civic attitudes, community participation, fair play, and sense of cooperation are among the values which these movements impart in the school programs. On the other hand, these organizations, when misused and misrepresented, are considered as politically oriented Americanization agencies, more so when their directors do not even take pains to use the Spanish language in ceremonies, publications, signs, symbols, songs, rituals.

The educational repercussions of these wars may be judged by the number of laws approved by the Congress of the United States and extended to Puerto Rico by which thousands of veterans were able to pursue some type of education at any level of the educational system. During the period comprised from January 27, 1944, to January 31, 1965, a grand total of 15,373 veterans pursued training in institutions of higher learning (5,113 veterans of World War II and 9,869 of the Korean conflict plus 261 under the benefits of Public Law 87–815 and chapter 35); 70,804 pursued studies below college level; 1,372 received farm training and 2,639 on-the-job training. In all, 90,188 veterans improved their educational level.

> Up to January 1960 over 53,000 diplomas of elementary, intermediate and high school had been granted to veterans. Besides 6,000 certificates on trades were issued. To this must be added 14,000 general achievement tests and 15,000 classification tests. In 1947 only 4 percent of the veterans had one or more years of college education, while at the same time the academic preparation of 43 percent was one or more years of elementary school.[illegible]

The significance of these figures may be easily analyzed. The estimated distribution of enlisted insular personnel in the Armed Forces during World War II, by years of education, shows, for example that only 2,214 persons had some college education. These data show an increase to 15,373 or seven times the number of persons reported for World War II. There were 26,052 persons with education from 1 to 6 years of school. Although we do not have the facts by separate years of schooling after 1960, it is an outstanding fact that 70,804 veterans pursued studies below college level. Of significance is also the fact that 85,866 persons benefited by readjustment training and 2,681 on vocational rehabilitation. The amount of $336,151,296 spent in training allowance, tuition and supplies, and reporting allowance is an amount that certainly would have an impact in any educational enterprise.

POPULATION

School enrollment, provision of trained teachers, physical facilities, teaching aids and materials, lunchroom programs and their nutritional consequences, and student transportation, all are affected by the population explosion, by migration and the movement of people from the rural to the urban zone. In population matters we have generally, although endowed with reason and scientific knowledge of the facts, assumed the attitude of the ostrich that sticks its head in the sand so as not to see the problem. The increase in population will force us to keep running fast to stay in the same place socially, economically and educationally.[73]

1. *Population data and potential school enrollment.*[74]—Population projections for Puerto Rico are prepared on the basis of three factors, which, according to past experiences, have been the determinants of population changes in the island—fertility, mortality, and migration.

(*a*) On the basis of these factors the official population projection predicts that the total population of Puerto Rico will increase from 2,358,000 [75] inhabitants as of July 1, 1960, to 3,562,563 inhabitants by July 1, 1979. Population calculations prepared under the presumption of a net migration of zero persons (between 1960 and 1980) indicate the possibility that the total population of Puerto Rico by July 1979 might be 4,031,675 inhabitants and not the 3,562,563 which the official projection foretells. (See graph No. I.)

(*b*) According to the official population projection the school-age population for the elementary and secondary levels (6–18 years of age) will increase from 789,831 persons in 1960 to 1,103,884 persons in 1979; for the university level (ages 19–22) there will be an increase from 152,914 persons in 1960 to 225,426 in 1979. According to the other population projection (zero migration) these increases may be to 1,227,601 in the 6–18 years age group and to 284,262 persons in the 19–22 years age group in 1979. (See graph No. II.)

(*c*) Total enrollment from first to twelfth grade in public day schools and accredited private schools as projected by the Research Office of the Superior Educational Council, may be 1,042,363 students for the school year 1979–80, in contrast to the 1963–64 enrollment of 668,949 students. (See graph No. III.)

(*d*) The total enrollment estimate of 1,042,363 students which has been indicated for the school year 1979–80 implies that in that school year enrollment in public schools and accredited private schools of Puerto Rico may be equivalent to 94 percent of the 6- to 18-year-old population that, according to the official population projection, Puerto Rico will have by 1979. Total enrollment registered in the school year 1962–63 represented 83.2 percent of the 6- to 18-year-old population of Puerto Rico in that year.

(*e*) Projection CSE–E–6 (recommended to be adopted as the official goal for the elementary and secondary levels of the Puerto Rican school system) predicts that the enrollment in the elementary level (1st to 6th grades) will increase from 432,195 students registered for the school year 1962–63 to 628,328 students in the school year 1979–80; for the junior high school level (7th to 9th grade) it predicts an increase from 142,398 students in 1962–63 to 245,168 in 1979–80; and for the high school level (10th to 12th grade) it predicts an increase from 82,857 students in 1962–63 to 168,867 in 1979–80. (See graph No. IV.)

(*f*) In the school year 1962–63, there were enrolled in the 12th grade 25 students for every 100 that had enrolled in the 1st grade 11 years before (1951–52). Projection CSE–E–6 predicts that in the school year 1979–80 this figure will be 50.4 for every 100 students enrolled in the first grade 11 years before. Projection CSE–E–6 is the projection accepted officially in education planning.

(*g*) In 1947–48, a total of 6,550 students graduated from high school, both public day schools and accredited private schools; in 1954–55 this number increased to 10,054 students and in 1963–64 to 20,392 students. In the school year 1979–80, the number of 12th grade graduates may be 34,566 or 42,390 or 50,162, according to projections CSE–GES–2, 5 and 8, respectively, for 12th grade graduates. (See graph No. V.)

(*h*) On examining our population reality (population facts) in 1930, 1940, 1950, and 1960, we find that in 1930 the people had a shorter life span than in the subsequent decades. By 1965 life expectancy has increased considerably and the young population goes on increasing rapidly. When the school-age population is considered in proportion to the total population, it does not show sudden or great changes as times goes by. Nevertheless, when the number of school-age persons in the total population is considered, a continuous increase year after year in this number is noticed and the changes from one decade to the other are considerable. School population in the 6- to 18-years-of-age group (elementary and secondary levels) represents more or less a third of the total population and according to the official projection this proportion will continue being nearly the same in the next 5-year periods. Nevertheless, in terms of number of persons this population group will increase from 789,831 persons in 1960 to 1,103,884 in 1979.

The same thing happens with the 19- to 22-year-old population (university level). Its fluctuation in terms of proportion to the total population is not pronounced, but in absolute numbers it is predicted that it will increase from 152,914 persons in 1960 to 255,426 in 1979.

Total enrollment in public day schools and accredited private schools (grades 1 to 12) increased from 226,550 students in 1929–30 to 668,949 in 1963–64. The increase corresponding to public day schools was from 221,197 students to 606,608 and in the accredited private schools from 5,353 students to 62,341. According to enrollment predictions of Projection CSE–E–6 in the school year 1979–80, the total enrollment in these schools will be 1,042,363 students—946,466 in public day schools and 95,897 in accredited private schools. (See graph No. VI.)

(*i*) The first year enrollment in public and accredited private university level institutions in Puerto Rico increased from 3,425 students in 1950–51 to 9,915 students in 1964–65. It is predicted that this enrollment may go up to 17,873 students (Projection CSE–UI–5), 22,355 (Projection CSE–UI–12) or 27,021 (Projection CSE–UI–27) in the school year 1979–80. (See graph No. VII.)

(*j*) Total enrollment at university level increased from 1,871 students in the school year 1929–30 to 36,834 students in the school year 1964–65. It is predicted that the total enrollment at university level may be 66,196 students (Projection CSE–UT–15), 82,796 (Projection CSE–UT–27) or 100,078 (Projection CSE–UT–54) in the school year 1979–80 according to the minimum, intermediate, and maximum projections. (See graph No. VIII.)

(*k*) Enrollment coefficient at university level (relation between total enrollment and the number of persons of ages 19 to 22 years old) increased from 7.73 percent in 1949–50 to 19.26 percent in 1962–63. The three projections of university enrollment indicated before for the school year 1979–80, imply that in that year the total enrollment in university level institutions may be equivalent to 25.92 percent (Projection CSE–UT–15), to 32.41 percent (Projection CSE–UT–27) or to 39.18 percent (Projection CSE–UT–54) of the 19- to 22-year-old population that Puerto Rico will have by 1979 according to the official population projection.

(*l*) In 1949–50, 1,214 bachelor's degrees were granted by public and accredited private university-level institutions of Puerto Rico; in 1954–55 this number increased to 1,463 bachelor's degrees, in 1959–60 to 2,152 and in 1962–63 to 2,676. In the school year 1979–80 the number of bachelor's degrees that these institutions may grant will be 6,355 or 7,948 or 9,608 according to Projections CSE–GU–2, 5 and 8, respectively, for bachelor degree graduates. (See graph No. IX.)

(*m*) Total enrollment in public and accredited private university-level institutions increased from 1,010 students in the school year 1919–20 to 36,834 in 1964–65. The increase corresponding to the public sector (University of Puerto Rico) was from 744 students in 1919–20 to 24,025 in 1964–65 and that for the accredited private universities from 405 students to 12,025. According to the enrollment predicted by Projection CSE–UT–27 (whose adoption is recommended as official goal for the university level of the Puerto Rican school system), in the school year 1979–80 total enrollment for the university level will be 82,796 students—64,581 students in the public sector (University of Puerto Rico) and 18,215 in the accredited private universities. (See graph No. X.)

(*n*) In the school year 1962–63 accredited private schools and public day schools jointly enrolled in their kindergartens a total of 7,112 students. This figure is equivalent to 10.8 percent of the 5-year-old children in the population of Puerto Rico as of July 1, 1962.

(*o*) Kindergarten enrollment projections predict that for the school year 1979–80 the number of children for whom accommodations may have to be provided might go up to 36,362 (Projection CSE–K–1), 45,077 (Projection CSE–K–2) or 58,099 (Projection CSE–K–3). (See graph No. XI.) These enrollment predictions for the school year 1979–80 would be equivalent to 36.3 percent, 45.0 percent, and 58.0 percent, respectively, of the number of 5-year-old children there will be in the population by July 1, 1979, according to the official population projection.

(*p*) Of the 7,112 children who were enrolled in kindergartens in the school year 1962–63, a total of 1,586 were enrolled in the public schools and 5,526 in accredited private schools. According to the projections, in the school year 1979–80 enrollment in public kindergartens might vary from a minimum of 23,344 students to a maximum of 51,946, and in kindergartens of accredited private schools enrollment might vary from a minimum of 7,053 students to a maximum of 13,018 students.

(*q*) The additional number of teachers the educational system will need between 1965 and 1980 at the elementary and secondary levels to take care of the enrollment increases predicted would be 11,444 or 9,901 according to the two suppositions on which calculations are based (35 students per teacher in the elementary level and 30 in the secondary in the first case or 40 in the elementary and 35 in the secondary in the second case). The assumption that these jobs will be filled presupposes that 100 percent of the graduates enter the teaching professions. Actually not more than 80 percent of those persons with normal degree and about 60 percent of those with a bachelor's degree enter the teaching profession. We are not taking into this consideration those who would have to be prepared to substitute for the persons who leave school because of illness, retirement, or the attraction of other jobs. Teachers are not prepared in 1 day.

(*r*) The additional number of teachers the university level will need between 1965 and 1980 to take care of the increase in enrollment according to Projection CSE–UT–27 may be 4,122 or 3,299 according to the two suppositions upon which calculations are based (12 and 15 students per teacher).

2. *Migration.*—The problems posed by emigration cannot be more objectively analyzed than by the reports and papers presented by Drs. José L. Janer and José L. Vázquez. Both are outstanding demographers. It is enlightening to read about their views which are devoid of accommodation to political or religious considerations.

> Although net emigration has shown a distinctly declining tendency during the last three fiscal years, the net emigration of native born Puerto Ricans has continued to increase throughout the same period according to the officially recorded migration statistics. This apparent paradox is explained by an increase in the net immigration of persons born outside Puerto Rico. In 1960–61 (the only year for which the necessary data are available) over 71 percent of these non-native immigrants were of non-Puerto Rican ancestry. [See table of Composition of Immigration, *1963 Economic Report to the Governor*, p. 113.]
>
> Although it is perhaps too early to estimate what the true consequences of such a population displacement process may eventually be, if its intensity is maintained in the future, it would be well to keep a close watch on its evolution, because in the long run it may happen, that whatever achievement statistics the Island may be able to wave throughout the world as evidence of her success in her fight against poverty and socioeconomic stagnation may not be truly representative of changes in the Puerto Ricans' situation, unless all the thousands of Puerto Ricans "voluntarily" exiled in the slums of New York, Chicago and other mainland cities be taken into account. [See the tables included.]

Composition of immigration

[Periods indicated from April to April]

	1955–60		1960–63		1962–63	
	Total	Percent	Total	Percent	Total	Percent
Total	77,328	100.0	85,800	100.0	40,200	100.0
Born in Puerto Rico and born abroad of Puerto Rican descent	47,785	61.8	63,800	74.4	33,000	82.1
Born in United States of non-Puerto Rican origin	26,111	33.8	8,700	10.1	4,900	12.2
Foreign born of non-Puerto Rican origin	3,432	4.4	13,300	15.5	2,300	5.7

Annual rates of immigration to Puerto Rico

[From April to April]

	1955-60	1960-63	1962-63
Total	15,500	28,600	40,200
Born in Puerto Rioo and born abroad of Puerto Rican descent	9,600	21,300	33,000
Born in Puerto Rico	7,200	16,200	26,000
Born abroad of Puerto Rican descent	2,400	5,000	7,000
Born in the United States of non-Puerto Rican descent	5,200	2,900	4,900
Foreign born of non-Puerto Rican descent	700	4,400	2,300

It is highly possible that the present political situation in some areas of the Caribbean may have had much to do with these rapid increments in immigration of non-native population, according to recent reports on the subject. But, continental Americans are also coming in relatively great numbers to the Island as technicians, skilled operatives, and businessmen. Some evidence of this current is obtained from a comparison of the 1950 and 1960 censuses. Apparently then, what has been happening during the last years has been an exchange of population on the Island and not a radical decline in emigration of native Puerto Ricans as one might infer from a superficial glance at the net balance figures.

Puerto Rican emigration, in contrast with previous overseas movements, is a two way current. Net migration, the difference between arrivals and departures, is a very small fraction of the total gross movement (arrivals plus departures). While in 1960 the total gross movement amounted to 1,339,000 persons, net emigration was only 16,000 (1.2 percent of the total gross figure). It must be remembered that there is considerable evidence that Puerto Ricans do not consider themselves permanent emigrants. They go to the United States with the hope of making some money and then coming back to buy a farm, a house, or small business enterprise and spend the rest of their lives here. They also tend to come back after retirement or when jobs opportunities are limited by age. This well known fact should move those who want to keep on pushing people off their Island to a reevaluation of their present policies under the guidance of a more humanistic socio-economic philosophy.[78]

Net out-migration: Puerto Rico

Fiscal year	*Net out-migration (Number of persons)*	*Fiscal year*	*Net out-migration (Number of persons)*
1939–40	1, 008	1952–53	74, 603
1940–41	500	1953–54	44, 209
1941–42	928	1954–55	31, 182
1942–43	2, 601	1955–56	61, 647
1943–44	8, 088	1956–57	48, 284
1944–45	11, 003	1957–58	25, 956
1945–46	24, 621	1958–59	37, 212
1946–47	35, 144	1959–60	23, 742
1947–48	28, 031	1960–61	13, 762
1948–49	33, 086	1961–62	11, 363
1949–50	34, 155	1962–63	4, 798
1950–51	41, 920	1963–64	4, 366
1951–52	61, 658		

Source of information: Negociado de Análisis Económico y Social, Junta de Planificación, "Informe Económico al Gobernador, 1964," p. 156.

TABLE A.—*Persons of Puerto Rican origin in coterminous United States and New York City: 1910 to 1960*

Nativity and year	United States		New York City	
	Total number	Percent of increase	Number	Percent of total
Puerto Rican birth:				
1960	615,384	172.2	429,710	69.8
1950	226,110	223.2	187,420	82.9
1940	69,967	32.6	61,463	87.8
1930	52,774	346.8	(1)	----------
1920	11,811	680.6	7,364	62.3
1910	1,513	----------	554	36.6
Puerto Rican parentage:[2]				
1960	272,278	261.8	182,864	67.2
1950	75,265	----------	58,460	77.7

[1] Not available.
[2] Born in the United States.

Source of information: U.S. census of population 1960, Puerto Ricans in the United States, final report PC(2)-ID, p. viii.

TABLE B.—*Characteristics of Puerto Ricans in the United States and in Puerto Rico: 1960*

Item	Total	United States		Puerto Rico
		Puerto Rican birth	Puerto Rican parentage[1]	
Total population:				
Males/100 females	100.0	99.3	101.8	98.0
Median age	21.4	27.9	5.9	18.4
Persons 14 years old and over:				
Median years of schooling completed:				
Male	8.4	8.2	10.3	6.1
Female	8.2	8.0	10.8	5.6
Percent in labor force:				
Male	79.6	80.6	70.2	65.7
Female	36.3	36.3	36.0	20.0
Median income	$2,533	$2,513	$2,868	$819
Percent single:				
Male	31.1	29.1	48.8	37.4
Female	21.9	20.1	39.2	28.6
Percent widowed or divorced:				
Male	3.0	3.1	2.5	4.2
Female	10.6	11.1	5.1	12.5
Percent enrolled in schools:				
Persons 5 to 24 years old	59.8	50.8	77.5	55.4
Persons 16 and 17 years old	61.2	58.0	74.9	47.1

[1] Born in the United States.

Source of information: U.S. census of population 1960, Puerto Ricans in the United States, final report PC(2)-ID, p. viii.

* * * our fellow countrymen have had to compete in the past and will have to compete in the future not with the 70 million persons who make up the labor force of the United States, but with the group of "non-skilled" and "semi-skilled" laborers of two cities, New York and Chicago. It is precisely at these places that unemployment is really critical in the United States. At present, 80 percent of the total of unemployed persons are within the category of non-skilled and semi-skilled workers. This, of course, is attributed in part to the radical growth of the group of unexperienced persons who are looking for their first job. This is due to a great extent also to the recent tendency towards automation in the American industry. There should be no doubt that on considering the supply in

Total number of persons of Puerto Rican birth and parentage by sex, for the United States and selected States, and median years of school completed by persons of this group of 14 years and over: 1960

Item	Puerto Rican birth and parentage	Puerto Rican birth	Puerto Rican parentage	Median years of school completed by persons of 14 years and over		
				Puerto Rican birth and parentage	Puerto Rican birth	Puerto Rican parentage
Total	892,513	617,056	275,457	----------	----------	----------
Male	446,361	307,408	138,953	8.4	8.2	10.3
Female	446,152	309,648	136,504	8.2	8.0	10.8
California (total)	(28,108)	(15,479)	(12,629)	----------	----------	----------
Male	14,451	7,077	6,474	9.1	8.7	10.1
Female	13,657	7,502	6,155	9.2	8.8	10.2
Illinois (total)	(36,081)	(25,843)	(10,238)	----------	----------	----------
Male	19,126	13,893	5,233	8.0	7.9	8.8
Female	16,955	11,950	5,005	7.3	7.1	9.3
New Jersey (total)	(55,351)	(39,779)	(15,572)	----------	----------	----------
Male	29,002	21,030	7,972	7.9	7.7	10.1
Female	26,349	18,749	7,600	7.7	7.4	11.2
New York (total)	(642,622)	(448,585)	(194,037)	----------	----------	----------
Male	313,202	215,795	97,407	8.4	8.2	10.[illegible]
Female	329,420	232,790	96,630	8.2	8.0	[illegible]

Source of information: U.S. census of population 1960, Puerto Ricans in the United States, final report PC(2)-ID, pp. 2-11, table 1, and pp. 12-17, table 2.

Persons of Puerto Rican birth and parentage, by State: 1960

State	Total	Puerto Rican Birth	Puerto Rican Parentage
Alabama	663	409	254
Alaska	562	475	87
Arizona	1,008	484	524
Arkansas	207	137	70
California	28,108	15,479	12,629
Colorado	844	471	373
Connecticut	15,247	11,192	4,075
Delaware	773	533	240
District of Columbia	1,373	1,001	372
Florida	19,535	14,245	5,290
Georgia	2,334	1,737	597
Hawaii	4,289	1,197	3,092
Idaho	60	36	24
Illinois	36,081	25,843	10,238
Indiana	7,218	4,781	2,437
Iowa	226	131	95
Kansas	1,136	829	307
Kentucky	1,376	1,130	246
Louisiana	1,935	1,204	731
Maine	403	249	154
Maryland	3,229	1,904	1,325
Massachusetts	5,217	3,454	1,763
Michigan	3,806	2,175	1,631
Minnesota	387	176	211
Mississippi	301	192	109
Missouri	940	571	369
Montana	53	41	12
Nebraska	333	235	98
Nevada	179	87	92
New Hampshire	212	147	65
New Jersey	55,351	39,779	15,572
New Mexico	433	248	184
New York	642,622	448,585	194,037
North Carolina	1,866	1,300	566
North Dakota	68	36	32
Ohio	13,940	9,227	4,713
Oklahoma	1,398	934	464
Oregon	233	117	116
Pennsylvania	21,206	14,659	6,547
Rhode Island	447	305	142
South Carolina	1,114	847	267
South Dakota	124	55	69
Tennessee	499	325	174
Texas	6,050	3,869	2,181
Utah	473	193	280
Vermont	108	61	47
Virginia	2,971	2,031	940
Washington	1,738	1,280	458
West Virginia	252	106	146
Wisconsin	3,574	2,552	1,022
Wyoming	50	30	20

Source of information: U.S. census of population 1960, Puerto Ricans in the United States, final report PC(2)-ID, pp. 103-104, table 15.

the labor market of the United States, North Americans will be preferred, simply because of their superiority in terms of language, education and occupational dexterity.

Mass migration, and for an indefinite time, is an expensive solution to the population problem. Puerto Rico, up to the present, has been preparing its people, paying for their breeding, education and training, only to see how a good part of them go away to produce in another place. The only economic profit we have had in relation to the people who migrate, is that we have had less mouths to feed and occasional remittance of money to relatives or friends. In terms of averages, migration is taking away the best educated people; the average of school years completed by the migrant group was more than 8 in 1960, compared to 4½ for the resident population.

At the same time migration is fattening itself from the age groups where economic production is greatest. During the decade 1950–1960 seventy percent of the migrants were persons 15–39 years old. For the reason that it has been taking away more "arms" than "mouths", migration has resulted in an increase in the load of dependency. If we define dependents as persons below 20 years of age and those 65 and over, we find that between 1940 and 1960 there has been a great increase in dependency. In 1940, for every 100 persons in the work ages (20–64 years old) there were 122 dependents (as defined before). By 1950 this ratio had already increased to 133 and in 1960 it went up to 140. If we define dependents as those persons who do not have an employment, either because they are unemployed or because they do not fall within the working group, we find the same ascending tendency. In 1940 for each employed person there were 2.5 unemployed persons. In 1950 this figure went up to 3.0 and in 1960 we find that for each employed person there were 3.3 unemployed persons.

It seems obvious that mass migration, in the long run, even when it represents an alleviation to the population pressure, will be an ineffective, costly solution from the economic point of view."[77]

* * * Some will allege that nobody is pushed or obliged, that migration is a voluntary act. Mass migration may be a "free" movement, but not a "voluntary" one. Free, because it is true that nobody is obliged to leave his country, but it is not voluntary because the great majority of the people who migrate do it against their best wishes and volition. Masses are pushed to migrate by political conditions—as is the case of Cuba; or socioeconomic conditions, as is the case of Puerto Rico, and not by the spirit of adventure."[78]

All these and many other aspects of the industrialization and migration experience in Puerto Rico should serve to clearly establish the fact that any definite solution to the problem that a rapid population growth due to a high rate of natural increase may represent in any densely populated area must necessarily be based on measures inequivocally leading to lower fertility rates and patterns of reproductive behavior dominated by deeply rooted attitudes of parental responsibility. This, and absolutely no other, will ever constitute the one and only basis for the definite solution of population problems anywhere. Economic opportunism by itself, apart from the issue of its questionable morality will never be the answer to such problems and at most all it can do is to allow some generations to evade their responsibilities with respect to their solution by safely transferring them to the generations to come.

After all, one should never forget that the basic unit in any human society is the family. Overpopulation problems at the national level must, therefore, always be considered as the cumulative result of overpopulation problems at the individual family level. And the existence of too many overpopulated individual families in any given society should always be seen as a very clear indictment of both, prevailing attitudes of parental irresponsibility, and governmental indifference towards the prevalence of the favourable parent-child relationships so necessary to maintain, at the highest possible levels, the probability that every live birth in the community will enjoy reasonable opportunities of becoming

> an asset to it through adequate upbringing. It follows from this, that no truly democratic government can for long maintain an attitude of indifference towards the increasing needs of its citizens to receive the advice and facilities that may free them from the fear of overpopulation without seriously impairing the very basis of democratic life. This should be so, not only in underdeveloped and overpopulated countries, but in every one, for even in the most highly developed and less densely populated nations, individual families, badly in need of such help, may be found.[79]

ADDITIONAL COMMENTS

To this constant migration of Puerto Ricans, a phenomenon which affects values, habits, attitudes and old entrenched mores and taboos, as well as economics, we must add the fact that the industrialization programs, the easy means of transportation, and the shrinking of distances have rapidly increased the number of North Americans who come to live in Puerto Rico or who periodically visit the island on business. The 1960 census reports that 50,000 North Americans live in Puerto Rico. During 1963–64, a total of 1,072,037 passengers entered Puerto Rico and 1,076,403 left the island. The important aspect of this movement of persons is not the difference between those leaving and those entering the island. Those going out are affected by cultural influences in a very direct and potent way. Those coming in exert also strong cultural influences on our population. The influence of the sheer numbers, aside from the impact and force which their economic power exerts, is something to think about. When the educational and cultural forces at work were limited just to a conflict of cultures, the Spanish culture, language, and heritage did not have, really, much to worry about. Although some claim that all the Americanization schemes tried through the school system have failed, it must be said frankly that the cumulative influences of all those schemes in the long run have weakened our cultural patterns, our personality make up, our habits and attitudes in ways not yet clearly discerned. It is equally true that some new values, ideals and attitudes have enriched our lives.

In a recent study by Mr. and Mrs. Bourne the conflict of cultures is discussed.

> Puerto Rico exhibits an essentially nationalistic position in its desire for self-government and in its pride and conscious devotion to its own cultural patterns. But, Puerto Rico is part of the Untied States, not only politically, not only through financial and economic ties, but also because of the impact of United States culture on the culture of Puerto Rico. This is reflected not only in practical involvement in interests outside its own boundaries but in a complex cultural pattern. This impact is sometimes clearly recognized, accepted and internalized, sometimes felt and unconsciously accepted, sometimes rejected politically and intellectually, but always present.[80]

When this clash of cultures took place earlier in the insularism we lived in, when we lacked outside contacts, quick communication, English radio and television programs, English newspapers, magazines, phonograph records, motion pictures, and books (except for the few who could afford such luxuries) the clash of cultures could have continued to "the millennium" without the Puerto Ricans losing much ground. But when all the above-mentioned forces of one of the cultures not only exist but are further strengthened by the economic ramifications of industries, movies, radio, and television stations, chain stores, the movement of hundreds of thousands of tourists, dozens of night clubs whose shows are mostly in English, buy thousands of English records (Beatles and all), the imitation of teenage rhythms and dances, garments, costumes, symbols, and behavior about which all the means of communication give account, the struggle begins to be one of gradual but sure weakening of the Puerto Rican culture. This happens irrespective of the fact that all cultures are being affected by other cultures in this shrinking world of ours. Instead of the romantic attachment to a pattern of thinking which idealizes a pure culture around which we need to throw an immunizing Iron Curtain, we should take pains to identify and strengthen what is worth keeping of our culture, traditions, habits, and values and to reason out why these should be worth fighting for. To what is new we should apply the same criteria of excellence, of usefulness, of capacity for enrichment of what we realistically hold as worth preserving. Otherwise it will be a struggle of frustrations, ambivalence and rationalization which will keep us arguing emotionally for decades to come. The transformation in cultural patterns, the changing of habits and behavior will take place to some extent, anyway, irrespective of final political solutions. The Puerto Ricans would do well to help guide the healthy changes and not be pushed by them.

The school system needs to develop an adequate philosophy of education which will do something positive to strengthen all that is of value in our culture, accept from other cultures what enriches ours, and develop procedures of analysis and understanding of these cultural transformations, or as sociologists say, processes of transculturation. The contact with other cultures and different languages, under a well-guided and soundly motivated and planned program, inevitably will have an enriching influence on our culture, which is to say, on our lives. The drifting attitude assumed by the government on matters of values, culture, and personality structures, and the lack of a sound, clear and understandable philosophy of education, not only of the formal school system but of education in general, the ambivalence and insecurity which permeates all our expressions, and the defensive attitudes and aggressiveness which we witness in every day human relations, will continue to plague us unless a policy of orientation and direction is well programed and executed within the framework of democratic procedures, principles and institutions.

The Bournes, in their "Study of Thirty Years of Change in Ten Selected Areas of Rural Puerto Rico," wrestle with this problem.

> The attitudes we find are clear and cogent illustrations of the gap which exists between Operation Bootsrap and Operation Serenidad, to enjoy the convenience of running water, to have health and vitality, to see the possibility of better jobs, to have a road to the nearest town—all these for most people are easy to accept. To understand that these very things bring with them problems of modern life, the discovery that values of the past are often inapplicable to the present, is a painful difficulty for adults, a problem for the social psychologist as well as the sociologist and anthropologist. For the young people who face the situation of the present without the perspective which memory of the past brings may seem a more simple matter, but it is in fact more complex. The past is theirs too, in history, tradition and in their relationship to their parents; they must live in the present and for the future; because they cannot go back, even in memory; they must somehow deal with things as they are; they must assimilate the meaning of the past from which the present comes.[81]

[This is why, an effective, well-planned, and exceptionally well-executed program of cultural clarification and reinforcement is being put into action by the Institute of Culture.]

I state at this time that the population explosion, explained only in statistical terms, does not reveal the magnitude of the task we are facing now and which we will have to face in the next decades. The violent changes that occur in society make the knowledge acquired yesterday obsolete. With respect to this, anthropologist Margaret Mead says:

> Within the lifetime of ten-year-olds the world has entered a new age, and already, before they enter the sixth grade, the atomic age has been followed by the age of the hydrogen bomb * * * Teachers who never heard a radio until they were grown up have to cope with children who have never known a world without television. Teachers who struggled in their childhood with buttonhooks find it difficult to describe a buttonhook to a child bred up among zippers * * * From the most all-embracing world image to the smallest detail of daily life, the world has changed at a rate which makes the five-year-old generations further apart than world generations or even scores of generations were in our recent past than people separated by several centuries were in the remote past. The children whom we bear and rear and teach are not only unknown to us and unlike any children there have been in the world before; but also their degree of unlikeness itself alters from year to year.[82]

It would be convenient to ask not how many teachers take additional and required courses in methodology, but what is being done to prepare teachers in large numbers so they can prepare themselves and enhance their teaching to face properly the rapid and violent changes we are continuously witnessing. It is being affirmed at this moment that the problem does not consist in preparing teachers so they teach what we know, but in how we are going to prepare them to teach what we do not know. In other words, "the central mission of elementary, secondary, and higher education must become, then, not teaching youth what they need to know, but teaching them how to learn what is not yet known." [83]

Implications of a philosophical and sociological type lead us to ask ourselves whether we should be content to continue planning in all respects in order to have more of what we have today, that is, to go on producing the same type of society, with the same conditions, with the same characteristics we now have; or whether we should plan instead for a society the profile of whose image will have to be traced on the basis of the positive changes we want effected in our present society. We will have to form that new image much more on the basis of investment in people than on investment of capital or accumulation of savings in the banks, though we recognize that is needed but far from sufficient.

It is worthwhile to quote John Kenneth Galbraith on this problem. He reminds us of the fact that "technological change is the result not of amassing capital; it is the work of human beings. An increasingly, of course, it is the result of a deliberate and purposeful investment in human beings." [84]

In other words, in an economy which is expanding, the human capital, measured in terms of the skills and education offered and that the people possess, is the principal factor which makes it possible to attain a rate of ascending growth, not only in material aspects, but also in those values and principles of living together which, after all, constitute the reason for existence of every human being and every civilized community.

CHANGES FROM AN AGRARIAN TO AN INDUSTRIAL ECONOMY

Puerto Rican society during the Spanish regime centered around agricultural activities. It was a predominantly static society. The elite, composed of landowners, prosperous merchants, high ranking bureaucrats, the ecclesiastical hierarchy, the professional groups, and the military, controlled and influenced life in the colony. The masses of the population were composed of laborers, dispossessed agricultural workers, and skilled and unskilled workers. Mobility was difficult within this stratified society. Wealth was poorly distributed. Education was the privilege of the few who could afford to send their children to foreign universities, mainly to Europe.

With the establishment of the universal, free, and compulsory system of education, egalitarian, and open to men and women alike; with the establishment of cultural and economic relationship with the United States; with the establishment of political parties which gradually evolved free, democratic, electoral processes; and with the industrialization of the island, the school system as well as all the other educational agencies have felt the impact of the influences generated by these changes.

The system of free enterprise, American pragmatism, feminist movements, the freedom of teenagers and adolescents, the love of comfort,[85] the emphasis on the value of time and money, and the liberal conception of sexual relations are influences to be reckoned with.

Since 1954–55, income produced by industrialization has surpassed agricultural income. This, in turn, has accelerated rural migration to urban centers. A new, vigorous, economically strong middle class is on the increase.

> Industrialization, urbanism, technology, transculturation, expansion of organized educational facilities and the increase of family income, have created during this century new problems of living.[86]

Other problems such as weakening of family ties, an increased rate of divorce, increase in juvenile delinquency, illegitimacy, and school dropouts, are significant factors which are affecting the tasks and programs of the school system in Puerto Rico and of education in general. If we add to these aspects the impact of the economic factors on our cultural ways, the influences exerted by advertisement and public relation agencies on the way of thinking and acting of the population and by the new ways introduced by chain stores, supermarkets, industrial complexes, easy communication, and radio and television; we may come close to realizing the challenges that education has faced and is bound to face increasingly in the future. These changes have affected and will continue to affect the curriculum, the administrative organization, the offerings, the training of teachers, the materials of instruction, and the physical facilities of the school system. Above all, values and philosophy, already in a state of ambivalence, will have to be reexamined squarely.

> On education—and here we use education in its broadest sense—lies the burden of interpretation, the painful responsibility of bringing to all Puerto Ricans an understanding of the problems they face and, if Operation Serenidad is to become a reality, the conscious facing of those problems. Conflict must be brought into the open and must move toward some new consensus.[87]

LITERACY AND ADULT EDUCATION

Literacy.—In the year 1890 in Puerto Rico, 79.6 percent of the population was illiterate. This figure was reduced only 1.2 percent during the next decade; that is, by 1900 there were still 78.4 percent illiterate. From there on the percentage of illiterates has been reduced by 11 percent every 10 years, except for the decade 1940–50. According to the census of 1950 there were still 25 persons out of every 100 (24.7 percent) who could not read or write.

The average education for persons 5 to 24 years old in Puerto Rico was 3.1 years according to the 1950 census figures. The average schooling of those 25 years old and over was 3.7 years. For the same year we had 1,526,154 persons 10 years of age or older. Of these, 362,058 were illiterates and 364,008 had from 1 to 3 years of schooling.

It should be remembered that due mainly to the economic situation prevalent in Puerto Rico before 1940 only about half of the school age population was in school, dropout rates and school failures were high. Many persons had barely a first or second grade education since a large number of the schools available were organized under the double enrollment or interlocking schemes. As the economic conditions improved there was need to open educational facilities for those who in their childhood did not have them or were forced too soon to leave school. There were in existence a few programs for adult education, but new ones were started opening new avenues of learning to adults. Other programs which increased the educational level of the adult population were sponsored and paid for by the different laws relative to veterans of wars.

The industrialization program, the mechanization of agriculture, the increase and complexity of commercial practices, and the rapid social changes which began to alter things as they were, led the government to approve and develop a literacy program that would open new educational opportunities for those who had been unable to profit by the regular day school. In May 1953 the legislature of Puerto Rico approved such a program.

Between 1953–54 and 1958–59, this literacy program enrolled 202,459 adults in the rural and urban zones of the island. Illiteracy was reduced to 16.6 percent by 1960. Illiteracy may be now (1965) if our estimates prove correct, around 13 percent.

At the same time that the literacy program was launched, it was necessary to reorganize the adult education program in the elementary, intermediate, and high school levels.

Elementary education for adults.—From the year 1953–54 to 1963–64 the cumulative enrollment in this program has been 304,801 persons. Out of these, 126,340 were from the urban zone and 178,461 from the rural. The average holding power for the last 10 years has been 71.1 percent. The number of sixth grade diplomas granted has been 14,733. The average age of adults enrolled in the elementary schools fluctuates between 24 and 25 years of age.

Secondary schools for adults.—In secondary schools for adults a notable increase has also been witnessed. In 1955–56 the program enrolled 12,062 students; 6,699 in grades 10 to 12 and 5,363 in grades 7 to 9. By 1964–65 enrollment increased to 19,589. The intermediate school enrolled 7,631 students and the high schools, 11,958. There has been an average increase of 760 students per year for the last 10 years. The cumulative enrollment in secondary schools from 1955–56 to 1964–65 has been 128,342. During the last 9 years the secondary school program has issued 12,523 ninth-grade diplomas and 12,428 high school diplomas. During 1964–65 some 1,400 intermediate and 2,500 high school diplomas will be granted. The average age of these students is 19+ for intermediate school and 21+ for high.

English program for adults.—The English program for adults has enrolled 105,169 students from 1953–54 to 1963–64. In the rural zone 67,086 were enrolled and in the urban 38,083.

English program by television.—The English program by television enrolls an average of 3,500 students per year. It has been in operation for the last 5 years.

English program for agricultural laborers in the United States.—There is also an English program for adults which functions in the United States, especially in laborers' camps. It has an enrollment of 2,000 and has enrolled some 10,000 adults during the last few years.

Reading program by television.—There is a reading program through television for new literates. It enrolls 399 persons.

Extension service and free examination.—The division of extension of the Department of Education has an enrollment of 12,922 in the 12th grade and 2,282 in the 9th grade. It has also given placement tests to 8,921 ninth graders and to 3,296 sixth graders. It has offered free examinations to 16,126 students of whom 4,978 got their certificates.

Library services.—Library services have had a significant increase in Puerto Rico in the last years. Eight bookmobilies carry books to 257 communities. These bookmobiles during 1963–64 loaned a total of 500,594 books. There are 33 libraries in public housing projects. There are 291 mobile libraries that are sent to rural communities. There are 115 school libraries administered by the library services. Law 86 of 1955 (as amended) provides $4 for each dollar assigned by the municipalities for public libraries. Eleven municipalities have already taken advantage of this plan. Over 1 million persons are served by these library services and more than half a million books are in use.

COMMUNITY EDUCATION PROGRAM IN PUERTO RICO

The division of community education, an agency of the Department of Education, was created in 1949 by Act No. 372 of May 1949. As stated in the preamble of the law that created the division:

The goal of community education is to impart basic teaching on the nature of man, his history, his life, his way of working and of self-governing in the world and in Puerto Rico. Such teaching, addressed to the citizens meeting in rural and urban communities, will be imparted through motion pictures, radio, books, pamphlets, posters and group discussion. The object is to provide the good hand of our popular culture with the tool of basic education.

In practice this will mean giving to the community the wish, the tendency and the way of making use of its own aptitudes for the solution of many of its own problems of health, education, cooperation, and social life through the action of the community itself.

The community should not be civically unemployed. The community can be constantly and usefully employed in its own service, in terms of pride and satisfaction for the members thereof.

Goals of a community education program.—The accomplishment of these aims is the principal task of the division of community education. They are as follows:

1. To help the families of a community through a living experience to have faith in themselves and in their neighbors.
2. To help them understand that through their own efforts and contributions they can create a dynamic community.
3. To awaken them to the realization that the right to participate and the right to decide what is "good" for their community is theirs.
4. To orient them in developing the processes of group discussion in meetings where democratic participation is guaranteed.
5. To help them develop the habit of scientific examination of their problems by seeking the best technical knowledge available.
6. To help them when solving a problem to mobilize democratically all material resources from within the community before looking elsewhere.
7. To help them discover the strength and satisfaction that comes through the concerted action of all, based on sound planning arrived at in open discussion.
8. To help them realize that common action such as that described above is the only base upon which active and responsible leadership can develop, and that the right to select this leadership is theirs and theirs alone.
9. To help them understand that it is ordained by the nature of growth that progress, as a result of common action, causes new needs which require greater efforts.

Administrative organization of the program of community education.—The community education program has a director, a field and training section, with supervisors and group leaders. It also has three other sections: Analysis, administrative and production. This last one is in charge of cinema, graphics, and editorial work.

The field and training section is in charge of the selection, training, and supervision of personnel to work directly with the program in the community.

The analysis section provides information that aids in the development of the program. This section is responsible for the evaluation of the program in terms of its basic objectives.

The group leaders.—The field work of the division is carried on by group organizers. One of their jobs is helping the neighbors understand that the solution of their problems is a responsibility of the entire citizenship working together democratically.

For this purpose community meetings are held regularly. At these meetings neighbors listen to the opinions of others stated freely; they learn to speak without bias; they plan together. Agreements are reached through a consensus following the discussions. The decisions must come from within the group. Technical knowledge upon which to base the decision is given before the decision is made.

The group organizer acts as a group discussion leader, not as a leader of the community.

During the school year 1964–65, the division had 65 group organizers and 10 supervisors. Each group leader was in charge of eight communities. (A community is composed of six families.)

At the present time the group organizers work in the rural area only. However the division has been studying for some time projects for the urban zone.

VOCATIONAL EDUCATION

Prior to 1920 there was not a vocational education program on the island, although vocational subjects—manual training, home economics and agriculture—were taught as special subjects. In 1931, with the extension of the Federal vocational legislation to Puerto Rico, vocational education was organized as such and pursued in accordance with the philosophy and the standards required by Federal legislation.

The vocational education program is administered by the Commonwealth board for vocational education. This board is composed of the Secretary of Education, the Secretary of Agriculture, the Secretary of Commerce, the Secretary of Labor, the director of agricultural extension services, the administrator of the economic development administration and three other members who are appointed by the Governor. The Secretary of Education is the president of the board. The board is responsible for the administration, supervision, and development of vocational and technical education in the island.

The vocational education program offers courses in industrial arts and home economics which are considered part of the program of general education, courses in agriculture, business education, distributive education, arts and trades, and human resources. It is now beginning courses in hotel personnel in the hotel school. All these courses are offered to prepare students for an occupation. It also offers counseling in high school, both for students in the general courses and for those in vocational courses.

The program also provides many courses for adults, often through extension service programs for employed persons, in such areas as the following: Practical nursing, technical information (in cooperation with the Department of Labor), fishing techniques, arts and trades (in cooperation with the economic development administration), trades to develop human resources (with the cooperation of the Department of Labor), preparation of waitresses, porters, and cooks.

To comply with the demands of the industrialization program for skilled and semiskilled workers and with the trend to mechanize agriculture the program has offered new courses and training opportunities. Training is offered to young and adult farmers in driving, operating, and maintaining mechanized agricultural equipment. Courses for cashiers and food packers have been given. A technological institute was established to prepare personnel for laboratories, research centers and industries where work of a technical nature is done. Courses in electronics technology, mechanical technology, air conditioning technology, and civil technology have been offered at this institute.

One can get an idea of the extent of this program by looking at the enrollment figures in vocational courses in 1963–64. In the day program in schools of trade and industries, 7,307 students were enrolled. A total of 11,508 pupils took courses in business education in the senior high schools. Adults took advantage of vocational education courses: 3,448 enrolled in special vocational training courses, 3,298 in agriculture, 4,216 in home economics, 3,194 in distributive education and 36 in industrial arts.

The financial resources available for this program in the last 5 school years were as follows:

Year	*Resources*
1960–61	$5,051,419
1961–62	5,632,588
1962–63	6,448,066
1963–64	7,824,238
1964–65	10,118,555

The following percentages of the total resources available for this program during these 5 years were Federal funds: 1960–61, 25.7 percent; 1961–62, 25.5 percent; 1962–63, 34.0 percent; 1963–64, 37.7 percent; 1964–65, 49.9 percent.

The number of students who took advantage of the vocational programs was as follows:

Year	Enrollment	
	Regular vocational high schools	Regular day school students taking some vocational courses
1960-61	6,426	90,870
1961-62	7,207	96,384
1962-63	7,049	93,048
1963-64	7,502	92,806
1964-65	7,700	97,034

The total number of students benefiting from this program represented the following percentages of the total junior and senior high school enrollment for these 5 years: 1960–61, 52.3 percent; 1961–62, 53.0 percent; 1962–63, 49.5 percent; 1963–64, 48.2 percent; 1964–65, 49.2 percent.

In addition to these young people, the following numbers of adults took advantage of the offerings of this program in the last 5 years: 1960–61, 24,157; 1961–62, 20,236; 1962–63, 24,187; 1963–64, 29,768; 1964–65, 34,558.

In 1965–66 the vocational education program has a budget of $10,861,308. Of this amount 46.6 percent comes from Federal funds. The secondary vocational schools expect an enrollment of 8,740 students and the program expects of offer opportunities of study to an additional 99,890 students from the regular day schools and 35,030 adults.

As stated elsewhere in this report, vocational education not only opened new opportunities for students not interested in the general or academic program, but also helped to dignify manual labor and skill work at the same time that it increased the employment opportunities of individuals who could not enter university studies.

The improvement of community life in the rural areas where second unit schools[88] offered vocational agriculture, home economics, woodwork, and handicrafts, owes much to the vocational education program. The initial supply of skilled and semiskilled laborers for industry came, generally, from these programs. The on-the-job-training of adults, the retraining of displaced workers, the improvement in farm practices, dietary practices, and homemaking have been a remarkable achievement mainly of vocational education.

The vocational education program has helped also to decrease school dropouts, giving attainable goals to a larger number of pupils. It has helped improve rural education in Puerto Rico. Through farm work, home economics, social work, handicrafts and the different clubs and societies for young people, and farmers and housewives, the rural second unit, mainly characterized by vocational courses, turned the schools into community centers.

> One of the purposes of these schools was to encourage the growth of a sense of community as a step toward group action, toward a new relationship of neighbor to neighbor, based on common needs and interests. * * * It was a step away from complete dependence on the landlord and therefore the forerunner of a genuine social change.[29]

All these programs constitute a concerted effort to uplift adults who for one reason or other could not or did not avail themselves of the opportunities offered by the day public schools when they were young. Education which limits itself to the formal day programs is out of step with the rapid transformation taking place in our society. Mechanization, automation, cybernetics and rapid social changes force everyone to keep studying and learning. There is a high correlation between education and employment and earnings, between education and health, between level of education and number of children born in a family, between education and socioeconomic status. People are aware of these facts in Puerto Rico. There are evening schools for adults from the first level of literacy to the university. The thrust of education is evident day and night, in academic as well as in vocational courses. These programs for adults are opening new opportunities, new avenues of development to individuals who otherwise would have stayed in the lower ranks of education, culture, employment and earnings.

SCHOOLS AND HEALTH

There is probably no more dramatic change in Puerto Rico than the improvement in health and life expectancy. The schools have been instrumental in this positive gain in our way of life. Let us look at this aspect in the perspective of time. This is the way James Russell Bourne and Dorothy Dulles Bourne saw the situation around the thirties:

> Sanitation in small towns and rural areas was almost nonexistent, water supplies were polluted, malaria, tuberculosis, gastritis-enteritis and other diseases were endemic. The resulting mortality rate was very high and life-expectancy very low. Due to lack of roads, sick people were carried down the mountain paths on hammocks to the nearest highway, then to be taken to the municipal hospital, itself not very sanitary. Often there was no doctor available when the patient arrived, or for some time afterward. There were a few latrines in the rural areas, with the result of a very high incidence of hookworm.
>
> Overpopulation was a strong contributing cause to the health situation. Parents simply could not feed or care properly for their large numbers of children.
>
> Malnutrition was an important factor in the death rate, not so much from starvation, as by lowering resistance to diseases. Poor and unsanitary housing

> was also instrumental in fostering disease and disability. Many of these troubles were due to ignorance. Even though the government spent an unusually high percentage of its income on education, less than half (46.5 percent) of the children had an opportunity to go to school, and for the majority this meant only third grade education. Neither could they learn the essentials of healthy living at home, since there were no social workers or welfare services until 1930, and only inadequate ones for some years more.[20]

Some years ago, in a lecture about the schools and their contribution to the improvement of public health, I presented a picture which I summarize to contrast it with present conditions:

1. Our total population exceeded two million inhabitants (2,045,793, in 1945, to be exact). This gave us a population density of about 600 inhabitants per square mile. Our population increased at the rate of 21 persons per each 1,000 inhabitants. Such a high human concentration in an area of 3,435 square miles, with an essentially agricultural economy, brought many problems, particularly in matters of health.
2. About three-fourths of our population was undernourished, "at the edge of the clinic deficiency in various elements of the diet, specially protein, calcium, vitamins A, C, and riboflavin." Children up to 15 years of age, who constituted 40.6 percent of the total population, were included in this figure.

The disadvantages of those in poor health are stretched out through all their lives, even more so if during their childhood they have been in need of a well-balanced diet, a proper home and the advantages of preventive medicine. "Poor nourishment during childhood will be an obstacle that the majority of the children will drag on all their lives." The dietary deficiency partly explains why the average Puerto Rican was dangerously under the standards of weight and height.

Analyzing the surveys made in Puerto Rico by Salivia (1916), Bary (1923), Payne, Berríos and Martínez Rivera (1930), Mitchel (1932), Eliot (1933), Morales Otero (1939), and Seijo (1942); Miss Ana Teresa Blanco in her study on nutrition in Puerto Rico (1946), reached the following conclusions:

> All the studies show consistently the same thing: Puerto Ricans are considerably shorter in height and of less weight than the North American groups with which they were compared. Within the groups in the Island, those persons who enjoy better socio-economic conditions are better-developed physically and the degree of advantage in the development is proportionate to the degree of socio-economic advantage of one group over another.

In another study we made in 1939–40 in the district of Mayagüez we found that out of 8,445 students in the public schools, 2,643 had some defect in their teeth. This number was 31 percent of the population under study. Out of that same number of students 3,653, that is, 43 percent, were underweight.

As these studies reveal, economic want seems to condemn poor children to have deficient physical structures that function inadequately.

3. Around 90 percent of the rural population--the great majority of our population—suffered from uncinariasis.

In 1961 the rate of deaths due to this cause was 0.2; that is, four people died.

4. Of every 100,000 Puerto Ricans, 225.9 died annually (1946) from diarrhea and enteritis—this was the greatest number of deaths due to a single disease in that year.

The rate of mortality of this disease in 1962 had dropped to 33.9 persons per every 100,000 inhabitants. This disease stopped being the cause of the greatest number of deaths, and since 1953 heart diseases have been the main causes of deaths. In 1962 heart diseases accounted for 3,083 deaths, which represented 18.6 percent of the total number of deaths that year.

5. Out of every 100,000 inhabitants, 207.6, that is, 25.3 percent of the total number of deaths, were due to tuberculosis, the second disease by number of deaths caused (1946).

In 1962 this disease caused 582 deaths, or the equivalent of a rate of 23.7 per 100,000 inhabitants.

6. Of every 100,000 inhabitants, 32.3 died from malaria (1946).

In Puerto Rico no deaths from malaria have been registered since 1955. Puerto Rico is now free from this disease.

7. In 1947 a total of 13,898 cases of syphilis and other venereal diseases were reported to the health department. Of these, 206 died.

In 1962, only 1,188 new cases of syphilis and 3,029 of gonorrhea were reported to the health department. Although these diseases have ceased to constitute the serious health problems they were in past years, there has been a small increase in their incidence in the last few years.

8. Bilharziosis had in 1947 a slight increase. Mortality per 100,000 inhabitants for this disease was 3.1.

In 1961 there were 678 cases of bilharziosis; mortality rate of this disease was 28.8 per 100,000 inhabitants (1961).

9. Other diseases like cancer, nephritis, pneumonia and heart diseases are responsible for a great number of deaths (1961).

A total of 3,614 new cases of cancer were reported in 1961. In 1962 the mortality rate of cancer was 82.3 and that for heart diseases was 125.6.

10. In 1946, 27,570 deaths occurred (all causes). This represents a rate of 13.2 deaths per every thousand inhabitants. In 1963 there were 17,213 deaths (all causes). The annual rate was 6.8 deaths per every thousand inhabitants.

We find in the statistics of the Second World War kept by the Puerto Rico Selective Service a positive reaffirmation of the fact that Puerto

Ricans have inferior health. Even if we ignore factors which are purely human, as are some of those that enter into the selection of candidates for the Army, the situation is no less than alarming even to the most optimistic persons. Out of 200,000 men called to the military service, 78 percent—a total of 163,141—were rejected because of various physical disabilities. Compare this with rejection in the United States, which was from 15 to 40 percent, depending on the area.

In Puerto Rico, during the Second World War, 11,911 candidates were rejected because of nervous disorders. Judging from this figure we could say that our mental health was also threatened. Eye, ear, and throat defects were the cause for the rejection of 7,040 men; feet defects disqualified 22;238, and 10,135 were rejected because of defects in their muscular and skeletal systems. Other purely physical defects prevented 14,345 candidates from going into the service.

Information provided by the Selective Service System in September 1964, indicates that between June 1, 1958, and June 30, 1964, out of 60,852 enlisted men who were examined, a total of 35,901, that is, 59 percent were rejected because of different reasons. Of those rejected 9,863, or 16.21 percent, had as one of the causes for rejection the results of the medical examinations. As can be seen from this data, the health of the young Puerto Ricans who can enter the military service has improved considerably. Of course, it must be made clear that part of the health improvement indicated by these figures may be due to the fact that physical conditions of a group of candidates may be one thing when there is a general recruitment—as during a war—and another when the drafting is highly selective, as has happened in these last years. We must also consider that selection and rejection standards may vary, and, in fact, have varied.

In our opinion, the two most revealing indexes in regard to attainments in health level reached by the population are the general mortality rate and life expectancy. The general mortality rate is affected in turn by the infant mortality rate and by maternal mortality. Infant mortality in Puerto Rico was reduced from 138.5 deaths per every thousand children born alive in 1937 to 44.2 per thousand in 1963. This improvement implies that the number of infant deaths which represented 25.3 percent of the total of deaths registered in 1937, represented only 19.7 percent of the total registered in 1963. In the same way the deaths of mothers which were 5.5 per every thousand children born alive in 1937, were only 0.5 per each thousand children born alive in 1963. Emphasis is given to these components of the total mortality because these are the factors needed to determine the number of school-age children there will be in the future.

We have seen how the general mortality rate has decreased from 26.9 per thousand inhabitants in 1937 to 6.8 per thousand inhabitants in 1963, and that, on the other side, the birth rate decreased from 38.2 per thousand inhabitants in 1937 to only 30.5 per thousand in 1963. In this way the natural growth of the population of Puerto Rico increases from 17.3 inhabitants per thousand in the population in 1937 to 23.7 in 1963. This increase in the population growth and in life expectancy, are the logical result of the improvement in the population health, among other factors.

The fundamental impact that health improvement of the inhabitants of Puerto Rico has had on the educational program of the country has been the greater number of children and young persons of school-age for which the educational system has had to provide study opportunities in its educational levels, from elementary to university level. On the basis of the 1937 mortality rate 1,209,000 persons would have died from 1937 to 1963. Only 643,000 died while 566,000 were spared by health improvement and other causes. On the basis of the 1937 infant mortality rate 295,000 children less than a year old would have died from 1937 to 1963. Only 161,000 died and 134,000 children were spared. Health improvement, among other factors, is reflected in the educational system in the population increase implied by that improvement.

EDUCATION, AND INDUSTRIAL AND COMMERCIAL DEVELOPMENT IN PUERTO RICO

It has been said elsewhere in this paper that education has been the driving force of the peaceful revolution which has taken place in the Commonwealth. Education influenced development in industries and commercial enterprises, and now both these areas of activities at the remarkable rate of increase they have shown are exerting and will continue to exert significant influence on the educational system, our cultural patterns, on our consumption and work habits, on our family organization, and on many other areas of our social and economic organization. Industries and commerce increase our contacts with the North American business world, with American points of views, ideals and preferences.

Cultural patterns which are directly introduced by economic power, commercial relations, and the power of business, develop faster than when these moving forces are not present.

Let us have a look at these influences in operation by observing these facts: In 1954, agriculture, generating a total income of $169 million, was the key factor in Puerto Rico's economy, followed by commercial income and manufacture which generated $155 million each. By 1964 manufactural enterprises accounted for $486 million income; commerce generated $375 million, and agriculture occupied third position with an income of $205 million. These figures represent an increase of 213 percent for manufacture, 142 percent for commerce, and 12 percent for agriculture.[91]

There is still another more important transformation: Puerto Rico, during the fiscal year 1963–64, had bought $1,119,218,000 worth of U.S. products. This turned Puerto Rico into the second buyer of U.S. products in the Western Hemisphere. Only Canada buys more than Puerto Rico in this hemisphere. The fourth buyer from the United States is Venezuela who bought only half of what Puerto Rico bought. Each Puerto Rican, it is reported, buys an average of $405 in American products as compared to $236 spent by Canadians and $70.90 by Venezuelans. In the world market only Japan, Great Britain, and West Germany buy more North American products than Puerto Rico. Nine European countries—Sweden, Denmark, Norway, Spain, Austria, Portugal, Ireland, Finland, and Iceland—all together buy less from the United States market than Puerto Rico. The 106,079,000 inhabitants of Brazil, Argentina, Venezuela, and Uruguay buy less from the United States than the 2,445,000 inhabitants of Puerto Rico.[92]

The number of employments, contacts, communications, social relations, family involvements which all this economic movement generates exert inevitable cultural pressure on any community so influenced. The schools not only have to train people for these developments, but guide and orient the course of cultural contacts and consequences. The growing middle class brings with it new values, new ideals, growing expectations. People in this class try to obtain by economic power what they lack in social prestige and relations.

Mr. and Mrs. Bourne, in the study previously mentioned, recognize these developments:

> * * * changes are taking place through growth rather than revolution. To a limited extent the change began in 1898, when Puerto Rico was forced to make some adaptations to the capitalistic systems of the United States. New directions, new functions, and the growth of resources have provided the forms for the prestige and power structures at the same time changing the proportions of the upper and lower classes—both in member and in influence—through the enormous growth of the middle class.[93]

PRIVATE SCHOOLS

Private schools (accredited and nonaccredited) constitute an asset to the island's educational system. This kind of school has been functioning since the Spanish rule. The origin of the primary and secondary schools developed during the Spanish regime is traceable to the efforts of the monasteries, the churches and the people.[94] After the public educational system was established with the advent of a new colonial administration, the private schools continued offering educational opportunities. There are private schools of different denominations as well as secular schools. Of the 155 private schools existing in 1960 there were 132 accredited by the Department of Education. Of these, 71 were Catholic, 34 nonsectarian, 2 Adventist, 6 Baptist, 3 Disciples of Christ, 3 Episcopalian, 2 United Evangelist, 9 Methodist, and 1 Presbyterian. Among these schools there are elementary, secondary and also post-secondary commercial schools.

Forty percent of these schools were accredited during the last decade. This shows the growth of private schools during the decade, a growth caused by factors such as population mobility, rise in the family economic level, improved transportation facilities, a longer schoolday, and the status symbol the private schools are acquiring within the community. During the past few years a continuous increase in enrollment has been noted at the junior and senior school level.

During the last 5 school years the distribution of the total enrollment of the school system of Puerto Rico, between public and private schools, was as follows:

School year	School level and type of school						Total enrollment	
	Elementary		Junior high school		Senior high school			
	Public	Private	Public	Private	Public	Private	Public	Private
1960–61	391,189	33,354	125,298	12,033	60,558	8,647	577,045	54,034
1961–62	393,495	34,132	128,642	12,857	66,353	8,775	588,490	55,764
1962–63	394,742	37,453	128,762	13,636	73,300	9,557	596,804	60,646
1963–64	398,865	38,168	128,375	14,251	79,368	9,923	606,608	62,342
1964–65	402,533	36,695	127,306	14,440	83,035	10,632	612,874	61,767

Private school enrollment which was 8.6 percent of the total public and private schools enrollment in 1960–61 increased to 9.2 percent in 1964–65.

There is no doubt that the private school will continue sharing the educational task with the public school. In computing enrollment projections for the future it is assumed that there will be a gradual increase in the total enrollment of the private schools. The projections of enrollment show that there will be about 10.5 percent of the pupils of school age in Puerto Rico enrolled in the private schools by 1975.

The Department of Education is in charge of accrediting these schools if they meet the requirements of organization, buildings, equipment, preparation of teachers, and materials.

Private schools are different from each other and in some aspects are different from the public schools. The most notable differences are in the selection of pupils, buildings, and materials, and in cooperation received from the parents. The following significant factors can be pointed out about private schools:

1. The higher socioeconomic level of their students which permits them to have the benefit of a variety of cultural and social experiences.
2. Better physical environment and more adequate school equipment which facilitate learning under desirable conditions of hygiene, security, and comfort.
3. Didactic materials in sufficient quantity, and availability of equipment necessary for efficient study conditions.
4. Parents' cooperation in the activities that are developed and in the homework assigned to students.
5. Disciplinary procedures and methods of instruction which make possible the full use of the school time for academic activities. Usually the extracurricular activities do not interfere with regular schoolwork.
6. Selective criteria for choosing their students.
7. Predominance of single enrollment organization or a special type of interlocking organization quite similar to the single enrollment.
8. Emphasis on academic achievement.

THE TEACHING PROFESSION AND THE COMMUNITY

If we were to apply the critique that a person's worth is to be measured by the quantity of his possessions or by the salary he receives, the teachers of Puerto Rico would inevitably appear at one of the lowest levels on the scale of professional persons. According to a recent study done by the superior educational council, the entrance salary of the teacher in Puerto Rico with a bachelor's degree is $250 per month which is much lower than that of 19 different classes of professional jobs in the competitive service of the Commonwealth government with the entrance requirement of a bachelor's degree or its equivalent. During the last 10 or 15 years there have been increases in the teachers' salaries but these increases have not been in accordance with those in the other government and industrial jobs nor with the increase in the personal income of Puerto Rico. During the years 1950–64 the personal income in Puerto Rico increased from $653.4 million to $2,100.8 million. This change represents an increase of 221.5 percent from 1950 to 1964; or an average increase of about 16 percent per year during these 14 years. During this same period the average annual salary of the public school teachers of Puerto Rico increased from $1,534 to $3,280. That is, this salary had an increase of 113.8

percent from 1950 to 1964. The average annual increase during these 14 years was only 8.1 percent. In other words, during the period 1950–64 the personal income increased three times while the average annual salary of the teachers of public schools increased only twice. If a teacher's salary had kept the relative position with the per capita personal income in Puerto Rico which it enjoyed in 1950 the average salary of a teacher would have been $4,297 instead of the $3,280 which a teacher received in 1964. Further analysis of increases in teachers' salaries in comparison with increases in the salaries of persons who work in industries show that while the latter had an average increase per year of about 10 percent from 1952 to 1963 the teachers had an increase of only 5.2 percent. Other analysis of increases from 1960 to 1965 of a variety of some 19 different salary scales for government employees, show consistently that during this period teachers have obtained the lowest percentages of increases in their salaries.

The prestige of public school teachers due to varying factors has been suffering. Teachers themselves, according to the "Study of Education System of Puerto Rico" conducted in 1960, express misgivings in this respect. They themselves do not have high regard for the schools in which they work in contrast to the opinion they manifest when public and private schools are compared. Teachers are the object of praise in speeches, ceremonies, and public functions, but not enough has been done to turn into reality the high verbal expression with which their work is described.

Regardless of these facts teachers keep being leaders in their communities, but they no longer stay for enough time in the towns or rural centers to continue participating in community life as they used to do. On the other hand, too many tasks that belonged to the family and the church are increasingly being left to the teachers and to schools to perform. Industrialization and urbanization are not going to ease this trend.

Appendix A of this report describes objectively the main aspects of the economic situation of the teaching profession in Puerto Rico.

Almost all the teachers of Puerto Rico are affiliated with the Puerto Rico Teachers Association, a most important organization which is supposed to uplift their morality and increase the appreciation and respect of society. The association was founded in 1911 when the following conditions prevailed:

> You could be a teacher if you passed the eighth grade and took a free examination offered by the Department of Education. Appointments were made on the basis of political relations; salaries were $30 for the rural teachers and $50 for the urban; the school year consisted of nine months; the supervisor and politicians controlled the whole situation; there were no tenure laws, retirement system or salary scales; the teaching profession served only as a stepladder for other activities.[85]

The following goals are pursued according to the bylaws approved by the association when it was founded:

a. To stimulate fraternity among teachers.

b. To adopt the necessary reforms to improve the present educational system.

c. To sponsor and execute projects which tend to improve the teachers' economic conditions such as saving and loan banks, cooperatives, etc.

d. To help the members in case of sickness, physical and professional disability, as well as that of their relatives in case of death.[36]

The association has worked for a series of measures that have improved the teaching profession. Among those are: Certification laws, tenure, salary scale, retirement system, and a 12-month school year, 10 months of which are devoted to regular classroom work, one to vacation, and another to school activities during the summer. It has established a series of services such as hospital and medical care for its members and their relatives. It has established credit cooperatives and insurance policies. It carries on such cultural activities as publications, radio programs, a scholarship plan for the members' children, and travel promoted by its bureau of tourism. It is affiliated to the National Educational Association. The bureau of tourism stimulates teachers to visit other countries for recreational and cultural purposes so that they can have a better understanding of other peoples.

Aside from the efforts to guarantee the teachers' security, the association has worked for, and has brought to the attention of the public and of government authorities, such problems of education as language policies, philosophy and objectives of education, the teaching of social and economic problems, the establishment of junior high schools, and the need to eliminate double enrollment and interlocking. The Committee on Educational Problems has dealt with various problems relative to the public schools and the teaching profession: Among others, textbooks, teaching materials, teachers' dropouts, selection of candidates, and the teaching of ethical values. Furthermore, the association has helped to stimulate the peoples' interest in the public schools of Puerto Rico. However, due to the socioeconomic conditions of teachers, the main emphasis has been on economic matters.

FINANCIAL RESOURCES DEVOTED TO THE FUNCTION OF EDUCATION: COMMONWEALTH AND FEDERAL FUNDS

Ever since the organization of the school system as a formal enterprise of the government of Puerto Rico it has claimed the largest share of our fiscal resources. In 1951–52, the last fiscal year before the advent of the Commonwealth status for Puerto Rico, the expenses in education amounted to 22.4 percent of a total budget of $149,590,950. In 1952–53, the first fiscal year under the Commonwealth status, this proportion decreased to 21.7 percent of the total budget for that year but by fiscal year 1962–63, a decade after the inauguration of the new status, $113.9 million (27.3 percent) were spent in education of a total budget of $417.4 million. For the fiscal year 1965–66 the recommended appropriation for education was $172.1 million (31.3 percent) of a total budget of $549.5 millions.

The two main educational agencies are the Department of Education and the university. The resources appropriated for each one of them is as follows:

(a) *Department of Education.*—In 1951–52, the Department of Education had an operating budget of $33.2 million of which $3.1 million (9.4 percent of this budget) came from Federal funds. This budget decreased in $32.4 million in 1952–53, and of this total amount $3.2 million, or 9.8 percent, came from Federal funds.

By 1962–63, the operating budget of the Department of Education amounted to $91.6 million of which $5.9 million, or 6.4 percent, were Federal funds. The proposed operating budget for 1965–66 amounts to $118.1 million of State funds and, in addition, the Department of Education expects to get $46.6 million from the Federal Government pursuant to the various acts recently approved by the U.S. Congress dealing with aid to education. During this year, Federal funds will amount to 28.3 percent of the total operating budget of $164.7 million. See detailed list herein included on Federal funds expected during 1965–66:

List of Federal funds to be received by the Department of Education during fiscal year 1965–66 pursuant to the provisions of the acts of Congress

Number of the act	Title under which the funds are provided	Amount of funds to be available
85-864	National Defense Education Act:	
	Title III.—Financial assistance for strengthening science, mathematics, and modern foreign language instruction	$1,304,000
	Title V-A.—Guidance counseling and testing; identification of able students	132,000
	Title X.—Improvement of statistical services of State educational agencies	36,000
89-10	Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965:	
	Title I.—Financial assistance to local educational agencies for the education of children of low-income families	21,550,053
	Title II.—School library resources, textbooks and other instructional materials	1,824,200
	Title III.—Supplementary education centers and services	1,000,000
	Title V.—Grants to strengthen State departments of education	150,000
597	Federal Aid to States for Library Services (as amended)	354,933
88-204	Higher Education Facilities Act of 1963	25,860
88-452	Economic Opportunity Act of 1964:	
	Title 1A.—Job Corps	1,500,000
	Title 1B.—Work training programs	900,000
	Title II-B.—Adult basic education programs	931,240
81-920	Federal Civil Defense Act of 1950 (educational related with civil defense)	105,600
82-210	Vocational Education Act of 1963	3,834,700
	Work study programs for education students	425,000
85-864	*Title III.*—Amended to include trades and industries of the vocational education program	326,381
87-415	Manpower, Development, and Training Act, Part B	1,500,000

List of Federal funds to be received by the Department of Education during fiscal year 1965–66 pursuant to the provisions of the acts of Congress—Continued

Number of the act	Title under which the funds are provided	Amount of funds to be available
87–447	The Educational Television Facilities Act of 1962 (grants for the construction of television broadcasting facilities to be used for educational purpose)	$150,000
79–396 and 87–823	National School Lunch Act	[1] 3,676,267 [2] 4,033,003
565	Vocational Rehabilitation Act	2,385,553
	(funds alloted for four special projects)	206,791
761	Social Security Act (program to determine the physical incapability in cases of social security claims)	292,994
	Total funds available	46,644,575

[1] Cash.
[2] Food supply.

The programs of the Department of Education which historically had benefited most from Federal appropriations are vocational education, vocational rehabilitation, and the school lunchrooms. Federal funds available for the programs of vocational education amounted to 25.8 percent in 1951–52, to 22.4 percent in 1952–53, and to 34 percent in 1962–63, respectively, of the total budget for this program during each of these fiscal years. It is expected that Federal funds will amount to 46.6 percent of the budget for this program during the fiscal year 1965–66. Federal funds accounted for 58.2 percent of the vocational rehabilitation budget in 1951–52, for 58.7 percent in 1952–53, and for 72.1 percent in 1962–63. In the fiscal year 1965–66 it is expected that 72.5 percent of this program will be financed by Federal funds. The school lunchroom program benefited from Federal funds in the following proportions: 1951–52, 39.6 percent; 1952–53, 35.9 percent; 1962–63, 52.6 percent, and 1965–66, 50.5 percent.

Other programs of the Department of Education which received Federal funds during the fiscal year 1964–65 and that expect to continue to receive them during the fiscal year 1965–66 are public libraries for the rural zones, teaching of science, mathematics, languages, social sciences, and English, improvement of statistical services, development and training of human resources, and educational programs related to civil defense.

The Department of Education expected to strengthen some of its programs through the utilization of Federal funds made available for educational programs under several Federal acts such as the Economic Opportunities Act of 1964 and the Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965. Thus far it is getting such funds in the amount of approximately $3.8 million. These funds are being used in youth programs, community programs, adult education, and preschool education (project Headstart).

(*b*) *The University of Puerto Rico.*—In 1951–52 the total operating budget of the University of Puerto Rico amounted to $8,627,876 of which $976,860, or 11.3 percent, came from Federal funds. For the fiscal year 1952–53 this budget increased to $9,447,271 and of this amount $1,026,265, or 10.9 percent, came from Federal funds. According to figures supplied by the budget office of the University of Puerto Rico, in 1963–64 the total resources available for all programs under the aegis of the university amounted to $37,215,662. Of this total, $7,543,223, or 20.3 percent, came from Federal funds. The estimated resources for the fiscal year 1965–66 amount to almost $44 million. It is expected that $9.54 million, or 21.7 percent of the total, will come from Federal funds.

Almost all of the Federal funds available to the university during the years 1951–52 and 1952–53 went to the agricultural experiment station and extension services as provided by the Hatch, Adams-Purnell, and Smith-Lever Acts. However, by fiscal year 1964–65 Federal funds available to the university were shared by practically all university programs. During the above mentioned year the agricultural experiment station was getting $1.2 million (29.5 percent of its total budget); agricultural extension services, $1.8 million (57.6 percent of its total budget); the school of medicine, $3.5 million, mostly for contracted research for Federal agencies; the school of dentistry, $155,000; the Río Piedras campus, $1.4 million; the Mayagüez campus, $185,728, and the Puerto Rico Nuclear Center, $1.4 million. Economic aid to students is also available at present under the Federal loan program and the work and study programs.

SCHOLARSHIPS

The scholarship and economic aid programs constitute one of the main features of the educational system of Puerto Rico. These programs are geared to the over-all objective of the development of human resources—the only abundant resource available. During the fiscal year 1962–63 the Department of Education devoted almost $2.8 million to scholarships and economic aid and during fiscal year 1964–65 this amount increased to $3.8 million. These funds have been used for the search and development of gifted students in public schools, for training in professions for which there is a growing demand in our society, and for development and training of our teaching personnel.

The scholarship and economic aid program of the University of Puerto Rico spent $405,500 during the school year 1952–53. During the fiscal year 1962–63 funds available for these purposes amounted to $2,580,000 and the funds budgeted for fiscal year 1965–66 amount to

$2,818,700. In addition to this program the University of Puerto Rico sponsors a program of sabbatical leaves, leaves of absence with pay or with economic aid, for the improvement of the academic preparation of its teaching and technical staff. Since 1941–42 up to 1964–65 the university had devoted a total of $6,401,510 of its resources to this program benefiting 1,836 faculty members. During 1964–65 as much as $736,439 were used in this program and 171 faculty members benefited from it.

Other government agencies such as the Commonwealth Office of Personnel and the Economic Development Administration also administer scholarship programs instituted by the Government for the purpose of supplying the trained and skilled human resources needed for the development of the economy.

These scholarship programs make it possible for able but poor students to study in the elementary and secondary schools of Puerto Rico and to pursue studies at the undergraduate and graduate levels in the colleges and universities of the island, the United States, and foreign countries. In fact, as stated in a publication of the Office of the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico in Washington, "in Puerto Rico an exceptional student unable to get an education for lack of financial means is 'an emergency.' If the Department of Education or the University of Puerto Rico have exhausted their appropriations for scholarships they can call on an emergency fund of the Government, set up to cope with disasters, for money to complete a student's education."[97] This will suffice to stress the importance given by Puerto Rico to the development of its more precious resource—its people.

UNEMPLOYMENT AND UNDEREMPLOYMENT

Unemployment and underemployment are still problems with which the people of Puerto Rico have to wrestle.

According to the data of the 1960 census, the rate of unemployment among the youngsters (14–19 years old) of Puerto Rico was 10.2 percent while that of the adults (20–44 years old) was only 6.1 percent. The number of youngsters (14–19 years old) in the labor force is expected to increase, according to the official projections, from 53,700 in 1960 to 73,100 in 1965—an increase of 36 percent in this 5-year period which represents a remarkable increase of 19,400 more youths coming to the labor market in search of jobs. These young persons depend mostly, in order to get job opportunities, on the number of years of schooling they have completed.

The perspective for the period between 1965 and 1980, according to the same projections, is not brighter, for it is expected that the younger group (14–19 years old) in the labor force will increase from

73,100 in 1965 to 90,200 in 1980. This is an increase of 17,100 youths whose hopes and opportunities of finding jobs will depend, to a greater extent as the years pass by, on the schooling they have attained.

In the year 1963, the average rate of unemployment in Puerto Rico was 12 percent. When this is analyzed according to the educational level of the unemployed, it is found that the rate of unemployment among those who have 11 years or less of schooling, fluctuated between 13 and 15 percent. The rate of unemployment among those with a high school diploma was only 10 percent. Among those who had completed 13 or more years of education, unemployment was only 3 percent.

The same picture is evident in 1964. The average unemployment rate for Puerto Rico was 10.6 percent. For those persons who had completed 11 years of schooling or less the average rate of unemployment fluctuated between 12 and 15 percent. It was 8 percent for those with high school and only 2 percent for those who had completed 13 years of more of schooling.

It is clear, from the above data, that education is a determining factor not only in employment figures but on salary rates. More years of schooling for the youngsters mean a larger and more expensive task for the educational system.

The mere fact that 40,000 children of deceased, retired, or disabled workers in the nation would receive social security benefit up to the age 22 instead of 18 tends to show the need for longer years of schooling. Puerto Rico is also affected by this change. Vocational education programs will have to expand and diversify their offerings to take care of a large and significant share of these educational needs. It is unavoidable that technical, terminal, and short-term careers, be offered in special institutions developed for these purposes, or in regional colleges or university campuses.

THE UNIVERSITY OF PUERTO RICO

Organization.—As part of the study of the educational system of Puerto Rico, a team of North American educators was asked to study the institutions of higher learning on the island. The group was picked and presided over by Dr. Frank H. Bowles, at the time President of the College Entrance Examination Board and now with the Ford Foundation. His report summarizes some of the main aspects of the governance of the University of Puerto Rico:

> The legal status of the University is determined by the University Law Number 135, approved May 7, 1942, and as amended.
>
> The law establishes a 6 man Superior Educational Council, names the Commissioner (now the Secretary) of Education as its president, states that the governance of the University will reside within that Council, charges the council

> with the continuing study of the educational situation in Puerto Rico and with formulating the basis for coordination between the system of public instruction and the University, provides for the appointment of the Rector of the University by the Council, to hold office at the pleasure of the Council and provides for one stated annual meeting. It further provides for the delegation to the Rector of the powers and authority required for the operation of the University and specifically reserves to the Council only two important powers of control—the approval of the global sum called for by the University budget and the approval of nominations made by the Rector for the senior administrative posts within the University. It also provides for a Permanent Secretary and staff, who are in general terms charged with studies of educational needs as well as with the administration of the arrangements, meetings and records of the Council.[88]

The University of Puerto Rico is a corporation under the superior educational council, so "the Superior Educational Council is by law the University. If properly exercised, it has the powers pertinent to planning, coordinating, policy making which are usually exercised by governing boards."

> The Superior Educational Council meets in regular sessions between April and June of each year. It may hold extraordinary meetings at other times when so directed by the president or required by four of its members.
>
> The Council outlines the general policies of the University, keeps itself informed on the functioning of the institution [through the Chancellor and the Permanent Secretary], and holds annual public hearings to consider University activities and problems.
>
> The Chancellor, who is appointed for an indefinite term by the Superior Educational Council, is executive director of the University. Subject to the approval of the Council, he appoints the Vice-Chancellor for the Mayagüez Campus, all University Deans, Directors of University special research facilities and the Agricultural Extension Service, the Treasurer, and the Registrar. He also has full authority of supervision and orientation over all University officials and employees.
>
> The University Boards at Río Piedras and Mayagüez act as advisory bodies to the Chancellor and collaborate with him in carrying out the University program. Each board consists of the Deans, a Faculty Representative elected for a two-year period by the teaching staff, and the Chancellor, who is President. The Vice-Chancellor presides over the University Board at Mayagüez when the Chancellor is not present. [The University Boards draft the University budget which shall be submitted to the Superior Educational Council for approval.]
>
> The Academic Senate of Mayagüez is a body consisting of the members of the University Board, the Director of Graduate Studies, the Director of the Nucelar Center, the Librarian, the Director of the Agricultural Experiment Station and the Director of the Agricultural Extension Service, and reprsentatives from the faculties which are elected for two years. [The Academic Senate at Río Piedras consists of the members of the University Board, two members elected by each Faculty and five members elected by the General Faculty, for a term of three years.] The Academic Senates have the authority to formulate regulations concerning all academic matters.[90]

The 1942 university law contemplates some advisory faculty participation in university matters when it states:

> The professors, associate professors, assistant professors and instructors of each college or faculty shall constitute a body to work for the improvement of the academic standards and the cultural progress of the University. The faculty, meeting under the chairmanship of the corresponding dean, can (a) recommend to the University Board measures for improving the programs of studies and the academic and administrative standards; (b) adopt resolutions to intensify the work of the college in question and make more effective the carrying out (of the purposes) for which the University has been created; (c) propose to the University Board programs of academic work to be carried out within the college and cultural-extension projects; (d) take action in those matters within its incumbency, submitted to it by the dean; (e) adopt, with the approval of the University Board, the rules necessary for the discharge of the functions fixed by this Act, and (f) express its point of view to the chancellor, the University Board, and the Superior Educational Council on every matter relating to the good progress of the institution.[100]

The lack of faculty participation has been one of the main bones of contention for years, almost since the law was approved. The Commission on Institutions of Higher Education, Middle States Association of Colleges and Secondary Schools, address itself to this point in "A Report on the University of Puerto Rico," of November 1959:

> What is needed is a formally organized faculty body with corporate responsibilities; the implementation of such a proposal is imminent. Such a faculty organization, necessary to introduce greater democracy in carrying out the affairs of the University, is long overdue.

In 1957, previous to this report, a faculty committee had also recommended legislation and amendments to the bylaws of the institution among which was the creation of an academic senate to guarantee the faculty participation in "the formulation of norms, orientation of academic programs, and guaranteeing faculty rights in the governance of the university."

The academic senates were created administratively; they were not the result of an amendment to the law. The Secretary of Justice was consulted on their creation. But the senate's decisions have to be "ratified by the corresponding authorities" which are none other than the university board and the superior council on education. If it is taken into consideration that the entire university board is part of the academic senate, technically and theoretically, any decision of the senate in which the members of the board are defeated, can be overruled afterwards if the decision goes to the board acting as one of the "corresponding authorities."

Thus, faculty participation is exceedingly limited.

Before 1948 the students had a representative on the university board. He and the faculty representative were the only two members of the board who did not owe their appointments to the chancellor. The student representative was eliminated from the university board immediately after the strike of 1948. Since then the students have had practically no say in university matters, not even those affecting them directly.

All graduate studies at the university are approved by the superior educational council upon recommendation of the chancellor and the corresponding university boards.

The graduate council is the body governing the graduate studies at the College of Agriculture and Mechanic Arts of the University of Puerto Rico. This organization was created by administrative action of the vice chancellor and the university board when graduate studies were initiated in this campus.

Colleges, Schools, and Faculties in Río Piedras

The principal and the oldest campus is at Río Piedras in the metropolitan area of San Juan. It comprises approximately 288 acres with the major part of its buildings grouped together near the eastern side of Ponce de León Avenue, the main thoroughfare connecting San Juan and Río Piedras.

The Faculty[101] of General Studies offers a program which is required of all first-year students at the University, except those taking the 2-year course in Secretarial Science offered by the College of Business Administration.

The General Studies program introduces the student to the fundamental disciplines of knowledge, helps him acquire and develop an understanding of the nature of man and the natural and social world in which he lives, and gives him the opportunity to reaffirm or modify his chosen profession. The program includes four basic introductory subjects: Physical Sciences, Biological Sciences, Social Sciences, and Humanities; and, in addition, basic courses in English and Spanish, and a course in Mathematics, which is taught in the Faculty of Natural Sciences. The Faculty also offers a program leading to a Bachelor of Arts degree.

The Faculty of Humanities offers a number of programs leading to the Bachelor of Arts degree: a general program and programs with majors in Spanish Studies, English, French, History, Philosophy, Art and Theater. [The Faculty also offers graduate courses in Spanish Studies, Philosophy, History and English.] The activities of the Faculty include the Archeological Research Center, the Spanish Studies Seminar, the Luis Muñoz Rivera Museum of Anthropology, History, and Art, the University Theater, the University Chorus and the University Orchestra.

The Faculty of Natural Sciences offers courses leading to the Bachelor of Science degree, by following a General Science Program or programs with majors in Biology, Chemistry, Mathematics and Physics. [It offers graduate programs in Chemistry, Biology and Mathematics.] It also offers a General Program leading to a Bachelor of Arts degree and special courses for premedical and predental students. The Institute of Tropical Meteorology, the Institute of Nutrition, the Radio Research Laboratory, the Cosmic Ray Laboratory, the Astronomical Observatory, the Radioisotopes Techniques Training Center, the Biology Museum, and the Division of Studies Related to Medicine are also part of the Faculty of Natural Sciences.

The Faculty of Social Sciences offers a Bachelor of Arts degree, by following a General Program or programs with majors in Economics, Government, Psychology, and Sociology and Anthropology. It also offers graduate programs in Public Administration, Social Work, [Planning and Economics]. The Social Science Research Center, the Institute of Labor Relations, and the Institute of

Cooperativism are part of the Faculty of Social Sciences. A Graduate Professional Diploma in Rehabilitation Counseling is offered by the School of Social Work.

The College of Business Administration offers courses leading to the Bachelor's degree in Business Administration by following a General Program or programs with majors in Accounting, Economics, Finance, and Management. It also offers a four-year program leading to the degree of Bachelor of Secretarial Science and a two-year course leading to a Diploma in Secretarial Studies. The Evening Division of the College of Business Administration offers the same programs; but the four-year programs take eight years to complete and the two year programs, five.

The College of Education provides academic and professional training for elementary and secondary school teachers.

Programs lead to the Bachelor of Arts Degree in Elementary and Secondary Education with majors in several fields of the liberal arts and in Business Education, Industrial Education, Home Economics, and Physical Education. [There are also graduate programs in Education and programs leading to a Bachelor of Science degree in Education, with majors in Home Economics or Nutrition.] The College also awards a General Normal Diploma and professional diplomas in Industrial Education and the Teaching of English, as well as professional diplomas in Educational Administration and Supervision and in Guidance. The College of Education also includes a Center of Audio-Visual Education, the University Elementary School, the University High School, and the Office of Guidance Services.

The School of Law offers the degree of Bachelor of Laws. The three year program is open to college graduates who fulfill the entrance requirements. The evening division offers the same program to be completed in a minimum of four years.

The College of Pharmacy offers a five-year program leading to the degree of Bachelor of Science in Pharmacy. The Pharmacy Museum, and the Pharmaceutical Research Laboratory are part of the College of Pharmacy.

Schools in San Juan

The School of Medicine-School of Tropical Medicine offers courses leading to the degrees of Doctor of Medicine, Doctor in Philosophy, Master in Sanitary Science, Master in Public Health Education, Master in Public Health, Master of Science, [Master of Medical Zoology and Histopathology, Master and Doctorate in Pharmacology and Toxicology], Bachelor of Science in Nursing, Bachelor of Science in Occupational Therapy, Bachelor of Science in Physical Therapy and Certificates in Nursing, with concentrations in Public Health Nursing, Clinical Nursing, Psychiatric Nursing, and Medical Technology. It also provides postgraduate courses and other facilities designed to keep persons in the medical professions informed of new discoveries and techniques in their fields.

The School of Medicine-School of Tropical Medicine has been able to establish a broad program of scholarships reserved for residents of Puerto Rico, which supports two-thirds of its students. After graduation, the holders of such scholarships are obligated to work for the Government of the Commonwealth for as many years as they benefited from the scholarship.

The School of Dentistry offers the degree of [Master of Oral Surgery], Doctor of Dental Medicine. Like the School of Medicine-School of Tropical Medicine, it also has a scholarship program benefiting a large number of its students.

Colleges and Faculties in Mayagüez

The College of Agriculture and Mechanic Arts comprises three divisions of studies: the College of Agriculture, the College of Arts and Sciences, and the College of Engineering.

The College of Agriculture offers courses leading to a Bachelor of Science degree by following a special program, or a general program, with majors in Agricultural Business, Agricultural Education, Agricultural Extension, Animal Science, and Mechanized Agriculture; and Master of Science degree in Agriculture.

The College of Arts and Sciences offers courses leading to the degree of Bachelor of Arts with majors in English, Humanities, Social Sciences, and Spanish; Bachelor of Science with majors in Biology, Chemistry, Geology, Mathematics, Physics and Pre-Medical Sciences; and Master of Science degree with majors in Biology, Chemistry, Mathematics, Physics and Radiological Physics.

The College of Engineering offers a five-year program leading to the degree of Bachelor of Science with majors in Chemical Engineering, Civil Engineering, Electrical Engineering, Industrial Engineering, and Mechanical Engineering; and Master of Science degree in Nuclear Engineering. In addition the College of Engineering through the Technical Institute Program offers Associate in Science Degree in the fields of Drafting and Building Construction, Electrical Power and Electronics, Mechanical Design and Metalworking, and Surveying and Highway Construction.

Agricultural Experiment Station

The main objective of the Agricultural Experiment Station is to develop and carry out a comprehensive program of research in the production, utilization and marketing phases of agriculture so as to provide basic knowledge for the advancement and development of the agricultural industry; and to devise new means of efficiently increasing the total volume of agricultural production in Puerto Rico. In addition to this basic function, the Station is authorized to carry on research for the improvement of the rum manufacturing industry and for the industrialization of the total agricultural production. The Station is also authorized to produce seed at low cost. These Seeds Farms are integrated with the Regional Research Substations.

The Station was originally established in 1910 by the Sugar Producers Association of Puerto Rico, which ceded the Station lands and buildings to the Government of Puerto Rico three years later. In 1933 the Station was transferred to the University by Legislative action, thus making it eligible to receive Federal grant-in-aid funds.

Sixty-eight percent of the Station's annual budget of approximately 3.5 million dollars is derived from funds allocated by the Legislature of Puerto Rico; 27 percent is derived from Federal appropriations under the Hatch Act and 5 percent, from donations and contributions. Besides the Main Station at Río Piedras there are six substations located at Isabela, Lajas, Corozal, Adjuntas, Gurabo and Ponce. The Food Technology Laboratory and the Rum Pilot Plant, together with the Main Agricultural Library and the Computer and Statistical Center are located at the Main Station at Río Piedras.

Agriculural Extension Service

The Agricultural Extension Service works in cooperation with the United States Department of Agriculture. Officially a divsion of the Mayagüez Campus of the University of Puerto Rico, it belongs to the educational section of the

Association of Land-Grant Colleges and Universities. Its operation funds come from both Commonwealth and Federal Government sources.

The Agricultural Extension Service was initiated in Puerto Rico in 1934, under a cooperative agreement between the United States Department of Agriculture and the University of Puerto Rico. Agricultural development work had been carried on by several government agencies before 1934, and the burdens carried by them were assumed by the present Extension Service. The Organization is headed by a Director selected by the University and satisfactory to the United States Department of Agriculture.

For the sake of the Extension work the Island is divided into five regions, which are then subdivided into 17 districts and 67 areas. In each area there is a planning committee made up of local people who discuss the problems and possible solutions which are the core of a long range program to be developed. This planning committee also helps the agents to develop an annual plan of work toward the solution of the problems. Extension work is basically an educational program that encompasses information, orientation and technical assistance and has as its ultimate objective the improvement of the standard of living and general welfare of the rural population, including adults and youth. Agents devote 25 to 40 percent of their time to youth development work through 4-H Clubs of boys and girls.[102]

The superior educational council is by law the accrediting agency of all institutions of higher learning in Puerto Rico:

> [There] is hereby established an accrediting system for colleges and other private educational institutions which offer advanced courses of study in the sciences, the arts, philosophy, professional and technical subjects and any others of superior level to those of the high school. The accrediting system so established shall apply to all colleges or institutions of higher learning heretofore or hereafter established in Puerto Rico.[103]

The law states further:

> The University of Puerto Rico shall be the official agency in charge of fixing the standards to be met, the values of capacity and efficiency to be possessed, and the requisites to be complied with by any of the aforesaid centers of higher learning, in order to obtain recognition and, as a consequence, be invested with public authority in keeping with the exercise of their cultural and educational function. The formulation of said standards in values and requisites, as well as their accessory regulation, shall lie with such members of the faculty and the administration of the University as may be designated therefor by the Chancellor of the University, or with members of other educational centers or agencies also designated by the Chancellor of the University, and the final approval thereof shall lie with the Superior Educational Council.[104]

Dr. Frank H. Bowles has these further comments relative to the university law:

> Without going into the colonial origins of the law which were responsible for some of its unusual features, it may be noted that it produces, by the status it gives the Secretary of Education, a situation in which an appointive officer of the government and a member of the governor's cabinet sits ex officio as presiding officer of the University's governing board and on occasion casts the deciding vote with respect to University policy. But the situation is even more

> complex. The same officer as Secretary of Education is responsible for the system of public instruction which prepares the bulk of the University's students. This system is also the largest single employer of University graduates (as teachers) and by setting the terms of employment, has a large measure of control over the curriculum of the largest school in the University (Pedagogía). As Secretary of Education responsible for the system of public instruction he has a public responsibility which is comparable to the public responsibility of the Rector of the University for the system of public higher education. Yet the Rector of the University reports to the Superior Educational Council under the Presidency of the Secretary of Education, while the Secretary of Education does not report to any governing board. It is true that the Superior Educational Council is charged by law with the coordination of public instruction and higher education, but its functions are undefined, and the law makes no provision for enforcement.
>
> In operation this law has produced a small Board of Trustees composed of distinguished and well qualified individuals who meet infrequently to consider reports from the Rector and to discharge its legal responsibilities with respect to the budget and nominations for major posts. The Council through its permanent staff undertakes studies of Puerto Rican education, but has not planned or directed planning studies or projections of University development. It works ordinarily as a committee of the whole and has no regularly functioning permanent committees dealing with University policies, plans or operations.
>
> In the light of these comments the Council must be viewed as accepting a limited role in the governance and control of the University. Part of this is due to the fact that its President has professional duties with the system of Public Instruction which are his primary and asborbing duties * * * part of it is due to the fact that the only real powers of control which the Council has are so drastic (dismissal of the Rector, rejection of the budget, disapproval of nominations for administrators) that with its limited membership and infrequent meetings it is reluctant to employ them, and part of it is due to the fact that the Council is not large enough to maintain functioning sub-committees which keep them abreast of University plans and problems.[105]

In the section of this report that deals with population there is a summary of the enrollment problems faced by the university. There is also a summary of the official projection figures for university population which are predicted up to 1980 and other pertinent analyses intimately related to the population explosion and the consequently increased demand for college and university education.

In his 1962 report to the superior educational council, the chancellor describes the university situation in this manner:

> The following propositions summarize what in my judgment are the basic factors in the University situation. First, it is a center of studies in constant growth. Second, our job is to facilitate and to intensify this growth and to see that it takes place at the highest possible level. Third, we lack the necessary resources to comply fully with the above task. The achievements, innovations, successes, failures, hopes and difficulties at the University are the results of the interaction of these three propositions.[106]

In the same report the chancellor gives a quantitative picture of the growth of the university and the future perspective in this respect:

From the date of its establishment in 1903 the University of Puerto Rico has grown at an accelerated rate. Sometimes the increase in enrollment, in programs, in faculty, has seemed overwhelming. During the past thirty years the enrollment has doubled every ten years. In 1933–34 enrollment reached 1,077; in 1943–44 it went up to 6,083; in 1953–54 up to 12,151; in 1963–64 there were 22,959 students. The same doubling every ten years appears when the size of graduating classes is noted. During the 1940–49 decade the number of graduates totalled 10,304. In 1950–59 the total was 21,355. The number of graduates during the five-year period from 1960 to 1964 (16,881) suggests that 1960–69 will produce more than 40,000, since the number of graduates in the second half of the decade may be expected considerably to exceed the number in the first half. As the number of graduates increases every year, it is to be predicted that the total for the next five years will surpass the 23,000 mark. Fortunately, as soon as our graduates finish their studies (and in the past, even before doing so) they are welcomed into the leadership cadres of the country.[107]

On the basis of this analysis the chancellor poses and answers the following question:

WHY INCREASE HIGHER EDUCATION ENROLLMENTS?

It should be noted that unless there should be a catastrophe in the life of Puerto Rico there is no possibility of checking the rate of increase in the number seeking higher education. On the contrary, everything seems to indicate that this rate will increase. This is evident if we examine the data which show the increase in the number of high school graduates, of applications for admission to the University and of applications for transfers to the University from other institutions. Furthermore, the following factors will increase the pressure in favor of the broadest educational opportunities:

1. **The increase in the urban population in relation to the rural population will result in longer retention in school.**
2. **The increase in family incomes and the continuing upward spiral of the economy will themselves require higher educational levels.**
3. **The development of regional colleges will make possible the enrollment of students who could not otherwise afford this opportunity.**
4. **University enrollments in four-year programs will increase in contrast with two-year programs as has already occurred in the College of Education and in the College of Business Administration. This is stimulated by the greater general prosperity as well as by the demand for better preparation.**
5. **The growth of high school programs will bring with it an increase in university enrollment.**
6. **The demand for university college preparation as a qualification for supervisory jobs will produce greater interest in the completion of university studies.**
7. **The growing use of mechanization and technology in the process of production and distribution will accentuate the demand for university-trained personnel. Furthermore it will increase the number of fields of employment requiring professional workers or workers with special training.**

The argument in favor of strengthening universities rests on the belief that there is a direct correlation between a higher level of preparation and the advancement of the best interests both of the individual and of the society. Our request for solid public support of a program of expansion and strengthening of this University in the coming years is based on the validity of this correlation.

> **The experience of the past twenty years has established as axiomatic the principle that superior knowledge is the most powerful and effective force for social transformation in the modern world. Thus its acquisition, diffusion, and expansion constitute a primary objective and a basic investment in contemporary society.[108]**

Other important aspects of university development.—The university has 1,932 members of the faculty of which 536 have doctors degrees (27.7 percent), 970 have finished their masters degrees (50.5 percent), 330 have a B.A. degree (17.3 percent), and 96 have degrees conferred by European or Latin American universities (4.5 percent). These data acquire more significance when it is added that in 1941–42 the total number of teachers—inclusive of the School of Tropical Medicine—was only 352 of which 68 or 18 percent had a doctorate, 150 or 42.6 percent had a masters degree, 96 or 27.3 percent had a B.A., and 38 (10.8 percent) were not even classified in any of the above categories.[109] [110]

From 1939–40 to 1962–63 the university has conferred a total of 44,880 degrees, certificates, and diplomas. The Río Piedras campus has conferred 38,117 of these, 4,893 have been conferred by Mayagüez campus and 1,870 by the medical schools.[111]

The functional budget of the university has gone up from $1,476,129 in 1942–43 to $37,070,471 for the academic year 1965–66. The agricultural experiment station had a budget of $273,694 in 1942–43 and $4,058,627 for 1965–66; and agricultural extension service had $386,411 for 1942–43 and $3,454,258 for 1965–66. It is to be noted that these amounts do not include amounts assigned for physical plant facilities or operating funds for auxiliary agencies.

During the last 10 years the university has doubled the number of classrooms. Equipment and laboratory space also had a notable increase, about 200 percent,[112] in Mayagüez and 509 percent in Río Piedras.

The generous plan of leaves granted to members of the university faculty has been one of the most outstanding programs of the university. It has offered the opportunity to hundreds of faculty members to improve their training. More than 1,655 such leaves have been granted during the last 22 years at a total cost of over $5,651,839.[113]

The University of Puerto Rico administers the largest scholarship program in the island. This program includes students, faculty and employees. The funds come mainly from Government sources. The students' scholarship program is designed to assure opportunity for education to the greatest possible number of able young people. Its main feature is that economic shortcomings should not deprive able students from acquiring a university education. It has been a very successful program and has helped bring into the Government and private sectors a larger number of able and well-trained persons.

The university has been an important factor in the development of Puerto Rico. The question is, had there been a more equitable distribution of responsibilities between the members of the administration, the faculty and the students; had there been a more democratic process of consultation, had the faculty and heads of departments been more frequently consulted; had their views been taken into consideration more generously in orientation, programing and decision making, would it not have been possible, with the resources made available to the institution, to have much better results and benefits for the people of Puerto Rico?

Problems and challenges facing institutions of higher learning in Puerto Rico.—Before discussing the opportunities for higher education in Puerto Rico, it is pertinent to mention what part of this task has been shared by the private institutions of higher learning. As in the case of the elementary and secondary education, the educational task at the college and university level is shared both by public and private institutions. During the last 5 school years public and private accredited institutions of higher learning enrollment has been distributed in the following proportions:

School year	Enrollment			Private enrollment as percent of total
	Public university	Accredited private colleges and universities	Total	
1960-61	18,893	7,647	26,540	28.81
1961-62	21,262	8,911	30,173	29.53
1962-63	21,892	9,849	31,741	31.03
1963-64	22,959	10,372	33,331	31.12
1964-65	24,809	12,025	36,834	32.65

Preliminary enrollment figures for 1965–66 indicate a record enrollment at the college and university level of 40,681 students of which 26,482 are enrolled at the public university and 14,199, or 34.90 percent, are enrolled at private accredited colleges and universities.

A larger proportion of the enrollment at this level is increasingly being taken care of by the private institutions. This is due in part to the lack of a more rapid growth of the public facilities. This can be attested by the fact that the public university has been increasing its entrance requirements in the face of an ever increasing number of applicants year after year.

Let us examine now some of the problems and challenges facing institutions of higher learning in Puerto Rico.

What is the real opportunity of admission in higher education institutions?—Not all the students who reach the 12th grade in high school can graduate. In 1964 some 20,392 out of 21,950 who started the 12th year of high school at the beginning of the school year could graduate. That is, of the 25 that reached 12th grade for each 100 that entered the 1st grade 11 years before, only 23.5 graduated at the end of the school year. On the other hand, the total enrollment of the first year in all university-level institutions of Puerto Rico in 1964–65 was 9,915 students. Of these 9,915 students, about 20 percent were not freshmen. Thus only 8 out of each 10 opportunities were available for the new high school graduates.

If this situation repeats itself next year, this would imply that of each 100 high school students graduating in May, only 40 can be enrolled in one of our universities in August 1965. On the basis of opportunities available in 1964–65, of these 40, 21 can enroll at the University of Puerto Rico, 11 at the Inter-American University, 4 at the Catholic University, 3 at the Puerto Rico Junior College, and 1 girl in the College of the Sacred Heart.

And what will probably be the situation faced by the high school graduates in the future? A report published by the office of research of the superior educational council in November 1964 entitled Enrollment Projections for the Educational System in Puerto Rico—1965–80, includes a series of projections of the first year, university level enrollment. According to the projections recommended to be used as guides in reference to opportunities of admission to university level institutions available for high school graduates, the first-year enrollment of public and accredited private university level institutions of Puerto Rico will be 22,355 students in the school year 1979–80 (according to the projections, with more probabilities of approaching what will be expected to happen in this level of the Puerto Rican educational system). Graph V shows this projection of the first-year enrollment contrasted with the projection of high school graduates which is likely to be expected.

If the projection of 22,355 first-year students of university level institutions materializes, this will imply that during 1979–80 the universities will accommodate 55 out of each 100 students who graduate in 1979–80 from the public and accredited private high schools of Puerto Rico. This is indeed a conservative projection considering that although it doubles the absolute number of 9,915 of first-year students enrolled in these institutions, it only implies that in 1979–80 we will have succeeded in providing university level opportunities to 55 percent of the high school graduates compared with the present situation which offers these opportunities to only 49 percent of them. In other words, if in 1964 of each 100 graduating students 51 had to find a place in other institutions, in 1979 of each 100 graduating students 45 will have to find this opportunity outside of the university. And if we attain these figures, by that time the number of opportunities for admission to the first year of the university will have to be more than double. Summarizing, the long-term prospects for the opportunities of enrollment of our high school graduates in institutions of higher education, even if enrollment is doubled at this level, shall not be proportionately better than for those who graduate in May 1965 or in May 1964.

Tables 10 and 11 show the relation between the number of high school graduates for the school years 1958–59 to 1964–65, and the applications for admission at the University of Puerto Rico and Catholic University of Puerto Rico, the number of students admitted, and finally the number who enrolled in both institutions.[114] These tables show the great demand for opportunities of study which the institutions of higher education in Puerto Rico face.

Of the 100,099 high school students who graduated (public and accredited private schools) in the 6 years from 1958–59 to 1963–64, 58,623 (almost 59 percent of the total) asked for admission to the University of Puerto Rico during the 6 years from 1959–60 to 1964–65. Of this total of applicants, 27,283 (only 46.5 percent) were admitted to the university and of these 27,283, about 23,422 (40.0 percent of the 58,623) were enrolled. In other words, during the last 6 years, 59 out of 100 high school graduates applied for admission at the University of Puerto Rico; 27 were admitted and only 23 enrolled as freshmen.

Catholic University received during these years a total of 7,891 applications for admission out of the 100,099 high school graduates, which means that 8 percent of these graduates applied for admission in this institution. Of these 7,891 applications, Catholic University admitted 6,077, or 77 percent. Only 4,800 of the 6,077, however, were enrolled at the first-year level; that is, 60.8 percent of the applicants were effectively enrolled at this institution. In conclusion, out of each 100 high school graduates during the last 6 years, 8 applied for admission at Catholic University, 6 were admitted, and 5 enrolled in the first year.

We must point out that in relation to applicants and students admitted there may be duplication, as there are students who apply for admission to more than one university level institution at the same time, trying to be sure of admission in one of them. Nevertheless, there is no duplication in the number that actually enrolls in the first year and so one may arrive at the conclusion that of every 100 high school graduates in the last 6 years the University of Puerto Rico and the Catholic University of Puerto Rico admitted 28 to the first year.

Those who think that were will always be opportunity for entrance in universities outside of Puerto Rico should again think over the situation. At the moment there is everywhere a great pressure to gain admittance to superior education. In some educational circles of the United States, the idea is expressed that for the next school year an increase in applications for admittance is expected and this increase will be over 40 percent of the 1964 applications. The facilities opened by the Federal Government through scholarship programs, economic help, provision of physical facilities, better salaries, etc., will make that pressure more notable, and there will be a greater demand for excellency and potentialities in the candidates for admittance to universities and colleges. University enrollment increased from 2,659,000 in 1950 to 4,800,000 in 1964 in the United States. There is a similar phenomenon in European universities and, to an increasing degree, in Latin America.

According to some recent reports, the students who are more likely to gain entrance are those with higher general ability and higher grades. For example, Yale University had 5,462 applicants but only 1,062 were admitted. Three out of every 10 students admitted had the first or second place in rank in their high school.

There will be more need of knowledge in the future, and there will be more pressure to get it. It will be necessary to utilize a greater diversity of educational means in order to have this knowledge reach everyone, according to his needs. Undoubtedly our welfare will depend more each day on trained talent and on the ethical and moral use of the knowledge placed at the service of man.

What can be done to remedy this situation?—School enrollment projections, the retention graphs we have analyzed, school dropouts, and the lack of skilled personnel to cover the technical and professional jobs created, show the need of a more accurate planning at all educational levels.

The unjustified fluctuations in the number of students who move from one level to the other in the educational system, the organizations that do not provide for the gradual, proportioned promotion of students in the ascending school scale, the reorganizations that use the whole system or a great part of it as guinea pig, the stagnated and even decreasing retention in some school levels, the great number of high school graduates who do not have adequate alternatives to choose from for the development of their capacities, in harmony with their interests and preferences, evaluations made without points of reference or when desired, to serve propagandistic rather than scientific canons, among other factors—a situation which has been pointed out year after year, in different studies—demand a more scientific, reliable planning in all the formal educational system. It is urgent to harmonize more effectively plans of articulation between secondary schools and the university level of education. This problem has been discussed for decades and it still is begging for a solution. For these and other reasons, we have advocated a total reorganization of the educational system, from nursery schools, and kindergartens to graduate and postgraduate levels of the superior education. To talk about a university reform independently of reform in the preceding levels of the educational system, to talk about autonomous regional colleges without having prepared a master plan for educational development that responds to present and future needs of the people of Puerto Rico, is to continue growing up like mushrooms.

We will add more buildings, more millions to the budget, more and more novelties; we will continue our fights for more and more funds while the product of this investment will be like fruit trees that grow and grow, and its fruits, offset by the vicious growth, are not well developed. There is a need to consolidate and strengthen what is good and to create new things, but the new things are not to be used without having been studied. We have suffered much because of novelties. The quality of education should show itself in the citizens' behavior, in their ideals, in their values, in the depth of their convictions. In this aspect some observations made by a reputed social anthropologist who studies aspects of our life are significant. He has recently stated that he notices in our daily life much superficiality, much acting just to let others see, much acting out; much movement, but little depth. Education needs rest to be thought over again; generosity in its leaders, laboriousness in its managers, vision in its leaders. Education—much more so in a country that has faith in its potentialities—should not substitute propaganda for truth.

In 1947, in the study of the research office of the superior educational council, "Problemas de educación en Puerto Rico," we made the statement that follows, which we used at the beginning of Chapter 6 of the Survey of the Educational System: "As our resources are so scarce, in the development of our educational system we should be guided by an eagerness for original creation." This statement gains such urgency at the present moment that we are forced to repeat it, conscious of the fact that more quantities of money, though necessary, are not by themselves the only solution to the problem under consideration.

Educational planning at university level, for example, will not be carried out adequately as long as we lack studies on the following: Utilization of available space; the academic load of the faculty and the timetable of investigators; the results of the admission policy followed; institutional costs; enrollment projections not only of the university level but also of elementary and secondary schools, both public and private; the demands of different professions and of technical and humanistic fields; programing of courses and careers in harmony with those demands; teaching of technical and research personnel; the proportion of administrators to faculty members; the quality, contents, and need of extension courses, and field services; scholarship programs, economic aids, and leaves of absence in relation to the variety of demands and situations; the control and standards systems that facilitate the functioning of the university. The concept of the relationship that should exist between the university that prepares professionals and the different government departments that use those persons in their programs who graduate from the university, should be included in that planning. There should be an awareness of our relations with our neighbors from the north and south and a more deliberate idea of where we should direct our steps. Until criteria that facilitate periodic evaluation are adopted, we will not be able to approach a knowledge of what we are getting with the efforts we are making. These are some of the elements that go into a good planning of university education, and all this fits into the picture of what we hope will be the course of Puerto Rico within the next 10, 15, 20 or more years. Of course, all plans for the future should be flexible, within probabilities deliberately analyzed and studied. This will not be attained if it is formulated only on the bases of guesses or momentary inspirations. We must admit, in justice, that some of these elements have been taken into consideration and some of these criteria have been put into practice.

If the University of Puerto Rico is going to make the best use of the money the legislature generously assigns to it, it must work on the basis of the best planning of economic and human resources. Planning cannot be done, either, exclusively on the basis of administrators' criteria. The experience and knowledge of all the sectors that make up the institution—professors, students, and administrators—must be used in that planning. This does not mean that students are going to determine the guides to be followed; it means that they should be heard in relation to facilities, rules, standards, and practices that will affect them directly. Not to count on the faculty would be to limit things extremely.

Superior education is moving fast to be able to keep up with, and if possible, to get ahead of, the rapid changes that occur in our society. Training for the different careers has changed in a marked way. Agriculture is not the same today as yesterday; trade is different; there are many new kinds of tools and fertilizing techniques. Business administration training is today completely different from what it was 10 years ago. There are today electronic machines, computers, chains of stores, supermarkets. The medical profession has changed and it changes from month to month. The heart is operated on, kidneys are transplanted, the body is frozen to facilitate operations, there are magic drugs and antibiotics.

One of the most conservative professions, the teaching profession, has had to take charge of the radio, television, recorders, metronoscopes, and the new courses in science and mathematics, activated by the sputniks. Geographical concepts are altered, social sciences have such dynamism that they force the professor to gallop to be able to maintain himself partly informed of what happens in the society in which he lives. In such a world, planning, orientation, and reliable, informed scientific direction, are urgent.

In order to understand better the key problems of the University of Puerto Rico it is advisable to resort to excerpts from various reports made by the Middle States Association of Colleges & Secondary Schools, which is the accrediting body of the University of Puerto Rico, the team of experts whose reports form part of the most recent "Study of the Educational System of Puerto Rico," and other sources which in one way or another present the basic issues confronting the institution. There have been in recent years dozens of studies of the university. On pages 2028 to 2040 of the report of the "Study of the Educational System" are summarized the positive and negative aspects of the university shown in not less than 13 of the most important of said studies and reports. This constant flow of studies and experts, prompted Dr. Frank H. Bowles to state:

> * * * it is patently useless to attempt further comments on details of governance, administration, standards, curriculum, or other operational matters. The fact is that the University of Puerto Rico, over a period of nearly twenty years, has been, largely on its own initiative, so examined, studied and reviewed that the chances of producing commentary on any of these points which will add to the knowledge already accumulated are negligible.[115]

The Middle States Association in its report of November 1959, reaffirms Bowles' comments.

Although some positive changes have recently taken place forced by the faculty and students' unrest, by the criticisms of reports and by the pressure for university reform, most of the main recommendations of these reports, and precisely the most significant, are still unattended to by the administration of the institution.

The following are some of these significant aspects relative to the university:

QUALITATIVE CONSIDERATIONS

Certain qualitative considerations characteristics of the situation require rehearsal here.

1. The University is suffering from excessive contemplation. Never has there been an institution which has been so supersaturated with experts, evaluators, observers, advisors, paid and unpaid, skilled and unskilled. In Latin America, too, everybody considers himself a qualified critic on any subject and the University is no exception.

The University has looked (up) too long or too much to the *norteamericanos.* There has been a constant flow of advice to the University. Too, the magnetic draw of the exotic, irenical Caribbean makes it easy for the University to secure skilled advice and consultation from the Continent. Many people would volunteer—the University pays them.

The University is now the repository of more suggestions and recommendations for improvement than it could possibly give practical effect to in years to come. Some of this advice (and it occurs more often than chance would suggest) is contradictory, both with itself and with the purposes of the University. Some experts have avoided making the small errors as they swept on to the grand fallacy. One man's baby has sometimes been another man's bathwater.

The University needs to be left alone. By the same token it needs to give practical effect to much that it already knows.

2. The University is a product, in its purposes, curriculum, administration and so on, of its own peculiar milieu, composed of two traditions: the democratic, new-world American and the authoritarian, aristocratic, old-world Spanish. Some would suggest that there is a separate Caribbean—Latin American influence. Sometimes this uniqueness has been ignored or forgotten by those advising the University.

For instance, both English and Spanish are required languages in the undergraduate curriculum. Such a dual emphasis necessarily results in less provision for curricular depth in other areas.

The Chancellor has, by law, extraordinary powers as the chief executive officer. One is reminded of Mosaic sovereignty (take your choice between the biblical or Knickerbocker variety). Such authority was, perhaps, necessary for the development of the University under any circumstances immediately after reform measures were instituted in the '40's. But it is also quite possible that the University's Spanish tradition had something to do with the statutory provisions affecting the institution.

3. Deriving from the second circumstance that the University is a product of its own milieu, it should be noted that substantially more than is characteristic of a continental institution, the University of Puerto Rico is an integral part of its culture. Much more than is the case on the mainland, the University is on intimate terms with the vital and vibrant thrust and purpose of its people. It is hard to convey the difference. It is typical of Latin American institutions that they are less distinct from their general communities.

That fine phrase *Alma Mater* has a richness and cogency of meaning for the people of Puerto Rico which approaches a biological literalness. Its life is their own. The University is, to use Cardinal Newman's term, a "fostering mother."

But the University, because it is also unlike Latin American institutions, is considerably more stable than they are.

Thus, "the University of Puerto Rico is neither the relatively isolated and socially autonomous university of the United States nor the politicized and shaky institution typical of many Latin American communities undergoing significant social transformation," to use the Chancellor's recent words.

The Island's basic needs—social, cultural, political, scientific and civil—are just as much the concern of the University as are the more usual academic values and functions such as imparting knowledge, searching for truth, academic freedom, and so on.

4. It is important to know that in a very real sense the University stands squarely in the land-grant college tradition. This orientation has implications for the University somewhat different from those to be derived from the other qualitative influences mentioned.

For one thing, this means that the University is committed to the extension of educational opportunity to the greatest possible numbers of those who can profit from it and desire it.

The University, as will be shown, is not fulfilling this commitment which is the first of two pillars characterizing American higher education. Neither is it well advanced in implementing the second mandate of American higher education, namely, an education on the highest level of skills in all advanced fields of learning.

An implication of the land-grant philisophy of the University is that, should it seek additional advice from continental consultants, these should in fair measure be drawn from educational contexts deriving from a similar orientation. Too often in the past the University advisors, drawn primarily or exclusively from private institutions and background, have surveyed it with a biased angle of vision. What is thus recommended sometimes reflects the prejudices of an outlook and purpose wholly incompatible with a different humanistic inspiration and philosophical persuasion. Whole answers do not emerge nor are some of them even appropriate.

Columbia, in particular, as a source of advice and advisors, has been a tremendous influence on the Island and in the life of the University. But cannot a legitimate question be posed here? When even two of the University's small number of trustees are faculty members of this distinguished continental institution, should not the University seek to diversify the origin of its advice? One institution as a source of influence can be neither infallible nor omniscient.

5. The institution has a number of pressing problems. Probably none of them is different from those experienced by continental institutions. But as an advisor of the University has suggested, the "University is unique in that it exhibits the whole range of possible problems".

The relative youth of the University; its inexperience; its rapid expansion; its culture: the hunger for education as a part of the new familiar "revolution of rising expectations" in which Puerto Rico is also a participant; mixed with the explosions familiar to the rest of us of population, knowledge, and its practical application; these things would complicate the life of any administration and any faculty.

Add to these a conflict of several personalities and charges of political interference and activity, and one gains some insight into the problems of the University and its Chief executive officer. Sometimes those on the Island, both within and without the University, believe their educational problems to be unique; that their weaknesses are not familiar elsewhere. But much of the concern about the University and its current criticisms are manifestations of a rather universal and warm interest in education today. The tendency to blame education in America for all our troubles is not without example in Puerto Rico. Education is played just as close to the chests of Puerto Ricans as it is to the American bosom. Fecundity overwhelms it in both places.

Such understandings do not solve problems; but they can bring serenity and mutual understanding which make problems easier to cope with.[110]

Dr. Frank H. Bowles in his report, previously quoted, has this to say:

1. GROWTH AND PRESENT STATUS

The development of the University of Puerto Rico during the past twenty years stands, by any standard that may be applied, as a major achievement. During this period, what was in fact a relatively small, poorly equipped college with a poorly trained, underpaid, and overworked faculty, a meager and outmoded program of studies, and generally poor academic standards, has become a complex university with a large enrollment, greatly improved facilities, including many excellent new buildings, good equipment, a much improved faculty, a diverse program of studies, and academic standards which, while not uniformly strong, are at least much higher than they were at the beginning of the development. Even considering all present deficiencies, this development stands as a remarkable achievement.

The achievement is not the product of the work of any one man, or even any identifiable group of men, though much credit for it must go to the relatively small group of men, including the present Chancellor, who provided the original leadership, and to governmental policies which supplied political, moral, and financial support during the recurrent crises of the first stages of development. Beyond this leadership and its essential support, there are many others—individuals, groups, and organizations—who had an important share in the creation of the present university—young graduates of the university who cut short their own studies to accept administrative tasks which they mastered by trial and error, often remaining at the university at a personal sacrifice instead of taking more lucrative positions elsewhere, young teachers and administrators from other colleges and universities who brought their interests and enthusiasms to the development of new programs, universities in the continental United States assisting through scholarship grants in the training of prospective faculty members, foundations that supported new undertakings and gave freely of their advice and counsel, and, not least in the roster of credits, the people of Puerto Rico who responded to the challenge of opportunity with an eagerness which literally forced the institution into a growth that would have been unbelievable to those who had known it in earlier days.

As a consequence of this change, Puerto Rico has received from its many investments of money and of the time and faith of men and women who devoted themselves to teaching and administration benefits which are literally incalculable. It has had civil servants and public administrators for a new and vigorous government, teachers for an expanding school system, engineers for its buildings and its public works, specialists and technicians for its growing industry, professional men to meet expanding needs in law and medicine, scientists and technicians to improve its agriculture.

Not all of these accomplishments have been well done. There have been mistakes, programs badly planned and ineptly administered, stubborn refusals to change when change was needed, poor use of skills, poor choice of men, needless misunderstandings, unedifying bickerings, failures in cooperation, public exhibitions of ill will. But, despite all of these, in the weighing of credits and debits, the university stands today as an accomplishment in which the people of Puerto Rico may have a justified pride. More important, despite its faults and problems, it stands as the base on which another great advance in education may be supported.

2. PROBLEMS, PRESENT AND FUTURE

The university as it stands today faces what may well seem to the observer an almost limitless series of problems. Some of these problems are external, having to do with relations to other branches of government and to other organizations and groups. But these problems, despite their ominous aspects, are not the university's true problems. They affect individuals and sometimes hamper decision making and cooperative planning, but they do not, at least in their present form, endanger the mission or the standards, or the intellectual stature of the university. To the extent that these are threatened, the true threat lies within the university.

The university's internal problems may be divided into three groups: academic development, administration, and finance.

The problem of academic development is a serious, perhaps a fateful, one for the university. It has been built for twenty years in terms of the concept of the provision of opportunity. Opportunity in Puerto Rico has long been masked and inhibited by low economic potential combined with an accumulated academic deficit of staggering size, a deficit which, if it could be computed, would have to be measured not in terms of minimum literary standards, but rather in terms of the preparation—or lack of it—of a large percentage of the labor force for the tasks of an industrializing society. Because of these two factors, the University has been developed in terms of very low costs to students (achieved by large subsidies per student) and relative ease of admission.

In the course of this development, little attention has been given—perhaps only very little attention could be given—to the lifting of academic horizons through research, investigation, advanced study, and the creation of new knowledge. It may be argued that the length of radius of its academic horizon is the true measure of an institution and that a University whose horizons have a short radius is not a true university but an overgrown college. However, this argument is beside the present point which is the practical one that a university which cannot provide at least the fundamentals of advanced training for its prospective teachers must rely on other institutions to make up for its own deficiencies. In a small institution this is not a serious problem for it can draw its new teachers and scholars from other institutions, but in a large one the problem assumes major proportions. It would not be fair to say that the University of Puerto Rico has ignored this problem for it has developed a program for training its faculty members in other institutions, but it is fair to say that the size of the problem has outgrown the solution and that the present program cannot supply the trained faculty members the University requires. If it supplies the numbers, the individuals cannot all have time to reach the level of education desired; if it obtains the level of education required, it cannot have the numbers. Thus, in a sense, the University has outgrown its program, for it now requires more and better faculty training than it can obtain. Its only alternative for the training of young faculty now remains the establishment of a true graduate program. With such a program it can attain a new measure of internal self-sufficiency and in the process extend the radius of its academic horizons, entering the company of the great universities which draw students and scholars from other institutions. It has, of course, the alternative of recruiting mature faculty from other institutions, but this can hardly be a large-scale process. Ordinarily, faculty recruiting of this type is done for the purpose of strengthening rather than enlarging a faculty.

The problem of academic development has another aspect aside from the scholarly one. This is the need for opportunity, and it is one which may be ignored easily in the course of preoccupation with new programs and new levels of academic prestige. The University of Puerto Rico has not entirely neglected the provision of opportunity at the lower end of the academic spectrum, but it has treated it as, at best, an incidental and pro forma operation. Actually, the University's growth has not liquidated Puerto Rico's academic deficit, but in some ways has accentuated it by widening the gap between those who have achieved a measure of education and those who have not. Such a gap is always a tragedy and, at worst, it is a danger to the political health of a state. The problem of closing the gap is not a glamorous one, for it can be closed only by the patient building of educational foundations; it is, however, a task that is inherent in the responsibilities of educational leadership. To close it the University must build a new program; if necessary, define new forms of University activity; and carry its programs deeply into the communal structure of the Island. In such a program it is not important that the standards or the subjects be those of the basic university curriculum, but that there be standards and subjects which will draw new groups of students within the University's reach and influence. Such a program cannot instantly wipe out an educational deficit for it will not succeed on a large scale in educating men and women who are already grown up to the highest university standard, but it can add to the stature of individuals who, importantly, may be the parents of university students to come.

The problem of administration, present and future, is of a different order from the academic problem. Any administration has essentially two tasks: to operate a going concern, and to plan its later forms and developments.

With respect to the first of these tasks, the present administration, despite faults and troubles, does function. It is obviously overcentralized; it is often inexplicably slow-moving, sometimes indecisive, sometimes inefficient, and always obviously overworked, but it does operate a going concern.

However, with respect to the second of its responsibilities, the view is less favorable. In the face of clear needs and problems to be faced, the University has no apparent plans save with respect to physical expansion. Such major problems as coordination of instruction, simplification of organization, the building of a graduate school, the development of student exchange with continental universities, the expansion of faculty to deal with the certainty of increased enrollment, the reorganization of administration to handle an expanded program, the provision for students now excluded by the present admission standards (which is assuredly part of a public university's responsibility), the extension of university programs into communities which now have no contact with them, closer cooperation with industry—all of these are known and admitted problems, but there are at best only fragments of plans for dealing with them, and few of these fragments have reached the point of presentation in operating form, nor have there been any projections of cost, faculty requirements, or facilities to be required.

If it be assumed that the University has grown to its present position according to plan, then it must be said, first, that the plan contained some obvious gaps which have been filled in with improvisation and, second, that the plan is now outgrown. If such be the case, then the University faces a direct danger—the danger of planless growth.

If the University is to serve Puerto Rico in the future as it has on the whole served well for the past two decades, it must begin by facing the fact that its present program and organization are inadequate to meet new demands for knowledge and training. It has already been noted that the program of faculty training is not providing enough faculty with enough training, and that there is no university-wide organization of instruction. It has not been emphasized that, while these are not uncommon problems in institutions that have grown rapidly, they are effective—indeed, disastrously effective barriers to further growth.

Thus, while it is unimportant that the majority of its teachers are drawn from its own student body, it is important that the number who have attained academic distinction is too small to provide leadership for a university—and that some who have done so have left the University—and it is important that it appears difficult to find new teachers of the quality required.

It is perhaps unimportant that the responsibility for coordination of instruction is placed in the hands of a junta of deans who have only advisory powers, but it is very important that because of lack of coordination it has proved impossible to develop an all-university effort to establish a graduate school. In fact, the lack of coordination tends to confine programs within their present boundaries and thus to actively inhibit growth and development.

It is by no means unimportant that both the faculty and the student body are without organization or effective voice, but the issues as to the nature and details of organization for each of these bodies are not nearly as important as the question of the purpose of organization. Presently, without any voice, both bodies are unclear as to their role in the University and have confused the issue of their own desire for a measure of self-government with the issue of responsibility for administrative decisions affecting students and faculty.

These items, then, are examples of limitations imposed by what is essentially unfinished academic housekeeping. This housekeeping must be done before effective plans can be made. This is a problem, but not an insuperable one for all of these matters can be dealt with. Taken all together, they do not represent as much of a task as the reorganization of the University in 1942.

Assuming the creation of a climate favorable to planning, the University must then face certain other facts:

First, the University as the dominant educational force in Puerto Rico, must be for Puerto Rico what all of higher education is for the continental United States. That is, it must provide excellence and diversity at the same time, must meet local needs, or see them go unmet, or sit by as other instrumentalities are created to meet them with inevitable wastage and duplication of effort.

Second, the University, though dominant, cannot be dictatoral. It cannot prescribe the detailed behavior of other institutions, limit their programs, fail to work with them on common problems, or deny such common institutional rights as the certification of teachers or the introduction of experimental programs.

Third, the compiling of statistics and projections is not planning but the raw material of planning. The construction of a new building without consideration of the program for which it may be used in twenty years is to accept the risk, perhaps the certainty, of premature obsolescence, and the opening of a new program without calculating the demand for its offerings or its effects upon the university curriculum is to court academic disaster. Buildings and programs follow upon a findings of need, but the need is determined not by numbers but by use, and the determination of use is the essence of planning.

> *Fourth*, the University's present level of financial support and, more importantly, its present philosophy of support which subsidizes between two-thirds and nine-tenths of the cost of a student's education cannot survive as a basis for forward planning. The experience of continental state universities has established that tax support cannot be expanded indefinitely and it cannot be otherwise, in the long run, in Puerto Rico. In the future, the best can be hoped for is the provision of expansion capital plus a modest subsidy for educational costs to be drawn from tax sources. Inescapably, Puerto Rican students must pay a larger part of their direct educational costs.
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> *Fifth*, plans which are based on the expectation of change also beget change. There cannot be a university plan, only a series of plans, subject to review and renewal from year to year. In the making of these plans, faculty and administration both have their roles, but these roles are determined by the statement of purposes and goals and these are a matter of policy to be determined and enforced by a governing body which cannot abdicate or delegate this responsibility.
>
> *Sixth*, change comes at a cost and it would be well having the nature of these costs understood. They cannot all be foreseen and listed in a brief statement, but certain of them are obvious. They are:
>
> (*a*) Expansion and decentralization of administration.
>
> (*b*) Expansion and decentralization of instruction, including a major development of extension and evening programs.
>
> (*c*) A detailed review and consolidation of existing programs.
>
> (*d*) An effective organization for the coordination of instruction with a reduction in prescribed courses, a reduction in the offerings of elementary courses, and an expansion of offerings for advanced courses.
>
> (*e*) A major increase in University income, including within ten years a doubling of present student fees, with such adjustments in the way of scholarship and loan programs as may be required.
>
> (*f*) A doubling of present enrollment within twenty years.
>
> (*g*) A doubling of present faculty within ten years, including the addition of a substantial number of mature teachers drawn from the faculties of other institutions.
>
> (*h*) A reworking of the present faculty training program to include use of the University's own resources for fundamental advanced training and emphasis on the use of education subsidies for experienced teachers going on for their final degree.
>
> (*i*) A doubling of faculty salaries in the upper brackets to provide adequate holding power for experienced faculty and adequate incentive for younger faculty.
>
> *Seventh*, there is no need for a further general review of the University before planning can be undertaken, nor for the importation of new consultants or specialists. The University's present problems and the general shape of its future tasks are now known. The need now is not for more reports, but for a program for utilization of the University's own resources, which include competent and devoted faculty, capable administrators, and a vast accumulation of experience. If these are applied to its problems, its problems can be solved."[117]

Dr. Frank H. Bowles further states:

> The basic and controlling fact with respect to the University of Puerto Rico is that as an educational institution it is operating below the quality standard

which is indicated by its capacities and resources, and what is more important, below the level required by the needs of Puerto Rico.

There are many causes which contribute to this fact. Some are products of its system of governance and control, some are the direct result of decisions and actions taken or not taken, some are the result of an artifically perpetuated isolation, or of failure to forecast and build in terms of approaching needs, and some, notably the poor standard of preparation of its entering students, are beyond its direct control but, indirectly are an important problem for which it must find a solution.

The problems of Puerto Rican education in general are not unlike the problems faced by educational systems in the continental United States. That is to say that they are rooted in a tremendous surge of popular demand for education which forces an over-rapid expansion of educational facilities and opportunities with an inevitable lowering of standards during the expansion period. But Puerto Rico appears to differ from many continental systems in which this expansion and the lowering of standards has taken place in that it has accepted and tried to meet the need for expansion without recognizing that standards have been lowered in the process. Thereby the lowered standards have become embedded in and have affected all tax supported education on the Island.

In these terms then, the first step in the solution of the problems of Puerto Rican education is to evaluate and reorganize the programs, to assess and reorder resources, and to reach internal agreement as to priorities—in a word to pause, evaluate, and consolidate.

The task is a large one but it is to some extent made easy by the fact that it has been repeatedly postponed and delayed. The delays have revealed, as no amount of professional probing could have revealed, the areas of strength and deficiency, and the needs not being met that must be met. In the light of what has been so revealed it is a reasonable estimate that an immediate and vigorous attack on the problem will produce noticeable improvement in educational quality within two years and a general improvement within five years.

The result of such improvement would be traceable in several very specific indicators: an increase in the number of children of school age continuing in primary and secondary school to completion of their studies; an increase in the average term of employment of primary and secondary school teachers; an increase in the percentage of college and university students who complete their studies; an increase in the number of college graduates continuing their studies to advanced degrees; and an increase in the number of university graduates trained in the professions, occupations and skills so urgently needed by the government, the educational system, the agricultural and technical enterprises and the commerce and industry of the Commonwealth. In other words, these are all problem areas which are now affected adversely by existing educational deficiencies.

As a final * * * observation it must be stated emphatically that neither administrative shifts nor paper reorganizations of programs will in themselves effect the urgently required changes. The reshaping must be an enlargement of program, a radical improvement in standards, a renewed commitment on the part of teachers, a serious drive towards quality and achievement. It must affect public policy and governance; planning and control; budget making, finance and support; administration and organization; programs and standards; student life and citizenship; faculty recruitment, tenure, pay and promotion; the relationship of secondary education and higher education; and the development of

> graduate education, adult education, technical education and international education.
>
> Such reshaping will inevitably change established patterns and standards and will require new lines of authority and control. Above all it will require a common belief in the values of education and a unity of purpose which will override the temporary discomforts of change.[118]

There is another very significant aspect of the governance of the University well taken by the late Dr. Ernest V. Hollis, head of the Division of Higher Education, Department of Health, Education, and Welfare, Office of Education of the United States, who, although not in his official capacity, studied and reported on the Organization for the Governing and Administering Higher Education in Puerto Rico (August 4, 1959) for the Study of the Educational System of Puerto Rico.

> ROLE OF THE COUNCIL
>
> The Legislature has for the most part done a commendable job in defining the scope and character of the role of the Superior Educational Council. It has, moreover, usually delegated authority commensurate with the responsibility given to the Council. There is, however, one important exception to this generalization.
>
> Those who plan or enact legislation for the further development of the University should reappraise the intent of Section 634 of University law. This is as important as earlier recommendations for a new look at factors that should be considered in determining the Council's optimum size and composition. Section 634 reads as follows: "The Superior Educational Council shall make a survey of the educational situation in Puerto Rico, with a view to the general orientation of the educational process in harmony with the basic needs of people in a democracy, and shall formulate the normal principles that it believes valid and advisable for the system of public education in general and for the coordination of said system with the University of Puerto Rico, in its several functions. For the said purposes, the Superior Educational Council may, from time to time, make surveys of the educational problems in Puerto Rico, and shall give the results and conclusions of said surveys to the Department of Education in Puerto Rico for such use as the latter may deem advisable. The Superior Educational Council shall, in addition, study and adopt, always taking into account the declared purposes of the people of Puerto Rico in regard to its University, the cardinal objectives which are to constitute its orientation.
>
> "Does Section 634 merely express a vague but deep feeling of the representatives of the people that there ought to be better articulation and coordination between the public schools and the University? Does it lack specificity because the Legislature did not know how to secure the articulation and coordination it appears to have desired? Or did this lack flow from political opposition to the Council having any authority over the Department of Education? These questions can be answered only by those who know the history of the legislation. It is a fact, however, whatever its reasons for inaction may be, that the Council has not undertaken any substantial work to implement Section 634. Indeed, the more comprehensive survey of education in Puerto Rico, of which this report is a part, has been undertaken only after prodding from the legislature.
>
> "The first sentence of Section 634 clearly mandates the Council to set the goals for elementary, secondary, and higher education in harmony with the declared purposes of the people of Puerto Rico. The last sentence reinforces and extends

this mandate with regard to the University. The role the Legislature envisioned for the Council, in other words, is that of the planning board for all public education in Puerto Rico; but so far as elementary and secondary education is concerned, apparently all it can do is 'give the results and conclusions of said surveys to the Department of Education of Puerto Rico for such use as the latter may deem advisable.' The Council is equally without authority to enforce the mandate given it in the first sentence to develop principles and policies for articulating and coordinating the public school system with the University." [119]

Dr. Hollis continues:

> Large sums have been assigned and notable efforts made to keep the University abreast of enrollment and program demands. The Governor and the Legislature, as elected representatives of the people, have been generous in supporting the University. The Chancellor, his staff, and the faculties have been untiring in their efforts. [Here are quoted statistics to substantiate the tremendous growth of the University, that are included, up to date, in other parts of these reports.]
>
> Despite this spectacular growth, the University today has essentially the same administrative organization and operating procedures that were in use in 1942. They were inadequate and cumbersome 17 years ago, but by today's management concepts, they are archaic if not impossible. A substantial share of the distrust and waste of money and talent at the University of Puerto Rico can, without doubt, be traced to outmoded ways of doing business.
>
> It is ridiculous, for example, for the Council to try to administer an enterprise of the scope and character just sketched with only two officials that have University-wide responsibility. These two, the Chancellor and the Dean of Administration, moreover, are also the chief administrators of the Río Piedras campus.[120] And to make matters worse, they are not always sure which official hat they are wearing. The lack of a division of functions between the two adds to the confusion. As a matter of fact, the Dean of Administration is an *alter ego* of the Chancellor for units of the system outside Río Piedras and the unofficial vice chancellor of the unit there.
>
> A close-up picture of the work of the Chancellor and the Dean of Administration shows each of them trying to supervise from 20-25 subordinates. This span of control is two to three times the number management experts have found one individual can supervise satisfactorily. And what is even worse, because of the confusion between central office and Río Piedras functions, half of the 25 subordinate officials report directly to both the Chancellor and the Dean. This lack of supervision is frustrating and undesirable for all concerned, but especially so for those individuals whose responsibility and authority are only hazily defined. The situation is as great a detriment to sound administration as allowing institution-wide authority only to the Chancellor and the Dean of Administration.
>
> In so muddled an administrative situation, the emergence of anything resembling university system policies is likely to be coincidental. The Chancellor and the Dean of Administration, if it must be said plainly, are absentee landlords who give ten percent of their time to Mayagüez, San Juan, other outlying units, the agricultural experiment stations and extension services, and ninety percent of their time to the Río Piedras campus. Policies of the Commonwealth Personnel Office and the Treasury Department, to put it bluntly, do as much to coordinate the separate units of the University as to the policies and plans of the Council through the Chancellor. Indeed, a closeup look at University organization makes it clear why the Governor and his department heads have not trans-

ferred to the Council full authority to manage its funds[121] and its non-academic personnel.

The defects in organization for general administration carry over into the structure for academic administration and business administration. There are no principal officers or bodies in a position to concentrate on planning and coordination in these areas for the University system. Indeed, there is no one officer on the individual campuses who is specifically responsible for either academic or business affairs. Such an office exists for academic affairs at Río Piedras, but it has never been filled. In business affairs at this campus, the Director of Finance and the Treasurer are coordinate officers, and their administrative relationship to some six subordinates, including the University budget officer, and to Treasury Department officials is not clear. At the Mayagüez and San Juan units, the business officer's responsibility is only slightly less confused.

Defects in current academic organization, aside from a common lack of unified leadership, are of a different order to those in business administration. Here everybody is in the act and the machinery is cumbersome. And it is equally to the point to note that each group has legislative authority for its role in academic affairs. First, alumni and students are assured a channel for making their views known to the Council. Second, by statute all college teachers are assured academic freedom which the Council and the administration must honor. Next, the entire faculty (the Claustro) of a campus has certain legislative and advisory responsibilities. More specifically, the Legislature gives the faculties of some 13 colleges of the University independent statutory authority to participate in six named aspects of University affairs.

In addition, both the Río Piedras and Mayagüez units have statutory *University boards* which advise and collaborate with the Chancellor in carrying out the University program. The existence of two such bodies permits the inference that they collaborate only on local problems and that there are no University-wide policies in the vital matters with which they deal—such as by-laws, budget, personnel, promotions, faculty welfare, and student discipline.

The Council, the Chancellor, and the faculties are not unaware of the inadequacies of the University's structure and operating procedures. Indeed, their zeal for democracy and their distrust of each other may account for so many legislative enactments to protect rights that in the States are assured by governing boards by-laws and regulations. The apparent lack of mutual trust and confidence has saddled the Council with statutory provisions that highlight and tend to perpetuate the separateness of groups that ought to be united and wholeheartedly engaged in promoting a common enterprise.

RECENT REORGANIZATION PROPOSALS

While not aimed directly at the weaknesses in organization and procedures just discussed, the Chancellor and his staff and, separately, the Council, have made several limited studies which concluded with proposals for improving isolated major procedures and organizational arrangements * * *

The chaos in academic organization is so critical that in evaluating the accredited status of the University in 1954, the Middle States Association of Colleges asked that consideration be given to revising the role of the Dean of Administration, to the creation of an academic dean or vice chancellor, and to the need for better curriculum coordination and the integration of departments into larger schools and colleges. The Association also asked for more and better inter-campus relationships. In the present state of disunity and disjointed organization, nothing significant has been done to improve the four fragments of academic admin-

> istration cited as crucial needs by the Middle States Association of Colleges. [Except the appointment of a Dean of Studies.] [122]

Dr. Hollis added that:

> The first step in governing and administering so complex, large, and far-flung a university effectively calls for the abandonment of centralized administration and the strengthening of centralized policy-making and coordination. What the Council needs most is an overall policy that recognizes the University as a system of articulated institutions rather than as one large organism with tentacles in all parts of the Island. Until there is a genuine acceptance of the articulated institution concept, no useful purpose will be served by devising and adopting an organization geared to central planning, policy-making, and coordination, and to decentralized administration.[123]

In a memorandum on aspects of the organization and administration of the University of Puerto Rico, prepared for the chancellor of the University of Puerto Rico by Dr. Floyd W. Reeves, these statements are made:

> Although the Chancellor of the University of Puerto Rico has been designated as the Executive Director of the University, at no time has he been able to function fully in that capacity. It has not been possible for him to do so for two reasons: (a) a faulty administrative structure through which the University is required by law to operate, and (b) an inadequate staff of qualified persons attached directly to his own office.
>
> Among the ways in which the University has suffered because of these deficiencies are the following:
>
> 1. Public relations of the University have at times been less than satisfactory.
> 2. Planning for the long-range future of the University, including both planning to secure coordination of activities and programs within the University, and planning to secure coordination of the institution's activities with those of other public and private agencies is less complete than is desirable.
> 3. The central administrative offices at Río Piedras have not always been able to give adequate attention to programs at the Mayagüez campus, the Experiment Station, and the Agricultural Extension Service, or to the coordination of such programs with each other and with those of the colleges at Río Piedras and the Medical School at San Juan.
> 4. Inadequate attention has been given to the relationship between University programs and the programs of the elementary and secondary schools, and to ways and means through which each may strengthen the other.
> 5. Inadequate attention has been given to the possible advantages of securing some degree of decentralization of the educational programs of the University at the junior college level, as well as to the development of some mechanism through which an optimum degree of decentralization might be secured * * *
>
> I am not surprised that these weaknesses exist with the present unsatisfactory university organization. I am surprised that the University, regardless of some weakness in its structure and regardless of overburdened officers in the central administration of the University, has during recent years made a record of outstanding achievement equalled by few, if any, institutions with which I am acquainted.[124]

All of these statements lead squarely to this important recommendation made by the survey commission of the Middle States Association in its report of 1959 and which has been just recently restated by the planning board of Puerto Rico as an urgent need:

> D. *The formulation and approval by the Superior Educational Council of a Master Plan for the future development and expansion of the University in relation to physical facilities, financial resources required, projected enrollment, and educational programs.*[125]

In a similar vein Dr. Ernest V. Hollis adds:

> Certain bedrock educational and managerial principles also underlie recommendations for a new organization for administering the University. They assume that planning, policy determination, coordination, and the final act of governing, in the last analysis, must be done for the University as a whole—perhaps for public education as a whole.[126]

III. STRUCTURAL CHARACTERISTICS OF THE EDUCATIONAL SYSTEM

ANALYSIS OF PRESENT PROVISIONS AND PROCEDURES

The Commonwealth

The Constitution of the Commonwealth adopted in 1952 has the following provision relating to education in section 5 of article II:

> Every person has the right to an education which shall be directed to full development of the human personality and the strengthening of respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms. There shall be a system of free and wholly non-sectarian public education. Instruction in the elementary and secondary schools, shall be free and shall be compulsory in the elementary schools to the extent permitted by the facilities of the State * * * No public property or public funds shall be used for the support of schools or educational institutions other than those of the State. Nothing contained in this provision shall prevent the State from furnishing to any child non-educational services established by law for the protection or welfare of children. Compulsory attendance at elementary public schools to the extent permitted by the facilities of the State as herein provided shall not be construed as applicable to those who receive elementary education in schools established under non-governmental auspices.

The government and education.—There is no doubt that education has a central place in the governmental structure in Puerto Rico. The Constitution provides (sec. 6 of art. IV) that there is to be a department of education along with departments of state, justice, health, treasury, labor, agriculture and commerce, and public works. Section 5 of the same article authorizes the Governor to appoint certain secretaries, with the advice and consent of the senate, who are to assist the Governor in exercising executive powers. These secretaries, including the secretary of education, constitute the Governor's advisory council, which is designated as the council of secretaries.

State agencies and voluntary organizations other than the department of education also have a decided impact on the educational program.

The Secretary of Education.—As previously pointed out, the Secretary of Education is a member of the council of secretaries appointed by the Governor with the advice and consent of the senate, and may be removed by the Governor at his discretion. The broad powers of the Secretary of Education may be shown by quoting excerpts from two sections of the law. Section 141 authorizes him to establish a system of public education.

> The Secretary of Education is hereby authorized and directed to establish and maintain a system of free public schools in Puerto Rico for the purpose of providing a liberal education to the children of school age, i.e. between the ages of five and eighteen years; to establish higher institutions of learning, including colleges, universities, normal, industrial, mechanical and high schools, together with such other educational agencies as said Secretary may find necessary and expedient in order to promote the educational development of the Commonwealth. In addition to the rural and graded schools which shall constitute the regular common school system, said Secretary is hereby authorized and directed to establish, maintain and direct, so far as the resources placed at his command will permit, such special schools as in his judgment are necessary to meet special education needs * * *

Section 142 of the law deals with his duties. The scope of his duties is shown by the following quotation from the section:

> The Secretary of Education, being required to supervise education in Puerto Rico, shall audit all disbursements made in extending it. He shall appoint, as occasion may require, an officer for each school district to be known as the Supervisor of Schools, and these supervisors of schools shall in all respects be subject to the orders of the Secretary of Education. The Secretary shall decide upon and make known the school curriculum; conduct all the examinations for the distribution of teachers' certificates; fix the salaries of teachers, provided the sums so allocated are not in conflict with law; select and purchase all such school books, materials and supplies as may be necessary for the proper conduct of education, except as otherwise provided by law, and shall approve all projects and plans for school buildings to be constructed in Puerto Rico, when the same are to be paid for by the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico; but when they are to be paid for by the municipalities, or by the municipalities and the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, then the school directors shall participate to such extent that no project or plan shall be approved without the consent of the respective school director. The Secretary of Education shall require and gather such statistics and reports from the school directors and school supervisors as he may from time to time deem beneficial to the school system, and he shall make such regulations as he may deem necessary for the effective administration of his office.[127]

As pointed out in numerous studies the Secretary of Education in Puerto Rico has far more power than is given to any State commissioner of education in any State.

The Department of Education.—The Department of Education in Puerto Rico has undergone an evolution similar in many respects to that which has occurred in most States in the United States.

The department is headed by the Secretary of Education who is responsible for its organization and operation as well as for the establishment and operation of all public schools in Puerto Rico. The school system in Puerto Rico is a highly centralized enterprise as may be easily confirmed by the laws quoted above.

Structure of the Educational System

1. *Elementary school.*—Grades 1 to 6 in rural or urban zones.
2. *Junior high school.*—Grades 7 to 9 in rural or urban zones. In the rural zone the school may be organized as a regular junior high school or as a rural second unit.
3. *Senior high schools.*—Grades 10 to 12 mostly in the urban zone although as of June 30, 1965, there are three schools of this type in the rural zone. The senior high school curriculum provides for a general course of studies and for a vocational course.
4. *Junior college.*—Two years at the university level. At present there are two of these colleges in Puerto Rico—one public which is part of the University of Puerto Rico—the Humacao Regional College—and one private, the Puerto Rico Junior College at Río Piedras.
5. *University.*—Two- and four-year courses, professional, and postgraduate studies. At present there are four institutions of this type in Puerto Rico—the University of Puerto Rico with campuses at San Juan, Río Piedras, and Mayagüez, the Catholic University at Ponce, the Inter-American University with campuses at San Germán and Hato Rey, and the College of the Sacred Heart at Santurce (a woman's college).

Private schools at the elementary, junior, and senior levels are accredited by the Department of Education of Puerto Rico. Private universities or junior colleges are accredited by the Superior Educational Council of Puerto Rico which is the governing body of the University of Puerto Rico. The Secretary of Education is ex officio president of the council. The other six members are appointed by the Governor with the consent of the Puerto Rican Senate.

When control of education was relinquished by the Federal Government, it was vested in the Secretary of Education, appointed by the Governor. Local financing has been practically discontinued and the Commonwealth government has now assumed almost complete responsibility for financing schools.

District Organization and Administration

There are 77 local school districts in Puerto Rico.

The superintendent of schools.—Each district has a superintendent of schools appointed by the Secretary of Education. The superintendent represents the secretary in the district, therefore he is not in reality a local superintendent but an official of the Commonwealth.

The school director.—Each municipality has a school director appointed by the mayor. The school director is also the municipal treasurer and may perform certain other municipal duties. His principal job is not that of school director. The school director is not an important school official. The government of Puerto Rico provides a small trust fund which is allocated annually by the Department of Education to the municipalities. This trust fund is used for school supplies, minor repairs, and certain small pieces of equipment. The school director approves expenditures from this fund which must also be approved by the Secretary of Education. He signs the appointments of teachers. This is of no particular significance now because the top person on the candidates' list for each position must be appointed irrespective of political or group pressures.

The municipalities have no direct control over the public schools other than that indicated above. However, the municipalities do have the power to construct school buildings and to provide additional local revenue for other current expenses except that local funds may not be used to supplement buildings or provide additional local operating funds.

Major Aspects of Organization and Administration

The curriculum.—The curriculum and courses of study are determined and prescribed by the Secretary of Education and his assistants in the Department of Education. Superintendents, principals, and teachers play little or no part in planning and developing policies for determining the curriculum and courses of study. Those functions are performed almost exclusively by professional personnel in the Department of Education.

Textbooks.—The Secretary of Education selects all textbooks. The procedure is as follows when a new book is to be selected:

1. The head of the section in the Department of Education which is concerned with that subject studies the available texts for that subject and makes a recommendation to the textbook committee.
2. A textbook committee is appointed by the secretary. The present textbook committee is composed of the assistant secretary for the regular school program, the assistant secretary for adult education, the assistant secretary for special services, the director of vocational education and the director of production and acquisition of textbooks. The committee studies the recommendation

of the head of the section of the Department of Education concerned with the subject and makes a recommendation to the Secretary of Education who actually makes the selection.

Supervision.—The intent of supervision is to facilitate improvement in the instructional program of the schools. Many teachers, especially new teachers, need assistance in learning their work and in improving their teaching. This assistance should come through a good supervisory program. However, this program, as it operates in Puerto Rico, actually serves its proper functions only in part. While some valuable assistance is provided for many teachers, the department, because of the nature of its organization, has placed considerable emphasis on inspection. Many local school personnel look on certain representatives from the Department of Education as persons who come primarily to see whether the manuals and directives are being observed rather than as persons whose primary purpose is to help improve instruction. Thus many teachers and principals are as much or more concerned about conforming to directives as about improving their work. Thus, the present plan of supervision has both helped and hindered the educational program. What seems to be most needed is more emphasis on supervision in a constructive helpful sense. Less time should be devoted to inspection and checking on details of form and more on bona fide assistance to local systems and schools.

Personnel.—The Secretary of Education has the legal authority to appoint every employee in the public school system of Puerto Rico from the rank of janitor to that of undersecretary of education. It is, of course, impossible for the secretary to know personally and to evaluate every person employed in the public school system. So in practice the secretary and the top staff members of the Department of Education, as authorized by him, directly appoint all professional administrators, supervisors, and technicians of the rank of assistant principal and above. Subject to certain restrictions the superintendents appoint the teachers, the school director appoints the lunchroom employees and the mayors appoint the janitors. Classified secretarial and clerical personnel are appointed by superintendents or by the secretary and his assistants depending on the type of service to be rendered. All appointments not made directly by the secretary must be approved by him.

All teachers must hold certificates issued in accordance with the rules and regulations promulgated by the secretary and approved by the Governor. The requirements prescribed for regular certificates, while not as high as those required by some States of the United States, compare favorably with those of many States. If qualified teachers are not available, the secretary may issue provisional certificates in sufficient number to fill the vacancies.

The superintendent of schools is supposed to be responsible for the instructional program in his district. But he has no voice in the appointment of the principals or supervisors assigned to his district.

The school plant program.—Almost all school plants are constructed and equipped by the Commonwealth. Only a few municipalities have constructed buildings although all have the authority to do so. Funds to construct school buildings are provided by the legislature.

Three Commonwealth agencies are involved in the construction of school buildings—the school planning division of the Department of Education, the Commonwealth planning board and the department of public works. The planning division of the Department of Education makes studies of school plant needs and recommends the project that should be constructed annually. Those recommendations are then presented to the Commonwealth planning board. The recommendations are reviewed by the division along with other recommendations for public works from other agencies. The Commonwealth planning board prepares a list of approved public work projects which includes school buildings. The department of public works then constructs the approved buildings within the limits of funds provided by the legislature. The building plans are prepared by the Commonwealth planning board after consultation with the planning division of the Department of Education.

Transportation.—School transportation is a recent development in Puerto Rico. The general policy is to provide transportation for pupils who live more than 3 kilometers from school.

School lunch.—Puerto Rico has made great progress in developing its school lunch program despite the fact that school lunch facilities at many schools are quite limited. The Commonwealth provides a substantial amount of funds which, combined with Federal school lunch and school milk funds and surplus commodities, makes it possible to furnish daily lunches for approximately 45 percent of all pupils. The pupils are not charged for these lunches. In order for a child to eat in the lunchroom, an application must be approved. Applications are approved on the basis of need. Such factors as distance from school and economic condition of the parents are considered in determining need.

Finance.—Beginning in 1946, the Commonwealth assumed the responsibility for financing the public schools. Prior to that time the municipalities had certain responsibilities including that of repairing and maintaining buildings and providing the equipment. The municipalities may at the present time help to finance construction, provide equipment, and assist financially in certain other ways. Since the responsibility for financing the schools is centralized, the responsibility for preparation of the budget is, as would be expected, pretty well centralized in the Department of Education. The tentative budget prepared by the department in considerable detail must, of course, go to the bureau of the budget for changes. The Governor may in his discretion make further changes before he submits the budgets to the legislature where action is final, except for certain adjustments within the amount appropriated for designated purposes, that may be approved by the bureau of the budget.

Aside from the fact that salaries of teachers are low, the most serious limitations seem to involve funds for library books for schools, repairs and upkeep of buildings, equipment and certain types of supplies. Funds for buildings and other capital improvements, provided through a separate budget, have always lagged seriously behind the needs.

The reason for limited funds is understandable in the light of the present economic situation in Puerto Rico.

IV. Significant Policies in Education

There have been significant changes during the last six decades in the public school system of Puerto Rico. Changes have occurred in the curriculum, in school services, in administrative policies, and in school organizations. Some of these changes have affected the system in a positive way, others adversely. A summary of some of these changes and their effect upon education follows:

Gradually a number of auxiliary services have been added to the school system with the idea of increasing the school holding power, improving attendance, contributing to the intellectual and physical development of students, and offering opportunities to keep and develop human resources. Among these services we may mention the following:

SCHOOL LUNCHROOM PROGRAM

This program functions as an educational agency. It aims to improve the dietary habits of the children and to provide part of their daily diet.

The total amount of resources available for this program in the 5-year period from 1960–61 to 1964–65 was as follows:

1960–61	$12,578,450
1961–62	14,237,298
1962–63	15,143,087
1963–64	17,024,155
1964–65	16,995,893

Federal funds have been a significant factor of financing this program. Of the resources reported, above Federal grants, both in money and in kind, accounted for the following percentages of the total in those years: 1960–61, 51.9 percent; 1961–62, 51.7 percent; 1962–63, 52.6 percent; 1963–64, 51.6 percent; 1964–65, 45.3 percent.

The average number of pupils who benefited daily from this program during 1960–61 to 1964–65 was as follows:

1960–61	238, 104
1961–62	241, 977
1962–63	245, 122
1963–64	255, 666
1964–65	270, 049

These figures amounted to the following percentages of the total enrollment in public day schools during those five years: 1960–61, 41.2 percent; 1961–62, 41.0 percent; 1962–63, 41.0 percent; 1963–64, 42.1 percent; 1964–65, 43.6 percent.

In general, the lunchroom program has served a type of lunch which more than meets the requirements specified under the agreement with the Federal Government. It supplies almost two-thirds of the nourishment the child needs each day.

THE SCHOLARSHIP PROGRAM

Scholarships are granted to gifted students at all levels: elementary, junior high school, and senior high school levels. There is no limitation as to the number of scholarships to be granted if the candidates qualify. Additional resources for this program can be obtained from emergency funds. In this respect this program is unique. During the last 5 school years the number of students who benefited from this program and the amounts of funds available for it were as follows:

Year	Funds	Number of students who benefited
1960–61	$640, 000	18, 610
1961–62	686, 000	20, 180
1962–63	660, 000	21, 906
1963–64	825, 000	16, 978
1964–65	825, 000	16, 947

The number of students who benefited each year represented the following enrollment during these years: 1960–61, 3.2 percent; 1962–63, 3.4 percent; 1962–63, 3.7 percent; 1963–64, 2.8 percent; 1964–65, 2.7 percent. The scholarships amount to $40 per year in the case of elementary school students, to $50 per year in the case of junior high school students, and to $60 per year in the case of senior high school students.

At the present time the number of students who benefit from the program are distributed by school level to which they attend in the following manner: elementary level, 40 percent; junior high school level, 35 percent; and senior high school level, 25 percent. Sixty-five percent of the students benefiting from the program are from the urban zone, and the other 35 percent are from the rural zone.

THE TRANSPORTATION PROGRAM

Free transportation is given to students who live in the rural areas to attend schools in the urban zone or to attend schools located far from their homes. This measure increases the holding power of the schools and prevents dropouts.

In the last 5 school years the number of students receiving free transportation and the amounts of money spent for the program were as follows:

Year	Expenditures	Number of students transported
1960-61	$1,096,080	43,928
1961-62	1,328,877	51,016
1962-63	1,470,749	53,331
1963-64	1,586,744	56,560
1964-65	2,118,878	71,278

The number of students receiving free transportation during these 5 years represented the following percentages of the total public day school enrollment: 1960–61, 7.6 percent; 1961–62, 8.7 percent; 1962–63, 8.9 percent; 1963–64, 9.3 percent; 1964–65, 11.5 percent. The average yearly expenditure per pupil transported was $25 in 1960–61, amount which increased to $30 in 1964–65. Twenty percent of the pupils transported are elementary schoolchildren, 50 percent are from the junior high school, and the other 30 percent from the senior high school. Seventy percent of the students are transported from the rural zone to schools in the urban zone, and the other 30 percent are students from the rural zone who are transported to rural schools far from their homes.

Since the school year 1961–62 students from the metropolitan zone are paid half of their bus fare if they utilize the transportation services of the Metropolitan Bus Authority (government owned). This program benefits both public and private school students.

During the last 4 school years the amounts spent and the number of pupils who benefited from this new program were as follows:

Year	Expenditures	Pupils who benefited
1961-62	$65,000	15,400
1962-63	65,000	15,400
1963-64	115,000	19,749
1964-65	119,000	21,288

THE FOOTWEAR PROGRAM

In 1955 it was found out that 2.4 percent of the pupils in the urban zone and 22 percent in the rural went to school barefooted. Because of the psychological effects and the hygienic risks this problem presented, the legislature passed Act No. 66 to solve this situation at once "without waiting for the fruits of the economic improvement programs launched by the Commonwealth." The law created the footwear program. Students who lack means to purchase shoes because of orphanage, desertion, or circumstances such as unemployment, illness, or insufficient income of parents or guardians, are eligible for this service. The law demands that the amount of 50 cents be paid to the department of education for each pair of shoes given to a child.

During the last 5 school years the amounts spent and the number of pupils who benefited from this program were as follows:

Year	Expenditures	Pupils benefited
1960-61	$222,881	116,984
1961-62	279,758	113,719
1962-63	284,119	105,870
1963-64	252,142	122,103
1964-65	261,350	82,432

The number of pupils receiving the benefits of this program represented the following percentages of the total public day schools enrollment during these 5 years: 1960-61, 20.2 percent; 1961-62, 19.3 percent; 1962-63, 17.7 percent; 1963-64, 20.1 percent; 1964-65, 13.3 percent.

SCHOOL SOCIAL WORK

Social work started in the second unit schools in 1928 to help the children in the rural zone in their social and cultural development. The general objectives of the program at that time were to take care of the health conditions of the community and to develop good social habits in the children. To comply with these aims, social workers engaged in activities to improve health and recreation and social life in the community. The number of social workers has increased gradually. In 1928 there were only 5 social workers, in 1964-65 there were 177. Their services have been extended to the urban zone and their work has become more definite since additional personnel has been appointed for some of the services (health educators and counselors).

At present the main objective of school social workers is to "help children in the elementary urban and rural schools adapt themselves to the school." To achieve this aim social workers use the techniques of case work, and group and community organization. They try to help students adjust to school environment. They make use of school, home and community resources for said adjustment.

THE HEALTH PROGRAM

One of the immediate purposes of the Puerto Rican school system is to improve the physical, mental, and spiritual health of its students. In order to achieve this purpose, a school program was organized with the following objectives:

> a. To preserve and improve the student's health.
>
> b. To develop appropriate habits and attitudes of the student to preserve his health.
>
> c. To promote the physical, emotional and social environment which would facilitate the integral development of the pupil.
>
> d. To promote understanding and development of habits and attitudes among the parents and adults in order to assure the improvement of their own health and of that of the community.
>
> e. To use adequately the services offered by the community.[128]

This program attempts to satisfy three basic necessities of the children's health: a wholesome school environment which, on account of its material facilities and emotional climate, will lead to good health; medical services that will keep children healthy and help correct those physical defects and health deviations (abnormalities) which may occur; and practice in health habits. The health program identifies itself primarily with three great areas: school environment, medical services, and health education. It is the teacher's responsibility to foster the development of these aspects of health.

In order to supervise the health program at the school or district level, health educators have been appointed. They study the health problems in the community, participate in its health improvement programs, help in the planning of the local health program, explain the health program to the community, prepare, select and distribute the material and guide the personnel in the continued periodic evaluation of the health program.

At the present time there are 68 health educators' positions in the department of education.

THE GUIDANCE SERVICE

The guidance service aims to help students in the secondary schools formulate their educational and vocational plans and solve their problems. Students are helped to discover their abilities and interests, they are offered information about educational and employment opportunities and counseled in the selection of a career and in the solution of their personal problems.

The program consists of five services:

(*a*) The individual inventory service which tries to help the students to appraise their interests, abilities and experiences before making choices.

(*b*) The informational service which secures and makes available to students information about occupational fields and educational opportunities.

(*c*) The counseling service in which the counselor and the counselee get together to interpret the data concerning the individual and his problems.

(*d*) The placement service, given to high school students to help them make the transition from one school to another or from school to apprenticeship or employment.

(*e*) The followup service, through which the continuity of the counseling process is assured.

Superintendents, principals, teachers and counselors are in charge of the guidance program. Counselors have the following basic duties:

(*a*) To provide counseling to students.

(*b*) To serve as a resource person [adviser] in the training of teachers in the use of techniques for understanding students.

(*c*) To participate in planning, organizing, developing and interpreting studies and surveys that would lead to curriculum improvement.

This program was started in 1937 with six counselors. In 1964–65 there were 216 counselors. The increase in the number of counselors is not in proportion to growth in high school enrollment.

VOCATIONAL REHABILITATION

Vocational rehabilitation provides the services necessary to render a disabled person employable. It functions under the Commonwealth board for vocational education. Any disabled civilian 16 years of age or over is eligible for rehabilitation services if he has a disability, no matter how it was incurred, which constitutes an employment handicap and which is not of such nature as to render any type of employment absolutely impossible. The services include medical examination, counseling, physical restoration, vocational training, necessary artificial appliances and placement, and maintenance during training if necessary. Special services are offered for the blind and persons with arrested pulmonary tuberculosis. During the last 5 fiscal years the number of persons who benefited from this program and the amounts of funds available for it were as follows:

Year	Expenditures	Number of beneficiaries
1960-61	$1,292,337	9,527
1961-62	1,448,491	8,780
1962-63	1,697,190	10,226
1963-64	1,966,828	9,793
1964-65	2,417,631	10,200

This is another of the programs under the Department of Education for which the Federal Government provides a very substantial part of its costs. Of the amounts of funds which the program had available during those 5 years, Federal appropriations accounted for the following percentages of the total funds: 1960–61, 66.3 percent; 1961–62, 70.1 percent; 1962–63, 72.1 percent; 1963–64, 70.0 percent; 1964–65, 70.4 percent.

During the fiscal year 1965–66 the program expects to count on funds amounting to $3,717,745 of which $2,695,365 (72.5 percent of the total) are Federal funds. The number of persons to benefit from the services provided by the program is expected to increase to 22,265 in contrast to the 10,200 that received services during 1964–65.

DEMOCRATIC SUPERVISION

In 1930–31 a new system of supervision was introduced. Emphasis was shifted from inspection to diagnosis and remedial suggestions. Supervision under the new plan was conceived as a cooperative enterprise directed at the improvement of teaching and of the teaching act. Great importance was attached to the human element in the relations between supervisors and teachers.

THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE SECOND-UNIT RURAL SCHOOLS

The second-unit rural schools were established to increase the holding power of the rural schools and to improve their conditions. These schools were consolidated rural schools (grades 4 to 8) of a vocational type aimed at fitting the students for efficient lives as producers and consumers of goods. They include besides academic teachers, teachers of agriculture, home economics, manual training, and industrial arts, and social workers.

During the school year 1964–65 there was a total of 190 second-unit rural schools in the educational system. One hundred and seventy-eight of them had programs of study for children from the 1st to 9th grades, and three others offered the complete program of studies from 1st to 12th grades. There were nine second-unit rural schools which offered programs of studies of 8 years or less. This type of organization opened opportunities of longer schooling and of a more diversified kind to the rural population of Puerto Rico. It opened the way to vocational training, to better job opportunities for rural students, for better community services such as social work, health centers, home improvements, better nutrition, knowledge and habits, and an uplift in values, aspirations, and expectations of the rural population.

THE 6-3-3 ORGANIZATION OF THE ELEMENTARY AND SECONDARY SCHOOLS

In 1942–43 a change in the general organization of the school system was effected. A 6-year elementary school was substituted for the 8-year plan, a 3-year junior high school and a 3-year senior high school took the place of the upper elementary grades (7th, 8th) and the traditional 4-year high school.

The junior high school was organized in order to provide an educational division especially centered on the needs and problems of the adolescent child. The work in this school was conceived to be of an exploratory nature designed to teach the child to make vital choices as to his field of future study and vocations.

PROMOTION POLICIES

One of the norms adopted in 1954 in relation to promotions established as one of the basic principles that no student should be failed from first through the third grade. This principle did not relieve the teacher of the responsibility of teaching reading and writing. Many students were promoted, though, without having acquired the preparation needed to work in the next grade.

CHANGES IN CURRICULUM

a. *Introduction of the look-and-say method to teach reading.*—A misinterpretation of the look-and-see method led to the elimination of phonics. This left students without a suitable technique to recognize new words. Thus many students became poor readers.

b. *Incidental teaching of grammar.*—The belief that grammar is not learned by learning rules led to a policy of teaching grammar incidentally. With this procedure pupils failed to learn the abilities and skills necessary for correct usage that are developed through a functional, systematic approach to the teaching of grammar.

c. *Introduction of social studies.*—Prior to 1930, history, geography, and civics were taught as separate subjects. When these three subjects were fused, the content of each subject was reduced. Skills and abilities related to geography were not emphasized. The knowledge of the children in these fields was limited.

d. *Introduction of the study of community problems.*—A further fusion was brought about when the study of community problems was introduced. The bases of this new subject were the everyday life problems of the individual communities in Puerto Rico. It aimed to train the child to be conscious of, to analyze, and if possible, to solve those problems that affect him as an individual or his community as a whole. Science, social studies, and health education were supposed to form an integral part of the study. But in practice this was not so. Thus children failed to learn science, history, and geography.

V. TRENDS IN EDUCATION

It is quite difficult to identify trends in education under the circumstances described by this document. What may seem a trend may be just one more passing preference of a particular administration in charge of education at the time. It may be that what looks like a trend is "going to no particular place, going for the joy of locomotion." [129]

At any rate these seem to be some of the trends in education which possibly may have some significance in the future:

DECENTRALIZATION OF THE SCHOOL SYSTEM

The island has been divided into six zones for purposes of supervision, technical assistance and to facilitate the distribution of books, reading materials, and supplies. Although still not adequately defined as to functions of local, regional and central officers this is a move which, if well executed, may improve the quality of the work done in the schoolroom.

PLANNING

A new office of planning and research has been created. Well devised and executed plans—both physical and academic—tend to improve school functioning.

EXPERIMENTATION AND RESEARCH

There is discernible a greater emphasis in experimentation and research. Although it is sociologically and anthropologically oriented, as far as methodology and techniques are concerned, it is a step in the right direction.

PRESCHOOL EDUCATION—KINDERGARTENS

Kindergartens have not been a permanent and formal program of the public educational system of Puerto Rico although some institutions of this type were sporadically established as far back as the school year 1901–2. Thus, according to the official reports of the Department of Education in 1901–2 there were 351 children in public kindergartens, in 1902–3 there were 604 children, in 1903–4 there were only 195 children, and between 1908–9 and 1911–12 these figures ranged from a low of 230 children to a high of 395. From 1912 on there is no information in the official reports to indicate that this program was further continued. It was not until 1960–61 that the public school system formally initiated this program in 6 of its schools with an enrollment of 288 children. By the school year 1964–65 the program had been extended to 80 schools which had a total of 83 groups organized with an enrollment of 4,345 children. Private schools have had kindergartens as a regular feature of their school organization. In fact, some of the private schools initiate their development with the establishment of a kindergarten and then move on providing facilities for the other grades as these initial groups move to first grade, second grade, and so on. By 1950–51 accredited private schools were enrolling 2,222 children in their kindergartens. This figure represented a proportion equivalent to 49.3 percent of the first grade enrollment in private schools in the school year 1951–52. In 1959–60 kindergarten enrollment in these schools was 4,854 pupils which represented a projection of 69.9 percent of their first grade enrollment in 1960–61.

In the school year 1964–65 kindergarten enrollment in private accredited schools was 5,398 pupils and in nonaccredited, 1,566.

In 1960–61 public and private kindergarten enrollment represented 8.7 percent (5,759 pupils) of the 5-year-olds in the population, and in 1964–65 this figure had increased to 16.1 percent (11,309 pupils). It is expected that in the current school year (1965–66) this percentage may fluctuate between 16.8 and 18.3 of the 5-year-olds in the population or between 12,086 and 13,165 pupils enrolled in both, public and private kindergartens. Private kindergartens include both, those of accredited and nonaccredited private schools.

PROGRAMS FOR GIFTED AND RETARDED PUPILS

a. *Testing program for pupils with extraordinary talent.*—This program of the Department of Education is directed to find out the students of the public schools with extraordinary academic talent and to try to retain them in the school until they complete the secondary school education in order that they will be able to enter the higher level institutions. In order to look for these talented students, tests are given to students of the 1st, 4th, 7th, 9th, and 11th grades. In 1963–64, a total of 520,957 students were given such tests. This number is about two and one-half times that in 1960–61, when 214,346 students were given such tests. During 1965–66, the department has planned to extend giving tests to all the pupils so that from the very early stage of the educational achievement, the talented students can be guided properly. The department has been appropriated $60,000 for this program during 1965–66. The same amount was available during 1963–64 fiscal year.

b. *Scholarships for talented pupils.*—The law 55 of April 1949 (amended by the law 64 of June 1956) established the program of scholarships for the talented students who lack sufficient financial resources to continue studies in the school. During 1963–64 some 16,978 students (2.78 percent of the total public school enrollment) were given scholarships under this program amounting to a total of $806,330. Of these 16,978 scholarships, 13,607 were renewals and the rest, 3,371, were new. During 1963–64 about the same number of students were given scholarships and in 1965–66 it expected that 17,500 students will be benefited using about the same amount.

c. *Program for retarded pupils.*—The Department of Education has developed since 1958–59 a program to attend the special needs of pupils who are retarded. The program was initiated with one group of 18 pupils in Bayamón District. Today, in 1965–66, there are 90 groups with approximately 1,500 such pupils. Separate groups are created so as not to hinder the progress of the normal (average) pupils.

The program, in all of its four phases, is being carried out through the regional directors. These phases are: selection and preparation of teachers, training of other participating personnel, collaboration with the other agencies working with retarded children and the expansion of the program. The teachers and other personnel are given special classes and are trained by specialists in the field. Lectures and seminars are also arranged.

A coordinating plan with the working program of other agencies has been prepared to be submitted to the U.S. Department of Health, Education, and Welfare for the financial appropriation. It is hoped that one center of evaluation and vocational rehabilitation will be created in each school region except in the region of San Juan, where there will be two such centers.

A plan of expansion of this program for the next 5 years is being considered through which it is expected to create 35 new groups of such children every year. The following relation indicates the yearly enrollment of the retarded children, since the program was established:

Year	Number of group	Enrollment
1958–59	1	18
1959–60	3	54
1960–61	8	144
1961–62	17	306
1962–63	31	558
1963–64	47	846
1964–65	72	1,250
1965–66	90	[1] 1,500

[1] Approximate.

It is estimated that there are around 12,000 elementary school students with varying degree of mental retardation.

d. *Experimental project of high schools.*—The Department of Education and the University of Puerto Rico initiated in 1961–62 a project dealing with a pedagogic experiment with the help of the funds made available by the Ford Foundation for "Adelanto de la Educación." The initial donation was of $650,000 for the first 3 years of the project. The project consists in offering university level courses of the first year and a half, particularly of general studies, during the 4 years of high school (9th–12th grades) in addition to the regular high school courses of these years. The program started in 1961–62 with 210 students; in 1965–66 there are 12 schools participating with a total enrollment of 1,833.

The following shows the growth of this program:

Year	Number of schools participating	Enrollment
1961–62	6	210
1962–63	7	719
1963–64	9	1,329
1964–65	9	1,623
1965–66	12	1,833

GUIDANCE

As is to be expected, trends like the ones described above will bring a reinforcement of measurement, guidance, and orientation procedures. The opening of new jobs and professions, at present nonexistent, and the rapid pace at which others become obsolete, will increase the need for vocational guidance and orientation in high school and colleges.

CURRICULUM

The elementary and secondary school curriculum—principally with gifted groups—is being reorganized giving it a more "general studies" flavor. Science and mathematics are receiving new impetus according to new practices underway in most of the progressive school systems of the States.

RURAL SCHOOL SUPERVISION

There is a trend to improve rural school supervision.

PARENT-TEACHERS' COUNCILS

The parent-teachers' associations have generally failed in their aim of interpreting the schools to the community and in strengthening the school-community relationship. New organizations are being developed, through parent-teachers' councils, which may accomplish what the earlier ones did not.

DOUBLE ENROLLMENT AND INTERLOCKING

There is a concerted effort to eliminate as soon as possible the double enrollment and interlocking schemes of school organization.

COMMUNITY EDUCATION

There is the purpose of extending community education to the urban zone.

RADIO AND TELEVISION

Greater emphasis is to be placed on formal educational programs through radio and television.

COMMUNITY COLLEGES

At the university level there is a strong trend to develop more and more diversified community colleges or junior colleges.

GRADUATE WORK AT THE UNIVERSITY

There is a strong movement to develop graduate work at the university.

VI. Concluding Remarks

The government of Puerto Rico has generously supported education as one of the main sources of strength for whatever plan of development is put in action. The people of Puerto Rico have a strong faith in education. It is even a tragic faith since it brings with it the belief, among the masses, that almost any problem—poverty, health, population control, low salaries, and even the attainment of any high-paying job—can be solved when a good education is acquired. This is, really, not far from the truth, but reaching that level of education which makes possible the fulfillment of such expectations is at times frustrating.

Governor Muñoz Marín reaffirmed the faith in education when he said that "there can be no greater emergency than that of providing education for those whom nature has endowed with power of mind and spirit," adding, "I earnestly believe that except for the most pressing human wants, education will constitute our supreme consumption * * *"

The financial support that the taxpayer has been willing to offer the educational process attests to the faith of the people of the island in the power of knowledge put to constructive use for uplifting the people and improving civilization.

If we were to single out the most persistent problems with which education has struggled in Puerto Rico, we would mention, first, the lack of a coherent, reasonable and unifying philosophy of education; second, the language issues—that is, the constant shifts in the policies and programs for the teaching of English; and third, the population explosion and its repercussions in school enrollments at all levels of the educational system.

A philosophy of education is necessary to provide the unifying framework for the Puerto Rican school system. In the past there has been confusion between a philosophy of education and a concern with procedure; this confusion can be seen in the continuous alteration of the educational process in Puerto Rico. A language policy and Americanization have often substituted for a philosophy. Since the school is an agent of change in society, a philosophy of education should reflect the Puerto Rican culture in which it is to operate.

The vernacular of the people of Puerto Rico has been, and still is, Spanish. For more than 400 years it has been used as a strong, unifying instrument of the people of the island. The situation in Puerto Rico, as far as language is concerned, is different from the one found in the Philippines and in Hawaii where there was no lingua-franca. For over 67 years now the idea of making the people of Puerto Rico bilingual has plagued educational policies and given ground for political controversies.

There have been in operation at least some seven different policies for the teaching of English in Puerto Rico since 1900, as are described from page 156 to page 180 of this report. There is no doubt that there is great need to teach and learn English in the schools of Puerto Rico.

Nor is there any doubt that the teaching of English in Puerto Rico should be strengthened by a clarification of educational policies, by the improvement of methods and techniques, by the utilization of better-trained teachers, by supplementing teaching with programs that avail themselves of new educational media such as audiovisual aids, radio, television, movies, among other effective means of communication.

According to the official projections, the total population of Puerto Rico will increase from 2,358,000 inhabitants on July 1, 1960, to 3,562,563 inhabitants on July 1, 1979. Population estimates, according to the present tendency of zero net migration, will pass the 4 million mark.

Based on this population projection, the official projection of school enrollment (CSE–E–6) for grades 1 to 12 in 1979–80 is expected to be over 1 million (1,042,363), the enrollment in 1963–64 being 669,000. (The total enrollment compared to the population of 6 to 18 years of age on July 1979 will be equivalent to 94 percent compared to 83 percent in 1962.) Of this total enrollment of over 1 million, the enrollment at the elementary level (grades 1 to 6) is expected to be 628,328; at the junior high school (grades 7–9), 245,168; and at the senior high (grades 10–12), 168,867.

The projection assumes that in 1979–80 the school system will succeed in retaining in the 12th grade 50 students of the 100 enrolled in the 1st grade 11 years ago. In 1962–63 this number was only 25.

It is expected that of the total enrollment in 1979–80, 946,500 will be enrolled in the public day schools and the remaining 95,900 in private accredited schools.

At the university level, the freshmen enrollment in the fall of 1979 is expected to be over 22,000 and the total enrollment to be about 83,000 students. The total enrollment would represent 32.4 percent of the population of ages 19–22 compared to 19.3 percent in 1962. Of the total enrollment about 65,000 will be enrolled in the state university and about 18,000 in the private institutions.

The number of elementary- and secondary-school teachers required for the increase in the enrollment in the public and private accredited schools during 1965–80 is expected to be between 9,900 and 11,500 (not counting those required for replacement due to death, resignation, and such other causes). At the university level it is estimated that the number of professors needed for the additional students enrolled during 1965–80 may be between 3,300 and 4,200 (not counting replacements).

The public school system of Puerto Rico has had extraordinary quantitative development. The illiteracy rate which was close to 80 percent in 1900 had been reduced to 16.6 percent according to the 1960 census, and will drop to 13.8 percent in 1964, if our statistical estimates turn out to be correct. There were less than 582 teachers in 1900 and there are now 16,749. In 1900, some 24,392 students were enrolled in the schools. The school enrollment during the year 1964–65 was 618,266 in primary and secondary schools.

The budget approved for the Department of Education for the fiscal year 1965–66 amounts to $130,648,900 or 28.7 percent of the operating budget of the government of Puerto Rico. The budget for the University of Puerto Rico amounts to $24,869,650 equivalent to

5.5 percent of the total operating budget of the government of Puerto Rico.

During the academic year 1964–65, 22,940 students received their high school diplomas.

The University of Puerto Rico has doubled its enrollment every 10 years during the last three decades. In 1963–64 there were 22,959 students at the university. The institution graduated 10,304 students during the decade 1940–49 and 21,355 during the decade 1950–59. From 1939–40 to 1962–63 the university has conferred a total of 44,880 degrees, certificates, and diplomas. It is expected that during the period 1960–69 it may graduate close to 40,000 students.

There are 1,932 members in the university faculty. The institution has granted over 1,655 leaves of absence for professors for study purposes at a total cost of over $5,651,000. The university administers the largest scholarship program on the island whose main feature is that economic shortcomings should not deprive able students from acquiring a university education. The schoolroom facilities have almost doubled during the last 10 years.

This tremendous explosion in school enrollment at all levels of the educational system has brought with it difficulties in administration, finances, curriculum, and programs with which educators and administrators are wrestling. From this rapid quantitative development came the double enrollment plan and the interlocking scheme, providing an incomplete ration of schooling for the children. This plan is also a contributing factor to the high dropout rates of students and teachers. In other words, quality was sacrificed for a while for the purpose of giving an opportunity of education to the largest number possible. From this point of view there was no other alternative. It is better to have half a loaf than none at all.

Historically the system of public education in Puerto Rico has suffered from the attempt to copy the public school system of the United States, at times without any adaptation to a different milieu, to a different culture, and different socioeconomic conditions. Methods, techniques, materials of instruction (especially textbooks), were adopted without regard to adaptability to varying conditions.

The policy of the teaching of English has constituted the backbone and the bone of contention of the whole educational enterprise. A pedagogical problem was turned into a political football. The long emotional and unreasonable debate as to whether English or Spanish should constitute the medium of instruction returned to a pedagogical and technical approach when Commissioners José Padín and Mariano Villaronga adopted the policy that Spanish be used as the medium of instruction and English be taught as a preferred second language. A more scientific linguistic program has been tried ever since and revised as new knowledge and experience are assimilated. The Villaronga policy and program on the teaching of English based on the science of linguistics gave a more scientific turn to the whole problem.

The program of vocational education has added dignity and value to skilled and unskilled work. The Latin tradition placed emphasis on the classical professions: law, medicine, the clergy and of late, perhaps, engineering. Vocational education, the new industrial development and the increase in the power of business and commerce have helped change the concept of the importance of any job well done. There is no doubt that this has helped to develop a new middle class.

Each new generation in Puerto Rico demands more education. In 1950, about 5.8 percent of our older generation (ages 65–74) had 5 to 7 years of schooling; in 1960, about 8.8 percent had 5 to 7 years of school. In 1950, 14.6 percent of the middle generation (ages 45–54) had 5 to 7 years of school; this grew to 17.95 percent 10 years later. In 1950, a total of 20.2 percent of the younger generation (ages 25–34) had from 5 to 7 years of school. Ten years later this dropped to 18.3 percent because most of the younger group continued further with their education than before. It can be said that 12 years of schooling is as normal for our young age group in 1960 as 5 to 7 years is for the older age group. In college, in the 1960 comparison, one notes that only 1.29 percent of the older age group had finished 4 years of university schooling. This percentage jumped to 2.66 percent for those in the age 45–54 bracket and up to 5.24 percent for the younger group. This is a clear reflection of the increased educational opportunities being provided to each generation of Puerto Ricans.

Also interesting to note are the changes in the way that Puerto Ricans make a living. In 1950, only 4.9 percent of our workers were in the professional and semiprofessional class. By 1964 this figure had increased to 7.6 percent. Office workers and salesmen, who occupied only 10 percent of our work force in 1950, increased to 15.3 percent by 1964. On the other hand, farm workers, who comprised 30.9 percent of the total in 1950 totaled only 15.3 percent in 1964 – less than half of the previous total. The drift away from agricultural work and towards manufacturing or skilled, white-collar employment has been dramatic in recent years.

Another extremely vital area for planners to consider is the dropout rate. For every 100 children who entered first grade back in 1937, only 35 reached the sixth grade in 1942. But for every 100 who entered in 1958, about 72 students were still in school in 1964. This is a tremendous improvement. However, it is a cause of concern that this percentage has not improved at all in the last 5 years. To reach a standstill at this point is dangerous.

The figures for first through ninth grade show that for every 100 students who entered school in 1937, only 23 were studying 9 years later. In 1964, 50 students were still left of each 100 who started in 1955. The dropout rate for the 1st to the 12th grades shows that only 12 of each 100 students who entered school in 1937 were still studying in 1948; but over 25 of each 100 students who entered in 1952 were still studying during 1964. Thus, despite a considerable improvement, 75 of every 100 children who entered school in 1952 are no longer in school; and at least 50 of these children never got to high school.

Several new services have been added to the school system of Puerto Rico which are of significance in bridging the gap between quantity and quality in education, such as:

(*a*) Educational radio and television.

(*b*) A strong and efficient lunchroom program.

(*c*) A badly needed system of transportation of students.

(*d*) Programs of orientation and guidance.

(*e*) Social work services.

(*f*) Different schemes of library services.

(*g*) An editorial and printing establishment.

(*h*) School papers.

(*i*) A shoe program by which shoeless students may get a pair of shoes for only 50 cents.

(*j*) A strong and laudable scholarship program which extends from the primary, through the high school, and to the university at both undergraduate and graduate levels.

(*k*) A salary scale which is uniform for those who have equal training and experience irrespective of place of work—rural or urban, elementary or high school.

(*l*) First steps towards decentralizing the highly centralized school system by dividing the island into six regions for purposes of supervision and to provide in each geographic area the technical, professional and teaching facilities formerly available only when received from the central offices at the Department of Education.

(*m*) New plans for kindergarten education which are gradually being developed and put into action.

(*n*) New facilities for talented and retarded pupils.

(*o*) The development of what has been called "exemplary schools," which have received unusual emphasis during the last 5 years.

(*p*) The intensified supervision of rural schools.

(*q*) Plans, seminars and work shops for curriculum revisions.

At the university level, a commission of educators is intensively working on the study of a new law to reform the university structure. This commission was jointly appointed, on mandate of both Houses, by the President of the Senate and the Speaker of the House of Representatives. Once the report is submitted to the legislature it will be taken up to draw a new university law.

Puerto Rico has gone through a peaceful revolution in politics, in socioeconomic conditions, in its relations with the United States, and in many cultural aspects. Education, somehow, has lagged in contrast to the rapid pace of other institutions. There has been significant educational progress, but not in proportion to the economic effort of the government of Puerto Rico or in keeping with the needs, aspirations, and expectations of the people of the Commonwealth. With few exceptions, notably during the administration of Padín and Villaronga, the policies adopted by the commissioners of education have kept Puerto Rico, its life, its culture, its values and its purpose, practically out of its school system. For decades there was established a shortsighted policy of Americanization, "the spread and triumph of American standards of thought and action" without due consideration to language, religion, manners, customs, attitudes and ideals of the people upon whom the Americanization process is applied.

AN OLD QUESTION BEGGING FOR AN ANSWER: WHERE ARE WE GOING?

In the process of acculturation, in the search for the definition of personality and attainment of security, Puerto Ricans should not allow mere drifting, as a policy, to drag them to solutions.. There has been a history of ambivalence, insecurity, clashes of culture, misunderstanding of political relations between United States policy and insular orientation. Both countries have entered new ways of relationship. But still in the process of acculturation, the aims and purposes are not clear enough to help develop an adequate philosophy of education to guide programs and school activities. Part of the truth is that we have not yet got enough understanding of our changing processes to set sound purposes. Some still attach too much value to outmoded and obsolete cultural patterns; patterns which would have changed irrespective of our political and cultural ties with the United States. Others, without any sense of what is really involved, would like to wipe out all our cultural values and replace them for all that sounds American to them. These divergent points of view make the task of education much more meaningful and challenging, as well as more purposeful and urgent. There could be conscious planning of education, identification of values, of social processes, of government policy as well as of the economic goals and orientation. Puerto Ricans should not isolate themselves in a "pure" culture. There has never been one, except for some few isolated tribes, and there cannot be one in this fast moving world of communication and transportation. Neither should the Puerto Rican, bewildered by American power, vigor and aggressiveness, try to discard all his heritage and substitute what is of value in his culture for anything that comes from the States.

The aim of most leaders during the last decades was to free political power from economic power and control. There may be still time to plan education and the orientation of other social institutions and agencies, which are also educational, to prevent the new economic forces at work in our communities not only from controlling political power again, but from turning into a powerful factor affecting adversely our culture, our customs, our family life and those desirable values and characteristics which have always been part of the most cherished way of life of the Puerto Ricans. There should be a purposeful effort to avoid the risk of having that weakening process realized by the forces of economics, by the power of advertisement, and the desire of the people for material possessions, the longing for comfort, the undue attachment to symbols of social status, and the push—at times exaggerated—to fulfill aspirations, individual as well as collectively, which are far beyond the economic potential, and the intellectual ability needed to attain them. The people of Puerto Rico may do well to strengthen the purpose of economic development side by side with educational and cultural development. People need to live well, but they also need to add quality and meaning to their lives.

The persistent question asked by Dr. José Padín in March 1931, still is begging for an answer: where are we going? At this crucial time in our political and cultural history, I must say with Dr. Padín. "I don't know * * *," and the people of Puerto Rico have not yet had a chance to express where they want to go. The majority of the voters have endorsed the Commonwealth status, but there has not been a plebiscite that would allow people to express their choice of a final political solution. The vote for the Commonwealth may be principally a vote for a socioeconomic program, not necessarily a vote for a final political solution according to the principle of "free determination," although it is generally interpreted as a vote for Commonwealth.

The establishment of the commonwealth form of government certainly is moving towards a goal; a terminal station has been building. But even that is no clear port of entry. If Congress offers the opportunity for public expression and assumes the responsibility of steering the course for the attainment of the final solution preferred by the majority of the American citizens who live in Puerto Rico, then this century-old drifting will set the scene for a clear philosophy of education, for the formulation of a program which will put people at ease in their quest for identity, for values, for cultural expression and fulfillment.

The school system has had certain goals, a number of objectives, and some well-expressed principles, workable in the development of a decent, honorable, respectable and alert human being. But these are goals which can be applicable in a limited way while we move ahead; no philosophy of education can be formulated unless it is known where we, as a people, are going.

Dr. Padín's words, expressed in 1931, still ring in our ears:

> Now, I may be forgiven for asserting that education is the basic remedy for our ills. But the uncertainty with regard to the future breeds confusion. We can neither set up clear goals to attain, nor move towards them with assurance and singleness of purpose. Our aims are challenged, our efforts neutralized. The people's faith in the school system is being slowly undermined * * * This complicates the process of preparation and lengthens it immeasurably * * * I fear that unless we select a port of destination soon and set sail for it we are going to be wrecked by the menacing winds that are beginning to blow.[130]

The urgency of this plea for definite action is better understood when we add that it has become true, as recent studies have shown, that parents and teachers, teachers who work in the schools, have been losing faith in their public school system, that there is growing restlessness among our youth, that political unrest in the Caribbean and elsewhere is adding elements of distrust of the democratic procedures. The means of communication are carrying information and a knowledge of other ways of life to all places; the revolution caused by inexpensive transistor radios has incalculable repercussions. People are on the move; people's growing expectations need reasonable fulfillment, or frustration will lead to bitterness. Developments in Puerto Rico have been peaceful, enlightened, productive. For Operation Serenity to be with us we need to know soon where we are going and harness the school to the service of the choices of the people clearly expressed and equally respected if expressed with the moral strength that offers a free, confusionless, democratic process of free determination. Not until then can public servants help steer the course of action, firmly and unhesitatingly, towards the fulfillment of well defined policies that are in harmony with a well-known philosophy, and a sound and healthy way of life towards which the people of Puerto Rich have determined to move.

This is the unmistakable task of the United States-Puerto Rico Commission on the Status of Puerto Rico.

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VIII. STATISTICAL DATA

TABLE 1.—*Official projection of total population by age groups for Puerto Rico—Years 1965, 1970, 1975, and 1980*

Age groups	1965	1970	1975	1980
0–4	399, 387	452, 217	495, 476	542, 350
5–9	344, 256	387, 402	440, 526	488, 716
10–14	321, 068	336, 058	379, 168	435, 828
15–19	309, 081	305, 354	320, 304	370, 496
20–24	229, 879	286, 592	282, 905	307, 982
25–29	157, 474	211, 023	267, 358	272, 259
30–34	124, 967	142, 781	195, 832	258, 246
35–39	121, 465	118, 547	136, 158	190, 419
40–44	125, 517	115, 535	112, 722	132, 144
45–49	101, 511	118, 163	108, 424	108, 040
50–54	100, 662	96, 244	112, 460	104, 109
55–59	71, 255	95, 609	91, 454	107, 298
60–64	60, 662	65, 545	88, 586	85, 429
65–69	54, 522	57, 921	62, 207	80, 257
70–74	41, 281	47, 693	50, 435	52, 333
75+	48, 541	60, 189	73, 848	87, 489
Total	2, 611, 528	2, 896, 873	3, 217, 863	3, 623, 395

Source of information: Department of Health and Biostatistic Division of the School of Medicine of Puerto Rico.

TABLE 2.—*Total population projection by age groups with zero net migration for Puerto Rico in the years 1965, 1970, 1975, and 1980*

Age groups	1965	1970	1975	1980
0–4	411, 792	489, 546	557, 077	604, 209
5–9	351, 036	408, 756	486, 676	554, 559
10–14	326, 483	350, 038	407, 685	485, 474
15–19	319, 951	325, 238	348, 721	406, 149
20–24	245, 214	317, 839	323, 106	346, 436
25–29	170, 284	243, 316	315, 444	320, 694
30–34	134, 867	168, 664	241, 009	312, 468
35–39	125, 110	133, 181	166, 569	237, 979
40–44	128, 577	123, 203	131, 214	164, 135
45–49	105, 026	125, 846	120, 614	128, 479
50–54	102, 317	101, 864	122, 123	117, 034
55–59	71, 835	97, 964	97, 611	116, 932
60–64	61, 642	67, 400	92, 114	91, 884
65–69	52, 852	56, 591	61, 675	82, 294
70–74	42, 376	47, 646	50, 702	52, 613
75+	48, 256	60, 344	73, 531	87, 243
Total	2, 697, 618	3, 117, 436	3, 595, 871	4, 108, 582

Source of information: Health Department and Biostatistics Division of the School of Medicine of Puerto Rico.

TABLE 3.—*Total population of Puerto Rico by age groups for persons in the age group 6–22 years old in the population (in number and as percent of the total population) actual figures for the years 1899 to 1962 and projections for the years 1964, 1969, 1974, and 1979*

Year (date)	Total population	Population 6–12 years of age		Population 13–15 years of age		Population 16–18 years of age		Population 6–18 years of age		Population 19–22 years of age	
		Number of persons	Percent of the total	Number of persons	Percent of the total	Number of persons	Percent of the total	Number of persons	Percent of the total	Number of persons	Percent of the total
1899 (Nov. 10)	953, 243	189, 459	19. 88	67, 906	7. 12	55, 889	5. 86	313, 254	32. 86	71, 715	7. 52
1910 (Apr. 15)	1, 118, 012	206, 069	18. 43	83, 821	7. 50	65, 123	5. 82	355, 013	31. 75	87, 863	7. 86
1920 (Jan. 1)	1, 299, 809	257, 563	19. 82	94, 058	7. 24	74, 000	5. 69	425, 621	32. 75	102, 368	7. 88
1930 (Apr. 1)	1, 543, 913	297, 670	19. 28	116, 466	7. 54	109, 628	7. 10	523, 764	33. 92	126, 832	8. 21
1940 (Apr. 1)	1, 869, 255	334, 887	17. 92	131, 589	7. 04	120, 711	6. 46	587, 187	31. 42	165, 025	8. 83
1950 (July 1)	2, 218, 000	421, 220	18. 99	150, 732	6. 80	131, 851	5. 94	703, 803	31. 73	161, 124	7. 26
1951 (July 1)	2, 224, 000	423, 789	19. 06	153, 160	6. 89	133, 005	5. 98	709, 954	31. 93	159, 603	7. 18
1952 (July 1)	2, 202, 000	420, 951	19. 12	153, 600	6. 97	132, 487	6. 02	707, 038	32. 11	156, 212	7. 09
1953 (July 1)	2, 182, 000	418, 469	19. 18	154, 152	7. 06	132, 084	6. 05	704, 705	32. 29	153, 050	7. 01
1954 (July 1)	2, 195, 000	422, 241	19. 24	157, 000	7. 15	133, 723	6. 09	712, 964	32. 48	152, 204	6. 93
1955 (July 1)	2, 235, 000	431, 291	19. 30	161, 752	7. 24	136, 902	6. 12	729, 945	32. 66	153, 128	6. 85
1956 (July 1)	2, 237, 000	433, 078	19. 36	163, 860	7. 33	137, 880	6. 16	734, 826	32. 85	151, 500	6. 77
1957 (July 1)	2, 252, 000	437, 215	19. 41	166, 807	7. 41	139, 569	6. 20	743, 591	33. 02	150, 801	6. 70
1958 (July 1)	2, 295, 000	446, 966	19. 48	171, 900	7. 49	142, 990	6. 23	761, 856	33. 20	151, 865	6. 62
1959 (July 1)	2, 321, 000	453, 351	19. 53	175, 510	7. 56	145, 467	6. 28	774, 628	33. 37	151, 815	6. 54
1960 (July 1)	2, 358, 000	461, 510	19. 57	179, 989	7. 63	148, 332	6. 29	789, 831	33. 49	152, 914	6. 49
1961 (July 1)	2, 404, 300	467, 848	19. 46	181, 869	7. 56	150, 212	6. 25	799, 929	33. 27	160, 451	6. 67
1962 (July 1)	2, 454, 600	460, 936	18. 78	179, 833	7. 33	149, 805	6. 10	790, 574	32. 21	164, 794	6. 71
1964 (July 1)	2, 572, 231	464, 372	18. 05	190, 033	7. 39	182, 631	7. 10	837, 036	32. 54	196, 496	7. 64
1969 (July 1)	2, 854, 071	504, 610	17. 68	192, 443	6. 74	183, 232	6. 42	880, 285	30. 84	233, 285	8. 17
1974 (July 1)	3, 169, 715	572, 051	18. 05	209, 466	6. 61	190, 239	6. 00	971, 756	30. 66	232, 996	7. 35
1979 (July 1)	3, 562, 563	644, 711	18. 10	241, 430	6. 78	217, 743	6. 11	1, 103, 884	30. 99	255, 426	7. 17

Source of information: Actual figures: For 1899 to 1940, Department of Commerce of the United States, Bureau of the Census, U.S. Census 1940, and for 1950 to 1962 population figures of the Bureau of Demographic Registry and Statistics, Health Department of Puerto Rico. Projections: Calculations made by interpolation of official population projections prepared for this study by the Biostatistics Division of the School of Medicine of the University of Puerto Rico.

Table 4.—*Number of 6-year-old children in the population as of July 1 of each year since 1963 to 1979, according to the official population projection for Puerto Rico*

July 1 of the year—	*Population 6-year-olds*	July 1 of the year—Continued	*Population 6-year-olds*
1963	66, 804	1972	84, 060
1964	68, 304	1973	86, 210
1965	70, 123	1974	88, 370
1966	71, 990	1975	90, [illegible]28
1967	73, 870	1976	92, [illegible]
1968	75, 780	1977	94, [illegible]0
1969	77, 760	1978	96, 500
1970	79, 807	1979	98, 240
1971	81, 920	1980	99, 765

Source of information: The number of 6-year-old children was calculated for this study by the method of interpolation from the distribution of population by age groups provided by the official population projection by the Biostatistics Division of the School of Medicine of the University of Puerto Rico.

TABLE 5.—*Enrollment in public day schools and accredited private schools of Puerto Rico in the school years 1946–47 to 1962–63, by grade, school level and total*

School level and grade	School year								
	1946-47	1947-48	1948-49	1949-50	1950-51	1951-52	1952-53	1953-54	1954-55
Elementary:									
1	76,701	77,668	76,930	79,047	85,324	79,180	86,686	92,700	83,899
2	61,924	63,961	65,238	67,236	71,645	76,953	73,285	80,970	86,843
3	52,103	54,664	56,896	59,614	62,734	66,335	72,319	71,518	80,395
4	40,787	45,062	46,338	50,761	53,624	55,843	60,658	66,201	66,222
5	33,809	34,355	38,029	40,962	44,905	46,944	50,088	53,942	59,682
6	28,690	28,878	29,601	33,661	37,121	39,965	41,625	44,349	48,342
1 to 6, total	294,014	304,588	313,032	331,281	355,353	365,220	384,661	409,680	425,383
Junior high school:									
7	22,586	23,990	24,428	25,853	30,055	31,528	34,572	36,175	38,926
8	19,736	18,999	20,234	21,499	22,892	25,426	26,892	28,873	30,770
9	20,093	17,761	16,715	18,459	19,596	19,881	21,944	22,855	24,799
7 to 9 total	62,415	60,750	61,377	65,811	72,543	76,835	83,408	87,903	94,495
High school:									
10	12,338	13,993	12,489	12,998	14,643	14,988	16,547	18,496	20,449
11	8,517	10,357	11,660	10,939	11,426	11,701	12,117	13,626	15,718
12	6,558	7,617	8,631	9,572	9,162	9,190	9,568	9,889	11,497
10 to 12 total	27,413	31,967	32,780	33,509	35,231	35,879	38,232	42,011	47,664
Total (1 to 12)	383,842	397,305	407,189	430,601	463,127	477,934	506,301	539,594	567,542

School level and grade	1955-56	1956-57	1957-58	1958-59	1959-60	1960-61	1961-62	1962-63
Elementary:								
1	81,176	79,845	79,966	78,132	83,760	85,540	87,962	88,204
2	78,877	75,740	75,663	74,559	72,045	75,190	77,385	80,362
3	87,312	80,463	76,201	74,823	72,812	70,247	72,748	74,917
4	73,943	79,560	76,070	72,093	71,218	69,477	66,874	69,138
5	59,492	65,680	72,296	69,578	66,455	65,606	64,142	62,005
6	53,116	52,891	58,716	63,542	60,879	58,483	58,516	57,569
1 to 6 total	433,916	434,179	438,912	432,727	427,169	424,543	427,627	432,195
Junior high school:								
7	41,788	45,660	47,312	51,919	56,386	54,698	54,394	54,898
8	32,261	34,928	38,131	39,291	42,360	46,868	46,793	47,019
9	26,251	27,696	29,716	32,370	33,012	35,765	40,312	40,481
7 to 9 total	100,300	108,284	115,159	123,580	131,758	137,331	141,499	142,398
High school:								
10	21,797	23,383	24,514	26,360	28,636	28,785	31,896	35,947
11	17,743	18,082	19,932	21,134	21,566	23,073	24,381	27,107
12	13,618	14,138	14,818	16,736	17,002	17,347	18,851	19,803
10 to 12 total	53,158	55,603	59,264	64,230	67,204	69,205	75,128	82,857
Total (1 to 12)	587,374	598,066	613,335	620,537	626,131	631,079	644,254	657,450

Source of information: Department of Education, Statistical Report for the school years 1958–59 and 1961–62 and Bulletin No. 2 of the Statistics Division of the Department of Education for the school year 1962–63.

Table 6.—*Holding rate from grade to grade in public day schools and accredited private schools of Puerto Rico, school years 1946–47 to 1962–63*

Grade	Holding rates from year to year (in percentages)															
	1946–47 1947–48	1947–48 1948–49	1948–49 1949–50	1949–50 1950–51	1950–51 1951–52	1951–52 1952–53	1952–53 1953–54	1953–54 1954–55	1954–55 1955–56	1955–56 1956–57	1956–57 1957–58	1957–58 1958–59	1958–59 1959–60	1959–60 1960–61	1960–61 1961–62	1961–62 1962–63
1–2	83.39	84.00	87.40	90.64	90.19	92.55	93.41	93.68	94.01	93.30	94.76	93.24	92.21	89.77	90.47	91.36
2–3	88.28	88.95	91.38	93.30	92.59	93.98	97.59	99.29	100.54	102.01	100.61	98.89	97.66	97.50	96.75	96.81
3–4	86.49	84.77	89.22	89.95	89.02	91.44	91.54	92.59	91.97	91.12	94.54	94.61	95.18	95.42	95.19	95.04
4–5	84.23	84.39	88.40	88.46	87.54	89.69	88.93	90.15	89.84	88.83	90.87	91.47	92.18	92.12	92.32	92.72
5–6	85.42	86.16	88.51	90.62	89.00	88.67	88.54	89.62	89.00	88.90	89.40	87.89	87.50	88.00	89.19	89.75
6–7	83.62	84.59	87.34	89.29	84.93	86.51	86.91	87.77	86.44	85.96	89.45	88.42	88.74	89.85	93.01	93.82
7–8	84.12	84.34	88.01	88.55	84.60	85.30	83.52	85.06	82.88	83.58	83.51	83.05	81.59	83.12	85.55	86.44
8–9	89.99	87.98	91.23	91.15	86.85	86.31	84.99	85.89	85.31	85.85	85.08	84.89	84.02	84.43	86.01	86.51
9–10	69.64	70.32	77.76	79.33	76.48	83.23	84.29	89.47	87.89	89.07	88.51	88.71	88.46	87.20	89.18	89.17
10–11	83.94	83.33	87.59	87.91	79.91	80.84	82.35	84.98	86.77	82.96	85.24	86.21	81.81	80.57	84.70	84.99
11–12	89.43	83.33	82.09	83.76	80.43	81.77	81.61	84.38	86.64	79.68	81.95	83.97	80.45	80.44	81.70	81.22

Source of information: Department of Education, annual reports for the school years 1946–47 to 1961–62. Holding rates for the school years 1961–62 to 1962–63 were calculated for this study using the enrollment report for the school year 1962–63 provided by the Statistics Division of the Department of Education.

Table 7.—*Cumulative retention from the first to the sixth grade, by number and percentage for the school years 1942–43 to 1962–63 (public day school and accredited schools of Puerto Rico)*

1st grade enrollment		6th grade enrollment		5 years later
School year	Number of students	School year	Number of students	Percent of the 1st grade enrollment
1942–43	65,157	1947–48	28,878	44.32
1943–44	65,669	1948–49	29,601	45.08
1944–45	74,248	1949–50	33,661	45.34
1945–46	76,043	1950–51	37,121	48.82
1946–47	76,701	1951–52	39,965	52.10
1947–48	77,668	1952–53	41,625	53.59
1948–49	76,930	1953–54	44,349	57.65
1949–50	79,047	1954–55	48,342	61.16
1950–51	85,324	1955–56	53,116	62.25
1951–52	79,180	1956–57	52,891	66.80
1952–53	86,686	1957–58	58,716	67.73
1953–54	92,700	1958–59	63,542	68.55
1954–55	83,899	1959–60	60,879	72.56
1955–56	81,176	1960–61	58,483	72.04
1956–57	79,845	1961–62	58,516	73.29
1957–58	79,966	1962–63	57,375	71.75

Source of information: Department of Education of Puerto Rico, annual reports for the school years 1942–43 to 1961–62. Data provided by the Statistic Division of the Department of Education for the school year 1962–63. Cumulative retention refers to the 6th grade enrollment compared with the 1st grade enrollment recorded 5 years earlier. The percentages in this table were calculated for this study.

Table 8.—*Cumulative retention from the 7th to the 12th grade, in number and percentage, school years 1942–43 to 1962–63 (public day schools and accredited private schools of Puerto Rico)*

7th grade enrollment		12th grade enrollment		5 years later
School year	Number of students	School year	Number of students	Percent of the 7th grade enrollment
1942–43	17,216	1947–48	7,617	44.24
1943–44	19,649	1948–49	8,631	43.93
1944–45	22,298	1949–50	9,572	42.93
1945–46	22,547	1950–51	9,162	40.64
1946–47	22,586	1951–52	9,190	40.69
1947–48	23,990	1952–53	9,568	39.88
1948–49	24,428	1953–54	9,889	40.48
1949–50	25,853	1954–55	11,497	44.47
1950–51	30,055	1955–56	13,618	45.31
1951–52	31,528	1956–57	14,138	44.84
1952–53	34,572	1957–58	14,818	42.86
1953–54	36,175	1958–59	16,736	46.26
1954–55	38,926	1959–60	17,002	43.68
1955–56	41,788	1960–61	17,347	41.51
1956–57	45,660	1961–62	17,851	39.10
1957–58	47,312	1962–63	19,803	41.86

Source of information: Department of Education, annual reports for the school years 1942–43 to 1961–62. Data provided by the Statistics Division of the Department of Education for the school year 1962–63. Cumulative retention refers to the 12th grade enrollment compared with the 7th grade enrollment recorded 5 years earlier. The percentages in this table were calculated for this study.

TABLE 9.—*Cumulative retention from the 1st to the 12th grades, in number and percentage, school years 1936–37 to 1962–63 (public day schools and accredited private schools of Puerto Rico)*

1st grade enrollment		12th grade enrollment		11 years later
School year	Number of students	School year	Number of students	Percent of the 1st grade enrollment
1936-37	54,960	1947-48	7,203	13.11
1937-38	70,332	1948-49	8,631	12.27
1938-39	70,646	1949-50	9,572	13.55
1939-40	64,071	1950-51	9,162	14.30
1940-41	59,259	1951-52	9,190	15.51
1941-42	67,179	1952-53	9,568	14.24
1942-43	65,157	1953-54	9,889	15.18
1943-44	65,669	1954-55	11,497	17.51
1944-45	74,248	1955-56	13,618	18.34
1945-46	76,043	1956-57	14,138	18.59
1946-47	76,701	1957-58	14,818	19.32
1947-48	77,668	1958-59	16,736	18.97
1948-49	76,930	1959-60	17,002	22.10
1949-50	79,047	1960-61	17,347	21.95
1950-51	85,324	1961-62	17,851	22.09
1951-52	79,180	1962-63	19,803	25.01

Source of information: Department of Education of Puerto Rico, annual reports for the school years 1936–37 to 1961–62. Data provided by the Statistics Division of the Department of Education for the school year 1962–63. Cumulative retention refers to the 12th grade enrollment compared with the 1st grade enrollment recorded 11 years before. The percentages in this table were calculated for this study.

TABLE 10.—*Holding rates from grade to grade used in preparing enrollment Projection CSE–E–6 for the public day schools and accredited private schools of Puerto Rico, school years 1962–63 to 1979–80*

Grade	1961-62 to 1962-63	1962-63 to 1963-64	1963-64 to 1964-65	1964-65 to 1965-66	1965-66 to 1966-67	1966-67 to 1967-68	1967-68 to 1968-69	1968-69 to 1969-70	1969-70 to 1970-71
1-2	91.36	91.79	92.22	92.65	93.08	93.51	93.94	94.37	94.80
2-3	96.81	96.99	97.17	97.35	97.53	97.71	97.89	98.07	98.25
3-4	95.04	95.37	95.70	96.03	96.36	96.69	97.02	97.35	97.68
4-5	92.72	93.24	93.76	94.28	94.80	95.32	95.84	96.36	96.88
5-6	89.75	90.27	90.79	91.31	91.83	92.35	92.87	93.39	93.91
6-7	93.82	94.01	94.20	94.39	94.58	94.77	94.96	95.15	95.34
7-8	86.44	86.82	87.20	87.58	87.96	88.34	88.72	89.10	89.48
8-9	86.51	86.88	87.25	87.62	87.99	88.36	88.73	89.10	89.47
9-10	89.17	89.41	89.65	89.89	90.13	90.37	90.61	90.85	91.09
10-11	84.99	85.24	85.49	85.74	85.99	86.24	86.49	86.74	86.99
11-12	81.22	81.74	82.26	82.78	83.30	83.82	84.34	84.86	85.38
	1970-71 to 1971-72	1971-72 to 1972-73	1972-73 to 1973-74	1973-74 to 1974-75	1974-75 to 1975-76	1975-76 to 1976-77	1976-77 to 1977-78	1977-78 to 1978-79	1978-79 to 1979-80
1-2	95.23	95.66	96.09	96.52	96.92	97.32	97.72	98.12	98.52
2-3	98.43	98.61	98.79	98.97	99.08	99.19	99.30	99.41	99.52
3-4	98.01	98.34	98.67	99.00	99.16	99.32	99.48	99.64	99.80
4-5	97.40	97.92	98.44	98.96	99.06	99.16	99.26	99.36	99.46
5-6	94.43	94.95	95.47	95.99	96.39	96.79	97.19	97.59	97.99
6-7	95.53	95.72	95.91	96.10	96.32	96.54	96.76	96.98	97.20
7-8	89.86	90.24	90.62	91.00	91.04	91.08	91.12	91.16	91.20
8-9	89.84	90.21	90.58	90.95	91.01	91.07	91.13	91.19	91.25
9-10	91.33	91.57	91.81	92.05	92.30	92.55	92.80	93.05	93.30
10-11	87.24	87.49	87.74	87.99	88.29	88.59	88.89	89.19	89.49
11-12	85.90	86.42	86.94	87.46	87.98	88.50	89.02	89.54	90.06

Source of information: Retention rates of the school years 1961–62 to 1962–63 were taken from table 13 of this study. Retention rates for the school years 1962–63 to 1979–80 were worked out for this study.

Table 11.—*Projection CSE-E-6—Enrollment in public day schools and accredited private schools of Puerto Rico in the school years 1962–63 to 1979–80, by grade, school level and total*

Grade	1962–63	1963–64	1964–65	1965–66	1966–67	1967–68	1968–69	1969–70	1970–71
Elementary level:									
1	88,204	88,967	89,757	91,139	92,485	93,816	95,256	96,726	98,222
2	80,362	80,962	82,045	83,160	84,832	86,483	88,131	89,893	91,696
3	74,917	77,943	78,671	79,871	81,106	82,889	84,658	86,430	88,320
4	69,138	71,448	74,591	75,548	76,964	78,421	80,419	82,415	84,425
5	62,005	64,464	66,990	70,324	71,620	73,362	75,159	77,492	79,844
6	57,569	55,972	58,527	61,169	64,579	66,141	68,131	70,191	72,773
1 to 6, total	432,195	439,821	450,581	461,211	471,586	481,112	491,754	503,147	515,280
Junior high school level:									
7	54,898	54,121	52,726	55,244	57,854	61,202	62,807	64,827	66,920
8	47,019	47,662	47,194	46,177	48,593	51,108	54,298	55,961	58,007
9	40,481	40,850	41,585	41,351	40,631	42,937	45,348	48,380	50,068
7 to 9, total	142,398	142,633	141,505	142,772	147,078	155,247	162,453	169,168	174,995
High school level:									
10	35,947	36,194	36,622	37,381	37,270	36,718	38,905	41,199	44,069
11	27,107	30,641	30,942	31,400	32,144	32,142	31,757	33,746	35,839
12	19,803	22,157	25,205	25,614	26,156	26,943	27,109	26,949	28,812
10 to 12, total	82,857	88,992	92,769	94,395	95,570	95,803	97,771	101,894	108,720
Total (1 to 12)	657,450	671,446	684,855	698,378	714,234	732,162	751,978	774,209	798,995

Grade	1971–72	1972–73	1973–74	1974–75	1975–76	1976–77	1977–78	1978–79	1979–80
Elementary level:									
1	99,695	101,211	102,686	104,107	105,587	107,099	108,659	110,225	111,737
2	93,537	95,368	97,254	99,113	100,901	102,757	104,657	106,616	108,594
3	90,256	92,237	94,214	96,252	98,201	100,084	102,038	104,040	106,104
4	86,562	88,758	91,010	93,272	95,443	97,533	99,564	101,671	103,832
5	82,230	84,762	87,373	90,063	92,395	94,641	96,811	98,927	101,122
6	75,397	78,077	80,922	83,869	86,812	89,429	91,982	94,478	96,939
1 to 6, total	527,677	540,413	553,459	566,676	579.339	591,543	603,711	615,957	628,328
Junior high school level:									
7	69,520	72,170	74,884	77,766	80,783	83,808	86,532	89,204	91,833
8	60,134	62,735	65,400	68,144	70,798	73,577	76,366	78,883	81,354
9	52,113	54,247	56,825	59,481	62,018	64,476	67,051	69,638	71,981
7 to 9, total	181,767	189,152	197,109	205,391	213,599	221,861	229,949	237,725	245,168
High school level:									
10	45,727	47,720	49,804	52,307	54,901	57,398	59,834	62,391	64,972
11	38,446	40,007	41,870	43,823	46,182	48,637	51,021	53,366	55,834
12	30,786	33,225	34,782	36,620	38,555	40,871	43,297	45,684	48,061
10 to 12, total	114,959	120,952	126,456	132,750	139,638	146,906	154,152	161,441	168,867
Total (1 to 12)	824,403	850,517	877,024	904,817	932,576	960,310	987,812	1,015,123	1,042,363

Source of information: (*a*) Enrollment for the school year 1962–63 was taken from Bulletin No. 2 of the Statistics Division of the Department of Education (actual data). (*b*) First grade enrollment from the school year 1963–64 to 1979–80 was taken from the projections of Superior Educational Council. (*c*) Enrollment from the 2d to the 12th grade from the school year 1963–64 to 1979–80 was calculated applying projected holding rates from grade to grade to the enrollments obtained from sources (*a*) and (*b*).

Table 12.—*Enrollment coefficients (total and for the elementary, junior high school and high school levels) of the educational system of Puerto Rico in the school years 1950–51 to 1962–63 (public day and accredited private schools of Puerto Rico)*

School year	Population*				Total enrollment and enrollment by school levels				Enrollment Coefficients (in percent)			
	6-18 years	6-12 years	13-15 years	16-18 years	Total	Elementary	Junior high school	High school	Total	Elementary	Junior high school	High school
1950-51	703,803	421,220	150,732	131,851	463,127	355,353	72,543	35,231	65.80	84.36	48.13	26.72
1951-52	709.954	423,789	153,160	133,005	477,934	365,220	76,835	35,879	67.32	86.18	50.17	26.98
1952-53	707,038	420,951	153,600	132,487	506,301	384,661	83,408	38,232	71.61	91.38	54.30	28.86
1953-54	704,705	418,469	154,152	132,064	539,594	409,680	87,903	42,011	76.57	97.90	57.02	31.81
1954-55	712,964	422,241	157,000	133,723	567,542	425,383	94,495	47,664	79.60	100.74	60.19	35.64
1955-56	729,945	431,291	161,752	136,902	587,374	433,916	100,300	53,158	80.47	100.61	62.01	38.83
1956-57	734,826	433,078	163.860	137,880	598,066	434,179	108,284	55,603	81.39	100.25	66.08	40.33
1957-58	743,591	437,215	166,807	139.569	613,335	438,912	115,159	59,264	82.48	100.39	69.04	42.46
1958-59	761,856	446,966	171,900	142,990	620,537	432,727	123,580	64,230	81.45	96.81	71.89	44.92
1959-60	774,628	453,351	175,510	145,467	626,131	427.169	131,758	67,204	80.83	94.22	75.07	46.20
1960-61	789,831	461,510	179,989	148,332	631,079	424,543	137,331	69,205	79.90	91.99	76.30	46.66
1961-62	799,929	467,848	181,869	150,212	644,254	427,627	141,499	75,128	80.54	91.40	77.80	50.01
1962-63	790.574	460,936	179,833	149,805	657.450	432,195	142,398	82,857	83.17	93.76	79.18	55.31

*As of July 1 of the school year.

Source of information: (1) Population: Health Department of Puerto Rico, Bureau of Demographic Statistics. (2) Enrollment: Department of Education of Puerto Rico, Statistics Division, annual report 1961–62 (table number 29) and bulletin number 2, 1962–63.

(3) Enrollment coefficient: Enrollment coefficient refers to the total elementary, junior high school and high school enrollment compared with the population of the age groups 6–18 years, 6–12 years, 13–15 years, and 16–18 years, respectively. The enrollment coefficients were calculated for this study.

TABLE 13.—*Enrollment coefficients of the elementary level (grades 1 to 6) for the enrollment predictions of the projections CSE–E–1, 6 and 9 for the school years 1964–65, 1969–70, 1974–80 (public day and accredited private school of Puerto Rico)*

School year	Population 6–12 years old	Enrollment in elementary school level (grades 1 to 6)					
		Projection CSE–E–1		Projection CSE–E–6		Projection CSE–E–9	
		Number	Enrollment coefficient	Number	Enrollment coefficient	Number	Enrollment coefficient
1964–65	464, 372	449, 719	96. 84	450, 581	97. 03	451, 365	97. 20
1969–70	504, 610	498, 004	98. 69	503, 147	99. 71	508, 214	100. 71
1974–75	572, 051	555, 929	97. 18	566, 676	99. 06	577, 468	100. 95
1979–80	644, 711	618, 659	95. 96	628, 328	97. 46	635, 916	98. 64

Source of information: (*a*) Population: Planning Board of Puerto Rico, official projection provided to the public agencies and corporations, June 1, 1962. (*b*) Elementary school level enrollment: It was taken from the indicated projections. (*c*) Enrollment coefficient: It was calculated for this study.

TABLE 14.—*Enrollment coefficient of the junior high school level (grades 7 to 9) for the enrollment predictions of the projections CSE–E–1, 6 and 9 for the school years 1964–65, 1969–70, 1974–75, and 1979–80 (public day and accredited private schools of Puerto Rico)*

School year	Population 13–15 years old	Enrollment in junior high school level (grades 7 to 9)					
		Projection CSE–E–1		Projection CSE–E–6		Projection CSE–E–9	
		Number	Enrollment coefficient	Number	Enrollment coefficient	Number	Enrollment coefficient
1964–65	190, 033	140, 502	73. 94	141, 505	74. 46	142, 881	75. 19
1969–70	192, 443	161, 570	83. 96	169, 168	87. 91	178, 287	92. 64
1974–75	209, 466	187, 587	89. 55	205, 391	98. 05	225, 125	107. 48
1979–80	241, 430	220, 635	91. 39	245, 168	101. 55	277, 306	114. 86

Source of information: (*a*) Population: Planning Board of Puerto Rico, official projection provided to the public agencies and corporations, June 1, 1962. (*b*) Elementary school level enrollment: It was taken from the indicated projections. (*c*) Enrollment coefficient: It was calculated for this study.

TABLE 15.—*Enrollment coefficients of the high school level (grades 10 to 12) for the enrollment predictions of the projections CSE–E–1, 6 and 9 for the school years 1964–65, 1969–70, 1974–75, and 1979–80 (public day and accredited private schools of Puerto Rico)*

School year	Population 16–18 years old	Enrollment in high school level (grades 10–12)					
		Projection CSE–E–1		Projection CSE–E–6		Projection CSE–E–9	
		Number	Enrollment coefficient	Number	Enrollment coefficient	Number	Enrollment coefficient
1964–65	182, 631	92, 366	50. 58	92, 769	50. 80	92, 889	50. 86
1969–70	183, 232	96, 927	52. 90	101, 894	55. 61	106, 943	58. 36
1974–75	190, 239	118, 035	62. 05	132, 750	69. 78	148, 954	78. 30
1979–80	217, 743	142, 647	65. 51	168, 867	77. 55	201, 431	92. 51

Source of information: (*a*) Population: Planning Board of Puerto Rico, official projection provided to the public agencies and corporations, June 1, 1962. (*b*) Elementary school level enrollment: It was taken from the indicated projections. (*c*) Enrollment coefficient: It was calculated for this study.

TABLE 16.—*Total enrollment coefficients (grades 1 to 12) for the enrollment predictions of the projections CSE–E–1, 6 and 9 for the school years 1964–65, 1969–70, 1974–75, and 1979–80 (public day and accredited private schools of Puerto Rico)*

School year	Population 6–18 years old	Total enrollment (grades 1 to 12)					
		Projection CSE–E–1		Projection CSE–E–6		Projection CSE–E–9	
		Number	Enrollment coefficient	Number	Enrollment coefficient	Number	Enrollment coefficient
1964–65	837, 036	682, 587	81. 55	684, 855	81. 82	687, 135	82. 09
1969–70	880, 285	756, 501	85. 94	774, 209	87. 95	793, 444	90. 13
1974–75	971, 756	861, 551	88. 66	904, 817	93. 11	951, 547	97. 92
1979–80	1, 103, 884	981, 941	88. 95	1, 042, 363	94. 43	1, 114, 653	100. 98

Source of information: (*a*) Population: Planning Board of Puerto Rico, official projection provided to the public agencies and corporations, June 1, 1962. (*b*) Elementary school level enrollment: It was taken from the indicated projections. (*c*) Enrollment coefficient: It was calculated for this study.

TABLE 17.—*Sixth grade graduates as a percentage of the 6th grade enrollment in the public day and accredited private schools of Puerto Rico; school years 1947–48 to 1961–62*

School year	6th grade enrollment	6th grade graduates	6th grade graduates as percentage of the enrollment
1947–48	28, 878	26, 019	90. 1
1948–49	29, 601	27, 394	92. 5
1949–50	33, 661	31, 857	94. 6
1950–51	37, 121	34, 452	92. 8
1951–52	39, 965	36, 634	91. 7
1952–53	41, 625	38, 391	92. 2
1953–54	44, 349	40, 559	91. 5
1954–55	48, 342	44, 258	91. 6
1955–56	53, 116	47, 683	89. 8
1956–57	52, 891	46, 793	88. 5
1957–58	58, 716	50, 608	86. 2
1958–59	63, 542	54, 046	85. 1
1959–60	60, 879	52, 238	85. 8
1960–61	58, 483	50, 869	87. 0
1961–62	58, 516	51, 372	87. 8

Source of information: Enrollment and graduates data: Department of Education of Puerto Rico—Annual reports for the school years 1947–48 to 1961–62. Percentages were calculated for this study.

TABLE 18.—*Ninth grade graduates as a percentage of the 9th grade enrollment in the public day and accredited private schools of Puerto Rico, school years 1947–48 to 1961–62*

School year	9th grade enrollment	9th grade graduates	9th grade graduates as percentage of the enrollment
1947–48	17,761	15,934	89.7
1948–49	16,715	15,396	92.1
1949–50	18,459	17,344	94.0
1950–51	19,596	18,100	92.4
1951–52	19,881	18,102	91.1
1952–53	21,944	20,092	91.6
1953–54	22,855	20,828	91.1
1954–55	24,799	22,632	91.3
1955–56	26,251	23,543	89.7
1956–57	27,696	24,545	88.6
1957–58	29,716	26,293	88.5
1958–59	32,370	28,059	86.7
1959–60	33,012	28,445	86.2
1960–61	35,765	31,573	88.3
1961–62	40,312	36,047	89.4

Source of information: Enrollment and graduates data: Department of Education of Puerto Rico—Annual reports for the school years 1947–48 to 1961–62. The percentages were calculated for this study.

TABLE 19.—*Twelfth grade graduates as a percentage of the 12th grade enrollment in the public day and accredited private schools of Puerto Rico, school years 1947–48 to 1961–62*

School year	12th grade enrollment	12th grade graduates	12th grade graduates as percentage of the enrollment
1947–48	7,203	6,550	90.9
1948–49	8,631	7,739	89.7
1949–50	9,572	9,011	94.1
1950–51	9,162	8,182	89.3
1951–52	9,190	8,074	87.9
1952–53	9,568	8,455	88.4
1953–54	9,889	8,855	89.5
1954–55	11,497	10,054	87.5
1955–56	13,618	11,126	81.7
1956–57	14,138	12,250	86.7
1957–58	14,818	12,704	85.7
1958–59	16,736	14,639	87.5
1959–60	17,002	14,394	84.7
1960–61	17,347	15,524	89.5
1961–62	18,851	16,959	90.0

Source of information: Enrollment and graduates data: Department of Education of Puerto Rico—Annual reports for the school years 1947–48 to 1961–62. Percentages were calculated for this study.

TABLE 20.—*Total enrollment and enrollment by levels (elementary, junior high school, and high school) in public day schools and accredited private schools of Puerto Rico for the school years 1898, 1909–10, 1919–20, 1929–30, 1939–40, 1949–50 to 1962–63*

School year	Enrollment, all levels (grades 1 to 12)			Enrollment, elementary level (grades 1 to 6)			Enrollment, junior high school level (grades 7 to 9)			Enrollment, high school level (grades 10 to 12)		
	Total	Public	Private	Total	Public	Private	Total	Public	Private	Total	Public	Private
1898	(1)	25,644	(1)	(1)	(1)	(1)	(1)	(1)	(1)	(1)	(1)	(1)
1909–10	(1)	95,314	(1)	(1)	92,502	(1)	(1)	2,608	(1)	(1)	204	(1)
1919–20	(1)	178,035	[2] 5,830	(1)	167,334	(1)	(1)	8,764	(1)	(1)	1,937	(1)
1929–30	226,550	221,197	5,353	204,698	200,985	3,713	17,070	15,983	1,087	4,782	4,229	553
1939–40	296,629	286,098	10,531	246,662	240,023	6,639	37,527	35,386	2,141	12,440	10,689	1,751
1949–50	430,601	408,083	22,518	331,281	317,121	14,160	65,811	61,851	3,960	33,509	29,111	4,398
1950–51	463,127	439,639	23,488	355,353	340,004	15,349	72,543	68,415	4,128	35,231	31,220	4,011
1951–52	477,934	452,603	25,331	365,220	348,287	16,933	76,835	72,499	4,336	35,879	31,817	4,062
1952–53	506,301	475,579	30,722	384,661	364,004	20,657	83,408	78,077	5,331	38,232	33,498	4,734
1953–54	539,594	505,092	34,502	409,680	387,077	22,603	87,903	81,946	5,957	42,011	36,069	5,942
1954–55	567,542	528,615	38,927	425,383	401,775	23,608	94,495	87,472	7,023	47,664	39,368	8,296
1955–56	587,374	544,817	42,557	433,916	409,039	24,877	100,300	92,664	7,646	53,158	43,114	10,044
1956–57	598,066	553,388	44,678	434,179	407,559	26,620	108,284	99,997	8,287	55,603	45,832	9,771
1957–58	613,335	564,041	49,294	438,912	409,223	29,689	115,159	106,043	9,116	59,264	48,775	10,489
1958–59	620,537	568,804	51,733	432,727	401,422	31,305	123,580	113,437	10,143	64,230	53,945	10,285
1959–60	626,131	572,705	53,426	427,169	394,364	32,805	131,758	120,622	11,136	67,204	57,719	9,485
1960–61	631,079	577,045	54,034	424,543	391,189	33,354	137,331	125,298	12,033	69,205	60,558	8,647
1961–62	644,254	588,490	55,764	427,627	393,495	34,132	141,499	128,642	12,857	75,128	66,353	8,775
1962–63	657,450	596,804	60,646	432,195	394,742	37,453	142,398	128,762	13,636	82,857	73,300	9,557

[1] Information is not available.
[2] Estimated on the basis of the Commissioner's Report, 1920–21, pp. 304 and 400.

Source of information: For 1898, Commissioner's Report, Department of Education, 1909–10, p. 22. For 1909–10 to 1929–30, Commissioner's Report, Department of Education, 1938–39. Private school enrollment for 1929–30 was obtained from the files of the Statistics Division of the Department of Education. Information for 1939–40 was obtained from the report of the Commissioner of Education for that year. Information for 1949–50 to 1961–62 was obtained from the annual statistical report of the Secretary of Education, Department of Education, 1961–62. Information for 1962–63 was obtained from bulletin no. 2—report on enrollment and personnel at the end of the 6th school month, Statistics Division, Department of Education, 1962–63.

TABLE 21.—*First year enrollment at university level, 12th grade graduates and 1st year enrollment at university level as percentage of the 12th grade graduates, for the school years 1950–51 to 1960–61 (public and accredited private day schools and institutions of higher education of Puerto Rico)*

School year	Enrollment 1st year of university	12th grade graduates (preceding school year)	Enrollment of 1st year of university—Percentage of the 12th grade graduates
1950–51	3,425	9,011	38.0
1951–52	3,056	8,182	37.4
1952–53	2,939	8,074	36.4
1953–54	3,868	8,455	45.7
1954–55	4,862	8,855	54.9
1955–56	5,202	10,054	51.7
1956–57	5,734	11,126	51.5
1957–58	6,558	12,250	53.5
1958–59	6,406	12,704	50.4
1959–60	6,479	14,639	44.3
1960–61	7,797	14,394	54.2

Source of information: (*a*) Enrollment, first year of university: Official enrollment data provided to the Superior Council on Education annually by public and accredited private university level institutions of Puerto Rico. (*b*) Twelfth grade graduates: Department of Education of Puerto Rico—Annual reports for the school years 1949–50 to 1959–60. (*c*) Percentages were calculated for this study.

TABLE 22.—*Projections CSE–UT–1, 5, 15, 23, 27, 50, and 54: Total enrollment in accredited institutions at university level, according to projections CSE–UT–1, 2, 5, 11, 12, 24, and 27 of 1st year enrollment at this educational level for school years 1963–64 to 1980–81*

School year	Projection													
	CSE–UT–1		CSE–UT–2 (1st year)	CSE–UT–5, total	CSE–UI–5 (1st year)	CSE–UT–15, total	CSE–UI–11 (1st year)	CSE–UT–23, total	CSE–UI–12 (1st year)	CSE–UT–27, total	CSE–UI–24 (1st year)	CSE–UT–50, total	CSE–UI–27 (1st year)	CSE–UT–54, total
	1st year	Total												
1963–64	9,186	28,706	9,805	33,579	9,805	36,315	9,805	33,579	10,423	38,604	10,423	35,696	10,423	38,604
1964–65	9,532	29,788	10,174	34,842	10,508	38,918	10,199	34,929	10,842	40,156	11,199	38,353	11,555	42,796
1965–66	10,795	33,734	11,522	39,459	11,899	44,070	11,602	39,733	12,334	45,681	12,740	43,631	13,145	48,685
1966–67	10,923	34,134	11,658	39,925	12,040	44,593	11,790	40,377	12,534	46,422	12,939	44,312	13,350	49,444
1967–68	11,071	34,597	11,816	40,466	12,204	45,200	12,040	41,233	12,799	47,404	13,271	45,449	13,693	50,715
1968–69	11,292	35,288	12,053	41,278	12,448	46,104	12,402	42,473	13,184	48,830	13,785	47,209	14,223	52,678
1969–70	11,225	35,078	11,981	41,031	12,374	45,830	12,478	42,773	13,266	49,133	14,015	47,997	14,560	53,926
1970–71	11,008	34,400	11,750	40,240	12,135	44,944	12,405	42,483	13,187	48,841	14,099	48,285	14,546	53,874
1971–72	11,596	36,238	12,377	42,388	12,783	47,344	13,262	45,418	14,099	52,218	15,258	52,254	15,743	58,307
1972–73	12,201	38,128	13,023	44,600	13,450	49,815	14,171	48,531	15,065	55,796	16,512	56,549	17,036	63,096
1973–74	12,968	40,525	13,841	47,401	14,295	52,944	15,294	52,377	16,258	60,215	18,056	61,836	18,629	68,996
1974–75	13,353	41,728	14,252	48,809	14,720	54,518	16,010	54,829	17,020	63,037	19,169	65,648	19,777	73,248
1975–76	13,833	43,228	14,765	50,566	15,249	56,478	16,856	57,727	17,919	66,367	20,462	70,076	21,112	78,193
1976–77	14,333	44,791	15,298	52,391	15,800	58,518	17,747	60,778	18,867	69,878	21,830	74,761	22,523	83,418
1977–78	14,942	46,694	15,948	54,617	16,472	61,007	18,813	64,429	20,000	74,074	23,480	80,412	24,225	89,722
1978–79	15,572	48,663	16,620	56,919	17,165	63,574	19,930	68,254	21,187	78,470	25,222	86,378	26,022	96,378
1979–80	16,214	50,669	17,306	59,268	17,873	66,196	21,029	72,018	22,355	82,796	26,190	89,693	27,021	100,078
1980–81	16,902	52,819	18,040	61,782	18,631	69,004	22,123	75,765	23,518	87,104	28,743	98,436	29,655	109,833

Source of information: (*a*) First year enrollment: School years 1963–64 to 1980–81. Data taken from the indicated projections, table 43 of the study. (*b*) Total enrollment—Calculated for this study on the basis of the following assumptions:

Assumption 1—Projection CSE–UT–1: That first year enrollment in institutions at university level will be equivalent to 32 percent of the total enrollment of these institutions in any given school year from 1964–65 on.

Assumption 2—Projections CSE–UT–5, 23, and 50: That 1st year enrollment in university level institutions will be equivalent to 29.2 percent of the total enrollment of these institutions in any given school year from 1964–65 on.

Assumption 3—Projections CSE–UT–15, 27 and 54: That 1st year enrollment in institutions at university level will be equivalent to 27 percent of the total enrollment of these institutions in any given school year from 1964–65 on.

TABLE 23.—*Total enrollment for the first semester in public and accredited private institutions at university level in Puerto Rico, school years 1909–10 to 1963–64*

School year 1st semester:	*Total enrollment university level*
1909–10	376
1919–20	1, 010
1929–30	1, 871
1939–40	5, 371
1949–50	12, 497
1950–51	13, 468
1951–52	12, 985
1952–53	12, 648
1953–54	14, 274
1954–55	16, 208
1955–56	17, 855
1956–57	19, 277
1957–58	21, 168
1958–59	[1] 22, 898
1959–60	24, 529
1960–61	26, 540
1961–62	30, 173
1962–63	31, 741
1963–64	[2] 33, 331

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[1] Enrollment figures from the school year 1958–59 on include enrollment in extension courses of the Inter American University of Puerto Rico. Prior to the school year 1958–59 there is no information available in this respect for this institution.

[2] Total enrollment data for the school year 1963–64 are preliminary.

Source of information: Total enrollment at university level according to information supplied to the Superior Council on Education by public and accredited private institutions at university level.

TABLE 24.—*Enrollment coefficient at university level of the educational system of Puerto Rico in the school years 1909–10, 1919–20, 1929–30, 1939–40, and 1949–50 to 1962–63 (public and accredited private university level institutions of Puerto Rico)*

School year	Total enrollment university level	Date	Population		Enrollment coefficient based on population	
			18–21-year-old	19–22-year-old	18–21-year-old	19–22-year-old
1909–10	376	1910 (abril 15)	96, 668	87, 863	0. 39	0. 43
1919–20	1, 010	1920 (enero 1)	107, 216	102, 368	. 94	. 99
1929–30	1, 871	1930 (abril 1)	151, 247	126, 832	1. 24	1. 48
1939–40	5, 371	1940 (abril 1)	171, 186	165, 025	3. 14	3. 25
1949–50	12, 497	1949 (julio 1)	164, 562	161, 628	7. 59	7. 73
1950–51	13, 468	1950 (julio 1)	164, 693	161, 124	8. 18	8. 36
1951–52	12, 985	1951 (julio 1)	164, 052	159, 603	7. 92	8. 14
1952–53	12, 648	1952 (julio 1)	161, 448	156, 212	7. 83	8. 10
1953–54	14, 274	1953 (julio 1)	159, 049	153, 050	8. 97	9. 33
1954–55	16, 208	1954 (julio 1)	159, 060	152, 204	10. 19	10. 65
1955–56	17, 855	1955 (julio 1)	160, 948	153, 128	11. 09	11. 66
1956–57	19, 277	1956 (julio 1)	160, 169	151, 500	12. 04	12. 72
1957–58	21, 168	1957 (julio 1)	160, 320	150, 801	13. 20	14. 04
1958–59	22, 898	1958 (julio 1)	162, 378	151, 865	14. 10	15. 08
1959–60	24, 529	1959 (julio 1)	163, 293	151, 815	15. 02	16. 16
1960–61	26, 540	1960 (julio 1)	165, 167	152, 914	16. 07	17. 36
1961–62	30, 173	1961 (julio 1)	171, 170	160, 451	17. 63	18. 81
1962–63	31, 741	1962 (julio 1)	174, 007	164, 794	18. 24	19. 26

Source of information: (*a*) Total enrollment at university level: data from Table 46 of this study. (*b*) 18–22-year-old population: Bureau of Demographic Registry and Statistics, Health Department of Puerto Rico. (*c*) Enrollment coefficient at university level: Computed for this study.

TABLE 25.—*Enrollment coefficient (based on the population of the age groups 18–21 and 19–22) at university level for the enrollment predictions of projections CSE–UT–1, 5, 15, 23, 27, 50, and 54 for the school years 1964–65, 1969–70, 1974–75 and 1979–80 (public and accredited private university level institutions of Puerto Rico)*

School year	Enrollment and enrollment coefficient for each projection														
	Population 18–21 years [1]	Projection CSE–UT–1		Projection CSE–UT–5		Projection CSE–UT–15		Projection CSE–UT–23		Projection CSE–UT–27		Projection CSE–UT–50		Projection CSE–UT–54	
		Enrollment	Coefficient	Enrollment	Coefficient	Enrollment	Coefficient	Enrollment	Coefficient	Enrollment	Coefficient	Enrollment	Coefficient	Enrollment	Coefficient
1964–65	210,963	29,788	14.12	34,842	16.52	38,918	18.45	34,929	16.56	40,156	19.03	38,353	18.18	42,796	20.29
1969–70	236,873	35,078	14.81	41,031	17.32	45,830	19.35	42,733	18.04	49,133	20.74	47,997	20.26	53,926	22.77
1974–75	238,352	41,728	17.51	48,809	20.48	54,518	22.87	54,829	23.00	63,037	26.45	65,648	27.54	73,248	30.73
1979–80	264,999	50,669	19.12	59,268	22.37	66,196	24.98	72,018	27.18	82,796	31.24	89,693	33.85	100,078	37.77
	Population 19–22 years [1]	Projection CSE–UT–1		Projection CSE–UT–5		Projection CSE–UT–15		Projection CSE–UT–23		Projection CSE–UT–27		Projection CSE–UT–50		Projection CSE–UT–54	
		Enrollment	Coefficient	Enrollment	Coefficient	Enrollment	Coefficient	Enrollment	Coefficient	Enrollment	Coefficient	Enrollment	Coefficient	Enrollment	Coefficient
1964–65	196,496	29,788	15.16	34,842	17.73	38,918	19.81	34,929	17.78	40,156	20.44	38,353	19.52	42,796	21.78
1969–70	233,285	35,078	15.04	41,031	17.59	45,830	19.65	42,733	18.32	49,133	21.06	47,997	20.57	53,926	23.12
1974–75	232,996	41,728	17.91	48,809	20.95	54,518	23.40	54,829	23.53	63,037	27.05	65,648	28.18	73,248	31.44
1979–80	255,426	50,669	19.84	59,268	23.20	66,196	25.92	72,018	28.20	82,796	32.41	89,693	35.12	100,078	39.18

[1] Population as of July 1 of the school year.

Source of information: Population: Puerto Rico Planning Board, Official projection provided to public agencies and corporations, June 1, 1962. Total university enrollment: Taken from the indicated projections, table 45 of this study. Enrollment coefficient: Calculated for this study.

TABLE 26.—*Total number of bachelor graduates as percentage of the total enrollment registered in the public and accredited private institutions at university level of Puerto Rico, school years 1949–50 to 1958–59*

School year	Total enrollment (1st semester; all institutions)	Bachelor degrees granted (all institutions)	Bachelor degrees as percentage of the enrollment
1949–50	12,497	1,214	9.71
1950–51	13,468	1,123	8.34
1951–52	12,985	1,190	9.16
1952–53	12,648	1,162	9.19
1953–54	14,274	1,267	8.88
1954–55	16,208	1,463	9.03
1955–56	17,855	1,669	9.35
1956–57	19,277	1,792	9.30
1957–58	21,168	2,086	9.85
1958–59	22,898	2,116	9.24

Source of information: Official data on enrollment and graduates provided annually to the Superior Council on Education by public and private accredited institutions at university level of Puerto Rico.

TABLE 27.—*Total enrollment in university level institutions distributed (in number and percentage) by the University of Puerto Rico (public sector) and accredited private colleges and universities (private sector) in the school years 1909–10 to 1963–64 (enrollment for the 1st semester)*

School year 1st semester	Distribution of total university enrollment					
	Number			Percent		
	Total	Public sector (University of Puerto Rico)	Private sector (private colleges and universities)	Total	Public sector (University of Puerto Rico)	Private sector (private colleges and universities)
1909–10	376	376	------------	100	100.00	0
1919–20	1,010	744	266	100	73.66	26.34
1929–30	1,871	1,466	405	100	78.35	21.65
1939–40	5,371	4,987	384	100	92.85	7.15
1949–50	12,497	11,348	1,149	100	90.81	9.19
1950–51	13,468	11,343	2,125	100	84.22	15.78
1951–52	12,985	10,890	2,095	100	83.87	16.13
1952–53	12,648	10,579	2,069	100	83.64	16.36
1953–54	14,274	12,151	2,123	100	85.13	14.87
1954–55	16,208	13,232	2,976	100	81.64	18.36
1955–56	17,855	14,268	3,587	100	79.91	20.09
1956–57	19,277	15,176	4,101	100	78.73	21.27
1957–58	21,168	16,753	4,415	100	79.14	20.86
1958–59	22,898	17,644	5,254	100	77.05	22.95
1959–60	24,529	18,223	6,306	100	74.29	25.71
1960–61	26,540	18,893	7,647	100	71.19	28.81
1961–62	30,173	21,262	8,911	100	70.47	29.53
1962–63	31,741	21,892	9,849	100	68.97	31.03
1963–64	33,331	22,959	10,372	100	68.88	31.12

Source of information: (1) Total enrollment in the university level according to information provided to the Superior Council on Education by public and private accredited institutions at university level (2) Distribution of enrollment (in number and percentage) by the 2 sectors was prepared for this study.

TABLE 28.—*Total enrollment in institutions at university level according to Projections CSE–UT–1, 5, 15, 23, 27, 50, and 54 distributed according to Assumption 2 by public and private accredited university level institutions of Puerto Rico for the school years 1964–65, 1969–70, 1974–75, and 1979–80*

School year (1st semester)	Total university enrollment according to projections distributed by sectors											
	Projection CSE–UT–1			Projection CSE–UT–5			Projection CSE–UT–15			Projection CSE–UT–23		
	Total	Public 2	Private 2	Total	Public 2	Private 2	Total	Public 2	Private 2	Total	Public 2	Private 2
1964–65	29,788	20,852	8,936	34,842	24,389	10,453	38,918	27,243	11,675	34,929	24,450	10,479
1969–70	35,078	25,256	9,822	41,031	29,542	11,489	45,830	32,998	12,832	42,733	30,768	11,965
1974–75	41,728	31,296	10,432	48,809	36,607	12,202	54,518	40,889	13,629	54,829	41,122	13,707
1979–80	50,669	39,522	11,147	59,268	46,229	13,039	66,196	51,633	14,563	72,018	56,174	15,844

	Projection CSE–UT–27			Projection CSE–UT–50			Projection CSE–UT–54		
	Total	Public 2	Private 2	Total	Public 2	Private 2	Total	Public 2	Private 2
1964–65	40,156	28,109	12,047	38,353	26,847	11,506	42,796	29,957	12,839
1969–70	49,133	35,376	13,757	47,997	34,558	13,439	53,926	38,827	15,099
1974–75	63,037	47,278	15,759	65,648	49,236	16,412	73,248	54,936	18,312
1979–80	82,796	64,581	18,215	89,693	69,961	19,732	100,078	78,061	22,017

Source of information: (1) The indicated projections of total enrollment in institutions at university level were taken from table 45 of this study.

(2) The distribution of total enrollment according to the University of Puerto Rico (public sector) and the private accredited colleges and universities (private sector) was prepared for this study on the basis of the following: That the total enrollment indicated by the projections will be distributed between the University of Puerto Rico and the private accredited colleges and universities in the following way: the University of Puerto Rico will take care of 70 percent of the total enrollment in the school year 1964–65 and will go on increasing this proportion until it takes care of 72 percent in 1970, 75 percent in 1975 and 78 percent in 1980. Private accredited colleges and universities will take care of 30 percent of the total enrollment in 1964–65, diminishing this proportion until they reach 28 percent in 1970, 25 percent in 1975 and 22 percent in 1980.

TABLE 29.—*Holding rates of students enrolled in the undergraduate level (1st to 4th years) of accredited university level institutions of Puerto Rico, according to their classification by year they were studying in the years 1954–55 to 1959–60*

School year (1st semester)	Enrollment by year of classification and holding rate from year to year (in percent)						
	I	Retention I-II year	II	Retention II-III year	III	Retention III-IV year	IV
1954–55	4,862	----------	(1)	----------	(1)	----------	(1)
1955–56	5,202	90.93	4,421	(1)	2,135	(1)	1,632
1956–57	5,610	88.45	4,601	57.54	2,544	95.74	2,044
1957–58	6,210	85.76	4,811	55.38	2,548	88.29	2,246
1958–59	6,054	83.37	5,177	52.90	2,545	91.01	2,319
1959–60	5,873	87.58	5,302	55.50	2,873	93.87	2,384

[1] There was no information available.

Source of information: (1) Enrollment by year of classification.—Information provided to the Superior Council on Education by public and private accredited university-level institutions. (2) Holding rates, year to year.—Holding rates refer to the number of students that enroll in a year at university level, in a specific school year, for every hundred students that enrolled in the immediate year of classification in the preceding school year. The percentages in this table were calculated for this study.

NOTE: Enrollment figures by year of classification do not include the enrollment for 1st and 2d years of the Puerto Rico Junior College, as this institution was not accredited until the year 1956–57. Its inclusion would invalidate the comparability of the data for 1954–55 to 1955–56 with those for 1956–57 to 1959–60.

Table 30.—*Kindergarten enrollment in Puerto Rico, school years 1901–2 to 1903–4, 1908–9 to 1911–12, 1915–16 to 1917–18, 1920–21 to 1922–23, 1938–39, and 1962–63 (public day schools and accredited and nonaccredited private schools)*

School year	Enrollment			Total
	Public schools	Private schools		
		Accredited	Non-accredited	
1901–02	351	--------	--------	351
1902–03	604	--------	--------	604
1903–04	195	--------	--------	195
1908–09	395	--------	--------	395
1909–10	230	--------	--------	230
1910–11	249	--------	--------	249
1911–12	268	--------	--------	268
1915–16	--------	388	--------	388
1916–17	--------	87	--------	87
1917–18	--------	120	--------	120
1920–21	--------	49	--------	49
1921–22	--------	64	--------	64
1922–23	--------	27	--------	27
1930–31	--------	459	683	1,142
1938–39	--------	1,006	--------	1,006
1942–43	--------	724	--------	724
1943–44	--------	1,072	--------	1,072
1944–45	--------	717	--------	717
1945–46	--------	1,212	182	1,394
1946–47	--------	1,274	430	1,704
1947–48	--------	1,687	416	2,103
1948–49	--------	1,823	664	2,487
1949–50	--------	2,034	--------	2,034
1950–51	--------	2,222	--------	2,222
1951–52	--------	2,561	--------	2,561
1952–53	--------	3,014	--------	3,014
1953–54	--------	3,253	583	3,836
1954–55	--------	3,407	468	3,875
1955–56	--------	3,251	798	4,049
1956–57	--------	3,080	887	3,967
1957–58	--------	3,551	715	4,266
1958–59	--------	3,828	801	4,629
1959–60	--------	4,854	597	5,451
1960–61	288	4,426	1,045	5,759
1961–62	734	4,879	1,364	6,977
1962–63	1,586	5,526	1,699	8,811

Source of information: Department of Education, Annual reports. The information is included as it appears in the annual reports for the years indicated in the table. All annual reports from 1901 to 1962–63 available in the Library of the Superior Council on Education were examined, but no additional data on this type of school was found.

TABLE 31.—*Kindergarten enrollment in accredited private schools as percentage of the 1st grade enrollment (next school year) in these same schools, school years 1942–43 to 1962–63*

School year	Enrollment in accredited private schools		Kindergarten enrollment as percentage of 1st grade enrollment (next school year)
	Kindergarten	1st grade	
1942–43	724	----------	----------
1943–44	1,072	1,952	37.09
1944–45	717	2,368	45.27
1945–46	1,212	2,534	28.30
1946–47	1,274	2,657	45.62
1947–48	1,687	3,227	39.48
1948–49	1,823	3,673	45.93
1949–50	2,034	3,884	46.94
1950–51	2,222	4,129	49.26
1951–52	2,561	4,401	50.49
1952–53	3,014	5,591	45.81
1953–54	3,253	5,648	53.36
1954–55	3,407	5,527	58.86
1955–56	3,251	5,464	62.35
1956–57	3,080	5,810	55.96
1957–58	3,551	6,290	48.97
1958–59	3,828	6,610	53.72
1959–60	4,854	6,982	54.83
1960–61	4,426	6,945	69.89
1961–62	4,879	7,157	61.84
1962–63	----------	7,827	62.34

Source of information: Enrollment—Department of Education, Statistics Division, annual reports (1942–43 to 1961–62) and bulletin number 2, 1962–63. Percentages were calculated for this study.

TABLE 32.—*Enrollment coefficient*[1] *in public and private kindergartens in Puerto Rico, school years 1942–43 to 1962–63 (according to available data)*

School year	Kindergarten enrollment				Population 5 years of age	Kindergarten enrollment coefficient			
	Public schools	Private schools		Total		Public schools	Private schools		Total
		Accredited	Nonaccredited				Accredited	Nonaccredited	
1942–43	--------	724	----------	724	55,865	--------	1.30	----------	1.30
1943–44	--------	1,072	----------	1,072	57,353	--------	1.87	----------	1.87
1944–45	--------	717	----------	717	58,842	--------	1.22	----------	1.22
1945–46	--------	1,212	182	1,394	60,332	--------	2.01	0.30	2.31
1946–47	--------	1,274	430	1,704	61,820	--------	2.06	0.70	2.76
1947–48	--------	1,687	416	2,103	63,310	--------	2.66	0.66	3.32
1948–49	--------	1,823	664	2,487	64,799	--------	2.81	1.03	3 84
1949–50	--------	2,034	----------	2,034	66,287	--------	3.07	----------	3.07
1950–51	--------	2,222	----------	2,222	67,497	--------	3.29	----------	3.29
1951–52	--------	2,561	----------	2,561	67,086	--------	3.82	----------	3.82
1952–53	--------	3,014	----------	3,014	65,844	--------	4.58	----------	4.58
1953–54	--------	3,253	583	3,836	64,672	--------	5.03	0.90	5.93
1954–55	--------	3,407	468	3,875	64,486	--------	5.28	0.73	6.01
1955–56	--------	3,251	798	4,049	65,109	--------	4.99	1.23	6.22
1956–57	--------	3,080	887	3,967	64,605	--------	4.77	1.37	6.14
1957–58	--------	3,551	715	4,266	64,487	--------	5.51	1.11	6.62
1958–59	--------	3,828	801	4,629	65,1[illegible]	--------	5.87	1.23	7.10
1959–60	--------	4,854	597	5,461	65,340	--------	7.43	0.93	8.36
1960–61	288	4,426	1,045	5,759	65,963	0.44	6.71	1.58	8.73
1961–62	734	4,879	1,364	6,977	66,833	1.10	7.30	2.04	10.44
1962–63	1,586	5,526	1,699	8,811	65,920	2.41	8.38	2.58	13.37

[1] Enrollment coefficient: Kindergarten enrollment coefficient refers to enrollment in kindergartens in each school year as percentage of the population of 5-year olds as of July 1 of each year. Coefficient were calculated for this study.

Source of information: Enrollment.—Taken from table 69 of this study. Population.—Bureau of Demographic Statistics, Health Department, population distribution by age, July 1, 1942 to July 1, 1962.

TABLE 33.—*Projections CSE–K–1, –2, and –3—Kindergarten enrollment which would be available, according to several assumptions, to organize a kindergarten program (in public and private accredited schools in Puerto Rico, school years 1963 to 1979–80*

School year	Population 5 years of age (as of July 1 of the school year)	Kindergarten enrollment coefficient used in the projections			Kindergarten enrollment according to the assumptions—Projection		
		Assumption 1	Assumption 2	Assumption 3	CSE–K–1	CSE–K–2	CSE–K–3
1962–63	[1] 65,920	[3] 10.8	[3] 10.8	[3] 10.8	[3] 7,112	[3] 7,112	[3] 7,112
1963–64	[1] 66,075	12.3	12.8	13.3	8,127	8,458	8,788
1964–65	70,120	13.8	14.8	15.8	9,677	10,378	11,079
1965–66	[2] 71,941	15.3	16.8	18.3	11,007	12,086	13,165
1966–67	74,040	16.8	18.8	20.8	12,439	13,920	15,400
1967–68	76,050	18.3	20.8	23.3	13,917	15,818	17,720
1968–69	78,090	19.8	22.8	25.8	15,462	17,805	20,147
1969–70	80,190	21.3	24.8	28.3	17,080	19,887	22,694
1970–71	[2] 82,347	22.8	26.8	31.1	18,775	22,069	25,610
1971–72	84,480	24.3	28.8	33.9	20,529	24,330	28,639
1972–73	86,610	25.8	30.8	36.7	22,345	26,676	31,786
1973–74	88,710	27.3	32.8	39.5	24,218	29,097	35,040
1974–75	90,810	28.8	34.8	42.3	26,153	31,602	38,413
1975–76	[2] 92,832	30.3	36.8	45.3	28,128	34,162	42,053
1976–77	94,800	31.8	38.8	48.3	30,146	36,782	45,788
1977–78	96,690	33.3	40.8	51.5	32,198	39,450	49,795
1978–79	98,490	34.8	42.9	54.7	34,275	42,252	53,874
1979–80	100,170	36.3	45.0	58.0	36,362	45,077	58,099

[1] Bureau of Demographic Registry and Statistics, Health Department of Puerto Rico.

[2] Figures taken from the official population projection by single years of age for the quinquenniums prepared by the Biostatistics Division of the School of Medicine of the University of Puerto Rico.

[3] Real figures taken from table 70 of this study.

Source of information:

1. Population 5 years of age: The number of 5-year-old children was calculated for this study by the method of interpolation, using as the starting point the age groups distribution provided by the official population projection.
2. Kindergarten enrollment coefficient: These coefficients were figured out for this study.
3. Kindergarten enrollment: It was calculated for this study on the following assumptions:

Assumption 1—Projection CSE–K–1: That the coefficient of kindergarten enrollment in public day and private accredited schools increase progressively from 10.8 percent, registered in the school year 1962–63 until it reaches 36.3 percent in the school year 1979–80.

Assumption 2—Projection CSE–K–2: That the coefficient of kindergarten enrollment in public day and private accredited schools increase progressively from 10.8 percent, registered in the school year 1962–63 until it reaches 45 percent in the school year 1979–80.

Assumption 3—Projection CSE–K–3: That the coefficient of kindergarten enrollment in public day and private accredited schools increase progressively from 10.8 percent, registered in the school year 1962–63 until it reaches 58 percent in the school year 1979–80.

TABLE 34.—*Projections CSE-K—Private 1 to 6—Kindergarten enrollment in private accredited schools, according to several assumptions relating the kindergarten enrollment that may be expected in a specific school year with the 1st grade enrollment predicted for the succeeding school year, school years 1962–63, 1964–65, 1969–70, 1974–75, and 1979–80*

First grade enrollment (private accredited schools)			Kindergarten enrollment according to assumptions						
School year	Projection		School year	Projection					
	CSE-EL Private 2	CSE-EL Private 3		CSE-K Private 1	CSE-K Private 2	CSE-K Private 3	CSE-K Private 4	CSE-K Private 5	CSE-K Private 6
1963–64	7,918	7,918	1962–63 [1]	5,526	5,526	5,526	5,526	5,526	5,526
1965–66	8,111	8,294	1964–65	5,678	5,921	6,164	5,806	6,055	6,303
1970–71	8,742	9,920	1969–70	6,119	7,431	8,742	6,944	8,432	9,920
1975–76	9,397	11,192	1974–75	6,578	7,987	9,397	7,834	9,513	11,192
1980–81	10,075	13,018	1979–80	7,053	8,564	10,075	9,113	11,065	13,018

[1] Real figures were taken from table 70 of this study.

Source of information: (1) First grade enrollment: It was taken from table 72 of this study. (2) Kindergarten enrollment: Projections were calculated for this study on the following assumptions applied to the first grade projections CSE-EL Private 2 and 3, respectively:

Assumption 1—Projections CSE-K Private 1 and 4. That kindergarten enrollment in private accredited schools in each school year from 1963–64 to 1979–80 will be equivalent to 70 percent of the 1st grade enrollment predicted for these schools for each school year from 1964–65 to 1980–81.

Assumption 2—Projections CSE-K Private 2 and 5. That kindergarten enrollment in private accredited schools in the school year 1963–64 will be equivalent to predicted for these schools for the school year 1964–65 and that this ratio between the enrollments increase at the rate of 3 percent annually, so that kindergarten enrollment in these schools in the school year 1968–69 will be equivalent to 85 percent of the 1st grade enrollment predicted for them in the school year 1969–70; that from 1969–70 to 1979–80 kindergarten enrollment for private accredited schools will be equivalent to 85 percent of the 1st grade enrollment predicted for these schools for each year from 1970–71 to 1980–81.

Assumption 3—Projections CSE-K Private 3 and 6. That kindergarten enrollment in private accredited schools in the school year 1963–64 will be equivalent to 70 percent of the 1st grade enrollment predicted for these schools for the school year 1964–65 and that this ratio between the enrollments increase at the rate of 6 percent annually so that kindergarten enrollment in these schools in the school year 1968–69 be equal (equivalent to 100 percent) to the 1st grade enrollment predicted for them for the school year 1969–70; that from 1969–70 to 1979–80 the kindergarten enrollment in private accredited schools will be equal (equivalent to 100 percent) to the 1st grade enrollment predicted for these schools for each school year from 1970–71 to 1980–81.

Table 35.—*Projections CSE-K-1—Public 1 to 6, CSE-K-2—Public 1 to 6, and CSE-K-3—Public 1 to 6. Kindergarten enrollment in public schools obtained by the process of subtracting the kindergarten enrollment predicted by projections CSE-K—Private 1 to 6 for the private accredited schools from the total kindergarten enrollment predicted by projections CSE-K-1, -2, and -3 for Puerto Rico, school years 1962-63, 1964-65, 1969-70, 1974-75, and 1979-80*

School year	Kindergarten enrollment in public schools according to projections					
	Public 1	Public 2	Public 3	Public 4	Public 5	Public 6
	Projection CSE-K-1					
1962-63 [1]	1,586	1,586	1,586	1,586	1,586	1,586
1964-65	3,999	3,756	3,513	3,871	3,622	3,374
1969-70	10,961	9,649	8,338	10,136	8,648	7,160
1974-75	19,575	18,166	16,756	18,319	16,640	15,222
1979-80	29,309	27,798	26,287	27,249	25,297	23,344
	Projection CSE-K-2					
1962-63 [1]	1,586	1,586	1,586	1,586	1,586	1,586
1964-65	4,700	4,457	4,214	4,572	4,323	4,075
1969-70	13,768	12,456	11,145	12,943	11,455	9,967
1974-75	25,024	23,615	22,205	23,768	22,089	20,410
1979-80	38,024	36,513	35,002	35,964	34,012	32,059
	Projection CSE-K-3					
1962-63 [1]	1,586	1,586	1,586	1,586	1,586	1,586
1964-65	5,401	5,158	4,915	5,273	5,024	4,776
1969-70	16,575	15,263	13,952	15,750	14,262	12,774
1974-75	31,835	30,426	29,016	30,579	28,900	27,221
1979-80	51,046	49,535	48,024	48,986	47,034	45,081

[1] Real figures taken from table 68 of this study.

Source of information: Each series of enrollment projection for the public sector was obtained in the following way: (1) Projections CSE-K-1 Public 1 to 6. This series of projections was obtained subtracting the figures for kindergarten enrollment predicted by each of the projections CSE-K Private 1 to 6 for private accredited schools from the total kindergarten enrollment predicted by projection CSE-K-1. (2) Projections CSE-K-2 Public 1 to 6. This series of projections was obtained subtracting the kindergarten enrollment figures predicted by each of the projection CSE-K Private 1 to 6 for private accredited schools from the total kindergarten enrollment predicted by projection CSE-K-2. (3) Projections CSE-K-3 Public 1 to 6. This series of projections was obtained subtracting the kindergarten enrollment figures predicted by each of the projections CSE-K Private 1 to 6 for private accredited schools from the total kindergarten enrollment predicted by projection CSE-K-3.

TABLE 36.—*High school graduates (public and private accredited schools), applications for admission to the University of Puerto Rico (for 1st year), students admitted to the university, and admitted students that enrolled (in number and percentage). School years 1958–59 to 1964–65*

High school graduates [1]		Applications for admission to the University of Puerto Rico [1]			Students admitted to the university [1]			Admitted students that enrolled [1]			
School year (end of the year)	Number	School year (1st semester)	Number	Percent of high school graduates	Number	Percent of applicants	Percent of high school graduates	Number	Percent of total admitted	Percent of applicants	Percent of high school graduates
1958–59	14,639	1959–60	9,520	65.0	4,260	44.7	29.1	3,495	82.0	36.7	23.9
1959–60	14,394	1960–61	10,010	69.5	4,310	43.1	29.9	3,556	82.5	35.5	24.7
1960–61	15,524	1961–62	11,280	72.7	4,640	41.1	29.9	4,236	91.3	37.6	27.3
1961–62	16,959	1962–63	7,760	45.8	4,000	51.5	23.6	3,621	90.5	46.7	21.4
1962–63	18,191	1963–64	8,660	47.6	4,790	55.3	26.3	4,153	86.7	48.0	22.8
1963–64	20,392	1964–65	11,393	55.9	5,283	46.4	25.9	4,361	82.5	38.3	21.4
Total	100,099		58,623	58.6	27,283	46.5	27.3	23,422	85.8	40.0	23.4

[1] Of every 100 graduates: Applied, 59. Were admitted, 27. Were enrolled, 23.

Source of information: (1) High school graduates from public and private accredited high schools.—Department of Education, Statistics Division. (2) Applications for admission, students admitted to the University of Puerto Rico and admitted students that enrolled.—Planning Office, University of Puerto Rico (table of applications, enrollment authorizations and actual enrollment of students who applied for admission to the University of Puerto Rico during the years 1958–59 to 1964–65, revised on January 5, 1965).

FOOTNOTES

[1] In order to put together this report I have used generously materials from the sources mentioned in the bibliography. The educational system of Puerto Rico in all its levels, is one of the most frequently studied systems anywhere. I have felt it better to bring to light some of the important contributions of so many studies.

[2] "The President's Message on Education". "Higher Education" 19: 3; March 1963.

[3] Luis Muñoz Marín, "Address to the Legislature," Mar. 7, 1956, pp. 4, 8–9, (Mimeographed papers.)

[4] George S. Counts and R. Bruce Raup, "Preface," "Culture and Education in Puerto Rico," Ramón Mellado, p. v.

[5] George S. Counts, "Education and the Progress of America," pp. 23–24.

[6] Theodore Brameld, "The Remaking of a Culture," p. 281.

[7] The Institute of Field Studies, Teachers College, Columbia University, "Public Education and the Future of Puerto Rico," p. 3.

[8] The International Institute of Teachers College, Columbia University, "A Survey of the Public Educational System of Porto Rico," p. 12.

[9] See Daniel J. Boorstin, Polémica sobre Boorstin, Editorial del Departamento de Instrucción Pública, Estado Libre Asociado de Puerto Rico, Serie III-MCMLVI-Núm. CXIV.

[10] Theodore Brameld, op. cit., p. 244.

[11] Logan Wilson, "Higher Education and 1984," "School and Society," p. 93:344, Oct. 2, 1965.

[12] Melvin M. Tumin and Arnold Feldman, "Social Class and Social Change in Puerto Rico," p. 454.

[13] For suggestions on philosophy of education for Puerto Rico consult, among other sources, the following: (*a*) I. Rodríguez Bou, "Study of the Educational System of Puerto Rico," 1960, (*b*) Ramón Mellado, "Puerto Rico y Occidente; Culture and Education in Puerto Rico," (*c*) Domingo Rosado, "A Philosophical Study To Propose Objectives for Education in Puerto Rico," (*d*) Theodore Brameld, "The Remaking of a Culture," (*e*) José Padín, "American Citizenship and Other Addresses," (*f*) The Institute of Field Studies, Teachers College, Columbia University, "Public Education and the Future of Puerto Rico."

[14] Melvin M. Tumin and Arnold Feldman, op. cit., p. 464.

[15] Ibid.

[16] "Estudio del Sistema Educativo de Puerto Rico," vol. I, pp. 427–431. Informe de la División de Investigaciones Pedagógicas del Consejo Superior de Enseñanza a la Hon. Comisión de Instrucción de la Cámara de Representantes de Puerto Rico.

[17] Antonio Cuesta Mendoza, "Historia de la educación en el Puerto Rico colonial." Vols. 1–2.

[18] This limited system produced men of high caliber such as: José Julián Acosta, Segundo Ruiz Belvis, Francisco Mariano Quiñones, Baldorioty de Castro, Ramón Emeterio Betances, Eugenio María de Hostos, Julio L. Vizcarrondo, Manuel Elzaburu, Alejandro Tapia y Rivera, Rafael María de Labra, and others. Thomás Blanco, "Prontuario histórico de Puerto Rico," pp. 68–71.

[19] Pedro A. Cebollero, "A School Language Policy for Puerto Rico," p. 1.

[20] Pedro A. Cebollero, op. cit., p. 2.

[21] Juan José Osuna, "A History of Education in Puerto Rico," pp. 281–282.

[22] Robert Herndon Fife and Herschel T. Manuel, "The Teaching of English in Puerto Rico," p. 3.

[23] Quoted by Juan José Osuna in "A History of Education in Puerto Rico," p. 342 from 56 Congress, S.D. 363, p. 60.

[24] Pedro A. Cebollero, op. cit., p. 7.

[25] Quoted by Pedro A. Cebollero from Victor S. Clark. "Teachers' Manual for the Public Schools of Porto Rico," p. 70.

[26] Pedro A. Cebollero, op. cit., pp. 7–8.

[27] Years later, Presidents F. D. Roosevelt, Truman, Eisenhower, and Kennedy have expressed views on the final status for Puerto Rico.

[28] Department of Education, "Annual report presented by the Commissioner of Education of Puerto Rico to the Secretary of War," p. 32. 1909–10.

[29] Assimilists.

[30] Separatists.

[31] Juan José Osuna, op. cit., pp. 376–377.

[32] Adrian Hull, "San Juan Review" 2:30–31, June 1965.

[33] Juan José Osuna, op. cit., pp. 392–395.

[34] Harold L. Ickes, letter to Dr. Gallardo from Mar. 31, 1943, quoted by Juan José Osuna in "A History of Education in Puerto Rico," p. 387.

[35] Juan José Osuna, op. cit., pp. 389–391.

[36] Quoted by Luis Muñiz Souffront in "El problema del idioma en Puerto Rico," p. 197, from a speech delivered by Mariano Villaronga at the Annual Meeting of the Teachers Association of Puerto Rico, on Dec. 26, 1946.

[37] Department of Education, *Circular Letter Number 10*, Aug. 6, 1949, p. 1.

[38] This statement is strange since English still has double period, there are more English field assistants and supervisors than those assigned to any other subject including Spanish.

[39] Adrian Hull, "The 'English Problem'," *San Juan Review* 2:30, 31, June 1965.

[40] Cámara de Representantes de Puerto Rico, Comisión de Instrucción, op. cit., vol. I, p. 690.

[41] Department of Education, "Annual Report of the Commissioner of Education," 1940–41, p. 29.

[42] Department of Education, "Annual Report of the Commissioner of Education," 1948–49, p. 24.

[43] International Institute of Teachers College, Columbia University, op. cit., p. 30.

[44] Ibid, p. 108.

[45] Ibid, p. 109.

[46] Robert Herndon Fife and Herschel T. Manuel, op. cit., pp. 311–312.

[47] The Institute of Field Studies, Teachers College, Columbia University, op. cit., p. 429.

[48] The Institute of Field Studies, Teachers College, Columbia University, op. cit., p. 453.

[49] Cámara de Representantes de Puerto Rico, Comisión de Instrucción, op. cit., vol. 2, pp. 1577–78.

[50] Letter from A. B. Hollingshead to Ismael Rodriguez Bou, Jan. 30, 1959.

[51] Adrian Hull, op. cit., pp. 30, 31.

[52] Robert Herndon Fife and Herschel T. Manuel, op. cit., p. 324.

[53] Ibid.

[54] Herschel T. Manuel, "Some Comments on Language in the Schools of Puerto Rico," p. 6. Report submitted to the Commission on Education of the House of Representatives as part of the "Study of the Educational System of Puerto Rico." Feb. 12, 1959 (Mimeographed Report).

[55] Robert H. Fife and Herschel T. Manuel, op. cit., p. 284.

[56] Beresford L. Hayward, "Toward Comprehensive Educational Planning in Puerto Rico," p. 17. Quoted by Ralph B. Long in "The Teaching of English in Puerto Rico," pp. 3–7. July 1959 (Mimeographed Report).

[57] Ralph B. Long, "The Teaching of English in Puerto Rico," pp. 3–7. Report submitted to the Commission on Education of the House of Representatives as part of the "Study of the Educational System of Puerto Rico." July 1959 (Mimeographed report).

[58] Ralph B. Long, op. cit., p. 38.

[59] Robert H. Fife and Herschel T. Manuel, op. cit., p. 331.

[60] Ralph B. Long, op. cit., p. 39.

[61] 56th Cong. S.D. 363. Quoted by Juan José Osuna in "A History of Education in Puerto Rico," p. 20.

[62] Juan José Osuna, op. cit., p. 134.

[63] B. W. Diffie and J. W. Diffie, "Porto Rico: A Broken Pledge," p. 215. Quoted by Pedro A. Cebollero in "A School Language Policy for Puerto Rico," pp. 9–10.

[64] Juan José Osuna, op. cit., p. 194.

[65] Juan José Osuna, op. cit., pp. 202–203.

[66] International Institute of Teachers College, Columbia University: "A Survey of the Public Education System of Puerto Rico," p. 120.

[67] Ismael Rodriguez Bou, "Problems de educación en Puerto Rico," pp. 110–179.

[68] Institute of Field Studies, Teachers College, Columbia University, "Public Education and the Future of Puerto Rico: A Curriculum Survey," p. 470.

[69] Ibid., p. 471.

[70] Institute of Field Studies, Teachers College, Columbia University, "Public Education and the Future of Puerto Rico: A Curriculum Survey," p. 472.

[71] Ramón A. Mellado, "Culture and Education in Puerto Rico," p. 62.

[72] Department of Education, Bureau of Veterans' Education, "Work Plan for the Year 1960–61," p. 1.

[73] Ismael Rodriguez Bou, "Population Growth and Its Implications in Education."

[74] The tables and graphs come from the study on "Projections of School Enrollment for the Educational System of Puerto Rico (1965–80)," Superior Educational Council.

[75] See tables included.

[76] José L. Janer, José L. Vázques and Nidia R. Morales, "Puerto Rico's Demographic Situation: Some of its Recent Changes and Their Transfer Value," pp. 32–35.

[77] José L. Vázquez Calzada, "La emigración puertorriqueña, ¿solución o problema?" pp. 9–11.

[78] Ibid., p. 12.

[79] José L. Janer, José L. Vázquez and Nidia R. Morales, op. cit., pp. 35–36.

[80] James Russell Bourne and Dorothy Dulles Bourne, "Thirty Years of Change in Ten Selected Areas of Rural Puerto Rico," pp. 21–22.

[81] James Russell Bourne and Dorothy Dulles Bourne, op. cit., pp. 431–432.

[82] Margaret Mead, "The School in American Culture," pp. 33–34.

[83] Malcolm S. Knowles, "The Future of Adult Education," School and Society 90:287, Sept. 22, 1962.

[84] John Kenneth Galbraith, "The Social Balance," The Educational Record 40:185, July 1959.

[85] Ramón Mellado, "Puerto Rico y Occidente," p. 196.

[86] Ramón Mellado, "Puerto Rico y Occidente," pp. 107–8.

[87] James Russell Bourne and Dorothy Dulles Bourne, op. cit., p. 432.

[88] The second unit rural school offers a combination of academic and vocational curriculum to children from the fourth to the ninth grade. The first unit is an academic school from grades one to three.

[89] James Russell Bourne and Dorothy Dulles Bourne, op. cit., p. 26.

[90] James Russell Bourne and Dorothy Dulles Bourne, op. cit., p. 3.

[91] "En Hemisferio Occidental alza en compras hace Isla segundo mejor cliente E.U.," El Mundo, jueves, 17 de septiembre de 1964.

[92] "En Hemisferio Occidental alza en compras hace Isla segundo mejor cliente E.U.," El Mundo, jueves, 17 de septiembre de 1964.

[93] James Russell Bourne and Dorothy Dulles Bourne, op. cit., p. 27.

[94] Antonio Cuesta Mendoza, op. cit., p. 37.

[95] "La asamblea de diciembre" (Editorial), Revista de la Asociación de Maestros de Puerto Rico 6:199, diciembre de 1947.

[96] José Joaquin Rivera, "Foundación, organización y estructura de la Asociación de Maestros de Puerto Rico," p. 11.

[97] "The Commonwealth of Puerto Rico," Washington, D.C., Office of the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, 1962, pp. 43.

[98] Frank H. Bowles, "Preliminary Report on Certain Aspects of the Study of Institutions of Higher Learning," Report submitted to the Commission on Education of the House of Representatives and part of the Study of the Educational System of Puerto Rico, pp. 4–5. September 1959. (Mimeograph report.)

[99] University of Puerto Rico, Mayagüez Campus, "Bulletin of Information, Agriculture, Art and Sciences, and Engineering," 1964–65, 1965–66, p. 13.

[100] Laws of Puerto Rico, Law No. 135, 1942, pp. 784–786.

[101] Faculty as used here denotes not only the teachers but the operational division usually referred to in the States as a college or a school.

[102] University of Puerto Rico, Mayagüez Campus, Bulletin of Information, Agriculture, Art and Sciences, and Engineering, 1964–65, 1965–66, pp. 14–17.

[103] Laws of Puerto Rico, Act No. 88, Apr. 25, 1949, p. 222.

[104] Ibid., p. 224.

[105] Frank H. Bowles, op. cit., pp. 5–6.

[106] Jaime Benítez, La universidad del futuro, p. 11.

[107] Jaime Benítez, op. cit., p. 17.

[108] Jaime Benítez, op. cit., pp. 19–20.

[109] Jaime Benítez, op. cit., p. 55.

[110] During the year 1964–65 the university had 1,940 members of the faculty of which 580 had doctors degrees (29.9 percent), 1,032 had finished their masters degrees (53.2 percent), 273 had a B.A. degree (14.1 percent), and 55 had degrees conferred by European or Latin American universities (2.8 percent).

[111] Ibid., p. 39.

[112] Jaime Benítez, op. cit., p. 69.

[113] Ibid., p. 59.

[114] No information was available for the other institutions of higher education in Puerto Rico.

[115] Frank H. Bowles, op. cit., p. 143.

[116] Commission on Institutions of Higher Education, Middle States Association of Colleges and Secondary Schools, "A Report on the University of Puerto Rico," pp. 6–12. November 1959. (Mimeographed report.)

[117] Frank H. Bowles, op. cit., pp. 143–156.

[118] Frank H. Bowles, op. cit., pp. 1–3.

[119] Ernest V. Hollis, "Organization for Governing and Administering Higher Education in Puerto Rico." Report submitted to the Commission on Education of the House of Representatives and part of the "Study of the Educational System of Puerto Rico," pp. 16–18. Aug. 4, 1959. (Mimeographed report.)

[120] A Dean of Studies was appointed on Aug. 13, 1959, but in practice, so far, the Chancellor and the Dean of Administration keep on running the institution.

[121] These were transferred by act of the Council on June 19, 1961.

[122] Ernest V. Hollis, op. cit., pp. 30–36.

[123] Ibid., pp. 24–25.

[124] Floyd W. Reeves, "Memorandum on Aspects of the Organization and Administration of the University of Puerto Rico," pp. 23–24, Mar. 25, 1955.

[125] Commission on Institutions of Higher Education, Middle States Association of Colleges and Secondary Schools, op. cit., p. 32.

[126] Ernest V. Hollis, op. cit., p. 38.

[127] "Laws of Puerto Rico Annotated," titles 1 through 4, Historical Documents, Federal Relations, Constitution, ch. 9, department of education, p. 373, 376–377.

[128] Departamento de Instrucción Pública, Programma de Salud, "Informe anual, 1958–59," p. 1.

[129] José Padín, "Where are we going?" p. 15.

[130] José Padín, op. cit., p. 19.

UNIONISM AND POLITICS IN PUERTO RICO

by

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INTRODUCTION

Most of this report is based upon formal interviews with labor leaders and those involved in the labor movement. In addition, for 4 of the past 6 years, the writer has come in weekly contact with Puerto Rican labor leaders, and their views are also reflected in the report. The interviews were structured to cover the interviewees' views on worker attitudes, employer attitudes, union structure, collective bargaining goals and issues, jurisdictional problems, internal power struggles, political affiliation and ideology. The interviews were done by the writer and by Prof. Julio Ramírez, assistant professor of economics, Inter-American University, and were held in 1962–63 and the summer of 1965. Those persons formally interviewed are listed under Selected Bibliographical References.

I. HISTORICAL REVIEW

A. FEDERACIÓN LIBRE DE TRABAJADORES

Puerto Rican labor history can be divided into three periods: 1899–1939, the period of the "Federación Libre de Trabajadores (FLT)"; 1940–52, the period of the "Confederación General de Trabajadores (CGT)"; 1954 onward, the period of the influx of the international unions. The origins of the Puerto Rican labor movement are linked to the activities of Santiago Iglesias Pantín. Iglesias, who learned his unionism and syndicalism as a youth in Spain, migrated to Cuba in 1887 where he was active in organizing unions. He was "deported" for these activities in 1896 and came to Puerto Rico where he resumed union activities. At that time organizing for collective bargaining was illegal. However, working men's social clubs were legal, and Iglesias attempted to fuse some of the existing ones into a union. His major obstacles were the absence of basic civil liberties, police harassment and jail sentences. Even under new political autonomy created by Spain in 1897, Iglesias found that the basic deterrent to unionism was a political one—the problem was a part of a larger political problem, that is, restrictions on the freedom of speech, assembly, and the legal status of unions. Iglesias was in jail when the U.S. troops landed but was released by the authorities. Later, while evading the police for continued union activities, he sought and obtained protection from the U.S. Army.

The early period of the U.S. occupation was a confused one for Iglesias and the predecessor organization of the FLT, the Regional Federation of Labor. On the one hand, strikes and demonstrations won many benefits, such as the 8-hour day which was ordered by government decree. On the other hand, Iglesias was once again harassed by the police.

In 1900, Iglesias called a general strike to protest a change in currency by the military occupation government. This change decreased purchasing power and was, therefore, to the disadvantage of all workers. At about this time he left for New York to avoid prosecution on a murder charge. On his return a year later, he was arrested, tried, and convicted and given a 3-year prison sentence. The conviction was subsequently reversed by the U.S. Supreme Court. It was during this period that Iglesias was able to obtain the support of the American Socialist Party, the American Federation of Labor, and of Samuel Gompers, who brought the problems of the Puerto Rican worker to the attention of the American public and the Federal Government in Washington.

The AFL, at its convention in 1901, passed resolutions supporting labor's cause in Puerto Rico. Gompers arranged a meeting for Iglesias with President Theodore Roosevelt, who gave Iglesias a letter to the Governor of Puerto Rico instructing the governor not to interfere with legitimate union organizing activities. In 1904 Gompers visited Puerto Rico where he assisted in organizing activities, later publishing a report on Puerto Rican working conditions which produced a great deal of controversy.

It is to be noted that Iglesias had to deal with the government rather than bargain with employers. Absence of civil liberties was the basic reason for this with fundamental conditions of employment being established by government decree. When Iglesias had difficulty with the insular government, he found it necessary to seek support from the Federal Government in Washington.

The "Federación Libre de Trabajadores," organized by Iglesias in 1899, was the dominant labor union in Puerto Rico for 40 years. The FLT affiliated with the American Federation of Labor in 1901; Iglesias became their representative for Puerto Rico and benefited from the support of Samuel Gompers in Washington. However, the FLT did not follow the "business unionism" philosophy of Gompers and the AFL, chiefly because the economic conditions of Puerto Rico did not permit it. The mass of workers were in agriculture and most agriculture wage earners were in the sugar industry. In every part of the world this type of worker has proved difficult to organize, and employers in agriculture, equally difficult to bargain with. Wages were low and there were 5 to 6 months' seasonal unemployment. The employer was also landlord and source of consumer credit. These conditions made impossible the building of a union on the basis of high dues, full-time paid professional leadership, and a financial reserve for strikes. Agricultural workers, because of low income were unable to pay union dues. It was not until 1933, therefore, that collective bargaining was achieved in the sugar industry.

Although the FLT included some craft unions, notably the bakers and cigarmakers, there were too few workers within each craft and too few crafts to imitate the early AFL structure. Whereas the AFL learned from its American experience that more could be gained through economic action and collective bargaining, the FLT learned the opposite from its experience. The strike could not be the test of economic strength when the odds were clearly against the worker. Strikes, therefore, were sporadic and short-lived demonstrations. Instead, worker benefits were won primarily through labor legislation.

The political ideology of the FLT may be described as democratic-socialist. The anarcho-syndicalist tradition of Spain did not take root in Puerto Rico. At the invitation of the Socialist Party leader, Daniel de Leon, Iglesias joined the party in 1899; FLT leaders formed a local chapter of the party, and Iglesias attended the party's national convention in New York in 1900. Although the FLT and the Socialist Party were distinct organizations, in point of fact they had the same officers for 40 years. It is generally believed that Iglesias and his associates did not know the fine points of the Marxist ideology or its schisms but rather accepted democratic socialism as a general altruistic principle.

The Socialist Party, similar to the Socialist Party in the United States, was never extreme socialist. The Socialist Party of Puerto Rico stood for universal adult suffrage, public education available to all children, the enforcement of the 500-acre law, and American citizenship for Puerto Ricans. Its influence faded with the decline of the FLT during the late 1930's. The great depression of the thirties did not bring the Puerto Rican workers flocking to the socialist banner. Instead, socialism was on the wane, as in the United States, for it was the New Deal politicians and the "brain trusters" who carved out the relief and reform projects. Most of the remnants of the Socialist Party were absorbed into the Popular Democratic Party with its rise to power after 1939.

From the beginning Puerto Rican unionism was enmeshed in political struggles. Under the new autonomy granted by Spain in 1897, political parties were contending for control of the labor newspaper Ensayo Obrero) founded by Iglesias. José Celso Barbosa and the "Puros" won support of the newspaper in spite of Iglesias' objections. By 1899 both the Federal Party and the Republican Party were competing for the support of the "Regional Federation of Labor." The union became the captive of the Republican Party which had made political deals with some of the leadership. It was the loss of control of the union that caused Iglesias to create the FLT, and it is believed that much of his union's difficulties with the police stemmed from the efforts of the Republican Party to promote the interest of their own captive union. Moreover, Iglesias formed the Socialist Party, in part, for the pragmatic reason that if he controlled his own political party, politicians would find it more difficult to steal his union. Union membership was a condition to party membership.

From 1915 to 1924 the Socialist Party made some progress in winning seats in the legislature and positions in the local governments, gaining appointive offices and securing the enforcement of labor legislation. The Socialists, however, could not win control of the legislature because workers sold their votes to any party who would pay, and the party was unable to compete for these votes on this basis. Tired and hungry, in desperation the Socialists formed a coalition with the Republicans in 1924. The coalition won control of the legislature in 1932. Iglesias was elected Resident Commissioner and went to Washington.

The coalition was a sterile one, considering the future of the Socialist Party. The Republican Party represented conservative interests, and was not friendly to labor's cause. Socialists traded labor votes in return for political patronage and in so doing, lost the support of the workers. These factors together with a contest for leadership within the Socialist Party—FLT paved the way for the success of the Popular Democratic Party. Bolivar Pagan split with the failing FLT in 1938 as part of a plan to create a new political party and a new union, the Federación Puertorriqueña del Trabajo but was not successful with either the party or the union. The death of Iglesias in 1939 led to a struggle between Nicolás Nogueras Rodríguez and Hipólito Marcano for control of the FLT. Nogueras won and Marcano left the FLT to become legal counsel for the longshoremen's union. The FLT lost considerable ground in a 2-year series of government-conducted elections in the sugar industry and was left with a small group of unions, principally in sugar. In 1950 the FLT was further weakened when, after demands by Marcano, it lost its affiliation with the AFL, its charter going to the Marcano group which had split from the FLT. This group of unions then became the Puerto Rican Federation of Labor. Today, the FLT has approximately 5,000 members.

Finally, it should be noted that Iglesias, the FLT, and the Socialist Party had always desired statehood as the ultimate status for Puerto Rico. Throughout the years those Socialists who favored independence were not welcome in either the party or the union. Although labor had difficulty now and then with the island administration appointed by Washington, Iglesias and his followers continued to regard the United States sympathetically for having liberated Puerto Rico from Spain and appreciated the support of the AFL and the U.S. liberals in Washington on behalf of Puerto Rican labor. Also, Iglesias and his followers had pressed hard for passage of the Jones Act of 1917 which granted U.S. citizenship to Puerto Ricans.

B. CONFEDERACIÓN GENERAL DE TRABAJADORES

The second phase of Puerto Rican labor history is concerned with the "Confederación General de Trabajadores" (CGT). The Confederation was formed in 1940 by 42 independent unions led by the powerful Choferes Union. Among the founders were Ramon Barreto

Pérez, Colón Gordiani, Ernesto Ramos Antonini, Saez Corales, and Alberto Sánchez. The ideology of the leaders ranged from independentista to communist to popular. (The ideology of the PPD was not in clear focus at that time and among its supporters were men with a wide range of views.) FLT leaders charged that the CGT was actually formed by the Popular Party for the purpose of destroying the FLT because of its differing views on the status issue, and in order to be uncontested spokesman of the workers. Founders of the CGT deny the charge, stating that the FLT had already fallen apart and a new federation was needed.

The CGT launched an organizing drive among the sugarworkers, the crumbling stronghold of the FLT and won the vast majority of workers in a representation election. FLT leaders cried foul play, arguing that Popular Party politicians had been out in force to win the workers' support for the CGT. Both CGT and PPD leaders admit this effort but argue that it was perfectly legitimate.

During the 1940's the CGT was the largest, most important federation of unions on the island. Its militant organizing efforts led to union recognition in many and diverse industries and occupations. Many claim, however, that they were assisted by the government. Leaders of the CGT now concede that their effectiveness in collective bargaining was modest. Although strikes were called, the workers were economically weak and the employers drove a hard bargain. For example, in 1945 the Sugar Producers Association offered the union a raise of one-eighth of a cent an hour. Most gains for the workers came from labor legislation and increased union effectiveness in wage board hearings.

The CGT suffered a series of crises in an internal struggle for power, some struggles on a purely personal basis and others for political and ideological reasons. The first split came in 1945 when Colón Gordiani, an independentista who had been cooperating with the populares, and a group of independentistas led unions broke away to create the CGT Autentico. In the same year, Gilberto Concepción de Gracia left the PPD to form the Partido Independentista. While these may be unrelated events, at least the independentistas reached the conclusion that the PPD was not moving in the direction of political independence. The next serious split came in 1950 over the issue of Public Law 600 which caused the defection of two groups. Of the two, the more important was the Union General de Trabajadores led by Saez Corales, an alleged communist.

The CGT was affiliated with the CIO in 1949. The problem arose of relating the various unions of the CGT to the appropriate international unions affiliated with the CIO. The solution to the problem, which was no real solution at all, was that all the unions remaining in the CGT in 1952 became affiliated with the United Packinghouse Workers Union. This makes jurisdictional sense to the extent that the bulk of CGT membership is in the sugar industry, a packinghouse jurisdiction, but the CGT included a multitude of other workers in everything from electric power to hotels, from rum distilleries to foundries.

The Packinghouse Workers Union remains the largest single union in Puerto Rico. It has been fairly active in organizing and manages to win representation elections, but its membership has been declining. This has been due to defections by its local unions as well as to an overall drop in the employment level in agriculture. The defections are, in part, political, as a local union leader concludes he can make a deal with another political party if he feels that he has been mistreated by the Popular Democratic Party. It may also simply be that a local leader will prefer to have an autonomous union in which he is the top man. The general view among union observers is that the Packinghouse Union is closely tied to the Popular Party, thereby putting political affairs on a par with union affairs. Many prominent officers of the Packinghouse Union also hold important committee positions in the legislature, and are thus involved in both union and political affairs.

C. THE INTERNATIONAL UNIONS

The third phase of union development began in the late 1950's with the coming of the international unions from the mainland. It is not surprising that with the industrialization of Puerto Rico, these unions should seek to protect their jurisdiction in Puerto Rico. At the same time, internationals were becoming concerned about the possible impact of lower labor costs in Puerto Rico on their mainland jurisdiction. As the clothing industry was among the first to be established in Puerto Rico, the International Ladies Garment Workers Union and the Amalgamated Clothing Workers were among the first of the international unions to arrive in Puerto Rico.

The 1955 AFL-CIO merger in the United States was followed in 1957 by a similar move in Puerto Rico, with Senator Hipolito Marcano becoming both the President of the Puerto Rico Federation of Labor and the Regional Director of the AFL-CIO. At that time the AFL-CIO in Puerto Rico consisted principally of the packinghouse workers, the longshoremen, and a few smaller unions. The packinghouse workers overshadowed all others in size and had a membership spread over a variety of industries. As organizers from other internationals arrived to assert their jurisdiction and to organize the new industries, they found themselves in competition not only with the packinghouse workers, who claimed jurisdiction over all jobs in Puerto

Rico but with the multitude of independent unions as well. Moreover, the international unions learned that there were only a few plants to be organized within their own jurisdictions at this early stage of industrial development. To keep busy and to justify operational expenses, many internationals started organizing outside their jurisdictions. In this situation the Puerto Rican Federation of Labor was, and continues to be, a completely helpless victim. The packinghouse workers do not pay dues to the Federation and join the independent unions in opposing "foreign" unions, in spite of the fact that they themselves are affiliated to an international. Most unions responded by refusing to pay dues to the Federation or by paying only token dues.

Jurisdictional disputes were further complicated by the arrival of Teamsters Union in 1958, after their expulsion from the AFL-CIO. They proceeded to launch a major organization drive. Not desiring to have the teamsters in Puerto Rico, the government prevailed upon the AFL-CIO to challenge them. The Seafarers Union seemed to have special competence for blunting the teamsters' organizing drive. The teamsters did not recognize the jurisdiction of other unions, and the seafarers competed with the teamsters in every organizing drive. In the face of both seafarers and government opposition, the teamsters gains in Puerto Rico have been modest in comparison to the investment.

The seafarers, however, were not content to fight solely the teamsters, but were soon challenging other international unions in organizing drives. The early 1960's found the Packinghouse, Teamsters, and Seafarers Unions raiding and challenging all other unions; the independents, while less aggressive, were contesting the organizing efforts of AFL-CIO unions; and other international unions found thmselves in conflict with each other. Representation elections were lost, not so much because workers did not want a union, but because the number of competing unions on the ballot only confused the cause.

The AFL-CIO replaced Marcano in 1961 as regional director, assigning the position to Agustín Benitez. Benitez, as full time director, was able to gain more coordination among international unions in organizing and in settling jurisdictional disputes, but again he did not have the cooperation of the packinghouse workers nor the seafarers. In addition, a new jurisdictional problem arose with the arrival of every new international representative, since each would find part of his jurisdiction already organized by another international and, as a result, he would be tempted by any unorganized plant, regardless of jurisdiction. It should not be concluded, however, that all international unions were warring with each other. Many have limited membership and are served by the AFL-CIO regional director, so no international representative is assigned to Puerto Rico. Others have had sufficient membership in Puerto Rico to keep their international representatives fully occupied.

II. The Present Union Situation

A. FAILURE OF MEMBERSHIP DRIVES

Taken as a whole, the organizing efforts of the international unions are of only modest success. While some unionists like to point out that the same percentage of the labor force is organized in Puerto Rico as in the United States, most of the membership is in agriculture, in which employment is declining, and in government, where unionism has been encouraged. The industrial plants, except for the garment industry, remain largely unorganized. Government-promoted industries are only 30 percent organized.

Union-organizing has failed to keep pace with rapid industrial expansion and this can be explained as follows:

1. Most plants are small (20-50 employees) and small plants are difficult to organize.
2. Many plants are in rural areas, and rural plants are difficult to organize.
3. Many plants employ only women, often young girls, and girls are usually not attracted to unionism.
4. Employers, in general, vigorously oppose union organization using all weapons available, legal and illegal, to cause unions to lose elections. Workers are easily intimidated.
5. Employers pursue modern personnel practices and keep their employees reasonably happy.
6. Puerto Ricans are new to factory employment and find the wages and working conditions superior to anything previously experienced. A factory job is better than one in agriculture and is certainly better than no job at all.
7. The wage boards tend to undercut collective bargaining. As wages are reviewed every two years and are pushed up as rapidly as the industry can tolerate, unions are reduced to bargaining more over wage inequities than over wage levels.
8. Finally, conflicts among the unions themselves prevent coordinated organizing campaigns.

B. UNION INSTABILITY

There is a degree of instability to Puerto Rican unions due to lack of worker identification with a union by reason of industry or craft. International unions have invested heavily in organizing and in training local leadership only to have the local leadership take the membership into an independent union. Many independent unions are for sale to the highest bidder. Some international unions have rapidly increased their membership by putting an independent union leader on the international payroll in return for delivering his supporters to the union. In many cases these local unions do not stay bought. Some groups have been in and out of several internationals. This instability is equally true of independent unions; switching from one coalition to another, and the continual splintering of a union through leadership rivalries. Often, the membership is loyal to a local leader rather than to the union as an institution.

Although the independent unions are unstable, poorly administered, and usually in financial trouble, they represent 30–40 percent of organized labor. The international unions, in spite of superior finances and professional organizers, have not made substantial headway against them. The arguments used by the independents against the internationals are:

1. The internationals are in Puerto Rico to collect dues for the benefit of mainland unions; thus, the workers' dues flow to the United States.

Comment: This criticism is not true. Most internationals are losing large sums of money by being in Puerto Rico. At best, a few unions are self-supporting by not paying per capita tax dues to the internationals. A related issue is the amount of the dues required by international unions. Wages in Puerto Rico are too low for workers to pay mainland rates. Many internationals recognize this and make special adjustments. The independents, nevertheless, insist that dues are too high while the internationals argue that unions cannot be built and maintained without income.

2. The internationals are here to protect mainland jobs by raising Puerto Rican labor costs, rather than to be concerned with the welfare of the Puerto Rican worker. Therefore, a conflict of interest exists between continental and Puerto Rican unionism.

Comment: Except in perhaps one case, this is not a fair criticism. It is true however that international unions do have something of a problem balancing the need to protect jobs in the United States, in order to prevent Puerto Rico from becoming a haven for runaway shops, without damaging employment opportunities for the Puerto Rican membership.

3. International unions do not organize workers; they organize employers. Sweetheart agreements are made to the detriment of the workers, while workers are unaware that they belong to a union or even that there is a payroll deduction for union dues. In particular, this charge is leveled against the International Ladies Garment Workers Union (ILGWU), and frequently against the seafarers.

Comment: It is true that the Taft-Hartley Act gives special consideration to the ILGWU on the grounds that garment fabrication is an assembly line operation carried out by a series of subcontracting employers. The union, therefore, has organized small Puerto Rican shops by applying pressure on mainland contractors. It is true that many members of the ILGWU, who are members because of a union shop contract forced upon their Puerto Rican employer by the prime contractor in New York, feel that the union is far removed from the daily working life. It is questionable, however, whether there are any genuine sweetheart contracts in Puerto Rico in the sense that agreements are made to the detriment of the workers. The possibility has been suggested that some internationals have settled for less than could be obtained in a contract in order to win union recognition before a contest between unions for recognition could develop; such a contract is not precisely a sweetheart affair, however, because the union may hope to improve the contract once recognition is assured. It is contradictory to state, on the one hand, that internationals are out to destroy jobs by raising labor costs and, on the other, that they make sweetheart agreements.

4. Collective bargaining is conducted by American unions and American employers in the United States on behalf of Puerto Rican workers. Puerto Ricans are not participants in negotiations.

Comments: This criticism is true to the extent that many internationals have not permitted a sufficient degree of bargaining over local issues and there has been a reaction against it as has occurred on occasion in the United States (i.e., the 964 automobile strike). It is also true in some unions that the membership is not informed of collective bargaining developments. Local unions in California make the same complaint about national bargaining done in Eastern cities. This is untrue to the extent that Puerto Rican industry is integrated into the national market and pattern bargaining by industry is inevitable.

Many independent unionists are also independentistas for whom economic integration with the United States is a source of deep frustration. Their objection to industry-wide bargaining as being un-Puerto Rican is but part of a more basic desire for political as well as economic independence.

5. International unions are undemocratic; they do not permit local autonomy and discriminate against local leadership by imposing American leadership upon Puerto Ricans.

Comment: These criticisms relate to a complex area and are not completely valid. Several international unions have one or two local unions in Puerto Rico with widely dispersed memberships. There is no local organization for each plant; the members cannot attend local meetings or become involved in local union affairs, and contact with the union is confined to visits of the business agent. These unions are merely complying with constitutional provisions, for their continental counterparts have the same organizational structure. They argue that it isn't economical to have a separate local for each small plant; nevertheless, many Puerto Rican workers resent this arrangement and feel that the union is too remote.

There has been criticism of the conduct of international officers who come to check up on local union affairs during the winter but who never leave the luxury hotels during their stay. Some American organizers have not learned Spanish but are not replaced by local people. Yet Spanish-speaking New York Puerto Ricans are locally resented. They are not "natives" and they hold jobs the "natives" should have, according to the leaders of some independent unions.

The fact that most internationals are directed by mainlanders has given rise to a debate as to who is a labor leader. Critics of the internationals argue that the mainland representatives are merely salaried employees who are not elected by the workers and thus are not leaders or spokesmen of Puerto Rican labor. This issue could not arise in the United States because workers would not feel imposed upon if their international representative or regional director came from another State. In Puerto Rico, with its different culture and the absence of a tradition of worker-union identity based on a common bond of job interests, there is resentment over the absence of Puerto Rican leadership in international unions.

In rebuttal, some international representatives have argued that they would like to have a local leadership, but that they have been unable to find qualified candidates. They say that Puerto Ricans like to organize from behind a desk, require close supervision to keep them working effectively, are poor administrators, tend to be careless in accounting practices, and want to use the union as a stepping stone to politics. They give examples of Puerto Ricans who have been given top positions only to take the union out of the international, creating an independent union. They claim that making a Puerto Rican officer only leads to internal rivalry as other Puerto Ricans will then try to take his job. Some argue that the membership prefers mainland leadership, because they will be assured of men who are hard working, honest and sincere. Where "personalismo" is still a factor, they argue that Puerto Rican union leaders are more autocratic than mainlanders. The independent unions are cited as examples of the quality of Puerto Rican leaders. On balance, however, there is considerable justification to the criticism that the internationals have not made strenuous efforts to develop local leadership.

6. Independent union leaders argue that there is little incentive to join AFL-CIO unions since the AFL-CIO is unable to maintain unity and is constantly involved in jurisdictional squabbles. They claim that because of internal strife the Puerto Rican Federation of Labor cannot speak as the collective voice of the AFL-CIO. In addition they criticize the organizing tactics of the Teamsters and Seafarers, arguing that Americans have brought gangsterism to Puerto Rico.

7. The AFL-CIO is accused of bringing its own mainland union problems to Puerto Rico, thereby making a difficult labor situation worse. Puerto Rico is seen as a pawn in struggles among mainland unions. The following arguments are made:

> The AFL fight with the CIO had an impact on Puerto Rico; the expulsion of the International Longshoremen's Union from the AFL split the San Juan waterfront into rival unions; mainland factors led to the appointment of a teamster as head of the Hotel and Restaurant Workers Union in Puerto Rico; the early cooperation between the Teamsters and Seafarers in Puerto Rico eventually developed into warfare. Accordingly, association with U.S. unions is viewed as importing trouble.
>
> International representatives reply that Puerto Ricans are not naive children and are aware of internal union struggles. If they would be loyal to a particular union they would not be victims of power politics. They point out that it is the independent unions that are unstable, as they are involved in politics, and are unable to unite into a federation in spite of repeated attempts.

8. Finally, the independents claim that the international unions do not understand the mentality of the Puerto Rican worker; that he needs his own kind of union. International representatives reject this charge arguing that American-style unionism was developed to take care of problems of workers and the records show that they do a better job than the independent unions. They also argue that most independent unions are led by those favoring political independence whose opposition is to a kind of

unionism that would further link Puerto Rico to the United States.

C. UNION STRUCTURE AND MEMBERSHIP

At the present time there are about 91 separate independent unions in Puerto Rico and 7 federations of independent unions. These federations are largely paper organizations. From time to time leaders of independent unions meet to form a new islandwide federation and to declare war on the internationals. However, the declarations of unity among the independents and war against the internationals have not materialized. The majority of competent observers of the Puerto Rican labor movement believe that the days of the independent unions are numbered. They are poorly administered and financially weak. As industrialization continues, a base will be provided for effective unionism and the international unions with superior financial reserves and administration will take over.

There are no reliable statistics of union membership. Out of an organizable labor force of 500,000–600,000, it is estimated that about 150,000 are union members. Of these, it is estimated that the independent unions have a total membership of 58,000–60,000 with the balance belonging to AFL–CIO affiliates. Among the international unions the largest is Packinghouse with an estimated 25,000 members (it claims 40,000), with the ILGWU and Seafarers having about 12,000 each. At present there are 27 international unions in Puerto Rico.

III. UNIONS AND POLITICS

As outlined in the previous section on historical development, Puerto Rican unions have been deeply involved in politics, and politicians have been involved in unionism since the very beginning of Puerto Rican unionism. In this section there is a detailed look at the present situation.

A. UNIONS AND THE POPULAR DEMOCRATIC PARTY

The Popular Democratic Party, in its inception, brought together Socialist, Communist, and Independentista labor leaders who had a common interest in achieving basic social and economic change. As the PPD evolved, working out its revolution in a pragmatic manner, labor leader supporters either lost their previous ideologies, or left the party. As indicated earlier, many of the independent unions created during the 1940's and 1950's were the result of political differences with the PPD, which led to the splintering of the CGT and later the Packinghouse workers.

The PPD has always been considered liberal and pro-labor, while the Republican party has been considered the party of conservatism and pro-business. The PPD has sponsored a wide variety of labor legislation to assure that benefits of industrialization reached the workers. The Department of Labor offers many services to unions: free auditing of union accounts, free worker education programs, and free arbitration service. When the AFL–CIO denounced Puerto Rico in their 1957 convention as a haven for runaway shops, the government met with AFL–CIO unionists to work out an acceptable wage policy for the wage boards and to assure that tax holidays were not granted to runaway shops.

With the exception of the Teamsters union, international unions have been welcome in Puerto Rico. It has been politically expedient, along with pro-labor proclivities, for the Government of Puerto Rico to be friendly to AFL–CIO unions. Just as Samuel Gompers could influence the White House on behalf of Puerto Rico in the days of Iglesias, the AFL–CIO today is a powerful lobby in Washington. Presently, it is a lobby friendly to Puerto Rico's favored tax status and generous Federal subsidies. There is always the possibility of its claiming that Puerto Rico is a haven for runaway shops which are unfairly competing in mainland markets. The accusation may be rebutted, but who in Puerto Rico would care to start such a debate in Congress?

As indicated above, there has been a close personal relationship between the PPD and some unions. Senator Hipolito Marcano is both a leader in the party and president of the Puerto Rican Federation of Labor; Armando Sánchez is both chairman of the House Labor Committee and president of the Packinghouse Workers. Ernesto Caraballo is chairman of the Senate Labor Committee and president of the "Obreros del Sur", an independent union that was formerly part of the Packinghouse union. Many local leaders of the Packinghouse union and of independent unions are PPD members of the legislature. Alberto Sánchez is high in the council of the PPD and international vice president of the ILGWU. Juan Perez Roa is a PPD Senator at large and head of the dockworkers union. From the point of view of these men, the union-PPD relationship is a good one. They keep the party labor-oriented, checking the influence of those businessmen who join the winning team just because it wins, and are in a position to see to it that the executive and legislative branches of government are responsive to the wishes of labor.

B. THE ANTI-PPD POSITION

There are, however, a growing number of critics of this PPD-union relationship, both within and outside the labor movement. The ineffectiveness of the Puerto Rican Federation of Labor is laid to the close association of the PPD to federation offices. It is alleged that the federation does not resolve jurisdictional disputes with the Packinghouse workers because the Packinghouse union is so closely allied with the PPD that it does not attempt to present labor's views to the Government as union representatives because the federation leaders are primarily PPD politicians.

Similar criticism is made of the Packinghouse union; its ineffectiveness is attributed to the preoccupation of its leaders with politics. The kindest criticism is that an individual does not have time to be a full-time labor leader and a full-time politician. Others go further to charge that there is a conflict of interest between being a union leader and a party leader and that the PPD is so powerful that union interests are subordinated to the interests of the party.[1] (This is the real basis of conflict of interest, rather than the too frequently made charge that there is a conflict of interest between being a member of the legislature and a union leader.) Accordingly, these men are accused of being politicians who have taken over unions for the interest of their party.

There is also the view that the PPD is, in fact, antiunion. Inasmuch as the PPD is aware of the Latin American tradition of using union leadership as a stepping stone to political power, and given the collapse of the Socialist Party which was related to the FTL split of the late 1930's, it is reasoned that the PPD does not intend to be so victimized. Thus it is charged that the friendly help to unions offered by the PPD is merely a game of playing one union off against another so that no one union can be strong, or so that unions cannot achieve solidarity. Free government services to unions are designed to smother unions with kindness and to splinter the labor movement by subsidizing the independent unions. Labor legislation undermines collective bargaining and is designed to prove that the only friend of the worker is the PPD. The raiding of a union of its leadership is to assure that the PPD will not have rival leadership.

Finally, it is argued that the PPD has a split personality. While appearing friendly to unions in one pose, the other pose—that of promoter of industry, is antilabor. Thus it is claimed that Fomento, the agency for industrial promotion, actively advises and assists companies in their antiunion campaign actively against unions in the face of company threats to move the factory if the union wins.

C. THE PRO-PPD POSITION

Defenders of the PPD policies answer that these charges are distorted. Union leaders become politicians because workers are poor and cannot support paid union leaders. The PPD is pleased to nominate union leaders as candidates who have a popular following, but also must guard against politically ambitious union leaders who may threaten PPD survival. Similarly, worker benefits are won through legislation because unions are too weak to win them by collective bargaining. The PPD is not in competition with unions for the loyalty of workers because the vast majority of workers are "Populares" first and unionists second. Workers know the PPD can give them more than can the union.

It is true that the PPD has difficulty holding the bureaucrats of Fomento in check when Fomento has the limited goal of promoting industrial expansion but it is the PPD who reminds Fomento that the ultimate goals of industrialization precludes industrialization at any cost. The official policy of the government is to oppose the entry of runaway shops and to be candid with prospective investors regarding labor's rights, labor legislation, and labor costs. The antiunion activity of PPD village mayors is more difficult to explain. In most cases a community will have worked hard to secure the location of a factory in its town. Even the workers themselves may want a union, but they want a factory job first. The mayor may be a liberal, but he is faced with the reality of the situation.

Finally, there are those who say that the PPD is correct in becoming cold to unionism. Union rivalry, as reviewed above, has not only brought few benefits to workers but has hurt industrial development as well. Thus, it is reasoned, the best interests of workers are protected by resisting forces which inhibit economic growth.

D. RECENT DEVELOPMENTS

In 1964, a group of international unions, led by Keith Terpe of the Seafarers obtained a charter from the AFL-CIO to form the San Juan Labor Council. The significance of the council is yet to be unfolded, but it has created a new schism in the labor movement. Senator Marcano, president of the Puerto Rican Federation of Labor, opposed the creation of the council on the grounds that it is unnecessary in Puerto Rico and would, in effect, create a dual labor movement. Under the AFL-CIO constitution, however, city councils are permitted. The council group claim is that their objective is to create AFL-CIO unity in resolving jurisdictional disputes, coordinating organizing efforts, and achieving common goals in legislative action, thus pointing up the failures of the Puerto Rican Federation. The critics reply that these are laudable goals, but that the approach is wrong. There is dissatisfaction with the Puerto Rican Federation. The constructive thing is to give practical support through the payment of dues. Then, if they do not like Marcano's handling of Federation affairs, they would have enough votes (each delegate has as many votes as he has paidup members) to unseat him and put in officers of their own choice. Consequently, it is concluded that the council has motives other than AFL–CIO unity. Terpe, in turn, charges that the San Juan Council is an innocent progressive group and is being attacked by PPD leaders and raises questions as to their motives.

As a result, the AFL–CIO in Puerto Rico has an unofficial split, roughly along political lines. The Federation officers are Puerto Rican PPD leaders of long standing. The leaders of the council are non-Puerto Rican and nonpolitical, their constitution forbidding those in political office to hold office in the council. (Some labor leaders who are members of the council assert that the PPD is secretly pro-independentista, whereas they are patriotic Americans who want Puerto Rico eventually to become a state.)

The council called a general strike in June 1965, in protest against a labor injunction bill pending in the legislature. It is against AFL–CIO policy to call general strikes, especially if they are for political coercion, as this one appeared to be. The council met with independent union leaders in calling the strike and Terpe claimed to speak for 250,000 workers; the council, however, does not have jurisdiction outside of San Juan, and must have known that workers could not respond to such a strike call, as indeed they did not.

Terpe has followed the strike call with a persistent attack on the PPD as antilabor. The Puerto Rican Federation has denounced the action of the council. Many believe that Terpe is using the council as a tool to achieve a nomination from the Republican Party as Senator at large. Terpe's motives remain to be seen, but the AFL–CIO in Puerto Rico is split with Puerto Rican leaders against the non-Puerto Ricans.

Although the political position of the San Juan Council has yet to be clarified, the following observation can be made. It appears that some unions are going to seek to be their own spokesmen for their membership in labor legislation. Therefore, this would suggest that the PPD will have to re-examine its relationship with trade unions. The council has been quiet on political matters since the month immediately following the threatened general strike. With difficulty it has sought to resolve jurisdictional disputes among its affiliates.

IV. Union Contribution to Social and Economic Development

There are two opposing views as to the contribution of unionism to Puerto Rican economic and social development. One view holds that unions are unnecessary to the Puerto Rican scene because: (1) unlike the United States where there are strong conservative forces, politicians in Puerto Rico are and must be responsive primarily to the needs of workers, thus making unions and their leaders less important; (2) wage boards push up wages as rapidly as possible; (3) employers profiting from labor history pursue enlightened personnel policies; (4) union-political party strife has only added unnecessary confusion to politics; union representatives on wage boards probably hurt economic development slightly by pushing up wages a little too fast; (5) continual jurisdictional warfare has not contributed to making Puerto Rico attractive for industrial location. The conclusion follows that the union contribution has been slightly negative, without doing serious harm.

Defenders of unions acknowledge most of these, but ask whether the situation would be better given the absence of existing unions. After all, Puerto Rican unionism could have been completely unstable as a succession of petty demagogues promoting discontent for selfish reasons, or there might have been a monolithic union-political party whose leadership completely dominated all institutions in the name of unity. In other words, the situation could be worse.

Some union critics agree with supporters of unionism that there is a function for unions in Puerto Rico, but that in general, this function is being poorly executed. All workers have grievances no matter how well managed the business. The most important union activity is the orderly processing of grievances: effective presentation of the workers' viewpoint to management. The successful unions in Puerto Rico are successful because they give efficient service in handling on-the-job problems. There is general agreement among labor experts that unions who follow this objective will succeed.

Clearly, Puerto Rican unions have not developed along lines found in the United States. As with unions in developing areas generally, their role is uncertain and unclear. One function of unions is to provide administrative machinery to institutionalize or channel worker discontent in constructive directions. At present, Puerto Rican workers are so satisfied with the rapid progress of the economy and with their material well-being that their discontent is submerged. Another function of unions is to give workers a collective voice in management policymaking as it directly affects their jobs. It would appear that Puerto Rican workers do not as yet feel the need for representation in policymaking. Since workers do not seem to wish a voice in determining conditions of employment nor to have serious complaints against management, organizing drives become contests as to which union can offer the best health and welfare plan. For example, seafarers have an excellent plan, and they win elections on this appeal. Collective bargaining tends to result in standard contract clauses, following the industry pattern of the United States, made by international representatives on behalf of the workers with minimum worker participation.

Labor theorists have held that unions in developing areas may give workers a kind of citizenship in industrial society to offset their lack of a sense of belonging which is found in rural communities with close family ties. It is reasoned that the sudden change from rural to urban living, from agricultural to industrial society is a traumatic experience. Union membership can give a sense of belonging as well as guidance in the ways of the city. Although this analysis may apply to some societies in the face of rapid cultural change, it does not fit the Puerto Rican experience. Factories are small and dispersed. Workers prefer factory employment. Family ties, while weakening, are still very strong. Attempts by some unions to make the union a social and recreational center have failed. (This is not surprising, because many other organizations have the same experience.) If workers have problems that cannot be solved by family connections, they take them to the local politician.

Nevertheless, successful local union leaders in Puerto Rico also devote much of their time listening to worker problems concerning wayward children, misunderstanding wives, selfish landlords, and family budgets.

In the United States and in other industrial societies, unions are built upon a community of interests in the same craft or industry. Workers join together because they are faced with similar job problems, common issues in job security, and the fact that their industry is confronted with the same economic forces. As indicated in the preceding historical review, workers have not developed this sense of brotherhood by job identity within Puerto Rico and certainly not with workers of the same industry or trade in the United States.

Finally, as already noted in the section above, Puerto Rican unions have not followed the U.S. pattern in the realm of politics. Union leadership is not always distinct from political leadership. Unions do not bargain with political parties for labor legislation in return for political support. Unions do not find collective bargaining a more fruitful path than politics to improvement of working conditions.

Several observers of the Puerto Rican scene feel that the labor movement is immature. Although the labor movement is 67 years old, it has been and still is largely composed of unions of agricultural workers. With this environment, unions must be demonstrations of protest rather than stable institutions organized to administer collective bargaining agreements.

There are forces at work that may lead to the "maturity" of the labor movement. Fundamental to the process is that agricultural employment is rapidly declining while industrial employment rises. Unionism cannot be effective when based upon a labor force of low paid, unskilled, seasonal workers. Industrial employment, on the other hand, is not only rising but the composition of industry is changing toward more highly skilled jobs with greater capital investment per worker. This can be the basis of unionism in which workers organize according to mutual job interests. Industries with above average profits have something to bargain about.

The present worker satisfaction with a factory job, in place of field labor, and year-round employment, instead of seasonal unemployment or underemployment may be expected to decline as industrial employment becomes the norm. Then the less attractive aspects of factory employment will become apparent to workers. At the same time, workers may become interested in securing a greater voice in decisions which affect their welfare on the job. These are factors upon which mature unionism is built. The international unions would benefit from this type of development. They have the financial resources, administrative know-how and experience in "business unionism." For these reasons, independent unions may be expected to decline.

As membership increases and as worker interest in union affairs develops, a local leadership may also develop. Such leadership is necessary to a sense of involvement in union affairs and to service the day-to-day problems of the membership. Out of a cadre of local leaders, top leaders for islandwide union posts may emerge. A question mark remains as to whether the international unions will be able to resolve their jurisdictional disputes.

Another issue, related to the maturing process is the "autonomy" issue. Although most unionists do not accept the views of the independents, there are many who believe that Puerto Rican affiliates to international unions deserve a special (but not clearly defined) relationship. This issue may resolve itself if there develops closer job identification among Puerto Rican workers which transcends national identification, if local autonomy is resolved by increased participation by workers in local unions, and if there is development of Puerto Rican leadership. Questions are also raised as to whether the Puerto Rican Federation of Labor is the appropriate relationship of Puerto Rican unions to the AFL-CIO since Puerto Rico is not a state. This issue was also raised when AFL cut its relationship with the FTL, and when the CGT affiliated with the CIO. Again the kind of autonomy desired is vague, but some suggest that the Federation be modeled after the Canadian AFL-CIO, in which Canadian locals of international unions have their own national federation.

The maturing process may also be related to political developments. If workers need unions to solve their on-the-job problems, then unions will have a distinct function apart from politics. If workers have the income with which to pay attractive salaries to their leaders, the leaders will be less tempted to enter politics. On the other side of the coin, political parties may be expected to develop in new directions. With the maturation of political parties they will no longer see popular labor leaders as political competitors. As the middle class grows, political parties must reflect middle class interests. The labor vote therefore would no longer be the key to elections and political parties would become coalitions of a variety of interest groups.

At present, Puerto Rican unionism is in a period of transition: Unions as social-protest movements, typical of non-industrial societies, are giving way to market-oriented unionism. Unions claiming to be still fighting the so-called evils of colonialism are unable to find much support. Unions that are tied to a political party and see themselves primarily as partners in a revolutionary enterprise of building a new nation, economically, politically, and socially are victims of the success of their revolution. Industrialization and accompanying socioeconomic changes seem to require a redefinition of roles and functions. It appears that political parties will be less identified with labor as they find that labor welfare and the general welfare are no longer identical, while unions will find themselves in a position to be more independent of political parties and more concerned with the economic welfare of specific groups of workers.

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[1] The *San Juan Star*, May 11 and 12, took note that Senator Hipólito Marcano and Armando Sánchez broke with their party over new Federal legislation on minimum wages, placing both men in a difficult position in their party and with their unions.

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PUERTO RICO: AN ESSAY IN THE DEFINITION OF A NATIONAL CULTURE

by

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> Every culture seems, as it advances toward maturity, to produce its own determining debate over the ideas that preoccupy it: salvation, the order of nature, money, power, sex, the machine and the like. The debate, indeed, may be said to be the culture, at least on its loftiest levels; for a culture achieves identity not so much through the ascendancy of one particular set of convictions as through the emergence of its peculiar and distinctive dialogue * * * Intellectual history, properly conducted, exposes not only the dominant ideas of a period, or of a nation, but more importantly, the dominant clashes over ideas. Or to put it more austerely: the historian looks not only for the major terms of discourse but also for major pairs of opposed terms which, by their very opposition, carry discourse forward. The historian looks, too, for the coloration or discoloration of ideas received from the sometimes bruising contact of opposites.
>
> As he does so and as he examines the personalities and biases of the men engaged in debate at any given movement, the historian is likely to discover that the development of the culture in question resembles a protracted and broadly ranging conversation: at best a dialogue—a dialogue which at times moves very close to drama.—R. W. B. Lewis, "The American Adam; Innocence, Tragedy, and Tradition in the Nineteenth Century" (Chicago, 1955), pp. 1–2.

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INTRODUCTION

This essay deals with the writings of social scientists on the nature of Puerto Rican culture, and seeks to clarify some of the concepts they use. I have drawn mainly from scholars in sociology and anthropology; where relevant, the views of observers in related fields are included.

The special qualities of Puerto Rican culture have been a matter of intense concern to Puerto Rican intellectuals. This is entirely expectable, in view of Puerto Rico's lengthy history as a dependent society, its insularity, and the very spirited debate of recent years concerning its identity and political future. But I think that a rather disappointing fuzziness has marked this dialogue, so far as the definition

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of the term "culture" is concerned. Those who write about Puerto Rico so often seem to be governed by deeply felt, but not very specific, convictions, that I believed some examination of terms might be useful.

It may also serve some purpose to fix a discussion of Puerto Rican culture within the context of island history, and of Puerto Rico's place within the Caribbean region. In terms of the history of Western oversea expansion, Puerto Rico is part of the oldest colonial area in the world. Furthermore, it was one of the last colonies of Spain to be surrendered to foreign domination in this hemisphere. Because of certain underlying features of geography and history, Puerto Rico does, indeed, share much with mainland Latin America; along different lines, Puerto Rico both shares, and does not share, features characteristic of the Caribbean area as a whole. In order to weigh Puerto Rico's distinctive quality as a society and to separate out its particularity from the rest of the Hispanic world, some attention is given to the island's culture history.

An attempt is also made to report some observations on the character of Puerto Rican society over a period of time, and in the present. This part of the discussion is more summary than interpretation; but little will be gained by dealing with terminology, social science concepts, and history, unless one is prepared to deal, at least tentatively, with the nature of island society as contemporary observers have perceived it.

The essay's concern is with culture—its definition, its relevance, and its particular meaning in the Puerto Rican case. To a major extent, political implications are not spelled out. The hope is, however, that the political dialogue may be clarified by achieving some common agreement on terms.

PART I. CULTURE AS A TERM OF REFERENCE

A. ANTHROPOLOGICAL VERSUS LITERARY VIEWS OF CULTURE

The term "culture" has been used for many years and in various ways by writers, both social scientists and belletrists. From the literary or esthetic point of view, culture usually refers to the intellectual product of a society's leaders in the fields generally associated with the esthetic experience, such as the graphic arts, music, drama, and literature. Using "culture" to mean an elite esthetic product is a common practice. Used this way, the term does not refer directly to the esthetic effort of "the people," but rather to that of some specialist class or societal group that concerns itself in particular with esthetic productivity.

The history of human society has repeatedly shown the ways in which the esthetic products of "the folk" are distilled, given new symbolic meanings, and synthesized, to produce culture in this more refined sense. Thus we feel no surprise in learning that Beethoven employed popular leitmotifs in the writing of classical compositions; nor are we startled by the revelation that African "primitive art" often inspired French modern painters.

In the work of anthropologist Robert Redfield, the dichotomy between "the culture of the folk" and "elite culture" expresses another dichotomy: that between "the little society" and "the great society" (e.g. 1962: 302). The historical process of nation-building or national integration is always likely to produce certain distinctions in esthetic products, setting apart those of the people at large from those of specialists in the fields of "culture." But this distinction reflects structural distinctions within the society. Whether one prefers Charles Ives or rock-and-roll is a matter of "taste," and taste reflects—among other things—social-structural differences. Elite cultural forms can not be shown to be better or finer or more esthetic on any convincing objective grounds, any more than one dialect of a language can be scientifically proved superior to any other. Cultural forms, in other words, do not lend themselves to quality measurement according to any scale but taste itself.

The anthropological view must be reserved whenever claims are made that one sort of culture is in any way demonstrably better than any other. To the anthropologist, culture is a concept applicable to all those products of the human species that are the result of social learning, communicated through the use of a symbol system, and not rooted in the purely physiological character of man as a species.

The classic anthropological definition of culture is that of Edward B. Taylor, the great British anthropologist whose work marked the emergence of anthropology as a professional discipline: "* * * that complex whole which includes knowledge, belief, art, morals, law, custom, and any other capabilities and habits acquired by man as a member of society" (1877: 1).

American anthropologists, in explicating the culture concept, commonly assert that man is the only animal who makes tools and continues to use them in cumulative ways; that man is the only animal whose principal mode of communication is through a symbolic system, embodied in language; that man is the only animal the evolution of whose social life was based in the first instance on the subjugation of basic physical impulses to some organized system of behavior, invented by man himself. It is in these terms that culture is claimed to be a distinctively human product. Culture, then, co-occurs with humanity. It is in no way the monopoly of some societies as opposed to others, or of some classes or specialist groups within a society, as opposed to others within that same society.

To the anthropologist, rock-and-roll is as much a part of culture as Ives; and pop art as much a part of culture as the works of a Chagall or a Picasso. Culture, in short, is by definition part of the environment within which any human being grows. To a very large extent, one takes on one's culture as one gets it; from birth onward, the human infant is busily engaged in clothing itself with the habiliments of its culture, as part of the price of becoming human. But "human" here is defined in terms of a particular set of values, beliefs, and symbolic meanings. One famous anthropologist has said that one never fully perceives one's own culture—that this would be as difficult to do as for a fish to discover that it lived in water. In fact, of course, cultures do become perceptible, and particularly when one can enjoy the perspective provided by coming to know well a culture different from one's own. Anthropology's special contribution to human understanding may very well be little more than this—to help man to perceive better the particular nature of one's own culture by assimilating the experience of the shock of contrast.

Robert Redfield defined culture as "* * * an organization of conventional understandings, manifest in act and artifact" (1941: 133). The use of the phrase "conventional understandings" is significant, because it says something both about what culture is, and about how it "works." What the culture concept does, among other things, is allow us to characterize the extent to which people who live within a particular society are able to operate confidently and efficiently in terms of endless everyday predictions about the behavior of others. Matters of dress, cuisine, etiquette, linguistic usage, and myriad other features of daily experience can only maintain their continuity because the members of a given society have certain commonly-accepted bases of agreement on what is both appropriate and acceptable.

From this point of view, it seems reasonable to argue that, when we speak of "Puerto Rican culture" or "American culture," we are referring first of all to those features of human behavior in each society which can be regarded as commonly accepted or agreed upon. It is of course true that each culture leaves considerable room for variation in behavior, either in the form of acceptable behavioral or valuational alternatives, or in the form of spheres of continuing controversy. Functioning in American society, for instance, does not require that one accept one, and only one, political view, style of dress, or religion. But the lack of utter uniformity that a culture may leave room for does not mean that the terms by which people act lack definition or predictability. It only means that large portions of daily activity, and many spheres of attitude and belief, are defined as falling within conventionally accepted areas of maneuver and difference.

However remote this discussion may seem from the question of Puerto Rican culture, I believe that it is of considerable relevance. Many writers on Puerto Rican culture seem quite unable—or perhaps unwilling—to make clear that they have in mind when using the term. "Puerto Rican culture" may be used to describe the speaking of Spanish; it may refer to the eating of rice and beans and the drinking of sweetened black coffee; it may refer to the novels and plays of a Laguerre, or the short stories of a González. It can mean many things or few; elite culture or popular culture; poor man's culture or rich man's culture. But unless and until the antagonists in this dialogue can make clear in what sense they are employing the term, they run the risk of continuing to waste words and effort without the achievement of clarity.

B. "CULTURE" AND "SOCIETY" AS PAIRED CONCEPTS

In American anthropological usage "culture" and "society" are intimately related but conceptually distinct terms. While the controversy concerning the meaning and employment of these terms continues, it is necessary to make some attempt here to counterpose them and to suggest their relationship. I use the term "society" here to refer to any organized group of human beings whose group nature can be circumscribed or delimited, and which has a continuity in time considerably greater than that of a single generation. This does not mean that small aggregates, or technically simpler ones, are excludable. We speak, for instance, of an American Indian society such as the Cheyenne, or the Hopi; or of an African society such as the Tallensi, or the Nuer. These are "tribal" societies, but the term society need not be restricted to groupings any more elaborate or technically more advanced than these. Smaller groups yet—say, the individual bands of Bushmen in Bechuanaland—are also societies. But the point is that each of these societies can be delimited, and set apart from the societies of its neighbors; that each has group continuity extending over generations, and that each fulfills the basic needs (biological, political, economic, etc.) of its people for continued group survival.

It would probably be proper to say that there is a body of behavior, and of the results of behavior, attaching to each of these societies, and to refer to this body of acts and artifacts as the substance of culture. Such a usage—admittedly put very loosely here—is consistent with anthropology's view. The people who live in some continuing organized group are the society, and the "carriers" of its culture. But men are mortal, and the personnel of a society move through it, from birth to death, while it endures. Its particular form—its internal divisions, its array of statuses and attached roles, its subgroupings, give to a particular society a characteristic structure or shape. There is no society without people; but people do not live in a society in some random scattering. Rather, they live as members of defined internal segments or sections through which successive generations move in patterned ways. Thus the term "society" may be seen here as referring to a kind of map or chart of some organized human grouping having continuity in time. It consists of a number of positions or slots filled by individuals who stand in certain relationships to each other. Societal subgroupings—for instance, those based on kinship, coresidence, common profession, common interest, and so forth—form segments of a total society. Over time, we take note, one generation replaces another; the society, then, is both an organized aggregate of people and an arrangement of parts, of social positions, through which mortal individuals move.

We are told by some writers that "a society consists of people; the way they behave is their culture." But this way of drawing the distinction between culture and society is not altogether helpful. Culture is a historical product. It takes on its characteristic nature, in a given society, over a period of time. And it is not integral, in the sense that all of its features are uniformly apprehended and employed by all of the society's members. No individual in any society ever has a total knowledge of overview of his culture. This means that in some sense a culture is supra-individual. The culture of one society is never entirely shared by all of its members at any point in time—even in the technically simplest and smallest societies, there are significant behavioral differences between men and women, and between the young, the adult, and the aged.

It is clear enough that, to some extent at least, distinctions within a given society are marked by differences in behavior between the members of different segments. On one level, everyone in a definable society participates through a common body of belief and behavior—that is, of culture. But on another, they differ in their behavior and in the ways that they are members of the society, in terms of those parts of the total culture which they do or do not employ. Since behavioral differences do denote differences of status and of differential group membership within some particular society, culture can serve as a means for expressing symbolically: (*a*) the maintenance of these differences; or (*b*) changes in status through accompanying changes in cultural forms. A person who changes his class position in American society, for instance, usually changes such features of his life as his habits of dress, cuisine, and possibly even speech. When he does so, he has not entirely changed his culture; but he may very well be taking on new "cultural" forms as an expression of his change of "social" position. One specific, if trivial, example of this should suffice.

The use of knives as eating instruments in Puerto Rican lower class rural subcultures has not yet appeared in strength; one eats normally with soup spoon and fork only. Yet knife-using is typical of the table etiquette of middle class Puerto Rico. When a person of lower class rural antecedents enters into middle class life by virtue of his own upward mobility and increased purchasing and consuming power, it is likely that his table etiquette will eventually change, along with many other features of his daily behavior. But the acquisition of knife-using represents a change in individual usage within the culture, rather than a change in the totality of Puerto Rican culture as such. Knife-using, in other words, serves as a marker or boundary in daily behavior; it characterizes a difference in class position; and it can be used to symbolize a change in such position. In like fashion, a particular cultural usage—again, such as knife-using—serves to express symbolically the maintenance of societal distinctions. The child of middle class parents learns to use a knife from infancy, and learns to regard the usage as correct, expectable, and "natural." He will perceive non-knife-using as incorrect, surprising, and not "natural"; as he puts his observations together, he may perceive a whole constellation of behavior traits as characteristic of a certain "sort" of person. That sort of person is also Puerto Rican,[1] but not of the same category as the observer. Thus behavioral differences maintain symbolically the societal distinction between members of different groups within a single society.

The concepts of "culture" and "society," then, give us different vantage points for looking at the same thing: human behavior. Culture consists of a body of historically accumulated usages and forms; society consists of the arrangement of people into various groupings which, taken all together, make up some total, aggregate, delimitable, human grouping.

Wolf has put this distinction provocatively, as he contrasts cultural and social anthropology:

> By culture I mean the historically developed forms through which the members of a given society relate to each other. By society I mean the element of action, of human maneuver within the field provided by cultural forms, human maneuver which aims either at preserving a given balance of life chances and life risks or at changing it. Most 'cultural' anthropologists have seen cultural forms as so limiting that they have tended to neglect entirely the element of human maneuver which flows through these forms or around them, presses against their limits or plays several sets of forms against the middle. It is possible, for instance, to study the cultural phenomenon of ritual coparenthood ("compadrazgo") in general terms: to make note of its typical form and general functions. At the same time, dynamic analysis should not omit note of the

> different uses to which the form is put by different individuals, of the ways in which people explore the possibilities of a form, or of the ways in which they circumvent it. Most social anthropologists, on the other hand, have seen action or maneuver as primary, and thus neglect to explore the limiting influence of cultural forms. Cultural form not only dictates the limits of the field for the social play, it also limits the direction in which the play can go in order to change the rules of the game, when this becomes necessary * * *. Past culture certainly structures the process of perception, nor is human maneuver always conscious and rational; by taking both views—a view of cultural forms as defining fields for human maneuver, and a view of human maneuver always pressing against the inherent limitations of cultural forms—we shall have a more dynamic manner of apprehending the real tensions of life (1959: 142).

Discussions of Puerto Rico that treat it as a unitary society with a unitary culture fail to clarify this distinction.

C. THE PROBLEM OF "CLASS CULTURE"

In the views of some, a national culture consists of a series of strata or levels of distinctive behavior within a single society. Social theorists who insist that social relations may be viewed basically as stemming from differences in access to the means of production, are likely to contend also that behavior in differing social segments is a reflection of differing group economic positions. Since the notion of "class" has come to be more widely accepted among American social scientists—say, in the past thirty years—various attempts have been made to describe what can be referred to as "subcultures" in terms of differing group economic positions. Even the half-facetious discussions of "highbrow, middlebrow, and lowbrow cultures" employed the notion that cultural forms are attached to differences in economic level; and the British discussions of "U" and "non-U" share something with this point of view.

Distinctions of this sort have their uses. In societies in which significant differences may be drawn between rural and urban segments, and among the economic positions occupied by various strata, class as a tool of analysis has a particular utility. That utility depends to a certain extent on the degree of rigidity which characterizes a total social system—that is, on the limitations to easy social and economic movement up and down. Societies which are, or have been, rigid in form, and lacking large numerical groupings which might be referred to as "middle class," are perhaps particularly suitable for analysis on these terms. Thus, within a society such as Puerto Rico's, we can readily localize differences in understanding, act, and in artifact which serve to characterize differential segments within the whole; and we can say with some reliability that movement from one such segment to another is normally accompanied by changes in "culture." In my own work on Puerto Rico, I early attempted to define a numerically substantial social segment which I referred to as the "rural proletariat" (Mintz, 1951a); this grouping within Puerto Rico was viewed primarily in terms of its economic position or productive relations within the total Island society. In several later papers and books (Mintz 1953a, 1953b, 1960; Steward 1956), the theme is enlarged in certain regards. Oscar Lewis' work on the "culture of poverty" takes a different conceptual tack, and yet concerns itself as well with the analysis of culture viewed to some extent as an aspect of economic status.

Serious questions remain, however, with regard to such concepts. Very importantly, it is often extremely difficult to determine whether a particular mode of behavior may properly be included under the rubric "class culture" or whether it may more correctly be seen as a variant on "national culture." In the case of a society such as Puerto Rico, for instance, distinctions must also be drawn between those items of act and artifact that are employed by members of different social segments and come from the historically accumulated body of Puerto Rican culture, and those that represent either innovations or introductions, and which diffuse at differential rates through various social groupings within the society.

To take several obvious examples, the "décima" is a traditional musical form in Puerto Rico, which has long been regarded as an integral part of the culture of that society. At the present time, décimas continue to be sung and composed mainly by rural people in Puerto Rico, normally and conventionally by members of lower class groupings. It would be correct to say that these musical forms do not form part of the contemporary culture of members of other classes, except to the extent that they may occasionally be listened to. Yet the décima, along with many other cultural items, has taken on a symbolic character in the continuing controversy concerning Puerto Rican culture; members of other groups, and perhaps particularly of that referred to as the "intellectual elite" vaunt the décima as an integral feature of the culture. It cannot be ignored that those who employ the décima as a political symbol—for that is the way it is manipulated—neither compose nor sing this form. Its presence within the total body of Puerto Rican culture is indisputable. But the way in which it forms a part of life, and is or is not employed, differs dramatically from one group to another, and the difference is probably not wholly attributable to differences in class.

In contrast, one may mention the use of pants as an article of feminine apparel in Island society. Slacks wearing by women is a mode of behavior clearly introduced from outside the Island society. This innovation was taken up first by members of middle or upper class groupings, and only diffused downward in the class structure over a substantial period of time. During a recent visit to the Island, I was struck by the extent to which slacks wearing has now become a part of the culture of rural lower class girls and women. Not only are denim slacks worn by young girls of lower class status in rural communities on the South Coast, but slacks are also worn under dresses by female field hands, who are members of one of the lowliest economic segments of Island society. But it is by no means analytically sufficient to say simply that a new cultural form has been introduced from the outside, and how it has now diffused to female members of all classes. The symbolic attachments to an innovation of this kind naturally vary significantly from one group to another, and only when some sense can be made of the symbolic (and utilitarian) values attached to such an item of behavior can any useful analytic comment be attempted.

And yet the concept of "class culture" adds importantly to our capacity to interpret analytically what the cultural character of Puerto Rico is like. Unfortunately, few social science studies of contemporary Puerto Rican society have extended this sort of analysis into new areas. The extent to which behavior may be viewed as a function of class position, and the extent to which interpretive derivations may be made from the symbolic meanings linked to such usages must depend on careful additional research. I will, however, employ the notion of class culture in this paper, wherever it may seem to apply usefully.

D. "GENUINE" VERSUS "SPURIOUS" CULTURE

In one of the most provocative essays in the literature of anthropology, Edward Sapir asked whether it was possible to describe cultures under the rubrics "genuine" and "spurious." His essay on this subject ([1924] 1956) excited response among social scientists, particularly because his view was plainly laden with considerable attribution of ethical and psychological value to one kind of culture as opposed to another, and modern, large-scale, complex societies came off rather badly. Sapir makes clear that he is not using these value-terms with reference to levels of technical development; a technically undeveloped society may have a "genuine" culture, while a highly evolved industrial society may have a "spurious" culture. Thus he writes:

> The genuine culture is not of necessity either high or low; it is merely inherently harmonious, balanced, self-satisfactory. It is the expression of a richly varied and yet somehow unified and consistent attitude toward life, an attitude which sees the significance of any one element of civilization in its relation to all others. It is, ideally speaking, a culture in which nothing is spiritually meaningless, in which no important part of the general functioning brings with it a sense of frustration, of misdirected or unsympathetic effort * * *.

> It should be clearly understood that this ideal of a genuine culture has no necessary connection with what we call efficiency. A society may be admirably efficient in the sense that all its activities are carefully planned with reference to ends of maximum utility to the society as a whole, it may tolerate no lost motion, yet it may well be an inferior organism as a culture-bearer. It is not enough that the ends of activities be socially satisfactory, that each member of the community feel in some dim way that he is doing his bit toward the attainment of a social benefit. This is all very well so far as it goes, but a genuine culture refuses to consider the individual as a mere cog, as an entity whose sole *raison d'être* lies in his subservience to a collective purpose that he is not conscious of or that has only a remote relevancy to his interests and strivings. The major activities of the individual must directly satisfy his own creative and emotional impulses, must always be something more than a means to an end. The great cultural fallacy of industrialism, as developed up to the present time, is that in harnessing machines to our uses it has not known how to avoid the harnessing of the majority of mankind to its machines. The telephone girl who lends her capacities, during the greater part of the living day, to the manipulation of a technical routine that has an eventually high efficiency value but that answers to no spiritual needs of her own is an appalling sacrifice to civilization. As a solution of the problem of culture she is a failure—the more dismal the greater her natural endowment. As with the telephone girl, so, it is to be feared, with the great majority of us, slave-stokers to fires that burn for demons we would destroy, were it not that they appear in the guise of our benefactors. The American Indian who solves the economic problem with salmon spear and rabbit snare operates on a relatively low level of civilizaton, but he represents an incomparably higher solution than our telephone girl of the questions that culture has to ask of economics. There is here no question of the immediate utility, of the effective directness, of economic effort, nor of any sentimentalizing regrets as to the passing of the "natural man." The Indian's salmon spearing is a culturally higher type of activity than that of the telephone girl or mill hand simply because there is normally no sense of spiritual frustration during its prosecution, no feeling of subservience to tyrannous yet largely inchoate demands, because it works in naturally with all the rest of the Indian's activities instead of standing out as a desert patch of merely economic effort in the whole of life. A genuine culture cannot be defined as a sum of abstractly desirable ends, as a mechanism. It must be looked upon as a sturdy plant growth, each remotest leaf and twig of which is organically fed by the sap at the core. And this growth is not here meant as a metaphor for the group only; it is meant to apply as well to the individual. A culture that does not build itself out of the central interests and desires of its bearers, that works from general ends to the individual, is an external culture. The word "external" which is so often instinctively chosen to describe such a culture, is well chosen. The genuine culture is internal, it works from the individual to ends (Sapir, 1956: 90–93).

To quote thus briefly from one of the most eloquent essays ever written on the subject of culture is to do serious injustice to Sapir's thinking. His major point, of course, is to suggest that we search for some reckoning of culture as a means both to express and to satisfy fundamental individual needs for fulfillment. His contentions work against the conception of the culture as simply an aspect of large-scale political units, and against the common inclination to see culture itself as a kind of automatic byproduct of technical excellence. What Sapir is not able to do in his essay is to explain in an entirely satisfactory way precisely how peoples in given societies may undertake to rationalize their cultures in a more organically coherent direction. I find it suprising that, to my knowledge, none of the writers on Puerto Rican culture has employed the Sapir essay in evaluating critically the place of that culture in the sphere of Western society. It is not entirely clear whether the Sapir formulation really carries significant implications of a political kind—even though such implications may be derived inferentially from what he has written. The point is this: can it be contended on any grounds that Puerto Rican culture—once some agreed-upon definition of its character can be reached—can grow more coherently under one set of political arrangements, than under another? The question clearly remains to be answered.

Surely, if one takes Sapir's criteria at face value, North American culture may seem as spurious as any, and more than most. If any writer on Puerto Rican culture has argued on such grounds in defense of a separate identity for Puerto Rico, the argument is not known to me. But more than a hint of this view may be found in Pedreira's classic "Isularismo": "La civilización es horizontal; la cultura, vertical. Si yo fuera a sumarme al grupo que todo lo define en términos del más y del menos, diría que hoy somos más civilizado, pero ayer éramos más cultos" (1946: 94). But of this, more later.

E. THE TERMINOLOGY OF CULTURE CHANGE

Since World War II, anthropologists the world over have concentrated more and more on the theoretical problems raised by change and on the substantive facts of change itself. In describing the phenomena of change, a large number of terms have come into common usage, which approach the description of these phenomena from various points of view. Not only anthropologists, but sociologists, economists, political scientists, and even psychologists have concentrated their attention upon the processes of change; within this sphere of inquiry, much attention has been given to the relationship between the so-called "developed nations" and those referred to as forming part of "the third world." Terms such as "acculturation," "Westernization," "Americanization," "industrialization," "deculturation," and "modernization" are now part of the everyday descriptive repertory of the social scientist. It is not surprising that many of these terms are laden with explicit or inexplicit valuations. Thus, for instance, "Westernization" and "acculturation" may be either "good" or "bad"; whereas "deculturation" is almost always "bad." It is probably inevitable that these usages mark the value positions of observers, be they social scientists or political ideologists, and express certain underlying orientations. It is also probably inevitable that these usages maintain a continuous ambiguity of position, since there is so little common agreement on their specific meaning. Thus, in the case of Puerto Rico, what may be approvingly referred to as "modernization" by one writer, may receive equally negative imputation from another, who calls the very same changes "Americanization." It would be pretentious to attempt here to set particular meanings on such terms; but a warning, at least, is necessary. Where it is requisite to use one or another of these terms to describe a process of change in the case of Puerto Rico, every effort will be made to describe in particular the kind of change being referred to; the value implications of the terms themselves had best be left to the eye of the beholder. An examination of the particular writings referred to in subsequent sections will make clear why so pedantic a usage is necessary. Over and over again, change is referred to in terms implying that it is either "good" or "bad," without sufficient effort being invested in specifying of what, indeed, the change consists.

Anthropologists have achieved almost unanimous agreement in their view that there exists no absolute moral, ethical, or civilizational standard by which societies may be compared evaluatively. We lack any dependable scientific means which permits us to say that the culture of *x* people is morally superior to the culture of *y* people; and in fact, anthropology is still reacting to the highly charged value categorizations which typified the writing of observers of the past century. We can—given a particular philosophical orientation—claim that a society that engages in cannibalism is morally inferior to one that does not; but it remains a truly open question whether a society that engages in cannibalism is morally inferior to one that engages in war. This view—commonly known within the profession as "cultural relativism"—has little or nothing to do with the notion of technical superiority or inferiority.

It is obvious enough that the technical repertory of a particular society may indeed be significantly superior to that of some other; we have no doubt that high-powered rifles kill elephants more effectively than bows and arrows. But it is quite another matter to argue from the level of technical development to the level of ethical or moral status. If, of course, we are prepared to say that the capacity of a society to fulfill the basic needs of its citizens can be viewed as nothing more than a function of its technical level, then moral or ethical superiority can indeed be derived from technical accomplishments. But few anthropologists are ready to settle for so simple-minded a notion of cultural satisfaction.

It has to be noticed that there is nearly universal agreement in the contemporary world that technical improvement in societies which are backward in these regards is considered "morally good." The question always seems to turn on whether the price for such technical progress is worth it. Each society should face the task of deciding for itself what it must sacrifice—and whether, indeed, it is prepared to—in order to achieve a standard of life that better satisfies the basic needs of its people. The difficulty comes of course, in the failure of technical achievement to satisfy other than nonmaterial needs, and indeed, the danger that such achievement may really frustrate such needs. This particular aspect of the problem is indeed highly relevant to the Puerto Rican situation. Much of the change that Puerto Rico has experienced over the past several decades has to do with the gradual improvement of technical levels, and the resulting impact of such improvement on the style of life. Technical improvement of this sort is rarely subjected to anything like a plebiscite; it originates in changes based to a a considerable extent on developments outside the receiving society, and those who ultimately enjoy (or suffer from) the derivative benefits of such change are rarely consulted about their subjective dispositions. Since this is so, it becomes very important indeed to know which groups within a developing society regard themselves as fitted to speak valuatively concerning change and its effects.

It is also important to keep in mind that change of various sorts—and perhaps particularly change of a technical kind—can occur to some extent without reference to considerations of the political order. One of the questions which the writing of observers of the Puerto Rican scene might be expected to answer—and, on the whole, does not—has to do with the intimacy of relationship between technical change and the political setting. It is enough here simply to put the question. What can be done in providing an answer may be suggested by subsequent sections.

F. THE CULTURE CONCEPT AS A POLITICAL INSTRUMENT

In political discussions of a national culture—that of Germany, say, or of the United States—the culture is generally referred to as if it existed without reference to the particular social order which perpetuated it. And when dependent, agrarian societies of the sort variously labeled "backward," "underdeveloped," and "developing" are described this way, they are generally seen as the recipients of an overwhelming cultural pressure from their respective metropolises. The various societies of Africa, before achieving political sovereignty, were viewed as human groupings with established ways of life, overwhelmed by the pressure for change emanating from more developed centers.

In these sorts of argument, "culture" is taken to be a substantially unchanging and coherent system, which has difficulty maintaining itself in the face of outside impact. This view has much to recommend it, as a means for understanding the process of change. But it seems useful to distinguish between social change and cultural change, in making an appropriate analysis. To speak English instead of Spanish represents a significant change in culture; at the same time, however, the use of English instead of Spanish also can signify significant changes in social structure and in the interrelated system. The addition of knives and teaspoons, rather than the exclusive use of the soup spoon and fork, is also a change in culture; it, too, can mark a significant change in society. But cultural change and social change are conceptually distinct, and must be viewed as such. Otherwise, the culture is mistakenly conceived to be some kind of totally homogeneous entity characterizing a society from its topmost to its bottommost levels.

In fact, the contemporary society which lacks significant internal distinctions of a social order is a rare bird, indeed. Puerto Rico is a clearly stratified society, the behavior of whose citizens varies significantly along lines of class position and background, among other things. Many of the changes, as pointed out earlier, referred to as destructive of "Puerto Rican culture" represent in fact social changes in the position of members of the society. Other changes, it is true, represent cultural changes in a true sense. The introduction of mass media of communication, entirely foreign styles of dress, and other features originating in societies outside, do represent cultural change. But these changes do not have a uniform and undifferentiated impact on all Puerto Ricans. In fact, many of the changes deplored by those who most fiercely defend the intactness and persistence of Puerto Rican culture are experienced first by those who are the severest critics of the change itself, and only reach the mass bearers of Puerto Rican culture at a later time.

Of what, indeed, does Puerto Rican culture consist? One might justifiably include such things as a rice-and-beans diet, the speaking of Spanish, a particular kind of authority relationship between parents and children, and between husbands and wives, and many other things. But even these basic features of Puerto Rican life cannot be regarded as existing with similar force and with similar meaning throughout all strata of Puerto Rican society.

The use of the culture concept as a political instrument has been characterized, in the Puerto Rican case, by assumptions of homogeneity and uniformity for the Puerto Rican people which the realities of Puerto Rican life do not in fact support. This does not mean that there are no features of Puerto Rican culture that all Puerto

Ricans share; but it is unclear to what extent these features are the bases of Puerto Rican cultural coherence, and to what extent they merely form a residual category of the most general sort. If all (or nearly all) Puerto Ricans—regardless of age, sex, economic position, or social status—accept as right and good a firmly stratified hierarchy of social and economic classes, for instance, this could [illegible] an important unifying feature of the Puerto Rican national value system. But if all Puerto Ricans prefer to drink coffee rather than tea, this uniformity of preference is much less likely to have any serious significance for Puerto Rican national culture.

Arguments for the defense of Puerto Rican culture based on the notion of total uniformity proceed from the assumption that the basic, common features of that culture are sufficient to provide a coherence worth maintaining for its own sake. From the point of view of those more favorably disposed to change, and perhaps less involved in the issue of political status as an aspect of change, the features which differentiate segments of Puerto Rican society from each other are implicitly regarded as more important than those which typify it from top to bottom. All I mean to do here with this point is to make it clear; the implications can be weighed at a later time.

G. CULTURE AS AN HISTORICAL AGGREGATE

A culture has no existence apart from the people who "carry" it. When a society has become extinct, either by the absorption of its members into some larger society, or by the genetic termination of those who make it up, the culture which it carried dies with it. It survives only in the sense that features of culture can diffuse across societal boundaries, and so be "carried forward" by members of some other society. Thus we can say, for instance, of American society that the culture which it carries is composed of elements originating in every part of the world. There is little that can be described as exclusively and uniquely "American," "Puerto Rican," "German," etc. The particular distinctiveness of a cultural system does not rest upon the origins of the things that make it up, but upon the symbolic values attached to those things and the way they express themselves in the organization, coherence, and distinctiveness of the society itself. People who are members of a particular society give special and unique meanings to the substance of their culture, and these meanings, when we grasp them, help us to differentiate one society from another. Thus we certainly cannot claim that any culture is in any sense a "pure" product by virtue of the origins of its elements. Suttell, borrowing the insights of anthropologist Ralph Linton (1936: 325–

27), has tried to make this clear in a good-natured spoof about the "typical Puerto Rican":

> The confusion surrounding the problem of whether we should pay homage to Western culture, Puerto Rican culture, or some combination of the two, has reached scandalous proportions and all this in spite of the fact that those holding opposing viewpoints have been unable to come up with a clear definition of the crux of the argument. Some of the more extreme aspects of this controversy are reminiscent of the graphic description of the "100 per cent American" made by Ralph Linton, famous U.S. anthropologist. (Later we will adapt his ideas in order to characterize the "100 per cent Puerto Rican".)
>
> As Linton indicates: "There is probably no culture extant today which owes more than 10 per cent of its total elements to inventions made by members of its own society." This, nevertheless, should be neither the cause for lament nor alarm, but rather should serve as an incentive to creativity.
>
> Those who have contributed the least to the cultural mainstream are almost always the ones who most loudly demand the preservation of the little that they have created. A certain magnanimity of spirit is necessary in order to appreciate the worth of an unfamiliar culture, to assimilate that which has value, from whatever origin, and to use it effectively in the interests of one's own culture.
>
> The Soviet Union is an outstanding example of a people which refuses to recognize any debt to another culture. The Russians specialize in attributing all inventions, discoveries and ideas, no matter how ancient, to their own ingenuity, taking great pains to extol Russian culture while negating or ridiculing any variation.
>
> Nevertheless, if we recognize the importance of creativity, we should not be afraid to study the best to be found in other cultures. One of the great writers of the last century in the United States, Henry David Thoreau, whose writings are considered to be completely "American," owed his success among his fellow citizens to the fact that he had first steeped himself in European literature, and later rebelled against it. Those who prostrate themselves and make a fetish of regionalism and traditionalism, nearly always end up, perhaps unconsciously, opposed to everything new and/or necessary.
>
> The Daughters of the American Revolution, for example, stand out as vigorous enemies of practically everything creative and thoughtful which their ancestors stood for. The same danger exists here, that the efforts to perpetuate the adulation of regionalism may preclude the attainment of a truly Puerto Rican contribution to the literature, art, and thought of the world.
>
> In today's world we need to focus our attention more and more, not on small things, but rather on the global aspects of life and art. From the political, the cultural, the aesthetic points of view—from every point of view—we are entering an era in which we need increasingly greater understanding and appreciation of other cultures. There is no reason to believe that this inhibits local creativity—on the contrary. Those who contribute most to Puerto Rican culture from now on will be those who see Puerto Rico as a part of the world picture. Fear of contamination by Western culture will never create a Puerto Rican culture; rather, it will sterilize any attempt at cultural productivity.
>
> We will end with a description of one day in the life of a 100 per cent Puerto Rican (my apologies and thanks to Ralph Linton.)
>
> We must confess that our subject, a solid and typical Puerto Rican, arises in the morning from that artifact called a bed, a product of the Middle East

and later modified in Northern Europe, before winning the Puerto Ricans over from their traditional hammock. He throws back covers made from cotton, domesticated in India, or wool from sheep, domesticated in the Near East, or silk, the use of which was discovered in China. No matter what the material, however, the invention of spinning and weaving originated in the Middle East. It is a rare Puerto Rican who uses sanitary facilities of completely indigenous origins; the most common is a mixture of European and American inventions, both of recent date. As our friend takes off his pyjamas in his bathroom, a product of Western culture, he is shedding a garment invented in India. Later he washes with soap, thanks to the ancient Gauls. Then, unless he is a slave to nature, our Puerto Rican shaves, and this, as Linton says, is "a masochistic rite which seems to have been derived from either Sumer or ancient Egypt."

Returning to the bedroom, our hero removes his clothes from a chair which owes its design either to Southern Europe or to the Museum of Modern Art in New York. Getting dressed, it seems that the major part of his wardrobe originally came from the Asiatic steppes. His shoes, however, are of Mediterranean origin as far as design is concerned, but the leather from which they are made was tanned by a process invented in ancient Egypt. He ties a horribly colored strip of cloth around his neck which is a vestigial survival of the shoulder shawls worn by the seventeenth-century Croatians.

(Incidentally, the majority of the so-called experts on life in the tropics agree that the necktie is a monstrosity in a hot climate, from any point of view. Perhaps a truly Puerto Rican contribution to universal culture could be the complete elimination of this technicolored absurdity.)

On leaving the house, our friend buys a copy of "El Mundo", paying for it with a coin (an invention of the ancient Lydians). At the restaurant a whole new series of borrowed elements confronts him. His plate is made of a form of pottery which originally came from China. His knife is of steel, an alloy first made in Southern India, his fork a medieval Italian invention, and his spoon a derivative of a Roman original. His china originally came, not from China, but from India. And his coffee—hard as it is to admit—originated in Abyssinia. Another import! And if he adds milk and sugar to his coffee—both the domestication of cows and the idea of milking them originated in the Middle East, while sugar was first made in India.

If our Puerto Rican bolts down, among other things, his traditional plate of rice an beans at noon, perhaps he would be interested to know that beans, although known in other parts of the world since prehistoric times, were introduced relatively recently in Puerto Rico and rice is a plant indigenous only to India and Australia.

The distilling process (to which our protagonist owes his shot of rum) is mentioned by Aristotle in the fourth century B.C., and later was greatly improved by the Arabs.

Our 100 per cent Puerto Rican gets closer to home if he smokes after lunch. Smoking was a custom of the American Indians and the tobacco plant was first cultivated in Brazil. Although cigarettes were invented in Mexico, the cigar, thank goodness, was developed in the Antilles.

While smoking, our 100 percenter reads "El Mundo" imprinted in characters invented by the ancient Semites upon a material invented in China by a process invented in Germany. And as he reads about the rest of the world's problems our hero, if he is a good citizen of the Commonwealth, will thank a Hebrew deity in an Indo-European language that he is a 100 per cent Puerto Rican.

Joking aside, this sketch really packs a powerful message for the cultural nationalist. It is by no means Suttell's contention (nor was it Linton's) that societies lack distinctive characters setting their members apart from those of other, geographically separate societies. National distinctiveness must be specified, not without reference to history, but in terms unrelated to the particular historical origins of any cultural element or complex.

If we take an institution such as "compadrazgo," the system of ritual coparenthood which marks baptismal and other life-crisis ceremonies in Catholic societies, we may describe the institution in terms of its general character, and note those societies in whose cultures it occurs. But it is not the possession of a system of compadrazgo which distinguishes a society such as Puerto Rico, or Mexico, or Spain, but rather the particular meanings with which this system is invested in each case, and the societal system within which it operates. Compadrazgo is an aspect of culture, a part of the historical aggregate of Catholic societies. But it is the particular interpretation made of its character, its uses in the establishment, maintenance, and changing of societal forms, its particular significance and utility, that give it its distinctiveness in each case.

In Puerto Rico, Catholics of all classes and regions select godparents for their children on the occasion of baptism, and frequently for other life-crisis events (e.g., marriage) as well (Mintz and Wolf, 1950). So important is the institution that some lower class people acquire several sets of godparents in different ceremonies, and at least one form of compadrazgo is no more than ritualized friendship, as when two men simply seal their formal relationship by agreement, and are ever after coparents (compadres) to each other. The institution serves to tie together families in cordial and sacred ways, to give religious sponsorship to children, and to fulfill many psychological motives of the participants. Wolf (1956a) and Manners (1956) point out that a man who fears that another has designs on his wife may choose him as a compadre to forestall sexual aggressions; while Mintz (1956) demonstrates how reciprocal giving of foodstuffs, labor, and work opportunities may hinge on the compadre relationship. In proletarian communities such as Cañamelar, workers normally pick men of their own class as coparents; in stratified communities such as San José (Wolf, 1956a), poorer men seek richer ones because of the help they can give, while richer ones accept compadre obligations in order to tap the labor of their subordinates.

Thus compadrazgo as a historic Catholic institution is only made specific to Puerto Rico's case when the precise usages, attitudes, and maneuvers it permits are fully described. It is these—not the institution itself or its origin—that bring one into the sphere of a particular culture. Noticeably, the social usages themselves, and the room they allow for modification, are the important key, showing as they do the way "culture" and "society" go together.

Much the same may be said of any other aspect of culture, including language. It is not the Spanish language which gives Puerto Rico its distinctiveness nor is it merely Puerto Rico's historical affiliation with the Spanish cultural stream. But the speaking of Spanish in Puerto Rico has special characteristics and symbolic meanings, such that it may be viewed as distinctive within the Puerto Rican—as opposed to the Mexican, Spanish, or some other Hispanic—context.

Thus, I am maintaining that one cannot fruitfully describe a national culture as distinctive unless one attends to the societal forms within which the culture is endowed with its particular meanings.

In the process of the gradual assimilation of provincial culture units into larger and larger societal systems, local provincial distinctions in culture have often been eliminated or reduced. Though contemporary Spain, for example, is typified not only by distinctions of a rural-urban kind, and by truly cultural distinctions between, let us say, Vascongados and Cataluña, its history also witnessed the emergence of "national culture." This "national culture" which can be found as well in societies such as France, Great Britain, and the United States, is not, however, a single undifferentiated system in which all members of the society participate equally and in the same ways.

Puerto Rico, as much as any national unit, is marked by internal differentiation of a societal kind which reveals itself in behavioral differences. This is true even though it is correct to say that Puerto Rican culture has a distinguishable and particular character. Puerto Ricans speak Spanish; they have their own cuisine; their patterns of social relationship reveal their cultural character in such matters as styles of speech, relationships between men and women, relationships between parents and children, and in many other ways. These features, however, are not uniformly shared by all Puerto Ricans. It is perfectly reasonable to build a picture of Puerto Rican society in which the common cultural features may be regarded as differentiated according to social position in the total system, and the work of Steward's students (Steward, 1956) is substantially along these lines. Thus, for instance, the speaking of Spanish is not uniform throughout the society; upperclass Puerto Ricans and lowerclass Puerto Ricans both speak Spanish, but it is a different Spanish in each case, and Puerto Ricans themselves are perfectly aware of the difference. To a large extent, it may be said that all Puerto Ricans drink coffee—but the coffee of the upperclass Puerto Rican is not the coffee of the lowerclass

Puerto Rican, and once again, members of these different classes are perfectly aware of the difference. Much the same may be said of every feature which is regarded as distinctively Puerto Rican.

Since much of this analysis has significant implications for the dialogue concerning political status, it should be said once again that these points are not being advanced with reference to one or another such political position. The point here is not to derive a political answer from the cultural and societal facts, but to make clear that these facts must be handled analytically, rather than emotionally, if any clarity at all is to be achieved with regard to Puerto Rican identity. It is simply not enough, as one writer (Maldonado Denis, 1963: 141) has suggested, to define culture as "the total form of life of a people." Indeed, culture is the total form of life of a people; but so defined, we come no closer to an analytic understanding of what culture is or how it may best be changed or preserved.

The discussions of culture and of identity, then, which have marked the Puerto Rican scene, probably would benefit from some sharpening of concepts. And when the significance of the culture is made to hinge on the meanings of the past, care in the use of concepts is especially important. Culture is a result of what has gone before, a historical product; even when culture change is rapid and intense, much that is cultural will persist with great strength. And those who mean to dignify and enhance Puerto Rican identity refer to the past as the keel of that identity. Thus, for instance, Vientos Gastón (1964: 37): "* * * the past is the sum of the accumulated experience of previous generations: history. The present lacks sense when there is no consciousness of the past." But whose past are we speaking of? The question is answered very differently, according to whether one asks a university professor or a sugar cane worker in the countryside. And which past? It matters whether one sees oneself, for example, as the end-product of Spanish hidalguia, Island-Arawak subjugation, or African enslavement. To today's 50-year-old cane cutter, "the past" signifies the awful thirties, now fading; to today's 80-year-old ex-cane cutter, "the past" means the Guardia Civil, Los Compontes, and the tragedy of Spanish rule; to the 20-year-old of today, "the past" is again a different one. "The past" is a very long time indeed; and different people conceive of it differently. It is hard to escape here the feeling that the real job of those who would observe an interpret Puerto Rican life and identity is to find out what the people—all the people—really believe and want. It may well turn out that those who most glory in the past are spared the necessity of living it; while those who must live it are indeed most disposed to change.

Collingwood has written of "encapsulated history," the historical consciousness of a people. It seems that some societies live their historical experience more richly than others and this may express, more than anything else, the national identity. But historical consciousness is not a thing or substance to be pumped artificially into those who lack it, and the historical sense of many Puerto Ricans is taken up more with island history since 1940 than with the longer and grander trajectory of centuries. I believe this to be far more than a mere assertion; it may, in fact, be an unpalatable truth for some.

PART II. PUERTO RICO IN THE CARIBBEAN SETTING

Puerto Rico was one of Spain's first colonies in the New World, and shared in the colonial experience during the initial period of Spain's imperial experimentation with the rule and administration of subject peoples overseas. Three important features of the later economic and societal development of the Antilles appeared very early here: the sugar cane, the employment of African slaves, and that particular form of agro-social organization referred to here as the plantation. Furthermore, it is within the Caribbean area that political dependence, European control, and the colonial ambiance have endured most uninterruptedly in New World history. Though considerable local variation qualifies a description this general, some attempt is made in the following presentation to define Puerto Rico's particularity.

Within the Caribbean sphere, it is worth remarking that Spain gave up no ground to its European rivals until the beginnings of the seventeenth century. In effect, this meant that colonization and administration within the islands were monopolized by Spain for about the first 125 years of its history as an imperial system. During the first 20 years of the Conquest, Spain established and consolidated its control in the Greater Antilles. The Lesser Antilles were ignored, partly because they had no mineral resources, partly because the Island-Carib peoples of these islands showed effective and unremitting resistance to the Spaniards. Within the larger islands, however, and on significant portions of the mainland coast, Spanish imperium was indeed established and fortified. In these larger islands, which included Puerto Rico, the early concerns of the colonizers were subjugation, the establishment of economic enterprise (especially mining, based, for the most part, on enslaved or enforced native labor), and proselytization. Though early development lagged, the Spaniards were able to establish substantial island colonies of overseas settlers.

Beginning with the discovery and conquest of the mainland in 1519, however, Spanish interest in the islands lagged; those who had colonized the Antilles did not wish to stay, and those migrants who were coming to the New World preferred to establish themselves on the mainland, where opportunities for the acquisition of wealth were greater. One of the most significant features of the Hispanic Caribbean, then, was the extent to which it became an isolated overseas area within a few short decades of the original conquest.

Beginning early in the seventeenth century, Spain's rivals began to establish successful small-scale settlements within the Lesser Antilles. Then, in 1655, Jamaica fell to Great Britain, and in 1697, the western third of the island of Hispaniola was ceded by treaty to the French. Thus it was that, from the early 17th century onward, Spain's possessions in the Caribbean area, which she had effectively controlled for more than a century, began to pass into enemy hands. After 1697, Spain was left with Cuba, Santo Domingo (eastern Hispaniola), and Puerto Rico within the Caribbean sphere.

The history of these Hispanic colonies was sufficiently different from those of other powers that they may be regarded as a distinctive subarea within the islands. That distinctiveness, however, must be set against the underlying uniformities which characterized the settlement and development of the Caribbean as a whole, as the first sphere of Western European overseas colonialism.

Before dealing with Puerto Rico itself, there are good reasons for attempting to see the Caribbean first as part of some larger region. That region, which marked the lowland areas of the New World extending from the United States south to northeast Brazil, and including the Caribbean islands as well as much of the circum-Caribbean coasts, shared in a pattern of economic organization of enormous proportions and very lengthy duration, to which Curtin (1955: 4) has referred as "the South Atlantic system." This system, in brief, was based on the development of plantation agriculture as an emergent phase in European expansion. Its operation involved the employment of various types of forced, contract, and slave labor as a major means for relating the labor force productively to the land. The principal source of post-Conquest labor was Africa. Expectably, therefore, cultural continuities within this grand area show a substantial (though by no means exclusive) African component. It further follows that this is an area within which political dependence on overseas power was both protracted and persistent.

The fact is, however, that the Hispanic Caribbean colonies shared most actively in this general characterization only at the beginning and at the end of the plantation saga. It would be quite mistaken to suppose that the participation of Spain's Caribbean colonies in the plantation experience, though limited and uneven, did not significantly affect their contemporary character. Nevertheless, it would be equally mistaken to suppose that, because these colonies had sugarcane plantations and African slaves, their essential character was so much like that of the British, French, and Dutch colonies as to have no distinctive features of their own. Thus, for instance, it is inappropriate to refer to the Hispanic islands as an undifferentiated portion of what anthropologists have called "Afro-America." The Puerto Rican population of African origin, while ancient—the first African slaves were apparently introduced in 1510—has never bulked largely, and has always been outnumbered by people of different antecedents. The picture contrasts sharply with that in Jamaica after 1655, Saint-Domingue after 1697, or other "classic" slave-plantation islands, where massive importations of enslaved Africans were controlled by tiny minorities of Caucasian masters, few of them permanent settlers, and where this background powerfully affects the modern sociology of these societies. This is why Professor Barbosa Muñiz is justified in questioning (1964: 6–7) Lewis' assertion that Puerto Rico is "by historical fiat (part of) the West Indies." Indeed, Puerto Rico is part of the West Indies; but it is by no means a part as is, let us say, Jamaica or Haiti. In fact, the Hispanic Caribbean, while it shared certain basic historical features with that wider area of which it is a part, must also be viewed as different, according to its special historical experience. For instance, though slave-based plantations flourished early in the Hispanic islands, they also withered there at the very time when slave-plantation expansion in the Caribbean possessions of other European powers was most rapid (Mintz, 1951a, 1959, 1961a).

Furthermore, the demography of such development in the non-Hispanic islands was quite different. The populational character of the Hispanic Caribbean was much more significantly European than was true for the British, Dutch, and French islands within the area, and this difference is still apparent, and culturally significant. Other aspects of the demographic experience also set Puerto Rico and the rest of the Hispanic Caribbean somewhat apart in ethnic or cultural terms. Of the three Hispanic colonies, only Cuba underwent the experience of receiving substantial numbers of migrants differing both in culture and in national origin from its own population at the time, and then, both late and in somewhat distinctive form. In these and other ways, it must be maintained that the Hispanic Caribbean both is, and is not, similar to that of other island neighbors.

But Dr. Lewis is correct in his assertion (1963: passim) that the fundamental historical trajectory of the Caribbean as an area characterized all of the islands, and much of their neighboring mainland coast. The problem, as always, is one of separating out similarities and differences in some analytically incisive fashion.

The "Hispanic Caribbean" consists in effect of three units: The Republic of Cuba, the Dominican Republic, and Puerto Rico. The term "Hispanic" is appropriate for several reasons. The populations of these three areas are Spanish-speaking, and all three units were originally colonized by the Spaniards, remaining Spanish possessions politically until the 19th century, and substantially Hispanic in culture until the present. The peoples of all three, though to a varying degree, regard themselves as carriers of the Hispanic heritage. The Dominican Republic achieved its final political independence in 1865, after a previous period of subjection to the rule of the Republic of Haiti, and a brief reassertion of Spanish rule. Cuba remained a Spanish possession, as did Puerto Rico, until the start of this century. The historical careers of these three societies prior to 1900 were by no means uniform. But they shared significantly a common colonial experience, by virtue of Spain's metropolitan ambitions in the New World.

As has been pointed out, after the discovery of the wealth in men and metallic resources on the mainland of Middle and South America, Spanish interest in her Caribbean colonies waned. As early as 1520, newcomers to the islands and their already-established populations were more interested in finding a new life on the mainland than in maintaining the strength and development of the islands themselves. The conquest of the Aztecs, and of the Inca Empire several decades later, led to a gradual depopulation of the Hispanic Caribbean, and to a significant change in its place in the Spanish imperium; Cuba, Hispaniola and Puerto Rico were to become fueling stations and bastions along the routes of the treasure fleets, while Spanish ports on the Central American mainland—such as Cartagena and Puerto Bello—were soon to replace Havana and Puerto Rico (that is, San Juan) as entrepots of New World Spanish trade.

Thus, until the closing decades of the 18th century, the Hispanic Caribbean was to undergo a period of lengthy and almost complete isolation, while its peoples took on a distinctive Creole culture of their own. Only after about 1775 did these Spanish colonies begin to grow economically once more; in so doing, they were to repeat in many ways the colonial experiences of the Dutch, British, and French Antillean colonies which were their neighbors. At the start of this century the particular colonial histories of the Spanish colonies would diverge anew. American interest in Puerto Rico and in Cuba was much more intense than in the Dominican Republic (then Santo Domingo). Having achieved its sovereignty in 1865, Santo Domingo would remain in many ways the most authentically "Hispanic" of these three islands. Moreover, it was to remain to a large extent the most isolated of the three—thereby continuing the "social remoteness" that had been imposed on the islands as early as the opening decades of the 16th century.

The political history of these three societies has differed significantly. Santo Domingo remained a nominally sovereign country, Cuba was to achieve an equally nominal sovereignty, and Puerto Rico was to be a U.S. dependency. The cultural consequences of these distinctions are also significant; although no serious attempt will be made to spell them out in any detail here, it is correct to say that these societies are more similar culturally than sociologically.

Whether one speaks of the Spanish language, the basic rice-and-beans diet, the significance of Spanish folk Catholicism, or some other feature of the cultural scene—coffee-drinking, compadrazgo, or cock-fighting—these islands find their commonality in their cultural past, rather than in their societal or political organization. In one sense, of course, social forms are themselves part of the culture. Such an institution as compadrazgo, particular forms of courtship, and other aspects of the cultural system which are themselves linkages or articulations between cultural content and standard patterns of human relationship are simultaneously social and cultural. But it has already been pointed out that each society employs its cultural materials in sociologically and symbolically distinctive ways. Thus, for instance, while the system of compadrazgo will show certain gross uniformities, whether in Santo Domingo, Cuba, or Puerto Rico, the different societal segments of these societies use the institution in particular and different ways. Furthermore, while the populations of these three societies may regard themselves as sharing some common cultural base, they do not regard themselves as members of some single "Hispanic society," however much such a view may be espoused. Puerto Ricans do not regard themselves as sharing a common identity with Cubans, and Cubans would reject such a notion violently; Santo Domingans (or Dominicans) also view themselves as societally distinct from both Cubans and Puerto Ricans. On certain political grounds, it has been fashionable to think of these societies as forming a single segment of an articulated Hispanic past (as expressed symbolically, for instance, in Rafael Hernández' popular song, "Las Tres Hermanitas"). Anyone willing to face social and political reality, however, should be prepared to acknowledge that these three societies share only features, and that these features do not make for membership within a single human grouping on societal grounds. Cubans often manifest a poorly-concealed condescension for their Puerto Rican neighbors, and members of both societies appear to regard Santo Domingo as the most backward and "hickish" of the three. Cuba, by virtue of her size, population, and lengthy political sovereignty, surely sees itself as pre-eminent among the Hispanic Caribbean societies, and this is the way Cuba is seen by her Hispanic island neighbors. The relationship between Cuban and Puerto Rican migrants to New York—even before the coming to power of the Castro regime—make clear that the societies, while they may share much within their cultural past, view themselves differently, and both Puerto Ricans and Cubans seem prepared to agree that Cuba is the stronger and more "intact" society. In contrast to these two states, Santo Domingo enjoys a lengthier history of political sovereignty, but a more backward and isolated past. In short, while these three societies do, indeed, share much, they remain significantly different, not only in the details of their pasts, but also in the consciousness of their peoples.

The contrasts among these three societies already referred to have not dealt with those features of Puerto Rican society which set it apart from those of Santo Domingo and Cuba, but rather with those held in common. Puerto Rico and Cuba both remained Spanish colonies until 1899. Both entered into a period of plantation growth in the late 18th and early 19th centuries; both (though Puerto Rico to a much lesser extent) underwent demographic expansion through the introduction of additional slaves in the early 19th century. Finally, both fell within the sphere of expanding U.S. power at the start of this century, and each society regards itself as more advanced than its third, Hispanic neighbor. There may be some special quality to Puerto Rico's consciousness of identity, insofar as its history lacks little demonstration of a political push toward independence at all as powerful as the disturbances which long marked Cuba's career as a colonial dependency of Spain. Cuba is larger, richer, and more populous than Puerto Rico. Its leading intellectual figures have had greater access to the international scene, and have won wider recognition, on the whole. Moreover, the particular political and economic relationships which have linked each of these societies to the United States during the 20th century have differed in significant regards. Puerto Rico's ambivalence—cultural, political, and intellectual—has certain qualities which seem to distinguish it from Cuba. It will be the purpose of subsequent sections to delineate this distinctiveness in greater detail.

PART III. SOME VIEWS OF PUERTO RICAN CULTURE

One of the earliest and most eloquent attempts to identify the distinctively Puerto Rican quality of island life is Antonio S. Pedreira's classic little book of essays, "Insularismo" (1946).[2] A survey of the observations of social scientists and humanists on the problem of Puerto Rican identity can begin no more effectively than with Pedreira's gracious and honest reflections. Since its original publication, this work has become increasingly significant in the ideological dialogue, a fact that requires comment; and Pedreira's perspective itself is of great interest. As an outsider, and one too unfamiliar with the island's intellectual life to speak with assurance, the writer cannot claim that his reactions to Pedreira are in the least sense definitive; but I must take my chances.

Pedreira urges his Puerto Rican readers to be self-critical, rather than merely critical—to repudiate "that optimistic and sterile interpretation of history from which flows the arrogant belief that we are the *non plus ultra* of Caribbean peoples" (1946: 10). He insists that Puerto Rico long had been, and remains, an Hispanic colony, albeit one that had created some quality of separateness and distinctiveness within the Latin American sphere (1946: 14). In somewhat mystical and racial terms, he suggests an ambivalence or incertitude of character, originating in the divided racial ancestry of the Puerto Rican people (1946: 22–29); almost in the same breath, however, he idealizes the highlander or jíbaro, whose robustness, humorous distrust, hospitality, and high spirits ostensibly lend special flavor to the Puerto Rican identity (1946: 24–25). Pedreira tries hard to balance those characteristics of the Puerto Rican people which he regards as affirmative against those that limit growth and free expression. On the negative side, Puerto Ricans are docile—unlike, for instance, their Cuban neighbors (1946: 33)—rather too cautious, too peaceful, too resigned. They are insular and, so, insulated (1946: 45); these characteristics may be part of the disadvantages of being islanders, and inhabitants of a small and benign island at that.

Pedreira's view of Puerto Rico and the Puerto Ricans was in many regards a very contemporary view, a view of island life as he saw it in 1934. He adverts repeatedly to the powerful influences from abroad than change and even undermine traditional Puerto Rican ways, and he makes frequent reference to the culturally destructive effects of large-scale plantation expansion (1946: 47, 93, 124, etc.). In view of this, it is interesting to have him assert at the same time that economically beneficial culture change may justifiably supplant traditions that persist either for their own sake, or simply because no alternatives are available. Thus, as one minor example, the beloved hut or "bohío" of the countryside has no justification for survival if its inhabitants have the means to build houses both more stable and more comfortable in their place (p. 48). The author's view is balanced throughout. Rapid change, the loss of old ways, the emphasis on the mass product (both material and human) characteristic of North American society, disturb and sadden him. But he seems to be saying that all of this can be tolerated, if only the Puerto Rican will struggle to see what he is, and what he can be, and if only the educational system that shapes him can be made to produce individuals, and not "mediocrats" (1946: 116–117, 193 et seq.).

"Insularismo" is not what would ordinarily be called social science in North America. It is, rather, an aesthetically pleasing and insightful attempt to probe the origins and identify the features of the Puerto Rican character, and many of its assertions seem both just and valid. If one were to seek some special theme in this book, it would probably be Pedreira's concern that Puerto Rican identity was in danger of being snuffed out, almost before it had begun to take shape. He argues that the Puerto Rican people, though docile and often resigned, had at last begun to form themselves into a nation after centuries of isolation and insulation, only to be caught up in a new dependency, both material and spiritual, upon the United States. In this basic sense, Pedreira's view carries a political message. But several other observations may be useful. First, Pedreira wrote "Insularismo" at a time when the North American economic impact on Puerto Rico was most acute, and when the world economic depression was at its worse. The 1930's saw a maturation of the sugar-plantation economy, deeply disturbing in its effects upon Puerto Rican culture. A continued decline of the coffee industry which, as the most important economic pursuit of the highlands, significantly nourished the stereotyped cultural core of Puerto Rican identity. Political difficulties resulting from North American neglect, exploitation, and ignorance were matched by a parallel growth of cynical resignation and angry nationalism. In a much-quoted article Luis Muñoz Marín had written in the 1920's, the perspective of Pedreira's analysis is, perhaps surprisingly, suggested:

> Two forces appeared dramatically to precipitate a change that would perhaps have taken place anyway: a cyclone and the Americans. The cyclone of San Ciriaco wrought havoc with the coffee and tobacco plantations of the mountains, ruining a host of small landowners and centralizing the soil into fewer and mightier hands. The Americans came in the name of liberty and democracy and destroyed the liberal parliamentary government wrested from Spain by Luis Muñoz Rivera two months before the outbreak of the war; they also brought the tariff on sugar, which attracted outside and local capital to the cane-fields of the coast. Twenty-three years ago there were scattered over the island several hundred primitive sugar mills which turned out around 69,000 tons annually. In 1920 there were seventy-five modern factories, belonging for the most part to large absentee corporations, turning out six times that number of tons. That is the open glory of the colonialists. Profit has been known to surpass 100 per cent per annum, and a very large share of it leaves the island never to return. That is the secret glory of the colonialists. And even this ghastly spectacle of wealth drained from a starving population into the richest country on earth is sanctimoniously set down in the official reports as a 'favorable trade balance.'
>
> As a young editor put it to the House Committee on Insular Affairs, one of our sorest economic troubles is that we have no bananas today. We used to have a lot of them; they grew all around and could usually be had for the picking, so that they made a very important item in the common diet. And what was true

> of bananas was true of many fruits and vegetables. But sugarcane is elbowing all of these out of the soil. Now we import our staples, with the result, as Dr. Bailey K. Ashford sees it, that not even the rich are well nourished in Porto Rico.
>
> The tobacco industry is entirely under the tutelage of the American tobacco trust, and coffee-growing, the last refuge of the falling middle class, suffers from the fact that to the great coffee-drinking people of the United States, all coffees taste alike! The consequences of all this have been the attainment of certain sections of a half dozen towns to a degree of opulence seldom tasteful enough to be a public good; the proletarization of great masses of people; the debasing of a general standard of living, that was never too generous; the elimination of certain ethical checks and cultural ideals that became untenable in sweated colonies and on rafts lost at sea" (1924: 384–386).

In these brief paragraphs, Muñoz suggests well the economic and acculturational perspective from which Pedreira tries to "explan" Puerto Rico. Given the times, there is nothing but honesty in what these men have written.

One cannot know, however, what Pedreira would think of his Puerto Rico today, and this raises another, rather curious, question. Thirty-one years have passed since Pedreira wrote, and they have been years of great change for the island. It is interesting, then, that hardly anyone has apparently been moved to rethink or to reevaluate his theses, especially since the book continues to be almost Biblical in its importance to many contemporary thinkers. This, too, may be a comment on "Puertorriqueñidad," though it may be considered invidious to suggest it.

What has distinguished Pedreira's work, aside from its service as an ideological guidepost to many contemporaries, is its concern with what may be called "national character." This thorny concept has bedevilled social scientists because of its vagueness and unspecifiability; even while reading Pedreira, one is tormented by the simultaneous feelings that much of what he says is true—but entirely unprovable. A few other writers have attempted to talk about "the Puerto Rican" or the "average" Puerto Rican; one may applaud their efforts without any thoroughgoing conviction about their generalizations. Petrullo, for instance, an anthropologist, has written (1947) a general analysis of Puerto Rico distinguished for its sympathetic understanding of the people, but drawing few distinctions among different social and economic groupings in insular society. He stresses appropriately the concern with a style of life, the humanism, the preoccupation with dignity in the best sense—but deals too little with the ways these values are symbolically differentiated among different subcultures. His assertion that Puerto Ricans disdain work (1947: 30–40, 102) because of the Spanish ideal of "hidalguía" and of the opportunities in previous centuries to eke out an indolent existence in the highlands, simply does not accord with the strongly-expressed rural feeling that vigorous labor is a symbol of male virility. Much the same criticism may be made of others who have grappled with the question of what is essentially Puerto Rican. In a truly poor article, Reuter (1946) enumerates supposedly Puerto Rican characteristics in a lengthy and pejorative list that could not possibly pass as more than impressionism, and of a ludicrously ethnocentric brand at that; Puerto Ricans are traditionalistic, adolescent in their emotional attitudes, fantasy ridden, nonrelativistic, and much else—all of it bad:

> The contrasted attitudes toward life which have been pointed out by both continental and Island commentators show that the American is realistic, concise, exact, irreverent, competent, prompt and dependable; the Puerto Rican tends to be romantic, diffuse, vague, superstitious, inefficient, dilatory and unreliable. Where the American is modern, the Puerto Rican is medieval; where the American is scientific, the Puerto Rican is poetic. Where modern life and industry demand accuracy, the Puerto Rican is casual and careless; where science demands verification, the Puerto Rican guesses and improvises. The American is interested in results, the Puerto Rican is interested in poetry; the American wants facts, the Puerto Rican prefers oratory; the American reads, the Puerto Rican talks. The American is impatient with the casual attitudes of the Puerto Rican; the Puerto Rican is irritated by the exacting demands of the American (1946: 96).

More useful, and much more serious, is Saavedra de Roca's attempt to formulate a schema for the examination of the traits attributed to Puerto Rican character (1963). Her paper seeks no judgment of the realities of that character, but summarizes instead some of the significant assertions other social scientists have made with regard to the Puerto Ricans. The paper treats of such traits as dignity, individuality, personalism, family values, "machismo," and so on. Again, of course, the difficulty lies in attempting either to specify for which groups in the society the particular values hold, or to find means of confirming or disapproving the assertions themselves.

In an important paper, René Marqués (1963) elaborates a general theme originating in Pedreira's "Insularismo"—Puerto Rican "docility." His analysis is intense, assertive, provocative, but again hardly provable. Puerto Ricans are suicidal, suffer from feelings of inferiority, have authoritarian personalities. As women gain economic and social equality, men retreat from their traditional machismo and become yet more docile. The English language cows and bewilders Puerto Ricans; its acceptance is additional evidence of Puerto Rican docility. Even the Partido Independentista is docile, for it passively awaits a future it cannot produce. Marqués is pessimistic and confirmed in his beliefs by his own findings. Much of his argument hinges on the theme of a dependency relationship between the United States and Puerto Rico, and he opens new vistas to understanding this dependency. But as with others, Puerto Rico for him is an integer, and its national character some sort of undifferentiated composite of lifestyles and attitudes.

More ambitious attempts to characterize the totality of Puerto Rico in cultural terms have been made by Brameld (1959); by Saavedra de Roca (1963) and Figueroa Mercado (1963), using the published works of others; and by Seda Bonilla (1957, 1964). Child-training and socialization materials, as used by Wolf (1952), Landy (1959), and Steward's associates (Steward, 1956), lend themselves to wider generalization about Puerto Rican "culture and personality." Scholars including Lauria (1964) and Seda Bonilla (1957) have sought generalization in the ideal patterns of behavior that are meant to guide Puerto Ricans in their social interaction. These various approaches, when added to those described earlier, offer a rich body of materials to the interested reader. But any summary statement of Puerto Rican character or identity, and any attempt to describe Puerto Ricans as if their culture were homogeneous, means treading on risky ground. Among the value statements that find support in the literature are the following: the near-universal use of Spanish, and its attached sentimental significance; the meaning of Puerto Rico's distinctive character as "a Catholic country"; the underlying acceptance of a stratified society, with behavioral accompaniments attuned to near-automatic deference on the one hand, and the unchallenged exercise of authority on the other; the belief in the integrity of the individual as based upon an inner worth, unrelated to worldly status or accomplishment; a humanistic view of the world, with social values put above scientific values; a double sexual standard, with a very strong emphasis on female chastity and a belief in the natural inferiority of women; a much-elaborated set of values dealing with maleness and male authority (machismo); a reliance on shame, rather than guilt, as a source of social control, and a dependence on the opinions of others in forming and maintaining one's opinion of oneself, accompanied by a strong gregariousness and dislike of solitude and of loneliness; and a dependence on others, expressed in docility, the inability to make difficult decisions, and the unwillingness to handle problems by directly confronting them.[3]

Different in approach and perhaps somewhat more amenable to validation, are those studies which limit their findings to members of one social group, class, or subculture, or differentiate their generalizations according to differences of these sorts. The fact is that Puerto Rico has never been an entirely homogeneous society in terms of physical type, ethnic identity, or social and economic position; from its beginnings as a New World colony of Spain, the island has always had a stratified and heterogeneous social structure. While it is perfectly tenable to posit and try to identify certain values, strains of temperament, attitudes, and beliefs considered "typical" of such a society, something more may be gained by accepting the relevance of social, economic, and other distinctions to any aggregate picture of Puerto Rico. Probably the most ambitious such exercise is embodied in the work of Julian Steward and his associates (1956), but before discussing that project, several other lines of research should be mentioned. These have to do with two significant social distinctions in Puerto Rican life—distinctions that can serve as axes, so to speak, for the analysis of the wider society: race and race relations, and subcultural differences related to differences in class.

The study of race in Puerto Rico has been little advanced by social scientists. While Lewis overstates the case when he writes that, so far as the study of race and race relations are concerned, "* * * the conspiracy of silence on the part of most Puerto Ricans has been respected by the American analyst" (1963: 263), it is true that little disciplined investigation of the subject has been undertaken. Several of the most telling studies have been the pioneer analyses by Rosario and Carrión (1940) and by Blanco (1942). Largely historical in their emphases, these works have done much to set the question of color as a social issue into a wider context. Slavery in Puerto Rico, though it began very early and lasted very late, was not, on the whole, severe or economically crucial. In spite of several periods when the Negro people, both slave and free, suffered from special disadvantages imposed by repressive colonial governments, the history of the "races" of Puerto Rico has been one of gradual and relatively unburdensome assimilation. There is no need to gild the lily; slavery in the Hispanic colonies could be—and often was—as vicious as it was anywhere (Mintz, 1961b). But never did race prejudice in Puerto Rico take on the unadornedly dehumanizing quality characteristic of such areas as the United States South. An uneven economic history, a relatively weak plantation development, the presence of a universalistic religion almost as available to slaves as it was to freemen, the functioning of protective laws, and the political importance of the Creole-Spaniard distinction—all worked to ease the harshness of Puerto Rican slavery and to make manumission both accessible and frequent.

This is by no means to say that race prejudice of some kind is unknown to Puerto Rico. But such prejudice has a particular character, best understood, it seems, by reference to economic history, the relative unimportance of slavery, the nature of Hispanic colonial rule, and the presence of a single official and universal religion. Social status, not color, was the axis along which prejudice revealed itself, and this is still true to a considerable extent, although solid contemporary research on race and race relations is disappointingly sparse.

The status of the slave was clearly marked out in Spanish legal and moral philosophy long before the discovery of the New World (cf., for instance, Tannenbaum, 1947; Mellafe, 1964). In spite of a most serious and important dialog concerning the social status of the enslavable and the enslaved, which gripped Spanish thinkers for centuries (Hanke, 1949; Zavala, 1964), Hispanic colonial policy in the new colonies of the Caribbean early sustained the economic and social relevance of slavery to development. The first Negro slaves reached Hispaniola by 1510, and enslaved Africans were imported into Cuba nearly until the eve of abolition (1880), and into Puerto Rico—where slavery ended in 1873—almost as long. Díaz Soler has written definitively of the history of Negro slavery in Puerto Rico (1953), and there is no need to review his presentation here. Suffice it to say that slavery in Puerto Rico was rarely characterized by deliberate viciousness; manumission was, for most of the epoch, relatively easy; the Catholic faith was usually available to the slaves, as was the creation of relatively stable family organization; and intermarriage of persons of differing physical appearance was common. By the second decade of the 19th century, Puerto Rico had a very substantial population of freemen of "mixed" ancestry, and at no time did the number of slaves exceed that of free people. During the period of rapid plantation growth—particularly after 1815—repressive legislation became more common, revolts occurred with greater frequency, and Negro people of all statuses were degraded by the expanding plantation system (Mintz, 1951b, 1959, 1961b). But this degradation was accompanied by a parallel decline in the civil rights of the landless free creoles of all complexions, and by the implementation of repressive labor laws that disadvantaged black and white alike. The struggle for Negro rights in Puerto Rico was almost always a struggle for the civil rights of all of the poor and landless, and little happened to give the Negro people a truly separate social identity. Any discussion of contemporary race relations must proceed from this historical background.

The almost continuous genetic intermixing of the Puerto Rican people produced several effects upon race relations similar to much of the rest of Latin America. For instance, racial terminology is often euphemistic and implicit—the commonest term for "Negro", trigueño, literally means "wheat-colored." "Negrito" is a term of affection; the word "negro" is rarely used, almost never in address, and is affective rather than descriptive. Sereno, a psychiatrist, has even contended (1947) that the liberalism of Puerto Rican race attitudes is conditioned by the secret fear that every Puerto Rican's ancestry may be at least minimally African, asserting at the same time that "race fear" results in social discrimination. Another aspect of race relations in Puerto Rico is the lack of any powerful barrier or conceptual boundary separating "Negroes" from "whites." As in most of Latin America, race distinctions are viewed along some sort of multidimensional continuum—one is not "white" or "Negro" so much as differentially placed along a series of imperceptibly changing gradients. This is not to say that there are no "types"—terms such as "pardo, moreno, triste de color, indio, grifo, jabao" are still much used—but such type-terms do not seem to be attached to distinguishable social groups within the society. While lack of adequate scientific research on these matters is a serious obstacle to evaluation, it is clear that Puerto Rico is not divided into "white" and "black."

At the same time that Puerto Rican race prejudice fails to show itself in more familiar (e.g., North American) ways, such prejudice does indeed exist. It is rooted in the historical reality of slavery in Puerto Rico. On the whole, enslaved Africans were confined to the island's coastal areas, where sugarcane production was economically important. Significant concentrations of persons of prevailingly negroid phenotype are still present in such municipalities as Arroyo and Loiza (more than 50 percent), Salinas and Carolina (more than 40 percent), and Guayama and Humacoa (more than 30 percent) (Alvárez Nazario, 1961: 101–102). Admitting the relative inexactness of such calculations, it is clear that the Negro people of today are still concentrated in the areas of important plantation production in the 19th century. It follows that the majority of the people of this phenotype are members of the poorer segments of Puerto Rican society, and accordingly, of those segments with less education. Thus stated, the relationship between being Negro and being subjected to social prejudice becomes a little clearer. Rogler (1948) is probably correct in suggesting that the relatively static mobility situation for lower class persons during most of Puerto Rico's history militated against the creation of any individious distinctions based on physical type alone. Yet the same author does not suggest that race prejudice is absent on the island and, in fact, renders an important service by stressing its differential importance in different social groups.

Social prejudice of an obvious sort shows itself in some segments of the upper classes, where its baldly racial basis is firm:

> A person who has marked Negro physical characteristics and is therefore described as a Negro may have high income, great political power, and advanced education, yet on racial grounds may be excluded from the inner circles of intimate family life, Greek letter sorority or fraternity membership, and the more select social clubs. He may attend political affairs, be a guest at the governor's

> palace, and be invited to political cocktail parties, because people wish to cultivate his friendship, but he probably would not be asked to a girl's engagement party or other private functions (Steward, 1956: 424–425).

For lower class people, while race "consciousness" is indeed high, race prejudice—as North Americans conceive of it—is rare or absent.

Thus, while race consciousness and certain sorts of race prejudice do indeed function importantly in Puerto Rican social relations, these restrictive attitudes apparently do not provide a major basis for dividing up the Puerto Rican people socially. Much more important, it seems, are those distinctions which might be drawn with reference to socioeconomic position, or rather, to class.

The most ambitious social science attempt to deal with Puerto Rican society differentially—that is, in terms of distinct sociocultural segments, and their behaviors and subcultures—is embodied in the work of Julian Steward and his students, "The People of Puerto Rico" (1956). Quite unamenable to summary, this book was an attempt to produce a holistic picture of Puerto Rico by synthesizing the findings of a series of simultaneously executed community studies, each purportedly of a community roughly representative of a large segment of the Puerto Rican people. In addition, culture-historical sections and a study of the insular elite are included.

The book was, for its authors, a test of method, as well as an essay in the delineation of a national culture. Probably more persons read it for its theoretical intent than for what it had to say about Puerto Rico. Whatever one may think of this study, it did provide the first multicommunity account of the daily lives of Puerto Ricans and a wealth of information on their cultures, and it puts heavy emphasis on the societal linkages between and among groups in trying to sketch in the basis for Puerto Rican homogeneity or unity.

The analysis of the social-class structure of Puerto Rican undertaken by Steward and his students was based on the results of field findings in the communities studied; as a result, the building-blocks, so to speak, in the national class structure were observable groupings in particular settings. The authors understood that they could generalize such local findings in only a limited fashion to the national picture. In certain instances, however, the generalizability of the local findings seemed somewhat greater than in others. For instance, the grouping labeled "rural proletariat" (Mintz, 1951, 1953a, 1953b, 1956) might be regarded safely as a "national sociocultural segment," to use Steward's terminology:

> The imposition of the sugar plantation system on the south coast of Puerto Rico effected the emergence of large numbers of rural proletarian communities. In these communities the vast majority of people is landless, propertyless (in the sense of *productive* property), wage-earning, store-buying * * *, corporately

> employed, and standing in like relationship to the main source of employment. * * * The working people not only stand in like relationship to the productive apparatus but are also interacting in reciprocal social relationships with each other and subordinate social relationships to members of higher classes. * * * The commonality of class identity, stabilized over a fifty-year period, and built upon a history of pre-occupation sugar haciendas in the region, makes for a kind of cultural homogeneity. House types are limited in variety and reveal many common features. Food preferences are clear cut and strikingly uniform. * * * Similarities in life-ways among these rural working people extend to child-training practices, ritual kinship practices (not merely the Catholic system of *compadrazgo* but the particular ways in which this system is employed and standardized), political attitudes, attitudes toward the land, attitudes toward the position of women, similarities of dress, and other expressions of taste, religion, and so on (Mintz, 1935b: 140).

In other words, those Puerto Ricans who may be accurately classed as "rural proletarians" probably share considerable uniformity of behavior and of culture. They are neither "typical" Puerto Ricans, nor "average" Puerto Ricans; what may be said generally of them need not hold for the Puerto Rican people as a whole. But they do from one sort of delimitable group within the totality of Puerto Rico, and a numerically significant one.

Hopefully, the utility of a category such as "rural proletarian," when compared to the more popular but much less specific and identifiable "jíbaro," is demonstrable. As Wolf (1956a: 203) points out, jíbaro is a term defined from the vantage point of the speaker; anyone more rural or "hickish" than the speaker is "un jíbaro." City people call villagers jíbaros; villagers call those more rural than themselves jíbaros; coastal people call highland people jíbaros; and so on. Nor is it feasible to refine the definition of the term, unless specific social and economic features are to be attached to it; so far, that has not been done by social scientists in Puerto Rico.[4]

But the formulation of other, nationally valid sociocultural categories similar to that of the rural proletarian is a difficult task. In his study of a traditional coffee-producing community, Wolf (1956a: 203) formulates a schema of the rural class structure that includes the peasantry, "middle" farmers, landless agricultural workers, and hacendados. Comparable though different schemata are offered by other members of the team working under Steward. But in spite of the considerable data gathered, it was not possible to synthesize these items in order to produce anything like a complete picture of national class structure. The significance of this lack for present purposes is as follows: I have been contending that any approximation of the national culture of Puerto Rico must take account of the social and economic differentiation of the Puerto Rican people, since the lists of temperamental and attitudinal traits considered "typically Puerto Rican," while they often sound right, are quite unverifiable. It seems reasonable to suppose, moreover, that even shared behaviors and attitudes may be invested with very different symbolic meanings in different segments of the national population. Hence there is real utility in attempting to localize different social groupings within the national society, the distinctive behaviors and attitudes of which can be specified more or less precisely.

In the preparation of Steward's "People of Puerto Rico" the writer and his colleagues had to grapple with their inability to say much about Puerto Rican "national characteristics" that could be fairly attributed to all Puerto Ricans, and that could be validly demonstrated by any concrete facts:

> The characteristics which are ascribed to the "typical Puerto Rican" may be found among certain groups not only in the island but throughout Latin America. Many of the traits mentioned by Reuter and Petrullo and by other commentators on Puerto Rican culture may be distinctive of the Hispanic upper-class heritage but could not exist among the lower classes. To emphasize spiritual values and to be casual and indifferent to the exacting demands of modern life derives from the economic security of hereditary privilege; to be poetic presupposes literacy and opportunity to develop esthetic tastes; to be concerned with individualism, as in achieving political position, requires training and status in a power structure which stresses personal relations and maneuvers; to have aversion to manual labor implies a status which obviates the necessity of such labor—a status so highly valued that impoverished scions of upper classes insist upon wearing clean if threadbare white shirts and prefer poverty to the degrading task of working with their hands; to be romantic involves an idealization of women as well as an acceptance of the double standard.
>
> The tradition from which these and other characteristics of Latin American upper classes were derived has not wholly disappeared in Puerto Rico. These characteristics survive in considerable force, especially where super-ordinate and subordinate classes continue to function in a personal, reciprocal and hierarchical relationship, as on the hacienda. The tradition also survives in some degree in other segments of the population, for it represents a set of values which is deeply rooted in history and which has an obvious appeal to persons, Latin American or not, who repudiate the materialism of twentieth-century industrial society.
>
> These "national characteristics," however, are not now and have never been shared to any significant degree by the majority of Puerto Ricans and, for that matter, the majority of people throughout Latin America. Neither the native Indians, the imported slaves, the free workers, the resident laborers, the small farmers, the share-croppers, nor the artisans ever had the wealth, leisure, or power to participate to any important extent in what is so often described as typical Latin American behavior. The less affluent and less privileged groups never had to decide whether to shun manual labor in favor of upper-class preoccupations. They never had the chance to cultivate poetry and philosophy, for they were illiterate. Their esthetic tastes and ideologies were those of a folk society. They did not face the issue of whether to be materialistic, for the only life they knew was one of daily toil according to the culturally prescribed standards and requirements of their status. If they were hospitable, they were so within the framework of a system of personalized relations, but their hospitality lacked the lavishness possible among the upper classes.

> The traditional Hispanic upper-class patterns have been changing under the impact of an industrial society. They have been influenced by new forms of commercial development and they are being affected by close contacts with, and even extended residence in, the United States. New middle classes have emerged in Puerto Rico, and the members of these groups are striving for life goals not unlike those of the upper classes. But there are still important distinctions between the lifeways of the differing socioeconomic segments of the population. Education and mass media of communication, the radio, newspapers and the like, have by no means leveled subcultural differences. Nor would these [influences] in themselves be capable of doing so even if they were extended somewhat more equitably among the different segments than is presently the case.
>
> In short, the features which are labeled 'typically Puerto Rican' generally apply to those groups which have had the means to perpetuate the Hispanic upper-class tradition, and/or to those who have been able to utilize education and other forms of communication to the fullest, and/or to those who have access to the outside world and are in a position to maintain standards of living appropriate to *new* sets of values (Steward, 1956: 490–491).

These arguments may lead to a methodological impasse. On the one hand, generalities concerned with what is "characteristically Puerto Rican," while often having the ring of truth, do not readily lend themselves to scientific verification. On the other, statements concerned with the typical or representative attitudes of various groups or socioeconomic classes in the society, while perhaps more amendable to test and confirmation, are not readily generalized to the society as a whole. Earlier, it was asserted that what is unique about Puerto Rico probably inheres largely in the social structure of the society, rather than in its cultural content. According to this assertion, a society such as Cuba or the Dominican Republic may share a very substantial part of its culture with Puerto Rico, but the structures of these three societies are distinguishably different. It is worth attempting to suggest what may make Puerto Rican societal structure distinctive.

Most useful for initiating such an exploration would be an up-to-date analysis of Island society comparable to that carried out by Steward's students in 1948–49 and published in 1956. Social and economic change in the past decade has been extremely rapid and thoroughgoing but information on such change remains scattered and sparse. We know that such phenomena as emigration, industralization, increased productivity (and its effects on income levels), and much improved media of communication and transportation have intensified many currents of change already operative nearly twenty years ago when Steward's students began their work. Even census data (for 1950 and 1960) give powerful evidence of change. For instance, the category for male professional and technical workers shows a 58.7 percent increase between 1950 and 1960; the comparable category for females a 58.6 percent increase. At the same time, the category of farmers and farm managers (male) shows a 50.6 percent decrease in the same period, and that of farm laborers and unpaid family workers an 83.7 percent decrease. Even more recent, and more telling, are figures given in an advance report on the Labor Department's study of family income of working families (1963). The average income went from $1,717 per family in 1953 to $3,314 in 1963, an improvement of 93 percent. In 1953, while only 9.4 percent of families made $2,000 or more per year, in 1963 49.3 percent of all families are earning $2,000 or above. Over longer time periods, the data are even more striking. In 1941, 80 percent of all families made less than $500 yearly; in 1963, only 2.3 percent of all families made less. In the absence of sociological data on the members of these categories, all one can do is suggest strongly that important atitudinal changes undoubtedly attach to the changes in the categories themselves.

It should surprise no one that the many inferences made in the press concerning such changes have usually lacked adequate sociological data to back them up. For those who have viewed modernization, industrialization, and economic change as mere reflexes of a general process of "Americanization," the trend has been downhill so far as Puerto Rican culture and identity are concerned. For those others who see such changes as beneficial to the people of Puerto Rico, the concrete benefits far outweigh any cultural "losses." But, again, neither view locates itself adequately in the facts, for the necessary research simply has not been done.

In a report on a brief visit to a rural proletarian South Coast community (Mintz, 1965), I attempted to sketch in some of the direct implications of recent economic change for local people, and was able to add my findings to those of the Puerto Rican sociologist José Hernández Alvárez, who worked in a neighboring village in the same barrio several years ago. The results of the economic changes themselves are readily seen and represent a general upward movement in earning power, followed by changes in consumption, aspirations, and expectations. So far as culture content is concerned, it is clear that North American culture items have supplanted other, more traditional items, though the process is more one of adition than of replacement. As Hernández Alvárez points out (1964: 143–157), changes in economic position have also begun to fragment the rural proletarian subgroup into higher and lower sectors, each marked by certain characteristic attitudes. The homogeneity in values that I discovered in the same community in 1948–49 has begun noticeably to give way to new internal distinctions of value and attitude, though admittedly little reliance can be put on information collected so impressionistically and on so brief a visit. At least one can contend that sociocultural change may indeed take place at extremely rapid rates, even though we lack sufficient evidence of the impact of such change on the ideologies of different groups in Puerto Rico. At the time that I carried out fieldwork on the South Coast in 1948–49, it was my feeling that emigration provided the only significant means by which rural proletarians could substantially change their life-chances, their culture, and thereby their value system. But in less than two decades, much of life has changed among these people, to judge by an admittedly brief revisit. Changes in other segments of the national population, as indicated by census statistics, the growth of new sorts of middle-class groupings, and some research findings (cf., for instance, Rogler, 1965: 34–36) do not prove that the elusive phenomenon called Puerto Rican "national character" is now different (or more "deteriorated", as some critics might say), but I believe that they argue for such a position.

In the preceding pages, I have tried to present in brief form some of the atempts by scholars of Puerto Rico to identify and describe Puerto Rican culture and identity. It will be seen that writers have approached this theme from numerous different perspectives. For some observers, the aim has been to localize certain widely held attitudes of values that supposedly typify the Puerto Rican people as a whole. For others, this objective seems impossible of attainment, at least insofar as an operational tests of validity are concerned, and differential group values (as expressed in different subcultures) need first to be delineated. I have attempted to suggest that any characterization of the Puerto Rican people on grounds of shared culture elements or culture complexes is likely to remain rather weak, because of the significant social, economic, and subcultural differentiation of the population. Though this assertion is surely open to criticism, it is advanced precisely in order to elicit contrary claims.

Part IV. Conclusions

Throughout this report, it has been contended that the term "culture" has been used carelessly and unreflectively by many students of Puerto Rico. An attempt has been made here to distinguish between "culture" as a term applying to the esthetic product of an elite, and as an anthropological category covering all of the learned social and symbolic behavior of the members of a society, and its consequences. It is also necessary to differentiate what might be called "national character" or "national characteristics" from the variant sets of behaviors and values typifying different social segments of the same polity. Thus, on the one hand, one must seperate out the esthetic products of a literate, historically conscious minority from those of "the people," widely conceived; on the other, one must distinguish those widely held "Puerto Rican" traits from those marking special groups or classes within the total society.

It should be plain enough that, while one may regard the novels of a Laguerre and the "plenas" and "décimas" of the countryside as fitting with equal justification within Puerto Rican culture, they represent very different aspects of that culture, and are to a large extent mutually exclusive aspects. Similarly, while there may be some grounds for claiming that disdain for manual labor, for example, is an historically determined "Puerto Rican" cultural attitude, it must be noted that this would definitely not be true for many, or possibly even most, Puerto Ricans. Finally, what goes by the label of "Puerto Rican national characteristic"—for instance, the speaking of Spanish, or a sexual double standard—may not only fail to hold for everyone, but in all likelihood has very different symbolic connotations in different social segments of the national society.

These qualifications should suggest the difficulties that one faces in seeking to treat Puerto Rican culture as if it were some sort of concrete undifferentiated entity. Nor is the problem in any way a uniquely Puerto Rican one; few are the social scientists so blithe and confident as to deal with greater assurance in the case of French culture, Russian culture, or North American culture. The fact is that modern nations do not lend themselves readily to holistic analyses of this sort, and the layman's notions about national character rarely find confirmation in the work of social scientists, no matter how convincing such notions may seem. "German" authoritarianism, "French" romanticism, and "English" doggedness may be delightful conversational counters for many observers, but no one has been truly successful in transforming such imputations into solid social science facts.

If any basis at all is to be discovered for formulations of this sort, I believe it will probably be located in one of four spheres of inquiry: social history; value-categories; socialization and child-training patterns; or "social idioms." Numerous attempts have been made to etch in some national identity—Russian, for instance, or French, or Mexican—by appeals to one or another of these four kinds of data. In the case of Puerto Rico, those few attempts that have been made to spell out the essentially Puerto Rican have not been conspicuously successful, though I have tried in this report to refer to the findings of some studies directed to this end.[5] One is left with the feeling that, if there are genuinely distinctive character traits or values we may confidently call Puerto Rican, they are extremely hard to enumerate and harder yet to corroborate by social science methods.

We have seen that Puerto Rican society was propelled in a special direction by the lengthy isolation that ensued after the discovery of the Mexican mainland (1519), and that continued almost unabated until the very start of the 19th century. During this period, Puerto Rico was effectively controlled by a small military bureaucracy, Spanish rather than creole in identity, and little involved in the problems of Puerto Rican development. The rural population included persons of heterogeneous genetic and cultural origins, who adapted to life on the island's "internal frontier" by maintaining a substantial detachment from public affairs of any kind. It was because of these rural highland folk that there originated the image of the jíbaro—unletered, laconic, shrewd, shy to the point of seeming semi-feral, and "unspoiled". Although slavery was important at various times between 1510 and 1815, it did not become the major basis for economic activity as in the non-Hispanic Antilles, nor did race emerge as a basic social assortative device. The insular social structure, however, was marked by a clear separation between the urbanite and the countryman and between the Spaniard and the creole.

It is important to keep in mind at the same time that the bulking rural population did not preserve Spanish folk culture in some state of unchanged 16th-century purity, as has sometimes been suggested. Many features of the Spanish heritage were sloughed off or supplanted in the Puerto Rican rural setting, and other cultures—Amerind, African, and non-Hispanic European—contributed to the growth of a particular Puerto Rican rural subculture. Though certain parallel processes occurred in Cuba, Santo Domingo and elsewhere, Puerto Rico, like any other society, has had its own unique cultural history.

After 1800, the social structure of the island changed more sharply, especially as the development of the slave-based plantation system was accelerated. Slavery and foreign immigration grew, and commercial expansion replaced the military emphasis that had dominated Puerto Rico's position in the Spanish imperial system. Early pioneers in commerce, whose main concern at the start of the 19th century was to win economic concessions from the Crown, soon became more concerned with the extraction of labor effort from the rural population of the island; both slavery and forced labor were encouraged by the concessions of 1815 (Fernández Méndez, 1959). In other words, once the Crown agreed to permit rapid economic development in the island, Puerto Rico entrepreneurs separated themselves ideologically and by identity from their less privileged countrymen, in the quest for higher profits and swifter economic growth. A sense of Puerto Rico nationality, utterly dormant in the 18th century, was stunted anew, as the plantation system expanded, and free but landless countrymen, white and colored alike, were forced into plantation labor.

After 1850, Spanish controls over Puerto Rican economic activities were intensified once more, leading to the growth of a more nationalistic sentiment among national leaders. Divisions in political view had appeared in the struggle over abolition, with the newer hacendado group more anxious to maintain slavery than the older, more powerful plantation owners. Further divisions, between Spaniards and creoles, also became sharper as questions concerning Puerto Rico's future political status began to be asked. Even earlier, in the 1830's, the United States had begun to emerge as an important potential market for Puerto Rican products, and the inescapable presence of the "Colossus of the North" inevitably influenced Puerto Rican political thinking. More and more, after 1850, Puerto Rican political opinion failed to divide simply into two camps—for Spain, or for autonomy—and the political issues were complicated by the differing stakes of various groups on the island. There were those fundamentally loyal to Spain and essentially accepting of Puerto Rico's dependent status under the Crown; there were those others who desired greater autonomy, the abolition of slavery, and a stronger orientation to the United States; finally, there were the separatists, who sought in varying degrees an autonomous or independent Puerto Rico.

In the late 19th century, beginning with the active struggle for abolition, there emerged the first clear expression of political nationalism in Puerto Rico. It was related to the continued dominance of Spaniards in all administrative circles, to the differential favorable treatment accorded Spaniards in contrast to creoles, and to the rapid economic gains in island economic life of capital-holding Spanish mercantile groups. To a great extent, Puerto Rican entrepreneurs and businessmen had been unable to maintain the economic momentum of the early 19th century, since neither sugar nor coffee had been continuously lucrative, and the island had come to depend heavily upon Spanish merchant capitalists and banks. In the closing decades of the 19th century, the barriers between creoles and Spaniards became sharper, and political repression of creole separatists grew. Though the weakening of Spanish overseas strength made possible the political reforms of 1897, these reforms were immediately terminated by North American rule.

The saga of Puerto Rican growth after 1897 is too well known to require much repetition here. Decades of governmental neglect were accompanied by a frighteningly rapid expansion of North American large-scale economic interests. By the onset of the world depression, Puerto Rico had become a plantation colony par excellence, with all of the worst features of absentee imperialism. It is surely worth remarking that, no matter how strongly this is stated, very few North American scholars of Puerto Rico will take issue with it, for there is precious little to argue about. Puerto Rico thus became an outstanding example of that rare phenomenon, undisguised North American colonialism and economic imperialism.

The cultural effects of North American rule likewise require no documentation here. Significant institutional changes, most important being the ambiguous political incorporation of the island into the North American system, were accompanied by the introduction of English as the language of instruction, and the growth of transportation, communication, and health systems of a more modern sort. While it is commonly supposed that the cultural impact was felt most sharply in urban centers and among members of the more privileged classes, the plantation system introduced widespread societal and cultural changes in rural areas, particularly along the sugar coasts (Mintz, 1960). To the extent that culture change depended mainly on improved buying power, it was within the urban middle and upper classes that the North American impact might be most easily witnessed, but in some regards, social and cultural change was even more dramatic and thoroughgoing among rural working people. Nor should it be forgotten that continued change among Puerto Rican working folk has often consisted of a taking-on of cultural items and practices already well established among middle class and upper class elements in the cities. (Surely those who most loudly bemoan the extirpation of Puerto Rican culture in the countryside should notice that they themselves are much more Americanized in their styles of life than the country folk—and that the Americanization of the country folk largely consists of taking on the consumption norms of their urban class betters.)

After 1940, some of the most nakedly exploitative elements in the North American hegemony were eliminated or reduced in importance, while the issue of political status was, for most Puerto Ricans, left to one side. The electoral strength of the Popular Democratic Party grew steadily during the 1940's, and to some extent the party ideology and membership changed, as power became more firmly institutionalized. In recent years, the issue of status has been quite vigorously revived, though electoral results continue to give the Popular Party position unmatched support.

Changes since 1940 have clearly brought more and more Puerto Ricans into intimate contact with North America, through migration, expansion of mass media, increasing education, and the implicit acceptance of the majority party's position on continued political association. Not only have many Puerto Ricans settled in the mainland United States or worked there for lengthy periods, thus familiarizing themselves with North American culture and values, but also the number of North Americans who visit or live in Puerto Rico has risen substantially. It can be asserted that the influence of North American culture was less before 1940, even though the exploitative elements in North American control were sharper in those years.

The way Puerto Ricans regard their present cultural status varies significantly, according to the ways in which they participate in all of these recent changes. It is my impression that the problem of cultural identity is not felt acutely by working class persons—an assertion which is not, however, based on reliable up-to-date sociological or anthropological study. Working people in Puerto Rico have been exposed to North American influences for over half a century, but until the 1940's these influences only slowly affected their ability to assimilate new cultural forms. In the highlands of Puerto Rico, North American cultural influences consisted largely of increasing pressure toward migration to the coasts, as the plantation economy expanded and the peasant economy contracted. Traditional highland culture and social forms were "collapsed" by this pressure, however. In coastal areas, such influences were felt through the imposition of the plantation regimen itself: wage labor replaced payment in kind; standardized work rules replaced personalistic affiliations; store-bought consumers' goods replaced homegrown foods; more modern medical services replaced traditional herbal remedies; and so on. But since real incomes remained extremely low, what I would call "consumer-based acculturation" was slow.

During World War II and after, higher worker incomes, electrification, roadbuilding, military service, the rise in emigration, rural industrialization, and a new level of political activity and consciousness began to effect much more basic changes in working class styles of life. Since about 1950, these changes have come with increasing rapidity, and my report on Barrio Jauca (Mintz, 1965), when taken in conjunction with earlier work (Mintz, 1951a, 1953b, 1960; Steward, 1956) suggests, at least minimally, just how rapid and thoroughgoing such changes have become. Nevertheless, I must repeat that, to a very considerable extent, changes in life-style among rural working people seem to consist in large part of a taking-on of forms which have long been standard among the urban middle classes of Puerto Rico, and that "Americanization" or the "destruction of Puerto Rican culture" in this case consists in good degree of a continuation of what is by now an established process in other segments of Puerto Rican society.

It is, of course, a different matter for urban folk and members of the middle classes generally. These are people who, if they have been of middle class status for more than 20 years, have been long practicing those very forms of behavior they may now deplore as they spread among poorer rural folk. To the extent that this is true, I find it difficult to see why it is more tragic for rural workers to give up the décima for rock-and-roll than it is for urban middle class persons to give up the danzas of Morel Campos for either rock-and-roll or the music of Pablo Casals. However, that rock-and-roll is inexorably supplanting the décima is undeniable, it seems to me, and this musical form is American—as any Englishman, Frenchman, or Russian can prove. It is difficult to avoid thinking that certain segments of the middle class, at least, feel themselves better prepared than their lower class compatriots to sift out the "socially good" from the "socially bad" in North American culture. If so, one is tempted to wonder how, were Puerto Rico politically sovereign (as it surely has every right to be, should its citizens so desire), those who know what is better for others would organize a democratic society in which the "socially good" opinions would prevail.

It is clear why cultural ambivalence might be stronger among the middle class elements of Puerto Rican society. Cultural "self-consciousness" is obviously more acute when education serves to deepen one's sense of affiliation to an abstract ideology of identity. Middle class Puerto Ricans, at least in superficial ways, often exaggerate their awareness of the norms, beliefs, and attitudes of their lower class fellow citizens. Though they are sometimes prepared to admit as much—no anthropologist who has worked in the Puerto Rican countryside has missed the experience of having at least one Puerto Rican university colleague admit that he controlled fewer facts about the rural sector than the anthropological stranger—the feeling inevitably persists that only a Puerto Rican can know Puerto Rico, no matter what the individual experiences of the claimant. The assertion is, paradoxically, both true and false. Middle class North Americans would of course react in precisely the same way to the statements of a foreign anthropologist who had worked intimately in the American countryside. Yet any honest North American—anthropologists emphatically included!—would also know that a foreign social scientists who had, for instance, worked in an obscure western or midwestern hamlet for a year or two might know at least as much about the culture of the people there, as he himself would know simply by virtue of being North American.

These statements do nothing, however, to diminish the difficulties of presenting a coherent picture of a unitary Puerto Rican culture. It is possible to list a series of adjectives ("docile," "resigned," "tolerant"), of culture traits (décimas, baquines, coffee-drinking, the speaking of Spanish), of institutional subsystems (compadrazgo, noviazgo), of widely-held attitudes and values expressed in language and in social behavior (machismo, personalismo, respeto, relajo), but I do not believe we are able at this time to describe an undifferentiated totality called "Puerto Rican culture."

Puerto Rico's particular history has given rise to a peculiar and unique set of social and economic classes and interest groups. Its political and economic dependence upon the United States has informed and seriously affected the beliefs and behaviors of members of these groups. The processes set in motion by the North American hegemony have continued to operate, and at accelerated speeds in recent decades. Emigration, industrialization, and economic growth have differentially changed the composition of the various groups and classes that make up the society, and have introduced new values and new value-conflicts. Underlying these processes, however, many observers would contend that there exists some ill-defined ideological core that still governs each individual Puerto Rican's characteristic "pitch" or "set" with regard to his identity. In discussing another "Latin" society, Mexico, Eric Wolf has written:

> It seems possible to define 'national character' operationally as those cultural forms or mechanisms which groups involved in the same overall web of relations can use in their formal and informal dealings with each other. Such a view need not imply that all nationals think or behave alike, nor that the forms used may not serve different fuctions in different social contexts. Such common forms must exist if communication between the different constituent groups of a complex society are to be established and maintained (1956b: 1075).

This suggestion may prove most useful in saying more about what is distinctively Puerto Rican and, in at least some sense, "common" to the Puerto Rican people, than anything else. But the careful research necessary to put it to the test largely remains to be done. One might expect that more work along these lines [one such pioneering paper, I believe, is that of Lauria (1965)], will not so much prove that there is a Puerto Rican identity or national character, so much as analyze how such character or identity works. From this perspective, much that has been said about the problem of identity is largely irrelevant, unless it proceeds from the interpretation of concrete statements and behaviors of the Puerto Rican people themselves. Such an insistence on empiricism will, of course, be regarded by some as a merely inevitable consequence of the writer's North American cultural identity, but surely social science proof will have to consist of more than a series of statements that "sound right."

The issue is complicated by the rapid change that has marked Puerto Rican life in the past quarter of a century. As more and more Puerto Ricans acquire an education, migrate to the United States (often to return), increase their buying power and their consumer choices, acquire new aspirations for themselves and their children, and begin to get a better sense of the wider world, the impact on Puerto Rican culture—however we try to approximate it—is one of inevitable change. The island is not a separate society in the same sense as an independent country with a long sovereign career; United States control and closeness has had the effect, to some degree, of making Puerto Rico a part of itself. The "web of relations" to which Wolf refers in discussing national character now frequently includes North Americans as well as Puerto Ricans. We cannot discuss Puerto Rico as if its relationship with the United States up to this time had had no effect on the Puerto Rican people, or assume that political change can be initiated from a baseline of 1900. Puerto Rico, in other words, is as it is, not as it was a half a century ago. Nothing can restore it to its cultural condition at that time, not even total and thoroughgoing isolation from the United States. Some may bemoan this assertion, but I believe it to be quite inarguable.

The various changes have had different effects on individuals and on socioeconomic groups. For some, they have stiffened the resistance to change and to outside influence, while for others they have heightened the eagerness for yet more change. Probably the more change-oriented persons are to be found principally among highly acculturated upper class groups, and among those of the very poor who have achieved a significantly higher standard of living as a result of recent changes. The growing middle classes, consisting often of service purveyors, government employees, university folk, and small-scale merchants, probably manifest the widest variety of different opinions concerning their culture, and may very well be those most ambivalent about the directions of change. All of this, however, is still in the realm of supposition, since the necessary research to test it also remains to be done.

I have tried here to expose the difficulties implicit in attempting to formulate a picture of Puerto Rican culture as some undifferentiated entity. Where possible, information has been given on some of those features of Puerto Rican life that are commonly regarded as part of a "national culture." At the same time, I have sought to show that our ability to generalize from these features is quite strictly qualified by the social, economic, and ideological complexity of Puerto Rican life. I recognize that this approach has left us without an entirely satisfactory answer to the question of Puerto Rican culture and national identity. I hope at least that it has suggested why, to some extent, the question itself needs to be asked in markedly different ways.

APPENDIX A

The following appendix is, except for a few minor additions and a brief concluding summary, the work of Mrs. Jane Collier, a Harvard graduate student in anthropology. It is an attempt to derive a profile of Puerto Rican values by the application of the Kluckhohn Binary

Value Categories to published materials on the Puerto Rican people. Since it is based wholly on such published materials, it is of course no stronger or more consistent than its sources; nevertheless, I felt it would be useful to have Mrs. Collier attempt just such an application.

The Kluckhohn schema was developed in order to obtain general ratings or scores for different societies, based on some weighing of attitude and belief. It consists of a series of polar terms or categories, against which information on a particular society may be checked off. In the following pages, each category is named and described; the derived value imputed by the scorer to Puerto Rican culture is then given in underlined capitals, and comments and quotes are marshalled from the sources employed, to substantiate the scoring. Thus, for instance, the first category is "Determinate-Indeterminate, with reference to the Supernatural." People are believed to see the supernatural world either as primarily orderly and consistent, or as primarily whimsical and capricious. Criteria for these contrasting positions are listed, a value attributed to the Puerto Ricans, and the relevant findings of social scientists who have worked in Puerto Rico are noted.

Mrs. Collier was not able to make a complete survey of the literature; this would have been an enormous task, and the addition of many more materials would not have guaranteed by itself any more reliable result. Still, certain consistencies do emerge. Mrs. Collier also stressed that her work was probably influenced to some extent by her previous experience with the method. All the same, I believe the findings may be of genuine interest.

DETERMINATE—INDETERMINATE: Supernatural

Description:

Determinate	*Indeterminate*
People see the supernatural world as an orderly world where supernatural events are either predictable to a certain extent, or are consistent with some system of lawful order.	People see the supernatural world as one of chance or caprice, where unpredictability or inconsistency predominates.

Criteria:

1. Supernatural beings have clearly defined roles, functions or positions.	1. The positions of supernatural beings or their roles are poorly defined.
2. The religious system is in a highly integrated and internally consistent conceptual scheme.	2. The religious system is poorly integrated.
3. The gods act reasonably, orderly or lawfully. They have regular habits.	3. The gods have irregular habits or act equivocally or are voluntaristic and capricious.

Ranking: DETERMINATE

The supernatural world is basically that of the Catholic church, which is very highly structured. People realize that there is order, even if they do not understand all the theological details. The Protestant sects also see the supernatural world as Determinate. The only major conflicting view is that of the spiritualists, but even the spirits they deal with seem to be subject to "laws." Seda Bonilla (1964: 79–80) notes that at death the spirit of the deceased is left in an innocent and vulnerable state, so that it can be tricked (by magical devices) into performing witchcraft. These spirits do not act by chance or caprice. They are specifically directed by humans to perform the acts they do.

DETERMINATE—INDETERMINATE: Social

Description:

Determinate	*Indeterminate*
The social world is orderly. Man's roles are well-defined, unambiguous and social behavior is consistent or viewed as consistent.	The social world contains elements of uncertainty or instability. People sometimes behave inconsistently or are viewed as behaving inconsistently.

Criteria:

1. Prestige, class, wealth, and power roles are clearly defined. The patterns of other roles are stable and unambiguous.	1. Differences of prestige, wealth, class, leadership are variable, or are not clearly defined. Other roles are flexible, subject to change, or are ambiguous.
2. The society is strongly unified and organized.	2. The society is very loosely organized.
3. People have regular habits. Their living patterns are highly structured.	3. People have irregular habits. They live spontaneously.

Ranking: DETERMINATE

Reuter, 1946. Puerto Ricans are not socially mobile. Traditional ways are deeply embedded. The body of class sentiments lives on.

Landy, 1959: 51. "From birth the child is inculcated with the expectations and duties of his parents' class."

Manners, in Steward, 1956: 144–145. "Since all societies demand specific kinds of reciprocal relationships among their various members, the Tabara infant learns early the kind of behavior which is considered appropriate to him and to other members of the society. He is taught both by precept and example what are the proper responses to other children and to adults of both sexes and all economic and social levels. At the same time he learns the prescribed kinds of behavior required of him toward all other people in most possible situations. * * * He learns, too, that his own position is not inevitably immutable, not forever determined by the accident of birth, but that he or anyone else may actually move up in the social hierarchy and, as he does so, alter the respect relationships between himself and all others."

Seda Bonilla, **1964: 116.** **Liberty is feared because it is taken to mean chaos where each does what he pleases.**

The Puerto Rican world seems basically determinate. Class roles are well defined, and while a person's class may vary with his wealth, there is little ambiguity about what kind of behavior a particular status demands. This may be breaking down now, however, because of a proliferation of statuses as new jobs and positions are created which do not readily fit into the old hierarchy. A man in such a new position may be in doubt as to what type of behavior he should exhibit. But basically the Puerto Ricans seem to want an orderly world in which behavior is regulated by social norms.

GOOD—EVIL: Supernatural

Description:

Good	*Evil*
Supernatural beings are mostly supportive and good. They are more benevolent than malevolent.	Supernatural beings are austere, dangerous, or malicious. They are basically evil.

Criteria:

1. Good aspects of the principal supernatural beings predominate over the bad ones. They are more helpful than harmful.	1. The principal supernatural beings are more evil and fear-inspiring than supportive or friendly.
2. Supernatural beings actively intervene to aid humans.	2. Supernatural beings actively intervene to punish or harm humans.
3. Some supernaturals specialize in helping humans and are more prominent than those supernaturals which may specialize in doing harm.	3. Some supernaturals specialize in doing harm to humans, and are more prominent than those supernaturals which may help humans.
4. People have feelings of affection for some supernaturals.	4. People have few feelings of affection for supernaturals.

Ranking: GOOD

Wolf in Steward, 1956: 214. "The saints are said to guard the household. At regularly spaced intervals the household offers certain goods to the saint, who is expected to reciprocate by furnishing the household with luck and prosperity."

Seda Bonilla, 1964: 79. The spirits of the dead are left innocent right after death.

Mintz in Steward, 1956: 408. ". . . local conversation about witchcraft and sorcery is mainly trivial."

The saints intervene to help men and they are the most important supernatural beings, at least to the lower classes. Even the spirits of the dead which can be manipulated by evil people are good and innocent if left alone. I found no evidence that any emphasis was placed on the devil or on evil spirits.

BUT:

Padilla Seda in Steward, 1956: 308, makes reference to some use of, and belief in, black magic, in the north coast sugarcane community she studied, and relates this to a high local level of insecurity. Steward's other associates found very little supporting material in other communities.

GOOD—EVIL: Social

Description:

Good	*Evil*
Human nature is viewed as being basically good.	Human nature is viewed as being basically evil.

Criteria:

Good	*Evil*
1. People are regarded as good until proven evil.	1. People are regarded as evil, until proven good.
2. People prefer to be trusting rather than suspicious.	2. People are highly suspicious, mistrustful, skeptical.
3. People are conceived as responsive and friendly.	3. People conceived of as unresponsive, dishonest, aggressive, predominantly evil or hostile.

Ranking: GOOD—EVIL

Brown, 1964: 49. People distrust others. They have fears of being exploited. Most people doubt that man is by nature cooperative.

Landy, 1959: 246. The male's desire for trust is often frustrated, which leads to a distrust of others.

Seda Bonilla, 1964: 113. People fear being tricked. They learn early not to trust appearances or to trust anybody.

BUT:

Brown, 1964: 48. People "see themselves as being generous, always willing to help their neighbors."

Human nature is conceived of as variable. There is some good because people see themselves as such and in their continual efforts to set up relationships "de confianza" they are trying to find others as good as themselves. Everyday life, however, seems to prove that people are out to exploit and trick one another, but the individual nevertheless goes on trying to find a friend worthy of "confianza" because of his own basic needs. Insofar as others fail to live up to the ideal, the individual is forced back into his belief about the faithlessness of men. Finally, all of these data come only from the lower classes; perhaps the upper classes believe more in the goodness of man.

RETIRING—GREGARIOUS

Description:

Retiring	*Gregarious*
People can be alone, can withdraw from time to time and do not need the presence of other people. Solitude is valued just as much as sociability.	People like to associate with others as much as possible. Social participation is emphasized. There is a constant desire for company and group activities. The individual may be forced to participate in social activities.

Criteria:

Retiring	*Gregarious*
1. Enjoyment of privacy.	1. Avoidance of solitude.

Ranking: GREGARIOUS

***Rogler*, 1940: 179.** "If a Comerieño is alone, he is very likely to be lonesome or, as he describes it, *triste*. If he is not lonesome when alone, he is likely to be considered 'peculiar.' Activities conducted in privacy are unpopular. Comerio is 'full of life,' and public life at that."

INDIVIDUAL—GROUP

Description:

Individual	*Group*
Emphasis on the rights of the individual.	Emphasis on the duties of citizenship, or on the duties of the individual for the group.
The individual is given priority. *Obligations are mainly to the self.*	The collectivity is given priority. *Obligations are mainly to society,* the extended family, or other groups.
Collectivities are a means to the ends of individuals, and there is little or no subjugation of self interests.	Individuals are a means to the ends of some collectivity. Subjugation of self interests to group or institutional interests.

Ranking: INDIVIDUAL

***Lewis*, 1963: 248–9.** People in the professions see their new status less as an opportunity to serve the public than as an avenue to personal advancement. They exhibit little sense of social obligation.

***Wolf in Steward*, 1956: 207.** There is a cooperative labor exchange system among poor farmers.

208. "All these relationships take place between equals and demand the exchanges of equivalent values in symmetrical fashion. Their performance is socially valuable, and the man who performs them carefully is rewarded with prestige. The exchange complex has given rise to an image of the ideal neighbor. He is a person who offers his services willingly, who sends meat to his neighbors whenever an animal is slaughtered in his house, who arranges to have the women of his household take care of a neighbor's house when the woman there is in labor and who gives readily of his resources and his knowledges. At the same time, he is expected to be 'shrewd' (listo). He must make sure that he does not give out more in the long run than he receives."

***Rogler*, 1940: 60.** "Mutual aid is an intraclass, not an interclass phenomenon, and its economic importance among the poor cannot be overemphasized."

***Rogler*, 1940: 61.** "The survival of large numbers of families is dependent upon aid received from neighbors."

***Mintz in Steward*, 1956: 366.** "The maintenance of good relationships with one's face-to-face associates is one of the best local guarantees of security, and thrift is not valued highly in the barrio."

***Seda Bonilla*, 1964: 116.** People fear to have anything because others will accuse them of not helping those in need. People try to have nothing, to be nothing.

***Landy*, 1959: 49–50.** "It is not unusual for lower-class persons to perform services free for middle and upper class members because this is their trabajo de compromiso (work of obligation)."

This category shows quite a range of behavior in Puerto Rico, especially among the lower classes. The middle and upper classes seem to be more inclined to be individual, with obligations primarily to the self and the immediate nuclear family. Their emphasis is on getting ahead or at least maintaining position. This is not to say that they don't acknowledge obligations to more distant relatives and to compadres, but such obligations are probably dropped if they become too burdensome or are a social liability.

The situation in the lower classes is far more complex. In very traditional communities such as that described by Wolf, 1956a, the individual forms part of an extensive network of rights and obligations. Proper performance of one's role leads both to prestige and to security. More or less the same thing is true in Comerío where it is recognized that cooperation is necessary to life. But in both these cases there is the strong underlying feeling that cooperation with the group in the end benefits the self. This is even more strongly recognized in Cañamelar, where cooperation is seen as a guarantee of security for the individual. But the situation has been turned upside down in Tipán as seen by Seda Bonilla, 1964. There, the mutual obligations have become a burden to the self, and individuals try to escape from their duties.

There is also a system of rights and obligations between classes, with the upper classes dispensing patronage and the lower classes providing services. Again, proper performance of one's role eventually benefits the self.

Puerto Rico is very interesting in this category because, while there is a great deal of cooperation entailing many obligations which are performed willingly, people nevertheless still see the collectivity as a means to the ends of the individuals.

(I am not very happy with the score on this category. I feel that I was forced into a score of "Individual" by the statements that I quoted above. But I still wonder if the American ethnographers who made the statements were perhaps overestimating the individual advantage derived from cooperation.—J. C.)

SELF—OTHER

Description:

Self	*Other*
Self concern predominates.	Emphatic concern for other people predominates.

Criteria:

Self	*Other*
1. Lack of concern over friendships or affectionate relationships.	1. Concern over maintaining or establishing warm friendships and affectionate relationships.
2. No concern for others in sickness or difficulties.	2. Pity, compassion, consolation of others in sickness or difficulty.

Self	*Other*
3. Extortion from others, exploitation of others, taking advantage of people.	3. Unrequired, unsolicited cooperation.
4. Intolerance of what others believe or do. No attempt to understand their motives.	4. Tolerance shown for what others believe or do. Ability to understand the feelings of others.

Ranking: SELF—OTHER

This is a problem category. Everyone seems to agree that Puerto Ricans are very interested in building and maintaining warm interpersonal relationships.

Petrullo, 1947: 129. Puerto Ricans cultivated the arts of living, among which figured personal relationships, rather than seeking wealth.

Landy, 1959: 168-9. Males are constantly trying to form relationships *de confianza* with other males.

Brown, 1964: 48. "Residents of Viví Abajo see themselves as generous, always willing to help their neighbors."

People even see themselves as capable of being warm and feeling emphatic concern. But the actual state of affairs is apparently quite different. People want trust but they cannot find it. While the individual sees himself as warm and understanding, he fears being exploited by others.

Landy, 1959: 246. "The more he seeks a close relationship with other males, the less the young man is apt to find it. When relationships are established they are brittle and easily fragmented. Thus the male's poignant desires find little permanent gratification, and repeated short-lived relationships lead to a distrust of others. At the same time, however, he longs for nothing so much as to be able to trust the relationship of other men. And so he looks continually for trust, or confianza, relationships. But he looks within a lonely crowd in which confianza relationships are rare because while the demand is great, supply is short."

Brown, 1964: 49. "In general, inhabitants of Viví Abajo are plagued by a distrust of others. They feel that they cannot confide in the majority of people; they never know with utter confidence on whom they can rely in difficult moments. According to them, most people tend to take care of themselves first and worry about others later, if at all. Each person is constantly watchful, for fear of being exploited by someone else. Many in the community believe that no one cares if a neighbor is on the way to failure, but several feel that at least a few people are sympathetic."

AUTONOMY—DEPENDENCE

Description:

Autonomy	*Dependence*
The adult individual tends to be self-reliant and self-sufficient.	The adult individual is dependent on other persons or on the group.

Criteria:

Autonomy	*Dependence*
1. Source of decisions located within the self. A person's behavior is not easily influenced by others.	1. Source of decisions, or basis of decision is external. No reliance on internal judgment. A person's behavior is easily influenced by others.
2. Attempts to do without help when ill, or in other circumstances of need. Feeling that the individual can take care of himself.	2. Dependence on institutions or persons for protection and satisfaction of needs.
3. Teaching of independence and self-responsibility.	3. Teaching of obligations and responsibility to others.

Ranking: DEPENDENCE

Brown, 1964: 48. "They are sensitive to other's opinions of them; they would choose to suffer hardship rather than do work which other people would criticize."

Lewis, 1963: 289. "The fear of being exposed to 'what other people will say' inhibits many a person from openly accepting a new solution to an old problem."

478. "In part, it is the terror of ridicule that makes the Puerto Rican adult so conscious of respect."

Petrullo, 1947: p. 128. "In short, there is a greater tendency to lean on someone else for a solution of one's problems than there is in Protestant societies."

I have given very few examples for this category because it is so clear cut. The Puerto Ricans are extremly dependent—on their superiors for favors, on their peers for aid, on their families for support—and they are also extremely dependent on the opinion of others. Little children are born dependent and remain so throughout life, although the character of the dependency changes (see Landy, 1959).

DISCIPLINE—FULFILLMENT

Description:

Some cultures tend to repress spontaneity in the effort to maintain an even-tempered social scene, while others prefer to give full expression to spontaneity and are less worried abou the consequence of impulsive actions.

Criteria:

Discipline	*Fulfillment*
1. Emphasis on self-control.	1. Emphasis on self-expression.
2. Emphasis on maintaining an even balance of social actions. Social constraint and reserve.	2. No concern with balanced social actions. Lack of social constraint.
3. Moderation.	3. Laxity, pleasure permitting, affirmation.
4. Asceticism, religious fasting.	4. Intoxication or overindulgence.
5. Strictness, austerity, denial, abstinence.	5. Self-realization, orgaistic tendencies.

Ranking: FULFILLMENT

Rogler, 1940: 181. "There is little social restraint placed upon the overt expression of those moods or sentiments that are called out by social stimuli."

Landy, 1959: 252. "The comparative inability of the adult Vallecanese to postpone gratifications in terms of anticipated future rewards."

Puerto Ricans seem to emphasize self-expression; however, the amount of freedom is severely limited by the individual's fear of being criticized by others.

BUT:

Seda Bonilla, 1963: 111. Men should not give free reign to emotions. Emotion "means" aggressiveness.

Aggressiveness, if one believes Kathleen Wolf (1952), is strictly controlled in both the middle and the lower classes. This limit on aggressiveness, however, does not seem enough to change the scoring of this category.

ACTIVE—ACCEPTANT

Description:

This category refers to the way man responds to the social world. He may accept it or seek to change it in some way.

Criteria:

Active	*Acceptant*
1. Dissatisfaction with people or society. A desire for improvement or change.	1. Acceptance of people and society.
2. Acts of autonomy sometimes take the form of rebellion in extreme cases.	2. Acts of autonomy sometimes take the form of withdrawal.
3. Social mobility.	3. Litle social mobility.
4. Initiative or impatience concerning social actions of others.	4. Tolerance or resignation concerning social actions of others.

Ranking: ACTIVE—ACCEPTANT

There is definitely an "active" group in Puerto Rico. The government is clearly active in the changes and reforms that it is trying to bring about. The question remains, however, as to how deeply this value of active permeates, even among the upper classes.

Lewis, 1963: 248-9. Business entrepreneurs and the new middle classes exhibit little sense of social obligations. Professional men see their new status as an avenue to personal advancement.

But this may be regarded as a type of "active" because it is an attempt to improve the position of the self.

The data on the lower classes:

Landy, 1959: 252. "the *mañana* value of the Vallecañeses is reflected in their reliance on the smiles of Fate, in their almost fatalistic acceptance of life as it comes, in their minimal aspirations."

Brown, 1964: 48. "Although a few people assert the impossibility of changing one's destiny, many feel otherwise. To most, the course which one's life follows is the result of personal efforts rather than of forces beyond human control. They firmly reject the concept that some are born to lead and others to follows. In short, the community is not resigned to the fatalistic notion, 'what shall be, shall be.'"

Rogler, 1940: 26. "Resignation, fatalism, and related attitudes that are so prominent in this community, are surely in part the result of this generally low level of health and the all too frequent appearance of death."

It seems clear that the lower class communities vary as to whether they are active or acceptant. The entire lower class cannot be characterized as one or the other.

DOMINANCE—EQUALITY: Power Evaluation

Description:

Dominance	*Equality*
Power over people is a dominant preoccupation in any kind of social interaction.	Power over people is not the main consideration in social interaction.

Criteria:

Dominance	*Equality*
1. Coercion, restriction, and domination follow lines of relative strength, power, or social position of the adversary.	1. Cases of resisting coercion or restriction, regardless of the relative strength, power, or social position of the adversary.
2. People follow only those who are more powerful.	2. People may follow the nonpowerful as well as the powerful.
3. Accumulation and aggrandizement of social power.	3. Unwillingness to take positions that involve power over others.

Ranking: DOMINANCE

I do not have any quotes on this category, but the value on dominance seems very clear. It has two facets, however. On one side, there are the upper classes, and persons who, through their positions, have power over others. These people are very preoccupied with maintaining their power, and in all interaction they demand the proper respect from their subordinates. On the other side are the people without power. These, far from trying to improve their positions and get power, seem to become almost totally dependent.

Brown, 1964: 50. Everyone prefers receiving orders to giving them.

Lewis, 1963: 476. There is an unwillingness to take responsibility, especially in businesses.

There almost seems to be a fear of presuming on the power of a superior. Both the high and the low seem intent on preserving the present power structure.

DOMINANCE—EQUALITY: Attention evaluation

Criteria:

Dominance	*Equality*
1. Instances of exhibitionism, display of self, of attention-attracting activities. Desire to dominate the attention and admiration of others.	1. Exhibitionism and the desire for social prestige is absent or muted.

Ranking: DOMINANCE

To Puerto Rican men life is a continual display of the self. "Machismo" centers around exhibitionism and letting others know how "macho" one is. Even women compete in showing off, but in a far less flagrant manner. Women try to show off through dress, or through having a model family. But in all cases, the individual tries to impress others and gain their approval.

In summing up this appendix, the clear-cut value categories appear to be as follows. Puerto Ricans believe in a determinate (i.e., orderly and consistent) supernatural world. They also believe the social world to be determinate and orderly, though rapid social and economic change, as Mrs. Collier points out, may be affecting this; the growth of new social categories doubtless has produced some ambivalence in values and in behavior. Puerto Ricans regard the supernatural world as not only determinate, but also good. Gods and spirits do not motivate men to do evil, and cannot be readily controlled in order to effect evil results. The social world, however, is by no means taken to be so unexceptionably good. There appears to be considerable doubt that man is "naturally good" and the establishment of social relationships proceeds with the unvoiced expectation that others may trick or exploit one. There appears to be a gap here between what people believe and what they tend to say they believe.

Puerto Ricans are emphatically gregarious. They like (or perhaps better, badly need) the company of fellow men, and appear to regard solitude as bad, and possibly even evidence of badness. Puerto Ricans also stress individuality more than they do the needs or good of the collectivity. This finding may occasion surprise, since much has been said and written of the collectivistic and familistic spirit of the Puerto Rican people. Mrs. Collier finds that individualism (with, of course, very active concern for the needs of one's immediate family) is strong; in the lower classes, this is perhaps less clear. Cooperativeness and group-oriented activity are important and even essential in some lower-class communities, and yet the stress on individual fate seems equally important. Mrs. Collier notes her own reservations about the observers' findings.

A similar lack of clarity marks the self-other category. It seems that Puerto Ricans very much want to create warm interpersonal relationships, and yet greatly fear deception, rejection, and failure in such relationships.

As to autonomy-dependence, the data show that Puerto Ricans are extremely dependent by most ordinary measures. On discipline-fulfillment, the Puerto Rican people seem committed to fulfillment. The active-acceptant value category, like that for determinate-indeterminate (social), seems subject to rapid change in modern Puerto Rico. Mrs. Collier notes that the island possesses individuals or whole groups that are definitely active in their world view—autonomous, impatient, and initiating. Yet the prevailing weight of island values in this regard—especially, perhaps, as revealed in the behavior of lower class folk—is toward acceptance, withdrawal being the most obvious expression of autonomy. One would expect recent changes in island life to affect this characterization somewhat, but there are too few data to prove as much. Brown (1964) and Mintz (1960) offer little to suggest that the change toward activity has been pervasive.

For the dominance-equality (power evaluation) category, Mrs. Collier finds the Puerto Ricans at the dominance end of the scale. She notes, however, that while dominance seems to mark clearly those who have power, dependence marks those who lack it. On dominance-equality (attention evaluation), the Puerto Rican people seem to come out strongly on the dominance side once more. Display to achieve approval seems important for everyone, and suggests that what is approved is subject very much to that of which others approve.

This brief sketch makes clear that the application of the Kluckhohn scale gives only qualified results when applied to Puerto Rico. It does point up some quite firm findings, especially with regard to dependence, gregariousness, and dominance-equality, and it suggests some additional directions in which to search out Puerto Rican values. Since only a part of the available materials on Puerto Rico have been employed in this exercise, it could be readily amplified.

APPENDIX B

This appendix purports to summarize briefly some of the principal books and articles that have dealt, more or less directly, with the theme of Puerto Rican culture. It is written in declarative form, rather than simply as an annotated bibliography, and it is organized under six headings, as follows: 1) community studies; 2) race relations studies; 3) Puerto Rican family structure and attitudes; 4) national culture, national character, national values; 5) studies of change; and 6) summary.

To digest and classify large quantities of disparate data so that they may be read in some orderly and unified fashion is difficult. The classification of particular bits of information can be rather arbitrary, unless one is willing to add on additional new categories along the way. It is rare, moreover, that any two authors write concerning precisely the same thing. Hence each summary tends to be a rather mechanical stringing together of data, not always in satisfactory fashion. Still, it is hoped that some value may be gained from an examination of the different sections of this appendix. In the concluding summary, I make some final comments on "Puerto Rican culture," in the hope that the difficulties in establishing the reality of the national culture will become clearer. The section preceding, on studies of change, mainly suggests our relative ignorance of the cultural derivatives of recent changes in Puerto Rican life.

COMMUNITY STUDIES

One of the first such studies was Charles Rogler's "Comerío" (Rogler, 1940), based on sociological fieldwork carried out in the town of that name in 1935. Comerío is a tobacco-producing valley town in the center of the island; at the time of the Rogler study, it was caught up in the world depression, and its class structure and the rhythm of life reflected as much. Rogler gives an informative picture of town life. In ten chapters, varying from five to 25 pages in length, he discusses economic and racial differences, the local economy, social and political structure, education, religion, and recreation. His text is enriched by numerous direct quotations from informants on a variety of subjects, but he does not contend that the commentators speak for their community, or that the community stands for Puerto Rico. In a concluding chapter five pages long, the author contends that the differences between classes in Comerío "* * * were never great enough to undermine an essential interclass unity. To move from an upper class atmosphere into a lower class atmosphere was not equivalent to moving into a different cultural world" (1940:185).

His findings lead him to assert that the local upper class provided a model or ideal for lower class behavior, and that members of other classes were excluded from equal participation in town life with their class superiors by the exercise of political and economic power. While class differences were more important assortative devices than sexual differences, still the differences between the sexes carry stronger sanctions, "* * * because sex mores are more precise and tend to deal with familiar relations between the sexes, while class differences are more diffused and subject to numerous variations" (1940: 186). As class differences reinforce and underlie the differential social participation of Comerío people in local affairs, so, too, do sex differences restrict women to inferior social positions and limit their participation in wider networks, as compared with the men. The primary cause of women's inferior position in the society seems to the author to rest with "limited economic opportunity," and the basic force behind this state of affairs—its primary sanction—is found in the sex mores: "The inferior position of the woman takes most definite form in the sex mores of decency, chastity, and fidelity" (1940: 187).

Though Rogler does not deal with national values or "typical" attitudes, he does conclude that there is an essential unity and consistency in the life of each Comerío inhabitant. The adjustments to the realities of life that each person must make—

> * * * have been of such a nature as to produce such attitudes as complacency, contentment, and fatalism. "I am contented because I make the best of what I have." These attitudes characterize both the nature of his actions and also the underlying tone of his remarks. Religious values approach from another direction and merge themselves into these attitudes, giving them a more exalted sanction and surrounding them with a supernatural atmosphere (1940: 189).

These concluding remarks are the nearest the author comes to a general approximation of Comerío "values" or "philosophy." The study, though lacking the statistical completeness and somewhat self-conscious methodological rigor of later works, is a very useful introduction to Puerto Rican town life. It is as outdated as the changes since 1935 have made it, but when read today by one who feels some familiarity with Puerto Rican values, it makes clear that in many areas, at least, there is some continuity in Puerto Rican life, apparently in spite of all of the subsequent changes.

In the easy 1940's, the late Morris Siegel, an anthropologist, conducted a brief study of a southwestern Puerto Rican coastal town, Lajas, that has never been published. I have been unable to secure a manuscript copy, and my memory of the study is poor, but several of Siegel's findings bear mention here. Siegel had apparently hoped that his investigations would, at least to some extent, stand for the whole of Puerto Rican town life, and he used his findings to formulate several generalizations he believed to be "typically Puerto Rican." Among these were his formulation of the so-called "virginity cult," which Siegel saw as an aspect of nationally-held values. This "cult" or value was an aspect of the institutionalized inferiority of women, an insistence on their purity as a necessary ingredient of masculine values. Its value-significance was paralleled by the idea of the "macho" or "machismo"—the much-discussed concept of maleness, said to permeate Puerto Rican society, as the logical opposite of the cult of virginity. Because I do not have the manuscript at hand, I will not enlarge on this pair of themes, but they will receive additional consideration later.

"The People of Puerto Rico," edited by Steward (1956), has been referred to so frequently in the body of this report that little will be said of it here. This work deliberately bypassed the idea of national values or beliefs, and concentrated instead on creating a picture of Puerto Rican life built up out of four community studies and a study of the national upper class (see also Manners and Steward, 1953). "The People of Puerto Rico" emphasizes differences based on considerations of economics, regional specialization, and class structure, much more than it does any underlying similarities of value or attitude. While it is concerned with the social history of Puerto Rico, as a backdrop to the quality of island society in 1948–49 (when the fieldwork was executed), the book's treatment of change is inadequate. But the reasons lie more with the rapid change than has typified Puerto Rican life over the past 15 years than with the ethnographers or their theory. My own study of the village called "Cañamelar," for example, entirely fails to take account of the changes which were to occur there within a few years of the completion of fieldwork (see Brameld, 1959: 355–359; Hernández Alvárez, 1964). The book also fails to deal with questions of Puerto Rican "character," or "ethos," in accord with the authors' theoretical reservations about this sort of research direction. Nevertheless, "The People of Puerto Rico" very possibly provides the fullest account of Puerto Rican society ever written. In spite of its many defects, it is based on long fieldwork experiences in many settings, and brings together a wealth of data on Puerto Rico of the time.

Edwin Seda Bonilla, an anthropologist who had worked as a field assistant to the Steward group in 1948–49, subsequently returned to the community he had studied and has published some of his findings (Seda Bonilla: 1963, 1964). His work benefits from the contrast provided by years of change; his concern is very much with such change, and I think it would be fair to say that his view is pessimistic and negative. Like many other observers, Seda Bonilla believes that recent changes have eroded some of the positive values of Puerto Rican culture, leaving young people cynical and uncommitted. I will discuss some of his findings in the section on social and economic change.

David Landy's "Tropical Childhood" (1959), though an anthropological community study in its own right, concentrates on personality, socialization and family structure, and will be dealt with mainly in other sections. Landy worked in a southeastern coastal sugarcane community, less fully proletarianized than Mintz' "Cañamelar," or Padilla Seda's and Seda Bonilla's "Nocorá." Perhaps partly for this reason, and partly because of his concern with the "fit" of culture and personality, his study takes on its primary value with relation to questions of personality and childtraining.

Two short community studies concerned with comparison and change though they give little depth of observation on attitudes and values, deserve mention here. Ríos and Vásquez Calcerrada (1953) and Vásquez Calcerrada (1953) deal with resettled rural communities, in which former "agregados" were able to make a new and more independent start. The Ríos and Vásquez Calcerrada study compares a "successful" with an "unsuccessful" resettlement, with the expectation that the successful community would have higher socioeconomic status, more effective "natural leaders," and a higher degree of community integration. Both communities were in the same region, but one was nearer the original settlement from which the "parceleros" had come. Of the three expectations listed, the second and third were confirmed. An unexpected finding was that those migrants who were closer to their former homes were able to make a more successful adjustment. This study, while interesting, tells us little that is relevant to the objectives of the present report.

Vásquez Calcerrada (1953) has more to say about the shift from "agregado" to "granjero" status, though he does not deal at any length with values or attitudes. The extent to which the resettlers participated in the development of their new community was encouraging. The community had considerable stability until World War II, when many people migrated to the United States in search of better work opportunities. Changes in community life incident to resettlement included a somewhat higher level of consumption, more interest in education, considerable use of modern medical facilities, expanded aspirations, and greater participation in community programs. Underemployment, lack of adequate institutional guidance, and lack of job training continued to create difficulties, and apparently the resettlement itself led to some breakdown in community norms of social control. Religious practices were maintained and even intensified in the resettlement; in fact, an active competition among different faiths attended the establishment of the new community. This study, however, while very informative, again bears only limited relevance to the objectives of this report.

Brown (1964) has completed a study of an impoverished highland farming community near Utuado, which has not been published. His findings suggest considerable disorientation and disillusionment among the people with whom he worked: a rather rigid traditionalism (1964: 43), a feeling of helplessness against poverty (1964: 44), a basic distrust of others (1964: 49), and considerable low-keyed quarreling (1964: 49). At the same time, Brown did not find his informants "fatalistic"—they think of their future and believe in hard work (1964: 48), in spite of their difficult situation. People are sensitive to the opinions of others, even while they are distrustful of them, and are inclined to rely mainly on close kinsmen for help in time of need (1964: 45–49). These and other points made by Brown will be referred to once again in the discussion of national character and values.

These few community studies are not all that have been done by any means, nor have I attempted here to deal with works treating urban neighborhoods and slums. The main studies of rural communities, however, forcibly suggest that there is no particular community that can serve as an exemplar for Puerto Rico as a national society—a point Steward made strongly when his associates began their work on the island in 1948. Community studies are valuable for the general information they offer the reader, but they naturally vary considerably in their usefulness as a basis for generalization, depending upon the skills and particular interests of the fieldworker. In the case of Puerto Rico, the most orderly studies were those of Steward's students (Steward, 1956), but I have suggested that much of their work has been outdated by the vast changes of the past two decades.

Several themes seem to appear with suspicious frequency in the works described so far, and they have to do in particular with men's and women's attitudes. Thus, for instance, most findings stress the status differences between men and women, and the culturally accepted status inferiority of women, accompanied by the so-called machismo complex of men. I will return to a consideration of such data in subsequent sections. Also, I have laid little stress here on statistical data, since there is no easy way to bring the disparate bodies of such data from various monographs into any meaningful relationship.

RACE RELATIONS STUDIES

All of the authors who write on race and race differences conclude that Puerto Ricans are very aware of physical differences. "Negro" features are in general regarded as undesirable while "white" features are prized. But there is no "caste system" as there is in the Southern states, nor is there any belief in the biological inferiority of the Negro. The undesirability of Negro traits is social in origin, and stems from the fact that Negroes were once slaves and, even now, are largely concentrated in the lower classes. There is discrimination against people with markedly Negro traits in Puerto Rico, but the degree of this discrimination varies considerably from situation to situation.

Statistics show clearly that Negroes are concentrated in the lower class, and that there are progressively fewer Negroid features in the population as one goes up the social scale. This does not mean that it is impossible for a black man to reach the top, but there are few who make it. The situation is also complicated by the fact that there are many terms to classify Negroes, and the terminology used will vary

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from situation to situation. Negroes and mulattoes who reach the middle and upper classes tend to be defined as being whiter than their counterparts in the lower classes. It is also true that the defined Negro population is steadily decreasing as more and more people are being classed as white. Gordon (1949) believes that continuing race prejudice will only serve to hasten the decline of the Negro population because all those who can will want to "pass" as white.

Renzo Sereno, in his article on "cryptomelanism" (1947), states that to a white, a Negro has three drawbacks: (1) He is the result of illegitimate union; (2) he is the descendant of slaves; and (3) he is not presentable to North Americans. To these it may be added that he is usually of lower class origin. Given no other indication of status, Puerto Ricans tend to classify persons with marked Negro traits as lower class and to treat them as such. Part of the discrimination that is directed against Negroes is based on social or class prejudice. Most Puerto Ricans, however, are of mixed ancestry. As people rise in the social scale they tend to try to forget their Negro ancestry; but because most are mixed, they are all vulnerable to attack. Negro can be used against someone, even when that person appears to be "pure white".

The degree of race prejudice and the form that it takes varies from class to class. In the lower class, where there is the largest concentration of Negroid features, there tends to be almost none of what we would call "race prejudice". Instead there is an awareness of color as one aspect of an individual, with Negroid traits being considered undesirable. But Negroid traits can be completely outweighed by other more desirable features, such as a secure economic position, good social standing within the community, etc. And as such, Negroid features are never enough to insure the exclusion of an individual. Instead discrimination takes lesser and more pitiful forms. The child in the family who has the most Negroid features is often the one who is least liked by his parents and most teased by his brothers and sisters. A dark child may not feel free to participate in all of the outside activities of his lighter siblings (Gordon, 1950). Landy (1959) noted that, in the community he studied, the dark girls were the last to be chosen as partners in dances.

The upper class is concerned with "limpieza de sangre" and the perpetuation of special privileges within its own select group. Because of this members tend to exclude any out-group, and Negroes are easily defined in this way because of their obvious physical differences. The upper class maintains select clubs and patronizes the better hotels, which discriminate against Negroes. Even though there are some Negroes who reach high business, professional and political positions, they are still considered to be unacceptable as members of the intimate circles in which the upper class likes to move. These Negroes will be treated as complete equals in business or political encounters among men, but they are never accepted in the home or in intimate social gatherings. An upper class man may marry a mulatto woman without too much censure, but his wife will never be completely accepted and will known that she will be "excused" from many of the functions of the other women of her husband's group. The upper class, however, seems to feel that it is very tolerant, and it actually is, if only because its members do not feel threatened by encroaching Negroes.

The middle class varies tremendously, but probably practices more pure racial discrimination than any other class. (These are the people whom Sereno principally discusses in his article on cryptomelanism). They know that they themselves may have some Negro ancestry, but they try to deny this by forming exclusive "white" clubs to prove to the outside world and themselves that they are indeed what they would like to be. They have adopted the ideal of "sangre limpia" from the upper classes, while knowing that their own ancestry is actually "tainted". They try to make their insecure position more secure by rejecting everything associated with Negroes and by practicing extreme discrimination. Of course, only a segment of the middle class is able to do this; the middle class does contain some Negroes and many mulattoes. These people often cannot pass as white, and are those who suffer from the discriminatory practices of their fellow members of the middle class. But the middle class is a rising class; its members tend to step on all below them, reflecting a sense of extreme competition. Many middle class jobs, such as that of bank clerk are reserved for "white" people, simply to reduce competition.

Contact with continental racial prejudice has probably had its most far-reaching effect in this class as well; the middle class is trying to modernize itself and most of its ideas about what is modern come from the continent. It is not clear just how much racial prejudice must be blamed on ideas from the United States. It has obviously had some effect in that jobs which involve contact with North Americans are often denied to Negroes; but it is also clear that there was prejudice in Puerto Rico before the United States occupation. The rising middle class probably got its racial prejudice from both sources. This is by no means a complete discussion of the middle class, but it is such a complex and diverse group that the dynamics of racial interaction are very incompletely described in the literature (see also Seda Bonilla, 1961; Williams, 1956).

Rogler (1944, 1946, 1948) discusses the fact that Puerto Rico has ideal conditions for race mixing. The double standard insures that at least middle and upper class men will mate with Negro women and produce mixed children, while in the lower class, marriages take place with little regard to color.

Another interesting aspect of race relations in Puerto Rico is the terminology involved. For instance, the term "negrito" is one of endearment, carrying a sense of togetherness, friendship, and mutual trustworthiness—it is almost a "we're in the same boat together" kind of term. "Blanquito," on the other hand, often carries the opposite meaning. When used by a member of the lower class it implies social distance. It also carries the connotation of "uppity" pretentious, and definitely implies the opposite of togetherness and trust. Rogler, however, also notes that it is a term that may be complimentary, insofar as it does imply the desirable traits of whiteness and higher social class.

PUERTO RICAN FAMILY STRUCTURE AND ATTITUDES

The subject is so vast, and the data on it so numerous, that this account is necessarily brief and extremely summary. I have used Mrs. Collier's scheme in the organization of information under several subheadings; for simple reasons of space, I have omitted many corroborative sources and much specific data, as well as nearly all quoted citations.

Courtship

Puerto Rican girls are carefully guarded throughout their childhood, but this guarding becomes more intense as they reach puberty. Soon after puberty, probably around the age of fifteen or sixteen, most girls are considered eligible for marriage. Upper class girls are introduced to society at this age and lower class girls begin to go to dances. All of the opportunities for young people of opposite sexes to meet and get together are carefully supervised; however, even so, there are few opportunities for a boy and a girl even to get to know each other casually. In the lower class girls dance with many boys, but at least one author recorded that they were not supposed to talk together. (See Mintz, 1960, for autobiographical data on courtship, from the male point of view.) It is on such slim meetings as these that the girls "fall in love," but they are not supposed to fall in love too often. In a study of middle and upper class boys and girls at the University of Puerto Rico, Hill (in Fernández Méndez, 1956) found that most reported only having one or two previous "novios," if they had had even that. In any case, the getting-to-know-each other period is very short and the formal "noviazgo" is established quickly.

Noviazgo is not a trial period to see how the couple get along together—it is a formal commitment to marry. Because of this it is hard to break, and all sides lose face when this happens. But in spite of the closeness of a noviazgo, the couple is still never left alone and Stycos (1955) reports that as it continues, the relations between the couple involve more and more "respeto" and not less, at least in the lower classes.

Charles Rosario (1958) has an interesting interpretation of the function of the noviazgo in Puerto Rico that seems to fit the facts better than those anyone else has offered. He says that noviazgo is a period in which the woman learns to submit her will to that of the man. It is not a time for the couple to get to know each other and set up roots for future compatibility; compatibility does not matter. What matters is that the woman learns her role of submission. This seems to tie in with the fact that after marriage there is little communication between husband and wife. The important thing seems to be that each learns to play his role, and the role of the woman is submission. Throughout life the sexes live in different spheres and even in marriage these spheres barely touch.

Noviazgo often lasts quite a while, and involves visits by the boy to the girl's house, where the couple sit and talk together under the supervision of some member of the girl's family. It may also involve occasional outings by the couple, but always accompanied by a chaperone or a group. This chaperonage pattern may be getting weaker, but it seems doubtful that it will disappear altogether within the foreseeable future. Chaperones not only serve to see that the couple behaves properly but they serve the very important function of preserving the girl's reputation. At marriage a girl should be a virgin, not only in fact but in reputation as well. Even when a marriage is consensual, it is usually preceded by some formal period of noviazgo. It is probably rare that a couple simply get together and elope. Though elopement and consensual marriage are the prevalent forms in a community such as Cañamelar, for instance (Mintz, in Steward, 1956), they involve clear-cut formalities, including more or less overt courtship. There are, of course, always exceptions; there are women with looser morals and families that care less about reputation. But both Stycos (1955) and Rogler (1940) were surprised at the extent to which even the lowest classes observed all the rules of the noviazgo and were careful to preserve their girl's reputation, and Mintz (1960) gives additional detail on relevant attitudes.

Husband-Wife Relations

Husbands supposedly have complete authority over their wives and children. The outward semblance of this authority is preserved even when it does not in fact exist. Kathleen Wolf (1952) notes that middle class men whose wives worked outside (and who therefore felt that their authority was threatened) would often make arbitrary demands on their wives just to show that they still had control. The actual degree of control that a man exercises over his family varies a great deal, both from class to class and from region to region. The husband's authority seems to be strongest where the family is poor and where the husband controls all the resources. In these families the wife and children work under his direction and submit completely to his demands. Such families are usually found in those rural regions where tobacco and coffee are farmed (see, for example, Rogler, 1940; Wolf, in Steward, 1956). The husband's authority is great and his wife may be reduced almost to the status of a child. She controls no money and so cannot buy herself anything; she is not allowed outside of the house without his permission; and she is expected to submit to his demands without question. She is the one who cares for the children, but even in this job she exercises as little initiative as is conceivably possible.

The authority structure of the family is somewhat more balanced in regions where people live close together and where women have means of earning at least a little bit of money. In these regions the women are not so completely isolated in their homes, they control some money, and they do some of the family shopping. They may also have a chance to earn money by making things at home to sell, such as sweets. The husband's authority is probably still less in urban areas, where lower class women have a chance to work in factories (see also Mintz, 1965).

In some of these cases the wife's income may support the family or at least contribute a large share of it. The husband also loses his authority to dictate his wife's activities when she works outside the home and has a life and friends of her own. The internal strains in these families, given the ideal of strong male authority, are sometimes great (Wolf, 1952; though see Mintz, 1965).

Middle and upper class husbands exercise more authority in their homes than do American husbands, but they do not have the complete control that some lower class men do. In many of the middle class families the women have fewer children and work outside the home. Even if the women do not work, they still have more freedom, as they are not so tied down by childrearing. The middle and upper classes are also beginning to adopt the American idea that children are a woman's job, and husbands are beginning to let their wives make more and more of the decisions concerning the children and how they should be brought up. Along with this goes the attitude that homemaking is a woman's job and that the women should therefore do all the family shopping. In relinquishing the control of money and of the children, middle and upper class men have come a long way from the extremely authoritarian families discussed above. The women have to tread the delicate line between submission to their husbands and exercising their own initiative in running their homes and families.

Almost all of the authors who write on the Puerto Rican family stress the lack of communication between husbands and wives. This lack is really quite understandable, given the childrearing patterns. From babyhood on, boys and girls are kept separate and each is taught to associate only with members of his own sex. Boys and girls share no common activities, and when they finally come together in courtship, the roles played by each are very different. Marriage merely continues the pattern. Husbands and wives each have their own roles and in very traditional families there is no need for communication between them. They share few common activities, and so there is almost nothing to be discussed. When decisions have to be made, the husband dictates and the wife submits. Such a family is, of course, extremely inflexible. It is unable to adapt very well to changing conditions. Because conditions are changing and have changed a great deal in Puerto Rico, it must be surmised that some changes have taken place in the family to make communication (and, therefore, greater flexibility) possible. No author really discusses the extent of these changes in descriptive sociological terms, and so it is difficult to tell just what has been taking place. Probably lower class families in backward areas have maintained more of the old and inflexible patterns (Brown, 1964), while in areas where change has been more drastic or where increased income has raised a family's status, there is now considerably more communication between husbands and wives (Mintz, 1965). But in any case, because of the separation of the sexes, the chances are that communication between spouses will remain at a relatively low level.

Landy especially discusses the power of women in his book "Tropical Childhood" (1959). He notes the inconsistency that, in a culture where the men are supposed to be absolute rulers of their homes, it is the women who are brought up to be stable and responsible. Women supposedly look for stability in marriage and the ideal is to get a man who is "serio" and responsible. But Landy says that such men rarely exist because men are brought up to be insecure and unstable. The women are therefore the anchors of their families and carry a large share of responsibility for the orderly running of society. Women exercise most of their power over their children (Wolf, 1952). There is an extremely strong feeling that a woman should not abandon her children. Fathers may leave, but mothers may not. The children derive their feeling of security from their mothers. In most cases the children are extremely dependent on their mothers, and boys may retain this dependency long after they have become men (Wolf, 1952; Mintz, 1965). But even in cases where men profess dependence on, and love for, their mothers, it is the daughters who end up caring for their old mother. This small area of power that belongs to women is, however, very slight when one compares it to all of the male privileges. Women may be responsible and more secure, but they are decidedly underprivileged. Women—and their roles—are regarded as inferior.

Women are supposed to be virgins when they marry and to remain chaste afterwards. Actually the women use their virginity as a lever against the men. A man who marries a woman and deprives her of her virginity owes her support and reasonable treatment for the rest of her life. The woman, in return, however, must show absolute fidelity in reputation as well as in deed. She cannot do anything which might even hint of infidelity, such as talking with a man who is not her husband. Women are not trusted around men at all. This is understandable, given the fact that women are not brought up to take care of themselves. They are taught to submit to men, and to rely for protection on their fathers, brothers, and later, husbands. It is presumed, and with some accuracy, that if given the chance a woman will fall. This puts a real strain on marital relations. The man can never be completely sure of his wife because he is away all day and he cannot check up on her every moment. The woman, on the other hand, must be extremely careful not to do anything which might arouse her husband's suspicions. The men seem to be the ones who suffer the most, though, because to be cuckolded is to have one's reputation almost completely ruined.

Childrearing

Childrearing patterns vary a great deal from class to class and probably from region to region, but there do seem to be some constants. In all classes obedience and "respeto" are the most prized qualities in children. Brameld (1959) cites a male informant who says that children under 10 should "fear," from 10 to 20, they should "respect," and over 20, they should "love" their parents. (Needless to add, the discontinuities in a socialization ideal of this sort are severe.) Love for parents is only secondary. In all classes the sexes are strictly separated. Little girls are kept clothed, are kept nearer home and under closer supervision, and are expected to be more submissive. Little boys are encouraged to be independent and aggressive within certain limits, and are allowed to go about without clothing, at least in the lower class. Boys are not so closely guarded, and in towns are allowed to roam the streets. In all classes children are kept dependent on their parents for quite some time. In the lower class this is fostered by the mother's neglect of the child, who therefore longs for attention; and in the upper class it is often fostered by the fact that the child is overpetted and cared for. In all classes, it also seems that aggression is strongly suppressed. Little boys are encouraged to show aggression in such situations as temper tantrums (Mintz, in Steward, 1956), but are not allowed to direct it against another human. Landy (1959) noted that in his village, children who were involved in a fight were punished no matter whose fault the fight was. Another constant might be that small children are universally loved and enjoyed. Not much is expected of them during the first 2 years and they are the petted playthings of adults. After they begin to talk, however, they are subject to demands for obedience and "respeto."

The lives of upper class children are not at all well described in the literature, but from what little there is it seems that such children are petted and pampered by adults for at least their early years. They have servants to wait on them constantly and are not taught to feed themselves or to do anything. They learn that the way to have their desires met is to order someone to do something, rather than do it themselves (Wolf, 1952). These children also come to see a strict dichotomy in their lives. When they are clean and well behaved they are admitted to the company of their parents and members of their parents' class. When they are dirty or ill behaved they are sent back to the servants. Sereno (1947) suggests that this causes little boys to associate sex with lower class women and "pure" love with their mothers and with women of their own class. When they marry, they allegedly have difficulty establishing adequate sexual relations with their wives.

Lower class childrearing is much better documented, but even there, the variation is notable. In isolated rural areas, children are kept at home and often see only brothers and sisters. Even in areas where families live relatively close together children may be kept isolated by parents who are afraid that their children's behavior might cause them shame (Landy, 1959). In some urban areas, on the other hand, the children run the streets day and night. The little girls are kept somewhat more confined, but they are still in the streets when they can get there. Lower class children are often part of large families and get little care and attention from their parents. The mother of a large family if often too busy to be able to do anything more than just provide food and clothing and a minimum of supervision for her children. In these families corporal punishment is frequent and forms the main means of ensuring obedience in the children. In fact, in some areas, punishment is regarded as a sign of love and the child who is unbeaten is regarded with pity because he is considered to be unloved.

Stycos (1955: 38–39) discusses what his informants listed as the main duties of children toward their parents, and of parents toward their children. Just as children should show obedience and respeto to their parents and love is only secondary, so the parents' main duty is to provide materially for the child, with love again being a minor consideration. Stycos also noted the mother's duty never to abandon her children. Fathers should provide material benefits, while mothers should be around to take care of everyday needs, and for protection. In the lower class families that Stycos studied, the father was always the supreme authority, while the mother was the day-to-day supervisor. Any decision or punishment she carried out, however, was always done in the father's name. Children were found to feel invariably closer to their mothers than to their fathers. The social distance between a man and his children was extreme. It was almost impossible for either to bridge the gap. Fathers were the recipients of fear and respeto but rarely of love.

Landy's entire book was about childrearing, but a few items seem especially interesting. Landy says that children are rarely rewarded for good behavior (1959: 123). Parents believe that if a child is rewarded too often he will lose his respeto for his parents. This ties in with an observation by Seda Bonilla (1964) that parents do not believe in letting their children argue with them because they will lose their "respeto." There seems to be a fear on the part of parents that children will lose their feelings of respect. (But as a part of the normal process of growing up, children have to cut their parents down to size. Children cannot go on forever seeing them as the omnipotent beings that they were during early childhood. One wonders if this normal process of growing up causes real strains in the Puerto Rican family.) Landy also notes in his book that there is very little demand for children to achieve in the community that he studied (1959: 150). Landy concluded with the same observations that others had made—that it is much easier for girls to fill the role expected of them than for boys. Girls only have to be submissive and obedient. Boys, on the other hand, are expected to be obedient and show respeto for their parents, while at the same time being independent and aggressive.

NATIONAL CULTURE, NATIONAL CHARACTER, NATIONAL VALUES

This is perhaps the hardest category of all to summarize usefully. Since I have taken the position that it is very difficult to speak of a common Puerto Rican culture or identity in the body of the report, I feel it essential to sum up what others have said in favor of the existence of some national character structure or value system. The difficulty lies not only with the relative abstractness of the concepts, but also with the many different viewpoints from which the problem has been approached. (I can say parenthetically that, if I had been able to summarize such materials to my total satisfaction at some earlier time, I would have published an article on this subject many years ago.)

Simple lists of traits may be mentioned first, though I have indicated my reserve about them. Reuter (1946) emphasizes the nonsecular and relativistic point of view of Puerto Ricans; the way class sentiments survived in the face of North American preconceptions that political democracy would break down such sentiments; the Puerto Rican predilection for dreams, unrealistic plans, and illusions, and the dependency of attitude of the islanders. I believe his view is ethnocentric and anachronistic.

A far better and more sophisticated enumeration is provided by Saavedra de Roca (1963), who used published sources to document each point. Since it serves no purpose to repeat her presentation wholly, I will simply list here the "prevailing values" in her paper, some of which will be discussed more analytically at a later point in this section. "Dignidad" refers to some powerful inner value concerned with maintaining one's public image or viewed status. It is seen as both a positive value and as a negative one—Cochran (1959) equates it with "sense of integrity", while Tugwell (in Fernández Méndez, 1956) feels it may be employed to conceal incompetence, and to substitute fantasy-renderings for the reality of the self. Tumin (1958) stresses dignidad as the source of pride in work, and, with Gillin (1955), sees it as giving a man of any social and economic status the capacity to feel his worth regardless of his worldly success or failure. Individualism is another "prevailing value" of the Puerto Rican, and numerous writers (e.g., Gillin, 1955; Schurz, 1949) see this trait as generally Latin American. This inner quality—be it called soul, or "alma," or "ánima"—is unrelated to the external world. "Whereas the effort of each man on the mainland to be 'as good as the next person' inevitably produced a competitive type of individualism, the possession of a 'unique inner quality' is quite divorced from external contests" (Cochran, 1959: 123).

Again, personalism or "personalismo" is seen as distinctively Puerto Rican. At least in contrast to the United States. Wells (1955) makes much of personalismo in explaining the special quality of Puerto Rican politics, in particular the emotionally charged adoration of Luis Muñoz Marín. Because of personalism, Cochran (1959: 125–26) tells us, the unification of small businesses into larger entities, the development of nonfamilial commercial ties, the maintenance of a high efficiency in committee work, etc., are hampered. Personalism in effect requires that all social, economic, and political relationships proceed on a basis of known face-to-face contact.

The value put on education is another characteristic of the Puerto Ricans. Tumin (1958), in his study, confirms the findings of Steward's associates (1956) and of Hill, Stycos, and Back (1959), that the desire for education in Puerto Rico burns brightly. Education is both the best marker of class differentiation (Tumin, 1958: 464–66), and the "most effective point of leverage in the total social system."

Family values, especially patterns of familial authority, form another category of the Puerto Rican value system. Saavedra de Roca does little with this theme, except to suggest that class differences are accompanied by differences in paternal authority, using Wolf (1952), Tumin (1958), and Mintz and Padilla Seda (in Steward, 1956) as her sources.

Other familial values discussed by Saavedra de Roca include respect for parents, parental obligations to the children, the position of women, communication between spouses, attitudes toward ideal family size, courtship attitudes, machismo, the woman's role in socialization separation of the sexes, bodily cleanliness, sibling rivalry and cooperation, parental conceptions of childhood, bodily punishment, inconsistencies in socialization, responsibility and dependency. I do not plan to examine these subjects fully here; a number of them are touched upon elsewhere, particularly in the discussion of family structure.

Finally, Saavedra de Roca makes reference to "optimismo" (i.e., as an attitude toward life), which was strongly identified by Tumin (1958: 166), to some extent in contrast to the findings of others. Parenthetically, I would say to this last that the "fatalism" of Puerto Ricans simply made more sense in terms of the realities of 1935 or 1940 than in 1950 or 1960. It would be difficult to contend, for instance, that average North American attitudes in 1935 were not significantly different in this regard from what they would become in 1945 or 1950. Though the Saavedra de Roca article does not employ all of the available relevant sources by any means, though it lacks a historical perspective, and though it gives little on the dynamics of behavior behind these various values or attitudes, it is a very useful preliminary staking-out of areas in which many observers have found common ground in studying the Puerto Rican people.

Figueroa Mercado (1963) covers some of the same ground as Saavedra de Roca, but puts her emphasis more firmly on culture and personality. She attempts to give historical "origins" for various attitudes—for example, hospitality and generosity are Indian and Spanish in origin, uncertainty ("incertidumbre") and fatalism derive from the disaster-prone and dependent status of Puerto Rico, and so on—but such attributions are not completely convincing. The island is caught up in a spiritual vassalage ("vasallaje espiritual") that Puerto Ricans must examine if they are to free themselves from it. Individual and group insecurity, the hope for miraculous good fortune, the unwillingness to make firm decisions, and other traits have been synthesized by those outsiders who, not understanding the Puerto Rican collective soul, see the phrase "¡A bendito!" as a symbol of the irresolute Puerto Rican personality. The Figueroa Mercado article shares much, it seems to me, with the position taken by Pedreira in his "Insularismo"; it is a good essay, and a moving one. Not surprisingly, however, it only admits that many changes have occurred since Puerto Rico fell into North American hands, and it does not deal at all with what those changes have meant for "the collective soul" of the Puerto Rican people.

These papers are more than simple trait-lists, but they provide only limited access to any analysis of Puerto Rican character. They go along with such works as Pedreira's "Insularismo" (though lacking its depths, reflectiveness, and charm), René Marqués' "El puertorriqueño docil," and other humanistic approaches to Puerto Rican culture. To some extent "belles-lettres" provide similar insights. As one illustration, César Andreu's "Los Derrotados" (which deals with a vain nationalist attempt to assassinate an American Army officer) provides a view of Puerto Rican society that is less than pure fantasy, and in some ways much more than pure social science. The class structure of island society is depicted through the book's characters, and the differences in attitude and ideology of the protagonists throw real light on island life. Only two "intellectuals" grace the book's pages. Though reputable and intelligent, these men are shown as empty, or hollow, because they could not be true to their own insights. Fully realizing the need for ideals and for honor (perhaps an aspect of machismo in this rendering), they simply could not follow the course they believed to be right. The working people in the book are factory proletarians, and poor fishermen and country folk. They fall into two categories—the honest but simple people who do the best they can with what they have (thus embodying dignidad), and the misguided sheep who depend on their class betters as moral guides and get their precepts from the radio. These latter lose their simple peasant culture in a grinding modernization process that gives them nothing better to enhance their lives. Finally, there are members of the middle class and they, too, fall into two categories. Those who choose a nationalist political direction retain their honor, their high ideals, and their status as machos. But the political imperatives deprive them of normal lives, and isolate them from their wives and children; their conflict inheres in the attractiveness of a life that insists on no responsibility except to political principles. The other middle class figures choose to follow North American ideals;

moneymaking becomes the be-all and end-all of their lives. They become effeminate as their women become mannish, and their activities make them dishonest and vulgar. Yet they get access to real political power, control money and resources, and thus gain control over others. The climax of the novel emphasizes that—if, indeed, this is the way things are—the thinking man and the principled man have no way out in Puerto Rican society. Obviously, this is a novel, not a sociological tract. But it would be unfair to claim simply that Andreau has given us a picture of what he thinks—much in this book rings true, and articulates real problems in contemporary Puerto Rico. It would be interesting to make comparable sketches of other literary works of this kind, but the rewards are probably tangential to the aims of the appendix.

In the body of the report, I suggested that four sorts of inquiry may give some answers to the question of Puerto Rican identity or national culture: social history, value categories, socialization and child-training patterns, and "social idioms." Something may be said now of each of these categories. Within the category of social history, one thinks of the work of Steward and his associates, the paper by Figueroa de Mercado, and Petrullo's book as examples. Such features of Puerto Rican life as the complex but essentially noncolor-based handling of race differences, the mandatory hospitality, the often illusory hopes for an economic windfall, the attitudes of dependency (especially in the political sphere), the acceptance of rigid class differences, etc., may be traced—though not with conspicuous success, I fear—to Puerto Rico's special history.

Investigations of value systems and reflections on commonly acknowledged values suggest a different direction. Pedreira's book deserves first mention. Some of the papers cited earlier (e.g., Saavedra de Roca) seek greater specificity within the same sphere. Brameld (1959), in an interesting book concerned particularly with the relationship between Puerto Rican culture and education, also makes some attempt to identify a single value system for the Puerto Rican people. He includes in his list of values "* * * the familiar cluster denoted by such terms as friendliness, outreachingness, kindness, sharing, hospitality, brotherliness, and gregariousness. Others that were underscored include devotion to family, personal pride, honesty in government, racial egalitarianism, respect for learning, loyalty to the homeland without fanatical nationalism (the value called nonnationalism), an accent upon being rather than becoming, and love of the Spanish language" (1959: 267). In eliciting responses, Brameld was unable to get clear opinions as to whether Puerto Ricans value esthetic matters above scientific ones, or vice versa; nor was it clear whether cooperation or competition was more important as a typical value of the "average" man (or even whether people felt cooperation was now gaining, at the expense of a more competitive attitude). The difficulties here may lie with the unspecificity of the subject, of course—these are hard things to discuss in the abstract. Brameld did locate two significant areas suggestive of widely held values. His informants largely supported the notion that Puerto Ricans are "* * * relativistic in the sense that they are exceptionally tolerant of attitudes and practices different from their own. Despite the volatility attributed to their modal personalities, they were said to abhor violence of a mass variety; hence they would much rather acculturate and even assimilate foreign values and accompanying practices than militantly resist them" (Brameld, 1959:271). The author goes on to add:

> Compared with several other Latin American countries, such as Cuba again, it is even possible to say that this "elasticity of accommodation" becomes a value distinctive in several ways—in a lack of chauvinistic quarrelsomeness; in the centuries-old evolutionary rather than revolutionary approach to cultural goals; in the friendly curiosity with which people listen to while seldom challenging outsiders; in a "purposeful patience"; in respect for the democratic voting process as a slow but sure way of achieving such goals; in the comparative success with which migrants accommodate themselves to a new cultural environment; and in the high regard attached to cultural change (Brameld, 1959: 271).

Another attempt at enumerating values, or at getting at some value system, is that employed by Mrs. Collier in the other appendix to this report. Here, written materials were examined to extract data confirming one or another position in the Kluckhohn values scheme. Firm answers could be given in only several categories; for many the data were either contradictory, dealt with different class groupings, or represented different points in time.

Studies of socialization and child training bulk importantly in the social science literature on Puerto Rico. Outstanding, I believe, is the paper by K. Wolf (1952), the book by Landy (1959), and some of the materials provided by Steward's associates. Other important data come from the many studies primarily concerned with birth control and attitudes toward family size. The difficulties implicit in employing socialization data in order to get at what might be called national character or a national personality are serious. Among other things, it is often very hard to establish any wholly convincing linkage between child training and the adult personality, even when these seem to go together. However, at least something should be said of this, in further elaboration of the data given elsewhere.

According to Landy (1959: 99, 120), Puerto Rican parents see children as completely dependent, and also believe that they have a ready predisposition to be "bad." Little boys are born with "malicias" (perhaps "malice," but more likely "shrewdness" or "guile"); girls, though born innocent, are easily corrupted. Obedience is demanded from children, and secured. Conformity is deemed more important than achievement; for instance, in spite of the many references to high values on education, Landy's informants were not overly concerned with keeping children in school (1959: 150–51). Boy and girl children receive differential treatment and training, starting at an early age. Wolf (1952: 410–11) points out how, in the rural highland community of Manicaboa, boys are encouraged toward physical autonomy and movement out of and away from the house, while girls are guarded and protected. Boys continue to go naked much longer than girls, who are clothed almost from the first. At the same time the demands put upon children are much more consistent in the case of girls than of boys; there is generally more for girls to do that needs doing, and success at tasks is an important part of growing up. For boys, the work to be done diminishes in some communities, so that adolescent males may have difficulties in attaching their physical maturation to any worthwhile service to the family. It is not surprising, perhaps, that a 15-year-old girl is ready for marriage while a boy of this age is still seemingly much younger.

Since sexuality seems to be regarded as both inherent and not inherently bad, the separation of boy and girl children, the clear demarcation of male and female tasks, and the strict chaperonage of adolescence, work together in shaping the adult male or female personality. Men cannot control their sexual impulses except through the presence of others, if one is to judge by the way socializing between boys and girls goes on. Girls should not have to resist sexual advances, but should rather have the protection afforded by the chaperone. The lesson seems to be that women are incapable of defending themselves against male sexual aggression, while men are incapable of internally imposed self-discipline. It needs to be understood that such assertions are inferences, rather than clearly stated beliefs or values, and further, that they can hardly be claimed to hold for each and every Puerto Rican.

Much more could be said of child training and socialization, but for reasons of space, I will turn instead to the supposed adult personality derivatives of these and other child training practices. Landy (1959: 168) claims that the Puerto Rican child-training experience leads to an insatiable adult need for intimate social relationships with others. Relations "de confianza" are desired, yet the demands of truly trustful closeness are overpowering, and men are constantly frustrated. Grownups have a "defense," even apprehensive outlook, suggesting that they find their environment hostile and menacing (Landy, 1959: 78). Expressions of salutation response ("Siempre en la lucha," "Ahí luchando," "Siempre defendiéndome," etc.) accompany this alleged attitude. People count heavily on the opinions of others in maintaining their self-images. Landy writes (1959: 194) "The fragile sense of community solidarity, the lack of a strong sense of communal responsibility and duty, and, conversely, a highly developed sense of familism (now somewhat tattered and strained) and individualism in terms of face and dignidad rather than ego-ideals and ego-aspirations" make for a weak superego—and no doubt for considerable dependence on outside opinion. Brown (1964: 56–58) gives a view of men in the rural and impoverished community he studies that builds on these earlier contentions. Here, men value machismo as they do elsewhere in Puerto Rican society. "Defending oneself," gambling, cockfighting, drinking heavily, having many women, and being a "good sport" are all positively valued. Women seek to deflect their sons from these ideals, and mothers are extremely important in perpetuating the curious childish quality of adult manhood imputed to Puerto Ricans; but women, due to their low social and economic status, are unable to keep their sons away from the male view of the world. Such ideals are trenchantly analized by Wolf (1952), and her contrast of three different community settings suggests that many such values are differently held, and have different symbolic connotations in different class and community groups. Brameld (1959: 192 et seq.) has attempted to synthesize some of these value attributions to adult Puerto Ricans in search of a "modal personality" or "basic personality," but with inconclusive results. The "defensiveness" of the Puerto Rican stands out as an imputed trait or character; it is displayed in guarding oneself against those of higher prestige or more powerful status; in not opposing persons of authority, even when they are regarded with doubt or suspicion; in getting one's way by patient and subtle "killing" of an opposite view, rather than by an open fight; and by the presence of its temperamental opposite, aggressiveness. This aggressiveness may be expressed in self-destructiveness (including suicide), in explosive anger, in homicidal violence (murder viewed as an end point of an adult "tantrum"), and in some features of machismo.

I must admit that I find it difficult to accept any of these statements as describing with total accuracy what is "characteristically Puerto Rican," and few writers on Puerto Rican behavior are so unreserved as to claim this. In a qualified but insightful paper, Albizu and Marty (1958) have attempted to use projective test materials (including Rorschach, modified TAT, and sentence completion tests) to derive a self-image sketch of the personality of lower class Puerto Ricans. Two groups, one in Puerto Rico and another in Chicago, were used as subjects, and the techniques used differed, yet the results show surprising uniformity. The tests revealed much that could be inferred negatively about the personalities of the subjects: A sense of inferiority to non-Puerto Ricans, a lack of resourcefulness and initiative, and a noticeable passivity, among other things. These authors, like many others, emphasize the dependency of the Puerto Rican people, their inability to confront crisis head on, their employment of resignation ("ay bendito") and circumventive aggression ("pelea monga") in seeking solutions, and their docility. Though the results certainly raise doubts and many questions, they are of special interest since they are supposed to originate in the self-perceptions of the subjects, rather than in the observations of naive outsiders.

Numerous other studies might be mentioned in this section, but the materials are too diverse to afford us any unified picture. I wish now to discuss only the notion of "social idiom" as an approach to the study of national character, and to add a final list of traits, before ending this section. Throughout my report I have carefully qualified all judgments about the unity of Puerto Rican culture by emphasizing that culture is a historical product, and is rarely shared (and certainly not, in Puerto Rico's case) by all members of the society. Instead, culture is differentially carried by individual Puerto Ricans, and its symbolic meanings are doubtless differentiated as well. At the same time, I have suggested that the concept of "social idiom" may well provide one of the more fruitful directions for getting at some nationwide value system or "style" that might justifiably be regarded as typically or even uniquely Puerto Rican. The concept rests on the known need for members of different social groups within a single society to interact meaningfully with each other. To do so, they must present images of themselves that are consistent with the social usages and expectations of others. The relational process—or more simply put, the way people carry on behavior in emotionally and symbolically comprehensible ways—requires some basic conventional understanding; Wolf (1956b: 1075), Seda Bonilla (1957), and others have explored this process usefully, and Lauria (1964) has sought to apply his analysis to one aspect of Puerto Rican social relations. His paper begins with a consideration of the concept of "respeto," and he admits at the outset that the values implied by the term, as well as the term itself, are clichés. It is, he contends, precisely because they are clichés that they say something true and analytically important about Puerto Rican character. Terms such as "homebre de respeto, falta de respeto, hay que darse a respetar antes de ser respetado, hombre de confianza, hombre prócerto, sinvergüenza, de carácter," and many others fall within the area that defines respeto and its opposite, and it is possible to explore this sphere of definition by getting descriptions of acts and feelings from informants. The overfamiliarity of the terminology no more obviates careful analysis than would be true of comparable terminology in the language of another culture. Thus, for instance, in American English, we use such terms as "shame," "self-respect," "no self-respecting person would * * *" "shameless," "conscienceless," "to feel guilty," "to feel small," to be "shown up," to "put up or shut up," "to back down," etc.—and the familiarity of such terms by no means invalidates their usefulness for understanding the characteristic tones of American social life. Lauria contends that, in the Puerto Rican case, proper understanding of such terms and their meanings is typical of the entire society, and not of a single segment of it. Such terms as are understood throughout the society prove their relevance to the social totality because they are clichés, and because they are understood by everyone; they mark the areas in which ready communication among people of different social status require considerable common understanding.

Lauria's exposition deals primarily with two such clusters, "respeto" and "relajo"; he establishes to my satisfaction that these terminologies lie close to the heart of Puerto Rican culture and identity, and give evidence that such identity is a reality. I feel a certain difficulty myself in dealing with these materials though I believe they are extremely insightful and provocative. It seems to me that the terms and their meanings suggest rather more about personality than they do about culture—though I am prepared to admit that they represent aspects of learned social behavior, and not simply "character structure." I also find it difficult to see how such materials can be transformed into a picture of a national culture—something presumably unique, and on a total societal scale. However, I believe the promise of this research is great. Lauria is now working on problems of "social types," with the hope of characterizing Puerto Rican (or Hispanic-Latin American) "social personalities." What is most interesting about the concepts, it seems, is the way they permit one's transcending such basic sociological considerations as differences in class, sex, age, and social status. I believe it is indeed true that, on such values as respeto and its meaning, the Puerto Rican worker and Puerto Rican banker probably share much of their understanding. This is, however, a long way from any satisfactory depiction of Puerto Rican nationhood, and pioneers such as Seda Bonilla and Lauria are well aware of it.

In her work for me, Mrs. Collier attempted at one point to summarize briefly her impressions of the features of Puerto Rican life that figured most importantly in her reading. I have added a bit to her list, but it is admittedly an impressionistic and untested formulation; I include it here for what it may be worth. It should be remembered that these various items are not regarded by Mrs. Collier or by myself as of equal weight or in any sense "proved."

(1) Puerto Rico is not only Spanish-speaking, but bids fair to remain so for as long as one can predict. The Spanish language, while it has different values, no doubt, to members of different groups, is commonly approved of and preferred by nearly everyone. Much of the sentimental speciality of feeling of the Puerto Rican people about themselves and about the island rests in linguistic considerations.

(2) Puerto Rico is a Catholic country; but it is not just any Catholic country, it is Puerto Rico. Puerto Rican Catholicism is much differentiated in class and other terms, and other religions—particularly the nonecumenical Protestant sects—have grown rapidly at the cost of a formal but sometimes empty rural Catholicism. All the same, many of what appear to be widely held or basic values in Puerto Rican life flow from the Catholic spirit; being a "bad" Catholic (consensual marriage, not attending church, not going to confession, etc.) does not signify an absence of Catholicism, but occurs within the context of the presence of Catholicism. The concept of a supernatural order; the belief that objects may possess supernatural powers; the division (implicit, to be sure) of women into "Marys" and "Eves"; the veneration of Mary and of motherhood; the confirmed use of external sanctions to atone for sins (penance), and of external social devices to control, prevent, and punish behavior; the double sexual standard; the much-used institution of compadrazgo—these, and much else, suggest the underlying power of a Catholic ideology which, in Puerto Rico's case, is less expressed as an aspect of religiosity than as an aspect of national character.

(3) Puerto Ricans continue to accept the idea of a class-structured society in which those with less power and authority owe agreed-upon acts, and attitudes of deference and respect, to others more powerful than they. It is perfectly true that this may well be changing rapidly in Puerto Rico; nevertheless it bears noting that the child-training patterns in many class groupings, and the institutionalized inferiority of women, are behavioral complexes that are probably consistent with this idea of a world ordered into superordinate and subordinate sectors. I will not attempt to substantiate this assertion anecdotally or at length, but examples are very easy to come by (Seda Bonilla, 1957, 1963, 1964; Brown, 1964; Rogler, 1940; Wolf in Steward, 1956; Mintz, 1960; Albizu and Marty, 1958; etc.).

(4) Typically Puerto Rican is the particular complex of attitudes delineated by Gillin (1955) for Latin America, and applied by Brameld (1959) and Cochran (1959) to Puerto Rico: (*a*) A special image of "the individual"; (*b*) the acceptance of a stratified social hierarchy (see above); and (*c*) a transcendental or idealistic view of the world. We have seen that "individualism" signifies here a notion of worth and uniqueness unrelated to the outer world or to worldly success.

The idea of the world as a fixed social hierarchy has been raised in the preceding paragraph, and needs no further discussion. As to Gillin's third generalization, it is interesting to note that Steward, though chary of characterological generalization, does write of the Puerto Ricans that (1956: 11) they share "* * * emphasis upon spiritual and human rather than commercial values; interest in poetry, literature and philosophy rather than science and industry; and emphasis on interpersonal relations rather than a competitive individualism." He makes clear at the same time that such dispositions are probably not equally shared by any means by all Puerto Ricans.

(5) The concept of dignidad, and the related concepts of honor, "respeto, confianza," etc., and their polar opposites, communicated in such terms as "relajón, sinvergüenza," etc. Since I have referred to this material earlier, I will say not more of it here.

(6) The need for interaction in order to define the self. Privacy is neither valued nor desired; the opinions of others seem to weigh more than any internalized abstract code of behavior; dignidad, respeto, confianza, etc., are defined with reference to others. Accordingly, outside sanctions are required to define individual behavior; chaperonage and the overuse of the terms vergüenza and sinvergüenza, are indicators of the powerful ways that outside sanctions function. There is fear of people who are sensitive to outside opinion, and therefore of "sinvergüenzas" fear as well of uncontrolled aggression, and some contradiction between attitudes toward aggression and attitudes toward ideal maleness (machismo).

(7) The double sexual standard. North Americans are hardly in a position to throw stones—but it would be a gross error to suppose that the North American double standard, and that allegedly typical of Puerto Rico, operate in identical or even roughly similar ways. Especially important is the way the double standard concedes no real autonomy to either sex—chaperonage operates as if no man were capable of controlling himself, and as if no woman were really able to say "no." At the same time, it should be noted that the underlying assumption here may make for relatively straightforward and satisfactory sexual relations in marriage. (The ethnographic data, unfortunately, do not confirm such an optimistic inference.)

(8) Together with the double sexual standard, there appears to be a strong belief in the natural inferiority of women—they have five senses compared to man's seven, they are weaker physically, they are more emotional and cannot reason, and they are assumed to have a radically different personality structure I need hardly add that I am unconvinced that this view is held with equal fondness by members of all social groups, or by members of both sexes.

(9) The cult of virginity, which goes along with the points made

above, and conceivably still affects powerfully the quality of social relationships in Puerto Rico.

(10) Consonant with this is the relative lack of communication between the sexes, and their strict separation throughout life. As in other ways—such as the belief in a rigid social hierarchy, with clear obligations of deference—I believe this aspect of Puerto Rican life is changing rapidly.

(11) Machismo, as a complex of attitudes and values having to do with maleness and male dignidad, and logically counterposed to the points made above. Though machismo as a term has been much used, it has received nowhere the serious analytic and qualifying attention it deserves. Mrs. Collier points out, for instance, that machismo is hinged more to the opinions of a man's peer group than to his inner sense of confident maleness, but much more needs to be done with this idea.

(12) Dependency, as an aspect of social life. Often claimed as a central feature of the Puerto Rican character (see, for instance, Pedreira, 1946; Albizu and Marty, 1958), too little has been done to relate the concept to concrete details of behavior.

To this list might be added, quite provisionally, the emphasis on personal cleanliness as opposed to much lesser concern with the physical environment; an "undeveloped" aesthetic sense; difficulty in deferring gratification; the relativistic tolerance of cultural difference; the unwillingness to rationalize the pleasurable as primarily practical (in contrast to the North American); the reluctance to see guilt as a preferable moral force to shame; and much else.

In concluding, I think it important to emphasize yet again that the kind of view of "the Puerto Rican" or "the Puerto Rican people" provided by arguments of this sort is not one to which I am personally very sympathetic. Though this sketch is brief, I have tried to state the case for such characterizations as fairly as I can. My reservations, once again, inhere in the difficulty, first of all, of proving such assertions; and secondly, in my feeling that class differences and rapid social change both conspire to invalidate these kinds of generalizations almost as soon as they are set forth.

STUDIES OF CHANGE

It may seem paradoxical that so little has been written on social change in Puerto Rico, when few societies seem to be changing so rapidly, or to be receiving so much social scientific attention. Tumin and Feldman (1961) take what may be fairly called an optimistic view of social change in Puerto Rico. Their study, based on questionnaire materials, indicates that Puerto Ricans share a universal desire to educate their children (1961: 123); that people see their society as open because they aspire more for their children than for themselves (1961: 143); that morale is high, and that people do not see present inequalities as insuperable (1961: 164); that those who see their children in the same social class as themselves are culturally conservative (1961: 201); and so on. In fact, there are several methodological difficulties here (not the least, perhaps, being that which dogs all questionnaire studies—the problem of reliability and of comprehension); among them, the disposition to treat informants from the various subcultures of Puerto Rico as if there were no subcultural differences seems particularly shortsighted. In spite of the authors' optimism, and of their confidence in education as the great leveler in Puerto Rican life, the book does not confidently increase our understanding of social change in the island.

Morse (1960), taking a very different tack, strikes out at what he sees as overglib and superficial analyses of the "transformation" of Puerto Rico, and calls this transformation illusory. He wonders whether it is realistic to suppose that the island will really one day have "* * * la piedad católica, las tradiciones afectuosas de familia, el respeto artificial hacia la mujer y el individualismo espiritual y estético, y por el otro lado, el empuje, logro material y 'confort' y la eficiencia organizacional del mundo de los negocios yanqui" (1960: 358). Not only does he doubt the chances for such a hybridization, but he feels called upon to point out that all the United States would be supplying in such an amalgam would be method, technology, and money.

Morse takes issue with the common assumption (as suggested, for instance, by the work of Brameld, 1959, and Cochran, 1959, in their use of Gillin, 1955) that Puerto Rico is but a piece of some single culture sphere called "Latin America," without attention to the special history of the island. That history, he argues, has been poor in national symbols and in national triumphs, and the Puerto Ricans have real difficulty in creating a tough "national self-image" (autoimagen nacional). Puerto Rico cannot be a hybrid of two cultures because Puerto Rico was never really Spanish (in the sense in which much of the South American mainland was). The island society was too fragmented, isolated, dependent, and ignored for this—even the Catholic church had no profound success in establishing itself. Spanish culture was reduced to a framework, perchance a matrix, rather than being the basic structure of the society. Little group identity evolved, perhaps in part because of the isolation of the island, with its internal fragmentation due to limited development, poor communication, rigid class lines, etc. The lack of a group identity may be related, in fact, to the often-imputed "docility" of the Puerto Rican people; they tend to look for help from outside, not trusting their own initiative and suffering when faced with critical decisions. A culture that is docile in this way, Morse contends, has three characteristics: (*a*) The powers of self-criticism and of self-evaluation are retarded; (*b*) the people and the whole society are prey to fantasies because they lack a self-image forged in internal conflicts; and (*c*) the members of the society have difficulty in identifying public objects upon which to vent the hostility that all societies possess (1960: 365).

Accordingly, Morse contends, the period of supposed "hybridization" and "transformation" has been one in which wishy-washy policies have developed, which are of no help to the Puerto Ricans in forming a picture of their own identity. Lacking a clear self-image, a clear purpose and a sense of national self, the Puerto Ricans lean too much on fantasy, and their docility hides hostility and frustrations; life swings between the extremes of apathy and frantic activity.

Obviously Morse is not denying that Puerto Rico has changed; he is arguing instead that it has not changed for the better, and that, in the essential terms of a national identity, it is as bemused as ever, if not more so.

An equally pessimistic picture, put somewhat differently, is given us by the work of Seda Bonilla (1964). Based on anthropological fieldwork in a north coast sugarcane community in 1948–49 and a decade thereafter, Seda's study provides an interesting series of insights about change. Seda sees the traditional rural family structure as deteriorating under the impact of higher consumption aspirations, migration, and the resultant inroads on familial and sexual stability. The traditional role of women is crumbling; they seek sexual pleasure for pay, leave their children with their grandparents, ignore the taboo on association with other males besides their spouses, and use their economic independence as a reassurance against the risks of a broken family. Young people admire the easy life of no obligations and little work. They reject the past, and have no use for the idea of the "hombre serio y formal" (1964: 49). They are bored, have little to talk about because they "know so much," and are passive and dependent ("cool"). They do not want manual work, yet lack the education to get clerical or skilled jobs; they tend to emigrate readily, and ridicule tradition and the old "jíbaro" customs (1964: 51).

People fear being tricked (see also Landy, 1959; Brown, 1964); they incline to trust no one, and their children are often made promises that are not kept. Generosity is highly valued, but always suspect (1964: 113). People with authority are seen as "good" if they grant special favors. As with a small child, to be denied a favor by one in authority is to be branded as "bad." If a man does not grant a favor, it is because he is holding it back for a relative, or does not like the petitioner (1964: 115). To be denied is to be offended, and so people fear to ask for things; yet they depend on the favors of leaders, and receiving a favor means being in debt. The consolidation and institutionalization of political power, the growth in consumption standards, the easy "out" provided by migration—these have intensified dependency, fear of freedom, and cynicism, while leaving nothing better behind. People fear both being left helpless, and being free, since being free means each can do as he pleases, resulting in a sort of chaos.

Seda Bonilla's work is a fascinating introduction to rural life from a largely "culture-and-personality" orientation, and it contains many sharp insights. However, one has little feeling that the author really controlled in any reliable way his assessment of social change. His pessimism is quite noticeable, and his hopes for communities of the sort he studied are markedly reserved. I will not attempt to examine here the same author's work on attitudes concerning civil liberties in Puerto Rico; but this work does throw some extremely interesting light on the relativistic tolerance imputed to Puerto Ricans. One obvious reservation is that many of these data were collected by questionnaire, with the accompanying problems of confirming reliability.

In a short paper, Maldonado Denis (1963) tackles the question of change, but puts his emphasis on the political implications of such change. In his view, industrialization and "penetración cultural norteamericana" are different streams of influence, not to be confused with each other (1963: 143). People in underdeveloped countries develop a sort of cultural schizophrenia, based on the conflicts implicit in changes away from the traditional culture. In Puerto Rico's case, the culture conflict brought about by North American power has been intensified by industrialization. The economy is largely within the sphere of North American control, and political decisions of a fundamental sort still rest in North American hands. The author sees the solution of Puerto Rico's cultural problems as a political solution—the annihilation or continuity of Puerto Rican culture depends, in effect, on whether Puerto Rico becomes independent, for independence would preserve the culture, while statehood would destroy it. While of interest, this paper adds little that is useful in any weighing of change in Puerto Rico. Though quite different in political outlook, much the same may be said of Fernández Méndez (1955) (also see Benítez and Rexach, 1964). Lewis (1963), in an intimidatingly well-documented study, says much of great interest concerning the Puerto Rican society. I will not attempt its summary here; as in the case of Tumin and Feldman (1961), I have written a review of the book which summarizes my main contentions concerning it (Mintz, 1964).

A short paper by Fernández Méndez (1963) sketches rather superficially the effects of recent changes (particularly economic) on the

Puerto Rican family. The description is not based on fieldwork, and the tone is exhortatory rather than objective.

I had hoped that the materials provided by Brown (1964) might give new light on the consequences of change in Puerto Rico, but in fact the materials deal mainly with what could be described as a strikingly conservative and isolated rural subculture. It seems that nothing approaching the Steward-edited work for completeness and detail has appeared on Puerto Rico in the intervening decade, and I am unable to add much that is not impressionistic. I have referred in the body of my report to the study by Hernández Alvárez (1964), and to my own observations on a 2-day visit to a rural community this year (Mintz, 1965), but these data are sketchy, perhaps inconsequential. Given the enormous importance of recent social and cultural changes for any thoughtful analysis of contemporary Puerto Rico, I regret that so little of value can be said here about change.

SUMMARY

The five preceding sections of this appendix enumerate some of the best-known studies of Puerto Rico (with occasional references to "belles-lettres"), and give at least a sketchy accounting of some of their findings. Additional sections—for instance, political life at the community level, life-history studies, and religion—might well have been added, but for the pressure of time. I do feel these materials make clear the difficulties implicit in attempting to draw any single holistic picture of island culture or Puerto Rican identity. While many of the items mentioned under national culture and national values doubtless have a certain validity and generality, I believe it would be hard to make them into a "picture" of the Puerto Rican personality or national culture.

Especially galling is the lack of any suitable factual basis for the interpretation of the impact of change on Puerto Rican culture and values. The obvious consequences are just that—obvious; but these understandings give us neither a full grasp of the society nor any predictive power. If some additional fieldwork were possible, more analytic data would be forthcoming. I should repeat once more my own reservations about holistic analysis of the Puerto Rican case, and admit to the clear incompleteness of the materials assembled here.

Perhaps the major value of such an exercise might be in the extent to which it could provoke additional dialogue concerning island society. It would be most helpful—and I acknowledged my prejudices—were some of the more articulate commentators to attempt ethnographic fieldwork in order to fill out their assertions, both positive and negative, with the words and voices of the Puerto Rican people.

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[1] This presentation is admittedly very sketchy. A behavioral trait (knife-using, shot-wearing, the use of a particular word or of certain grammatical forms, styles of dress, etc.) may have to be acquired beforehand in order to change one's status; some "successful" people take pride in maintaining some behavioral traits exactly because they are symbols of behavior of members of a lower status group; parents may push their children toward new manipulations of cultural materials to prepare them for upward status mobility; and so on. In the case of Puerto Rico, many culturally nationalistic middle class persons regard those poorer and more rural than themselves as more authentically Puerto Rican; but this is because the depressed status of the rural poor so often has kept them from taking on the symbols employed by those more fortunate than themselves.

[2] The first edition was published in 1934.

[3] Cf. app. B for a discussion of these points.

[4] Rosario (1930) has written a sketch on the "peasant" useful in this connection.

[5] The late Clyde Kluckhohn, anthropologist, sought to get at what might be called "national character" through studies of group values. In an appendix prepared by Mrs. Jane Collier, a tentative application of the Kluckhohn approach to Puerto Rican materials is offered. It must be emphasized that this work was base don written materials only, and involved no fieldwork. All the same, the findings are of some interest.

Wolf's brilliant paper on Mexican group relations (1956b), and Lauria's exploration (1964) of Puerto Rican interpersonal relations deal with "social idiom"; the work of Kathleen Wolf (1952) makes valuable use of child-training data for Puerto Rico; and Steward's associates (1956) employed social history very significantly in their analyses.

THE UNITED STATES AND THE DILEMMAS OF POLITICAL CONTROL

by

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The United States came into being out of a revolution which was declared in noble language to represent universal principles of freedom in government. It took form as a nation under a written constitution which, by surviving tests of time and perils of politics, demonstrated that government of the people was possible. Such at least is the conviction which history has instilled and fortified among Americans.

This or any nation must be, of course, the continuing creation of each new generation, but the articulation at its birth of principles which were renewed and reapplied in the demands of each new era has given the national life of the United States a unique coherence which is a source of immense strength. The "fourscore and seven years ago" of the Gettysburg battlefield has passed its centennial. History, for Americans schooled in the national origins, is not just time endured, not an idiot's tale nor the blind oppression of fate. Rather—and this is true of men of various philosophies, many of whom profess to be in revolt against excesses of patriotism—it provides values and objectives which demand application to every great national decision, in terms too profound and pervasive to be ignored.

The central principle of American political belief is that government derives legitimacy from the consent of the governed. This is a subversive and divisive idea, an invitation to revolution, incompatible, one might suppose, with successful government of a vast and diverse state. But it has been sufficiently achieved in the Constitution and practice of the United States to have become on the whole a source of strength. It can dissolve empires, but it can also be a potent, attractive and adhesive force for the nation that can exemplify it. On this principle, the United States took form as a Federal Republic and expanded across the continent, responding at each step, it was believed, to demands for freedom. As with most principles, this gave rise to blindness and abuse; it helped to conceal and excuse both injustice to American Indians and aggressive pressures against adjacent sovereignties. But it precluded the establishment of an American empire in which the rulers were set permanently over the ruled. Whenever the United States came into control of dependent territories, its rule was challenged and weakened by the beliefs and contentions of its own people. Prolonged and calculated exploitation was hardly possible as long as freedom was valued, although one must also recognize that the working of representative government can bring self-delusion and neglect and may leave opportunities for special interests to take advantage of political subordination.

☆ ☆ ☆

From the beginning of its national life, the United States was not composed of States only, but included immense areas which were held in the name of the union of States. The pattern for transition to statehood was set while the Constitution was being written in 1787, in the Northwest Ordinance. In its basic provisions this followed an earlier plan by the author of the Declaration of Independence and it reflected the spirit of that document. Jefferson, in the words of his biographer, "had no desire to break from the British Empire only to establish an America—in which the newer regions would be subsidiary and tributary to the old. What he dreamed of was an expanding union of self-governing commonwealths, joined as a group of peers."[1] The Ordinance of 1787, although less liberal in some respects than Jefferson's draft, provided for early achievement of self-government and statehood. Moreover, it proved to be politically realistic. In a letter to James Monroe, Jefferson brought together the elements of moral imperative and self-interest which Americans have been impelled to apply:

> With respect to the new states where the question to stand simply in this form, How may the ultramontane territory be disposed of so as to produce the greatest and most immediate benefit to the inhabitants of the maritime parts of the union? the plan would be more plausible of laying it off into two or three states only. * * * But it is a question which good faith forbids us to receive into discussion. This requires us to state the question in its just form. How may the territories of the Union be disposed of so as to produce the greatest degree of happiness to their inhabitants? * * * [I]f they decide to divide themselves we are not able to restrain them. They will end by separating from our confederacy and becoming its enemies. * * * Upon this plan we treat them as fellow citizens. They will have a just share in their own government, they will love us, and pride themselves in a union with us. Upon the other we treat them as subjects, we govern them and not they themselves; they will abhor

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NOTE.—Footnotes follow at end of study, p. 468.

us as masters and break off from us in defiance. (Jefferson to Monroe, July 9, 1786) [2]

It could not always be true that the long-range interests and the values of the United States would coincide, but American political beliefs demanded the assumption that free expressions of the will of the people are a source of lasting national strength and advantage. The people of a distinct territory, it was assumed, could not and should not be prevented from developing distinct interests and giving political expression to them, at first within a loose framework of territorial government and soon through statehood. Their interests should not and need not be obliterated in the spread of a national sovereignty.

In keeping with the natural law philosophy of the time, Congress "ordained and declared" that the substantive provisions of the Ordinance of 1787 constituted "Articles of compact between the Original States and People and States in the said territory", and should "forever remain unalterable, unless by common consent".[3] This legislative invocation of "compact" was vulnerable to strict tests of law and logic. It covered detailed provisions regarding boundaries as well as fundamental matters of right, the most contentious being the prohibition of slavery. It was a unilateral pronouncement by a body soon to be superseded, and implied that permanent restrictions might be maintained upon the States in this region which would not apply to the rest of the States. Litigation regarding slavery and other matters resulted in court decisions which denied the binding character of the Ordinance, and boundary changes were made without the consent of the parties.[4] But the very weakness and questionable character of the concept in legal terms gives added emphasis to the fundamental nature of the significance of the idea of a compact in the minds of those who formulated it, as an expression of the principle of consent.

Despite the diversity among the States which formed the Union in 1789, all of them were predominantly English in the origins of their institutions and culture. The framers of the Constitution were not consciously providing for a conglomerate nation. Yet the principles of government which they set forth were considered to be universal, and it was already evident that the American Nation would be heterogeneous in the national origins of its population. This country, it was believed, could and would demonstrate the basic validity of its ideals and institutions through their appeal and applicability to all manner of men. In practice, to be sure, the United States left the Indians "out of its sympathy and almost out of its care" [5] and failed, even for a century after emancipation, to give full recognition to the civil rights of Negroes. But these were problems not squarely confronted in terms of political relationship.

Despite the tendency to fear and distrust people of different language and religion, the United States did not exclude the possibility that territories predominantly not of English language and culture might share through statehood in the political life of the Nation. The flood of settlement from the seaboard States meant that this was never a probable outcome in the Old Northwest, although persons of French descent constituted a majority as late as 1800 in the area which became Illinois, and in Michigan, even in 1812, some four-fifths of the 5,000 whites were French. But the treaty of purchase for Louisiana, where the French majority was not likely soon to be outnumbered, provided that "the inhabitants shall be incorporated into the Union of the United States, and admitted as soon as possible, according to the principles of the Federal Constitution, to the enjoyment of the rights, advantages, and immunities, of citizens of the United States."[6]

The purchase and control of Louisiana provided a new test of the scope and application of the basic ideas of American Government. By extending the sovereignty of the United States over territory not part of the Union when the Constitution was adopted, with the apparent promise of statehood for a substantial settled population around New Orleans which was strongly French, the Jefferson administration gave the Nation imperial dimensions and responsibilities while at the same time affirming principles of freedom and equality. Those in the older States who would lose political power in a country of vast expanse had reason to question the right of the Federal Government "at will, to weaken and outweigh the influence, relatively secured to each State, in this compact, by introducing, at pleasure, new partners, situate beyond the old limits of the United States."[7] Following this course, they argued, might not the United States come to include the islands of the West Indies and even Great Britain? But no one could effectively deny that the United States had the power to acquire new territory, nor that it had in fact become the responsible sovereign of Louisiana. Nor was there any inclination to promote the eventual independence of this territory, despite Jefferson's belief that the expansion of population would and should ultimately result in the emergence of several States in North America. The resulting dilemma was well described by Henry Adams:

> Did Louisiana belong to the central government at Washington, or to the States? The Federalists maintained that the central government, representing the States in Union, might, if it pleased, as a consequence of its inherent sovereignty, hold the rest of America in its possession and govern it as England governed Jamaica or as Spain was governing Louisiana, but without the consent of the States could not admit such new territory into the Union. The Republicans seemed rather inclined to think that new territory acquired by war or conquest would become at once a part of the general territory mentioned in the Constitution, and as such might be admitted by Congress as a State, or otherwise disposed of as the general

> welfare might require, but that in either case neither the people nor the States had anything to do with the matter. At bottom, both doctrines were equally fatal to the old status of the Union. In one case the States, formed or to be formed, east of the Mississippi had established a government which could hold the rest of the world in despotic control, and which bought foreign people as it might buy cattle, to rule over them as its owner; in the other case, the government was equally powerful, and might besides admit the purchased or conquered territory into the Union as States. The Federalist theory was one of empire, the Republican was one of assimilation; but both agreed that the moment had come when the old Union must change its character.[8]

The solution was to accept change as a feature of the Union, with assimilation rather than empire the stronger theme, and Americans since that time have not doubted the wisdom of the incorporation of Louisiana. But statehood was not achieved until after the United States had conducted a brief experiment in empire, despite the treaty and the Constitution, and had heard the fundamental principle of government by consent invoked in eloquent protest against its oppression.

The first Louisiana act gave the President practically absolute powers, which were exercised by a Governor who know next to nothing of the society and law of the French and Spanish population. A few months later, Congress separated the territory around New Orleans from the largely uninhabited northerly and westerly expanses of the Louisiana Purchase and set up, on a temporary basis, a wholly appointive legislative council. In a long remonstrance in the name of "the people of Louisiana," signed by three men of French descent, the force and appeal of what the United States stood for in government was displayed in bitterness and irony. The very protest went far to refute the assumptions which could justify denial of political rights:

> Are truths * * * so well founded, so universally acknowledged, inapplicable only to us? Do political axioms on the Atlantic become problems when transferred to the shores of the Mississippi?
>
> To deprive us of our right of election, we have been represented as too ignorant to exercise it with wisdom, and too turbulent to enjoy it with safety. Sunk in ignorance, effeminated by luxury, debased by oppression, we were, it was said, incapable of appreciating a free constitution, if it was given, or feeling the deprivation if it were denied.[9]

Congress did move in 1805 to give Orleans the rights of other territories and made more explicit the goal of statehood. In 1811, after a memorable debate, it gave approval to the admission of the State of Louisiana. Opponents questioned the qualifications of a population predominantly of different national origin, language and religion from the vast majority of the nation, but on the whole, criticism on this score was muted. Those who supported statehood held that Americans should be pleased to find in this portion of their new land, instead of a wild and uncultivated waste, "a fruitful and luxurient territory, covered by a great number of people, who, since the time of their being ceded to the United States, have manifested, as much as in their power, their attachment and allegiance to the United States."[10] It was held that, by accepting the condition that all governmental proceedings be conducted in English, these people had proven "their willingness to sacrifice prejudice at the shrine of liberty."[11] Advocates of statehood refused to be daunted by the argument that this would set the nation on a new and dangerous course. Were it possible, said Representative Rhea of Tennessee, "to move the foundations of the West India islands, and place them close alongside the United States, I would have no objection to the admission of them as States into the Union, if the people thereof were willing." The United States, in his view, having at great effort and cost "purchased the rights of freemen, self-government and independent to themselves," had also gained the right and ability to communicate those sacred rights to people of all nations, tongues, and kindreds, who, at any time, embodying themselves within the United States, according to the laws thereof, or being inhabitants of territories contiguous thereto, the United States might deem proper * * * the consent of all parties interested therein being peacefully obtained, to adopt as their own.* * *"[12]

Florida, which had long been settled and controlled from Spain, was also gained by the United States under a promise that it would be incorporated into the Union. Its government passed quickly through two stages of autocratic control in the same manner as Orleans, the council becoming elective in 1826, but it did not gain statehood until 1845. The Spanish inhabitants, who soon became a small minority, were praised by the Governor in 1822 as "the best even among the most quiet and orderly of our own citizens."[13]

Texas, having become an independent State dominated by emigrants from the United States, was annexed and given statehood by act of Congress, without having to pass through a period of dependency in territorial status. This procedure was a convenient substitute for the conclusion of a treaty which could not have gained the required support in the Senate.

California and New Mexico were gained in consequence of the ensuing war with Mexico. The local populations were urged by the military officers in charge, on instructions from President Taylor, to form constitutions and seek admission to statehood. In California, where American emigrants had seized local leadership, a constitution was quickly adopted and became the basis for statehood the following year. In New Mexico, where the population included fewer than

1,000 people who had been born in the United States, among more than 65,000 of Spanish, Indian, and mixed origin, a convention in 1850, responding to pressure from the administration, drafted a constitution for a State government and elected prospective senators and other officials.[14] President Taylor's hope that the question of slavery in the territories could be avoided by immediate statehood gave way, however, upon his death, to the strategy represented by the great compromise of 1850, leaving the theoretical possibility of slavery in New Mexico. This entailed rejection of the proposal for statehood under a constitution which outlawed slavery.

It is noteworthy that in the mixture of motivations which were brought to bear on the question of immediate statehood for New Mexico, the Spanish and Indian or "Mexican" preponderance in its population and culture was not considered a disqualification. Nine-tenths of the delegates to the constitutional convention of 1850 bore Spanish names, although American immigrants seem to have taken the lead and gained most of the available offices.[15] Senator Seward of New York, the strongest advocate of admitting New Mexico, said that although he would not have taken steps "to bring these peculiar people into the United States as a State of this Union" by purchase or conquest, in the existing circumstances their rights could not be protected or defended in any other way. Unlike the English colonists, he maintained, the Spanish had "operated successfully in winning the Indians to Christianity and partial civilization," with the "extraordinary result" that the United States, although excluding Indians from the rights of citizenship at home, had "conquered the aborigines of Spanish portions of the continent for the purpose of making them citizens, and * * * extended to them the rights and franchises of citizenship." [16]

Having come close to statehood in 1850, New Mexico did not attain it until 1912. The long delay was due only in small measure to the prominence of the Spanish-speaking population, although this was brought into discussion by opponents of statehood whose position was taken primarily for other reasons. In 1875, when Spanish was spoken by more than four times as many New Mexicans as spoke English, statehood was approved by large majorities in both Houses of Congress and failed final passage only because southern representatives were offended by the apparent support given by the delegates from New Mexico to a "bloody shirt" speech and switched their votes to block the two-thirds needed at the end of the session to reconcile the Senate and House versions of the bill.[17] In subsequent years, when the issue arose, part of the press and some members of Congress cast doubt on the fitness of the people of New Mexico to exercise the responsibilities of statehood. A Denver newspaper was moved to comment in 1902:

> While teachers were being sent by the shipload to Porto Rico and the Philippines, New Mexico, although for 50 years a territory of the United States, had never received any aid in the way of public education. * * * When this territory passed under the dominion of the United States it was as thoroughly foreign in customs and language as Porto Rico is today. Yet the United States has taken no special pains to educate the people of that territory, and what they have accomplished is due to their own splendid effort.[18]

The Senate Committee on Territories, whose chairman, Senator Beveridge of Indiana, was determined to find means of thwarting what he considered to be the corrupt motivations of some of those pressing for statehood, held hearings in 1902 which gave emphasis to the need for interpreters in the courts, in politics and in the legislature, as well as the extent of illiteracy and the "characteristics * * * of the 'Mexican' element" which comprised the majority of the population.[19] But Beveridge supported statehood in 1910, a status which was achieved 2 years later, along with a provision "that ability to read, write, speak and understand the English language sufficiently well to conduct the duties of the office without the aid of an interpreter shall be a necessary qualification for all state officers and members of the State legislature."[20]

New Mexico, as it turned out, was the only large area of Spanish-speaking population which was annexed by the United States prior to the war with Spain. There were, however, proposals, seriously if briefly entertained, for other acquisitions. It is unavoidable that the hindsight of history, in the fullness of its view of what did happen, tends to assume that this was what had to happen and finds it difficult to recapture the position of those in the past with options still before them, unaware of the future turn of events. It would be going too far in the other direction to assume that what was thought of might actually have transpired, but it should at least be noted that during the period of continental expansion a considerable number of influential Americans thought that the United States would eventually include all of North America as well as Cuba and perhaps other Caribbean islands. This was a latent expectation rather than a spur to aggressive action, but it could be aroused by unusual need or opportunity.

Pressures for expansion southward in the period before the Civil War were to a large extent both generated and checked by the tensions which brought on that conflict. The movement which arose at the end of the Mexican War to annex much or all the territory of Mexico represented more, however, than the defensive maneuvers of the South. Nor was this simply a desire to enlarge the domain which was available for settlement from the existing States. It represented some of the same feelings which entered into the acquisition of the Philippines and Puerto Rico a half century later—"the conception of a religious duty to regenerate the unfortunate people of the enemy country by bringing them into the life-giving shrine of American democracy."[21] Weinberg, in his classical study of American national beliefs relating to expanson, sees this as the time of conscious and momentous change from the assumption that assimilation of the population of annexed territories would be a natural consequence of time and settlement to "a toleration of amalgamation with other breeds."[22] In their "youthful optimism," Americans believed that "this republic, being charged with the mission of bearing the banner of freedom over the whole civilized world, could transform any country, inhabited by any kind of population, into something like itself, simply by extending over it the magic charm of its institutions."[23] Such vews were doubtless rather shallowly held, and were set forth as rationalization of a development that seemed inevitable or desirable on other grounds. When President Polk was presented with the chance to make peace without large-scale annexation of Mexican population, he did so, and the idea of a mission of regeneration was forgotten. But similar attitudes reappeared later and the chain of events which left the Philippines under American control after 1898 was hardly less tenuous than that which kept Mexico independent in 1848.

There were other occasions in the 19th century when a chance that Spanish-speaking people might be joined to the United States became more than vague speculation. Cuba, in particular, was often thought of as ready to cast off its dependence on Spain and to find a new relationship to the United States, according to a supposed law of political gravitation. Probably the very belief in the inevitability of this event tended to prevent it from becoming a matter of urgent national policy. Congress and the public were preoccupied with other aspects of national growth in the post-Civil War period. President Grant's rather abrupt move to annex the Republic of Santo Domingo generated little public support and was blocked in Congress, not without an acrimonious quarrel, but without a national debate as to what such a step would mean in the long-range development of the nation and the hemisphere.

Thus, in 1898, the United States was suddenly projected into a position of responsibility and control of the Spanish islands of Cuba, the Philippines, and Puerto Rico, without a pronounced consensus as to the capacity of the American system of government to devise and maintain a political relationship with compact populations of different language and culture. There were precedents for temporary resort to arbitrary rule and for acceptance of the notion of incorporation of divese peoples, but neither imperial control nor the acceptance of cultural diversity as the basis for shared institutions had gained the rooting of historical experience. What did seem quite evident in the record was an ability and willingness to experiment, on the one hand, and the vigor and persistence of a fundamental commitment to freedom—the principle of consent—on the other. Indeed, the belief among Americans that their society derived its basic strength and character from the commitment to freedom was so strong that it could and did conceal the reality of arbitrary control under a cloak of good intentions, as well as keeping alive the optimistic belief that exposure to the American way of government would inculcate political virtue among people of different experience and tradition.

The events of 1898 which left the United States responsible for political construction in Hawaii, the Philippines, Cuba, Puerto Rico, and Guam, were not the result of a calculated effort for territorial acquisition. To be sure, the origins of the war with Spain and its outcome in the expulsion of Spain from its possessions without any concomitant recognition of the legitimacy of the revolutionary forces which had opposed Spanish control reflected the attitudes which prevailed throughout the western world at that time, in particular the exaggeration of national and "racial" differences and the belief that the United States should take its share of the "burden" of imperial responsibility. Most Americans would never concede, however, that this country's relationship with dependent peoples should follow the pattern of European imperialism; the contribution of the United States, they thought, would be to transform and liberate the people who came under its control. Unless this were deemed possible, overseas expansionism could not gain acceptance. The commitment to consent as the basis of legitimacy in government was too strong to be directly overcome although it would permit and even give support to experiments in tutelage which entailed at least the temporary establishment of arbitrary rule without any clear view of the means by which self-government would ultimately be attained or the form that it should take, either within the American realm or independent of it. The possibility that a period of intensive exposure to American control and influence might create such an intimate relationship that independence could not be achieved without severe costs, and that for this or other reasons objectives consistent with the American political ethic might prove unattainable, gave pause to some Americans in 1898 and thereafter, but did not prevent the actions which established American control. Perhaps, in any event, there was no real alternative to a period of dependency and exposure to the consequences of close association.

The recognized and accepted consummations of freedom, in American belief and experience, were independence and statehood. There was no explicit formulation as to what would determine which of these should be the outcome in a given situation, but factors of contiguity and homogeneity in relation to the existing states, whose consent would in any case be needed for statehood, entered strongly into the basic assumptions of the American approach and the hopes and expectations of the people concerned. It soon became evident that a resolution of the ultimate status of dependencies was not always apparent in terms either of statehood or independence. The noncontiguous territories of Alaska and Hawaii, the one sparsely populated, the other inhabited in majority by people of Oriental, Polynesian and mixed descent, were accepted as condidates for eventual statehood, but the achievement was put off, it seemed, to a receding future. Territories which had not been "incorporated" with the implied promise of statehood and which were or seemed to be still farther removed from contiguity and homogeneity with the states were not readily advanced on the road to unqualified independence. Cuba, to be sure, did become independent in 1902 in at least partial fulfillment of the pledge of Congress in the Teller amendment, but the United States insisted on retaining an explicit right of intervention, and an economic relationship developed which forged even closer links between the two countries than geography and the pattern of resources alone would have brought about. In the Philippines, resistance to American rule was forcibly subdued and a tutelage was undertaken which entailed only gradual and restricted achievement of self-government. There was a rather precipitate retreat from this objective during the presidency of Woodrow Wilson and again in the 1930s, when domestic economic pressures came close to reversing the motivations of self-interest which in earlier years had reinforced the cautious and conservative features of the policy of tutelage, with the consequence that the Philippines almost fell into independence before the Philippine leaders who had been pushing for it could realize how thoroughly and for what reasons the resistance had diminished. When it did come, Philippine independence was accompanied by economic arrangements which eased the transition. In both Cuba and the Philippines, U.S. military requirements were an important factor, and base rights were retained following independence. For the smaller dependencies, of which all but Puerto Rico are far smaller than any state, independence did not present itself as an evident solution for several reasons. An assumption on the side of the United States that Puerto Rico had become permanently linked with this country was expressed and consolidated in the grant of American citizenship to the people of

Puerto Rico. Economically, a rather passive dependence on markets in the states was superseded by an active and successful effort to take advantage of the opportunities which were presented by local control of taxation and the access which Puerto Rico enjoyed to the American economy. When vigorous political initiatives developed in Puerto Rico, seeking dignity and assurance in a "commonwealth" status, Congress responded with legislation which recognized such a status without fully defining it.

Thus the United States, dealing with the island territories which it acquired at the time of the war with Spain, has over the years maintained fundamental adherence to the principle of consent despite having exercised control over the people of these islands for varying periods of time and with varying severity, and despite inability or unwillingness to prevent the economic consequences of our policies from intensifying their dependent association with this country. In so doing, the United States has demonstrated its ability to relax the dogmas which might have led to the restriction of statehood to contiguous or continental territory, for example, or to a strict severance of special economic relationships as a concomitant of independence, or to a premature commitment for Puerto Rico. A closer look at the history relating to Hawaii, Cuba, the Philippines, and Puerto Rico may reveal in more detail some of the understandings, capabilities and susceptibilities which this country has demonstrated in trying to meet changing pressures and demands without permanent or basic denial of the principle of consent.

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In 1959, with the admission of Alaska and Hawaii, the United States showed that the destiny of statehood was not limited to the contiguous bloc of territory which (except for the District of Columbia) had achieved it by 1912. The people of these more remote areas were persuaded that their political aspirations would be satisfied and their problems could be adequately dealt with within the irreversible and rather inflexible pattern which statehood provided. Congress respected and gave effect to their desire.

Although the issues which Alaska posed were in some ways more difficult than those posed by Hawaii, these were largely questions of timing and finance, related to the vastness of the territory, the sparsity of its population and the difficulty of providing adequate state services. The basic decision that statehood need not be limited to the mainland and to the descendants of white settlers was more pronounced in the case of Hawaii.

In some respects Hawaii belongs in the same category of acquisitions as Texas and California. Like Texas, it had attracted emigrants from the states and came largely under the control of a minority who sought annexation in such fashion as to make it appear that this was but another step in westward expansion. Unlike Texas, however, Hawaii, in addition to being some 2,000 miles at sea, was inhabited by only a small minority of Americans and had developed a system of plantation agriculture which depended upon large supplies of unskilled labor. Annexation was opposed by the majority of the population, to all indications. The familiar image of self-reliant frontiersmen striking roots in virgin farmland hardly matched the realities in Hawaii. But the dominance of Americans and the longstanding belief that these islands were destined to become American territory made it difficult not to take the image for the fact.

Although annexation was by joint resolution of Congress rather than by treaty, Congress followed the provisions of the unratified treaties of 1893 and 1897 in declaring Hawaii to be "a part of the territory of the United States".[24] This implied that, unlike Puerto Rico and the Philippines, Hawaii was to enter upon the familiar progression from territorial status to statehood, in fulfillment in some sense of an obligation to the ruling group which had voluntarily relinquished sovereignty. Leaders of the Hawaiian Republic were deferred to. They were given a strong role in recommendations for an organic act when President McKinley appointed two of them to the five-member Hawaiian Commission. The Commission advocated restricting the suffrage to provide "a government at the start which would enable them to hold control in the hands of the best element of the islands until the question of loyalty to the United States could be a little more thoroughly tested." [25] Although Congress refused to accept a property qualification and there was a brief period when the Hawaiian Legislature was controlled by flamboyant dissenters, on the whole, American rule did not disrupt the dominance of the group which had gained control before annexation. Despite the opinion of Theodore Roosevelt, which was shared by leading members of Congress, that Hawaii should become "a healthy American community of men who themselves till the farms they own" rather than "a region of large estates tilled by cheap labor",[26] it was several years before any effective action was taken to stop the importation of Oriental labor. It was apparent by 1920 that despite all hopes to the contrary, the islands would be largely Oriental in population, and their agricultural economy would be based on large plantation units. Yet this did not in the end seriously detract from the success of self-government.

Advocacy of statehood gained strength during the 1930's when it received the support of major economic interests after they had become concerned that Congress could discriminate against Hawaii. It was a quarter of a century between the first serious consideration of statehood and its achievement in 1959. Long after it had become clear that a large majority of both Houses of Congress and the people both in Hawaii and in the States favored statehood, it was blocked in Congress. In a longer perspective, however, the attainment first of the consensus and eventually of statehood itself is more significant than the procedural delay.

The lengthy consideration of statehood for Hawaii provided ample opportunity for consideration of the arguments for and against it. Designation at the outset as an integral part of the United States established a presumption of eventual statehood (Hawaiians often claimed that it constituted a promise) and insured that, with slight exception, Hawaii was subjected to the same body of laws and taxes that prevailed in the States, so that statehood posed no major problem of economic adjustment. Per-capita income was in the upper part of the range among the States by 1953. Objections based on the racial composition of the population, the concentration of economic power, and the remoteness of the islands from the main body of the national territory met with vigorous refutation. In measurable standards of citizenship, Hawaii could boast of attainments superior to those of many States. The Japanese of Hawaii made an impressive record of loyalty and patriotism in the Second World War.

The contention that Hawaii's geographical separation from the mainland should weigh heavily against statehood was set forth by a number of Senators and commentators who thought that some form of Commonwealth status would be more appropriate. The interests of the people of a remote and distinct territory, it was argued, cannot be fused in Congress with those of the United States. To extend statehood overseas, this thesis held, was "in the nature of empire building" and it would add injustice to incongruity to give "these segments of empire the right to cast deciding votes that could * * * drastically change the laws that now govern the integrated States of our Union".[27] But this reasoning did not gain much support in Hawaii, despite the prospect that tax exemptions similar to those enjoyed by Puerto Rico would be a corollary of Commonwealth status. The proposal was rejected by a considerable majority in the Senate. Advocates of statehood asserted that modern transportation and communications had made remoteness unimportant. Hawaii had become "an integral part of the American scene," in the view of a Senate committee. The United States, it said, is "more than a mere geographic arrangement. It is a union that comes of a common loyalty and a common purpose. In these respects, Hawaii is, in fact, contiguous." [28]

The attainment of statehood by Hawaii was an authoritative denial that the geographical distance and the ethnical difference between it and the rest of the United States required political innovation. These factors of separation had been rendered largely irrelevant by economic and cultural assimilation and by the very attitudes and assumptions which enabled Hawaiians to aspire to statehood and eventually to gain it.

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Acquisition of the Philippine Islands could by no stretch of the imagination be thought of as a continuation of the traditional pattern of expansion. There had been no thought that "manifest destiny" spanned the Pacific and there was no significant advocacy of eventual statehood for the Philippines, either before or after the annexation. Americans nevertheless tried to bring the consequences of this unanticipated event within the scope of their political values through an assertion that American control of the Philippines would prove to be liberating in its effects. American rule was defended on the basis of necessity and duty rather than as permanent and preferred policy.

The Republican administrations which determined policy until 1913 embarked upon a long-range program of developing the economic and educational bases for successful self-government and providing for gradual introduction of Philippine leadership to political responsibility. Having resolved to put down the independence movement led by Aguinaldo, they resisted Democratic demands for an explicit commitment to eventual independence and a definition of the conditions for it. The dispute between the parties derived in part from the debate over annexation and was magnified because of this. Although there was a discernible difference in the pattern of their hopes and expectations, spokesmen of both parties used the traditional American political vocabulary. Republicans insisted, however, that to stress independence even as a future goal "would retard progress by the dissension and disorder it would arouse" [29] and some of them cherished the thought that the people of the Philippines might eventually decide to remain linked with the United States if the issue of independence were not unduly magnified nor decided too soon. President McKinley used the phrase "benevolent assimilation" to describe "the mission of the United States".[30] His spokesmen in the Philippines, General Otis and the Philippine Commission, did not hesitate to use such words as "liberty" and "free self-government" in their pronouncements.[31] By the narrowest of margins, the Senate rejected a resolution which set forth the goal of independence as soon as stable self-government should have been achieved and approved instead a vaguely worded statement that the United States did not intend permanent annexation of the Philippines "as an integral part" of its territory, but would "in due time * * * make such disposition of said islands as will best promote the interests of the citizens of the United States and the inhabitants of said islands."[32]

Elihu Root and William Howard Taft were the principal architects of early American policy toward the Philippines. They insisted that government there should conform to the customs, habits, and even prejudices of the Philippine people "to the fullest extent consistent with the accomplishment of the indispensable requisites of a just and effective government,"[33] and set in motion the procedure which led to the election of an assembly in 1907. This provided a forum which immediately came under the domination of advocates of immediate independence. Whatever private dissent and reservation existed, and there is evidence that it was considerable, political unanimity was quickly achieved on this subject. Thus there was a constant challenge to the continuation of the long-range policies of Root and Taft, of the kind which the American political system could not readily resist. In 1912, when the Democrats were about to take over, President Taft reaffirmed his view that the United States should try "to secure for the Filipinos economic independence and to fit them for complete self-government, with the power to decide eventually, according to their own largest good, whether such self-government shall be accompanied by independence."[34]

The difference between the Democrats, who stood for independence but did not press for complete and immediate withdrawal, and the Republicans, who stood for tutelage in self-government but did not reject the prospect of eventual independence, was not fundamental. But the accession of a Democratic administration did bring a radical change in the tone of administration. Wilson thought there should be step-by-step movement "toward the time of * * * independence as steadily as the way can be cleared and the foundations thoughtfully and permanently laid." But it was to be "their counsel and experience, rather than * * * our own" which would teach us "how best to serve them and how soon it will be possible and wise to withdraw our supervision".[35] In the Philippines, there was a striking reduction in the number and the authority of American administrators. In Congress, the administration-supported Jones bill promised independence, but it proved difficult to agree on a statement of the conditions for it. The debate revealed strong support for quick withdrawal. Neither party sponsored this, but members of both took part, discouraged and disillusioned, in some instances, by realization that the time and forebearance which would be required to enable the Philippines to meet any ideal criteria for independence were simply not attainable. The chance to move potential competition outside the American tariff wall played a part also, as did the hope of liquidating a strategic liability. A fixed time schedule, which passed the Senate in 1916, was defeated by a narrow margin in the House, however. The Jones Act of 1917 stated in its preamble that "it is, as it always has been, the purpose of the people of the United States to withdraw their sovereignty over the Philippine Islands and to recognize their independence as soon as a stable government can be established therein." [36]

After the Republicans returned to power, an attempt was made to restore more strict tutelage under Governor General Leonard Wood, with independence removed from the immediate agenda. Wood's very attempts to divert Philippine political leaders from their agitation for independence served as a stimulus for renewed demands; however, while in Congress the desire to cut loose from the Philippines was still strong. The administration tried to appease congressional sentiment in 1924 by a bill which would have given the Philippines independence in 20 years, but in the face of strong support for immediate withdrawal it was never brought to the floor. President Coolidge rejected Philippine demands with the argument that continued American sovereignty was the only means of meeting both the defense and the economic needs of the islands.[37] But the assumption that independence would be incompatible with essential requirements appeared to repudiate the commitment set forth in the Jones Act and was almost a challenge to irresponsible action both by Philippine leadership and by Congress.

There had indeed developed both economic and military ties which made the dependency of the Philippines more complete and more permanent. The ironic proof of this lay in the ability of the United States to do injury to the Philippines by the very act of giving it independence. To Congress, the sugar coating of apparent political altruism on the sustenance of supposed economic advantage presented temptation hard to resist.

When free trade was established between the United States and the Philippines, culminating in 1909, little thought was given to the contradiction between the effects of this action and the possibility of Philippine independence. The desire to open up Philippine markets to American exports played an important part, but the establishment of free trade also reflected the belief that the stimulus which it would provide would be a major contribution to Philippine development. Manuel Quezon did see that preferential access to the American market "would create a situation which might hinder the attainment of * * * independence",[38] but in Congress, Democrats who stood for early independence were even more insistent than the Taft administration in pressing for it. In the thinking of many Americans there was a paradoxical combination of beliefs: That it would be unjust to apply discriminatory restrictions to a territory under U.S. sovereignty, and improper to give special advantage to an independent country.

The legislative proposals and the acts by which the United States extricated itself from this dilemma by combining a program for Philippine independence with provisions for special economic relations between the two countries need not be traced in full detail. Protectionist pressures abated but did not disappear. The rapid imposition of tariffs and quotas provided for in the bill which passed the Senate in 1930 gave way to more moderate provisions in the Hare-Hawes-Cutting Act which was passed over President Hoover's veto but was rejected by the Philippine Legislature, and the Tydings-McDuffie Act under which the Philippines was designated a Commonwealth and scheduled for independence after 10 years in 1946. Nothing was done before the coming of war to extend a system of preferences into the period following independence, but the gradual introduction of partial restrictions implied that the independent Philippines would be given further time for economic adjustment. When independence did come, precisely on the date set 12 years before, despite two conquests and a period of occupation, economic relations were governed by new legislation which extended the period of duty-free trade to 1954, with gradual application of tariffs and reduction of quotas over a 25-year period to 1974. This act also included a requirement that American citizens be given parity rights with Filipinos in investment in the development of natural resources and the operation of public utilities, a provision which required amendment of the Philippine Constitution and gave rise to considerable resentment. A rehabilitation act was also passed in 1946, providing compensation for wartime losses. In 1955 the Trade Act was revised to extend the opportunities for Philippine access to the American market and to accelerate the imposition of Philippine duties on imports from the United States. In concession to Philippine sentiment, the parity provision of the act of 1946 was made reciprocal, a gesture which did not put an end to criticism. Thus it developed that, as an independent country, the Philippines was able to gain better terms than Congress had been willing to extend in looking toward the future before the Philippines gained independence. Economic relations continued to be a source of irritation. As the gradual imposition of duties and quotas began to be felt, new proposals were advanced for extension of preference.

With regard to military considerations as well, Philippine independence did not mean the severance of special relationships. The thought of liquidating a strategic liability in the Far East by leaving the Philippines, such as expressed by Theodore Roosevelt in 1907, lost all point after the United States became a global power. Philippine bases were regarded as a strategic asset, perhaps even as indispensable, following the Second World War. Base rights, negotiated at the time of liquidating a strategic liability in the Far East by leaving the source of recurrent irritation in Philippine-American relations.

The Philippine experience revealed some of the inconsistency which may result from the application of American political values. Freedom could imply tutelage and good works with the result of strengthening the economic and cultural ties which linked the Philippines with the United States or it could call for independence and the severance of special relationships. In the name of freedom, under the stimulus of Philippine demands and the pressure of domestic economic interests, policies of tutelage and association could be abandoned. There was, however, no way by which the United States, having come into control, could divest itself of the responsibility of facing decisions which could have profound, even shattering effects in the Philippines. A quick grant of independence could have been a damaging exercise of American power.

Congressmen and other Americans who tried to influence U.S. policy in terms of what was best for the Philippines might, of course, be affected in their judgment by their own policy preferences. The corrective for this, apart from countervailing preferences among Americans, was the willingness which American political values instilled to hear and respect expressions of Philippine sentiment. Philippine spokesmen, although aware of the economic risks they were running, were practically of one voice in seeking independence. A sterner test would have been presented if authentic spokesmen for the Philippines had sought to guarantee some of the advantages of association with the United States by foregoing some of the symbolism and prerogative of sovereignty. The United States did prove willing to abate the economic consequences of independence—in part, it must be recognized, to the advantage of American as well as Philippine interests. It can never be known whether this country might have found and accepted an alternative to independence which would have been consistent with the principle of consent; indeed, had the demand been unmistakable and a solution acceptable to the American people been available, adherence to this principle would have been required.

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Although Cuba was never annexed by the United States, it came fully under American control following the defeat of Spain in 1898. Its career as an independent State was launched by the United States, with a right of intervention stipulated, and a special economic relationship was established. U.S. policy choices regarding Cuba are therefore significant in an examination of attempts to give effect to American political values where there are strong pressures for the establishment and maintenance of dependent association.

It is remarkable that the Philippines rather than Cuba became a U.S. possession following the war with Spain. The island close to our shores, long considered to be destined for annexation, was the subject of the Teller amendment in which Congress renounced any political objective beyond "pacification", while the distant archipelago of which few Americans had even been aware was held as U.S. territory in the face of stubborn indigenous resistance. In Cuba, no less than in the Philippines, however, the United States took full control from the hands of Spain, refusing to concede authority to those who had led the movement for independence. President McKinley used his influence to prevent final passage in the Senate of a resolution which purported to extend recognition to a republican government of Cuba. In his view, this would have prevented the United States from ensuring that the Government of Cuba would meet acceptable standards. Had it not been for the Teller amendment, the U.S. commitment there would have been open-ended in the direction of close tutelage or even annexation, as it was in the Philippines.

Even with the Teller amendment, it was by no means certain that the outcome would be the independence of Cuba. The idea that the island should and would become U.S. territory was furthered by the long history of American interest, by the dissolution of constitutional and emotional bars to the acquisition of oversea territories, by the expressed desires of many of those upper class and commercially minded residents of Cuba whom Americans found most competent and congenial, and by the convictions of Gen. Leonard Wood and others who held administrative positions in Cuba.

Although there is no evidence that President McKinley and Elihu Root, who became Secretary of War, ever decided to promote annexation, they insisted upon conditions for independence which could not readily be attained. Well over a year after the fighting had ended, McKinley stressed the insufficiency of independence as the objective of United States policy:

> The new Cuba yet to arise from the ashes of the past must needs be bound to us by ties of singular intimacy and strength if its enduring welfare is to be assured. Whether these ties shall be organic or conventional, the destinies of Cuba are in some rightful form and manner irrevocably linked with our own, but how and how far is for the future to determine in the ripeness of events. Whatever be the outcome, we must see to it that free Cuba be a reality, not a name, a perfect entity, not a hasty experiment bearing within itself the elements of failure. Our mission * * * is not to be fulfilled by turning adrift any loosely framed commonwealth to face the vicissitudes which too often attend weaker states.[20]

Generals Wood and Wilson wrote from Cuba to urge the President to frame his policies with a view to persuading the spokesmen for Cuba to seek annexation. They disagreed, however, as to appropriate means. Wood was in favor of prolonged occupation. He thought that if "decent, candid, courageous government" by the United States could take the place of "dillydallying and talking politics," public sentiment would turn so strongly "that I do not believe you could shake Cuba loose if you wanted to."[40] Wilson, who was convinced that the great majority of Cubans were earnestly in favor of independence, advocated bringing the occupation quickly to an end. He thought, however, that a treaty relationship should be established, providing guarantees of free trade and stable government, which "would practically bind Cuba hand and foot and put her destinies absolutely within our control" and would lead the Cuban people within a few years to seek the greater security of annexation. Wilson rejected the view that the Cubans were unfit for self-government and suggested that they might eventually become United States citizens.[41]

McKinley and Root decided in the autumn of 1899, however, that the United States would have to work toward withdrawal, subordinating any thought of early or eventual annexation. Rumors that a civil governor would be appointed and that this would mean indefinite prolongation of the occupation produced reactions in Cuba which alerted them to the dangers of the situation. Root said later that he had expected from day to day to read "that the Cubans had taken to the woods and the Americans were after them. That would have meant the ignoble end of America's adventures in altruism, with the Cubans fighting not the Spaniards but the Americans for liberty."[42] "A Philippine war in Cuba would be too disastrous to contemplate," Root wrote on the last day of 1899.[43]

Under the firm and energetic direction of General Wood, the United States proceeded to lay the groundwork for Cuban independence. Considerably more than the "pacification" referred to in the Teller Amendment was involved. Wood had little regard for the character and abilities of the men who became active in Cuban political life. He strongly urged that the franchise be limited, thought that Congress should make it clear that there would be no transfer of authority until there was a suitable government, and pledged that he would "make every effort to bring the conservative and representative elements to the fore."[44] In Washington, however, the desire to withdraw from direct responsibility for Cuban affairs was strong enough to offset any desire to insist on suffrage restrictions or to apply rigid standards to Cuban politics.

It was decided, nevertheless, to require that the Cuban Constitution stipulate a right of intervention as well as giving the United States title to one or more naval bases. The motivation for this was not entirely strategic or economic; it included genuine concern for the quality of self-government in Cuba, similar to that which found more direct expression in the Philippines.

The difficulty of securing such privileges was apparently not foreseen. In his first annual report as Secretary of War, Root wrote that a "representative convention" would "frame a Constitution and provide for a general government of the island, to which the United States will surrender the reins of government," and added: "When that government is established the relations which exist between it and the United States will be matter for free and uncontrolled discussion between the two parties."[45] However, the call for election of a constitutional convention indicated that provisions regarding relations between the United States and Cuba should be included in the constitution. This met strong resistance. The convention could not be persuaded to take upon itself the onus of making the proposals which the United States wanted. Before agreement was finally reached, the United States had to make it quite explicit that control would not be lifted until the required terms were accepted. To this end, the executive sought and gained the backing of Congress in the Platt amendment.

Root was uneasy about the implications of unilateral insistence upon special rights and thought that "the demand that Cuba shall treat us as a kind of foster mother" could not be justified unless the United States granted Cuba economic advantages.[46] He was "willing to stay on in Cuba and stand all sorts of misrepresentation and attack so long as we are right and doing what is best for the Cuban people," but he did not want to occupy "a position where we are retaining our hold on Cuba, to the injury of the Cuban people, doing them an injustice, refusing to properly care for them while we prevent them from caring for themselves."[47] Yet because he doubted that Congress would make economic concessions to Cuba, he was unwilling to hold out this inducement; instead, he asked Congress to place, in the Platt amendment, "the whole united power of the nation" behind the American demands, and he let the Cuban leaders know, through Wood, that no government other than the occupation regime could be established "until they have acted upon the question of relations in conformity with this act of Congress." He pointed out also the economic dependence of Cuba upon the attitude of Congress and of the American people; a favorable response from Cuba could rouse an immense force of "kindliness and sense of moral obligation," but an exhibition of "ingratitude and entire lack of appreciation of the expenditure of blood and treasure of the United States to secure their freedom from Spain" would risk the loss of any advantage.[48]

The Cuban leaders were subsequently assured that "interference or intermeddling with the affairs of the Cuban Government" was not contemplated by the Platt amendment; it would give rise only to "the formal action of the United States, based upon just and substantial grounds," for limited purposes.[49] Root seems to have been surprised to find that the Cubans "really suspected, and perhaps some of them believed, that under the provision of the law was concealed a real purpose to make their independence merely nominal and really fictitious."[50] The convention, having tried to give its own interpretation of the right of intervention, found this procedure unacceptable and finally gave approval, by a narrow margin, to that which the United States demanded. The occupation came to an end in May 1902. In his annual message to Congress in the following December, President Roosevelt reaffirmed his support for special tariff arrangements with the argument that "in a sense Cuba has become part of our international political system. This makes it necessary that she should be given some of the benefits of becoming part of our economic system."[51] In 1903, a reciprocal tariff agreement as concluded, with the result that Cuban sugar found its market almost entirely in the United States, while American manufactures became dominant in the Cuban market.

In 1906, during disorders which followed electoral abuses, the United States again took control of the Government of Cuba. The Cuban President, Estrada Palma, having failed to gain United States support against the revolting faction, resigned his office at a time when the Cuban Congress was incapable of taking action to keep a government in power. He thus forced President Theodore Roosevelt, against his wishes, to comply with his request for intervention; "the United States intervened, not because it was invited, but because Cuba was without government."[52] But from Estrada's point of view, it seemed that the United States, by withholding support, had "exacted of the Government of Cuba * * * that it abdicate before an armed insurrection."[53] This illustrates the delimma which resulted from an express willingness to intervene. Had the United States given support to the Estrada Palma government, perhaps the revolt could have been ended with little further turmoil and bloodshed, without full-scale intervention. In later disturbances in Cuba, the United States did support the existing government. But as long as the role of the United States was a major factor in the calculations of contending factions, American involvement in Cuban politics could not be avoided. In 1906 it appeared, somewhat paradoxically, that open intervention with the purpose of holding free elections—William Howard Taft termed it "clean intervention"[54]—offered the best hope to avoid partisanship in Cuban politics.

It was more than 2 years, in this instance, before the United States succeeded in bringing about conditions deemed necessary for its withdrawal. During this time, the American Governer, Charles E. Magoon, ruled by decree, his power "limited only by his sound discretion and instructions from Washington."[55] Advocates of Cuban annexation renewed their activity, gaining the support of Senator Cullom, the Chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee, but President Roosevelt was firm in his insistence that the objectve of American policy was to enable the Cubans to preserve their independence.[56] American reluctance to intervene was demonstrated repeatedly in subsequent years, but this did not enable the United States to divest itself of blame for conditions in Cuba; it was thought to be "not only permissive of political evils in Cuba * * * but also * * * virtually responsible for them."[57]

The Taft administration inaugurated a "preventive policy", the purpose of which was to avoid open intervention by "an attitude of constant and critical watchfulness" which entailed considerable "intermeddling or interference with the affairs of the Cuban Government", despite Root's disclaimer that this would be the effect of the Platt amendment.[58] It would be impossible to say just which actions constituted intervention or to what extent the United States became responsible for achievements and deficiencies of Government in Cuba. During the administrations of Wilson in Washington and Menocal in Havana, "suggestions and hints in personal conversations replaced ominous notes, as a means of securing action in Cuba in harmony with the desires of Washington."[59] In January 1921, Gen. Enoch H. Crowder was sent to Cuba as the personal representative of the President. For 2 years he carried on a very active mission of advice and supervision. Until the Cuban Government succeeded in overcoming the financial weakness of the immediate postwar period, Crowder's suggestions were followed with little exception. In pressing for recognition of the right of the United States to inquire into any activity of Cuban Government, Crowder wrote to President Zayas:

> I need not remind Your Excellency with what you are historically familar, namely, that the interest of my Government in the framing of the Constitution of Cuba was not confined to those parts of it which fix Cuba's relationship to the United States, but extended to each and every provision whose authority would be invoked in the maintenance of a Government adequate for the protection of life, property and individual liberty, and for the discharge of the obligations devolving upon the United States under the Treaty of Paris.[60]

Crowder's advice received explicit backing from the Department of State in a note of September 14, 1922, which made it clear that "to carry out the reforms in the manner suggested" would "avoid the serious situation which would inevitably arise" through failure to do so.

In 1923, however, after Crowder had become Ambassador, the United States did not act to prevent dismissal of cabinet members who had been instrumental in carrying out the reform program. The Cuban Congress warned that further interference by the United States "might end in the breaking of the moral and historical ties which have hitherto bound our country to the great Republic of North America."[61] No attempt was subsequently made to return to the policy of close supervision of Cuban affairs. As sentiment against the regime of Machado mounted to open revolt in 1931, the United States avoided any open commitment, but its failure to break diplomatic relations was regarded in Cuba as support for the hated government. In 1933, Sumner Welles took an active part in mediation while the resignation of Machado and the accession of Cespedes was being accomplished. After this government was overthrown in less than a month by a radical junta, the United States withheld recognition of the Grau San Martín government, while continuing to resist pressures for formal intervention. The Grau government collapsed in January 1934. A week later the United States extended recognition to the compromise government of Mendieta. Within a few months a treaty was concluded which abrogated the right of intervention which had been established in the Platt amendment. Although Cuba and the United States continued to be bound together in a special way through geography and history, this marked the end of a formal reservation of U.S. rights in Cuba, the exercise of which had amounted during two extended periods to a replacement of Cuban sovereignty and the potentiality of which had been a constant influence in Cuban politics.

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The history of United States responses to the dilemmas of political control is a product of basic values and specific pressures, of hopes and assumptions which derived from both of these and tended to obscure their incompatibilities, and of the particular situations where action or inaction by the United States shaped the future. There was no systematic development of a planned relationship over an extended period of time. Decisions were made without their effects being fully taken into account. Each decision changed the setting for the next, sometimes in unforeseen ways. Yet despite sharp contrasts and changes of direction, there is a fundamental consistency in American policies which reflects the central conviction in the American approach to fundamental political decisions—that the consent of the governed is the ultimate test. Indeed, it was this conviction, together with the political system of the United States which it had done much to form, which limited the ability of the United States to plan and direct political development and to relate it to economic changes. As a result, political choices were to a degree precluded or predetermined, but the right of choice was not denied.

The United States showed in its treatment of Hawaii that distance and cultural differences are not insurmountable obstacles to statehood, and in its handling of the Philippines and Cuba, that it is capable of relinquishing military and political control without demanding perfection in the arts of self-government or the strict severance of special economic relationships. Although these situations were finally resolved within the accepted categories of statehood and independence, in the course of their development, economic, cultural, and strategic realities conflicted with political ideals in such ways as to suggest that these categories might not suffice.

In Hawaii, local self-government amounted at first to oligarchy and implied renunciation of any serious attempt to break the pattern of large plantations dependent on Oriental labor. Although statehood seems to have proven fully satisfactory, it was long delayed and it did not provide answers to the problems, fortunately theoretical, which would have been posed had distance and insularity given rise to a distinct set of interests or a demand for recognition of political distinctiveness.

With regard to the Philippines, which were taken without design and held as much through duty as resolve, the hope of "benevolent assimilation", which was furthered by the removal of economic barriers, was offset both by Philippine demands for independence and by political and economic pressures within the United States. The effort was never made to devise a political form of permanent association. Congress was so willing and even eager to let the islands go that Philippine political leadership had little chance to give voice to second thoughts or to compromise their vehement demand. The United States did relax its view of the economic consequences of independence, partly in its own interest.

In the case of Cuba, the entry of the United States into the war with Spain gave rise to a commitment that the island should not be annexed. Although Cuba was subjected to thorough and extended control and occupation, in the course of which demands for annexation arose from both sides, the administration was persuaded, in part by the threat of armed resistance, to reaffirm its intention to bring the occupation to an end. In doing so it demanded and used strong pressures to gain the right of intervention set forth in the Platt amendment. This right was never invoked for the direct purpose which provided its strongest justification—to forestall foreign threat—but the United States found itself maneuvered into reoccupation of Cuba in 1906 and became deeply involved in Cuban administration in later years, largely in the attempt to avoid another open intervention. As with the Philippines, the Cuban economy was shaped by preferences into dependency upon the U.S. market and supplies. The experience with Cuba was the failure of an attempt to maintain stabilizing influence without sovereignty. Whatever the merits of U.S. objectives and the desirability of some form of association between the United States and Cuba, the pattern of intervention entailed the serious disadvantage of making the United States appear responsible for every evil which befell the island, even while giving up the means and resolve to control events there.

Decisions and actions relating to Puerto Rico reflected both the traditional assumptions of the United States in its treatment of continental territories and awareness that the Philippines and possibly Cuba posed unprecedented demands. Until about 1940, little effort was made to look at Puerto Rico for its own sake, in its own situation, with regard to its own needs and possibilities.

In the first few years, the inclination to treat Puerto Rico in essentially the same manner as continental territories contended with the desire of Republican expansionists to show that the Philippines could be governed without regard to narrow constitutional restraints. The first legislation for Puerto Rico was intended to prove that the United States could impose duties on the products of a dependency, although Root had said that "the highest considerations of justice and good faith" required the removal of duties on goods from Puerto Rico.[62] The effect upon Puerto Rico was minimized by limiting the duties to 15 percent and their duration to 2 years, with provision that the proceeds would revert to the local treasury. More important than the direct effects of the duty was the affirmation that Puerto Rico belonged in a dependent category which lacked the protection and the prospects of "incorporated" territories. In confirmation of this, a provision for U.S. citizenship which was included in the Senate bill was abandoned after the suggestion was made that this would entail application of the constitutional requirement of uniform taxation. Thus, although trade soon became free and the Puerto Ricans gained U.S. citizenship in 1917, the premise remained which had been established because of the Philippines, that taxation in Puerto Rico need not be uniform with the States. The recompense for this was that revenues should accrue to Puerto Rico. The basic pattern in the U.S.-Puerto Rican relationship emerged as a paradoxical combination of almost unrestrained legal authority and effective inhibitions upon its exercise. Without having to pay the price of constitutional safeguards, Puerto Rico enjoyed the results of moral restraints upon the United States; "no taxation without representation" became an accepted imperative. This gave Puerto Rico a leeway for eventual economic expansion which an incorporated territory would not have had. The ability of the United States to discriminate against Puerto Rico became the basis for the ability of Puerto Rico to control its own fiscal policies.

The governmental institutions which were created for Puerto Rico did not reflect a clear choice of long-range political objectives. Some Americans thought that Puerto Rico could be taken as it was into the traditional territorial system, with universal suffrage and retention of the Spanish codes of law.[63] Others thought that the island should be Americanized by drastic educational methods and changes in the legal system carried out under military control.[64] General George W. Davis, the military governor, took an intermediate position, calling for a Legislative Council chosen by a broad electorate but with limited powers, under the ultimate control of the Governor and an appointed Executive Council.[65]

The Foraker Act of 1900, which established organs of government essentially as General Davis had recommended, was intended to be temporary, but it was not superseded until 1917, when the Jones Act established an elective Senate and extended U.S. citizenship to the people of Puerto Rico. During this time the attitude of political spokesmen in Puerto Rico underwent a reversal; the parties at first united in seeking citizenship and the status of an incorporated territory, but as it became evident that the United States was not prepared to offer any promise of statehood the Unionist Party turned to the goal of autonomy with loose ties to the United States. Demands for independence were also heard. In 1914, the legislature gave unanimous support to a resolution which eloquently rejected the idea that Puerto Ricans could "convert themselves into American citizens, in that spiritual sense that the notion of citizenship requires".[66] When the Jones Act became law, there was little opposition to the citizenship provision, but it was not clear either in Puerto Rico or in Washington just what this accomplished and implied. Many Congressmen went on record to deny that the acquisition of citizenship would place Puerto Ricans on the road to statehood. It had no effect on the status of the island as an unincorporated territory. There was no clearer expression of U.S. goals than that which had been made by Secretary of War Stimson with the approval of President Taft: "the aim to be striven for is the fullest possible allowance of local and fiscal self-government, with American citizenship as the bond between us—in other words, a relationship analogous to the present relationship between England and her oversea self-governing territory." [67]

The status of Puerto Rico remained without further definition for three decades following the Jones Act, while the twofold process continued by which the island was being bound to the United States economically, while a vigorous political life developed in which

Puerto Ricans demonstrated their desire and their competence to make their own decisions.

It was difficult to develop effective and responsible political leadership in Puerto Rico while Governors and the legislature were pitted against each other. The legislature, drawing vetoes, could cast blame on the United States for problems which were not being dealt with, while Governors despaired at the pettiness and virulence of local politics. The lack of understanding and cooperation reached a climax in 1936 when the assassination of the well-respected police chief, Colonel Francis E. Riggs, gave rise to an independence bill in Congress which was intended by some of its sponsors to be punitive and by others to be sobering. Muñoz Marín called it a maneuver "to obtain the mandate from the Puerto Rican people under the threat of literal starvation for a continuance of the present colonial status."[68] This dramatization of the apparent contradiction between independence and economic progress undoubtedly contributed to his decision to dedicate his political talents to the attainment of economic goals, with the problem of status subordinated.

The leadership of Muñoz and the statesmanship of Governor Tugwell finally broke the pattern of stalemate and vindictiveness. The vigor with which both men were opposed and attacked showed that the issue of status had been at least temporarily superseded by contentions more relevant to immediate needs. Yet, although political life was no longer dominated by issues which pitted Puerto Ricans directly in opposition to the United States, the achievement in Puerto Rico of an effective capacity for self-expression was bound to bring the status problem again to the fore. There was explosive potentiality in a conflict between economic and political aspirations.

During the Second World War, when Puerto Rico again became a matter for congressional concern, it appeared that impatience both there and in Washington might precipitate independence, regardless of more considered preferences on both sides. In 1943 the Puerto Rican Legislature resolved to lay "before the President and Congress of the United States the right of the people of Puerto Rico that the colonial system of government be ended and to decide, in special free and democratic elections . . . their permanent political status, as expeditiously as possible, immediately if feasible."[69] Against the opposition of the Puerto Rican members, who wanted a definitive solution, an advisory committee recommended that immediate action should consist only of making the office of governor elective and declaring the intent of Congress not to make changes in organic legislation without Puerto Rican approval. When President Franklin D. Roosevelt brought these proposals before Congress, there was strong resistance to any renunciation of legislative control. A Senate committee not only rejected any statement that would purport to set conditions on future congressional action, but advocated an express stipulation that Congress could annual Puerto Rican legislation. Moreover, it opposed the establishment of an Advisory Council on United States-Puerto Rican relations, on the ground that any studies or proposals on this subject "are of such transcendental importance that they should be handled directly by Congress."[70] One Senator contended that if Puerto Rico refused to accept an affirmation of the legislative competence of Congress, it should be confronted with "the stark realism" of an independence bill, while another suggested that Puerto Rico would be better off economically if it were freed by independence from the one-crop economy which was imposed by its link with the United States.[71] Senator Taft, however, predicted that independence would bring "the direst poverty" and favored making Puerto Rico "a sort of autonomous dependency in which we retain our diplomatic and military status, under an arrangement by which we would give certain definite contracts to the Puerto Ricans with respect to tariff and economic arrangements, which would insure their prosperity."[72]

President Truman renewed the drive for legislation for Puerto Rico, asking Congress to consider each of four proposals—an elected governor with a wider measure of self-government, statehood, independence, and dominion status—and to enact legislation submitting to the people of Puerto Rico, alternatives which it would be prepared to accept.[73] Meanwhile, Muñoz, having decided that independence could not be gained on terms which would not sacrifice the economic gains and prospects of Puerto Rico, gave up his demand for a plebiscite. An act providing for election of the governor was passed in 1947. Under the leadership of Muñoz, a possibility of commonwealth was set forth in the election campaign of 1948 as an alternative to either independence or statehood. Although the result of an election cannot be considered the equivalent of a plebiscite, the continuing successes of the Popular Democrats at least gave evidence that the people of Puerto Rico were willing to explore the possibility of a status which would not require them to jeopardize economic advantages in order to gain the self-government which their self-respect required.

The Commonwealth proposal, as originally made, simply asked Congress to give the dignity of recognition and acceptance to Puerto Rico's desire to express its character and interests within the territory of the United States, under its sovereign jurisdiction. Such an objective, presented by the strongest political movement in Puerto Rico, could readily be supported. American political values demand that strong deference be paid to any concerted and considered demand for greater self-government. Congress had repeatedly shown the force of the liberal ethic in its willingness to relax direct control, broaden the suffrage, grant citizenship and, with paradoxical effect, liberalize trade policy. The existence of a populous dependency was a troubling anomaly. Had the majority demand been for independence, as it was from the Philippines, Congress could have offered little resistance without doing sharp damage to self-esteem. Indeed, Congressmen were inclined to test consent by offering independence. A demand for statehood would have brought into play a more even balance of considerations, because the people of the United States, in the exercise of their own self-government, could validly decide whether a candidate for statehood was qualified to take part in the Government of the whole.

While the commonwealth idea posed little difficulty as an objective, it could not be given legal definition without presenting problems which Congress was altogether unprepared to resolve. Puerto Rican spokesmen did not seek and Congress did not attempt a formulation in legal terms of limitations upon the legislative competence of Congress. On one hand, the act of 1950 was explicitly intended to give effect to "the principle of government by consent." The role of Puerto Rico as an active participant in its enactment was implied by the statement that the act was "adopted in the nature of a compact." [74] On the other hand, affirmations of the undiminished competence of Congress, in committee reports and individual statements, were not effectively qualified or questioned. This ambivalence has continued in legislative actions and proposals to the present. Congress has not denied or violated the principle of consent in any essential manner nor has it given approval to measures which would give it more complete and guaranteed effect.

CONCLUSIONS

In order to understand what the United States has done and is capable of doing in situations where it has come into political control, one must appreciate how stern is the test which such a situation poses to the essence of American political commitment. The American people, pleasure-seeking and business-oriented as they may be, are deeply aware of their Nation and what it stands for. Americans in public life cannot be indifferent to the Nation's founding principles. To repudiate them would be to reject the Nation itself. Paramount among these is the conviction that political control must be exercised responsibly, its only enduring justification being the will of the governed.

In holding to this commitment through close to two centuries of growth and change, the United States has had to respond to the reversal of its role; what it proclaimed in protest against tyranny has become a standard for its own performance as a power which can control the destiny of others. The challenge which this implies is threefold. The United States could and did show that it can grow, extending the area covered by self-governing States of the Union. It could and did show that it can set bounds to its acquisition and control, that it can permit and promote the full self-government of independence for countries which come under U.S. rule without having come under the cultural domination of resident emigrants from this country. But when neither incorporation nor renunciation provides a clear answer, the challenge is more profound and the response less clear.

Basically, the principles of free government proclaimed by the United States constitute an assertion that freedom and political control are not incompatible. Out of this premise the great and successful experiment in federalism was conceived. There is no reason to conclude that this is the only workable form between centralized control and full independence. What nature joins together man needs to govern in concert, but in political orthodoxy the idea of sovereignty keeps asunder that which is not merged into a larger whole. The true exercise of sovereignty would be for those who are bound together to find the best means of governing their common concerns.

With regard to most of the territory which has come under its rule, the United States has been able to solve dilemmas of political control with the apparent finality of categorical decision, through either statehood or independence. In relationships between the United States and people of different history and culture, ambivalence and hypocrisy have not been fully avoided, but the United States has fortunately been able in the end to respect the apparent will of the people concerned. It has not been confronted with strong and persistent disagreement among them or between their desires and major national interests and objectives. Neither statehood nor independence has been a full and final answer to problems arising from the cultural and geographical distinctness of areas which have come under U.S. control, but the valuable advantage of defined, dignified status which either of these provides is worth some loss of flexibility. In any event, neither forecloses all possibility of adjustment to particular situations. A State, guaranteed the right to exert political power, may be able to have some of its particular needs met by legislation, within the fairly flexible bounds of the Constitution, while in the relations between the United States and an independent country special agreements may help to meet economic and strategic needs to mutual advantage. It is clear, nevertheless, that either category implies renunciation; statehood of distinctness, identity and autonomy, independence of permanent acceptance and participation in the larger whole. Neither can resolve the dilemma which is posed when what is wanted and needed is to combine as much as possible both of the security of acceptance and of the freedom of autonomous development.

The people of Hawaii were willing to forego whatever they might have kept if they had not followed the road to statehood. The people of the Philippines and Cuba seem to have attached greater value to independence than to the benefits which they might have gained through an attempt to establish a permanent political relationship with the United States. The United States, guided as it had to be by its own values, among which respect for the right for self-government weighed heavily, and following the procedural requirements of its own political system, was able eventually to give what these people wanted and to take measures which would mitigate some of the disadvantages which were entailed.

In the case of Puerto Rico, there has been no clear demand for a resolution of status in either of the two established categories. Spokesmen for the United States have expressed willingness, in accordance with our political principles, to concede independence should the demand for it be clear. A promise of statehood cannot be set forth as plainly, because it entails issues of economic and political practicality which may prove difficult to resolve and requires act of commitment on both sides which cannot be anticipated. However, there is nothing in American political conviction and experience which need prevent expression of an attitude of hospitality toward aspiration for statehood and of willingness to seek affirmative answers to the questions which this entails. Indeed, to would hardly be consistent with American political principles to take any other attitude toward a population which have been loyal American citizens for two generations.

But policies cannot deal only with ultimates, nor indeed can they derive from the assumption that it can be known what are the relevant ultimates. Particularly when the purpose and principle upon which decisions are based is to respect and enhance the ability of the people concerned to make their own major choice of destiny, in their own time and in their own way, it would be destructive of this commitment to require or expect that they choose between fixed categories at any particular time. Thus the United States cannot fulfill its fundamental commitment unless, simultaneous with receptiveness to any clear expression of Puerto Rican preference on the question of ultimate status, it maintains constant and sympathetic concern for the reality and the dignity of self-government now and in the near future. What exists need not be burdened, in the attitudes of responsible citizens, either with the imputation of transcience and imperfection or with the stamp of finality. Its virtue and strength is its responsiveness to changing needs and wants. It represents the continuing desire of the United States and of the people of Puerto Rico to find the best enduring relationship. It can be thought of in pride as the very vehicle of self-government. It can be the means of preparation and transition to statehood or independence—indeed, there can be no other means. Or it can, conceivably, in gradual accretion, take on attributes of permanence, definition and dignity which the people of Puerto Rico would not willingly exchange for any other, and in which the people of the United States could take quiet satisfaction.

The values and the history of the United States lend encouragement to the belief that a workable and gratifying relationship can be maintained between a self-governing Puerto Rico and the Federal Union with which it has acquired such a strong and varied ties. Indeed, Americans would be at variance with their historical tradition if they did not believe that this country is uniquely qualified to work out ways of enhancing the genuine exercise of self-government in such a relationship. There is, however, one source of possible failure which also has firm rooting in the nature of American political life. This derives from the vitality of an immense country and from the vigorous functioning of its political freedoms. It is difficult to summon influential Americans from the duties and opportunities which press most constantly upon them to give consideration to the care and cultivation of a relationship the needs of which are expressed not so much in day-to-day decisions as in measured regard for the importance of friendship, forebearance and opportunities for growth. Without such attention, efflux from the byplay of American politics may do damage, and accepted principles may be violated solely through inadvertance.

Thus the contribution which may be expected from the United States is the application of its own deeply rooted principles of political conduct and judgment. In these there is no imposition of prescribed forms upon Puerto Rico; rather, they imply an essential recognition of the profound value of freedom to grow and to change in response to the interplay of political and economic demands. But there is clearly in the American experience also the warning that undesired and undesirable results can flow from political neglect or abstention, underlining the importance of statesmanship to protect the fruits of freedom by anticipating sources of inadvertant damage. If Puerto Rican relations can command the attentive reflection of responsible citizens, the national heritage and commitment has a good chance of renewed and deepened affirmation.

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[63] Henry K. Carroll, "Report on the Island of Porto Rico" (Washington, 1899).

[64] "Report of the United States Insular Commission to the Secretary of War" (Washington, 1899).

[65] "Report of Brig. Gen. Geo. W. Davis, U.S.A., on Civil Affairs in Puerto Rico, 1899" (Washington, 1900).

[66] "Congressional Record," 63d Cong., 2d sess., 6720.

[67] Annual Report of the Secretary of War, quoted in "House Report 341," 62d Cong., 2d sess., 2.

[68] Thomas Mathews, "Puerto Rican Politics and the New Deal" (Gainesville, Fla., 1960), 257f.

[69] "Congressional Record," 78th Cong., 1st sess., 1563.

[70] "Senate Report 659," 78th Cong., 2d sess., 11.

[71] "Congressional Record," 78th Cong., 2d sess., 1667, 1669.

[72] Ibid., 1669.

[73] Ibid., 79th Cong., 1st sess., 9676.

[74] "Statutes at Large," LXIV, 319.

SELECTED TRENDS AND ISSUES IN CONTEMPORARY FEDERAL AND REGIONAL RELATIONS

by

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INTRODUCTION

A concrete political order may operate on several levels of community—local, regional, national, or supranational. In speaking of such "levels" one suggests that such levels are sharply separated from each other, like boxes piled on top of one another. Actually, levels of community and government are never thus sharply divided; they constantly interact, as the human beings operating them argue, fight, cooperate and compromise with each other. Still, to speak of "levels of government" has a distinct and operational meaning, namely the range or territorial extension of power and authority. There are four such levels that are generally recognized (though there could be many more). These four levels are constituted by the community to which the level refers—the local community, the tribal or regional community, the national community, and the supranational cultural (and eventually the global) community.[1]

The contemporary world is significantly shaped by complex patterns of interaction between these several kinds of communities. Federalism, regionalism, and decentralization have all increased in importance as possible ways of dealing with the political issues resulting from such interaction. Both federalism and regionalism can be viewed as little more than particular forms of decentralization. From a strictly administrative standpoint there is much to be said for thus interpreting federalism and regionalism. But as the word decentralization clearly indicates, such an approach posits the center as given and primary, and allows for subcenters as in effect governmental entities to which some power and authority has been delegated for purely pragmatic and heuristic reasons. This is in fact often an unrealistic assumption to make. Either the subcenters may be primary, as were the Swiss cantons, or they may be coeval, as was the case with the American States. If this situation is recurrent in federal relations, it is equally true of regional relations. In spite of the prepotency of the central government in France, the historic regions in France have preserved a measure of real community; not only Brittany and Alsace, but also Provence and Flanders have a distinctive personality, though it is not at present institutionalized, as the Regionalist movement has demanded for years it should be. In Italy, since the second world war, regionalism has achieved constitutional protection; not only Sicily, but also the other border regions have been recognized as distinctive and a regional division of the country has been embodied in the constitution, albeit weakly and ineffectively. Such regionalism is not the result of administrative and governmental convenience, quite the contrary. It has occurred in response to the surviving vigor of distinctive regional ways of life and traditions rooted in a distant tribal and historical past.

Regionalism has frequently been associated with tribalism. That is especially the case in some of the new nations. Even a constitutional document as sophisticated as that of the Weimar (German) Republic spoke in its preamble of "the German people, united in its tribes * * *" These tribal communities, whether in Germany, in India or in Nigeria, are reinforced by marked linguistic peculiarities, whether these be merely dialects, as in Germany, or wholly distinct languages, as in

India. It was a characteristic feature of the old empires that they allowed such cultural regionalism wide scope. Both Tsarist Russia and Hapsburg Austria-Hungary were quite willing to acknowledge the existence of such regional communities of language and culture and the same was true of oriental empires.[2] Such acknowledgment went hand in hand with a vigorous and often oppressive centralization of administration of those functions which concerned the central imperial power. It is a tradition which the Soviet Union has continued with considerable skill, even while insisting that their policy was motivated by quite different considerations, rooted in Marxist ideology. Indeed, Soviet "federalism" is basically a legal recognition of the tribally circumscribed regionalism of its polyethnic population base.

Decentralization may, on the other hand, be largely unrelated to distinctive community formation. The constitutional tradition of English local self-government is community-based; but the French départements were fixed with "ruler and compass" and by utter disregard for past tradition and local communal bonds. To be sure, decentralization has been in France of very limited scope; but there has been an increasing amount of it, resulting from the needs of a more and more complex pattern of governmental tasks, as well as popular pressures, operating through democratic channels.

If one were to contrast federalism and decentralization, as is often done in political studies, the conclusion is rather equivocal. At times unitary government is simply thought of a centralized government, and then contrasted with federal systems, leaving entirely out of account the possibility that a unitary government may be decentralized, as it is in England and was in Prussia. Are there no distinctions between such a decentralized government and a federal one? Is it merely a matter of the "territorial composition of the state"? Of decentralized England it has been said that—

> the British system is nevertheless dominated by the idea that all legislative power is presumed to lie in the first instance in the king in Parliament and all executive power in the Crown—a twofold constitutional principle which represents the very apotheosis of centralization.[3]

Is this an accurate assessment? What is really centralized is the power over legislation and its execution, surely a vast area of governmental functions, but hedged in by English constitutional tradition. A vital part of this tradition is that of local self-government and of the decentralization which that tradition implies. It is so deeply embedded in the pattern of English constitutionalism that any frontal attack upon it would be sharply resented; yet the centralizing tendencies have eaten away some of its foundations. Newer constitutions, embodied in a more or less systematic documents, have therefore undertaken to "guarantee" such decentralization through explicit protection of local self-government.[4] When that occurs, the situation is similar to that of a constitutionally protected regionalism. How are both to be distinguished from federalism? The question does not permit, as already indicated, a clearly unequivocal answer. It is possible, however, to approximate a meaningful distinction, if one recalls that a federal order typically preserves the institutional and behavioral features of a foedus, a compact between equals to act jointly on specific issues of general policy. Effective separate representation of the component units for the purpose of participating in legislation and the shaping of public policy, and more especially effective separate representation in the amending of the constitutional charter itself may be said to provide reasonably precise criteria for a federal as contrasted with a merely decentralized order of government. Whether under particular conditions one or the other arrangement is more appropriate, constitutes a problem of practical politics which can only be solved in terms of the specific situation. Generally speaking, it can be said that decentralization is indicated where functional considerations are of primary importance, whereas communal preoccupation demands a federal system. There is no object in laboring the distinction which is clear enough when Switzerland and England are juxtaposed.

Decentralization has, however, a particular meaning in connection with some federal systems, and that is the devolution of administrative execution of federal legislation, as practised in Switzerland, Austria and the Federal Republic of Germany. This form of decentralization is of such importance in contemporary trends and issues of federal relations, however, that we propose to deal with it in a separate section (sec. V below). Suffice it here to say that such decentralization is intended to reinforce the federal system and does in fact do so.

In the light of the foregoing, it is possible to define federalism and federal relations in dynamic terms. The problems connected with such a definition will be more fully explored later (sec. X), but it seems at the outset desirable to stress that federalism should not only be seen as a static pattern or design, characterized by a particular and precisely fixed division of powers between governmental levels; for as such it is hard to distinguish it from other forms of decentralization (sec. IX). For federalism is also the process of federalizing a political community, that is to say the process by which a number of separate political communities enter into arrangements for working out solutions, adopting joint policies and making joint decisions on joint problems, and conversely also the process by which a unitary political community becomes differentiated into a federally organized whole. Federal relations are fluctuating relations in the very nature of things. Any federally organized community must therefore provide itself with instrumentalities for the recurrent revision of its relations. For only thus can the shifting balance of common and disparate values, interests and beliefs be effectively reflected in more differentiated or more integrated relations. In short, we have federalism only if a set of political communities coexist and interact as autonomous entities, united in a common order with an autonomy of its own. No sovereign can exist in a federal system; autonomy and sovereignty exclude each other in such a political order. To speak of the transfer of part of the sovereignty is to deny the idea of sovereignty which since Bodin has meant indivisibility. No one has the “last word.” The idea of a compact is inherent in federalism, and the “constituent power” which makes the compact, takes the place of the sovereign.

I. FEDERALISM, NATIONALISM AND LANGUAGE

The relation and interaction of federalism and nationalism is a complex one. For federal relationships may be utilized to provide a political order for a nation to be united out of separate and distinct entities, as was the case in Germany in the 19th century, that of India in the 20th. Or federalism may be serving as a means of combining several nations or nationalities into one political order as is the case in Switzerland and Belgium, and is the hope of those who are working on the unification of Europe.

Nationalism is generally acknowledged to be one of the most potent political forces of the contemporary world. There has been a good deal of discussion and argument over its nature. Nationalism, it has been said “is a state of mind”, animating a national group to express itself in “what it regards as the highest form of organized activity, a sovereign state.”[5] Nationalism would thus be the conscious will to give a nation a political order, to provide it with a state. Such has certainly been the nature of a great deal of nationalism since the emergence of European nations since the 16th century. But nationalism is not merely a state of mind, but a political movement highlighting particular aspects of group life. As a movement it creates a new kind of political community, preoccupied with a common cultural heritage, especially in terms of language. It is, therefore, quite possible for two nationalisms to clash within the boundaries of a single state, and indeed for two nationalisms to overlap, as has recently happened in Canada, where the all-Canadian nationalism asserting the unity of Canada has been rivaled by the separatist nationalism of the French Canadians.

In the early stages of European nations, language played a decisive role in the shaping of national sentiment. In both Italy and Germany the first manifestations of nationalism were intimately linked to the

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birth of a vernacular literature such as that fashioned by Dante, Petrarca, and Boccaccio in Italy, by Luther in Germany. Nationalism and linguistic self-discovery went hand in hand. Yet, this is not a universal rule. In Switzerland nationalism transcends the linguistic boundaries of French, German, and Italian and welds a nation out of disparate linguistic groups. The same task now confronts many of the newer nations, where especially in Africa a bilingual or multilingual composite population is to achieve a national consensus. This had also been the hope in Belgium, Canada, and other linguistically divided communities. The ever-present temptation of the majority (or even the largest minority) to impose its own language upon the rest of their fellow-countrymen is likely to engender a violent reaction. It has been so in Belgium, Canada, Italy (the Tyrols), and India, to mention only some striking cases (to be treated later in greater detail). Therefore, even though a nation may be constituted and defined without reference to the unity of language,[6] nationalism feeds upon the desire and need of people to communicate with each other in their "own" language.

Nor is this fact to be wondered at. The coming together of human beings into communities and the experience of self in confronting the outside world is inconceivable without communication. Even many animals have developed elaborate systems of communication. The elaboration of communication is language. In any developed sense, community means, therefore, language. To communicate by words is one of the basic traits of man.[7] Anthropologists assure us that no community of men is known which did not, does not possess "the gift of speech and a well-ordered language."[8] Language expresses feelings, thoughts and other experiences and is thus intimately linked to the distinctive life-processes of particular groups. All language is listening as well as speaking, and language is thus embedded in culture, as culture is embedded in language. They are like Siamese twins, and the passions engendered by the will to maintain a language is the expression of a will to self-maintenance and self-determination. Federalism provides the opportunity to give maximum scope to such linguistic self-expression. Bilingual (or even multilingual) communication may be a substantial burden in official and unofficial communication, but it is the necessary price which must be paid, where otherwise only an imposed single language is likely to disrupt the community and tear apart those bonds which might otherwise suffice for effective political life.

The relation of language to nationality and race has been a major weapon in the armory of modern politics, whether the argument has run toward diversity or unity. Nationalism implies a necessary and close relationship between common language and effective political community. The argument in favor of a racial basis of language and political community may be largely specious. What is not specious is that a common language and its common sayings and habits of mind and speaking is a decisive bond of all political community. Determined efforts to force the issue, such as that of "Americanizing" immigrants through the teaching of English, or of reviving ancient languages are the result of this incontrovertible fact; they have often failed. For since nationalism and linguistic self-discovery go hand in hand, such efforts may serve to reveal the lack of community, as well as stimulate resistance. Indeed, the movement that is nationalism finds many of its most potent symbols in linguistic expressions. It bears a resemblance to other symbols of exclusive group loyalty, but is distinguished from them by its concern with cultural self-identity; its most pronounced form is literary self-expression. All values and beliefs are colored by this self-identity, and there is associated with it a firm conviction that only the member of that particular national group can fully appreciate its "unique" literary creations.[9]

The disruptive potential of such linguistic identification with a literary tradition is, of course, particularly great when the group with a separate identity speaks a major language of another powerful political community. This problem is pronounced in such cases as Belgium and Canada. The Royal Commission Report on Canada (1965) speaks of this aspect in measured terms:[10]

> It is probably true that the discovery by some of them (French Canadians) of a world which is French-speaking (France, Belgium, Switzerland, former French Africa, etc.) has a reassuring effect and brings them promise of valuable cultural enrichment; in this way French Canadians are becoming more conscious of being a part of a much larger cultural world; some of them are thus having the experience of a world-wide French community * * *[11]

The situation is further aggravated when the link is to a nation across the border, as is so common in Europe.

American experience, reinforced by German and Swiss experience, is by contrast the most telling in showing what a federal order can accomplish in facilitating the growth and the building of a nation. In sharp contrast to the forcible uniting of disparate elements by the monarchical rulers of medieval Europe, American federalism provided a chance of linking unity with diversity as the democratic alternative. Federalism thus provides the only voluntary approach to the task of coordinating disparate national elements. It is being experimented with all over the world, in India, as well as in Nigeria and the Congo, and finally in Europe. The issues are similar, but usually contain a specific and unique element. Thus in India, the federalizing process encompasses an entire culture, in many ways more complex than that of Europe, more diversified in religion, language, and social customs. In Nigeria, similar complexities are compounded by the absence of an overaching tradition, such as the great literature of India provides for the cultural elites in many parts of the country. The key issue is whether a national sentiment can become associated with the Federal order of things.[12]

The most difficult issue which endangers such entities as India and Europe, is whether it is possible to cultivate two rival nationalisms alongside each other. Much thought on loyalty tends to stress its exclusiveness, since divided loyalties are patent sources of conflict. And yet, human experience is familiar with divided loyalties of all kinds, in interpersonal relations of family and profession. Analogies suggest themselves which we cannot develop here, except to hint that for most men the loyalty to wife and mother have to be effectively coordinated and integrated. Under democratic conditions, unfortunately, the potential conflict situation offers a rich source for demagogic exploitation. Dr. Johnson's poignant observation that "patriotism is the last refuge of a scoundrel" has its apt relevance to the agitators for nationalist causes in the 20th century. Federalism, by providing channels for intergroup communication, by delaying precipitate action and offering a stage for intergroup compromise, seems to be one of the political instrumentalities for negotiating the problem of a divided loyalty, by affording both integrative and differentiating forces some room to operate in. But the Canadian instance shows that it may not do so, if unwisely constructed. There is evident need in the Canadian case for a looser bond in the case of the French Canadians than for the rest. Only the most skillful deployment of "federal behavior" would seem capable of coping with these difficulties.

For there is such a thing as "federal" behavior. It is a highly pragmatic kind of political conduct which avoids all insistence upon "agreement on fundamentals" and related forms of politically doctrinaire rigidity.

II. Federalism, Socialism and Planning

The problems which federalism presents to socialism and planning have been at issue for many years. Classical Marxism had no use for the thought and behavior required by federalism. Nor had the more pragmatic socialism nurtured in and by utilitarianism. John Stuart Mill's "Representative Government" had little to say about it. There was only one strand of socialism which was keenly interested in the federal idea and that was the unionist (syndicalist) and anarchist version of Proudhon. Partly as a reaction to traditional French centralism, partly in response to the specific concerns of trade unions in Europe, Proudhon developed a confederal view of federalism which bears strong resemblance to Calhoun's notion of concurrent majorities. An absolute autonomy of the component parts of a federal order was its hallmark.[13]

For modern, operative federalism these ancient doctrinal controversies are just distant memories. Socialism has become pragmatic as the protagonist of a welfare state which everyone accepts, though many with reluctance, quite a few with regret. It is characteristic as well as symptomatic for the proponents of the welfare state that socialism's old battle cry "socialization of property" has yielded to the 20th century undertaking of planning, and more especially planning for full employment and against the business cycle. Both in England and France, Socialist parties discovered upon assuming power and responsibility that relatively little was accomplished for the standard of living by "nationalizing" industry, unless it was accompanied by comprehensive planning.[14]

Such planning raises very grave problems for a democracy, and it has often been claimed that the two are completely incompatible. This view is at least in part due to the fact that overall planning was first attempted in the Soviet Union in the early twenties of this century, as she proceeded to implement the development of a totalitarian regime (which the Soviets call "true democracy"). It has become clear in the course of more recent experience that planning may be totalitarian, but that it may also be democratic. Indeed, all democratic states are instituting planning procedures in which the objectives of such a plan are periodically reviewed by the elected representatives of the people. It is possible to describe (and thereby define) such planning as follows: It constitutes guidance and coordination of the community's economic activities, and more especially its investments, through an overall program, especially in the use of economic resources, in accordance with the popular preferences, as expressed through representative bodies, within the framework of a constitution. Such an overall program describes, in quantitative terms, wherever possible, the various measures required in guiding production and distribution over a definite planning period.

It is obvious that such planning presents difficult issues to the continued operation of federal systems. Planning will have to be undertaken not only at the federal level, but at the state level as well. These two planning levels must, at the same time, be brought into harmony with each other. It may be possible to plan at the state level in a more intensive way, as has happened in Puerto Rico, if the general goal of such planning meets with the approval of the people at large. But it would obviously be destructive of the very purpose of planning, if the component units went ahead with developing plans that clashed with each other and with the federal plan as well. The shared or cooperative federalism which has been developing in the United States and elsewhere, is based upon the fact that "most of the time under most circumstances compatibility rather than conflict of interest is characteristic." [15] This cooperative federalism provides the instrumentalities for coordinating federal and state planning. It follows the pattern of the division of functions between the two levels, arbitrary and pragmatic as this division is. There is nothing inherently unfeasible about the states planning for state functions and the federal government for federal functions. In some important fields, such as highway construction, the planning of both has had to be intermeshed. But it is equally patent that such planning within an operative federal system will lack some of the neatness and precision of planning for an unitary setup with only decentralized delegations of execution to local authorities. Yet, the pattern of delegated administration (see sec. V) which prevails in some federal systems, offers an opportunity for combining comprehensive planning with differentiated implementation by local plans. What is more, the cooperative federalism which has been growing in the United States provides beginnings of delegated administration in fields particularly in need of planning, such as the previously mentioned road construction.

There can be little question that effective dovetailing of central and local planning presupposes a democratic planning process.[16] Such a process is basically consistent with democratic procedures, when it is assimilated to the budgetary process; a budget has rightly been called an elementary short-range plan. The elaboration of these procedures has helped in discovering ways of developing democratic planning. Considerable difficulties arise, however, when the realities of advanced administrative patterns are taken into account. Some tentative and fragmentary approaches to a resolution of these difficulties have been developed in the United States and in the EEC, but they are rapidly being expanded.

The British Commonwealth does, in fact, offer a wide field for experimentation and observation. In the more mature federal systems, cooperation has increasingly replaced the former strict separation and division of federal and local activities in the economic sphere. In the newer ones such cooperation has been constitutionally provided for, and new institutions such as economic councils have been established. While the central governments have usually led in overall planning and economic policy, the planning work in the component units (states, provinces and so forth), has by no means been without its limited impact; in some fields, such as agriculture and labor, it has been of primary importance. It is, of course, true that these complex federal patterns of organized cooperation occasion many difficulties and delays, but the situation in Britain illustrates the equally serious difficulties of centralized and therefore top-heavy systems (the same goes a fortiori for the Soviet Union and other Communist states). Here as elsewhere the intrinsic value of federal cooperative ways must be weighed against conflicting values of efficiency and dispatch.

Fiscal and monetary policies have in recent years become a decisive instrument in the directing of a developing economy. Hence a modern federal regime cannot avoid the task of coordinating these fields, when engaged in planning. Very serious troubles plague the older federal systems such as the United States and Switzerland, where a constitutionally sanctioned division of fiscal resources impedes, if it does not render nugatory, a coordinated fiscal policy. The Federal Republic of Germany has encountered similar problems; how they have been overcome suggests some clues as to ways of dealing with such situations. In the newer federal systems a more flexible program is usually sanctioned by the constitution. The resulting preponderance of the central government's tax resources has been limited by a system of unconditional grants, often carefully protected by constitutional or legal enactment.[17]

The objection often heard that federalism is incompatible with modern development planning and coordinated economic and fiscal policies can therefore not be admitted. Nor are there clear indications that the degree of looseness or tightness of the federal structure bears any direct relation to the degree to which economic planning may be successful. In some respects, looseness helps by providing greater planning scope to a pathfinding, progressive unit; in other respects, tightness helps, because it insures a greater degree of parallel conformity. Difficulties there are plenty; but these difficulties are inherent in the continuing extension of governmental participation in economic activities; they are as real in centralized unitary systems as in federal ones, and they may be even more serious, if the social structure actually calls for a federal order (see sec. IV). For such an order is capable of eliciting under these conditions a great degree of cooperation and loyalty, although the risk of a *liberum veto* on the part of a single unit constitutes at times a real threat. It is, however, undeniable that the greatly expanded scope of governmental activity calls for a careful balancing of central and local concerns and much important experience is being gathered in this field at the present time.

While thus planning and related welfare state activities are going forward steadily, socialism in the sense of the collectivization of property has been losing ground in spite of the fact that it presents fewer problems to a federal order. Such collectivization can without much difficulty be carried through in local subdivisions, as indeed it has been in the United States, in spite of fairly general hostility toward the ideology of socialism. Switzerland and Canada, to mention two other federal systems, have also seen considerable variations in the degree of collectivization in their Cantons and Provinces, respectively. It just does not seem to matter a great deal any more; the greater chances for bureaucratic inefficieny, if not corruption, to creep into collective enterprises have dampened the ardor of former protagonists of socialism.

III. Federalism and Party Structure

The relation between federalism and party structure presents highly significant issues which have been receiving increasing attention in recent years. The comparative analysis of party systems has highlighted the fact that in federal regimes parties tend toward paralleling the governmental setup. American parties are seen as essentially federations of state parties; similar trends may be observed in other federally organized countries. Political science has recognized for some time that the organizational structure of parties tends to correspond to the governmental pattern under constitutional democracy. This is only natural, since it is one of the purposes of parties to gain control of the government; therefore, if the government is federally structured, parties must adapt themselves to such a structure. In Germany and Switzerland there is stronger cohesion in the national party organizations than in the United States, corresponding to the tighter federalism in these countries. But the Laender and Kanton Parties display a much greater degree of autonomy than do party subdivisions in unitary states such as England.

Before we explore these issues in somewhat greater detail, it is worth noting that the interaction between governmental structure and party organization is also to be observed in authoritarian regimes based upon a single party. Only here it is the government which responds to the centralizing impact of the party. Notably in the Soviet Union the formal federalism of the governmental structure is superseded and transcended by the integrating force of the CPSU. This does not mean, as is often asserted, that the federal system has no significance in the Soviet Union; it is, as indicated before, a formalized system of decentralization. But it cannot resist the centralizing impact of the single party. For this to happen there would have to be at least two parties so that in some of the component units the "other party" than the one being in power at the center could render effective the local autonomy under some such slogan as states' rights. Even so, deep-rooted local differentiation may reinforce the local party organization, as was the case; e.g., in the Ukraine and in

Georgia which have long traditions of resistance to central Russian predominance.[18]

The real issue, both theoretical and practical, is to evaluate such a federal party setup in comparing it with a unitary one. Parties have in many ways become the mainstay of modern democratic government and political science has come to speak of the "party state" as a distinctive form of contemporary democracy.[19] While the constitutions of the 18th and 19th centuries did not recognize parties at all, recent constitutions contain specific provisions concerning parties, notably the basic law of the Federal Republic of Germany. But even where the constitution does not recognize parties, they have become the subject of judicial concern, notably recently in the United States, where such questions as the outlawry of subversive parties and redistricting have highlighted the increasing importance of parties for the very functioning of democracy. The totalitarian regimes, too, have found it appropriate to incorporate provisions on the role and functioning of parties in their "constitutions." [20]

In the field of European unification—a key case of progressive federalism—parties have been of considerable importance. In the European assemblies, party caucuses have been developing between representatives of parties from different countries, sharing similar programs and ideologies, such as the Socialists and the Liberals.[21] Such efforts at effective cooperation have been important pathfinders in developing support for federal relations and it is, therefore, not at all surprising that Puerto Rican parties, the Independentistas of course excepted, have sought and found links with American parties on the mainland which they consider close to their own position. Any developing federal relationship is bound to seek expression in a corresponding party bond.

But there is another force which increasingly shapes the interaction between government and party and transforms the federal system through its impact on party and that is the policy aspect. We have encountered this force already in the discussion of planning; but not only in the economic planning sphere, but even more insistently in the sphere of foreign and defense policy is it to be felt. There is increasing need for a fully integrated national policy and this need has been taken care of primarily by party effort. It is, to speak of the United States, simply not true that only presidential elections help to federate local parties into a national body; the need for an integrated foreign and defense policy has become an additional and ever-present factor (as contrasted with the intermittent presidential elections). The creation of national policy committees which occurred in the fifties is expressive of this trend. Even the much-sloganized "bipartisan foreign policy" has its role to play in this syndrome of interacting factors, even though it clashes with the tradition of the two-party politics of countries like the United States. For a policy field that must ever seek to transcend party controversy surely involves federal integration. Therefore, this universal trend, manifested in Europe in the insistent demands for an effective coordination of foreign policy, makes any plan illusory which presupposes a distinctive foreign and defense policy for a member state, even if it is merely an associated state, of a federal system. What it does call for is adequate procedures of consultation and participation in decisionmaking which will render such integrated policy fully "democratic." [22]

The difficulties of effectuating such central coordination are indeed formidable, on account of the inner divisions within parties, reinforced by local issues. In the United States, both parties contain an international and a nationalist (isolationist) wing which can by no means be identified with the progressive and conservative wings in both parties. Comparably in the Federal Republic of Germany, the parties contain elements that differ sharply on such crucial matters as European unification, cooperation with France and the cold war. A local leader, like Strauss, may be an exponent of a divergent position which his federally reinforced party position may enable him to give additional weight. Switzerland has always been troubled in maintaining its traditional neutrality, when the sympathies of French-speaking, German-speaking, and Italian-speaking Switzerland become entangled in the rivalries of the neighboring great states. It is one of the marvels of Swiss federalism that she has been recurrently able to overcome these tensions through the deep loyalty of all Swiss for their traditional order. In cases such as Belgium and Canada, the parties have had to respond to divergent sentiment, possibly aggravated by foreign policy issues. Belgian conservative elements of the Flemish persuasion have traditionally leaned toward Germany, even to the point of imperiling the national foreign policy. French Canadian sentiment, though by no means favorable toward "laicist" and "godless" France has been hostile toward a vigorous maintenance of a foreign policy of close cooperation in the British Commonwealth of Nations and is apt to become more radical in this respect. Under such circumstances, parties may have to provide the real battlefield for the reintegration of policy when the formal federal arrangements foster division and disunity. It has been rightly observed that there has been a tendency to treat in cause-and-effect terms this interrelation between party and constitutional structure, when it is actually a matter of circular interaction.[23] It is therefore right to conclude that—

> in a federal system decentralization and lack of cohesion in the party system are based on the structural fact of federalism, but * * * the degree to which

these become the dominant characteristics of the distribution of power within the political parties is a function of a variety of other governmental and social factors which are independent of the federal structure or are merely supportive of its tendencies.

It is therefore necessary to turn to the exploration of some of these "other social factors" which constitute the social substructure of a federal system.

IV. FEDERALISM AND SOCIAL STRUCTURE

The discussion of federalism in relation to party structure cannot be carried through without giving more detailed consideration to the issues raised by the social structure of the political community concerned. The conflict of nationalities is only one of the several aspects and perhaps in an era of worldwide social struggles not even the most urgent one. Federalism has been praised as providing an opportunity for experimentation in a more limited area, that is for testing out possible solutions to urgent problems. But it has also been criticized and even denounced as providing a refuge for backward elements, for resisting effective social change. The history of every federal system is replete with illustrations supporting both contentions; for they are both true and indeed are merely the concrete manifestation for that organized diversity and multiformity which is the very reason for federal arrangements. Obviously, the looser the federal bond, the greater will be the potential diversity; consequently both praise and blame as just suggested will increase.

It is very natural that the divisive propensities, the universal trend toward pluralism, in combination with the economic pressures (reinforced by military necessities) for ever-larger units of effective cooperation, should have provided the main support for the forward march of federalism. For since each basic human concern, a man's religion, his language, his ideology and so forth serves to form subcommunities within a larger, more comprehensive community (or sustains them, if a larger one is formed), a federal order is the only way to protect such autonomous self-realization in combination with others holding divergent views. Among the current issues there is found, therefore, a marked tendency to pay increasing attention to the patterning of the social substructure of federal orders, to explore with all the more advanced techniques of quantitative analysis the kind of community which a particular political order is intended to serve, and to determine by ever more refined and sophisticated indices the extent, the depth, and the vitality of differentiations in communal life which might deserve constitutionally protected autonomy.

One of the most telling illustrations of the relevance of social structure to the functioning of federalism is, of course, the issue of race relations in the United States. But it is hardly necessary to describe this situation in all its complexity. It is well to realize that it is in no sense unique in the recent politics of federal orders. Rather it is an instance of a recurrent pattern of federal problems. The case in hand illustrates well one important aspect of the social substructure, and that is its role in remolding federal relations. Just as in the case of Puerto Rico the transformation of the island into an industrial community has significantly altered the issues and trends of Puerto Rican federal relations, so it is generally true that the social substructure provides the dynamic processes which cause a gradual transformation of a federal system. In a sense, the history of the United States is one huge demonstration of this general proposition. The probable amazement of the makers of the American constitution if they were able to observe what has become of their work has often been commented upon, and slogans such as that about the horse-and-buggy age have highlighted the point. Yet it all becomes quite understandable once the social substructure and its transformations are taken into account. The rival forces of integration and differentiation are continually at work to alter the pattern of values, interests, and beliefs which shape the social structure. The study of social structure in relation to federalism has, therefore, helped us to understand better the dynamic nature of federal orders, to look upon a federal system as subject to continual change, rather than as a static design fixed forever in an immutable distribution of functions. (It has also helped to eliminate the barren concern with the question of sovereignty, as noted above.)

In a way, this is a very old argument. When the American Constitution was argued, in 1787 and 1788, the regional differences were a significant factor. Indeed, quite a few observers believed that no real unity could ever be achieved. Thus Chateaubriand wrote in his memoirs:

> It is immensely difficult to create a country out of states without any community of religion and interests, states which have been peopled by different stocks and are living on varied soils and under diverse climates. * * * How many centuries will be needed to make these elements homogeneous?[24]

Similar arguments were brought forward in justifying or opposing federalism in Germany, India, and elsewhere; it is a key argument in conjunction with the extended discussion concerning European unification. Most of these arguments are rather general, however, and the very fact that they can be and have been applied on both sides of the question demonstrates their imprecision. Is it, then, possible to determine a definite and meaningful correlation between the quantitatively described balance of differentiations and integrating factors and the suitability and workability of federal relations? It has recently been affirmed, but the evidence is so far inconclusive.[25] Generally speaking, the social structure of a country like Britain is as pluralistically diversified as that of Germany, and more so than perhaps Australia or Canada. It is more diversified, probably, than that of Switzerland, except for language.

Leaving aside the nationality aspects of social structure, dealt with above (sec. I), there are three other components which are of primary importance in determining it—religion, economic activity (including urbanization), and class structure; there may be special features, such as the caste system of India, which further complicate the analysis. If a particular national community should be (is) regionally differentiated according to a reasonably defined distribution of adherents of different religions, a federal organization will considerably aid in negotiating bargains on issues involving the several belief systems. It may, of course, harden the conflict situations under certain circumstances, but this danger can be minimized, if the political subunits do not coincide with the religious divisions, as logic might suggest, but divide the territory in which one religion prevails into several component units so that on the fringes subunits with mixed religious backgrounds may exist. The most striking case of this type of arrangement is Switzerland, but Germany also ranges from predominantly Catholic to predominantly Protestant subunits, so that bargaining can proceed on a variegated basis of coalition and compromise (sec. IX, E, and H below). It is noteworthy that England, France, and Spain (three unitary States), are characterized by religious homogeneity, bought by considerable oppression at an earlier stage of history.

In many ways, economic activity is in the 20th century more important than religion. Consequently, the divisions which it produces have a significant impact upon the development of Federal and regional relations. Of particular importance is the difference between agricultural and industrial interests. Where these follow a regionalized pattern, as they are likely to do, they may shape the federal relationship. Again, it could be said on available evidence that a federal organization will considerably aid in the protection of the agricultural minority—for it is agriculture which is apt to be the minority interest in modern economies. In underdeveloped countries, the reverse is likely to be the case of course, but the same principle applies in reverse. Because of this protection of the minority, bargains will in the end be more feasible, although in this instance too there is the danger that entrenched special interests will exploit and abuse the protection which federalism provides. Again, this danger can be minimized, if the political subunits do not coincide with the economic divisions, but divide the territory in which, say, the agricultural interest predominates into several subunits with some subunits containing a more or less balanced mixture of agriculture and industry. Virtually all existing federal states correspond to this pattern, though in varying degrees. In the extended discussions carried on during the period of military government over the question of the optimal size of component units of a future German democracy, these considerations constituted an important ingredient.[26]

It has been alleged recently that "in pure theory * * * what one ought to abrogate for federalism is a system of minority decision that imposes high external costs on everybody other than the minority." [27] But as the author of this statement sagely remarks, the costs of such an arrangement may be too high, especially if the minority has intense feelings on the issue involved. This is true enough, but the "pure theory" itself may be questioned. Rarely can there be maintained such minority prevalence over any length of time. The author gives it verisimilitude by asserting that certain particular minorities are the recurrent beneficiaries of federal protection, and he prejudices the analysis by such terms as "capitalists," "landlords," and "racists." But the beneficiaries may be peasants as well as "landlords," workers in particular industries as well as their masters, and so forth. Social structure, then, provides a key to some of the most dynamic aspects of federalism. Its continual and more or less independently determined change provides much of the impetus for changes in federal relationships, be they engendered by mere convention and usage, or by formal amendment.

V. THE PROBLEM OF DELEGATED ADMINISTRATION

The diversities of social structure, and more especially the cultural divisions, have given rise to an issue which has been answered quite differently in different federal systems, and that is the issue as to who should administer the laws which are made on the federal level. Many Americans assume that of course the Federal Government must do it. For in the United States this has been the established practice. To be sure, in recent years, some joint administering has developed, as in agriculture and social security, but even here the federal authorities are largely in control. The rather striking homogeneity of the American people, in spite of regional differences, has made such arrangements seem entirely reasonable, especially as the custom of "senatorial courtesy" as well as the need to cooperate with local party bosses has generally been manifest in the appointments to local federal office. But when the diversity becomes as pronounced as it is in Puerto Rico, the demand has been put forward that federal legislation be administered by the state government, and this idea has aroused much puzzled comment and some sharp criticism. And yet, at least two of the mature federal countries, Switzerland and Germany, have always operated on the basis of delegating a large part of the administration of federal laws to the Kanton and Land governments, and of providing for such delegation in their constitutions.[28]

The issue is a significant one in a number of the newer federal systems, especially those, like India and Europe, which are being compounded of established government with more or less highly developed bureaucracies. This was, of course, also the situation of Germany at the time of her unification. The problem presented itself in terms of integrating existing administrative units, as well as utilizing them for the execution of federal legislation. But there was the further problem that Bavarians, e.g., did not wish to be "administered" by Prussians and vice versa, that is to say, Bavarians did not wish to see culturally alien persons (though they were Germans) in their midst. Linguistic aspects—a different dialect—were by no means the only point at issue; many behavorial traits were involved.[29]

To the students of federal and regional relations, the question posed by these experiences is, of course, what might be the advantages and disadvantages in each of these arrangements. Let us review them in turn. Federal execution of all federal policy has the basic advantage of ensuring uniformity throughout the union. If federal officials are responsible for the carrying out of federal policy, it simplifies the problem of control and insures full accountability; supervision is simply an administrative task. Obviously then federal policy cannot easily be frustrated by the local authorities, although where the issue is "hot," and cooperation is required, local officials may find ways of nullifying the efforts of federal officials; it has happened recurrently in the United States, especially in the field of race relations. The advantage of unity and uniformity is bought at the expense of very large federal administrative entities. Such extended federal administration has the advantage of providing a strong centralizing force (if that is wanted), but it also has the disadvantages resulting from excessive size. We need not here enter into all the issues that are associated with such "bureaucratization"; suffice it to mention that such federal bureaucracies will cement otherwise disparate units, as happened in Canada, until the French Canadians began to develop a self-consciousness of their own nationality (see above and below sec. IX C). But there are other disadvantages, especially where the federal system is formed out of pre-existing states, with strong administrative organizations. The problem of transforming local into national services which took the form of "federalizing" them in both Australia and Canada is not an easy one. Another major disadvantage is the duplication and overlapping of federal and local administrative services, with consequent waste and inefficiency.

The advantages of effective delegation are, of course, the obverse of the disadvantages just sketched. But perhaps it might be well to indicate very briefly how administrative delegation works in Switzerland and Germany. Not all federal legislation is administered by the Kantons and Laender; there are functions, especially foreign affairs and defense, which are largely handled on the federal level, though there are exceptions, such as cultural relations with foreign countries and the draft of soldiers; functions which are delegated in whole or in part. At the same time, "contact" fields, such as taxation and social security (insurance) as well as a great deal of economic policy, are left to the local units. There is detailed provision for this in both constitutions.[30] The constitutions also provide for federal supervision of such administrative activities, and an elaborate code of carefully circumscribed practices has been developed in this connection.

The advantages of such delegated administration are at least three. First, duplication is avoided. Second, the impact of federal legislation is mediated through locally responsible agencies. Third, it enables the federal authorities to draw on locally entrenched administrative services (this is important primarily, when such services already exist). It commits the local authorities to the federal bargain, and enables them to participate effectively in negotiating the federal compromises. Especially when reinforced by an institution such as the German Federal Council through which the Laender are cooperating in federal legislation this may become very effective. For in this Council, though it be formally composed of the Minister Presidents of the several Laender, most of the work is actually done by competent officials to whom authority is delegated and who work in special committees with a functional task.[31] The parallel to this Council, in the case of Puerto Rico, could be the Federal Commissioner; but in order to be effective, he would have to associate with himself, in cases where administration of federal legislation were delegated to the local authorities, qualified officials who could be familiar with the administrative experiences. It seems arguable furthermore that the necessary federal supervision might raise issues of particular bitterness, as has already happened in the European Common Market. Since the local units become in effect the agents of the federal authorities, safeguards are required to make sure that the local officials do not encroach upon the federal sphere, but likewise safeguards are needed to ensure that the federal supervision does not turn into control of the local (State, Kanton, Land) sphere of competence and jurisdiction. Both are real dangers which only much practical experience can teach one to avoid. If the different units execute federal policy in too divergent a way, administrative confusion and even chaos might result; yet local autonomy may be lost, if federal administration seeks to dominate local activities by means of interference, rather than control merely the faithful execution of federal policy. Effective control requires three instrumentalities. First, there should exist a channel of information by which the federal government can know the manner of the local execution of its policies. Second, the federal authorities ought to have the power to give instructions with reference to the execution of federal policy. And finally third, the federal government should be provided with some means of compelling obedience to its instructions. In both Switzerland and Germany, these instrumentalities are provided to some extent. On the whole, they have served to make the delegated administration function smoothly, though there are instances of sharp conflict.[32] It can be seen from this review that advantages and disadvantages of both centralized and delegated administration are fairly evenly balanced. It depends upon the particular circumstances, especially the degree of cultural and social diversity whether one system or the other is preferable.

Delegated administration raised, in a sense, the issue of federal decisionmaking. For as we pointed out above, one of its features is that the officials of the local level are brought into close contact with the officials on the federal level at the initiating stage of federal policy in so far as this is feasible. It is a noteworthy feature of American federalism that this is rarely the case. Sorensen could write his study of presidential decisionmaking[33] without ever mentioning governors, let alone local officials.

VI. Federal Policy and Decisionmaking

Decisionmaking having come to the fore as a focus of political science inquiry,[34] it is surprising that the trends and issues in federal decisionmaking have received relatively little attention; yet very crucial problems are involved. It is, to be sure, easy to overestimate the importance of deciding upon courses of political action, when actually many political actions are repetitive or adaptive without any decision being involved. Much political behavior is not freely chosen but socially conditioned. Even so, decisions, and more especially policy decisions, are a crucial aspect of federal as of all politics. An authoritarian leader like General de Gaulle objects to supranationality precisely because he resents the prospect of some decision being made without or against him. Indeed, the issue of sovereignty is the issue over who has the last word, that is to say, who makes the final decision. A federal order is characterized by the fact that many crucial decisions must be arrived at cooperatively; President

Johnson's constant concern with "consensus" is due to his realization of the necessity of such cooperation. He cannot afford to jeopardize the cooperation of those who share in the decisionmaking power, more especially the Senate's majority. And when Puerto Ricans object to the fact that such important areas as foreign relations and defense are being decided upon without their effective cooperation, they are rightly questioning the present status of the federal relationship. For it is of the essence of such a relationship that the component units share as such in the determination of federal policy. They do so in the United States in a somewhat attenuated way through their equal representation in the Senate. How then are political decisions in a federal system arrived at? Before we can adumbrate an answer to that question, it is necessary to elaborate what kind of political decisions there are.

Broadly speaking, three types of political decisions may be distinguished. First, there is the decision of a single individual deciding a matter wholly within his range of power and authority. This kind of decisionmaking may be further subdivided into those made with and those made without advice. Such decisions are typically those of the administrator and of the citizen. The second kind is arrived at by a group's joint action, either unanimously or by majority, after extended consultation among them. Courts, commissions, legislative committees and numerous other bodies acting without public participation employ this kind of procedure. The third type is one made in the light of public discussion and argument. Town meetings and party conclaves, legislating and budgetmaking fall into this category. One might designate these three types as individual, group, and public decisions. Differentiated by procedure and scope of application, they have in common that they are decisions about what action to take in face of a problem confronting the decisionmaker or those whom he is acting for. This taking of action can be seen as a process which may be broken down into a number of stages. Lasswell has distinguished seven such stages or functions: They are as much the stages of a policymaking as of a decisionmaking process; indeed the two tend to merge into each other. For policy is a deliberately adopted decision as to how to act in an ongoing situation.[35] There is the intelligence phase of gathering information, of trying to predict and to plan; there is the recommendation phase which involves the promotion of alternatives; there is the prescription phase which results in the prescribing of general rules; this is followed by the invocation phase in the course of which conduct is invoked in accordance with the rules; there is the application phase in which conduct is definitively specified as according to the rules: finally there are the assessment and termination phases during which success and failure of the policy and its possible termination are decided upon. It is apparent that only the first three phases are strictly speaking relevant to one kind of decisionmaking, the making of rules, whereas the later phases constitute other kinds. For the making of rules and adoption of policies is only one kind of decision and the procedures indicated above suggest that different kinds of processes may be suitable to different kinds of decisions. Finally, the study of decisionmaking may seek to elucidate the "setting"—an inquiry which leads once more into the kind of problems which have been explored above (secs. V and VI). Value orientations, institutional pattern, role differentiation, and related aspects would here become relevant.[36]

If one projects this general pattern of decisionmaking against the background of a federal order, it appears that the processes and functions are both more complicated and more refined. Individual decisions are multiplied, not only because the citizen has to decide twice on many issues, but also because there is a multiplication of "chief executives." Group decisions of a particular kind are needed, because in numerous policy contexts it becomes necessary to organize specific decisionmaking groups representing the regions or other subdivisions. Finally, the public decisions usually involve the extensive exploration by bodies on the two levels. In all these spheres, a federal policy will have to evolve a large number of specific rules of procedure, behavioral habits and the like. The descriptive literature on federal counties is replete with illustrations. We have already mentioned earlier the "senatorial courtesy" in the United States; Switzerland has developed firm traditions about the proportions in which the three linguistic groups must be represented in all governmental activities; Germany has elaborated its Federal Council with its complex ritual of interstate cooperation for providing federal policy decisions with adequate regional support.

On the whole, though, the sharp separation of federal and state functions has tended to minimize the participation of the component units in the federal sphere of decisionmaking. Only constitutional amendments are formally identified as decisions requiring such collaboration. Cooperative federalism has increased the scope, but it is quite typical that the decision in the Steel case, 1962, was arrived at without significant sharing by governors or other state authorities.[37] It is, of course, different in cases of policy involving "states' rights," so-called, and more specially the problems of segregation. In such cases, efforts at coordinating federal decisions with state decisionmaking may be crucial for the success of a particular policy. It is important to bear this relative weakness of federal dependence upon the states in mind, when considering some of the suggestions that have been advanced for consultation in connection with Puerto Rican federal relations; they tend to run counter to American usage, even though they are patently in line with federal thinking.

As pointed out in the discussion of delegated administration, a federal system built on administrative delegation is more apt to institutionalize effective interaction between the two levels of government. Both the flow of information and the recommendation of policy alternatives will contain a significant amount of local participation. This fact may have both positive and negative results; for it is bound to slow up (and possibly prevent) the making of decisions, as has certainly been the case in the Federal Republic; it may also lead to the adoption of decisions which more nearly meet the need of the situation.

The High Commission of the Common Market has gathered some extremely interesting experience on the subject of federal decisionmaking in a very loose federal setup. Until President de Gaulle decided not to cooperate any longer (that is, made the basic decision to abandon important parts of the federal bargain), the decisions of the High Commission, requiring the approval of the Ministerial Council acting by unanimity, necessitated a very extended consultation (including the securing of competent advice) for the purpose of "defining the situation." This defining of the situation by perception, choice and expectation[38] is done primarily in terms of the federal relationship itself; it cannot be accomplished without full exploration of the values, interests, and beliefs of the federated entities involved in the issue at hand. A special difficulty in such federal decisionmaking results from the fact that the several federated units are interacting and that what appears as a given at the outset of a policy discussion may undergo radical change as the positions of other entities become clear. Thus General de Gaulle's threat of noncooperation in December 1964, if his specific timetable and policy preferences were not met (leaving aside the legal and institutional conditions and qualifications), produced a change of German orientation which permitted a compromise on the uniform grain prices, in spite of the contrary interests of German grain producers. In more fully integrated federal systems this aspect of federal decisionmaking leads to the formation of blocs for specific policy purposes in the decisionmaking bodies and groups. It is intended to forestall the possible breaking away of some entities where complex interest patterns are involved.

It remains to say a word about the extent to which experience with decisionmaking promotes the evolution of institutions. It is unfortunately the fashion to juxtapose behavioral and institutional studies, as if they were totally separate and apart. But just as institutions provide part of the setting or environment of decisions, so decisions tend to mold and reshape institutions. For institutions are basically nothing but habitual behavior patterns which may be reinforced by rules. In federal orders, policies which require local implementation will typically result from decisions which reinforce the centripetal tendencies, while the opposite is true of policies which do not. E.g., foreign and defense policy decisions unify, social, and cultural policy diversify.

VII. INTERNATIONAL FEDERALISM?

There are those who would deny that there is any such thing as international federalism, urging a sharp differentiation between the federalism of a federal state and the internationalism of a confederation of states. Indeed this distinction used to be the quintessence of the static and formalistic approach. It still survives in much popular discussion and propaganda. The struggle over supranationalism in the Common Market shows that the dichotomy has political meaning and significance. There can be little question that a distinction needs to be made between a federal order which represents a unit toward the outside and faces other states as if it were a unitary system and a federal order which does not. There are, however, times when it may be very difficult to say whether one or the other situation prevails. Thus, the several Soviet Republics represented in the United Nations face other states as distinct entities, yet they are not part of a closely knit federal system. Comparably complex, though in the opposite sense, is the situation of the British Commonwealth which does and does not represent itself as a unit toward other states. It is, therefore, desirable both to recognize the existence of international federalism and not to take it as a sharply defined alternative to national federalism. Federal orders range, as was pointed out many years go, over wide spectrum between the nonfederal limits of a unitary state and a plurality of states. They are all part of the general process that federalism is and involves.[39]

The qualifying of a federal order as "international" is here taken to mean that a particular federal order is sufficiently loose for its members to have separate and autonomous relations with other states, as well as developing or maintaining joint relations. The European nations united in ECSC and EEC are facing the outside both together and separately; that is why the Common Market is an instance of international federalism. In connection with the federal relations of Puerto Rico, the distinction is a hotly debated one; those who advocate a separate and autonomous relation of Puerto Rico with other states, whether throughout the world or in a more limited area, are to that extent raising the issue of international federalism. It does not mean an end to the federal relationship, but it does mean a highly significant qualitative alteration in the nature of the relationship.[40]

International federalism has played an important role in the building of national states as well as in organizing an international order. It has also served to facilitate the transition from empire and imperialism to cooperation and equality. The most interesting example of a gradual substitution of a federation for an empire is, of course, the transformation of the British Empire into the British Commonwealth of Nations.[41] This feat was accomplished very gradually as former colonies were granted the status of a Dominion, beginning with Canada in 1867. A dominion today is a nearly independent state, of course, tied to Great Britain by bonds of common political and legal tradition as symbolized in the crown, for even India accepts the crown as a symbol, though it does not accept allegiance to the crown. Many would deny the federal character of the Commonwealth; if one does not accept the reality of international federalism, this is indeed a cogent argument. But then the Common Market (EEC) would certainly also have to be ruled out as a federal order, since in many respects the bonds of the Community of the Six are less secure than are those of the Commonwealth, as recent actions and reactions of De Gaulle have only too patently shown. By skillful bargaining and pragmatic compromise—the proverbial muddling through—the British have succeeded in holding the Commonwealth together. They have provided the essentials of federal equality of the component "mechanism" of this federal (or confederal, if preferred) order in the Commonwealth Prime Ministers' Conference which has operated reasonably effectively as an instrumentality for discussing and when possible adopting common action. The gradual evolution of this federal relationship or bond within the Commonwealth with all its subtle gradations even between present members suggests a lesson for all those who would structure such a relationship "irrevocably" or "unalterably." [42]

For all governments and hence all federal orders the establishment and maintenance of an effective executive is decisive; it presents particular difficulties in international federal schemes. And yet, there can be little doubt that the success or failure of the federalizing process depends upon this factor more than any other. Historical evidence in support of this general proposition is abundant. This is not to say that the organizing of such an effective executive guarantees the success of federal order; obstacles, and more especially divisive forces, may be too strong for real progress. Even then such an executive may be able to insure the effective execution of the existing federal bargain. The history of the United Nations provides a case in point [43]; the European Community may find itself forced to be content with a similar operation for a certain period. In any case, the setting up of an executive is crucial for an international federal order (or its retention in case the federalizing process operates toward greater independence rather than closer union). In such situations the advantage of a developed and responsible bureaucracy may be decisive, regardless of how the chief executive is chosen.

Closed federal systems usually exclude secession, but many federal systems have had to face the problem of the admission of new members. In international federal setups, secession is typically provided for (it may be merely a formal right, as is the right of secession of the member states in the Soviet Union).[44] It stands to reason that the looser a federal order is, the more readily will it admit new members and allow old members to secede. As the case of the United States shows, there may be special reasons for readily admitting new members into a close-knit federal union, but in such a case secession will be excluded. The War Between the States, as well as the Sonderbund War in Switzerland (1847), was waged to prevent secession of members that wished to do so, because they had rejected a key policy decision of the majority. Leaving legal provisions aside, it can be stated generally that the ability to secede will increase with the weakness of the federal bond. One might be tempted to make it the distinguishing criteria of an international federal union. But such a distinction does not always hold, though it is undoubtedly frequently true. The ability to secede will decline and tend to disappear as the inclusive community is extended to ever-widening spheres of governmental activities. The European Community presents an interesting, if somewhat irregular case here. No admission has occurred, though association has been negotiated, and secession is not permitted by the treaty; yet France under de Gaulle, though blocking the admission of Britain, has hinted at her own secession. Puerto Rico's situation is in a sense illuminated by these observations: while her admission to the federal union of the United States is, if a possibility at all, only a distant prospect, her secession has been viewed as entirely possible by President and Congress alike. Whether a more permanent federal relationship should retain the right to secession would seem to be bound up with the question of how close the relationship itself is; that at least would be in keeping with the general practice of federalism.

International federalism also raises complex issues in connection with a common citizenship. Obviously, federal states will have such common citizenship; there is an interesting and symptomatic contrast, though, in that some federal states provide for a person being a citizen of the union as a consequence of his being a citizen of one of the member states, while others make citizenship in a member unit depend upon federal citizenship. Obviously the latter is a feature of a closer union, as the case of Germany shows, where originally the first arrangement, but now the latter prevails, as it does in the United States. In the reverse process of increasing federal differentiation, as in the British Commonwealth, common citizenship may disappear altogether, so local citizenship as a condition of federal citizenship may become suitable at a certain point in the evolution.

The question has been raised, in regard to Puerto Rico, whether common citizenship imposes certain limits on a federal relationship. The usual answer has been that such citizenship presupposes that the union be a unit in international relations, and it has been deduced from that that at least foreign relations and defense must be federally controlled, if common citizenship is to be justified. While this may well be the practical consequence of American and more specifically congressional attitudes, it is hard to see how it follows from the federal relationship as such. There may be fairly close bonds without common citizenship, as in the Common Market; there may be very loose ones with such common citizenship, as was the case at one point in the evolution of the Commonwealth.[45] The drafters of the constitution for the European Political Community left the question of formal citizenship open, while its rights were gradually to be extended to more and more persons.[46] This was done, even though the draft constitution only provided for the "coordination" of the foreign policies of the member states.[47] Such a provision shows that there is no intrinsic reason why common citizenship should imply a united foreign policy. In short, citizenship while an important feature of federal orders, is not a presupposition of such a relationship, nor can the "limits" of such a relationship be derived from common citizenship. It all depends upon the circumstances. But it is possible to formulate a rule of thumb to the effect that the more international a federal relationship becomes, the more questionable becomes the retention of common citizenship.[48]

VIII. The Issue of Association

International federalism provides the background for the many-faceted potentialities of association with a federal union, however close. Although associated membership has been known to have occurred in the past, notably in connection with the leagues of city states, it has come into its own only in the 20th century and in conjunction with the full development of federalism. Its quintessence is the institutionalized process by which a state becomes associated with an existing federal union by means of organizing a looser federal relationship than that prevailing among the regular members of the union. Its direct ancestor is the institution of the "Zugewandten" Orte or associated places in the ancient Swiss Confederation. Its outstanding examples at present are, besides Puerto Rico, on the one hand the associates of the Common Market, Greece, some African states (federated for this purpose) and Austria (being negotiated), and on the other the Free City of Berlin, associated with the Federal Republic of Germany. The reasons for arranging such looser association may be many—greater cultural difference, interference of a foreign power, desire for greater neutrality and so forth. Generally and abstractly stated, the case for associated as against full membership can be put thus: when the weight and number of common values and interests is less, and/or the weight and number of divergent values and interests is more than is the case for regular members, associated membership is indicated.

In spite of the historical antecedents, it is fair to say that free association is a new dimension of federalism, suggesting that there even could be an inner and outer group of participating communities such as seems to be developing in the process of European unification. The idea that an autonomous, self-governing community might be an "associated" member of a federal union is difficult to understand and interpret as long as federalism is seen merely as a static pattern or design, rather than being comprehended also as an ongoing process. If the federal order is understood as continually evolving, then the involvement of an associated member becomes part of this overall development. Neither permanence nor irrevocability are part of the federal relationship, according to the more recent insight into the nature of federalism (see introduction and sec. X). Once this is understood, it also becomes patent that the peculiar relationship of association requires effective institutionalization just as much as does the full membership. The typical functions of developed government, the executive, legislative, and judicial spheres of action, must all be provided for. What is perhaps less evident, there must also be available, as under all constitutionalism, and more particularly its federal form, a sound system of organized change; the great discovery of the need for an amending power which the drafters of the American Constitution made[49] has particular application to the federal relationship of association. At the same time, the insight of the men of Philadelphia that such an amending power must itself express the federal relationship, must constitutionally fix the participation of the members, equally has application to this case of associated membership.

This need is particularly clearly recognized in the treaties of association concluded between outside powers and the European Economic Community (Common Market), notably Greece, Turkey, and a group of African States (former French colonies).[50] Requests have also been filed for such association by Austria, Denmark, Ireland, Norway, Spain, Sweden, and Switzerland, as well as some other new states.[51]

Some of these would prefer membership, notably Denmark, Norway, and Ireland, whereas Austria, Sweden, and Switzerland, because of their policy of neutrality definitely desire association rather than membership; the same, for other reasons, holds for the African states. In the case of these as well as Greece and Turkey, it has been urged that even though the existing relations of Greece and Turkey with the members of EEC might suggest membership, "their economic structures are so different from those of the Six, that a gradual process of association leading in a more or less distant future to full membership seemed a better solution."[52] The Agreements which were finally concluded, in accordance with articles 237 and 238 of the EEC Treaty regulating association, in 1961 and 1963, respectively, were the result of long and careful negotiations which established "a framework of relations, based on the progressive creation of a customs union and an economic union of exactly the same kind as that prescribed for implementing the Treaty within the Community."[53] It contains many detailed provisions of an economic sort, but what interest us most here is that there is set up, in each case, a Council of the Association which is charged with administering and developing the association. Meeting at least once every 6 months, it is assisted by an executive committee which acts on the basis of equality (Greece has as many members as the Community) and it has already accomplished important work in implementing the Agreement.[54] Besides the Council and its Committee, a Parliamentary Commission has been set up to provide the opportunity for continuing consultation of the parliamentary control bodies as the necessary liaison with the national parliaments.

A very similar institutional framework has been brought into being for the association of the African states Burundi, Cameroun, Central African Republic, the two Congo Republics, Ivory Coast, Dahomey, Gabon, Upper Volta, Malgache, Mali, Mauritania, Niger, Republique Rwandaise, Senegal, Chad, and Togo, federated for this purpose as the "associated states."[55] It too consists of a Council with Committee, a parliamentary conference, and a court of arbitration. The Council in this case consists of a representative of each of the member states of the Community and of each of the associated states, as well as members of the Commission of EEC; it can act only with a majority of all members present. Meeting once a year, the Council is assisted by a committee, also based on equal representation, which meets more often, prepares its decisions, and works in accordance with the Council's regulations; it can act for the Council, when so authorized. Provided with a regular secretariat, these bodies have already done important work in implementing and interpreting the association agreement. The parliamentary conference receives an annual report from the

Council and can make recommendations in the form of resolutions. The Court of Arbitration is called upon only after the Council has failed to reach a settlement. It consists of five members, two nominated by the Council of the EEC, two by the associated states and a president named by the Council of Association. They should be independent and competent and serve during the life of the Agreement. The Court's decisions are by majority and binding upon the parties.

It may seem a bit farfetched to speak of India, Pakistan, and Malaysia as associated members of the Commonwealth—in law they are considered members—and yet that seems to be their position in fact; for the federal bond linking them to the other members of the Commonwealth is reduced to "acceptance of the King" as "the symbol of the free association of its independent member nations," while "common allegiance to the Crown" is held to be incompatible with their republican form of government.[56] But they accept the Queen as "Head of the Commonwealth." In their case, the relationship is almost completely informal. No institutional arrangements are spelled out, although their prime ministers do participate in Prime Ministers Conference. The case is mentioned here primarily in order to indicate how very tenuous, indeed, the federal relationship under association can become, when political, economic and cultural developments suggest it. It is also well to bear in mind the great skill which British statemanship has brought to the task of maintaining a relationship under highly adverse conditions. The Puerto Rican case seems hardly to fit this pattern at the present time, but conditions may change, and the maintennace of an association may yet be preferable to complete separation and independence.

The case of Berlin within the Federal Republic is different, but nonetheless instructive. Here we have an entity which would very much prefer to form an integral part of the larger federal union that is the Federal Republic, but is prevented from doing so by Allied veto and the East-West conflict. As a consequence, Western Berlin is tied to the Federal Republic in a free association (not called thus) which gives her citizens the citizenship of the Federal Republic and full opportunity to participate in the political life of Western Germany, provides for the location of important Federal German administrative and judicial bodies in Berlin, and permits Berlin to send representatives into the federal legislative bodies who fully take part in the work, although they do not have a formal vote. (There is an exception to this last provision in that Berlin delegates have voted in the presidential elections which are carried through in a special assembly.) [57] All federal laws are applicable to Berlin, although upon Allied insistence they have to be reenacted by the Berlin Legislature.[58] Of course Berlin, like all other states of the Federal Republic, administers (executes) many federal laws and is in this connection subject to federal supervision. Judicial decisions are integrated into the German precedents, and cases are appealed to the highest German courts, such as the Constitutional Court (one of these the Federal Administrative Court or "Bundesverwaltungsgericht" is located in Berlin).

Berlin is obviously a case where the citizens have a maximal desire to share in the federal union; their position corresponds to that of the inhabitants of an incorporated American territory prior to its achieving statehood, except that Berlin has a position much like that of Puerto Rico. The arrangements raise the question of how Puerto Ricans might participate in electing the President and whether they should not have several representatives in Congress, but the answer would seem that such changes could not be worked out without changing the U.S. Constitution with all the objections arising from the slowness of the amending process.

It is probably more in keeping with the basically different position of the political systems involved to derive the more general lesson of a need for effective instrumentalities of steady cooperation and continuing change. A formal institutionalized bond calls for the possibility of amending it by mutual agreement between the partners. All legislation should be based upon cooperative arrangements; and Berlin's scheme of reenacting the federal laws before they become applicable makes sense under such circumstances; in the Common Market this is the common practice throughout the federal union, and not only in the case of "associates." It might, however, be sufficient to provide the associated member with the power to declare any federal law inapplicable. Furthermore, an associated member of a federal union should be provided with the maximum amount of delegated administration (see sec. V); here again the experience in the loose union that is the Common Market suggests the broadest application. Perhaps the most difficult question which remains is that of the associated state's tie-in with the federal union's foreign relations and defense policies. In the case of Berlin, practically complete acceptance of the Federal Republic's decisions is a natural consequence not only of Berlin's dependence upon Western Germany, but also of her citizens' firm desire to remain a part of the German people and its political order. In the case of the European Common Market, foreign policy and defense have so far not been effectively federalized, but even this possibility has caused Austria a major headache in connection with her association; for the "neutrality" which the State Treaty of 1955 provides excludes her from any common defense or foreign policies; the same would presumably apply to Switzerland, if she sought association with the Common Market, as quite a few Swiss demand. The very hesitancy of the European Community to enter this field facilitates association. In the case of Puerto Rico, the close-knit federalism of the United States makes it a serious problem. And yet, some kind of equivalent for the current participation of the citizens of American states in the shaping of foreign and defense policies would seem to be indicated.[59] Treaties might be made subject to specific assent, legislative control participated in, and some body corresponding to the Dominion Prime Ministers Conference could be set up.

IX. Country Studies

The country studies which follow are not intended to give a complete panorama of each federal regime treated—impossible within the limited space, anyhow—but rather to serve as cases illustrating a particular point of the general analysis. They are alphabetically arranged for easy reference.

A. BELGIUM

Belgium presents, like Canada and Cyprus, a case of an intensified conflict between two nationalities which are related to neighboring national states and have been divided by hostile relations over many generations. Its distinctive feature consists in the fact that Belgium has been and is to this day a unitary state built on the principle of bilingualism. This Belgian state is of relatively recent origin. It came into being in 1830, following a revolution against the Netherlands and was guaranteed its neutrality by an international treaty to which the leading states of Europe were parties. Since the revolution was carried out by the French-speaking Walloons who then and until recently constituted a majority, the Belgian constitution of 1831, modeled on French monarchical liberalism and constitutionalism, was given a distinctly unitary and majoritarian character, even though the Flemish population, while alienated from the Dutch by their Catholic religion, possessed a strong sense of identity and formed a distinct cultural community. Eventually this sense of national separateness led to a violent movement for Flemish autonomy, going at times all the length of a demand for independence.[60] As such, this antagonism endangered the very existence of the Belgian state, and in recent years responsible voices could be heard which proclaimed that there was no such entity as a Belgian nation. To aggravate the problem, the Flemish population around the turn of the century became the majority and has been inclined to claim for itself the same privileges of predominance which were formally assumed by the French-speaking Belgians. There are nine provinces all together of which the four northern ones are French speaking, while the province of Brabant with Brussels is divided—as a result there is a reasonably clear boundary.

If one keeps Brussels separately—the Bruxellois consider themselves as apart—the population balance according to the census of 1848 was Flemish-speaking 4,272,392 or 50.19 percent; French-speaking Walloons 2,940,543 or 34.54 percent and Brussels 1,298,545 or 15.2 percent; in short the Flemish (a Dutch dialect) speaking people have become an absolute majority. At the same time, since the Flemish annual increase through births over deaths is almost seven times that of the Walloons, it has been estimated that the Flemish population will, by 1980 constitute over 60 percent.[61] It is obvious that this confrontation will aggravate the problems of the French-speaking minority. Some Belgians hope that these problems will have found a federal solution by that time. In the meantime, it is further hoped that Belgium's membership in the European Community of the Six will attenuate the sharpness of the clash, since the Netherlands with whom the Flemish people have, religion apart, a strong cultural and linguistic affinity, are also a member of this more inclusive federal union, and the Benelux countries (Belgium, Luxembourg, and the Netherlands) tend to collaborate in facing the much greater power of France and Germany.

Belgium has been a bilingual state since 1898, largely as a result of the efforts of the Flemish movement which came into being soon after the state became independent. To this bilingualism corresponds a bireligionism, since the Catholic preponderance in the country hides the sharp conflict between the clericalism of the conservative Flemish and the liberal anticlericalism of the progressive and socialist Walloons. This contrast is related to the agricultural economy of the North and the mining and industrial economy of the South. The elections have reflected this contrast over many years; at the same time the interlarding of the party following has served as something of a palliative. In 1958, the 104 Flemish deputies were divided into 62 Christian Social, 31 Socialists and 10 Liberals, the 76 Walloon deputies on the other hand were divided into 40 Socialists, 29 Christian Socials and 5 Liberals. The Communists were a negligible group. This striking contrast between the Flemish and Walloon parts of the country is, as we said, clearly related to the economic structure; the industrial South has worldwide links which give it a decidedly more cosmopolitan outlook. But this situation is changing, especially since the institution of the Common Market. The greater availability of manpower has in fact induced foreign enterprisers who have come into Belgium to prefer the Flemish part; it is reported that 36 out of 38 foreign firms chose the Flemish section for the establishment of their branches.[62] The French-speaking part of Belgium was further hit by the crisis in coal which has plagued Europe for a number of years. These trends eventually led to a crisis, highlighted by strikes which in the years 1960–61 culminated in demands for constitutional reforms. These plans have a considerable history. They have a good deal of interest for the student of federal relationships, even though none has so far been realized.

In the past, there had been plans to dissolve Belgium either by joining Flanders (the Flemish part) to Germany, France or the Netherlands, or to let it become a separate state. But these plans have never had substantial support, and so we shall concentrate here upon the plans for maintaining Belgium intact, though it ought to be remembered that making one or another part into a separate state may become more urgent, if all such solutions fail.

Originally, federal solutions were only popular among the Flemish people, while the Walloons favored decentralization in combination with a parliamentary form of Calhoun's idea of "concurrent majorities", that is, a provision according to which each law had to have not only a majority of the parliament, but also a majority in each of the two nationality groups.[63] It is odd that such a provision was not recognized as the radically federalistic method that it is, and was not seen as the commencement of a federalizing process which their adoption would undoubtedly have engendered.

The plans for federalizing Belgium were based upon Swiss precedent. Favored in the past by the Flemish part, they have become the battlecry of the Walloons since the Second World War. Spearheaded by the Walloon Movement (originally started in opposition to the Flemish Movement), the Walloon demands are now directed toward a federal state. There has been bitter disagreement over the form of such a state, whether it should be composed of the three parts of Flanders, Wallonia and Brussels, or of two parts, eliminating Brussels, or of the several provinces. It is curious that many advocates of these solutions seem to feel that an autonomous Wallonia would have better chances, economically, than it has now. Presumably it could prevent the application of laws which it considered inimical to its interests, but its promotional appeal would not necessarily increase as a result of such negative action. Politically, the situation would also be aggravated, because on the basis of the distribution of votes indicated above there would be permanent majorities in both parts with corresponding accerbation of the relationships between the two. It would seem that a federal system which would retain the present division into provinces would be most nearly likely to function satisfactorily; a reduction into five which has been proposed[64] is undesirable, though better than two or three and would raise all sort of problems of redistricting which are notoriously among the most difficult issues of politics. At the present time, decentralization rather than federalism seems to be the line of compromise.

B. BRAZIL

Brazil presents a very different case, although here too economic issues and the retardation of parts of the country have been a key factor in precipitating a crisis. But her case is primarily interesting as demonstrating the limits of federalism as a solution to problems of diversity, when economic conditions are unfavorable. The federal system of Brazil, instituted after the overthrow of the Empire (1889), twice broke down. The first regime lasted for about four decades, but was overthrown in the sequel of the world economic crisis in 1934 by Getulio Vargas who transformed Brazil into a dictatorship on the Fascist model (Estado Novo).[65] Reestablished in 1946, the second model did not even last two decades, although its outward forms, retained by the military dictatorship, may be considered a continuation. It should be noted in this connection that Brazilian scholars have been inclined to question the federal nature of Brazil after 1946,[66] but since these arguments were mostly based on an outworn static and formalistic conception of federalism, they need not detain us here. In any case, Brazil was reconstituted as a closely integrated federal order, comparable to India (see below).

The Brazilian social structure is characterized by extremes of contrast between classes and regions. Enormous wealth in São Paulo and Rio de Janeiro contrast with abject poverty and a standard of living way below that of Puerto Rico in the North and West of the country. São Paulo with 18 percent of the population produces 55 percent of the country's industrial goods and receives over one-third of the national income. It stands to reason that São Paulo and the three other leading states (out of 21) should tend to control the national government; yet its tasks were primarily those connected with the need for economic development in the poorer states.

What was said concerning the first Republic's federalism applies ceteris paribus to the second:

> Federalism and republicanism, instead of consolidating the country and creating the consciousness of a Brazilian nationhood, only helped to paralyze the solidarity of the people and to promote a vicious regionalism in which the two most powerful states, Sao Paulo and Mindas Geraes, dominated for their own economic and political interests the whole country.[67]

And yet, the second form of federalism had given so much power to the center that as mentioned it could even be questioned whether it was, properly speaking, in accord with the federal principle. As one Brazilian constitutional lawyer put it, the states were free only to elect their governors and deputies to the state assembly.[68] "As one reads the text of the Constitution of 1946, one is struck so forcibly by the overwhelming scope of the Union's jurisdiction as to wonder what could possibly be left to the states," an outside observer has added. It seems more than doubtful that such arguments, based upon formalistic criteria of competency, constitute a realistic assessment; even in 1961, the states and communes in Brazil together had slightly more revenue than the Federal Government, namely 308 plus 62 as against 308 billion cruzeiros.[69] In the vigorous federal system of the United States, as well as Switzerland, the Federal Republic and elsewhere, the federal authorities collect a much larger percentage of the total revenue. In the United States the figures are: Total revenues for 1962 (in millions of dollars): Federal, 106,441; State, 37,597; and local, 43,278.[70]

It does not seem realistic therefore to blame the increase in federal activity for the breakdown of Brazilian federalism, or to insist contrariwise that this federalism was a disguised unitary state (as Vargas' regime had been). It seems much more nearly correct to suggest that the federal authorities had failed to satisfy the country's economic needs and had therefore yielded to radical, even Communist elements. And that argument brings us back to the disparity between the states. In every federal system some of the component units will be more opulent than others: New York is richer than Mississippi, Zuerich more so than Unterwalden, Rhineland-Westphalia with its Ruhr decidedly more so than Schleswig-Holstein. Indeed, it might be said that these very contrasts are part of the federal bargain. But they are only bearable, and that is to say politically durable, if the federal authorities are intent upon balancing the imbalance by federal subsidies in one form or another. In the United States, the per capita contribution in the form of grants-in-aid in one of the poor states, Wyoming, in the late fifties was over $50 per capita (in Puerto Rico $10), while the contribution of its citizens by way of federal income tax was less than $200. But these contrasts are much more extreme in the case of Brazil. States like Guanabara (Rio de Janeiro) and São Paulo are modern communities on the standard of the West, while in the North and West of Brazil conditions are as low as in the most underdeveloped parts of Latin America and Asia. The per capita income is as low as $100, and many of these states can operate modern facilities and attempt to effect some development only by means of federal support. Hence the federal government is called upon to redistribute income and to manage the economic growth of the poorer regions. In this task it has not succeeded, and the measures needed for accomplishing significant results aroused the antagonism which undermined the regime.

In view of this situation, it does not make much sense to argue that autonomy will be sacrificed to the central government, nor can such floundering policies as the federal government of Brazil has promoted, and which have resulted in inflation and a breakdown of the external balance of payments, be usefully described as an "economic dictatorship over the states." [71] Rather, the conclusion which seems to impose itself is that federalism is no cure for inadequate, not to say incompetent, government. Indeed, it requires a high degree of skill and the pragmatic capacity for compromise. But neither is a unitary state. Just as the German Weimar Republic did not fail, because of its weak federal structure, so Brazil did not do so (there are striking parallels between the centralistic federalism of both). Brazilian federalism suffers from the fact that it is not an institutional outgrowth of its own peculiar social realities, as are the federalisms of Switzerland, the United States of America, and the Federal Republic of Germany. It was artificially imposed upon a country that had lived under a unitary monarchy, and its institutions were largely copies from the U.S. Constitution without Brazil in any real sense resembling the American reality of 1787 or later. "A unitary state, which had worked well for two generations, was broken up into artificial segments which were endowed with political independence without being ripe for it or even desiring it," Karl Loewenstein has written.[72] Since only a few states have a cultural or economic personality of their own, being the successors to colonial districts, the rest cannot hope and do not desire to maintain themselves as states. In view of the large size and the wide diversities of the country, a radical decentralization would seem a more sensible constitutional program than a federal system. Perhaps something like the unitary federal state could be made to work.[73]

C. CANADA

The Canadian federal relationship, long believed to be a very stable compromise,[74] has in recent years become the subject of violent controversy. An insistent demand for independence on the part of a substantial group of the French Canadians has precipitated a crisis of major proportions. It is a striking case of the disruptive force of nationalism and linguistic separatism. As the Royal Commission put it recently: "Indeed it seemed (from the testimony taken) that French-speaking participants used the term 'nation' to emphasize their understanding of a binational Canada, while English-speaking ones used it to insist on the necessity of 'national unity' for the country." [75] This misunderstanding between English-speaking and

French-speaking Canadians regarding the meaning of the very term 'nation' is symptomatic for this conflict. (It cannot be explained away by reference to the meaning of nation in French; on the contrary, French usage inclines to link the concept of nation to that of Etat.)[76]

During the testimony, taken by the aforementioned Royal Commission, many spoke of the fact that other nationalities, besides the French, had become assimilated, so why not the French. The answer must be in terms of numbers, compactness of settlement, and complete predominance in one state, the Province of Quebec. There can be little question that such concentration and recognition within the federal framework makes a vital difference. Bilingualism is the cause and the reinforced result of such an arrangement. There is an old legend that German almost became the official language of the State of Pennsylvania, and that it took the persuasive power of Benjamin Franklin to prevent it. No one knows, of course, what might have been the consequence; there can be no doubt that it would have strengthened German separatism.[77] In a sense, therefore, we may state it, as least hypothetically, that a federal recognition of a nationality and its language reinforces its differential development and hence centrifugal tendencies. In light of the Swiss experience, it may be doubted, however, that this need be the result, if the two or more language groups are placed on a basis of strict equality. What has caused the trouble is the attitude, expressed by many English-speaking Canadians: if English is the majority's language then that is what we will speak. In this connection, it is worth observing that the confrontation of two languages, one of the majority and the other of the minority, seems to be particularly prone to precipitate conflict. Bilingualism may be linguistically more manageable than multilingualism, but it is also politically more difficult to cope with. (See secs. A and D.)

A little over 30 percent of Canada's total population of 18,233,247 are of French ethnic origin, while not quite 44 percent are British, so the balance is not quite a third against not quite a half. Over four-fifths of the French-speaking Canadians are concentrated in the Province of Quebec, where they constitute over four-fifths of the total population (4,241,354 out of 5,259,211). The rest are scattered widely, nowhere except in New Brunswick (38.82 percent) reaching anywhere near the national percentage figure. There is a rapid dropping off toward the West, with Ontario, the Province with the largest population (6,236,092), having just over 10 percent Canadians of French ethnic origin.[78] Since the next largest ethnic element is the Germans who are not quite 6 percent whose percentage increases toward the West, it is clear that Anglo-French conflict is the decisive one. The other nationalities tend, as is usual in such situations, to side with and assimilate to the English-speaking elements, though when taken together they could give a majority to the opposition.

These figures are somewhat misleading. If one considers mother tongue, English speakers appear to be nearly 60 percent, whereas the French contingent does not quite constitute 30 percent; and if "official language" is considered, there are over 67 percent who report "only English," while a mere 19 percent report "only French," with a significant 12 percent claiming both languages, thus showing that about a third of the French-speaking population are bilingual, against perhaps 3 percent of the rest of the people. This kind of imbalance contrasts sharply with the Swiss situation, where bilingualism is widespread. But the basic pattern is the same: a large English-speaking majority in Canada outside the Province of Quebec, and a large French-speaking majority in Quebec. As the Royal Commission Report remarks, the chief protagonists are French-speaking Quebec and English-speaking Canada; it is a conflict between two majorities. Quebec wants and is building itself into an autonomous society.

The development of this determination to recapture its cultural identity and to reinforce it by the formation of an autonomous state rests upon many factors. The clash is based upon ancient enmities. But it is reinforced by economic disparities, especially in industrial control and per capita income. Yet central to the Canadian situation is the dualism of two cultures. Canadian federalism, according to some Canadian theorists, rests upon an implicit compact or alliance of these two cultures.[79] It is difficult to see how such a theory can be combined with the highly centralistic tenor of the British North America Act (1867). Rather, the Canadian situation would seem to correspond to the theory of the unitary federal state, though here it is not the creation of the constituent people themselves, but rather the "mother country." This may in fact be part of the difficulties.

In a long series of interpretative decisions, the Privy Council, as the court of last resort, until recently, has strengthened the power of the states, thus responding to the realities of Canadian dualism; this judicial federalizing process has been sharply criticized.[80] It certainly ran counter to the trend in the United States, so that a critic could write that where a "looser federalism in the United States was unified by the judgments of a Marshall, in Canada a stronger union was decentralized by a Watson and a Haldane."[81] But his phase came to an end with the completion of Canadian independence from the control of the British parliament, in this century. The rising tide of economic dirigism, common to so many countries, led to a rapid extension of federal activity, promoted by political leadership. There can be little question that this increase in central activity and power served to exacerbate the situation of the French Canadians and was thus bound to intensify their desire for greater autonomy, even at the risk of some economic disadvantage. Cooperative federalism has been of some help in this connection (as it has in other federal systems), but the actual imbalance is so pronounced that cooperation is difficult. It is probably true that it strengthens both levels of government, and is not merely a cloak for centralism, but it does not provide the degree of local autonomy which the French Canadians desire. They do not wish to become "dignified and haughty pensioners rather than partners of the national government."[82] On the contrary they insist upon the partnership becoming real.

The resistance to the spreading power of the federal government is not limited to Quebec and the French Canadians. It is also increasingly felt in Ontario and British Columbia.[83] Especially where taxes and public expenditure are concerned, these provinces wish to extend rather than curtail provincial autonomy. But the hard core of the fight for expanding such autonomy is undoubtedly Quebec. In essence, it has been said, "they (the French) do not wish to be treated as outsiders," yet "they want to remain a separate group." The same author reported that one of Quebec's top public servants, Claude Morin, told him: "Every French Canadian is at heart a separatist."[84] In keeping with such sentiments, the government of Quebec has been developing a vigorous program of industrial conquest, that is to say a program under which the effective control and management of business and industry in Quebec would be in French Canadian hands. Using the hydroelectric power, banking and steel as starting points, the government of Prime Minister Jean Lesage has already achieved vital progress in the direction of such a conquest. As a part of it, he has wrested nearly 50 percent of the income tax revenue from the federal authorities (as against the 18 percent the provinces normally have been getting).

Canadian federalism has been evolving at such a rapid rate, and especially the federal relationship of Quebec has undergone so extensive an evolution, that it seems difficult to delineate the future development. When both the Federal and the Quebec governments have already authorized a study of the possible consequences of complete separation, when at least one premier of a Western province has declared that he would propose his province's joining the United States in case of the secession of Quebec, it is obvious that something dramatic will be needed to institutionalize the distinct relationship. Perhaps the Canadian Premiers' Conference, which was established in 1960, can be developed to provide a new symbol of provincial autonomy, perhaps the conventional representation of distinct provinces in the federal cabinet could be constitutionally firmed to provide a recognition of the dualism that is Canada's cultural reality. But to an outside observer, the Royal Commission was wise, when it reminded its readers of Lord Durham's remark (in his famous report of 1838): "I found two nations warring in the bosom of a single state." They rightly add that the present crisis concerns the totality of two societies, and they remind us that such a relationship, "like anything that is living, must constantly adapt to changing conditions." [85]

D. CYPRUS

The federal order of Cyprus provides the clearest case for the argument that federalism is ill-suited to situations in which the will to federal cooperation (common values, interests, and beliefs) is weak, especially when only two partners exist of whom one necessarily constitutes the majority. The difficulties are compounded when both elements in the community are related to interested outside powers which themselves are in conflict.[86] That is precisely the situation of Cyprus.

Cyprus is about the size of Puerto Rico and lies in the Eastern Mediterranean within the sight of the Asiatic coast, opposite Lebanon and Turkey. It had a population of about 575,000 inhabitants in 1960 which increases rapidly (by about 1.75 percent per year). Of these less than 20 percent are Turks, while the largest part of the remainder are Greeks. Most of the latter are autochthonous, while the Turks are descendants of a population settled in Cyprus during the Ottoman rule, in the 17th to 19th centuries (Britain acquired Cyprus as recently as 1878 and granted her independence in 1960). In this connection a treaty was concluded between Great Britain, Greece, Turkey, and the Republic of Cyprus (Aug. 16, 1960). At the same time, a constitution came into force which had been drafted by a joint commission upon the basis of an agreement, resulting from conferences at Zurich and London in 1959, which became known as the Cyprus Agreement. This agreement and the constitution derived from it sought to bridge the deep gulf which divided the Greek and Turkish Cypriotes by an elaborate dualism. The gulf is the result of the historic animosity of the two peoples, dating back to the Turkish conquest and the Greek struggle for liberation. It is deepened by differences of religion, language and many related aspects of culture. Since Greeks and Turks are intermingled on the island, rather than living in geographically well-defined areas (though there are some differences in density of distribution), the federalism chosen for Cyprus was what might be called "corporate federalism"—a scheme once proposed for the solution of the nationality problems of the Hapsburg Empire and afterwards adopted in Estonia.[87] Federalism was here based on a nonterritorial plan whereunder a person could choose which particular nationality he wished to belong to and participate in. It is not clear from the record whether the Austrian plan or the Estonian experience had any influence upon the constitution makers for Cyprus. In any case they structured their federal scheme upon a comparable idea, as generally the constitution of Cyprus follows the Continental European rather than British or American precedent.[88]

The federal bargain, in the case of Cyprus, was very carefully worked out in terms of what appears to have been an unresolved conflict. It was forcefully supported by the Greek Cypriotes who were led by the strong and unscrupulous Archbishop Makarios, the Ethnarch or ruler of his people, as he was called. Resisted by the Turkish minority to the very end, the compromise which the British accepted did not rest upon a deep-seated will to unity, except on the part of the majority.[89] As a result, the existing dualism was recognized throughout and became a built-in part of the constitution. Its extremely long and complicated provisions constitute an elaborate scheme of checks and balances in which the need for organizing the community for effective action is sacrificed to the purpose of preventing the abuse of power by one of the two parties to the bargain. Right at the start, there is provision for a president who must be a Greek and a vice president who must be a Turk. It was not long before the two, instead of cooperating, were at loggerheads; since they did not owe their election to one constituency, but were the representatives of the two nationalities, the Greeks electing the president, and the Turks the vice president, this was hardly to be wondered at. There follow provisions for two official languages, and for flying the flags of the two nations along with that of Cyprus, as well as celebrating the respective national holidays.

The basic error of having two chief executives, representing the two hostile communities, was continued downward in the governmental hierarchy. The cabinet or council of ministers of 10 members must have 7 Greeks and 3 Turks, respectively named by the president and vice president, yet decisions were to be taken by majority so that the Greeks could and did disregard the Turks. Likewise, there was to be a dualism in other top offices, such as the attorney general. Again the entire civil service was to be composed of 70 percent Greeks and 30 percent Turks, with as much matching as possible throughout. A surer recipe for failure to achieve a working federal bargain could hardly be imagined. The federalizing process which is the crux of a working federal order could not possibly get under way in such conditions.

But the error was compounded by the legislative setup. There was provided a house of representatives of 50 members, 35 Greeks and 15 Turks. This house had a president who was a Greek elected by the Greeks and a vice president to be elected by the Turks. But even this degree of dualistic splintering of the legislative power was not deemed adequate. So in addition, communal chambers were organized to be in charge of legislation in regard to religion, education, culture, family, and personal relations, and were even given their own separate taxing power in order "to provide for the community's needs" (cf. the Yugoslav "chambers" below sec. IX J). These communal chambers were elected each by their respective national communities and therefore in a sense corresponded to the legislatures of territorial subdivisions in classical federal systems. But since they possess no clearly assigned executive establishment, they were bound to act as a disruptive element in reinforcing the divisive tendencies in the dualistically structured civil service.

As if these provisions for organizing only conflict and competition and omitting all institutional safeguards for cooperation were not enough to doom the federal relationship, it was further provided that the relationship of each of the two nationalities to their outside national communities should be reinforced by such arrangements as subsidies from the Greek and Turkish governments for education and the like, and the participation of clergymen, professors, and teachers from Greece and Turkey.

So radical a system of divided power and conflicting competencies desperately needed an umpire in the form of a constitutional court to adjudicate differences regarding the interpretation of these provisions. But how could one find a neutral arbiter? The Supreme Constitutional as well as the Supreme Judicial Court were both composed in the same dualistic fashion by one Greek and one Turkish judge, with an outsider as third member and president of the court. Actually one of these outsiders was a German, the other a Canadian. In the Constitutional Court the President tried to cope with the situation by persuading his colleagues not to render any decisions, except unanimously; the result was, of course, that no decisions could be rendered on matters in controversy between Greeks and Turks, although these were the only matters calling for decision under the circumstances. Eventually, the president resigned, because the Greek President of the republic brought heavy pressure upon him to side with the Greek member in making a decision. Similarly, the president of the Supreme Judicial Court resigned.

The stumbling bloc proved to be the management of local government which the Greeks sought to make more effectively operative, by providing for unified rather than dualistic control. The Turks considered this a clear violation of both the letter and the spirit of the constitution. Presumably they were right (we do not wish to enter into the elaborate formalistic arguments), and the president of the court inclined to render that kind of formalistically correct judgment.[90] But constitutions are not formal documents; they must be interpreted flexibly to allow for developing social context, as the history of the U.S. Supreme Court shows very clearly. It may be doubted, however, whether a constitution so ill-constructed and embodying so incomplete a federal bargain could have been made to work by any judge, no matter how wise.

The lesson of the Cyprus experiment—and it is an important one—is that a federal system requires for its effective functioning adequate machinery for continuous readjustment. There must exist workable institutional devices, "mechanisms," if you please, for reassessing the position and for allowing the partners to negotiate further bargains to implement the existing one. In short, the structure must allow the federalizing process to go forward. But no machinery, no matter how skillfully contrived, can serve effectively, if it is not supported by a determined will to make it work, if there is no commitment to a degree of federal unity, as well as a determination to maintain local values, interests and beliefs intact. A dual regime compounded of two hostile groups, one bent on domination and majority rule, the other preferring separation and secession provides no foundation for the operation of the difficult system that is federalism.

E. GERMANY

The case of Germany, or rather of the Federal Republic of Germany, is particularly interesting from the viewpoint of federal administration. For here the system of delegated administration is developed to a very high degree. It has a long tradition and is linked to the strong sense of local patriotism which has been characteristic of Germany throughout most of her history. Leaving aside the medieval period and the earlier modern times when Germany was divided into many principalities, we find that after her unification in the Empire, in 1871, delegated administration became the rule for a large part of federal administration. This was due to the fact that the large principalities, such as the kingdoms of Bavaria, Wurttemberg, and Saxony, not to speak of Prussia, had highly developed administrative services[91] which had been in charge of the execution of local law. As such laws were gradually replaced by federal legislation, it seemed the better part of wisdom to allow the existing services to carry on, and indeed, through the Federal Council, to participate in the shaping of federal legislation. Under the Weimar Republic, after 1919, this tradition was partially abandoned, and a number of federal ("reichseigene") administrations were organized; their top-heavy bureaucracy became one of the controversial features of that ill-fated system. Hitler's radical concentration of all power, both legislative and administrative, not only caused a strong demand for a return to federal relationships between Germany's constituent parts, but also a natural reaction in favor of its tradition of delegated administration. The fact that such delegated administration was also practiced in Switzerland suggested that it was not "undemocratic" to resume it.[92]

The constitutional provisions for delegated administration are embodied in title VIII of the basic law (Constitution) of the Federal Republic, comprising articles 83–91.[93] They are of considerable complexity. The foreign service, the federal finance administration (internal revenue), the federal bank, the railroads, the postal service, waterways and shipping, social insurance, armed forces, and finally air transport are designated as part of federal administration proper. Most other matters forming the subject of some federal legislation (there are some exceptions) are administered by the "Laender" (states) under federal supervision. Thus federal policy is executed by the Laender governments who administer these matters as "of their own concern," that is to say as if they were their own policy, establishing the necessary offices and issuing the needed rules and regulations. At the same time, the Federal Government may issue general rules which are, however, subject to approval by the Federal Council. This means in practice that the administrations of the Laender governments acting by a majority of votes (21 out of 41) must be willing to accept such a general regulation; they often are.[94]

In exercising its supervision, the Federal Government may send commissioners to the "Land" government, and if the Minister President of the Land government refuses access to the Land authorities concerned, the Federal Government can go to the Federal Council and seek authorization for approaching the particular Land authorities directly. In general, this supervision which also involves the making of reports and the submission of documents, functions smoothly; the cases where conflict has resulted are relatively rare. The federal authorities may and do request that shortcomings be corrected. But what happens if they are not and conflict results? The basic law provides that in such cases the Federal Council is to be the umpire. It decides, upon application of the Federal Government, who is right and if this does not settle the matter, it may be appealed to the constitutional court. The court has had to handle some cases, but not very many.[95]

The Federal Government may also issue instructions to the Land authorities and if it can secure the assent of the Federal Council, it may issue "individual instructions for particular cases." Unless the matter is urgent, such instructions must, like all instructions, be addressed to the "highest Land authorities", that is to say the Minister President. Here again we see the careful effort to protect as far as possible Land autonomy against federal interference in local administration. On the other hand, so intimate a matter as the training of civil servants was given to the Federal Government to regulate and it has done so. This arrangement has resulted in a certain rigidity and has served to buttress the near-monopolizing of the civil service by the legal profession (Juristenmonopol).

If it be asked what may be the standard or criteria by which federal supervision is exercised, the answer is given by the Basic Law when it says that supervision may be in terms not only of conformity with the law, but also in terms of the appropriateness of the execution, at least where the Land operates by mandate of the Federal Government. In other words, the effectiveness of what the Land authorities undertake in the course of administering federal law is part of the supervision. A fairly elaborate code of regulations has been developed to further circumscribe the actual procedures. More detailed provisions are made with regard to the armed forces in case the Federal Government should call upon the Laender to act as "agents" of the federal authorities in order to give the federal authorities greater degree of power and free them of the necessity of securing the consent of the Federal Council. Special provisions are also made for the administration of federal highways and motor roads by the Laender.

This entire system, as envisaged in the constitution, has been greatly altered and implemented by the further delegation of the execution and administration of federal legislation to the cities (Staedte) and counties (Landkreise), i.e., to the communes (municipal corporations). The cities are quite independent of the state administration, while the administration of the counties is intertwined with that of the states, but has also become increasingly autonomous. Hence the administration of both state and federal legislation is carried out by the local bodies which are administering the two kinds of law together. Nor do they form special administrative units; rather their administration is organized according to functions and these functional departments administer federal, state and local law jointly. In effect they integrate all administration.

The resulting separation of policy formation and execution administration brings it about that the control turns upon the principle of "legality" (Gesetzmaessigkeit) which in turn leads to stating the policy in great detail in the form of normative law. That is the reason why German administration is to such a large extent handled by men trained in the law—the above-mentioned monopoly of the jurists. For such legally trained civil servants possess the capacity to interpret and apply the legal norms which are handed them by the superior authorities. They are further encouraged to do so by their subjection to a very active administrative court practice. These administrative courts provide a large part of the control. All this judicial supervision is integrated on the national level, by the Federal Administrative Court, as similar State Administrative Courts integrate the local activities. In order that such a system function effectively, it is necessary that the citizen is ready and willing to appeal to the administrative courts, whenever he feels that the administrative authorities step outside the law. Germans are notoriously willing to do so, and are encouraged by a rather simple procedure and the inclination of these courts to favor the citizen rather than the administrator. Thus a good deal of the control which might be difficult internally is provided by external judicial control.

Such a system would not work, unless the officials were interested in the judicial decisions. In fact, the bureaucrats are keenly concerned, since any decision against their work carries the implication of illegality. The often-belabored "legalism" of German administration is rooted in this attention of the German official to judicial precedents which in turn reinforces the "monopoly of the jurists." It is difficult without being trained in law, to be a good administrator under such a system. As a consequence, the superior Land and federal authorities need not be too much concerned with controlling the execution of federal law. A further advantage of this system is that such a legally controlled administration does not have to organize new offices for each new task. The Land authorities hand on to the cities and counties the new legislation which simply require the department in charge to handle the matter; the department is enlarged rather than a new agency instituted and the problems of supervision and control remain the same.[96]

One important administrative means of supervision and control is the tradition of requiring reports which in turn becomes the basis of communications, including instructions (Anordnungen) and orders (Erlasse). But these communications also usually take the form of general norms rather than being specific and addressed to a particular office or official.

Where administration operates freely and according to discretion rather than legal norm, the federal influence is wielded by means of grants-in-aid, with specific conditions attached, as in roadbuilding and other public works. The techniques, familiar in the United States, are reasonably effective in securing the quality of the performance.[97]

F. INDIA

India's federal experiment is particularly interesting, because of its increasing differentiation, due to the diversity in languages and economic development. While originally it was hoped by its creators that India would become monolingual in the course of a few years, it has actually proven necessary not only to accept multilingualism, but also to restructure the country's effective divisions in accordance with diversified cultural and linguistic ambitions. It might be objected here that the issues India presents are not, properly speaking, related to federalism, since many Indian scholars insist that India is not a federal system, but "a unitary state with subsidiary federal features."[98] But apart from the fact that such arguments are usually based on too narrow a conception of federalism, excluding the "unitary federal state" (see below sec. X), India is clearly undergoing a federalizing process in the course of which federal diversity is increasing. It is, as has been shown a number of times in this study, a recurrent process that in the course of the democratizing of a society, regional and linguistic-cultural communities become more articulate and demand recognition in the form of a set of political institutions, including safeguards for the identity of the particular community. India is as much a case in point, as are Belguim, Canada, Cyprus, and the rest.

It stands to reason that at first after independence had been won and British imperial rule had been replaced by local authority, unitary sentiment should have been very strong, especially after one of the major subdivisions; namely, the Muslim community, had broken away into a separate Pakistan. Yet, even though the federal scheme of the constitution of 1935 had proved unworkable, there was virtually no sentiment for the establishment of a constitutionally unitary state;[99] but there was powerful sentiment for giving the central authorities sufficient power to combat the centrifugal tendencies in so vast a country with a rich diversity of cultures, languages and religions, and it is submitted that the extent of these formal powers cannot be made the measuring rod of the force of regionalism and federalism in India. The consolidation and regrouping of the original subdivisions—largely the result of dynastic conquest in the princely states and of British administrative expediency in the rest of India—into fairly large units of unilingual homogeneity has increased the weight of the states considerably.[100] As a leading Indian scholar put it recently:

> It would be rash to assume that the federal system in India has definitely settled down to the acceptance of central dominance. The growth of regional consciousness has only just begun and new problems based on it are coming to the surface despite the weight of law, custom and habit on the side of the Center.[101]

Among the most interesting challenges to centralizing tendencies and the former unitary propensity is the opposition to policies designed to carry out the constitutional injunction for establishing Hindi as the common language of India; such terms as Hindi imperialism are at times heard in the course of such opposition.[102] Planning, the distribution of revenues and related issues of economic policy add to the opposition's ammunition. Hence the federalizing tendency is on the increase.

The linguistic factor in the Indian federalizing process deserves some further analysis, especially since it is a multilingual pattern, but one in which each language tends to be identified with one state (this holds, of course, only for the major languages, while many minor ones must be and are to some extent protected by the central government, as provided in the constitution (article 350A)). How, in such a situation a common language can be established is as yet an unsolved problem.[103] The selection of Hindi is understandable in terms of the politics of the Congress Party many of whose leaders came from the section of the country, including Delhi, in which Hindi is the common folk's speech. But according to the best testimony, the foremost literary language of India is Bengali; Tamil has a very long literary tradition, Sanskrit is the vehicle of the ancient epic and great religious literature; hence each of these has a better claim to prestige and respect. "Objectives and weighty criteria tend to rank it (Hindi) below at least Sanskrit, Tamil and Bengali," we hear [104] and there is violent resentment spreading against the "imposition of an inferior and rather recent language (Hindi has emerged during the last 100 years). It is rightly claimed that the prestige of a language is associated with its literature, and Hindi lacks such prestige because of its ordinary, lowbrow character. As a leading Indian scholar political put it in 1959: "The new Hindi, as it continues to develop, is not a language, but a burlesque.[105]

As a result, English continues as the available lingua franca of a good part of the governing and business elite of India, subject to the qualification that the rising local politicians, as noted above, are more and more inclined to communicate in its own idiom with their mass following. This is only natural, considering that democratic party politics has to be carrier on at the grassroots, and hence will also turn to local habits of speech that can be readily understood by and generally appeal to the common folk, the mass electorate. No matter how much an intellectual elite may dislike it, the lower caste leaders, rising rapidly in the democratic context of modern India, will follow the path of least linguistic resistance (just as democratic politics requires Spanish in Puerto Rico).

The Indian constitution recognizes 14 languages, besides English: Assamese, Bengali, Gujarati, Hindi, Kannada, Kashmiri, Malayalam, Marathi, Oriya, Panjabi, Sanskrit, Tamil, Telegu, and Urdu (art. 351). As each of these languages is spoken by many millions, it proved possible to reorganize the division of the country inherited from the British administration into 14 States (and 6 Federal territories) roughly coincident with these languages. These States do not differ as much in size as the American or German States, ranging from 4 to 63 million,[106] with the average of about 25 million. Actually this distribution of languages among States roughly resembles the European pattern, as represented in the Council of Europe (see sec. IX(I)), while the differences between these languages are much greater than are those between the European languages, and the range of religious differences is also far wider.[107] In terms of overall patterning, therefore, a considerably looser federal relationship than the present one of the Indian Union would seem to be indicated in a fully developed bureaucratized and democratized India.

The extent and variety of the linguistic conflicts and problems have by no means decreased as a result of the creation of States based on linguistic communities.[108] "Linguism" has appeared as a form of chauvinism of a prevalent language group. The States Reorganization Commission noted that "already in some of the States a large percentage of members in the legislature know only one language and this trend is likely to become more and more pronounced. In some States even ministers only know one language."[109] As a result, the States are becoming more and more inclined to oppress the linguistic minorities within their border, and the national government has not been very active or successful in upholding the constitutional provision for the protection of such minorities.[110] Riots and other disturbances have been the result. There were "language riots" in Assam and in Bombay, there were the Punjabi-Suba agitations in the Punjab, there has developed an urgent demand for the recognition of Urdu as a regional language in Uttar Pradesh and Bihar with their Hindi majorities; there have also been border disputes, related to linguistic minorities, such as that between Mysore and Mahareshtra. It all seems part of a clear trend toward greater linguistic and cultural autonomy throughout India.

There is little question that some of these tensions are related to the desperate economic plight of India. If it were possible to raise the standard of living rapidly, and if the Federal Government were the prime promoter of such improvement in the condition of the masses, the language problem would become less serious. As it is, it provides a potent weapon in the hands of demagogues and a source of endless quarrels. The fine hopes that are frequently expressed by scholars are not likely to be realized under such conditions. We are told that "some Indians feel that the least harmful way out of the present difficulty might be an improved education in the regional languages and also in Hindi and English, combined with a general attitude of tolerance and patience." [111] True enough, but the top-heavy federal system of India makes it unlikely, and besides, such trilingualism is not practical for the masses of even a gifted people. In highly literate and democratic Switzerland the general electorate speaks only one language, though the Swiss are usually familiar with one other (see below); besides, its languages are closely related to Indo-Germanic tongues. It would seem that an alien lingua franca like English (corresponding to Latin in medieval Europe) would have the best chance, especially as it provides the much-needed link with the outside world for the governing elite (English language dailies have the largest circulation in India, 1 million as against half that for Hindi). Vigorous development of the several languages, combined with retention of the increasing pluralism of such an increasingly federal India, might become a source of strength, as the component States mature into vigorous democratic societies.

G. ITALIAN REGIONALISM AND THE TYROL

The violent and aggressive activities of the South Tyrolese (Austrian) against the Italian authorities have highlighted a problem which has been an issue in Italy for many years: regionalism and federalism. In view of Italian history, which like German history has been characterized by much intense localism—the great cities like Florence and Venice formed independent states until modern times—it would have seemed natural for Italy to become a federal system. There were strong advocates for such a form. But the historic role of the Piedmontese monarchy in the liberation and unification of Italy (the Risorgimento) led to the establishment of a unitary state under the house which had acted as liberator. The excesses of Fascist centralism helped to bring on a reaction in the direction of regionalism which was reinforced by the transformation of Italy into a democratic republic. In the new constitution (of 1948) regionalism was proclaimed and organized as the future form of Italy (arts. 114–133). But only part of it has since become reality.[112]

The constitution calls for the establishment of two types of regions—the regular ones and the special regions which are granted particular forms of autonomy under statutes which are considered constitutional and which were to be adopted for each region in light of its particular needs and requirements. Curiously enough, it is the special regions that have come into being, while the regular ones have not so far been organized, the Parliament having failed to adopt the necessary legislation.[113] The constitution itself provides for a system of concurrent powers under which the regions were to have carefully a circumscribed share in the legislative power, subject to three important limitations. The first of these was of course the requirement of constitutionality; such regional laws must be, the constitution provides, "within the limits of the fundamental principles established by the laws." In other words, they implement national legislation, rather than supplanting it. Furthermore, such legislation must not be "in conflict with the interests of the nation or other regions." Finally, every legislative act passed by the council of the region is subject to objection by the national government.[114] Such an objection was to be communicated by a commissioner who also "supervises the administrative functions" of the national government, and "coordinates" those exercised by the region; the legality of administrative acts was to be subjected to a special body which the law was to establish. It is clear that these "limitations" are not very different from those to which states or cantons are subject under a federal regime. The range of functions was quite considerable, too: besides the obvious one of organizing their own offices and administrative agencies, the regional legislative competency was to include communal districting; local police; fairs and markets; public welfare; health and hospitals; professional and handicraft instruction; museums and libraries; city planning; tourist and hotel business; intraregional streetcar and bus lines; intraregional roads; aqueducts and public works; lake navigation and ports; mineral and thermal springs; stone quarries and bogs; hunting; fishing; agriculture and forests; handicrafts. There was also a permissive clause enabling the extension of this list by constitutional legislation; besides "the power to enact regulations for the implementation of the laws of the Republic may be delegated to the regions." What the aforecited provisions show is that Italy's regional plan closely approximated the pattern of a "unitary federal state" such as Brazil or India. It was characteristic for such an attempt at federalizing that it provided the structural pattern for the regions; they were the regional council, the regional committee, and its president (art. 121). The first was to be its legislative organ, the committee its executive, and the president was to represent the region, to promulgate its laws and regulations, and to direct such delegated administration as the national government might wish to have them administer. It is significant that the further organization of the region was to be embodied in a "statute" which, unlike the state constitutions in federal regimes, was to be subject to approval by the national legislature.[115] It should be remembered, however, that the constitution of an American state, when joining the Union, also is subject to congressional approval, and similar provisions prevail elsewhere.

These provisions apply, generally speaking, to the special regions which are simply included in the list given in the constitution.[116] Special statutes have, in the case of these five special regions, actually been adopted (Sicily 1946, Sardinia, Trentino-Alto Adige and Val d'Aosta 1948 and Friuli-Venezia Giulia 1964). The reason undoubtedly is that in these regions there exists a strong sense of local identity, reinforced by more pronounced cultural differentiation, including linguistic minorities, French-speaking in the Val d'Aosta, German-speaking in Trentino-Alto Adige (South Tyrol). These facts are related to others given: three of the special regions border on foreign states in which the minority of the region is the majority, and two are islands. In Sicily a strong separatist movement sprang up toward the end of the Second World War which the grant of regional autonomy headed off, but quite apart from that islands generally are characterized by a strong sense of insular individuality. The special situation in each instance of these regions accounts for the larger autonomy and has worked reasonably well in all of them, except Trentino-Alto Adige.

The special statutes which have been adopted for the five special regions have, in general, followed the pattern laid out in the constitutional provisions summarized above. Regional competence has, however, been more broadly defined. In the case of the Trentino, the arrangements are reinforced by a treaty between Italy and Austria. Even so, the limitations set down by the constitution have been operative; the national government has often objected to regional laws, and where no agreement could be reached, the issues have been settled by the constitutional court. The court has been inclined to favor the National Government and to restrict regional competence.[117] Two of the regions, Sardinia and Val d'Aosta have functioned effectively; their regional governments have succeeded in satisfying both the local electorate and the national authorities. The experience in Sicily is very much less satisfactory. Regional politics is fraught with corruption, clientilism and factionalism (tras formismo). Dubious alliances and coalitions of incompatible parties have given the region very inadequate governments which have failed to concern themselves with many of the tasks assigned to a region, notably education, welfare, and agriculture. In spite of such inadequacies, Sicily has developed rapidly, due to fiscal and financial incentives provided by the region, reinforced and to a considerable extent promoted by public corporations of the Indian state. In any case, Sicily has depended a good deal more upon national support than other regions.[118] Friuli-Venezia Giulia have only been organized last year; it is too early to evaluate the setup. The serious problems have been in Trentino-Alto Adige. Here the Austrian minority of Tyrolese has carried on a relentless resistance in defense of their local culture, and more especially their right to use German in school and public life. Feelings run very high and acts of violence have punctuated a rather tortuous effort on the part of both Italian and Austrian authorities to cope with the situation. The Austrian minority tends to feel that it was unfair to create a region in which the Italians have a majority, when actually one of the provinces, namely Bolzano, has a German majority. Regionalism appears to them as an attempt to escape from protecting the minority (and incidentally to violate the letter and spirit of the Treaty between Italy and Austria.) For the region controls the main functions of local interest, and the demand has crystallized for giving these functions back to the provinces. As a result the two provinces have been granted greater autonomy than is possessed by other Italian provinces. What this means is that decentralization, rather than regionalism has provided the key to the attenuation of a difficult problem of the kind that minorities present. It may, however, be questioned whether a genuine federal order, with Bolzano (South Tyrol) in a special federal relationship to the rest of Italy, would not serve better to resolve the issue than the present half measures. This might be particularly true, if administrative delegation (see sec. V) were made an integral part of such a scheme. As we saw, the constitution provides that "the state may, by law delegate to the region the exercise of administrative functions." This provision deserves a few additional comments.

As suggested above, the constitutional provision seems to place the Italian regions in a position similar to that of the Swiss Cantons or the German Laender. But the difficulty is that the regions do not possess adequate financial resources for handling this sort of delegated administration on their own, so that it has to be supported by the national government and so hardly contributes to local autonomy, but rather the opposite. This could of course be altered by giving the regions adequate tax resources. But Italian students of these matters are skeptical concerning the possibilities. They argue that so much regular administration is today in Italy carried out by special agencies with their own regional divisions that a delegation of administrative execution to the regions from the traditional central administration would complicate the situation, would cause additional financial burdens, and would weaken democracy.[119]

H. SWITZERLAND

Among the many interesting aspects of Swiss federalism which are the fruit of a long history, reaching back into the middle ages, we have selected the multilingual and multicultural aspects in relation to referenda as perhaps the most relevant to the contemporary situation. It is highlighted by recent serious difficulties in the Canton of Bern over a French-speaking minority in the Jura. In many ways this conflict is particularly revealing, since the Swiss, as so many others in other lands, have prided themselves on the absence of any such disturbances between their cultural components. Switzerland's problem would seem to be aggravated by the fact that all but her tiniest cultural group, the Romansch-speaking minority of 1 percent in the mountains of Eastern Switzerland, are related to one of the surrounding great powers—the German-, the French-, and the Italian-speaking Swiss each bordering on their cousin's respective land. To be sure, the Swiss have developed a very strong sense of identity and the language they speak is for many of them no ground for feeling related to Germany, France, or Italy, except in a cultural sense. But since cultural affinities tend, again and again, to carry strong political implications, Switzerland has in the past become emotionally involved in the conflicts between these powers.[120]

The distribution of the four languages in 1960 (by mother tongue) gave German 74.4 percent, French 20.2 percent, Italian 4.1 percent, and Romansch 1.0 percent. If the recent immigrants from Italy who have become resident are added, the Italian percentage rises to 9.5 percent, with the others slightly reduced accordingly. In any case, it is clear that the German-speaking Swiss far outnumber the other three, and have done so throughout Swiss history. Yet, a tradition of moderation and fair play has prevented this majority from overplaying its hand; years ago it was pointed out that; e.g., in appointments to the Swiss civil service, the minorities have been given more than their proportional share of appointments. The Swiss in other words developed a habit of equal treatment for all Swiss, regardless of their nationality, which has served to build a powerful civic pride in Switzerland. The authoritarian aberrations in their three powerful neighbors have further reinforced this sentiment in the present century.[121]

Yet with all this strong national sentiment, the Swiss have preserved an equally strong cantonal spirit (Kantönligeist), a local patriotism which has caused particularly the more conservative elements to guard with jealous concern, sometimes bordering on pettiness, the prerogatives of each canton, no matter how small. Religious, cultural and economic interests and beliefs combine to give each canton its sense of individuality, regardless of whether they belong to one or another of the language groups. To be sure, a large majority of the cantons are unilingual, but since three of the four languages are official and all four are "national" languages, every citizen, even though in a canton with another language is fully protected in his rights. The recognition of Romansch as the fourth national language is of relatively recent date, and had to be adopted by referendum, as do all constitutional amendments (see below). It is characteristic of the Swiss general attitude that 92 percent of the voters and all of the cantons voted for it.

This brings us squarely up against the use and problem of the referendum as an instrumentality of federal government. In Switzerland and for the Swiss it incorporates their belief in full-fledged democracy, that is to say their belief that the people should be the final arbiters in the basic questions. Not a Supreme Court, but the people are the umpire, by two requirements, one which calls for a referendum on all constitutional amendments, the other that a not inconsiderable group of Swiss citizens (30,000) may use the initiative in requesting a referendum on any law (with some exceptions noted below). They may also by initiative of 50,000 demand that constitutional amendment be submitted to the people.[122] These instrumentalities are familiar from American practice, but it is important to add that since these instrumentalities were embodied in the constitution in 1874 they have been extensively used and have, generally speaking, acted as a curb rather than a promoter of change. There can be little question, though, that such methods of direct popular action have been working fairly satisfactorily in Switzerland. As far as the federal relationship is concerned, they serve to emphasize the fact that the people of each canton constitute a separate and distinct entity with a substantial degree of autonomy. Even so, governmentalism (étatisme) has steadily progressed and by such referenda as that on economic questions (1947) the Swiss people have not only by popular, but also by cantonal majority sanctioned the development of a closely regulated market economy.[123] Such an act would seem to prove the viability of the Swiss system. It is noteworthy in this connection that the federal constitution requires that cantonal constitutions be submitted to popular referendum. Besides, the Cantons provide for referendum and initiative in many different forms. Here, too, they are very widely practiced and have given acceptable results.[124] An important addition was made in 1921 when it was decided that treaties with foreign powers lasting more than 15 years must, when requested, be submitted to the people—a logical implication of the basic conviction that all important matters should be settled by the people themselves. Even with so highly literate an electorate as the Swiss one, it may be doubted whether this provision is sound. Nonetheless, Swiss experience was well summarized in the past:

> Direct legislation in Switzerland has not realized all the extravagant anticipations of its friends. But on the other hand, it has completely falsified the dismal prophecies of chaos and revolution * * *. It has become a vital and freely functioning part of the Swiss political organism.[125]

The recurrent refusal of the general electorate to sanction constitutional and legislative measures designed to benefit particular interest groups suggests that the referendum is an integrating mechanism. It is a mechanism, more particularly, for developing the federal relationship between the Swiss people at large and the people of each and every canton on a basis of mutuality and compromise. This aspect of the matter is central to Swiss federalism with its emphasis on the will of the people. This autonomous will is epitomized by the notion of a linguistic autonomy (Sprachenhoheit) which gives the cantons the right to fashion their own language policy within the framework of the principles provided by the constitution. It may defend its own language and culture as much as its people deem desirable. This principle was put by a leading Swiss constitutional lawyer as follows:

> It is now a tacitly recognized principle that each territory (not necessarily a canton) should be able to retain its traditional language regardless of immigrants of other languages, and consequently that linguistic boundaries should not be shifted.[126]

It was generally accepted by the Swiss, but not by the recent immigrants from the South who feel no obligation to assimilate to what they consider an alien environment. As a result, serious tensions and animosities have developed which used to be quite alien to Switzerland. On the whole, though, the linguistic frontiers of Switzerland have remained rather fixed, in spite of considerable mobility of the working force. According to the 1960 census, the unilingual cantons had between 82 and 99 percent of its citizens belonging to the particular dominant language group, and the bilingual ones were divided into clearly defined areas, where the percentages were similarly high. One might add that of more than 3,000 communes in Switzerland, only 6 changed their linguistic regime since 1848, we are told.[127] The many local dialects spoken in German-Switzerland have helped in maintaining this stability.

There has, however, developed a very sharp conflict in one of the bilingual cantons; namely, Bern, in which the capital city is located. That capital city itself presents some difficult problems, especially that of the education of the children of civil servants from the French-speaking cantons.[128] But these we leave aside in order to give brief attention to the issues involved in the position of the French-speaking minority. It is concentrated in the northern part of the canton bordering on France habiting the valleys in the mountain range of the Jura. This district was added to the canton in 1815; it is Catholic, which has precipitated difficulties with the Protestant majority and helped in maintaining a sense of local identity. But only since the Second World War has the conflict become bitter, occasionally even leading to violence. The Jurassiens banded together and formulated demands, including that of separating from Bern and becoming an independent canton. Short of that they asked for various reforms, including educational autonomy and decentralization of the public service. But these reforms all culminated in the insistence that the French- and German-speaking parts of Bern were two separate and distinct peoples. The cantonal authorities met some of these demands, including the constitutional recognition of a separate and distinct peuple jurassien and equality of the two languages. But the concessions proved inadequate, and the clamor for a separate canton became more insistent. In 1960, the population of the Jura district amounted to 131,000 (compared to the 759,000 in the rest of the canton), but that figure is well above the population of several other cantons, so there is widespread sympathy for the Jurassien claim in other parts of Switzerland and some experts believe that a nationwide referendum would favor the Jurassiens. However, there are dissentions within the group itself, and when the canton held a referendum on the issue, not only did the Bernese at large reject the proposal; but it did not even receive a majority in the territory itself, and 4 out of 11 districts in the Jura territory for economic and religious reasons refused to go along. This was in 1959, but the issue has not come to rest. On the contrary, there has been an intensification of separatist feeling. Many Swiss feel that the attitude of the Jurassien is most un-Swiss and contrary to Swiss tradition. The violent nationalist sentiment is certainly unlike the feeling of most Swiss, although there have been rumblings in the Ticino (Italian) and in the Grisons (Romansch). At the same time, it is noteworthy that all of the agitation has rarely, if ever, been anti-Swiss, but rather has always remained within the bounds of loyalty toward Switzerland as a whole. It may well prove necessary to fall back upon this loyalty and to settle the issue through national referendum.

In conclusion, one can say that the Swiss have succeeded in handling nationality difficulties successfully by means of a number of democratic instrumentalities, more especially direct popular action through initiative and referendum. The referendum is useful in making possible an affirmation of a collective sense of belonging on the part of distinctive constituency, but the problem of how to define that constituency in particular circumstances belongs among the most delicate problems of political strategy.

I. UNITED EUROPE

United Europe, or more specifically Europe in the process of federalizing the relations among its members, presents some very special issues to the student of federal and regional relations. One of the industrially advanced regions of the world (except for some retarded entities, like Sicily and Ireland), it represents the greatest conglomeration of people within a small territory. Its population of several hundred millions (the exact figure depending upon what is included) is living on a territory not much larger than Texas. Formerly the "hub of the Universe," it is now being united not only by its defense needs, but by the economic problems which the disintegration of its several colonial empires has created. At its core, France, Germany, Italy and the Benelux have formed the Community of the Six, so-called, the primary focus of which is the Common Market, a treaty-based confederation for the purpose of developing a united economic policy. Many more states are loosely associated in the Council of Europe which preceded the Common Market, having come into being in 1950. Great Britain, the Scandinavian countries and a number of other smaller states participate in this international union. It has primarily promoted some general patterns of cooperation through conventions in the social and cultural field, including the setting up of an arbitration procedure for alleged violations of an agreed bill of human rights; [129] unfortunately some important powers, notably Great Britain, have so far not ratified this convention. These two organizations of a federalizing Europe are implemented by a special union in the military field, the Western European Union brought into being in the sequel of the failure to agree on a European Defense Community; it has not played a very vital role, since its functions overlap with those of NATO. Significant mostly as a forum and means for promoting all-European economic cooperation is the Organization for European Economic Cooperation which renders valuable service also in the field of banking and currency.[130]

As a result of these and other specific functional ties, it is extremely difficult to define the European Federal relationship at the present time. Special issues, such as that of supranationality, meaning the question whether any of these functional bodies have an authority transcending the authority of the national governments which cooperate in them are rather artificial in view of the fact that the formal juristic situation is continually being superseded by specific developments in particular fields of custom and usage. But there can be little question that the lack of a unifying and integrating political organization is causing very serious difficulties. Numerous proposals for creating such an organization have been put forward in recent years, and men of great experience, such as President Hallstein of the EEC, have often stated it as their conviction that an economic cooperation cannot hope to succeed without adequate political organization to back them. But none of the plans and proposals have so far succeeded, or even come near doing so. The most advanced of these proposals, the draft of a constitution for a European Political Community, fashioned by an Ad Hoc Assembly in the winter of 1952–53, may be considered a high water mark which Europe is now farther from reaching than ever. Yet, even this "advanced" mechanism was far from adequate as a framework of European political unity, and it was only meant to apply to the Community of the Six.[131]

If the question is asked, why the federalizing process has been so slow and has recently been retrogressive, the answer is not simple. Personal factors, such as President de Gaulle's hostility toward any kind of supranational authority, undoubtedly have played a considerable role and continue to do so. But they could not have done so, if support for a federal union in Europe were stronger in the respective constituencies; a France truly committed to European unity would withdraw its support from a leader who refused to participate effectively in this task. The more powerful factors feeding European disunity are both economic and political ones, while the cultural field has seen a much greater readines to shape a European future. Among the political factors the varying intensity of apprehension concerning the aggresive designs of the Soviet Union is very important. Such fears have varied not only between periods; they have also been much more intense in Germany than in Britain, more intense among farmers than workers and so forth. Under these circumstances it can hardly be considered surprising that initiatives promoted at one time and by one power falter at a succeeding period of thaw or Entspannung and so forth. It is more than doubtful that this situation will change noticeably in the years to come.

Even so, as pointed out in an earlier section (see sec. VIII), the Common Market continues to attract states, seeking both membership and association, and Switzerland has joined the Council of Europe, after many years of hesitation.[132] There can be little doubt that the European Community is a growing one; numerous informal bonds are being created through the multiplication of human contacts in business, in cultural relations, and so on. There are today developing in Europe intimate working relations between parties, research institutes, publications and other communication media that were rate in the interwar years. At the grass-roots level, communes are developing special links, the so-called "jumelages," through which French, Italian, German, Belgian and Dutch, and indeed British local governments cooperate in promoting a European togetherness and a belief in the potentialities of solving common problems jointly.[133] From all these different sources, in themselves small, spring activities which presuppose an eventually united Europe with a common citizenship, foreign and defense policy. Indeed, certain nationality problems which have plagued European states, such as the Belgian and Italian ones we have analyzed, will become attenuated and may eventually be reduced to the kind of internal quarrel which the question of the Jura amounts to within Switzerland.

The most significant lesson which the student of the Puerto Rican problem can derive from the long drawn-out federalizing process of European unification is that even very loose bonds may have high significance, and that it is not necessary to insist upon the outworn issues of sovereignty when handling the highly pragmatic issues of a federal relationship, nor to try to give such a relationship a permanent, let alone an irrevocable form. It is possible to let such a relationship evolve, and solve specific problems as they emerge.

At the same time, European experience also suggests the inherent dangers of a loose international federal relationship. Sovereignty may be defined, as it is in the Swiss constitution (art. V) by whatever is left, after the supranational competencies have been enumerated; in that case it is a harmless, if somewhat nebulous concept. But if sovereignty is allowed to intrude itself into the federal relationship in its old absolutist sense of an unlimited competence to determine its own range of competencies (as is De Gaulle's inclination) then it becomes destructive of the federal relationship. Some statements made in connection with the redefinition of the federal relations of Puerto Rico point in that direction.[134]

J. YUGOSLAVIA

The case of Yugoslavia is interesting in connection with trends in contemporary regional and federal relations, because Yugoslavia is a Socialist country, and a so-called popular democracy or totalitarian dictatorship, which is multilingual and composed of several nationalities, notably the Serbs, the Croats, the Slovenes, the Montenegrins and the Macedonians. One of its leading constitutional authorities has characterized the position of Yugoslav federalism in light of the recent constitutional revision as follows:

> The Yugoslav Federation was formed during the Liberation War and the Socialist Revolution on the basis of the right of every people to self-determination,

> including the right to form separate states or unite in a federal community. It came into being as a voluntary community of equal and sovereign Yugoslav peoples which constituted a common federal state and simultaneously ensured their individuality in their republics as forms of state organizations.[135]

Such federalism was an important ingredient of Tito's plan, since the preceding regime, before being conquered by Hitler's and Mussolini's armies, had been a unitary state, based upon the hegemony of the Serbs. This hegemony had been exceedingly unpopular with the other peoples. More especially the rivalry of Serbs and Croats had been so violent that the Nazis and Fascists found it to their advantage to encourage the Croats to set up an independent state, under the leadership of one Pavelic who had for many years been the head of a movement, known as the Utascha (meaning the rebel), members of which had murdered the King of Serbia and the French foreign minister in 1934. This "Independent State of Croatia" perished, of course, with its Fascist protagonists, but it left a heritage of passionate nationality sentiment which only a federal order could assuage to some extent.[136] Such federalism was proclaimed by Josip Broz Tito, the Communist leader of the popular liberation army, and himself a Croat, as early as 1943. It was quite in keeping with the Soviet "constitution." The federal system, while Communist, was to be based upon the equality of the several nationalities. The constitution of 1946 made this principle the basis of the political order and it has been retained in its most recent draft.[137] In the "Basic Principles" preceding the constitution, the principle of self-determination is acknowledged and, just as in the Soviet Union, the right to secession is explicitly recognized; both are transcended by the integrating power of the Communist party which speaks of itself as a "union" of Communist parties, but is in fact a closely integrated monolith under Tito's dictatorial leadership. This fact also finds expression in the constitution itself. It would lead too far afield to recite here in detail what is the jurisdiction of the "federation"; it includes virtually all the economic policy fields which in a Socialist country are the core of government.[138] One of the authors of this constitution, a jurist of renown, has described the situation as follows:

> The common functions of the working people of Yugoslavia are made secure by the establishment of a unique social, economic and political system * * * the federation is responsible for the establishment, the consolidation, the protection and the development of the socio-economic foundations of socialism.[139]

It is obvious that the federal relationship under such conditions and in light of such goals is bound to be very different from that prevailing elsewhere. It is more nearly like a centrally directed setup which is built upon a substantial amount of decentralization. It has been argued that the stress on centralization in the 1946 constitution was "even greater than in the constitution of the Soviet Union of 1936."[140] The revision of 1963 makes a considerable effort to protect the member republics (as it does the citizen) by the establishment of a constitutional court (art. 231–9). It contains such a provision as that—

> If the constitutional court finds that the federal law in question does not conform to the constitution of Yugoslavia, it shall decide that, pending termination of the proceedings, the provisions of the federal law that do not conform to the constitution shall be inoperative. (article 236).

Even in the earlier constitution, there was at least formal recognition of the requirement for federalizing the exercise of the legislative powers by the establishment of a "Nationalities' Council", composed of 30 representatives for each republic (for the autonomous provinces and districts a smaller number, namely 20 and 15 respectively, were envisaged). While democratic centralism reigned supreme, these provisions had no more significance than in the Soviet Union. But after Tito's break with the Cominform in 1948, an explicit rejection of this centralism, now dubbed "bureaucratic," led to a search for new approaches. Forms of communal property were proclaimed the harbingers of genuine socialism as contrasted with the "state capitalism" of Moscow. This did by no means imply a return to Western democracy, far from it. Yugoslav Communist theoreticians, notably E. Kardelj, began to stress "socialist democracy" which is based upon the direct participation of the producer. The recent constitution has made these notions more explicit.[141]

> The foundation of the socio-economic organization of Yugoslavia comprises free associated labor with the means of production and other socially-owned means of labor, and self-government of the working people in production and distribution of the social product in the working organization and the community.[142]

The student of the history of socialist doctrines will readily recognize a turn toward pre-Marxist and syndicalist notions. As Kardelj comments: "Under the Constitution, the commune is the basic social-political community." The stress on local communities as autonomous entities with their own revenue base is part of a legally decentralized system. The Yugoslav Communists are quite ready to recognize the differences in economic development and to rely upon the communes to cope with the resulting tensions and maladjustments.

It is obvious that such stress upon local groupings involves a substantial degree of decentralization of power. In an intermediate constitution (1953) the federal relationship (equality of nationalities) had been strengthened by transforming the Nationalities' Council into a National Council—a kind of superior rulemaking body which was to consider constitutional amendments, the basic planning objectives and which could propose alterations, by law, in the relations between the federation and the member republics. We know too little about the functioning of this body, and about its relations to the Federal Council (the regular legislature) to form a judgment of its suitability as a "mechanism" for vitalizing the federal relationship. Judging by the fact that it has disappeared in the new constitution, it may be presumed that it proved cumbersome, if not unworkable. Space does not permit going into the detailed provisions of the new constitution of 1963, including the electoral arrangements. Suffice it to note that the representation of the nationalities is now relegated to one of five "chambers": the Federal Chamber, the Chamber of the Economy, the Chamber of Education and Culture, the Chamber of Social Welfare and Health, and the Politico-administrative Chamber; members of the Federal Chamber include the members of the Chamber of Nationalities which meets for certain purposes, especially constitutional amendments and matters pertaining to the "equality of the peoples and republics." These particular members of the Federal Chamber are elected by the republics and other autonomous units, 10 and 5 respectively. Since the Federal Chamber is the key body of the Assembly—one author calls it "the representative institution of Yugoslavia" [143]—it is elected by direct vote, whereas the other Chambers are elected by the communal assemblies (this, it will be remembered, is the Soviet or Council principle which facilitates control by a single party), except for those of its members who are elected by the Republics and other autonomous units. It seems that the arrangements resemble an imaginary situation in which the U.S. Senate when indirectly elected would have been a part of the House of Representatives except on those occasions when matters of special concern were to be discussed and hence would occasion a special sitting of the Senate. One wonders how such an arrangement might work, but no specific information is available. In the opinion of Professor Djordjevic "the new constitution preserved the old forms of the protection of the autonomy of the peoples of Yugoslavia," [144] and that therefore the setting up of these chambers does not modify the bicameral principle. It would seem on the evidence of the constitutional provisions that it certainly modifies it, if it does not abolish it. If one interprets the Federal Chamber as a "permanent second chamber," it would still seem that it has rather an integrating than a balancing function. Its committees presumably control the execution of the law, and the Federal Executive Council, though responsible to the assembly at large which comprises, be it recalled, all the chambers, will more particularly be looking to the assembly's core chamber, the federal one, for guidance and supervision.[145] Above them all presides the assembly elected president who, certainly as long as it is Tito, remains the decisive coordinator of all this activity. It is further more explicitly provided that the composition of the Federal Executive Council should also have due regard to the equal representation of the nationalities. Since it seems that various high officials, also are members of this Council, it must be a fairly large rather unwieldy body.

But the most significant innovation of the constitution of 1963 is the introduction of "judicial review," that is to say the notion that a federal constitutional system needs a judicial umpire for the resolution of conflicts of jurisdiction and the invasion of rights and freedoms. It appears that Yugoslavia has, in this matter, followed the precedent of the Federal Republic of Germany[146] in identifying a specific constitutional jurisdiction. The federal court is paralleled by constitutional courts in the several republics. This change seems to be in line with a general trend in Communist countries to institute a rule of law as a necessary ingredient of an advanced economy and an industrial society. As I put it in discussing this trend:

> A secret police may still be needed, because the rigid limitations upon public criticism of the official exercise of power oblige such a regime to search out potential enemies * * * yet no autocratic regime * * * would endure long without providing a measure of believed-in-justice.[147]

The gradual formation of a substantial amount of consensus has facilitated this development. The development of socialist federalism is an important part of this evolution. Dependent as federalism is upon rules of law, it can only hope to function when a substantial consensus comprising all the citizens provides a countervailing power to the centrifugal propensities of national cultural minorities. Even if it merely achieves the unitary federal state, it is preferable to the centralized monolith of the extremes of totalitarianism.

The stage now reached in the evolution of Communist federalism was summed up rather well in a recent study by a Canadian scholar who wrote that the decision of the Yugoslav constitutional commission to experiment concretely with judicial review, involving as that decision does a sharp break with past Socialist legal forms and precedents, seems to be far more than a mere ad hoc response to the pressing necessities of "Socialist legality." He feels that it appears to involve an acceptance of the contribution that can be made by a balanced constitutionalism and its independent judiciary to the harmonious functioning of a multinational, federal, yet Socialist society.[148]

X. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

The review of selected trends and issues in contemporary federal and regional relations has, it would seem, shown that federalism is more fully understood, if it is seen as a process, an evolving pattern of changing relationships rather than a static design regulated by firm and unalterable rules. This finding ought not to be misunderstood as meaning that the rules are insignificant, far from it. What it does mean is that any federal relationship requires effective and built-in mechanisms by means of which these rules can be recurrently changed upon the initiative and with the consent of the federated entities. In a sense, what this means is that the developmental (historical) dimension of federal relationships has become a primary focal point, as contrasted with the distribution and fixation of jurisdictions (the legal aspect). In keeping with recent trends in political science (as well as other social sciences) the main question is: What function does a federal relationship have? rather than: What structure?

Obviously, recent trends and issues are related to the dominant themes of contemporary political controversy: Nationalism, socialism, planning, effective decisionmaking and the rest. The brief "country studies" that were included as "cases" highlighting these and other issues and trends provide a body of data which cannot be said to "prove" either the success or the failure, nor the desirability or undesirability of federalism. As in so many other political arrangements, "it all depends." At the same time, there are some fairly clear indications that federalism, like other political instrumentalities and orders, can be more or less adequate, more or less suited to the communal situation and structure which it is intended to serve. The suitability of its patterning depends on the degree of differentiation in the community, the urgency of the common task, the strength of the interests and beliefs in their particular mix of time and place.[149]

Before we consider some of the theoretical responses to this changing situation, a word might be in order about the omission of the United States, the U.S.S.R., Australia, Austria, Nigeria, and other federal systems, whether mature or emergent, from the country studies. There is no one answer to this question. Obviously, a selection had to be made from among the large number of federal systems now in operation or planned. The reason the United States was omitted is that most readers of this report will be familiar with the ongoing discussion and development in our own country, so that occasional reference in the analytical part seemed sufficient and not requiring elaboration through a separate country study. The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, on the opposite end, is so unfamiliar, the operation of its federalism is so unknown, even to Soviet scholars,[150] that it seemed best to focus attention upon the more open and more fully developed socialist federalism of Yugoslavia. Australia, on the other hand, did not seem to offer any particularly challenging issue relevant to our special inquiry. The same may be said of Austria where the working of the federal system as contrasted with the legal norms governing it are admittedly terra incognita.[151] Finally, Nigeria and some of the other new states have come into being so recently and their affinity to constitutional traditions is so tenuous that concrete experience, even where known, is not particularly convicing, and changing from day to day.

The rapid expansion of federal regimes and proposals have led to a steady broadening of the theoretical scope of federalism. Nearly 30 years ago one could write that—

> from an empirical standpoint, an effectively centralized government, a federation, a confederation or league of governments (state), an alliance, an alignment, a "system" of independent governments (states) and finally completely unrelated governments—all these could be represented as differences of degrees in the relation of governments to the persons subject to their rule * * *.[152]

This was the beginning of the end of the traditional juristic notions, preoccupied with problems of sovereignty, of the distribution of competencies, and of the structure of the institutions. As for the latter, the emerging pragmatic (and behavioral) view recognized that a federal system (or state) could be characterized simply by the fact that its structure "resembles a league in one or more of its organizational features * * *".[153] Federal theory has come a long way since then, and the decisive turn is the recognition of its dynamic aspect: that federalism implies a process of federalizing, as well as a pattern or design.[154] It is the core of such a theory that a federation is a union of groups, united by one or more common objectives, rooted in common values, interests, or beliefs, but retaining their distinctive group character for other purposes. It unites without destroying the selves that are uniting and is intended to strengthen them; it is organized cooperation of groups as groups. The nature of the particular groups which federate will have a decisive impact upon the particular system. Understood as implying the process of federalizing, an emergent federal order may be operating in both the direction of integration and differentiation; federalizing being either the process by which a number of separate political units, be they states or other associations (churches, trade unions, parties, etc.) enter into and develop arrangements for working out solutions together, that is to say making joint decisions and adopting joint policies on common problems, or the reverse process through which a hitherto unitary political community, as it becomes differentiated into a number of separate and distinct political subcommunities, achieves a new order in which the differentiated communities become capable of working out separately and on their own decisions and policies on problems they no longer have in common.[154] Federalism refers to this process, as it does to the structures and patterns which the process creates; it also encompasses the beliefs (ideas and ideologies) which it presupposes and generates. Federal behavior and federalist belief are part and parcel of federalism.[155]

The extension of the range of vision that federalism in theory and practice has called for means, as we have shown, the inclusion of international federalism, that is to say the recognition that there is a continuum linking the federal state with loose leagues on one side, with decentralized systems of government on the other. It has also meant that the practice of nongovernmental federated entities is being investigated and compared with the realities of federal government.[156] These realities themselves have been usefully systematized by a number of writers, notably K. C. Wheare and Edward McWhinney, as well as the collective work edited by R. R. Bowie and C. J. Friedrich.[157] Wheare was much concerned with developing a "test" of what a federal government is, and he answered that when "a system of government" embodies "predominantly a division of powers between general and regional authorities, each of which, in its own sphere, is coordinate with the others and independent" then that government is federal.[158] Perhaps the term "autonomous" would more correctly describe the situation than "independent" (since, as in Puerto Rico, independent has come to mean separate and apart), but it is evident that his position is sufficiently flexible to fit the dynamic process of federalizing. Wheare also prepared the ground by asking the functional question: when is federal government appropriate? His answer stressed the "desire" of a population to be both united and separate; more recent theory has been inclined to go behind this desire and to stress the community structure underlying federal orders.[159] He related such desire to a variety of factors which have always been recognized and which we have encountered in the preceding analysis again and again: Cultural and linguistic diversity, different social economic structure and stage of development, religious conflicts and so forth, have made for the desire to preserve a measure of autonomy, while foreign policy and defense needs, economic development and related matters have produced the desire for uniting. On the basis of a broad-gaged review of how federal government works, the learned author then inquired how adaptable federal governments have proved to be, how flexible they have been in evolving in response to the community's needs. He found them on the whole pretty satisfactory; both in war and in economic crisis federal regimes have displayed a capacity to meet the emergency situations, and he concluded that "flexibility and adaptability" can best be achieved through increasing cooperation. He finally arrived at a positive evaluation: it is worthwhile to preserve federal government, and that for one reason. Federalism provides the means for accomplishing what only ever larger units can hope to do, while at the same time preserving as much diversity as possible.[160]

This is the basic justification for federalism in much other federal theory. Thus, Guy Heraud, in his eloquent plea for a "Europe of nationalities" ("Europe des Ethnies") would have a federalized Europe organize itself into ethnically homogeneous regions, regardless of present state boundaries, whenever such nationalities desire it.[161] Only thus, he thinks, can the "massification" of a United Europe be avoided. "The federation of nationalities is the rational crowning achievement of the liberation of nationalities; it reduces alienation and it establishes peace." [162] He would have nationalities in France, Spain, Italy and other countries, the Bretons, the Alsatians, the Basques and the Catalans, the Tyrolese and so forth form themselves, if they wished, into autonomous regions; it is in such a context that problems like the Belgian one may be attenuated, if not resolved. Profoundly impressed with the sacrifices imposed upon national minorities by the modern national state, Heraud sees federalism as the one and only remedy for such self-alienation.[163]

It is in keeping with this analysis, specifically addressed to the problems of an emergent Europe, that McWhinney suggests that the formal contests in existing federal systems "mask" contests "between differing ethnic-cultural communities." [164] Such a view is natural enough in the case of a Canadian scholar, but he rightly compares it to the racial conflict in the United States. We have seen in our country studies that it is a recurrent problem. It highlights a basic distinction, he believes, between pluralistic and monistic federalism—a dichotomy which it would seem more realistic to describe in terms of more or less, of looser or closer federalism. He himself points the way by emphasizing the importance of federal "comity," a behavioral aspect of federalism which is "crucial to the fruitful working of a federal constitution." [165]

All this experience appears in a different light, if the analyst happens to be disillusioned about the workings of federalism. Such a view has recently been presented by William H. Riker,[166] but without producing any significant new theoretical insight. Apart from some unfamiliar terms for familiar facts, the critical evaluation culminates in so extravagant a statement as that "if in the United States one approves of Southern white racists, then one should approve of American federalism," the reason being that "in pure theory" "what one ought to seek to abrogate for federalism is a system of minority decision that imposes high external costs on everybody other than the minority." [167] Insofar as this means a high degree of flexibility, we have seen that earlier theorists have been well aware of this need; more recently the understanding of federalism as process has made the point paramount. Thus, the criticism is overstated; nonetheless it is well worth stressing that federalism, like all political arrangements, has its weak as well as its strong side. Wheare, of whom this author gingerly asserts that he "displays very little understanding of political realities," stated the point more effectively and based it upon a richer knowledge of federal political reality.

This federal reality has been further elucidated by a recent "theory of confederacies."[168] In this interesting contribution, C. J. Hughes argued that federal governments had "borrowed" the devices for protecting local cultures from confederacies, but that such confederacies made "the preservation of this machinery itself part of the purpose." He believes that a true theory of confederacies is easier to formulate than one of federations, and that such confederacy is "a true form of government with identifiable institutions." These apear to be (*a*) a constitution, termed a treaty, (*b*) a council of ministers exercising the princely power in the center, possessing de facto the power to overrule the objections of minor states, (*c*) a body of officials identifying itself with the central power, and (*d*) an authoritarian kind of government in the component units. He believes that with the drift toward strong executives, confederacy is once more possible.[169] This theory marks in fact a return to the old dichotomy of federalism in terms of sovereignty, though in weakened form. The federalizing process is here rigidified into a "decision" between a confederacy and a federalism which Hughes goes so far as to declaim as "no form of government at all" which "exists more in the mind of the beholders than in the real world." Men living in federal regimes would be startled to hear such a dictum. Yet, it is important to develop the theory that an international federal scheme is a kind of government. The same theme animates another recent study including the United Nations under the heading of international federalism, and coining for it the suggestive term "amphictyonic federalism." Dusan Sidjanski has shown the truly federal tendencies in such organizations as the Council of Europe and has rightly emphasized the federalizing process which they signalize.[170]

At the other end of the spectrum that is federalism there has emerged an increasing recognition of the fact that a federal structure may be the result of a basic decision by a constituent power to embody federal features as a species of separation of powers in a constitutional charter.[171] It has been presented as the theory of the "unitary federal state."[172] Proceeding from the very specific and concrete issues of German constitutional law (but Brazil, India, Nigeria and a number of other states would have served equally well) he argued that the Federal Republic is such a state. There can be no question of a compact or federal "bargain." The constituent assembly of the Federal Republic decided in favor of federalism as an organizational principle. He would call it the "federal principle" as contrasted with the "federalistic principle," and in radical opposition to the conclusions of Hughes would assert that the federal principle is vital, while the federalistic principle is obsolete. It is, so he claims, a principle of organization which a democratic people may adopt as a suitable form of organization. This principle not only enlarges the division of power, but it also affects the relation of government and opposition, the structure and working of parties and interest groups and so forth. For Germany, Konrad Hesse concludes that "a federal structure seems indispensable for the free democratic order."[172] But by his preoccupation with Germany's problems, the author is led to overlook the possibility that such a "basic decision" may as seems to be the case in India, unloosen a federalizing process by giving scope to differentiations which eventually will demand more effective recognition (or achieve it as a result of other pressures, as was the case in Prussia).

One might, in this connection, suggest that the idea of a "unitary federal state" also has meaning in its application to totalitarian systems such as the Soviet Union. For here a unitary and unified party which claims to be the sole legitimate representative of the working people really does decide, in the interest of fulfilling its historical role as defined in the ideology of the movement, to adopt the structure and machinery of a federal state. But the key purpose is not, as the case of Yugoslavia shows clearly, the establishment of a division of power—there can be no effective autonomy of the component units in face of the unitary will of the ruling party—but rather the satisfaction of cultural and linguistic needs which do not matter otherwise.[173]

We conclude this brief review of some recent theoretical trends and issues by stating that the basic insight, now increasingly accepted, is that "federations of states and the federal state must be seen as particular applications of a recurrent form of effective organized cooperation between groups." A federalism is a union of group selves, united by one or more common objectives, a community of communities which retain their distinctive group being. It unites without destroying the selves that are uniting, and is meant to strengthen them in their group and communal relations. Thus, it is the particular relation which exists in fact that should shape the federal relationship. This relationship needs to be shaped, and is in fact so shaped in successful federalizing, in such a way that it can be reshaped and transformed in an ongoing process. That process may lead to greater unity or to greater diversity, and the federal bond will become weaker or stronger in response to it. In any case, it is clear that the small state and the small political community can only hope to survive in a world of ever-widening contacts and interests,[174] if freedom is recognized, not as a panacea, but as a useful instrumentality for good government. It remains to suggest once more that federalism also holds out the prospect of organizing the world at large, lest it be accomplished by imperial conquest and domination. Let us conclude with a statement by John Stuart Mill: "When the conditions exist for the formation of efficient and durable federal unions, the multiplication of them is always a benefit to the world."[175] Thus the author of representative government foresaw more than 100 years ago what has since been proven by political experience.

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[1] For a discussion of the general theoretical aspects of political community see "Man and His Government," 1963, ch. 8; for the problem of levels ibid. ch. 29ff. and the literature cited there. For the empirical data, cf. R. R. Bowie and C. J. Friedrich (eds. & contr.) "Studies in Federalism," 1954. Cf. also my general reports to the Oxford Round Table, 1963, and the Geneva Congress of the International Political Science Association, entitled respectively "Federalism, National and International" and "New Tendencies in Federal Theory and Practice"; the former was published in "Politische Vierteljahrsschrift," 1964 (in German), the latter will appear in "Jahrbuch des Oeffentlichen Rechts," 1965 (in English).

[2] Cf. S. N. Eisenstadt, "The Political Systems of Empires—The Rise and Fall of the Historical Bureaucratic Societies," 1963, and Richard Koebner, Empire, 1961, 1965, pp. 281ff.

[3] W. A. Robson, "The Development of Local Government," 1948, p. 189.

[4] Cf. art. 5 of the Italian constitution, 1948, Constitution of the Federal Republic, 1949, arts. 28,2, Constitution of Bavaria, 1947, art. 11, Constitution of Baden-Wuerttemberg, 1947, art. 98.

[5] Hans Kohn, "Nationalism," 1944, ch. 1. The peculiar nationalism of Zionism possibly helped to shape Kohn's view; cf. for Zionism Ben Halpern, "The Idea of the Jewish State," 1961 (vol. 1).

[6] The Institut International de Philosophie Politique held a colloquium on the subject of nation and nationalism at Florence, July 1965 of which the papers will be published in the next volume of "Annales de la Philosophie Politique" (ed. R. Polin) in 1966.

[7] Friedrich, op. cit. (footnote 1), pp. 43ff.

[8] Edward Sapir contributed a by now famous article on the subject of language to "Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences," 1931.

[9] One can hear highly intelligent persons make curious comments embodying such notions. Passages carrying such implications may be found e.g. in Oswald Spengler, "Der Untergang des Abendlandes * * * vol. II, pp. 62ff.; Herrmann Keyserling, "Das Reisetagebuch eines Philosophen," 1922, vol. I, pp. 16f., 244ff., 385ff.; vol. II, pp. 629f., 856f.; Salvador de Madariaga, "Portrait of Europe," 1950, pp. 18ff.

[10] K. C. Wheare, "Federal Government," 1946, 1953. Cf. also Edward McWhinney, "Federal Constitutionalism for Multinational Societies and International Legal Integration," 1965 (to be published; the pp. ref. are to the MS.).

[11] A Preliminary Report of the Royal Commission on Bilingualism and Biculturalism, 1965, p. 114.

[12] Robert O. Tilman and Taylor Cole, (eds.) "The Nigerian Political Scene," 1962.

[13] Guy Héraud, "L'Europe des Ethnies," 1963, has argued that the ethnic groupings should become the basis of a future European Federal order, rather than the existing states.

[14] "Constitutional Government and Democracy," 1950, ch. XXIII. Although nationalization and socialization are often used interchangeably, the former is strictly speaking a special case of the latter which may also mean the transfer to other collectivities than the nation.

[15] Morton Grodzins (ed.), "A Nation of States," 1961, p. 23. Cf. also the same author's (with Jacob Cohen) "How Much Economic Sharing in American Federalism?" The American Political Science Review, vol LVII, 1963, pp. 5–23, concluding the two planes of government in the Federal system do not pursue fundamentally antagonistic economic policies.

[16] For the problem of democratic planning, cf. my op. cit. (footnote 14) ch. XXIII and the work cited in footnote 1, ch. 3 (re: policy).

[17] R. L. Watts, "Recent Trends in Federal Economic Policy and Finance in the Commonwealth," Public Policy, vol. XIV, pp. 380–402, 1965.

[18] Klaus von Beyme, "Federal Theory and Party Reality in the Soviet Union," Public Policy, vol. XIII, 1964, pp. 395–412.

[19] Gerhardt Leibholz, "Politics and Law," 1965, pp. 37ff. and his Strukturprobleme der Modernen Demokratie, 1958, 1964, where the same issue is treated at greater length.

[20] Notably art. 23 of the Basic Law; there are similar provisions to be found in the Soviet, Yugoslav and related constitutions.

[21] Ernst B. Haas, "The Uniting of Europe—Political, Social, and Economic Forces," 1950–1957, 1958, esp. ch. 11.

[22] Ibid.

[23] David B. Truman, "Federalism and the Party System," in Arthur W. MacMahon, ed., "Federalism Mature and Emergent," 1955, pp. 115ff. and William H. Riker, "Federalism," 1964, p. 101.

[24] Chateaubriand, "Memoires d'Outre Tombe," ch. I.

[25] Peter Merkl, "Federalism and Community Structure," a paper read before the Geneva Congress of the International Political Science Association, Sept. 1964; cf. also Riker, op. cit. (footnote 22) who stresses the bargain aspect, pp. 12–16, 20–25, and 92–97; it is a new word for the old compact theory of federalism.

[26] Cf. Peter Merkl, "The Origins of the West German Republic," 1963, for general background; for the specific issue cf. J. F. J. Gillen, "State and Local Government in West Germany," 1945–1953, published by the Historical Division of the High Commission, 1954.

[27] Riker, op. cit. p. 155; the table given there is highly questionable, both in terms of the factual basis and the implications; it is unrealistic.

[28] See the provisions reprinted in Bowie and Friedrich, op. cit. (footnote 1), pp. 93ff.

[29] Loc. cit. (footnote 27) pp. 78ff.

[30] Art. 74, Basic Law of the Federal Republic, arts. 1–70 of the Constitution of the Swiss Confederation.

[31] Karlheinz Neunreither, "Der Bundestag zwischen Politik und Verwaltung," 1959.

[32] Arnold Kottgen, "Der Bundesgesetzgeber und die Gemeinden," 1957; the same, "Der Einfluss des Bundes auf die Deutsche Verwaltung," "Jahrbuch des Offentlichen Rechts," vol. III, 1954, pp. 67–147; Dietrich Katzenstein, "Rechtliche Erscheinungsformen der Machtverschiebung zwischen Bund und Laendern seit 1949," "Die Oeffentliche Verwaltung," 1958, pp. 593–604.

[33] Theodore C. Sorensen, "Decision-Making in the White House," 1963.

[34] Cf. ch. 3 of the work cited in footnote 1, as well as the studies cited there, especially those by Lasswell, Snyder and Furniss. There now exist extensive bibliographies on the subject; Karl W. Deutsch, "The Nerves of Government—Models of Political Communication and Control," 1963, p. III has reviewed this literature, esp. in ch. 9.

[35] Cf. pp. 79ff. of Friedrich as cited in footnote 1. Cf. also Daniel Lerner and Harold Lasswell, eds. "The Policy Sciences: Recent Developments in Scope and Method," 1951. More recently, Lasswell has put his view in "The Decision Process," 1956, publ. by the Govt. Research of the University of Maryland.

[36] Cf. Richard C. Snyder, H. W. Bruck, and Burtin Sapin. "Decision-Making as an Approach to the Study of International Politics," publ. by the Foreign Policy Analysis Project of Princeton University in 1954; on p. 34 the authors present a diagram of this process.

[37] See Grant McConnell, "Steel and the Presidency," 1962, which did not mention the Federal aspect at all; a foreign reader might believe that the United States is a unitary state.

[38] Snyder et al., op. cit., footnote 35, pp. 37f. and 47f.

[39] Cf. Elmer Plischke, "Systems of Integrating the International Community," 1964, esp. the ch. by Francis O. Wilcox, "International Confederation—the United Nations and State Sovereignty," pp. 27–66, and my own paper on International Federalism.

[40] C. J. Friedrich, "Puerto Rico—Middle Road to Freedom," 1959, ch. 3. This possibility is completely overlooked by Gordon Lewis, Puerto Rico, 1964, who name-calls views he disagrees with as "utopian"—an epithet that may more properly be applied to his own position.

[41] William S. Livingston, "Federalism in the Commonwealth," 1963, does not include this aspect, but it is treated by Taylor Cole in the paper, mentioned below, footnote 77.

[42] K. C. Wheare, "The Constitutional Structure of the Commonwealth," 1960; Patrick Gordon-Walker, "The Commonwealth," 1962; D. B. Miller, "The Commonwealth and the World," 1958.

[43] Wilcox, in the paper cited above footnote 38, pp. 40–45. Cf. also Inis L. Claude, "Swords into Plowshares" (rev. ed. 1959), ch. 10.

[44] Carl J. Friedrich, "Admission of New States, Territorial Adjustments and Secession," Study 15 in Bowie and Friedrich, op. cit. footnote 1.

[45] Clive Parry, "Naturalization and Citizenship Laws of the Commonwealth and the Republic of Ireland," 1957, chs. 2 and 3.

[46] The Draft Resolutions of the Study Committee, 1952, had proposed that "all the citizens of the member states shall be citizens of the Community." Cf. Bowie and Friedrich, op. cit. footnote 1, p. 819; also ibid. the comparative study on citizenship by W. J. Schrenk, ibid. Study 12.

[47] Art. 69.

[48] Cf. C. J. Friedrich, "Nationaler und Internationaler Föderalismus in Theorie und Praxis," "Politische Vierteljahrsschrift," vol. V, 1964, pp. 154ff. esp. at pp. 166ff. and 182f. Also "Die europäische Einigung und die kommende Weltordnung," in "Europaarchiv," Dec. 1954. The French Constitution of 1958 contained an article (art. 88) on association which has not been applied; it may have been hoped that it would help solve the Alegrian problem.

[49] It is not sufficiently appreciated how novel this provision really was; cf. my op. cit. (footnote 14), ch. VIII, and my article "Origin and Development of the Concept of Federalism in the United States," "Jahrbuch des Oeffentlichen Rechts der Gegenwart," NF, vol. 9, pp. 29ff.

[50] See European Economic Commission. Sixth General Report, 1962 to 1963, pp. 190ff; and Seventh General Report, 1963/4, pp. 222ff, and 259ff. Further see "European Yearbook," vol. IX, 1961, pp. 453–503, giving the text of the Treaty of Association with Greece; and the same, vol. X, 2, 1962, p. 788, and XI, 2, 1963, 511ff. and 607ff.

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[51] Sixth General Report, pp. 236ff. Seventh General Report, 266ff.

[52] "European Yearbook," vol. XI, 1963, pp. 58–9.

[53] Ibid. p. 59.

[54] Seventh General Report, pp. 259ff.

[55] The Treaty of Association is given in "European Yearbook," vol. XI, 2, 1963, pp. 622ff. The articles on the institutions (arts. 39–53) on pp. 632ff.

[56] Cf. Wheare, op. cit. (in footnote 41) ch. VII.

[57] Art. 54, Basic Law.

[58] Cf. W. Phillips Davison. "The Berlin Blockade—A Study in Cold War Politics," 1958, esp. ch. XI: Hans Speier, "Divided Berlin; The Anatomy of Soviet Political Blackmail," 1961; Peter H. Merkl, "The Origins of the West German Republic," 1963, esp. pp. 63ff.

[59] Cf. the discussion in my "Puerto Rico," pp. 68ff, for more detailed argument. For background, see Charles T. Goodsell, "Administration of a Revolution—Executive Reform in Puerto Rico under Governor Tugwell, 1941–46," 1965.

[60] M. P. Herremans, "La Question Flamande," 1948.

[61] Herremans, op. cit. p. 54. For Calhoun, see his "Disquisition on Government" and his "Discourse on the Constitution and Government of the United States," 1849–50.

[62] J. Delacroix, "La Révolte des Modérés ou le Compromis des Belges," "Revue Générale Belge," 1961, pp. 25–36 who pleads for toleration and unity; cf. also the monthly comments of Memnon (a pseudonym) which are informative and seek to be objective.

[63] There is a tendency in Belgium to carry decentralization to the point where it turns into a federalizing process, under the heading of "territorial decentralization"; it is defined as "confier la gestion de l'ensemble des intérêts régionaux et locaux des autorités regionales et locales dotées vis-a-vis du pouvoir central de l'autonomie organique . . ." In A. Buttgenbach, "Théorie Générale des modes de gestion des services publiques en Belgique," Brussels, 1952, (italics in the original).

[64] R. Ullner, "Belgien—Dualismus als Verfassungsprincip," "Aussenpolitik," 1961, pp. 841ff. The principle of dualism can, however, hardly be considered an established one; in an authoritative work, such as P. Wigny, "Droit Constitutional," 1952, 2 vols., it plays no significant role.

[65] Karl Loewenstein, "Brazil under Vargas," 1942, esp. pp. 9ff. and 59ff. Cf. also, for the first republic, J. G. James, "The Constitutional System of Brazil," 1923, passim.

[66] "Perspectivas do Federalismo Brasileiro," a special issue of "Revista Brasileira de Estudos Politicos," 1958.

[67] This summary is found in Loewenstein, op. cit. p. 14. He himself is critical of this outlook, but thinks rather that "the Federal principle was driven to unhealthy extremes." He believes that the attack on federalism served as a foil for antidemocratic sentiments.

[68] G. de Britto Mello Boson in op. cit. (footnote 64) p. 72. See for this view also Leslie Lipson, "The Federal Principle and the Brazilian Reality," Public Policy vol. XIV, 1965, pp. 444–455. This paper is based on a report to IPSA, 1964, at Geneva. The following quote is found there, p. 5.

[69] Lipson, loc. cit. p. 6, and "Annuario Estatistico," 1963. The statistics which Lipson quotes do not prove his point as they could easily be duplicated elsewhere, e.g. consider the amount of Federal income tax coming in from New York, Pennsylvania, and California.

[70] "Statistical Abstract of the United States," 1964, Bureau of the Census, U.S. Department of Commerce; it should be remembered, however, that the figures would contrast less strongly, if allowance were made for the huge military expenditures of the U.S. Federal Government.

[71] J. Pinto Antunes, "O Principio Federative na Costituicao Brasileira," Revista da Faculdado de Direito, Gérais, 1953. Lipson cites this statement with approval but it seems to me obscure, if not meaningless.

[72] Loewenstein, op. cit. p. 13. See also his description of the imbalance on p. 74.

[73] Konrad Hesse, "Der Unitarische Bundesstaat," 1962. Soviet federalism certainly fits this pattern, cf. K. von Beyme, op. cit. footnote 18.

[74] Cf. Bowie and Friedrich, op. cit. (footnote 1) which contains specific sections on all the topics of Canadian federal relationships. Its bibliography is superseded by the excellent contribution of Alexander Brady to Livington, op. cit. (footnote 40), pp. 11–28. Cf. also Taylor Cole, "Federalism in the Commonwealth," Public Policy, vol. XIV, 1965, pp. 355–379.

[75] "Royal Commission Report" (ref. above footnote 11) p. 48. This report speaks of "Crisis" pp. 133ff.

[76] R. Johannet, "Le Principe des nationalites," new ed. 1927; cf. also my discussion in my op. cit., footnote 1, ch. 29 & 30.

[77] John A. Hawgood, "The Tragedy of German-America," 1940, remarks that the massing of German immigrants in Pennsylvania did not result from any deliberate attempt to found a New Germany * * *" he adds that "the Pennsylvania Dutch" were "not interested and did not participate in the efforts * * * to found a true 'New Germany' or a series of New Germanies in America that were made in the 19th century." p. 93. Such attempts were made in Missouri (ch. V) and in Texas (ch. VI.)

[78] Report (footnote 11) App. V, pp. 190ff.

[79] Alexander Brady, in Livingston (see footnote 40); the particular issue is treated on pp. 13ff. Cf. also the "Trembley Report", 4 vols. 1956.

[80] Taylor Cole, loc. cit. (footnote 71), discusses this matter critically, citing Frank R. Scott's view, as offered in "French-Canada and Canadian Federalism," in A.R.M. Lower, "Evolving Canadian Federalism," 1958, Cf. Lower himself p. 40.

[81] Frank R. Scott, "Centralization and Decentralization in Canadian Federalism," Canadian Bar Review, vol. 29, 1951, p. 1104, as cited by Cole.

[82] J. A. Corry, in Lower, op. cit. (footnote 77) p. 124.

[83] Cf. footnotes 27 and 28 in Cole, loc. cit. (footnote 77).

[84] Philip Siekman in "Fortune," 1964.

[85] Report (footnote 11) p. 144.

[86] "Cyprus," 1960 (publ. by H. M. Stat. Office) contains the agreements, constitutions and other important material. The sketch which follows is replete with data drawn from this important source. An interesting supplementary study is A. J. Meyer (with Simos Vassiliou), "The Economy of Cyprus," 1962, which I found very useful.

[87] Karl Renner, "Der Kampf der Oesterreichischen Nationen um den Staat," 1907, and the same author's "Das Selbstbestimmungsrecht der Nationen * * *" 1918. For Esthonia cf. Evald Uustalu, "The History of the Esthonian People," 1952. The whole issue is related to Heraud's thought, above footnote 13.

[88] McWhinney, in the study cited in footnote 10 discusses this matter on pp. 64ff.

[89] Stanley Mayes, "Cyprus and Makarios," 1960, esp. chs. 8–11, is sharply critical of the Cypriote leader; Sir Harry Luke, Cyprus, 1957, is a lively, if

uncritically pro-British account; cf. also "Treaty concerning the Establishment of the Republic of Cyprus, "Nicosia, Aug. 16, 1960, Cmnd. 1252, 1962.

[90] Ernst Forsthoff, the (German) outside Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of Cyprus until 1964, has offered his rather formalistic notions on constitutional interpretation in "Zur Problematik der Verfassungsauslegung," 1961. Had Marshall and other U.S. Supreme Court Justices followed such norms, the U.S. constitution could never have evolved in the way it has.

[91] For the concept of a developed bureaucracy, cf. my op. cit. (footnote 14), ch. II.

[92] See for what follows Bowie and Friedrich, op. cit. (footnote 1) pp. 93ff. and the literature cited there.

[93] See for the translation of the text William G. Andrews," Constitutions and Constitutionalism," 2d ed. 1963, pp. 125–129.

[94] See for this and other concrete detail Neunreither, "Politics and Bureaucracy in the West German Bundesrat," American Political Science Review LIII, 1959, 1 p. 713ff.

[95] Edward McWhinney, "Constitutionalism in Germany and the Federal Constitutional Court," 1962; Taylor Cole, "The West German Federal Constitutional Court: An Evaluation * * *", Journal of Politics, vol. 20, 1958, pp. 278ff.

[96] Cf. the authors noted above footnote 31.

[97] Art. 120a of the Basic Law; note the commentary to the "Lastenausgleichsgesetz" by Rudolf Harmening, 1953 and later (many editions).

[98] Cf. e.g. S. A. H. Haqqi, "Federalism, Single Dominant Party and The Problem of Linguistic Autonomy in India," a paper read before the Geneva Congress of IPSA, Sept. 1964, p. 2; but others are of the opposite opinion, e.g. N. Srinivasan, "Democratic Government in India," 1954, p. 147: "The Federal character of the Constitution is indisputable * * * The new constitution of India has effected and adjustment of federal-state relations suited to the conditions of India that is sui generis * * *" The latter position seems sounder in terms of our view of federalism.

[99] Shri N. V. Gadgil, "Constituent Assembly Debates," vol. XI, p. 657 (as cited by Haqqi). For an admirable review of the extensive literature on Indian federalism and its background, cf. T. J. Leonard's essay in Livingston, op. cit. (footnote 40).

[100] S. V. Kogekar, "Federalism in India," a paper read before the Oxford Round Table on Federalism, Sept. 1963, passim.

[101] Ibid. p. 6.

[102] Paul Friedrich, "Language and Politics in India," Daedalus, Summer 1962. Haqqi gives the following figures for the 10 major language groups: Hindi, Urdu, Punjabi and Hindustani 149,944,311, Telegu 32,999,916, Marathi 27,049,522, Tamil 26,546,764, Bengali 25,121,674 Gujarati 16,310,771, Kannada 14,471,764, Malayalam 13,380,109, Oriya 13,153,909 and Assamese 4,988,266; he notes that there are besides 47 other Indian and tribal languages, though not all of them are languages with a literary record. (For the distribution among the states see below note 103.) Art. 351 of the Constitution recognizes 14 languages—in addition to the ones cited these include Kashmiri, Punjabi, Sanskrit and Urdu. It will be noted that two of these, Punjabi and Urdu, as well as Hindustani are lumped together with Hindi in the above official statistics, obviously in order to swell the size of Hindi to make it look to be by far the largest group; such lumping is not accepted by speakers of these languages; there are many millions of each of these.

[103] M. P. Desai, "Our Language Problem," 1956; B. R. Ambedkar, "Thoughts on Linguistic States," 1955; cf. also the article cited in previous note. *Cf.* also S. S. Harrison, "The Most Dangerous Decades—Language Policy in Multilingual States," 1957; W. H. Morris-Jones, "The Government and Politics of India," 1964.

[104] Paul Friedrich, loc. cit. p. 552.

[105] C. Rajagopalachari, "Tamil Culture," 1959, p. 210.

[106] The states are, with population and language in parentheses, as reported by P. Friedrich: Andhra (31, Telegu); Assam (Assamese, 5); W. Bengal (26, Bengali); Bihar (38, Hindi); Madras (29, Tamil); Orissa (14, Oriya); Punjab (16, Punjabi, Hindi); Uttar Pradesh (63, Hindi); Rajastan (15, Rajastan, Hindi); Jamnu and Kashmir (4, Kashmiri, Urdu); Mysore (19, Kannada); Kerala (14, Malayalam) from S. Sarkar, Hindustani Yearbook, 1959, pp. 402ff.

[107] Harrison drew this comparison, when he wrote: "In size and resources the 10 regional components of the Indian Union can properly be compared to the sovereign Nations of Europe * * *" in S. S. Harrison, "The Challenge to Indian Nationalism," Foregin Affairs (N.Y.), 1956, p. 620.

[108] Haqqi, loc. cit. p. 8; cf. also refs. note (100).

[109] Haqqi, loc. cit. p. 11; cf. also Hugh Tinker, "India and Pakistan," 1962, pp. 134ff. and the "Report of the Official Language Commission," New Delhi, 1965, pp. 451ff. Haqqi here reports the case of a premier of Madras who coming from below had so little command of Hindi (and English) that he had to use an interpreter for his conference with the Prime Minister of India!

[110] R. V. Rao, "Parliamentary Democracy in India," 1961, ch. VI, pt. II, esp. pp. 190–195.

[111] Paul Friedrich, loc. cit. p. 558; cf. also Haqqi, loc. cit. at the end. Rao, op. cit., p. 286, wisely comments that "it is obvious that it is the particular weakness of the Constitution that it will create constant friction between the Center and the States * * * and that this constant friction will weaken the solidarity of the country much more than a real federation with greater provincial autonomy could have done." This is the conclusion of his chapter (IX) on the Indian Federal Problem.

[112] Gasp. Ambrosini, "Autonomia Regionale e Federalismo" (no date—probably 1955).

[113] Comitato Nazionale per la Celebrazione del primo decennale della Promulgazione della Costituzione, "Raccolta di scritti sulla Costituzione," 5 vols., 1958.

[114] Subject, however, to the provision that the regional council could reaffirm the law by absolute majority; if, in such a case, the National Government did not wish to abide by the regional decision, it could submit the issue to the constitutional court (and has repeatedly done so in the conflicts with the special regions).

[115] *Cf.* Piero Calamandrei and Alessandro Levi, "Commentario sistematico alla Costituzione Italiana," 1950, vol. II, pp. 225–379 (Gio, Miele).

[116] Art. 131 lists the following regions: Piedmont, Val d'Aosta, Lombardy, Trentino-Alto Adige, Veneto, Friuli-Venezia Giulia, Liguria, Emilia-Romagna, Tuscany, Umbria, Marche, Lazio, Abruzzi and Molise, Campania, Puglia, Basilicata, Calabria, Sicilia, Sardinia. Besides noting that the list includes the special regions to which therefore the general provisions presumably apply, one might recall that each of these regions includes two or more of the traditional provinces which are subdivisions of the unitary state.

[117] Taylor Cole, "Three Constitutional Courts: A Comparison," American Political Science Review, vol. LIII, 1959, pp. 963ff. Gottfried Dietze, "Judicial Review

in Europe," Michigan Law Review, vol. 55, 1957, pp. 539ff, and "Decline and Emergence of Judicial Review," Virginia Law Review, vol. 44, 1958, pp. 1233ff. Edward McWhinney, "Constitutionalism in Germany and the Federal Constitutional Court," 1962, esp. ch. I.

[118] John Clarke Adams and Paolo Barile, "The Government of Republican Italy," 1961, discuss the regions pp. 120–123. They cite with approval a statement by Luigi Einaudi (former Italian President) from "Che cosa reimarebbe allo stato?" in "Prediche inutili, despensa sesta," 1959, pp. 335–359 at p. 357 that Trentino subsidies amounted to less than a third of the subsidies, percentage-wise, of those to Sicily, or, as they put it, "if the subsidies going to Trentino-Alto Adige were applied" to all of Italy, "the regions would be receiving 18 to 19 percent of the State's annual income, while if the Sicilian subsidies were applied, the regions would be spending 61 to 62 percent of the annual Italian national income." I believe what is meant is not the national income, but the national tax revenue. Even so, the argument does not seem very decisive; similar figures of contrast could be worked out for the poorest members of other Federal systems.

[119] For the range of problems here discussed, cf. the contributions to a symposium held in 1963 at Florence and published under the title "Symposium Internazionale sui problemi della regione e del governo locale" (Milan), 1963, esp. the contributions by V. Crisafulli and L. Giovenco; cf. also P. Virga, "La Regione," 1949, C. Mortati, "Alcuni aspetti dell 'ordinamento regionale'" in Studi sulla Costituzione, vol. III, 1958, and A. Predieri, "Pianificazione e Costituzione," 1963. I would also like to acknowledge with thanks the help received on this section from Dr. Stefano Passigli.

[120] Robert C. Brooks, "Civic Training in Switzerland," 1930, still seems to me the most balanced general treatment of the problems here involved. A recent study of the multilingual problems by Kenneth D. McRae, "Switzerland—Example of Cultural Coexistence," 1964, brings this special phase up-to-date in a very concise fashion.

[121] Carl J. Friedrich and Taylor Cole, "Responsible Bureaucracy—a Study of the Swiss Civil Service," 1934; cf. also the discussion in my op. cit. (footnote 14, chs. 2 and 19. Art. 107 of the Swiss Constitution requires that the Federal Tribunal (Supreme Judicial Court) should include representatives of all three official language groups.

[122] Brooks, op. cit. pp. 107ff. Cf. also Friedrich, op. cit. (footnote 118) esp. pp. 550ff. The most searching study of the Swiss practice of referendum and initiative is a Swedish one by A. Brusewitz, "Folkromroestningsinstitutet i den Schweizeska Demokratien," 1923.

[123] W. E. Rappard, "La Constitution Fédérale de la Suisse—1848–1948" (1948), pp. 328ff.

[124] F. Fleiner, "Schweizerisches Bundesstaatsrecht," 1932, pp. 56–58.

[125] Brooks, op. cit. p. 11.

[126] Burckhardt, "Kommentar," 3. ed. 1931, p. 806.

[127] McRae, op. cit. p. 13, citing "Res Publica," (Brussels), vol. IV, 1962, p. 254. This issue of Res Publica, entitled "La question linguistique en Suisse," contains other valuable contributions, especially by H. Weilenmann, the author of the most comprehensive study on the Swiss language situation, "Die Vielsprachiche Schweiz; Eine Loesung des Nationalitaetenproblems," 1925. Although now in some respects dated, it is still a basic source.

[128] McRae, op. cit. pp. 57ff.

[129] The general literature on the unification movement in Europe has become very voluminous. A good general review of the politics up to the midfifties is provided by Ernst B. Haas, op. cit. (footnote 21); for a more recent assessment see Arnold J. Zurcher, "The European Community—An Approach to Federal Integration," 1964, pp. 67–115, and for the preceding period the same author's "The Struggle To Unite Europe, 1940–1958, 1958." The British view (favorable) is well stated in Uwe W. Kitzinger, "The Challenge of the Common Market," 1961. Besides these, the general "Reports on the Activities of the Community," Brussels, published by the EEC Commission, are an important source, as is the "European Yearbook," The Hague, published since 1954 under the auspices of the Council of Europe. R. R. Bowie and the author's "Studies in Federalism," prepared by a group of researchers for the ad hoc assembly in 1953 contains an introduction by the author reviewing the background of the draft constitution and its shortcomings.

[130] The commission at Brussels has published a list of all the organizations concerned in the unification movement of Europe.

[131] Bowie and Friedrich, op. cit. (footnote 1). In the appendix, there is found the text of the draft treaty for a constitution, preceded by the "Resolutions" of the preparatory study committee; these latter are more radical.

[132] May 6, 1963, cf. "European Yearbook," 1964.

[133] This subject forms the topic of one of the studies on informal community formation and its political implications, directed by the author, under the auspices of the Center of International Affairs at Harvard; the results are to be published in 1966. Dr. Rolf Grauhan has been carrying on this research. In the meanwhile, the publication "Communes d'Europe may be consulted for current, if uncritical information.

[134] See the resolution of the Bar Association of Puerto Rico, March 1963.

[135] Cf. Jovan Djordjevic, "Some Aspects of Federalism in a Multinational Socialist Society," a paper read before the Oxford Round Table of IPSA, 1964. Cf. also E. Kardelj, "On the Principles of the Preliminary Draft of the New Constitution," in The New Yugoslav Law, vol. XIII, 1962, p. 29.

[136] Ladislaus Hory and Martin Broszat, "Der Kroatische Utascha-Staat," 1941–45, 1964.

[137] Art. 1 of the Constitution of 1963: "The Federal Socialist Republic of Yugoslavia is a Federal State of equal peoples voluntarily united, and a socialist democratic community based on self-government and on the power of the working people."

[138] The list is a long one; cf. art. 160–162, but especially art. 161.

[139] J. Djordjevic, "Les Caractéristiques Foundamentales de la Nouvelle Constitution Yougoslave," in Revue Internationale de Droit Comparé, 1963, pp. 698–9.

[140] Edward McWhinney, op. cit. (footnote 10) (p. 73; it is mistakenly argued though that the "control" over the administration of Federal laws is in conflict with federalism; for delegated administration can be part of a Federal order as we have shown in sec. V).

[141] Art. 6–34, loc. cit.

[142] Kardelj, loc. cit. (footnote 132), pp. 19–20.

[143] Art. 165 corresponding to art. 45 describing the National Council in the Constitution of 1953.

[144] Djordjevic, loc. cit. (footnote 136), p. 700; the next quotation also ibid.

[145] Arts. 241–251.

[146] McWhinney, op. cit. (footnote 10), p. 78.

[147] C. J. Friedrich and Zbigniew Brzezinski, "Totalitarian Dictatorship and Autocracy," 2d. ed. 1965, ch. 10, cf. also Alex N. Dragnich, "Recent Political Developments in Yugoslavia," in Soviet Satellite Nations, ed. John H. Hallowell, 1958 (a reprint from "The Journal of Politics, 1958).

[148] McWhinney, op. cit. (footnote 10), p. 80.

[149] The dynamic political view of federalism is becoming accepted so widely that it is beginning to appear in casual references. Thus we read in Héraud, op. cit. (footnote 13) "Ce schéma est impliqué dans tout processus fedéralisant a base de traité * * *," p. 257; and Cole writes: "Federalism is the process by which adjustment is made between those forces making for disunity and those making for unity," op. cit. (footnote 12), p. 62.

[150] Cf. the highly formalistic presentation of A. I. Lepeshkin, "Problems of the Development of the Soviet Socialist Federation," a paper read at the Geneva Congress of IPSA in 1964. Cf. contra, Beyme, as cited above, footnote 18.

[151] At present, a dissertation is being prepared under my direction by Miss Christa Altenstetter on the political reality of Austrian federalism.

[152] Op. cit. (footnote 12), p. 190.

[153] Op. cit. (footnote 12), p. 197.

[154] In the papers cited above, footnote 1, I overstated the issue by insisting that the dynamic aspect of federalizing replace the static aspect of patterning and structuring; I believe the present formulation to be more appropriate. Cf. for a more recent statement my article cited in footnote 47 above.

[155] E.g. Denis de Rougemont, "La Suisse: Histoire d'un peuple heureux," 1965, "L'Europe dans le Monde," 1965, and A. Marc, "Principes du Fédéralisme (avec Robert Aron), 1954. These and other writers stressing the humanist and consenual aspect of federalism hark back to Proudhon, Constantin Franz, and Otto v. Gierke. Cf. for this my article cited in footnote 48.

[156] Kenneth C. Wheare, see footnote 10; Edward McWhinney, "Comparative Federalism—States' Rights and National Power," 1962; Bowie and Friedrich, eds., see footnote 1.

[157] Cf. e.g., Leo Moulin, "Le Fédéralisme dans l'organisation des Ordres Religieux," a paper read before the Geneva Congress of IPSA, 1964.

[158] Wheare op. cit. pp. 32–3.

[159] Friedrich, op. cit., footnote 1, ch. 32.

[160] Wheare, op. cit., ch. XII, pp. 252–260.

[161] Héraud, op. cit. footnote 13. On p. 260 one reads "L'aliénation économique et l'aliénation culturelle sont à cet égard les maux essentiels à surmonter" and it's federalism which can accomplish this.

[162] Héraud, op. cit. p. 269; the 3 pages 266ff. develops the idea of the "fédération des ethnies."

[163] Héraud, op. cit. p. 18 describes in vivid terms the loss of identity suffered by the member of an ethnic minority, if he seeks to become effective in the larger community, how he must substitute for his original personality by great effort and sacrifice another "une langue, une culture, une sensibilité, une personnalité étrangère"—a veritable betrayal of his self.

[164] McWhinney, as cited footnote 153, p. 13.

[165] McWhinney, op. cit. p. 20.

[166] Riker, as cited footnote 22, p. 155.

[167] Ibid.

[168] C. J. Hughes, "The Theory of Confederacies," a paper read to the Oxford Round Table of IPSA in 1964.

[169] Dusan Sidjanski, "Fédéralisme Amphictyonique—Éléments de Systéme et tendance internationale," 1956.

[170] Ibid.

[171] The territorial or spatial division of power was stressed in my op. cit. footnote 14, ch. XI, entitled "Federalism and the Territorial Division of Power." I first brought forward this aspect in "Constitutional Government and Politics," 1937. This important theoretical point was further developed by Arthur Maas (ed.) "Area and Power, A Theory of Local Government," 1959, with important papers on the history of this aspect of federal theory by Stanley Hoffman and Samuel P. Huntington.

[172] Cf. Hesse, op. cit. footnote 70. The argument tends to merge with that for local self-government.

[173] Lepeschkin, loc. cit. (footnote 147).

[174] Sir. J. A. R. Marriott, "Federalism and the Problem of the Small State," 1943.

[175] John Stuart Mill, "Representative Government," 1854.

THE NETHERLANDS, FRENCH AND BRITISH AREAS OF THE CARIBBEAN

by

THE INSTITUTE OF CARIBBEAN STUDIES, UNIVERSITY OF PUERTO RICO

The Institute of Caribbean Studies is part of the University of Puerto Rico and serves as a center for research and study of the Caribbean area. It is headed by Professor Thomas G. Mathews, author of "Puerto Rican Politics and the New Deal" and several articles on the Caribbean.

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PREFACE

The Institute of Caribbean Studies was established by the University of Puerto Rico in 1958 as a center for study and research. Although administratively a part of the University's Faculty of the

Social Sciences, the Institute is also active in the fields of the humanities and education.

The objectives of the Institute of Caribbean Studies are: (1) To encourage, support and serve as a center for scholarly research and exchange in the Caribbean; (2) to give disciplinary training to Caribbean specialists; (3) to stimulate interest in the Caribbean among university students, both Puerto Rican and visiting, offering them preliminary training and, when possible supporting them in advanced studies. The work of the Institute is supported in part by a grant from the Ford Foundation for the period 1963–68.

The Institute's area of study, the Caribbean region, contains more than 40 populated units, most of them islands, ranging in size from the tiny Grenadines—each several square miles in area—to British Guiana, which is 83,000 square miles. Population varies from a few hundred inhabitants on the smallest Dutch, French, and English islands to Cuba's 7,000,000. With regard to ancestry, the people of Haiti are nearly all descended from Africans; the European strain predominates in Cuba and Puerto Rico, while the people of Surinam are African, European, American Indian, East Indian, Javanese and Chinese in origin.

The same variety found in geography and population of the Caribbean can be found in the political affairs of the area. In this study, undertaken at the request of the United States-Puerto Rico Commission on the Status of Puerto Rico, we have attempted to analyze the existing political relations between a few selected former colonies in the Caribbean and the metropolitan countries of Europe which for centuries administered these colonies.

There are three parts to this study. The first is a succinct essay which generally follows the outline of the work as requested by the Executive Secretary of the Status Commission. The second and most extensive section includes the detailed political and economic reports and studies which were required for the adequate and accurate preparation of the essay found in the first section. To explore in greater detail the observations contained in the first part, the reader, aided by footnotes, is referred to the various pertinent sections to be found in the second part. The third section contains a selected and current bibliography of works used in the preparation of parts 1 and 2.

Three members of the staff of the Institute of Caribbean Studies cooperated with the director in the preparation of this study: Dr. Fuat Andic, Mrs. Suphan Andic, and M. Gérard Latortue. The economic sections of the study were prepared by Dr. and Mrs. Andic, who are research associates of the Institute and associate professor and assistant professor, respectively, in the Faculty of Social Sciences of the University. Dr. Fuat Andic was born in Instanbul and educated in Turkey, the United States, and Scotland. He has been instructor in economics at the University of Instanbul and research fellow in the University of Edinburgh, besides having worked for the European Office of the United Nations. Mrs. Andic in addition to collaboration with her husband on several economic studies has co-authored with Professor Alan T. Peacock, University of York and with Dr. J. Veverka of the University of Leicester.

M. Gérard Latortue is a political economist who was educated in Haiti and the University of Paris. He is currently visiting professor at the Inter-American University and Research Assistant at the University of Puerto Rico's Institute of Caribbean Studies. As a French-speaking Haitian, Mr. Latortue was able to secure access to local leaders of Guadeloupe and Martinique thus permitting an accurate analysis of the contemporary political situation in these islands.

The Institute was fortunate to secure the temporary services for the purpose of this study of Mr. Michael Joshua, a graduate of the Inter-American University and Syracuse University. Mr. Joshua is the son of the chief minister of St. Vincent, one of the British Windward Islands in the Caribbean. With his intimate knowledge of the workings of politics and government Mr. Joshua has been able to prepare a revealing study of the problems of the federation of the British Lesser Antilles.

Finally, mention should be made of Mr. Gregorio Tromp of Aruba and Mr. Tjark Petzoldt of Surinam who were most helpful in preparing the work related to those particular areas. Miss Annette Biscombe prepared the English translation of material on the French-speaking areas and also contributed to the compiling of the bibliography. We are appreciative of the care and dedication of Mrs. Dora Passalacqua who typed the final manuscript.

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I. OVERVIEW AND SUMMARY

A. THE PEACEFUL BREAKUP OF THE EUROPEAN EMPIRES IN THE CARIBBEAN

The Caribbean has been the scene of bloody battles in every century as empires were made and unmade. But in this century, which has seen the breakup of empires in other areas of the world, such as Africa or parts of Asia, the Caribbean has for the most part escaped the bitter violence which has accompanied elsewhere the forging of new nations. While the limitation in size and the lack of any really significant material wealth may have been important in determining the peaceful development of the Caribbean communities toward self-government, autonomy, and independence, there are other cultural, political, and economic factors which operated to enable the Caribbean people to experience this peaceful transformation.

1. Cultural Factors

Strong historical and cultural ties still bind these small and somewhat isolated communities to the metropolitan powers which established, nurtured, and exploited them. There is no rich pre-European cultural heritage, such as would be found in Mexico, to which these Caribbean communities can return. All inhabitants of the Caribbean are strangers there. Even Africa or India, in British Guiana, Trinidad or Surinam, can offer little guidance or consolation for the West Indian who seeks to define his cultural personality. Back-to-Africa movements do exist, for example among the Ras Tafarians of Jamaica, but they lose their drive and enthusiasm as they approach the realization of their dream. Even in the independent countries like Haiti or Cuba, where strong and violent nationalistic movements have endeavored to forge a local culture free from European influence, there still are strong European ties. Communism in Cuba has not stopped direct weekly communication with Catholic Spain, and Paris is still the center of culture for even the most ardent follower of the President of Haiti, Francois Duvalier. Martinique or Barbados, even with self-government or independence, will take many decades to develop its own cultural personality.

2. Political Factors

Great Britain and the Netherlands have realized that these strong cultural ties cannot be enforced by pressure. Pressure for self-government or independence has not been met by these two powers with opposition or repression, but on the contrary, they have nudged forward the small communities on the road to autonomy. In the case of France, whose program is assimilation of the French Caribbean into the Republic of France rather than autonomy, political pressure has been applied to enforce this policy and repress any contrary political feeling. However, the molding of nationalistic forces within the Caribbean in all cases has been denied the anvil of military suppression in defense of a glorious empire.

During the worldwide depression of the thirties the Caribbean was the scene of general strikes, hunger demonstrations, and violence. Uriah Butler in Trinidad, Alexander Bustamante in Jamaica, Pedro Albizu Campos in Puerto Rico are perhaps the most famous personalities who were jailed for their outspoken and often violent opposition to colonial subjugation. Other lesser known personalities from smaller islands are Clement Payne of Barbados and P. P. Marchena of Curacao. Economic recovery brought about by preparation for the pending world war relieved some of the pressure in the Caribbean for a change in the existing colonial regimes. The war also provided an easy excuse for continued restriction on the political activities of a Marchena who was placed in a concentration camp on the small island of Bonaire or a Butler who was detained for "safety's sake" in Trinidad.

Public opinion, aroused by the propaganda used by the European and American powers to secure united support for the tremendous war effort needed to crush fascism, could not be confronted by continual repression in the colonial areas of the great allied powers. Thus, stimulated in great part by Winston Churchill and Franklin Roosevelt's declaration known as the Atlantic Charter, the European powers pledged one by one to take steps immediately after the war to extend self-government to the colonies of the Caribbean.

The British, faced with a complicated conglomeration of small island communities, each at a different level of competence in the management of local affairs, looked to the prewar report of the Moyne Commission (1938–39), which envisaged a West Indian Federation with a dominion status, to solve the problem of the dismemberment of the Caribbean colonial empire.[1] Queen Wilhelmina of Holland, forced into exile by the Germans who overran her country, declared in 1942 the intentions of her government to reconstruct a Kingdom of all her territory based on equality. The French, acting hastily in 1946, were the first to take steps to wipe out the colonial status of their Caribbean possessions by incorporating them into the French departmental system.

Thus each metropolitan power had the same goal: to transform a colonial regime into a form of government which would satisfy local demands for control of their own destiny. Everywhere in the Caribbean this process has been set in motion, not completely without friction, nor unfortunately without utter frustration in some cases. Nevertheless, the transition has been peaceful with a clear recognition on the part of almost all concerned of the experimental nature of the approaches toward the solution of very complex problems.

3. *Economic Factors*

The economic dependency of the Caribbean communities on the metropolitan powers required an extended transitional period during which economies could adjust to the changing political conditions. With the exception of Trinidad, Jamaica, and, perhaps in the future, Surinam, few of these former colonies of the Caribbean could survive a sharp break and subsequent reorganization of economic ties which have been developed over centuries of colonial domination. Even independent and comparatively wealthy Cuba suffered severe economic shock during the recent years when it experienced a radical reorganization of its economic structure with the creation of new lines to markets and supplies replacing ones which had been built up peacefully over decades. Thus while political changes may be realized in the Caribbean area, economic commitments, subsidies, and marketing arrangements dictate continued peaceful cooperation with the former imperial powers of Europe and America.

Dutch commercial interests in the refineries of Curacao and the bauxite mines of Surinam or British and Canadian interests in Jamaican bauxite or Trinidadian oil are all of such importance that efforts have been made to insure that the political revolution occurring in the Caribbean was a peaceful one. Indeed, if reports are to be relied upon concerning the support which Bookers Ltd. (the monolithic imperialistic corporation par excellence of British Guiana) extended to Dr. Cheddi Jagan and his party, one can conclude that the economic interests in these colonies and former colonies are insuring that their interests will be protected in the future independent nation by purchasing goodwill at a very early date in the struggle for independence.

This then is the Caribbean of which Puerto Rico forms a part: scattered and somewhat isolated island communities slowly but surely evolving peacefully toward the greatest degree of political freedom compatible with a realistic appraisal of the socioeconomic and cultural ties which still bind these communities to the European metropolitan powers which once held them in colonial subjugation.

B. DEVELOPMENTS FROM THE CLOSE OF WORLD WAR II TO 1962

1. *French Areas*

The evolution toward political freedom in the Caribbean has taken quite different paths in accord with historical, cultural, and political forces which have been present at different times and places in the various colonies of the European powers. The French islands of Guadeloupe and Martinique along with the sparcely populated former penal colony, French Guiana, have moved toward greater political participation in the determination of their own affairs in a completely different and opposite way than the other areas of the Caribbean. In part this unique road traveled by the French areas can be understood by realizing that more than any other area of the Caribbean the historical development of the islands of Martinique and Guadeloupe reflect the points outlined in the introductory pages of this study.

The impact of the French culture on these two islands and their small dependencies is greater than the English impact on any island, even Barbados, the so-called "little England" of the Caribbean. In the words of the leftist French writer, Daniel Guerin, who is an ardent supporter of autonomy for the islands of Martinique and Guadeloupe: "There is no doubt but that Guadeloupe, and, even more so, Martinique have, over the centuries, been more *gallicized* than the British West Indies have been *anglicized*."

Since 1866 and confirmed by the Constitution of 1875 there has been universal suffrage for municipal elections in the French islands thus extending to these colonies a measure of local autonomy which has permitted local political traditions to develop and a degree of political sophistication not seen until recently in other areas of the Caribbean. Thus the French anticipated by many years the extension of self-government on a local or municipal level but did not develop a political structure which allowed local determination of insular policies. This was determined by the central government in Paris.

In respect to the economic factors, it is obvious that the dependency on the metropolitan power of these two islands is greater than any other area in the Caribbean of comparable size and resources.

Therefore the action taken by the French in 1946 to incorporate them into the Republic as integral départements of France is nothing less than the logical and natural outcome of various historical forces, some of which date back to the glorious days of the French Revolution. This assimilation of the French Caribbean communities, including French Guiana, did not provoke any protest, except by one or two isolated and independent personalities. Even the numerous Communists, including the great poet and man of letters of the Caribbean, Aime Cesaire, went along in the hopes that perhaps with the aid of the strong French Communist Party (Maurice Thorez was one of the deputy prime ministers of the French Government at the time) the vestiges of colonialism would be wiped out once and for all.

It is ironic and worthy of serious reflection that an action which appeared at first to be so logical, so just by any anticolonial standard and so well-received would have proved to be so unsatisfactory at a later date. The incorporation of Guadeloupe and Martinique on a plane of equality into the Republic of France served not to integrate these two diverse communities, but rather to accent the cultural differences so that they grew to an importance which was previously unrecognized. Political integration into a highly centralized government served not to satisfy aspirations for political freedom, but rather accented the need and desire for self-government. Finally, such a discrepancy existed between the socioeconomic level of the people of the islands and France that, even with the best intentions for improvement in these areas of social concern, the people began to feel that the only solution which could bring satisfaction was one in which they were in direct control of their welfare and economic development programs.[2]

2. *British Areas*

The British have been even less successful than the French in solving the political problem of their Caribbean colonies in accord with their own preference. As indicated above, the prewar report of the Moyne Commission recommended the setting up of a West Indian Federation. In fact, since 1871, when the Leeward Islands Federation was formed, Britain had been working toward some form of federation of the smaller islands to avoid and cut down the high costs of colonial administration. In 1876 attempts were made to federate the Windward Islands but riots in Barbados prevented this move until 1885 when the Federation was carried out without the participation of Barbados.[3] But neither of these moves toward Federation were combined with expansion of self-government; indeed, the riots in Barbados were caused by the fear that in joining the Federation this island would lose the limited degree of self-government which it enjoyed.

The riots and social unrest of the depression forced the British to move toward establishing some degree of self-government, but these steps were delayed until the middle forties. In 1945 toward the close of the Second World War the British Colonial Secretary publicly acclaimed the legitimacy of the aspiration of self-government by the Caribbean colonies, but in recognition of the widely disparate potential of a Jamaica on the one hand and a Monserrat on the other, insisted that autonomy could be attained by all of the colonies through the creation at the dominion level of a West Indian Federation. In the words of the distinguished political scientist of Columbia University, Amitai Etzioni, taken from his recent book, "Political Unification:" "Britain did not impose federation; it just promoted it."

The Second World War accelerated the desire for self-government but prevented the realization of the steps which had to be taken at the local level before the West Indian Federation could be set up. Since Great Britain had not prepared its Caribbean colonies for self-government, the organization of constitutional governments on the various islands responsible to the citizens forced a necessary but unwanted delay in establishing the Federation. Jamaica received universal suffrage and a constitution in 1944, Trinidad in 1946, Barbados in 1949, and British Guiana in 1952; but full internal self-government was not achieved by Jamaica until 1959 or by Trinidad until 1961, both dates subsequent to the establishment of the West Indies Federation in 1958. It has been argued that if the Federation had been created immediately after the war when there existed a certain feeling of solidarity or unity among the British communities of the Caribbean, there might have been a greater chance for success for the nation.[4]

The smaller British islands of the Lesser Antilles were favorably inclined toward the Federation, although there were some misgivings and doubts about the preponderant roles of Trinidad and Jamaica. The Bahamas rejected immediately the invitation to participate in conversations looking toward the Federation since they did not feel part of the Caribbean community. The British Virgin Islands, British Guiana, and British Honduras did not participate in the conferences leading to the Federation although the latter two sent observers to some of the meetings. The British Virgin Islands would probably have accepted an invitation, if it had been extended (which is doubtful at this point), to unite with the American Virgin Islands. The east Indian majority of British Guiana was not favorably inclined to join a predominantly Negro Federation. The very small and isolated community of British Honduras, currently under severe pressure from Guatemala to relinquish its ties to Britain, felt that its political destiny did not lie within the West Indian Federation but rather with the continent.

The commitment of the West Indian Federation of the larger islands of Trinidad and Jamaica was stimulated by the vision and interest of leaders like Eric Williams and Norman Manley who were able to understand and appreciate the common destiny of the West Indian society.[5] Lesser politicians and an indifferent populace made the future of the new nation fraught with danger and difficulties. Even before the formal creation of the Federation on April 22, 1958, a very sympathetic political analyst like Prof. Gordon Lewis in a perceptive essay "The British Caribbean Federation," pointed out one by one the dangers and obstacles which would have to be overcome if the new nation were not to be stillborn.

The West Indies Federation was dissolved in May 1962, after Jamaica voted in a referendum to pull out of the association. Norman Manley had failed to insure continued support of the Jamaicans for this experiment allowing his cousin and political opponent, Alexander Bustamante, to gain growing support for withdrawal for the Federation. Since Jamaica's right to independence within the British Commonwealth of Nations was never in doubt, in spite of British rumblings to the contrary, there was very little pressure, aside from Manley and his party, to remain within the Federation. Isolationism won out, and Jamaica in effect told the smaller islands that she no longer wished to share with them her wealth and their misery.

But more than the action of Jamaica's withdrawal, the Federation was faced with isolated island communities cramped with an insular mentality which could not break the bonds of expensive and inconvenient means of transportation and limited, and wholly inadequate, channels of communication which from the beginning frustrated the unification of the English-speaking West Indian society. The weak Federal system, with which the Federation was forced to initiate its operation, could not possibly cope with the dissimilar units. Over half the population of the Federation was in Jamaica and she contributed about 43 percent of the revenue but was given only 17 seats out of 45 in the lower house. Trinidad which contributed 39 percent of the Federal revenue and had only 10 members in the House was not beyond cultivating the support of the representatives of the Lesser Antilles as a means of increasing her weight and thus outvoting Jamaica on specific issues. But to cite such trivia, like the bickering which occurred over the location of the Federal capital, is only to give proof to the observation of Dr. Lewis that unless the West Indian could rise above "selfish insular thinking" the hoped for Federation was doomed to failure. Dr. Etzioni is inclined to place more of the blame on the fact that the Federation never had a realistic socio-economic base which would have allowed it to grow up from roots deeply lodged in the West Indian environment.

The idea of a federated community of English-speaking West Indian islands is not completely dead even though the West Indian Federation has dissolved, and Jamaica and Trinidad have gone on separately to independence as dominion partners in the British Commonwealth of Nations. The Federation of the Lesser Antilles is still under study and reference will be made to this development when attention is directed to the evolution of the contemporary Caribbean political scene.

3. Dutch Areas

Holland was completely occupied during the Second World War and the Japanese controlled the Dutch East Indies. The only land the House of Orange effectively governed until the defeat of Japan and Germany was found in the area of the Caribbean. While in exile in London Queen Wilhelmina announced, out of appreciation of the loyalty of the Caribbean territories and recognition of the decline of the old style colonialism, the formation of a new Kingdom of the Netherlands in which the oversea territories would participate on an equal footing with Holland.

The creation of this kingdom was delayed because of the postwar troubles which the Dutch had in the East Indies. The original hope had been that Holland would enter into partnership with not only its territories of the Caribbean, but also Dutch territories in the East Indies. The problems with the Javanese do not concern us at this point, but what is pertinent is the fact that as a result of the delay the communities of the Caribbean became restless and forced Holland to move more rapidly.

In the more politically sophisticated industrial climate of Curacao, in contrast to the other Dutch islands or Surinam, a very limited spirit of nationalism was present in the prewar years. However, bombarded by German submarines and living constantly under the shadow of the threat of Venezuela, the population of the Netherlands Antilles has been quite pro-Dutch in their orientation. This sympathy was placed under strain when the Dutch delayed, seemingly without reason, in taking action to fulfill the promise of local autonomy made during the war.

One of the more outspoken leaders paid to have published in one of the local newspapers an appeal for a Sukarno for Curacao. Even the more moderate political leaders, in desperation and exasperation with delay, broke off abruptly in 1948, negotiations with the Dutch officials in Holland and appealed directly to the Organization of American States and the United Nations for support in their fight for self-government.

The delay had been further complicated by the need to revise the existing Dutch Constitution to allow the organization of a superstructure, such as the Kingdom of the Netherlands, which would contain Holland, the Netherlands Antilles and Surinam as equal participating parts. Finally the formula of special laws was used to put into effect measures decreeing local autonomy, thus allowing self-government to function on a provisional basis until the necessary constitutional steps, which were quite complicated and time consuming, could be carried out in Holland. This provisional arrangement pacified the vast majority of the political leaders and their following and allowed then an easing of the tension. These measures entered into effect in 1950 and functioned without cause for concern until 1954, when the constitution creating the Kingdom of the Netherlands was proclaimed. Again as in the case of the French islands this action was widely acclaimed with no opposing votes in the Netherlands Antilles and only one abstention in the Legislature of Surinam. Contrary to the British experiment of the Federation there were no warning flags hoisted of impending dangers and problems. And as we shall see, the Dutch have had greater success than either the French or English, although in the case of Surinam it has not been a success entirely unmarked by complaints.

C. AN EVALUATION OF THE CONTEMPORARY POLITICAL SCENE

Since the Second World War the European nations have taken steps with varying degrees of success to dismember their Caribbean empires, cultivate the growth of local participation or control in the determination of the political destiny of the various Caribbean communities, and aid in the creation of either new nations and autonomous states, or the incorporation of the Caribbean community as an integral part of the metropolitan power. In the French and Dutch areas sufficient time has elapsed to evaluate the success of the action taken and the degree to which the status satisfies the aspirations of the people. With the exception of Trinidad and Jamaica, the rest of the British Caribbean has been floundering since 1962, the year of the dissolution of the West Indies Federation. Some attention will be given to the plans for political development of the Lesser Antilles but this will be done in the final section of this brief essay where we will take a look at the plans for the future.

1. British Areas

In August of 1962 both Jamaica and Trinidad became independent members of the British Commonwealth of Nations. Politically, their freedom is as complete as that of Canada or Australia, and they are tied to the Commonwealth by the vague and nebulous bonds of loyalty to the British Monarch who is the symbolic head of the State. Following the nomination by the local Prime Minister, the Queen appoints a Governor General who is a Trinidadian or Jamaican. The Governor General's powers are extremely limited and mostly symbolic. He has the power of some local appointments, but these are carried out on the advice and order of the Prime Minister. In the area of international relations, Trinidad and Jamaica have been extended full recognition as independent States and have been accepted as members of the United Nations.

In the economic realm steps are being taken by at least Trinidad to diminish the indirect economic control which comes from a banking and monetary system which grew up under a colonial climate. Already a central bank of Trinidad has been established and plans are underway for the creation of a national currency. As members of the British Commonwealth of Nations both Jamaica and Trinidad enjoy preferential tariff arrangements with Great Britain.

Whether other English-speaking areas of the Caribbean are to follow this road remains to be seen, but at least clearly and unequivocally, these two islands have achieved full and complete independence. Their economy is a solid one based on valuable mineral deposits (bauxite in Jamaica and petroleum in Trinidad) as well as agricultural products, such as sugar, cacao, and coffee.

In both causes responsible government, free of any marked corruption, is functioning effectively for the overall welfare of the general populace. Jamaica is blessed with a competent and able opposition party which is well prepared to replace the party in power should the populace choose to vote down Alexander Bustamante and his more able younger political followers. In Trinidad the opposition cannot effectively match the capable Eric Williams. As a result, the party in power gives the impression of quarreling more internally than with the adversary. Dr. Williams, who has a very dynamic personality, has alienated some of his more capable second lieutenants, who have dared to differ with him over public policy.

Trinidad, in contrast to Jamaica, is also faced with a racial division which may bring about serious problems in the near future. The East Indian minority is growing in numbers and will within the next 5 to 10 years outnumber the current colored majority. Unless Dr. Williams is successful in incorporating young East Indian leaders into his party, he will be faced with a racially divided society and the unpleasant role as minority spokesman. Such political problems are of an internal nature and will not affect drastically the political independence of the new nation nor its potential economic development.

These two new independent States, firmly planted practically at opposite ends of the Caribbean, serve as goals and guideposts for other island communities and the three Guianas, nearby on the South American coast. Some, like small Barbados, hope to emulate the achievement of her sister islands. Others have developed in different directions.

2. *Dutch Areas*

The status of the Netherlands Antilles and Surinam as partners in the tripartite Kingdom of the Netherlands falls short of the independence of the Caribbean members of the British Commonwealth of Nations. Nevertheless, there is a similarity, since the Netherlands Antilles and Surinam enjoy a great measure of local autonomy, as equal partners in the Kingdom with Holland. Legally and constitutionally these two Caribbean divisions of the Kingdom are identical, but cultural and economic factors have given different characteristics to the shaping of political forces in each.

Local autonomy is complete in both Surinam and the Netherlands Antilles but the latter is a Federal State made up of six islands, each with their own local government.[6] In comparison with the six-fold cultural division of the Surinamese people, the population of the Netherlands Antilles is fairly homogeneous even though English is more frequently heard than Dutch in the northern Windward Islands of Saba, St. Martin, and St. Eustatius. In the more populous Leeward Islands both Dutch and English give way to the widely used Papiamento. Economically the Netherlands Antilles is entirely dependent on Venezuelan oil for the operation of the huge refineries on Aruba and Curacao; [7] in contrast Surinam is in the process of opening up vast mineral reserves to contribute to her growing program of industrial development.[8]

The political leaders and populace of the Netherlands Antilles have expressed fairly unanimous conformity with the existing political situation. Some of the younger elements, mostly students who have studied in Holland, would like to see more emphasis on the development of a local Antillian culture with perhaps Dutch being eventually replaced by Papiamento as the idiom of expression. However, both the constant threat of Venezuela, almost in sight from the shores of the islands, and the lack of any potential resource which might offer a basis for economic or commercial activity, has forced the Netherlands Antillean to take a realistic position concerning any political change in the relationship with Holland.

The general provisions of the charter for the Kingdom of the Netherlands are broad enough to allow flexibility in interpretation, thus allowing continued growth as experience and circumstances might require. During the first years of the application of the charter some friction was encountered in Curacao with a rigid Governor unaccustomed to the new order allowing extensive local autonomy.[9] The Governor was replaced by a Dutch administration sympathetic to the party in power in the Netherlands Antilles. As in the British system, the Governor represents the Monarch but contrary to the situation in the British Commonwealth the Governor has certain political duties and responsibilities as the local representative of the Kingdom of the Netherlands.

The Governor, who is in both Surinam and the Netherlands Antilles a native, is the commander in chief of the troops stationed in the particular division of the Kingdom. The police, however, are in the hands of the local administration. There are emergency provisions which permit martial law to be declared. Also the Governor is assigned the vague task of serving as defender of "human rights and freedoms, the rule of law, and the integrity of administration." In effect the more recent Governors, operating on instructions from Holland, have been extremely reluctant to enter into local affairs. During private conversations Governors of both countries expressed independently the observation that intervention could be initiated only upon serious and most drastic provocation.

Certain functions are reserved by the Kingdom of the Netherlands, which is that government over and above the autonomous governments found in Holland, Surinam, and the Netherlands Antilles. The most important of these functions deal with foreign affairs, defense, and citizenship or nationality. Legislation concerning these matters is considered Kingdom affairs and thus subject to special procedures which allow the plenipotentiary ministers, who represent Surinam and the Netherlands Antilles at the seat of government in Holland, to exercise a limited veto power or to cause an obligatory delay in the approval of Kingdom legislation which does not meet their approval. Treaties or international agreements between other nations and the Kingdom of the Netherlands require the express approval of the government of Surinam or of the Netherlands Antilles before it is binding on these parts of the Kingdom. In effect, Surinam or the Netherlands Antilles can, using the medium of the Kingdom, enter into an agreement with a foreign power which may not be binding on the other parts of the Kingdom, as in the case of the treaty with Venezuela which regulates the tonnage of crude oil to be carried by tankers destined to Curacao or Aruba.[10]

In reality, a close look at the detail contained in the provision of the charter for the Netherlands Kingdom discloses two examples of discrimination against Holland. Products from Holland enter into the Netherlands Antilles and Surinam in exactly the same way as products from other nations. There is no preferential treatment extended to Holland. Furthermore no Dutch citizen can reside in either Surinam or the Netherlands Antilles without express permission and work permits which are difficult to secure. On the other hand, Antilleans or Surinamese, all of whom are Netherlands' citizens, can freely visit, reside, and work in Holland.

After the brief period of adjustment to the new political structure, no serious complaints have been forthcoming from either Surinam or the Netherlands Antilles concerning the lack or limited degree of self-government. In reality the opposite has been the case at least in the instance of the Netherlands Antilles. The head of the Kingdom of the Netherlands has had to turn down on a few occasions appeals to intervene in strictly internal affairs. For the most part these appeals have been due to the problems which arise from the Federal-type structure of the Netherlands Antilles Government, which sometimes permits the local government of Curacao to be in the hands of one party while the Federal Government, whose center of power is on the same island, is controlled by the opposite party.[11]

Surinam has expressed growing concern over two possible areas of limitation which some leaders in that country feel might be modified.[12] According to the charter of the Kingdom foreign loans from other nations or any international organization must be undertaken and negotiated with the full knowledge and approval of the Kingdom Government. So far no obstacle has been placed in the way of such an operation because Holland has always been willing to meet requests for financial assistance thus making it unnecessary to turn to foreign sources. Nevertheless, there are some Surinamese who feel that their country, with a more independent position, might become eligible for financial support from such generous programs as the Alliance for Progress. Furthermore, it is argued that tied into the Kingdom of the Netherlands they are no longer eligible for beneficial treatment as an underdeveloped nation, which they clearly are, under such agreements proposed by the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development.

This position of some of the Surinamese is further reflected in their feeling that they would perhaps develop faster as a nation if they could independently operate in the field of foreign relations rather than being forced to operate through the machinery of the tripartite kingdom. Thus, as has been recently requested, Surinam would like to explore the means of expanding the complete local autonomy which she now has to include the right to an independent status in international affairs, including representation in the United Nations and possibly the Organization of American States. Holland's reaction to this has been that of a willingness to discuss any possible change in the charter. The proposal must come from the interested party, and as yet no one has come up with a formula which would allow Surinam to be a member of the Kingdom of the Netherlands, in which her populace still has a very vital interest, and at the same time be recognized as an independent state with an international status.[13]

Until the internal political picture, complicated by its multiracial populace, is clarified so that there is a clear consensus of the opinion of the Surinamese on this matter it is unlikely that there will be any immediate change. If Surinam is successful in working out an acceptable formula, then it can be expected that the Netherlands Antilles will probably follow also.[14]

In summation, it can be flatly stated that the Kingdom of the Netherlands after 10 years of operation has been favorably received by the vast majority of the citizens of the former Dutch colonies. For all practical purposes the measure of internal self-government is almost complete.[15] Furthermore, the participation through a complicated but most adequate formula in the preparation of legislation of a kingdom nature, has been effective and satisfactory to all parties concerned. Finally the attitude of the Dutch Government marked by self-restraint on the one hand, and receptivity to change on the other, has clearly established a healthy environment for growth toward political maturity and constructive cooperation.

3. French Areas

Almost 20 years have passed since the first steps toward assimilation of Guadeloupe, Martinique, and French Guiana into France were taken. As indicated above there was little opposition to this move, but as time went on and problems increased rather than diminished, opposition began to grow in both of the two French islands of the Caribbean. The causes and motivation of the opposition are not easy to uncover and are further complicated by the fact that France has become a highly centralized state. To what extent the opposition within the French Antilles is directed toward the excessive centralization or toward the principle of assimilation is debatable. It is important to note, however, that the first strong opposition, as expressed by prominent, though radical leaders, came originally at a time when France was not ruled by de Gaulle.

The assimilation produced political equality between the Frenchman and the Antillean. Voting privileges, office holdings, legislative representation, civil service appointments are all carried out with no regard for the place or origin of the applicant or candidate. And yet, for some inexplicable reason, a Martinican civil servant or policeman finds himself more than likely assigned to Bordeaux or Marseille instead of Point-a-Pitre or Lamentin. Those few Antilleans, like the former Secretary General of the Caribbean Organization, or the able Prefect of Martinique, have risen to high ranks of prestige and importance because of years of absolute dedication to duty and unswerving loyalty to France. More independent minds rarely make it through the fine seine which produces the machinelike, but highly capable, French diplomat, or prefect. And as for racial or color discrimination, while there is a general impression that it does exist, how can it be exposed while even after centuries it is still a social asset in Paris to be of exotic appearance? No, one must conclude that while political, social, and racial discrimination are subtly present this cannot be the cause for the negative reaction to assimilation with France.

In spite of the growing awareness of the roots of the other half of his cultural personality the Antillean is still very much French. As yet the French Antilles have not produced the rich flow of literature, art, or dance that Haiti has turned out almost in answer to its obvious adulation of French culture. And yet there is an awareness of the underlying fact that while they are French, they are really Antillean French. As this attitude grows it will provide the cultural background for the opposition to assimilation; but at this point it does not explain the growing discontent. The famous French writer and Antillean, Aime Cesaire, in his letter of resignation from the French Communist

Party and declaration of opposition to the program of assimilation declared that Martinique had been used as a pawn in the global struggle of the Communists and had been isolated from their fellow islands of the Caribbean and from "Black Africa, mother of our culture."

In the early days, 1956, of the declaration of dissatisfaction with assimilation, the French were successful in rejecting this movement as being Communist inspired and designed not to produce autonomy, but rather separation from France. This technique has worn thin in recent years in spite of the threat posed by Castro's Cuba and the continual political persecution of those opposed to assimilation. A growing group of independent minded citizens who cannot be labeled even as pro-Communist, are beginning to make their opinion heard.

Two outstanding examples in this non-Communist group are Professor Guy Lasserre, geographer at the University of Bordeaux and author of a recent two-volume study on Guadeloupe, and H. Descamps de Bragelongne, a native Antillean and director of the Institute Vizioz of Guadeloupe. Lasserre concludes that the assimilation of the Antilles has been detrimental to the development of a healthy and balanced economic structure.[16] Descamps, whose study is more of a political nature than economic, puts forth such a cogent case for political autonomy in association with France that his published doctoral thesis was not allowed to circulate in the French Antilles.

Most of this opposition expresses its argument in economic terms pointing to the fact that assimilation has not cured the economic ills of the two island.[17] Furthermore, statistics produced and certified by the French Government, show that the Antilles have not received their share of welfare payments from metropolitan France. Certain benefits are available to the French citizens living in France but are not extended to French Antillean citizens living in the Caribbean départements.

The French have been generous in channeling funds into the French Antilles but this economic support has been of such a nature that it has not changed the basic structure of the economy.[18] This economy is still oriented in the colonial way; i.e., raw sugar and some tropical fruits are sent to France while practically all consumer products are imported at high costs.[19] No investment has yet produced the degree of activity or growth which would allow the economy to support the French Antillean independently. The French economists argue, and rightly so, that financial support on the scale to which it is given in France would put a strain on French resources all out of proportion to the benefit it would bring to the people of the Antilles. In order to absorb this financial support, which is rightfully due, the economy of the Antilles must show the signs of growth which will allow a normal adjustment.

Precisely at this point the antiassimilationists stress that for some 20 years France has had the opportunity to put the Antilles on their feet so that they could take their rightful position with the rest of the départements, but, in effect very little progress can be shown. It is now time to try another pattern. The other pattern most commonly proposed is autonomy.

Coupled to this economic argument is a bureaucratic one, which should not be confused with the one of political equality. With the highly centralized French Government all key and most secondary decisions are taken in Paris. In reality there is very little freedom of movement or criteria left for the local authorities whether they are the prefect or the mayor of a small town. Assimilated and centralized, the government of the Antillean departments of the French state has not been functioning for the benefit of the local citizenry, but rather, as again Lasserre[20] implies, for the benefit of the industrial and commercial interests of the metropolitan power.

Until very recently, the French reaction to this growing dissatisfaction has not been wisely conceived. As noted above, there is a subtle form of censorship which restricts the free flow of ideas. Recognizing the failure of discrediting the autonomy position by alleging that it is Communist inspired, a more direct action has been undertaken. Citizens have been sent to prison and others have been forbidden to visit or live in the oversea departments. This punitive action is in direct contradiction to the allegation that the Antillean has full equal rights with the metropolitan Frenchman. In spite of one or two favorable signs, the situation may grow worse before it gets better. If unchanged, the French attitude will continue to polarize the political groups of the French Antilleans since up to now no middle position is permitted to prosper. In turn this will strengthen even more the Communists and leftists who now elect the mayors of the capitals of Guadeloupe and Martinique.

There are two recent developments which seem to indicate a possible change in the future of the French position. The Fifth Economic Plan for the development of Guadeloupe and Martinique, contrary to the previous ones, has been drawn up in consultation with the local officials who previously had been required to submit their requests to Paris and the development plan was worked out at the superior level and, so to speak, decreed from above. The final result bore little relationship to the original requests of the local officials. However, the Fifth Plan, which has yet not been published in its final form, has been drawn up through a process of continual dialog with the local government officials in charge of the various ministerial functions at the departmental level. While the final draft is not yet known, this procedure would indicate, nevertheless, that some deference is being extended to the Antillean leaders and administrators.

A second straw in the wind which might indicate another softening of the hard line, is that the official French governmental opinion, as expressed through local press and responsible officials, has refrained from strong criticism of a middle position which is neither autonomist nor assimilationist. This position is represented by Léon-Laurent Valère, a lawyer of Fort-de-France who ran against Aimé Césaire for the post of mayor of Fort-de-France. Perhaps the most succinct description of his position would be to classify it as a modified form of autonomy or adjusted form of assimilation.[21] Whether this middle road would gain support from both the French and from the Antilleans remains to be seen.

D. FUTURE DEVELOPMENTS

The only area where immediate political developments can be expected is within the Leeward and Windward Islands of the English-speaking islands. With the breakup of the West Indian Federation and the subsequent independence of Jamaica and Trinidad-Tobago, those smaller islands of the Antilles were left to determine their own destiny very much on their own. Dr. Williams did express an interest in incorporating some of the Lesser Antilles into a more centralized state headed by Trinidad-Tobago. With the exception of Grenada, which expressed interest in this proposal, the other islands declined the invitation and began to study plans toward a new federation generally known as the Little Seven.[22]

Great Britain having been burned badly by the failure of the West Indian Federation was reluctant to push the new idea; nevertheless, she agreed to conversations designed to explore the possibility of such an independent state. The hard drive for autonomy even by the smallest islands cannot be denied, and some realize that such a federation provides them with their only chance for escape from colonial rule. Incidentally, this colonial rule is even more bitterly resented in some quarters after the heady experience of independence under the West Indies Federation. However, there are other islands, like the comparatively debt-free Barbados or the tourist infested island of Antigua, which feel that they are so close to independence that it would be a mistake to limit their activity by forming part of a greater federation.

At this point the talks concerning the Federation of the Lesser Antilles have floundered on the question of whether the proposed federation will be a highly centralized one with power enough to act decisively (according to some analysts this was one of the reasons for the failure of the previous federation; i.e., the lack of power in the hands of the Federal Government) or a more loosely tied confederation of semiautonomous states leagued together for mutual interest and cooperation. St. Lucia argues strongly for the first type of federation while Antigua would prefer the second type.

Even if the plans for the Federation are frustrated because of this debate, it is highly probable that at least Barbados will become an independent member of the British Commonwealth; Antigua will receive autonomy and perhaps other islands like St. Lucia will also achieve a marked degree of self-government, free from the embarrassing budgetary controls which frustrate and hamper the local politicians and thus prevent a really responsible government from developing.[23] Thus, even though at first glance the British policy regarding the political development of the colonies of the Caribbean seems to have hit a snag, there is the clear determination, as exemplified by conversations with responsible West Indian leaders and actions of British Government officials, to liquidate the Caribbean empire and establish as great a degree of independence and autonomy which can be sustained by the local island communities no matter how limited their size or precarious their resources. Certainly there is nothing more daring than independence for Barbados, one of the most densely populated islands on the globe with an economy based on sugar and tourism.

Even in the American Virgin Islands, where for decades the merest mention of self-government or autonomy brought forth a negative reaction from the islander, because he felt that it was an indirect affront to his pride as a U.S. citizen, there has been within the last 6 months a concerted move for greater local autonomy. A constitutional convention was locally convened to draw up proposals for greater autonomy, including the election of a Governor. As yet this action has not produced the desired results from the U.S. Congress, but certainly the growing sentiment within the Virgin Islands can no longer be denied, and limited local autonomy will soon be established there also.

Without exception throughout the Caribbean, unless one considers the 8,000 British Virgin Islanders worthy of note, the drive is toward effective autonomy. The French Antilleans are dissatisfied with their position in the centralized French Republic and are moving slowly but uncertainly toward a different solution for their political problems. The Netherlands Antilles will undoubtedly follow the lead[24] of Surinam in seeking a solution to the riddle of establishing within the Kingdom of the Netherlands a degree of independence which, while not prejudicing the economic support received from Holland, will allow them to receive recognition as a full-fledged nation duly accredited as a member of the United Nations. Trinidad-Tobago and

Jamaica, already independent, will be joined by other members like, perhaps, Barbados, of the once grandiose West Indian Federation who will have achieved a dominion status on their own power. It is not impossible that even some of the smaller islands, such as Nevis, Monserrat, or Anguilla, may be bound together in some type of federation which will allow them to aspire also to a dominion status within the British Commonwealth of Nations.

In sum, it is not beyond the realm of possibility that all of the European colonies of the Caribbean will have achieved in the next decade either complete independence or independence in association with the European states.[25] The stirring revolution which is carrying this out in a peaceful fashion is not free from frustrations and defeats but these have not blocked the eventual realization of the formation of new nations. There is little reason to doubt that these new nations will be a credit to the maturity of the Caribbean people and the wisdom and understanding of the leaders of the European states who pioneered in the setting up of new roads leading toward responsible and free governments.

II. Country Papers

THE NETHERLANDS

1. Economic Background of the Netherlands Antilles

The Netherlands Antilles is comprised of six islands which are divided into two groups which are approximately 550 miles apart. Aruba, Bonaire, and Curacao form the Leeward Island group and they lie about 35 miles north of the coast of Venezuela. St. Maarten (southern part of the island), Saba, and St. Eustatius form the Windward Island group and they lie east of Puerto Rico. The total area is 394 square miles and the number of inhabitants total 203,520.[26] Of the six islands the important ones are Curacao and Aruba. They occupy 63 percent of the territory; Curacao has a population of 132,055 and Aruba 59,315, i.e., 94 percent of the entire Netherlands Antilles live on these two islands. The population is very young: one-half is in age groups of less than 19 years. The net rate of increase is rather high, being around 3 percent per annum.

The focus of this economic study is only on Curacao and Aruba, for two obvious reasons: First, practically no information exists on the remaining four islands; second, the fact that 94 percent of the population live on these 96.5 square miles is evidence enough of their importance.

Official national income accounts are not yet available in the Netherlands Antilles; thus it is impossible to carry out an analysis by industrial sector and by expenditure categories. One source (Caribbean

Organization) gives only aggregate and per capita income without any explanation on the methodology of computations. According to this source, per capita income in 1961 was $952.[27] A private source (Lieftinck and Goedhart) attempts to establish national income estimates for the period 1954–60 on the basis of factor incomes (see table 1). According to these authors per capita national income at factor cost was $950 in 1960. A third source of information (N.A. Eilandgebied Aruba) estimates the global national income of Aruba to be in the neighborhood of $53 million in 1960 with a per capita income of $925. It is clear that income per head of population in the Netherlands Antilles is very high relative to the other countries in the Caribbean, except perhaps with respect to Puerto Rico where per capita national income in 1964 has reached the level of $830, and the U.S. Virgin Islands with per capita gross income of $950 in 1962.[28] We have been informed by the Netherlands Antilles Government that the first official national income accounts will be available at the end of this year. The preliminary results, which are still confidential, seem to indicate that Lieftinck and Goedhart has somewhat underestimated the level of national income; therefore, per capita income in 1960 was higher than indicated above. It has also been disclosed that since 1960 income has been declining at the annual rate of 15 percent.[29] Nevertheless, in the absence of official data, our analysis below will still be based on estimates of Lieftinck and Goedhart. The structural analysis will not be affected to an appreciable extent thereby, but the new figures will show some discrepancies.

The reason for the high and the declining level of income lies in the existence of two oil refineries, Shell Curacao N.V. in Curacao, and

TABLE 1.—*National income of Curacao and Aruba at current prices, 1954–60*

[NAf million]

	1954	1957	1958	1959	1960
Wages, interest, profits of the oil companies [1]	110.6	124.2	131.6	122.1	122.0
Wages, interest, profits of other enterprises	102.2	128.6	137.0	146.2	161.0
Wages and salaries paid by the Government	[2] 33.4	40.1	48.0	49.1	51.0
National income at factor cost	246.2	292.9	316.6	217.4	334.0
Indirect taxes:					
Paid by the oil companies	5.6	6.2	7.8	7.7	7.4
Paid by other	27.0	39.9	35.4	39.9	35.8
National income at market prices	278.8	339.0	359.8	365.0	377.2
Aggregate expenditure (consumption and investments)	253.0	317.8	322.9	347.6	352.2
Out of which:					
Private	189.5	226.5	233.6	252.8	255.6
Public	63.5	91.3	89.3	94.8	96.6
Net balance	25.8	21.2	36.9	17.4	25.0

[1] Only taxes on profits are imputed to national income.

[2] Including NAf 1.7 million Government revenue from abroad.

Source: Lieftinck and Goedhart.

Lago Oil & Transport Co., Ltd., in Aruba.[30] They cause the asymmetry in the structure of the economy, more so than in any agricultural monoculture economy. It is claimed that the oil industry contributes approximately one-half of the national income of Netherlands Antilles (Hollandse Bank-Unie). This statement is certainly true for Aruba, where wages and salaries alone paid by Lago Oil & Transport Co. amounted to NAf47.2 million in 1960, when in the same year national income is estimated to be NAf100 million. Table 1 indicates that 45 percent of aggregate net value added in the economy of the Netherlands Antilles rose in this industrial sector in 1954; its share had fallen to 36 percent by 1960. It should be remembered, however, that not the entire profits of the oil companies but only the tax paid on them is included in the national income.

Because of the great importance of oil refining activities, the Netherlands Antilles economy is rather vulnerable to changes that take place in this sector and is strongly affected by the world supply of oil and its price. In fact the economy expanded until 1958, when the volume of oil refining activities shrank somewhat, chiefly as a result of the economic recession in the United States which reached its severest phase in the first 6 months of that year and caused the United States to put restrictive measures on imports of crude oil and oil products. This started a process of rationalization and automation which was further enhanced in later years by the excessive supply of oil products in world markets and the fall in the price of oil and oil products. Automation became a necessity to meet the keen world competition by means of lowering processing costs; but it also led to the decline in the amount of employment. The number employed by Shell Curacao fell from 10,919 in 1954, to 6,033 in 1962; similarly the number of employees of Lago Oil & Transport Co., was reduced from 6,613 in 1954, to 3,667 in 1962. We have been informed privately that by the time the automation process is completed, employment is expected to decline to around 2,000 in Shell Curacao N.V. and 800 in Lago Oil & Transport Co. The economy stagnated after 1958. Whatever expansion occurred thereafter took place mainly in the public sector and in "other enterprises," chiefly tourism. Between 1958 and 1960 national income at current factor cost rose by only 5.5 percent; in real terms—deflated by the cost of living index—this is equivalent to an increase of 2 percent over the 2 years. Considering that the natural rate of increase of the population is 3 percent per annum, income per head must have stagnated in nominal terms, but declined in real terms.

Despite the fact that no breakdown of national income is available by industrial origin, a look at the structure of employment verifies the lopsidedness of the structure of the economy. The overwhelming role of the oil refineries and services, such as trade, transportation, and government is brought out in table 2:

TABLE 2.—*Distribution of employment, 1960*

	Percent
Oil refining and mining	22.4
Agriculture	2.2
Manufacturing	11.3
Construction	8.4
Electricity	2.0
Commerce	16.7
Transport	7.8
Services, others	29.2
Total	100.0

Source: Memo sent by the government of Netherlands Antilles to the Caribbean Organization.

The economy's close dependence on the activities of oil refining can be observed once again in the composition of external trade (see tables 3 and 4). Since before the Second World War around 98 percent of commodity exports have consisted of oil and oil products; similarly on the average of 85 percent of commodity imports have consisted of crude oil. Both exports and imports of commodities amount to values which are many times higher than the national income. If imports and exports of oil are excluded, commodity imports constitute around 62 percent and commodity exports 5 percent of national income. Thus exports pay for a very small proportion of imports. It should be remembered in this context that even after exclusion of oil imports the remainder still includes items, such as raw materials (chemicals) which are for the use of oil refineries and exports include items which in essence are reexports, by tourists in particular.

The balance of trade has been in continuous deficit; this deficit is greatest when one disregards the exports and imports of oil, and it has risen by approximately 10 percent since 1954. However, no consequent shortage ensues in the balance of payments, because of the remittances by the headquarters abroad of the oil companies on account of wages and other payments to be effected in the Netherlands Antilles. Moreover, the balance of invisible accounts shows also a small surplus. About one-fourth of the imports consist of food, beverages, and tobacco. Because of the oil refineries the main provider of imports is Venezuela (81 percent in 1962) which provides almost the entire crude oil refined on the islands. The major customer is the United States (31 percent in 1962) followed by the United Kingdom (7 percent) and Holland (6 percent).

It is precisely because of the vulnerable one-sided economic structure of the islands that the first serious efforts were made in 1958[31]

TABLE 3.—*Exports of Curacao and Aruba, 1938, 1946, 1954–63*

[NAf million]

Year	Mineral oil	Raw materials	Machinery and equipment	Food, beverage, and tobacco	Other	Total
1938	336.1	0.3	0.6	0.04	2.9	339.9
1946	495.8	2.5	1.2	8.8	5.9	504.2
1954	1,429.3	18.3	3.3	.4	4.0	1,455.3
1955	1,491.4	18.1	2.1	.4	3.7	1,515.7
1956	1,567.7	14.4	1.8	.2	3.7	1,587.8
1957	1,626.9	11.4	3.0	.2	3.7	1,645.2
1958	1,506.5	9.8	4.6	.2	4.3	1,525.4
1959	1,321.1	10.6	5.6	.3	4.6	1,342.2
1960	1,221.2	10.0	5.2	.2	4.1	1,240.7
1961	1,319.0	11.1	3.6	.1	3.4	1,337.2
1962	1,274.4	9.9	7.8	.1	4.9	1,297.1
1963	1,222.5	11.0	4.0	.2	3.9	1,241.6

Source: 1938 and 1946, N.A. Statistiek-en Planbureau; 1954–59, Hollandse Bank-Unie; 1960–63, N.A. Dept. Soc. en Ec. Zaken.

TABLE 4.—*Imports of Curacao and Aruba, 1938, 1946, 1954–63*

[NAf million]

Year	Mineral oil	Raw materials	Machinery and equipment	Food, beverage, and tobacco	Other	Total
1938	320.2	5.6	21.5	9.3	30.8	387.4
1946	385.4	14.3	21.2	38.1	43.8	502.8
1954	1,344.8	43.6	38.0	44.9	71.4	1,542.7
1955	1,380.0	40.0	31.0	44.3	70.7	1,566.0
1956	1,442.2	35.2	44.0	47.6	86.9	1,655.9
1957	1,573.3	37.9	51.3	52.9	97.2	1,812.6
1958	1,444.9	40.7	58.4	57.9	90.8	1,692.7
1959	1,234.9	38.5	39.8	57.9	92.6	1,463.7
1960	1,072.8	37.2	35.8	53.8	85.1	2,384.7
1961	1,188.2	31.9	28.1	45.5	57.9	1,351.6
1962	1,144.1	32.2	47.3	48.9	75.9	1,358.4
1963	1,102.2	41.9	43.1	51.7	72.4	1,311.3

Source: See table 3.

to diversify the economy and promote the establishment of industrial enterprises and hotels. The situation was all the more serious because of the rapid growth in population accompanied with growing unemployment due to the drastic rationalization undertaken by the oil companies. Against this shrinking employment no job opportunities could be offered in other activities while the increasing labor force urgently demanded employment. By 1961 unemployment had reached the level of 17 percent in Curacao and 16 percent in Aruba. Today it is around 25 percent. None of the government measures taken since 1954 had altered the dependence of the economy on the oil industry. Investment was low and was adversely affected by the practically complete absence of raw materials and by the limited size of the local market. Agriculture and fishing practically do not exist. Trade with neighboring areas was declining, and it never constituted an appreciable portion of total trade.

This increasingly unfavorable economic situation demanded a serious consideration of the policy of the government to find perspectives for the possible future development. Efforts were concentrated on creating a fiscal atmosphere as favorable as possible to new establishments, of granting exceptional positions to industry in the form of protective tariffs, quantitative restrictions on imports, granting of monopolies, and improving the infrastructure with financial support from Holland and the European Economic Community. They culminated in the preparation of 10-year development plans [32] (1962–71) for Curacao and Aruba. Their aim was to achieve full employment without reduction in the level of welfare. Their costs amounted to NAf473 million for Curacao and NAf225 million for Aruba. Out of this total of NAf698 million around 43 percent was allocated to the promotion of industrialization in the form of preparation of industrial sites, construction of industrial buildings, financing of the free trade zone, advances to tourism, etc.; 35 percent of the total was devoted to the improvement in infrastructure, and the rest to housing, health, and education. It was estimated that 60 percent of the total projects would be self-paying; therefore initial capital outlays could be met out of loans and the annual expenses covered from the revenues immediately connected with these projects. The expenses connected with the nonpaying projects would somehow have to be found in the budget means.

The consolidated account of the central government and island governments of Curacao and Aruba over the period of 1954–61 are given in the report of Lieftinck and Goedhart. According to this source current expenditures have been less than current revenues (taxes and other) thus providing budgetary surpluses that are used to meet capital expenditures. Capital expenditures, however, have exceeded these surpluses in the current account. Consequently the consolidated budget has been closing with deficits fluctuating from NAf8 to NAf14 million annually. The funds to finance the investment projects of the 10-year development plans could not be found within the domestic economy itself. The balance of payments shows that between 1955 and 1960 on the average NAf20 million capital has been exported annually, the greatest portion of which consists of private remittances abroad. To this amount must be added the payments abroad of the oil companies at the same annual rate. Under the present circumstances it is impossible to prevent this drainage abroad, since a liberal policy of profit and capital transfers must be followed because of dependence on foreign enterprise and if foreign enterprise is to be attracted in the future. Since taxes could be expected to grow at the same rate as that of expenditures because of tax exemptions and the favorable fiscal climate, sources of finance were to be found outside of the Netherlands Antilles.

Even before the preparation of the development plans the Dutch Government was prepared to give financial support to an emergency program of NAf114 million. It has also declared that it would support the longterm development by providing two-thirds of the funds, half of which would be in the form of grants. Furthermore, it would guarantee the interest payments and redemptions of loans arising out of the implementation of the development programs. However, in 1965 the plan is still very much on paper, because of the refusal of the Dutch Government to meet the high capital demand. Since the necessary finance could not be obtained elsewhere, the implementation of the plan has been postponed with the exception of a few emergency projects, such as preparation of sites for industrial and housing construction purposes.

We should like to conclude our report on the economy of the Netherlands Antilles with brief remarks on the feasibility of the success expected from the application of such development plans. Assuming that the labor force will grow at the same rate as population, the 10-year plan of Curacao, e.g., had estimated that during the plan period 20,200 jobs would have to be created, 9,050 of which would be in "supporting" activities aimed at direct provision of local needs, and 12,850 in new activities of international trade, tourism, and industry. In manufacturing industries alone, 10,500 places were to be provided. With the new estimates on the economy of Curacao these figures remain probably somewhat on the low side; even so, they still are too optimistic a prediction considering the high level of wages in the Netherlands Antilles, the distances that manufactured commodities will have to travel to reach their relatively lucratively market destinations, and the need for competitive production and hence for capital intensive methods. The level of wages and salaries in the Netherlands Antilles is among the highest in the Caribbean, except for Puerto Rico and Venezuela. They are about one-third of the U.S. wages and salaries, but 25 percent above those of the European Common Market countries. Consequently, competition with American products is a possibility, if freight rates are not prohibitive and American import duties excessively restrictive. But with respect to the European Common Market [33] it is by no means so obvious that the advantage of duty-free imports to Europe will compensate for the high labor and transportation costs. In order to maintain competitiveness, the disadvantage of high level of wages will have to be compensated by reducing unit labor costs, i.e., selecting capital intensive methods of production in the new industries. This selection of course runs counter to the full-employment aim, and brings out clearly the conflicts that countries like the Netherlands Antilles face in their strive for economic development. On the one hand full employment is established as an irrevocable tenet, yet it cannot possibly be achieved under adverse domestic and international circumstances.

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2. *The Economic Background of Surinam*

Surinam, formerly Dutch Guiana, is the middle of the three Guianas situated on the northeast coast of South America. It has an area of 55,174 square miles (smaller than British Guiana, but larger than French Guiana) with a coastline of 225 miles. Eighty percent of the territory is concentrated in the coastal zone. Its size is estimated to be 275,000 in 1960 (Stichting Planbureau, 1962, 9), excluding an estimated number of 33,000 Bushnegroes and 5,000 Amerindians.[34] It is a very heterogeneous population consisting of Creoles (44 percent), East Indians (35 percent), Indonesians (16 percent), Europeans (2 percent), Chinese (1 percent), Syrians and Lebanese, and of course Bushnegroes and Amerindians. The heterogeneity stems from several waves of importation up to 1863 of slave labor for the plantations, and of indentured labor out of India and Indonesia thereafter. Around 45 percent of the population live in the Paramaribo district, i.e., in the capital city itself of more than 100,000 inhabitants. Another 30 percent live in the Surinam district. The 1950 census showed that 87 percent of the population inhabited an area of 12 miles radius around Paramaribo (van Dusseldorp, 210). This means that in a country with a very low population density (5 persons per square mile) a great proportion of the inhabitants is concentrated in a small over populated area; and it is expected that the degree of concentration will rise as a result of internal migration.

Compounded annually, the rate of population growth is 4 percent. This exceedingly high rate of growth is partly due to improvements in registration. The natural rate of increase (the difference between the birth and the death rate) is around 3.3 percent. The high rate of growth also explains the relative importance of young age groups. In 1955, 43 percent of the population fell into age groups less than 14 years, and 70 percent into those of less than 30 years (Stichting Planbureau, 1962, 13). By 1970 the importance of the former is expected to rise to 50 percent (van Dusseldorp, 211).

Gross domestic product at factor cost per head of population rose from Sur. f506 ($270) in 1954 to Sur. f695 ($370) in 1962.[35] Part of this 37 percent increase over the 8 years is due to price increases. In real terms gross income per head of population rose only by 15 percent over the years in question.[36] There is no reliable information on the distribution of income by size, except for tax data (Algemeer Bureau voor de Statistiek, 1960), which are necessarily deficient.[37] According to this source in 1956, 5,020 of the 14,676 income tax payers (34.2 percent) had an annual net income which ranged between Sur. f1,000 ($530) and Sur. f2,000 ($1,060) and which represented 16.3 percent of all taxable incomes. On the other hand 334 persons (2.3 percent of the taxpayers) had annual incomes of Sur. f12,000 ($6,300) which represented 13 percent of all incomes.[38]

The size distribution of agricultural estates can be used to confirm the information obtained from tax data. The agricultural survey of 1959 (Algemeer Bureau voor de Statistiek, 1962, 54) has covered 16,239 agricultural enterprises of various sizes comprising 105,832 ha.[39] It showed that there are some 3,197 holdings of under 1 ha. accounting for 1.7 percent of the total cultivable area. On the other hand 50 percent of the land was being held by farms of 50 ha. or more which represented 0.85 percent of all agricultural holdings. Thirty enterprises alone accounted for 33,654 ha. or 32 percent of the acreage.[40]

Another way in inquiring into the inequalities of income is to look at the differentials between the agricultural and nonagricultural sectors. It has been estimated that in nonagricultural enterprises per capita income in 1960–61 was Sur. f2,034 ($1,080), while in small farms it was only Sur. f975 ($516). It was assumed that 65 percent of small farmers with holdings of less than 3 ha. earn only an annual income of Sur. f530 ($280) (van Dusseldorp, 212) which is 30 percent lower than the overall average of the economy.

Well into the period of the Second World War Surinam's economy was based mainly on agriculture.[41] Bauxite was first discovered in 1951 and started to gain in importance from 1922 onward. Since the Second World War the economic structure of the country is determined by the relative dominance of the mining sector, i.e., by the production of bauxite, which accounts for one-fifth of the world's production of this ore. This is seen in table 1 which gives the composition of the output by industrial sectors for the years 1954–62. While in 1954 agriculture accounted for 15.4 percent of the aggregate gross output, its share declined to 12.5 percent in 1962. The mining sector, though continuing to play the predominant role, was faced with a more significant relative decline: from 35 percent in 1954 to 28.5 percent in 1962, after having risen from 18 percent in 1938 (van Dusseldorp, 211). On the other hand, manufacturing has started to occupy a more and more significant position: 11 percent in 1954 and 18 percent in 1962. Similarly, for obvious reasons, such as the development activities arising from economic plans and the important role assigned to the government in their implementation, the share of the public sector has risen from 13 percent in 1954 to 18 percent in 1962.

Agriculture in Surinam employs approximately one-half of the labor force. The most important crop is rice, which occupies 75 percent of the cultivated area. It is grown in the Nickerie and Suriname districts. The former district alone has 53 percent of all the area cultivated with rice. The Wageningen project operated by the Stichting Machinale Landbouw Suriname is situated in this

TABLE 1.—*National product of Surinam, 1954–62 (Sur. f million)*

[Current prices]

	1954	1955	1956	1957	1958	1959	1960	1961 [1]	1962[1]
Agriculture:									
Agriculture, except forestry	14.0	15.1	15.7	15.9	20.5	21.0	20.0	20.5	21.0
Forestry	2.7	2.8	3.0	3.2	2.8	3.4	3.0	4.5	4.5
Mining	38.3	34.5	39.7	47.0	42.5	55.0	58.0	57.0	58.0
Manufacturing	12.3	13.3	12.8	15.3	17.0	23.0	26.0	35.0	36.0
Trade and transportation	15.5	16.1	17.7	20.0	21.7	24.0	27.0	26.0	26.0
Services	9.1	9.3	10.5	12.3	12.7	14.0	16.0	16.0	16.0
Government	14.3	16.4	17.5	20.6	21.5	24.0	27.0	36.0	37.0
Rent	2.6	2.9	3.3	3.8	4.4	5.2	6.0	6.0	6.0
GDP at factor cost	108.8	110.4	120.2	138.1	143.1	170.0	183.0	201.0	204.5
Minus:									
Depreciation	9.5	10.0	10.8	12.5	12.9	14.0	15.0	20.0	20.5
NDP at factor cost	99.3	100.4	109.4	125.6	130.2	156.0	168.0	181.0	184.0
Minus:									
Net factor income from abroad	7.9	4.4	11.0	11.0	9.4	24.0	28.0	26.5	26.0
NNP at factor cost	91.4	96.0	98.4	114.6	120.8	132.0	140.0	154.5	158.0
Plus:									
Indirect taxes—subsidies	14.5	14.2	15.8	19.2	19.8	21.0	25.0	26.3	27.0
NNP at market prices	105.9	110.2	114.2	133.8	140.6	153.0	165.0	180.8	185.0

[1] Global estimates by Stichting Planbureau and Department Van Economische Zaken. Because of better data in 1961 and 1962 these 2 years are not strictly comparable with previous ones.

Source: Stichting Planbureau, 1964, 29.

district, where the high degree of mechanization causes output per worker to be the highest in the country. Rice is the major agricultural commodity exported (55 percent of total value of agricultural exports), but it is extremely sensitive to changes in weather conditions; thus its production was severely affected by the droughts of 1957 and 1961. It is also a product the price of which depends on the conditions of the world market. This causes severe fluctuations in export receipts. Thus, while total quantity of rice exported by Surinam rose by 71 percent between 1957 and 1961, its value rose by only 26 percent. On the contrary when the quantity exported rose by 7 percent between 1961 and 1962, export value rose by 40 percent.

Other agricultural crops grown are banana (introduced in 1959 within the framework of the development plan and still in its experimental stage), cacao, coffee, sugar, oranges and grapefruit. They provide altogether—excluding banana—25 percent of the receipts from exports of agricultural commodities.

The mining sector employs 5 percent of the labor force, yet provides nearly one-third of the total output of the economy. It is almost identical with the production of bauxite, except for the insignificant and declining quantity of gold produced (in 1953, 204 kgs.; in 1961, 125 kgs.; in 1962, 81 kgs.). Recent geological surveys have brought into light the existence of further bauxite reserves of good quality of approximately 400 million tops in Western Surinam, and of nickel, iron, and manganese. The entire output of bauxite, which has remained stable around 3.3 million metric tons a year, is exported and provides around 80 percent of the total export receipts. It is expected that with the termination of the construction of the Afobaka hydroelectric powerplant, an alumina plant and an aluminum smelter (capacity of 40,000 tons annually) will start operating in 1966 so that Surinam will be able to process domestically the ore it has been exporting traditionally, and export not the raw material itself, but the products manufactured therefrom. Great hope is placed by the Government on these projects in terms of a faster rate of growth in national income, increasing exports, improvements in the balance of payments, and greater revenue for the government itself.

The manufacturing industry, including construction, employs 14 percent of the labor force and provides 18 percent of the aggregate output. It is geared mainly to meeting consumer demand; it provides articles like sugar, matches, tobacco, footwear, plywood, bricks, etc. In its development it runs against a number of social, economic, geographic, and institutional obstacles, all of which are closely interrelated. Most prominent among the social factors is the heterogeneous structure of the society which influences tastes and consumption patterns. Among the general economic and geographic factors can be cited the small size of the domestic market and its limited purchasing power, inexistence of entrepreneurial endeavor, the natural layout of the country and hence the high costs of transportation of its commodities to world markets, and lack of technical know-how. Added to these factors are the lack so far of a proper industrialization policy on the part of the Government and slowness in creating a favorable industrial atmosphere to attract the private entrepreneur.[42]

In 1962 exports of commodities constituted 40 percent of the gross domestic product while imports of commodities were almost one-half of the aggregate output. These are high ratios commonly found in developing countries which have one or two intensely specialized products to export, but lack local manufacturing to meet the domestic demand and undertake big strides toward development and thereby experience a high import ratio. Not only is the import ratio high, but it has been rising since 1954 (from 43 to 49 percent), i.e., imports have been growing faster than the aggregate output of the economy.

As was mentioned in the previous paragraphs, Surinam specializes in bauxite and one or two agricultural products, such as rice, while it imports a variety of raw materials, food, and manufactured products. Surinam imports for food consumption, twice the value of agricultural commodities that it exports. Among other imported consumer goods are clothing, medicine, house furnishings, bicycles, etc. Total value of the consumer goods imported are about one-third of the total imports and their importance has fallen since 1954. On the other hand, the share of raw materials imported for the various manufacturing industries (beverage, tobacco, textile, construction, etc.) has risen from 32 percent of total imports in 1954 to 41 percent in 1962. Investment goods account for 17 percent of total imports. More than 90 percent of the bauxite is shipped to the United States, which accounts for Surinam's active trade balance with this country, which is also her major customer (three-fourths of total exports). The major providers are the Netherlands and the United States, each with a share of one-third of the imports. The Caribbean area provides 11.5 percent but buys only 4 percent of Surinam's exports. Europe (excluding the Netherlands) is also an important provider (20 percent).

Surinam's balance of payments has been deficitary since the middle of the last century; the deficit was annually covered by transfers from Holland in the amount of Hlf250,000 annually on the average between

1861 and 1900, and of Hlf2,210,000 between 1900 and 1940 (van Dusseldorp, 212, 215). Today, with imports rising faster than exports,[43] the structural deficit in the balance of payments still continues, as is seen from table 2, and it is met out of public and private capital imports from abroad which have risen from Sur. f3 million in 1954 to Sur. f50.5 million in 1962. It is expected that with a more appropriate industrialization policy aiming at import substitution and/or export promotion (the cases of alumina, aluminum, bananas) a reduction will be achieved at least in the deficit in the balance of trade. The extent to which this expectation can be realized depends on the extent of rises in commodity imports caused by higher investments and higher incomes arising from gradual industrialization.

TABLE 2.—*Balance of payments, Surinam, 1954–62 (Sur. f million)*

[Cash account]

Year	Balance of trade	Balance of invisible account	Deficit in current account
1954	−1.7	−4.4	−6.1
1955	−4.1	−.6	−4.7
1956	+4.0	−7.1	−3.1
1957	−8.0	−6.4	−14.4
1958	−7.0	−7.0	−14.0
1959	−3.2	−23.3	−26.5
1960	−9.4	−26.9	−36.3
1961	−18.4	−26.9	−44.8
1962	−17.8	−30.8	−48.6

Source: Stichting Planbureau, 1962, 26.

NOTE: The enormous jump in the deficit beginning with 1959 is due to the new accounting practice of showing fictitiously Suralco's profits from sales of bauxite to its mother company, Alcoa, as transfers abroad. This is corrected by entering an equal amount as capital import into the capital movements section of the balance of payments.

The public sector occupies a very important position in the economy of Surinam. Fifteen percent of the labor force is employed by this sector which contributes 18 percent of the gross domestic product in the form of wages and salaries. There are no estimates for output by expenditure categories, but table 3 indicates roughly that total current and capital expenditure by the Government amounted to Sur. f107.9 million and accounted for almost 53 percent of the nation's output in 1962. In other words an amount equivalent to more than half of the nation's output is spent, one way or another, via the public budget. (The estimates in table 3 include the expenditures made within the development plan.) Table 3 also shows the enormous rise in public expenditures since the beginning of the fifties. Current expenditure almost tripled and capital expenditure rose by fivefold, so that on the whole expenditure rose by almost four times. And, as is so common in almost all developing countries the growth in current revenue has not been able to keep pace with that of the current expenditures, so that the surplus in the current account has on the whole not been sufficient to compensate for the deficit in the capital account. Furthermore, in 1962 the current budget closed with a deficit for the first time. This situation raises the familiar question of the possibilities of financing future development, to which we now turn our attention after a brief summary of the development plans.

The first efforts toward Surinam's development date from 1947 when a welfare fund was established to which the Dutch Government contributed Hlf40 million. This was to provide the means for the realization of a series of projects, above all that of surveying and making an inventory of the natural and agricultural resources of the country. The first development plan started to operate in 1954,[44] the year in which Surinam became an independent partner in the tripartite Kingdom of the Netherlands. This plan was revised in 1958 and a new 10-year plan was drawn up for 1963–72.

TABLE 3.—*Government revenue and expenditure, Surinam, 1950–62*

[Sur. f million]

Year	Current budget			Capital budget			Total budget deficit/surplus
	Expenditure	Revenue	Deficit/surplus	Expenditure	Revenue	Deficit/surplus	
1950	21.5	24.3	+2.8	7.3	2.2	−5.1	−2.3
1951	21.1	24.3	+3.2	6.3	3.1	−3.2	----------
1952	24.3	29.9	+5.6	6.0	6.5	+.5	+6.1
1953	26.0	32.0	+6.0	10.3	3.4	−6.9	−.9
1954	28.5	33.9	+5.4	11.1	3.4	−7.7	−2.3
1955	32.2	36.0	+3.8	13.0	9.0	−4.0	−.2
1956	32.4	38.6	+5.2	13.5	9.5	−4.0	−1.2
1957	44.4	52.1	+7.7	17.8	10.5	−7.3	+.4
1958	39.8	46.9	+7.1	24.3	19.6	−4.7	+2.4
1959	46.6	51.1	+4.5	22.7	19.6	−3.1	+1.4
1960	53.2	57.3	+4.1	32.3	19.1	−13.2	−9.1
1961	57.0	58.4	+1.4	32.4	26.0	−6.4	−5.0
1962	62.4	61.1	−1.3	34.5	28.0	−6.5	−7.8

Source: Data provided by the Ministry of Finance and Stichting Planbureau, 1964, 30–31.

The main objective of the original development plan was to lay the foundations for a social and economic development which could be continued by domestic resources once the 10-year plan had expired. Naturally it aimed at increasing per capita real income, and left the sphere of directly productive investments to the private enterprise, while the role of the government was limited to the encouragement of private initiative and undertaking of investments of infrastructural nature. The plan entailed an expenditure of Sur. f127 million over the 10 years, of which Sur. f35.8 million (30.6 percent) was in the agricultural sector, Sur. f36.8 million (31 percent) for the improvement of the transportation system, and Sur. f24 million (18.3 percent) in the social sector.

The revision in 1958–59 incorporated further aims into the plan: the provision for permanent employment together with increases in real per capita income; the improvement in the economic structure; improvement in the balance of payments; and maintenance of monetary stability. Total expenditure was thereby raised to Sur. f143.4 million and the greatest portion of the increase was allocated to the agricultural and transportation sectors.

The second development plan [45]—the first half (1963–67) of which is worked out in considerable detail, while the second is prepared more on a global basis—follows in the footsteps of the first in accepting the broad aims of striving for a favorable balance of trade, improving the standard of living. Yet it is an enormous improvement over its predecessor in that it is more specific in setting up its targets, and, above all, it is comprehensive. It establishes a target rate of annual growth of 7 percent, so that with an annual population increase of 4 percent per year, real income will rise, given price stability, at the rate of 3 percent. Its most important feature, however, is its comprehensiveness in considering private and public activities as a whole in their effects on the growth of output. Not only are all public development activities now encompassed within its framework,[46] but the entire economic activity, private as well as public, is taken into consideration, such that public investment operations become supplementary to private activities. Every activity is considered and analysed sector by sector; individual projects in each sector are analysed and examined with respect to their correspondence to the general targets of the comprehensive plan. More specifically, they are weighed with respect to their relative contribution to the growth in output and to the elimination of the discrepancies between the factors of production and of wide income and regional differentials. Total directly productive expenditures entailed over the first half of the plan period amounts to Sur. f247 million, of which Sur. f119 million is considered to be profitable. Approximately one-third of this amount is allocated to agriculture. In addition Sur. f90 million is envisaged as indirectly productive expenditure.

The sources of finance for development expenditure are of two kinds: either they are met out of domestic sources, i.e., savings by the private and the public sector, or out of external sources, i.e., public grants, public and private loans, or both.

The saving of the public sector is the surplus realized in the current budget. We have seen in table 3 that this surplus, after having risen to considerable heights between 1957 and 1960 as a result of an increase of revenue arising from levying an export duty on bauxite, has turned into a deficit in 1962, because of the tremendous rise in current expenditures due to increases in the number of government personnel and in wages and salaries. The effect of the revenue measure has lost its strength by now, and so long as new measures are not inroduced,[47] public revenue cannot be expected to grow faster than output.

Private savings occur mainly in three forms: undistributed profits of business firms; pension and life insurance premiums and savings in banks; and housing. There are no reliable figures on the extent of undistributed profits; it is assumed that they are relatively large for some firms, especially in the field of transportation, which largely autofinance their expansions (Stichting Planbureau, 1963, 39). The second form of saving which is channelled via institutional investors is not well developed, and it is assumed that it cannot provide more than 3–4 percent of the national income (Stichting Planbureau, 1963, 39). On the other hand, saving in mortgages, with the aim of owning one's house appear to be quite widespread. Since a capital market is not developed, internal long-term borrowing is very restricted.

The result is that domestic sources cannot possibly meet the expenditures arising out of the implementation of the plan; recourse is, therefore, made to external sources. These sources are grants and loans from the Netherlands, the European Economic Community (EEC), technical assistance of the AID, and Special Fund of the United Nations. Of these the first two are most important. The golden rule of sharing the cost of investments is that two-thirds of development expenditure undertaken within the plan is met by the Netherlands, one-half of which is loans which have to be serviced and repaid, and the other grants. Surinam's attempts to associate herself with the EEC dates from 1957. It was in 1961 that an official application for associate membership was made which was accepted as of September 1, 1962. Thereby Surinam gains access to the development fund of the EEC. However, the EEC finances only projects which are considered to be unproductive. Its help is to a very large extent in the nature of grants.

This brief exposé on the economic structure and finances of Surinam describes yet another case which shows the difficulties facing underdeveloped countries as they strive toward economic development and to catch up, at least relatively, with the growth and high levels of living in developed economies. In their efforts not only are they hampered by the lack of a variety of crucial factors and elements which will lead on to the right path, but also by their dependence on the developed economies, which is a logical consequence of their state of being a have-not nation. We can perhaps illustrate this specifically with Surinam's experience of a monetary and financial crisis in 1962, which arose for two major reasons. One is the emphasis of the first development plan on providing a wide basis of infrastructive, which, though essential, does not bring about immediate increases in productivity, nor does it cause an automatic flow of entreprenurial activity. It was, therefore, found that enormous investments had limited effects on employment,[48] did not widen appreciably the productive basis of the economy and public revenue lagged behind the forecasts of the plan. After 8 years of development activity the government was still faced with the task of promoting economic activity, since private initiative did not come forth.

The second reason for the financial difficulties in which Surinam found herself in 1962 resulted from the inflationary method of financing its portion of the 10-year plan. Since possibilities to raise appreciable current tax revenue were limited by the low level of national income and its slow rate of growth, and since the surplus in the current budget was insufficient to meet the contribution to the development plan and other capital expenditures, the necessary amount above and beyond the budgetary surplus was obtained by a reduction in the foreign-exchange reserves and short-term borrowing.

By the middle of 1962, however, Surinam was unable to meet its short-term debts; its liquid reserves had fallen from Sur. f9.1 million in December 31, 1957, to Sur. f0.8 million in December 31, 1962. In September 1962 she did not possess any liquid reserves at all but was a debtor. With the retraction, at the same time, of the Dutch banks from giving further credit the financial distress reached its acutest stage. Prices rose, domestic supply could not be increased to meet demand, imports rose, and the balance of payments worsened. The result was the increase in the official discount rate from 4 to 5 percent (which did not have much effect, since private banks possessed large amounts of liquid reserves) and in import duties, restrictions on private transfers abroad (excluding profits of businesses), and limitation of the quantity of credit made available by commercial banks. As far as financing the one-third contribution to the development plan is concerned, it was obvious that the Surinam Government was in no position to provide this amount. An agreement was reached with the Netherlands, whereby the Dutch Government agreed to meet the deficit in the Surinam budget on condition that her contribution to the 10-year plan be reduced by a corresponding amount. Moreover, Surinam could now list some of the EEC financed projects in the plan as her one-third contribution, with the result that the development expenditures were reduced by the relevant amount (Sur. f15 million) and the content of the development plan was interfered with, since some projects were replaced by entirely different ones.

The problem can perhaps be summarized as follows: what is really needed in underdeveloped countries, as exemplified by Surinam, is not a finance of development which is concerned merely with finding the means with which to finance each individual project, but a public finance of development, which will consider the entire economy in a balanced and coordinated manner from an aggregate point of view in terms of global effects on the broad sectors of the economy, on capacity changes to meet demand increases arising from higher levels of expenditure. It is very heartening to see that with the comprehensive plan of 1963–72 a step has been taken in this direction, at least as far as the philosophy of the official authorities is concerned; we do not yet have data to pass judgment on the actual performance of the economy. It is openly recognized that an acceleration in the development process cannot immediately occur once the construction of the entire infrastructure of the economy is completed. On the contrary it is agreed that operations on such a large scale can cause the rift to widen between the growth of real output and of purchasing power; i.e., between supply and demand, and only if the latter conforms to the former can monetary equilibrium prevail. Emphasis, therefore, is now given to cooperation between infrastructure activities and entrepreneurial acivities, in that efforts are made to enlarge the existing production and to create and spur new production opportunities (e.g., the Afobaka Dam and the aluminum smelter).

Since the 1962 current budget closed with a deficit, and since a sudden change in the opposite direction cannot be expected in the following years, and given the limited lending capacity of the internal money market, the government will most probably be unable to contribute substantially to the additional development project. Future prospect for the development of Surinam does not seem to be entirely bright, yet it is not darkly somber either. In the past a great quantity of foreign capital has been imported into Surinam, and the 10-year plan and EEC financing helps this stream to continue. With increased exports of alumina and aluminum and the promotion of import-substituting industries the balance of trade could improve. It is not to be denied, that, despite abuses, investment expenditures have caused perceptible increases in production, especially in agriculture (van Dusseldorp, 243) which, in itself, is an important condition of economic progress. How the economy will perform in future years and in which direction it will move depends on the careful application of the plan.

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3. The Charter of the Kingdom of the Netherlands

The Kingdom of the Netherlands, composed of the Netherlands, Surinam, and the Netherlands Antilles, is a constitutional state governed by a monarch with limited and defined powers. Each of the three countries within this state has its own constitution which regulates its own internal affairs. The charter for the Kingdom of the Netherlands which was proclaimed by Queen Juliana on December 29, 1954, takes precedence over the constitutions of the three separate and equal divisions of the Kingdom, regulates the relations between these three divisions, and defines the matters which are of joint concern or so-called Kingdom affairs. The charter and the monarch, whose powers are defined and limited by the charter, serve to bind loosely the three equal parts together.

Some of the terms of the charter are fairly specific, delineating wherever possible the matters which are the concern of the Kingdom as a whole. These matters, outlined in article 3 (the most important of which are defense, foreign relations, and nationality), are subject to legislation by the Kingdom through Kingdom statutes or Kingdom ordinances. The charter is also flexible and indefinite in some instances allowing room for more specific definitions to be formulated, if necessary, by Kingdom statutes. (See arts. 20 and 23.) Thus, one can see that while the charter sets the basic pattern for the relations between the three parts of the Kingdom some attention must be given to subsequent Kingdom measures which have served to define even further the relations between the component parts of the Kingdom of the Netherlands. Finally the charter itself may be amended by means of a Kingdom statute which must be approved through a special procedure by Surinam and the Netherlands Antilles.

General provisions

The charter is divided into five sections. The first refers to the general provisions outlining the structure of the constitutional monarchy, defining the powers of the ruler of the House of Orange-Nassau, stipulating the matters which are identified as Kingdom affairs, and clearly stating that the charter takes precedence over the constitutions of the three countries in the Kingdom.

Plenipotentiary minister and Kingdom affairs

The second section of the charter is the most important and most extensive since it sets down the procedure for handling Kingdom affairs. Much consideration is given to the powers and responsibilities of the plenipotentiary minister, his alternate, and special delegates, who from time to time may be named. The plenipotentiary minister is the official who represents the Netherlands Antilles (another represents Surinam) before the Crown and participates in all legislative processes which deal with Kingdom affairs. Appointed by the Government of the Netherlands Antilles (or Surinam) this minister has the right to participate in the deliberations of the council of ministers, any permanent boards, or special committees of the council whenever any matters are discussed which concern his country. These matters, such as defense, foreign relations (including treaties), and economic support of Kingdom affairs to the extent which they benefit the countries involved, are enumerated but not limited, since the Netherlands Antilles or Surinam may indicate any matter which it is felt affects them and thus command their plenipotentiary minister to participate directly in the deliberations concerning the indicated matter.

The legislative process for Kingdom statutes

The extraordinary power of this plenipotentiary minister should not be underestimated. Any proposal for legislation of a binding nature which is under discussion in the council of ministers of the Kingdom may be blocked for a limited length of time while further discussion takes place if either of the two plenipotentiary ministers feel that it is detrimental to his country. While the plenipotentiary minister does not have veto power, he can insist upon the postponement of a decision, thus requiring a subcommittee to reexamine the matter. The subcommittee is formed of five members: the Prime Minister, two Netherlands ministers, and a minister to be designated by the country concerned and the plenipotentiary minister or, if the matter affects both countries, then both plenipotentiary ministers may attend instead of the temporarily appointed ministers. The recommendation of the subcommittee goes to the council of ministers.

The proposal for legislation is then referred to the Netherlands states general and also to the legislative bodies of the Netherlands Antilles and Surinam. The latter two bodies have the right to submit a report on the legislation which will be taken into consideration. In exceptional circumstances the King may forego this requirement after consulting with the plenipotentiary ministers. Furthermore, during the discussion within the two chambers of the states general the plenipotentiary minister has the right to participate in the discussion and if necessary explain why he is against the measure. Should the measure which is opposed by the plenipotentiary minister be approved by the states general with a vote less than three-fifths majority in favor, then the measure is delayed and referred back to the council of ministers for further considerations. In the participation of the legislative process in the states general the plenipotentiary minister enjoys exceptional powers. Having a voice in the second chamber he is able to introduce legislation or drafts for Kingdom statutes. Furthermore, over and above the powers of the members of the second chamber of the states general, the plenipotentiary minister may propose amendments to any draft of a Kingdom statute without the necessary additional support of legislators, said support being required of other members of the states general.

The countries of Surinam and the Netherlands Antilles can be represented on the council of state, the highest advisory body to the King within the Netherlands Kingdom. This representative may or may not be the plenipotentiary minister.

In effect it is possible that Kingdom statutes can be passed over the objection of the plenipotentiary minister and the objection of the countries concerned if the situation and matter is of greatest importance. This action would require the cooperation of the council of ministers, the Prime Minister, and at least three-fifths of the members of the states general. It is also possible for the plenipotentiary minister to block at several stages a proposed Kingdom statute if he secures support from some of the members of the council of ministers or if he can count on more than two-fifths support within the states general.

In exceptional circumstances such as war, the threat of war, siege or the threat of siege, or if a threat to or disturbance of internal peace and order may affect the interests of the Kingdom, the King may declare martial law and place any area in the Kingdom under military control. In such circumstances, the right of free press, the right of assembly and association, and the right of inviolability of domicile and correspondence may be abridged. The manner of carrying this drastic action out is left to the determination of Kingdom statutes.

International relations

Treaties or international agreements of an economical or political nature cannot be held binding on Surinam or the Netherlands Antilles unless they have given their express agreement. This also applies to the possible abrogation of treaties. The Netherlands Antilles and Surinam may request treaties or international agreements which affect them alone. For example the Netherlands Antilles have entered into an international agreement with Venezuela concerning the regulation of tonnage to be carried by the oil tankers operating between the Maracaibo basin and the refineries in Aruba and Curacao. This agreement was negotiated between representatives of the Netherlands Antilles Government and Venezuela without participation of or consultation with the Netherlands Government. The agreement was put into effect by the Kingdom of the Netherlands, solely on the advice of the Netherlands Antilles.

Defense

The final important area covered in this section is that of defense. The charter is somewhat vague in this matter leaving much to the Kingdom statutes and also implying a great deal which is not spelled out. The Netherlands Antilles and Surinam are to be defended by the Kingdom of the Netherlands. Conscription in the Netherlands is not applicable to the Netherlands Antilles or Surinam unless put into effect by action of the local government. Actually recent government action by the Netherlands Antilles has put into effect a token form of conscription which puts about 200 youths into uniform. There was some comment to the effect that this measure was subtly suggested by ministers in the Hague. It was passed with little or no comment or opposition. It is looked upon in the Antilles as a means of taking up slack in the growing ranks of unemployed and also as a measure to curb juvenile delinquency. Surinam has no conscription. The charter implies that the cost of local defense should be borne wherever possible by local support and should utilize local personnel wherever possible. Persons conscripted cannot be sent out of the country (Surinam to Holland or Antilles to Surinam) without express consent of the country involved. The cost of defense and the maintenance of the Kingdom of the Netherlands is to be borne as much as possible by the component parts of the Kingdom. The amount to be paid by the Netherlands Antilles and Surinam is to be determined by the council of ministers on a year-to-year basis. Such financial or budgetary decisions must have the approval of the local governments before becoming effective.

The final matter mentioned in this section is a vague clause indicating that the supreme court of the Netherlands was to have jurisdiction over the Netherlands Antilles and Surinam in accordance with and through regulation of a Kingdom statute. Theoretically in effect as of March 1, 1965, is a Kingdom statute which permits appeals to be carried from the courts of the Netherlands Antilles (not Surinam) to the supreme court in Holland for the purpose of review, examination, and confirmation of the judicial process.

Matters of mutual concern

The charter in the third section refers to non-Kingdom matters which are not subject to Kingdom regulation but because of their importance and relation to the overall integration of the Kingdom are singled out as areas where mutual consultation and support are strongly recommended. These matters include social, economic, and cultural relations. Matters such as currency, banking, transportation, communications, assistance programs, civil and commercial law procedures, weights and measures, etc., should not be changed without ministerial consultation.

The charter stipulates in the fourth section certain conditions and principles which should be followed in the constitutional organization of the Netherlands Antilles and Surinam. These are conditions and principles identified as Kingdom affairs and are embodied in constitutional articles referring to fundamental human rights and freedoms, provisions relating to the powers of the Governor, articles relating to the power of the representative bodies, and articles relating to the administration of justice. This, for example, includes such an apparently internal measure as that which regulates the representation in the government of the Netherlands Antilles from the six islands' divisions. The charter stipulates also that these same matters if subject to change in the constitution of the Netherlands Government are to be considered Kingdom matters and treated as such.

In this section is also included a stipulation to the effect that it is a Kingdom affair to maintain and safeguard the fundamental rights and freedom, the rule of law and the integrity of administration. This vague stipulation has been seen as a means of interference, or at the very least, supervision over local or internal affairs (to be analyzed more thoroughly later).

The final section of the charter indicates the means of amending the document. Here again, there is indication of limited power. The governments of Surinam or the Netherlands Antilles, while having virtual power of veto over proposed amendments, do not have any effective way to amend the charter, only power to propose amendments which then would have to be adopted by using the procedure of Kingdom legislation. Thus, there are no legal means which guarantee that local initiative can effectively modify the existing status.

Finally since the power of judicial review to declare legislation unconstitutional is not known within the Netherlands system, the Crown is given power of veto over any local legislation which is in conflict with a Kingdom statute, Kingdom ordinance, the charter, an international agreement, or "with interests whose promotion or protection is a Kingdom affair."

In summation one might conclude that these two minor communities of the Netherlands Antilles (200,000 people) and Surinam (300,000) have been given a great degree of local autonomy but decisive and complete local autonomy they have not received. In matters which concern the Kingdom as a whole it is understandable that the Netherlands (10 million people) would reserve final control and decision for the government based in Holland.

Kingdom laws

The Kingdom of the Netherlands has been in existence for a 10-year period. No changes or amendments have been made to the charter which seems to have been serving well as a basic document by means of which local governments and officials have been able to function and effectively relate themselves to the large overall Kingdom Government. One area where joint operations have been noted is through the legislation of the Kingdom statutes. The method of legislation which produces the Kingdom laws has been referred to in the discussion of the charter but it would be in order to refer to this process again.

Legislative procedure for Kingdom laws

Under the parliamentary system of government the party or coalition of parties in power follow the lead of the head of the party, usually the Prime Minister. In the council of ministers, then, any proposed legislation is discussed and drawn up. If related to matters within the categories of those outlined in the charter as Kingdom affairs, the plenipotentiary ministers are consulted and drawn into the process of preparation from the beginning. It is here where their power of opposition is most effective, requiring prolonged consideration by a subcommittee in which the deciding vote is only held by the Prime Minister.

If sent to Parliament over the opposition of the plenipotentiary minister, the approval of the measure requires a three-fifths vote. In effect, with a 150-member branch of the legislature, this means that Surinam and the Netherlands Antilles with a combined population of almost half a million have theoretically about 15 votes over the simple majority of 75 out of 150. In other words, the party in power in the Netherlands in order to pass a measure requires only 76 votes or a simple majority if the measure is a non-Kingdom measure. However, if the proposal deals with Kingdom matters, then the party in power must command an additional 15 votes in order to pass the measure over the opposition of a plenipotentiary minister.

If the Netherlands Antilles and Surinam were to be represented directly in the lower House of Parliament in accord with the formula of proportional representation in existence in Holland, that is, 1 member per 70,000 citizens, there would be approximately 4 representatives from Surinam and 3 from the Antilles in the lower House. Furthermore, this finite minority of seven persons could hardly block legislation nor could it exercise much power unless it found itself in the unique position of exerting the balance of power between two large parties or coalitions of parties.

Concerning the procedure for the legislation of Kingdom statutes, it would appear that the solons of the Kingdom of the Netherlands have succeeded in setting up a process which allows effective power which falls short of absolute veto power, to be held by the plenipotentiary ministers who represent the oversea divisions of the Kingdom. The power is effective in the sense that it can postpone consideration of measures, and it also requires a three-fifths majority vote on measures which it opposes. A government in power with a scarce margin of majority votes in Parliament could be effectively blocked from approving measures over the opposition of the plenipotentiary ministers.

The power of royal appointment

In two areas of government, the executive and the judiciary, the influence of the Dutch Government is felt rather heavily. The Governors, the lieutenant governors, and also the attorney general are appointed by the Crown. For the most part these individuals are selected from local candidates. In Curacao, the Governor of the Netherlands Antilles is a native of the Antilles as are the lieutenant governors for the most part. Furthermore, the powers of the Governor, except under extraordinary circumstances are rather limited and formalized. The bulk of the executive responsibility, as with most parliamentary governments, is borne by the Prime Minister and his ministers.

Soon after the creation of the Kingdom of the Netherlands, the Government of the Netherlands Antilles found itself with a carryover appointee as Governor. Due to the novelty of the new system and the newly established autonomy there developed a situation of conflict between the Governor and the political party in control of the Federal Government of the Netherlands Antilles. The exact details of this conflict need not be outlined but the situation was resolved through an appeal to the Prime Minister of Holland and his council of ministers who undertook to clarify the conflicting situation and eventually the obstinate Governor was replaced by a more understanding person. In appointments of this nature the tendency and pattern seem to be well established that qualified people native to the area are selected for executive posts.

Concerning positions in the judiciary branch, this has not been as clearly established. To the contrary, there is an expression of opinion that judges should be selected from qualified candidates outside of the area where they are to serve. The explanation for this different policy is that the exercise of justice was hindered if the judge is too closely tied to the interests which exist in the communities where the court is to be held. Furthermore, the tendency has been to encourage the judges to serve, contrary to the charter, for a period of 6 years rather than for life. The contention is that after this period the judges find themselves too involved with local problems and pressure groups to be able to offer impartial judicial opinions. In the Netherlands Antilles this matter has promised to become a political issue since recently the opposition party has accused the party in power of forcing the resignation of judges who have overstayed the assigned 6-year period.

The creation of a local judiciary is not easy since it requires very specialized training which can only be secured after long years of study in Dutch universities. While there are perhaps 20 Antilleans qualified to be judges, the number available for appointment is not enough to fill the positions, and the remainder, 1 chief justice and 9 associate justices, have to be selected from qualified Dutchmen. Furthermore, as in the case of one distinguished Antillean judge, Judge Ellis who has just resigned, the provision of limited tenure reduces the possibility of securing local people for such positions.

The only possible solution to this problem would be to change the requirements for appointment to Antillean judicial positions and/or create a bona fide law school for the training of local judges. Surinam and the Netherlands Antilles have a small law school which offers a limited program to a select number of students.

4. The Government and Politics of the Netherlands Antilles

The Netherlands Antilles has a form of Federal Government composed of four quite unequal parts. The seat of the Federal Government is in Curacao, the largest and most important island of the Netherlands Antilles. Local island governments, consisting of a lieutenant governor, an administrative council and an island council exist in Curacao, Aruba, and Bonaire. The fourth part of the Netherlands Antilles is composed of the three Windward Islands, St. Martin, Saba, and St. Eustatius. The center of authority for these islands is found in St. Martin where a lieutenant governor, with the administrative and island councils, oversees the administration of the three island communities.

The political organizations of each island are quite independent of each other since local issues and local personalities tend to take precedence over matters and issues which are of a general concern to the

Netherlands Antilles. For the sake of forming a federal government the local island political parties have entered into coalitions or blocs which thus permit the formation of a majority group capable of dominating the federal legislative council. This legislative council is composed of 22 members: 12 from Curacao, 8 from Aruba, and 1 each from Bonaire and the Windward Island group.

In the absence of any strong party organization at the federal level, it is easy to understand why the political parties within the Netherlands Antilles are not really institutional parties based on any political philosophy. Between the two coalitions or political blocs there is relatively little difference. Both fiercely defend the autonomy of the Netherlands Antilles. Neither are in favor of independence nor can either be classified as more subservient to Holland than the other. Both are moderately socialistic in their emphasis on the responsibility of the state for the welfare of the Antillean citizen. There does exist a very subtle distinction along social and racial lines which can best be understood by a closer look at the political picture of each island group.

Curacao

Although there are only two large political parties in Curacao, the political divisions among the inhabitants of that island are not easy to analyze. For the purposes of this study, it is important to note that there is little difference between the two parties in their posture toward Holland. Both have competed with each other in the past in their efforts to secure autonomy and self-government for Dutch Antilles. At the present both are fairly well satisfied with the existing Kingdom of the Netherlands and the role within that Kingdom of the Netherlands Antilles. Efforts to label either party by the other as being pro-Dutch have failed. Also each party is sufficiently realistic and honest in its program as to not consider or propose absolute separation from Holland.

Neither of the two parties in Curacao can be classified as following a well-defined ideological position. Both stand for extensive social welfare programs for the people of the Netherlands Antilles. In both parties the position of the strong leader (Mr. M. F. da Costa Gomez of the National Peoples Party (NVP) and Mr. E. Jonckheer of the Democratic Party (DP)) serves to define the position of the party on the main issues. Loyalty to the leader then is the main cohesive force which operates in the political arena.

Subtle racial, social, and religious differences seem to be reflected in the composition of the two parties. The National Peoples Party, which was until recently openly identified with the Catholic church, still tends to be classified as a Christian Democratic Party although it is questionable now as to whether it is Catholic controlled. Racially the Nationalist Peoples Party seems to appeal more to the darker sectors of the population and in the recent past has been accused of fomenting racial animosity. Da Costa Gomez is a light skinned mulatto who has built up a strong political movement by appealing to the rural inhabitants of the island of Curacao. The Democratic Party tends to represent the urban sectors of the population and has been effective in appealing, although not exclusively, to the middle and upper classes of this highly industrialized and commercial society.

The current issue in politics has been the position of Curacao in the Netherlands Antilles Government. Mr. da Costa Gomez, whose party controls the insular Curacao Government, argues for a more independent role for Curacao within the Netherlands Antilles system. Since Curacao is by far the richest and most populous of the six islands, it has been argued that she has been unjustly hampered in development by the regulations which bind her to the other five islands in the Federal Government of the Netherlands Antilles. It is ironical that this regulation of the structure of the Federal Government which is written into the charter of the Netherlands was the creation of Mr. da Costa Gomez who at an earlier date was in favor of a more regional type of representation rather than representation based strictly on population.

This strictly local issue has caused some strain on the comparatively smooth operation of the charter of the Netherlands. The Prime Minister of the Federal Government of the Netherlands Antilles is Mr. Jonckheer, who is also the political opponent of Mr. da Costa Gomez in Curacao local politics. For the lack of sufficient support in his own island Mr. Jonckheer has been unable to control the local government of Curacao, but through support in Aruba, Bonaire, and the Windward Islands he has been able to sustain himself and his party in the position of control of the Federal Government.

Such a division of power and party control lends itself to friction. The Federal Government is in a position to frustrate some of the measures of the local Curacao Government, and vice versa the local Curacao Government can, if so inclined, provoke or prevent the smooth functioning of the Federal Government. On several occasions political tension has increased to dangerous levels and appeal has been taken to Holland for intervention in the strictly local affairs of either the Federal Government or the local government of Curacao. Holland has been extremely reluctant to interfere, arguing that this must be solved by the local persons concerned without intervention by the Dutch Government. The Dutch officials rightly argue that the Federal Government by charter definition has the right of intervention in local government affairs when there is clear and serious cause. On the other hand the members of the Federal Government have denied their right and requested Dutch intervention because they feel that anything that they might do could be misconstrued as being politically motivated for the benefit of the minority party in the local government of Curacao.

The result of this political situation which is extremely delicate and complicated has been to drag Holland into matters which are of only local concern and cast one member of the tripartite Kingdom as an arbitrator in the affairs of another member. Of course, the charter does provide that the king can interfere in local matters if certain dangerous situations arise, but up to this point most appeals for intervention have been over small matters of local politics far removed from questions of treason or national defense.

As long as both parties continue to practice a lower form of political activity, the purpose of the charter of the Kingdom will perhaps continue to be frustrated in the sense that true and complete local autonomy will never be realized. For this reason Holland has refused to intervene and when intervention has been inevitable as in the De Wit affair, it has usually been carried out unofficially. This has been accomplished by privately notifying the parties concerned what the action or decision will be if intervention is carried out.

Aruba

The Island Council of Aruba is composed of 21 members. In the last election, 1962, three political groups competed for the seats on the Council. The Patriotic Party of Aruba captured the majority (13), with the Aruba People's Party securing 6 seats, and the Aruba National Union captured 2 seats. The two principal parties were founded by two dominant political personalities on the island. Henny Eman founded the Aruba People's Party and Juan Enrique, Irausquin, after breaking from Eman, established the Patriotic Party of Aruba. Both founders are dead (Eman died in 1957, and Irausquin in 1961), but the two parties continue to dominate the political activity of the island. The Eman party, now led by his son, tends to be composed primarily of Arubans or those living in Aruba but born elsewhere of Aruban parents. The Irausquin party, now led by Mr. Petronia, draws considerable support from those who have come to Aruba to work in the oil refinery from the Dutch Windward Islands, the British West Indies, Surinam, Curacao, and Venezuela. One should not carry this description too far because just as members of the Eman family can be found in the Patriotic Party, so too can people not born in Aruba or of Aruban parents be found in the Aruba People's Party.

Aside from the effort to claim to represent the native Aruban point of view, there seems to be little difference between the two political groups. The dynamic leadership offered by Irausquin converted Aruba into a tourist center, with a luxury hotel, a modern airport, and excellent roads. The third party, the Aruba National Union seems only to stress good honest government. Recently some effort has been made, with no measurable success, to unite the refinery workers into a political movement.

As the refinery becomes more and more automized and the non-Aruban workers are laid off and thus return to their native land, the Patriotic Party of Aruba, now in power, can expect a decline in support. Growing unemployment will tend also to encourage a shift in vote to the opposition party which seems little prepared to offer any dynamic leadership. The disappearance of the successful Irausquin will also harm the Patriotic Party of Aruba, since as yet no one has been found who can match his political skill and leadership. Five of the eight representatives Aruba sends to the Federal Legislative Council belong to the Patriotic Party and form part of the majority bloc headed by Mr. Jonckheer.

Bonaire

On the sparsely populated island of Bonaire the political situation is somewhat different since the two large Curacao parties find themselves competing for the support of Bonaire. A powerful political figure until his recent death was Julio Abraham, who has now been succeeded by his son. The island is receiving more and more returning citizens who are being relieved of their positions in the refineries of Curacao and Aruba. Some attention is given to tourism, but the island's population is so small that it must look for support for its case in the Federal Government. Bonaire at this point finds itself in the enviable position of an eligible maid with two ardent admirers both courting her favors. The Jonckheer bloc, with its slim majority, needs the support of the Bonaire representative in the Federal Legislative Council. The Island Council is split five to four between the two principal groups on the island but there is growing dissatisfaction, which has recently split the party, with the son of Julio Abraham who represents Bonaire in the Federal Legislative Council and forms part of the Jonckheer majority bloc.

Windward Islands

The political picture in the Windward Islands is less attractive. Small isolated island communities, separated by the lack of convenient and economical means of transportation and deprived of any common media of communications, are very much at the mercy of the decisions of the Federal Government, which sustains the social welfare programs in the islands, and the control of one or two merchant families which monopolize the means of transportation and communication.

Under such circumstances any meaningful political activity would be quite out of the ordinary. In effect the political picture is dominated by the leading merchant family on the principal island, which in turn is supported by the party in power in the Federal Government. Some signs of opposition are forthcoming from the returning workers from the refineries, but as yet this opposition has not become significant. The weekly newspaper on St. Martin, The Windward Islands Opinion is in the hands of a member of the opposition but as yet he has not been able to break the control of the power merchant family.

Here also the support of the Windward Island representative to the Federal Legislative Council is ardently sought and catered to by the two political blocs of Aruba and Curacao. The representative is one of the sons of the dominant merchant family on St. Martin.

The Dutch influence in culture and education is much less evident here than in the three islands near the coast of Venezuela. Here in the northeast corner of the Caribbean, Dutch is rarely heard and English is the common language of communication. It is also interesting to note that on St. Martin the only English language newspaper edited in the Netherlands Antilles can be found. However, because of their very limited population, which for the most part depends upon the economic activity of the oil refineries of Aruba and Curacao, these islands show no signs of opposing the continued association with Holland in the Kingdom of the Netherlands.

5. The Political Conditions in Surinam

Political conditions in Surinam are much different from those in the Netherlands Antilles. In the Antilles there is general and ready acceptance of the existing relationship with Holland under the charter of the Kingdom of the Netherlands. In Surinam there is almost general recognition and acceptance of the opinion that the existing relationship with Holland under the charter must undergo some revision leading to at least an expanding role in foreign affairs for the Surinam Government. This is a new development in Surinam politics since 3 years ago when the writer paid his first visit to this country. At that time there seemed to be general acceptance, with only a small but significant group in disagreement, of the tripartite Kingdom of the Netherlands.

There is a wide difference of opinion concerning the degree of independence or autonomy to be sought by the people of Surinam. There is also disagreement as to how rapidly this expansion of local autonomy should be carried out. Some leaders, like Mr. Lachmon of the United Hindustani Party, while recognizing the need for an independent role in foreign affairs would prefer to move slowly exploring the possible ways of realizing this goal without drastically changing the existing relationship with Holland. Others, like Mr. Pengel of the National Surinam Party (NPS), would like to see Surinam achieve a dominion status similar to that of Canada within the British Commonwealth of Nations which would allow an independent role in foreign affairs but retain some connection with Holland. Finally the National Republic Party, led by Mr. Bruma, would prefer to have immediate and complete independence for the young nation.

An effort was made to understand the motivating forces which brought about in such short a time this change of attitude in the minds of the political leaders of Surinam. There are two immediate and most commonly expressed reasons: The leaders of Surinam feel that if granted a more independent role in the field of foreign affairs and thus becoming eligible for membership in the United Nations and perhaps other international bodies, not only would Surinam gain prestige and recognition as an independent nation, but she would become eligible for economic support or aid offered by international bodies or programs sponsored by the United States like, for instance, the Alliance for Progress; secondly, some Surinam leaders have felt that the Kingdom of the Netherlands cannot adequately express in the field of foreign affairs the diverse interests and concerns which come out of the multiracial community which is Surinam. Before turning to other possible reasons for the change in attitude in Surinam, let us explore these two points further.

According to the charter of the Netherlands (art. 29), any foreign loans which Surinam or the Netherlands Antilles may want to contract must be negotiated and guaranteed by the Kingdom of the Netherlands. Neither governments of the Caribbean can point to an instance where Holland has refused to cooperate in this matter. In effect Holland has been most generous with financial support, making appeals to other bodies unnecessary. Nevertheless, when Surinam, through her observer at the Organization of American States meeting at Punta del Este in 1961, requested consideration for loans under the announced Alliance for Progress program, she was politely told that as a part of the Kingdom of the Netherlands there was some question as to her eligibility and at any rate negotiations would have to be initiated by Holland and not Surinam.

The extremists feel that almost exclusive Dutch investment or financial support is a type of positive interference which frustrates normal nationalist growth by depriving credit to unsympathetic or nationalistic groups or individuals. So preponderant is the Dutch financial investment that even perhaps unwillingly it shapes the type of economic development which Surinam must follow. More conservative interests feel, however, that Holland along with Surinam took the initial risks with Surinam. When these initial investments paid off in the promise of rich resources and tremendous industrial potential it would be a mistaken policy to turn away from Holland and reject further economic support or give preference to foreign investment. It is important to note that Mr. Bruma, the nationalist leader, feels that it is a distinct and decided mistake to charge Holland with any indebtedness for centuries of colonial exploitation. This is explained more as a result of local pride rather than a denial of colonial exploitation.

The leaders of Surinam feel that the Kingdom of the Netherlands does not express adequately the opinion of the multiracial people of Surinam on vital world issues. The most commonly cited example of this divergence of opinion between Holland and Surinam is found in the attitude of the Kingdom toward the policy of apartheid practiced by the Government of South Africa. Surinamese would have preferred outright condemnation of this policy and expulsion of South Africa from all international organizations. Holland has chosen to temporize this extreme position with strong statements which do not bring any punishment to the historically friendly Boer nation. Another case is cited when the Kingdom of the Netherlands, participating in the Conference of World Trade, finds that one or possibly two parts of its Kingdom are classified as industrial and highly developed, whereas Surinam by any obvious classification would find itself grouped with the underdeveloped or developing nations and thus eligible for certain favorable financial and trade considerations. However, as part of the Kingdom she is deprived of this favorable treatment.

The position of Holland in the light of the growing concern in Surinam for a more independent role in the area of foreign affairs has been most disarming. While indicating that she will cooperatively listen to any suggestion for change or complete revision of the charter, Holland has endeavored to make it as easy as possible for Surinam to participate in the area of foreign affairs. For example the Dutch consul of the Dutch consulate in New York City is a Surinamese who is exclusively involved in cultivating economic contacts for Surinam's economic development program. Successful business arrangements have been carried out with American firms and most recently with a West German business combine by the Surinam Government.

Concerning the concrete suggestions for changes in the charter which Holland has invited the Surinamese Government to present, no action has been taken to date. The Prime Minister has spoken of a commission which is to study the situation and prepare concrete suggestions for changes in the charter, but as yet the commission has not made any proposals. This lack of alacrity can be best understood by looking at some of the underlying reasons for the very recent growing concern for a role in foreign affairs. These reasons can best be brought out after a general description of the political scene in Surinam.

Political parties in Surinam

Political parties in Surinam with one exception represent no particular ideology or philosophy, but rather the principal racial groups of the country. Within the racial groups the position of leadership usually falls on a strong personality who rules rather arbitrarily on the strength of the charismatic appeal to his racial group. In previous years there was a strong Catholic Party which has since declined in importance, but may be revived in the near future.

The Creole Party led by Mr. Pengel is the most powerful at this point, drawing support from the Negro group. Mr. Pengel became politically powerful mostly because of the backing of the labor unions. This support may be weakening since the government, led by Mr. Pengel, has blocked attempts on the part of the labor unions to open up contacts with Latin American labor organizations. Of importance is Mr. Pengel's commitment to the Moravian Church; all members of the Party Council belong to this religious body. The Creole or Negro group is numerically superior in the metropolitan district of Paramaribo. In this district alone block voting is in effect, i.e., the dominant party takes the total 10 seats assigned to Paramaribo, if their followers vote, as they have done up to now, the party ticket.

The second most powerful party is the Hindustani Party led by Mr. Lachmon. This group currently working in coalition with Mr. Pengel draws its support from the East Indian who is predominant in the small farming areas which surround the District of Paramaribo. With eight members in the Parliament, this party is the second in size but is expected to grow in size and importance as the East Indian population increases at a faster rate than the Creole. As a member of the coalition which forms the present government, this party serves as a conservative influence on the Prime Minister, Mr. Pengel. They are reluctant to move as fast as Mr. Pengel would apparently like to move in separating from Holland. As long as he is in a minority, the East Indian prefers to have the arbitrating influence of Holland present. Should the East Indian become the dominant group, a development which might occur within the next 10 years, this conservative attitude will change. The younger leaders of the Hindustani are much more eager for an independent Surinam than the more conservative older leaders of the party.

The last member of the coalition which forms the present government is the Indonesian Party (KTPI) which has four members in the current Parliament. Again the Indonesians, like most of the East Indians, are located in the small farm area outside of Paramaribo.

Even more than the East Indian, the Indonesian is a withdrawn racial in-group which operates strictly for its own self-interest as determined by its unchallenged leader. At least in the case of the East Indian there is a movement out of the farming community, toward more education, and a concern for a growing role in the life of the Surinam community. Some optimistic observers hope to see in the near future the racial exclusivity of the East Indian weakening and a blending with some of the European elements in the metropolitan population of Paramaribo. None of this can be hoped for or even thought of as far as the Indonesian group is concerned. While numerically this group is rather small, even though with the East Indian group they outnumber the Creole, their cooperation has been solicited and required to form a majority coalition.

In opposition are a number of small parties. The previously mentioned Catholic Party (PSV) makes an attempt to appeal over and above the racial divisions of the community but in reality can only count on support from the non-East Indian and Indonesian groups, or what is known broadly speaking as the Catholic Creole Sector. Established by a Dutch priest, this party is one of the oldest parties in Surinam but has in recent years failed to elect, due to the block voting system in effect in Paramaribo, sufficient members to the legislature which would reflect its actual strength. Some observers feel that it can recover some strength and certainly its leaders seem to demonstrate more political sophistication than is found in some of the other groups.

One small regional party (NOP) represents the Nickerie District and, while representing Creole elements, seems to be dominated by the East Indian leaders of the area. Since it is limited by its definition as a regional party, its appeal to a broader and wider base is difficult, if not impossible. There are two members of this party in Parliament. As the dominant East Indian Party grows more powerful, it would seem that this party would be absorbed into it, even though at this point they are not cooperating.

Efforts to interview representatives of the remaining opposition party in the Parliament were unsuccessful. From indirect sources it can be gathered that the party follows a conservative line usually reflected in the editorial opinion expressed in De West, one of the daily newspapers in Paramaribo owned by the leader of the party, Mr. Findlay. This party does not represent any of the large racial groups in Surinam but appeals to the Creole group, and some of its leaders are of predominant European descent.

The National Republic Party (PNR) led by Mr. Bruma, a lawyer, failed to secure any significant electoral support in the last election. Nevertheless, this party seems to be the only one which has based its appeal for support on a firm political or ideological doctrine. Also a serious effort on the part of those cooperating with Mr. Bruma has been made to make a broad appeal which would transcend racial divisions.

As its name indicates, this party is a nationalistic party which has as the keystone of its program the immediate independence of Surinam. All issues and measures are judged as to whether they would further the realization of independence. Dutch interference and influence is staunchly fought and criticized as a form of "positive intervention" which distorts the natural development of an independent Surinam. The leader of the party, Mr. Bruma, indicated that if Holland accepted the conditions of independence there might not be a need for absolute separation. This seems to be a recent modification in his position, possibly caused by an attempt to broaden his appeal and possibly secure some East Indian support.

Together with independence as the immediate political goal, the party has stressed the need for the formation of a Surinamese culture. Cultural and racial differences should be erased and fused into one Surinam culture and people. The common language of all people in Surinam, usually refered to as taki-taki, would replace Dutch as the official language and the medium for cultural growth. The racial divisions as symbolized in the flag of Surinam should be broken down and racial integration should be recognized as a necessity for the formation of an independent Surinam.

Mr. Bruma has been accused by his opponents of being a Communist. There seems to be little evidence of this in spite of the fact that he is quite resentful of the foreign (mostly Dutch) exploitation of the Surinamese. His solution to this problem is strictly nationalistic since he argues that a truly nationalistic and independent government would be able to establish the terms and conditions of foreign investment in Surinam. Indirect financial control in addition to the preponderant Dutch influence in the preparation of the Surinam development plans has prevented up to now a completely independent Surinamese Government. He argues for an independent government in which all sectors of society will be represented and rejects communism since in this type of government labor's importance is out of proportion to its contribution and responsibility. Private capital and foreign corporations will continue to be necessary for the growth of Surinam but must operate within the terms and conditions set down by the governments. Finally the party believes that closer cooperation among the three Guianas is necessary and Mr. Bruma, in this connection, finds Cheddi Jagan an easier person to work with than Mr. Forbes Burnham.

Although small and insignificant, the PNR is recognized as a very real threat to the established parties, and particularly to the position of Mr. Pengel. In part, this threat is explained by the fact that, for the first time in Surinam's politics, there is a party with a clearly defined program and philosophy which has a broad appeal to a community which has been kept in colonial isolation in a rather remote and out of the way corner of the world. The relatively young population of Surinam has had opportunity for education and many of the more industrious have traveled for work and study to Europe. For these the program of the PNR has a strong appeal. The economic development of Surinam, while obviously offering great potential, has not been smooth or without serious problems. For example the growing unemployment in Paramaribo is becoming quite alarming and the inaction of a government willing to spend thousands on display and pageantry for the visit of a member of the royal family, has allowed an able critic to gain a tactical advantage. The enraged reaction of the government in power to such continued criticism has been to close, on a legal technicality, a radio station used by Mr. Bruma. This may have favorably impressed representatives from industrial firms in the United States but it has not increased Mr. Pengel's popularity with his own people.

There seems to be good evidence, which unfortunately cannot be documented on the basis of a short visit and a limited study of Surinamese politics, that Mr. Pengel, who operates as a skillful but programless politician, has been forced by Mr. Bruma and his following to take a more critical stand toward the charter of the Kingdom of the Netherlands. This, in a way, would perhaps also explain why the government has been publicly critical of the lack of authority in the area of foreign affairs, but at the same time has not been able to suggest a specific plan for modification of the existing political relationship with Holland. On the one hand held back by his coalition with the East Indian and on the other threatened by the pressure of a growing nationalism stimulated by Mr. Bruma, the Prime Minister is forced to forge a middle-of-the-way program. If Mr. Pengel were a more able leader, rather than just a skillful politician, these pressures would not be cause for concern but rather serve as a healthy stimulus for a dynamic program. Certainly other leaders in the Caribbean faced with similar pressures have been able to come forth with positive action which has served to keep them in power for 20 years or more.

Two pressing problems aggravate the political scene in Surinam. One is the ever present but rarely expressed concern over possible racial violence. The constant example of neighboring British Guiana serves to warn Surinamese of what could happen in their country.

Nevertheless, parties have become even more racially oriented and attempts to forge an interracial movement have been up to now quite unsuccessful. Whether Mr. Bruma and his nationalist party will be more successful with their forthright program of racial integration will remain to be seen. There seems to be some disposition to cooperate on the basis of the younger East Indians, but this has not gone beyond mere discussions among leaders. For public view an effort is still made to cater to the racial distinctions. Thus in recent government receptions the East Indian members of the cabinet attend social functions with their wives dressed in saris and other ornaments distinctive of the East Indian. This was not previously practiced and, in spite of efforts to the contrary, marks a step backward in the drive toward a fusion of racial groups and the creation of a common Surinamese culture.

The other problem posed by the growing nationalist movement and perhaps unwantingly forced on the political leaders of the country presents an equally confused future. Certainly none of the dominant leaders either of the Creole or East Indian parties have a clear-cut idea of how to modify the existing charter of the Kingdom and thus placate their own nationalistic desires and yet not destroy the existing relationship with Holland. The attitude of Holland is most enlightened. The Surinamese have been flatly informed that Holland will not stand in their way but will even cooperate toward the realization of legitimate steps toward greater autonomy and even independence. The next move is now up to the political leaders of Surinam, and with one or two exceptions they seem to be extremely reluctant to discuss any action.

FRANCE

1. *The Economic Background of the French Antilles*

The purpose of this paper is to describe and study the revenue system of the French Caribbean and evaluate its importance within the general economic structure of the areas in question. It is divided into four parts. In the first part general background information is given on population, natural resources, external trade, economic structure, and the financial and monetary framework. The second part is a brief analysis of the general tax pattern, and the burden of taxation. The relationship and suitability of taxes to economic development are discussed in part III. The final section is devoted to the analysis of the economic and fiscal relations between France and the French Caribbean from the point of view of their role in fostering economic development.

1. General economic conditions

We would like to emphasize at the outset that the purpose of this section is merely to outline some of the most prominent characteristics of the area concerned and not to analyze in detail the economic problems which are confronted, nor how the various characteristics are interrelated. The economic analysis connected with finances will follow in the subsequent sections.

The French Caribbean consists of three departments of France: Martinique, Guadeloupe (and its dependencies),[49] and French Guiana. Within the entire Caribbean setting they constitute 2.7 percent of total population and 14.0 percent of total area. Martinique and Guadeloupe are small islands, while French Guiana is an immense piece of territory on the northeastern coast of the South American continent; but more than 90 percent of the total population of the three departments live on the two islands.[50] It is a very young population with approximately one-half in the age group of less than 20 years. Its annual net rate of increase is 2 percent in French Guiana, and 3 percent in Guadeloupe and Martinique.

The three "old colonies" were voted unanimously into oversea departments with the law of March 19, 1946, which thus brought to an end a process of decolonization which had started in 1848. The effective assimilation was completed by January 1, 1948. Assimilation has meant the adoption of a number of metropolitan institutions. It has brought a political and administrative organization identical with that of any department in metropolitan France, but not necessarily in harmony with the geographical, economic and social reality of the Caribbean area. The tax system of France has been adapted with some changes and direct taxation was introduced. The entire labor legislation with its minimum wages, social charges, social assistance regulations has been accepted with some changes, taking into consideration the differences in economic and social circumstances.[51]

These three areas are quite similar in economic structure, yet French Guiana offers some contrast over the other two. Their outstanding common economic characteristic is the low level of per capita income compared with European and North American standards and even with some of the islands of the Caribbean. Table 1 shows that income per head is only one-third to one-fourth of that in France, and about one-half of that in Puerto Rico. We are fully aware of the difficulties of converting national currencies into a single monetary unit on the basis of official exchange rates and then making comparisons of standards of living. Even so, there is no question of the relative poverty of the territories. Causes of these low levels of income are the high degree of underemployment [52] on the one hand, the insufficiency of capital equipment and technical know-how, and the primitive organization of enterprises,[53] on the other.

TABLE 1.—*Gross domestic product per head of population (1961)*

Guadeloupe	$350	Sweden	$1,780
Martinique	370	United Kingdom	1,400
French Guiana	430	Puerto Rico	750
France	1,350	Trinidad	680
United States of America	2,800	Jamaica	450

NOTE.—Figures refer to gross domestic product at market prices. Approximately AF500=$1.

Sources: Puerto Rico, Junta de Planificación, "Ingreso y Producto, Puerto Rico 1963," San Juan, February 1964. Other countries, United Nations, Statistical Yearbook 1962; United Nations, Yearbook of National Accounts Statistics, 1962.

There is no information on the distribution of family incomes. The only source available is the tax statistics on incomes of individuals (INSEE, A–H). This source is deficient since it covers only incomes assessed under the surcharge of the income tax, and thus proportions derived from it could be very misleading. In these statistics the distribution of incomes by income brackets is related to the distribution by source of income. It appears that in the Island of Martinique, where agricultural activity constitutes a great portion of total domestic activity, the number of taxpayers in that sector make up only 1 percent of all taxpayers, and their income only 0.5 percent of total individual incomes. In Guadeloupe agricultural taxpayers constitute 2 percent of all taxpayers and receive 2 percent of all incomes assessed. Two causes explain this situation. On the one hand more than one-half of the population actively employed in agriculture consists of wage earners, who also engage in subsistence agriculture, and whose income is too low to be assessed by the surtax. On the other hand, the method of assessment of agricultural profits in no way reflects the true amount of these incomes, for it is based, as will be seen in later sections, on evaluations by the appropriate tax authorities as to what constitutes the yield per hectare. Again, according to these statistics we find that in both islands 25 percent of the income tax payers in 1959 had incomes of less than Ant. f600,000 ($1,200), and about one-half had incomes of less than Ant. f1 million ($2,000). Some 54 people in Martinique, and 44 in Guadeloupe (less than 1 percent of all taxpayers) had incomes higher than Ant. f6 million ($12,000). No such information is available in French Guiana.

A more reliable source of information is the SEDES (Societe d'Etudes pour le Developpement Economique et Social) publications which give estimates of disposable income for a number of years, 1958 being the latest year. The disposable income is divided into two categories: high incomes and low incomes. The former are defined as incomes of over Ant. f350,000 ($700) a year in 1958. In this year, out of a disposable income of Ant. f25.5 billion, 56 percent had incomes of less than Ant. f350,000 in Martinique. In Guadeloupe, out of a disposable income of Ant. f25.2 billion, the share of annual incomes of less than Ant. f350,000 was 59 percent. (SEDES, A, 56.) Estimates are not available of disposable income in French Guiana. However, rough calculations show that 77 percent of the population had incomes of less than Ant. f300,000 ($600). (SEDES, C, 56.)

The inequality in the distribution of income is confirmed by data on the size distribution of farms. According to the agricultural census conducted in 1957 by INSEE (Institut National de Statistique et des Etudes Economiques) the number of farms cultivating more than 100 hectares (1 hectare=2.471 acres) was 51, i.e., 0.2 percent of all farms. The area cultivated by them constituted 31.6 percent of the total area. On the other hand 13,813 farms, i.e., 57.9 percent were comprised of areas of less than 1 hectare, accounting for only 14.8 percent of the total cultivated area. (Lasserre, 429.) In Martinique land holdings are equally concentrated. Farms over 40 hectares account for 5 percent of all farms and occupy 74 percent of the agricultural land. Farms over 100 hectares cover 61 percent of the total area (U.S. Department of Agriculture, 6).

In Martinique and Guadeloupe about one-half of the actively employed population is engaged in agriculture, which provides approximately one-third of the total domestic product.[54] The major products are sugarcane and banana (with some coffee and vanilla) in Guadeloupe; and pineapple, sugarcane, and banana in Martinique. The few major industries, therefore, are those that transform the agricultural products.[55]

Another characteristic of the two economies under study is the high share of services in the domestic product. In 1962 trade and transport, public enterprise (which include expenditures on education and health), and public administration have provided in both economies more than one-half of the total product. This is connected, on the one hand, to the heavy reliance on external trade, and on the other, to the importance of various public administrative bodies. The role of the latter institutions will be discussed in detail in part III.

In Guadeloupe in 1962 exports of commodities constituted 35 percent of the gross domestic product while imports of commodities constituted 54 percent; in Martinique the respective ratios were 30 percent to 48 percent. These are extremely high ratios with respect to developed countries, but by no means out of line in the Caribbean setting,[56] with intense specialization in one or two agricultural products. Exports consist predominantly of tropical agricultural products,[57] while imports consist of food and manufactured products. Two-thirds of

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the imports are consumer goods. This high percentage reflects the inexistence of small local industries, limited specialization in agriculture and vastness of the commercial sector. France is the main customer as well as the main provider. Ninety-seven percent of all exports of Guadeloupe and 94 percent of those of Martinique are destined to the franc zone, France's share being 90 and 75 percent respectively. At the same time approximately four-fifths of the imports come from the franc zone. The export monopoly of the franc zone is to be explained by the protective policy of France and the franc zone. Within this market producers are assured a uniform guaranteed price per unit of quantity on the basis of quotas fixed for each territory.[58] In general, quantities in excess of the quotas are sold outside of the franc zone at international prices which are lower than the guaranteed one. The import monopoly is to be explained by the procedure of licensing imports from countries other than the franc zone. Recently some liberalization measures have been introduced.[59]

The intense specialization in few agricultural products, the high ratio of exports to total output, the dominant share of France in exports, coupled with weather hazards (hurricanes), increase the economic vulnerability of these areas to cuts in export demands, which in this case means changes in France's protective price and quantity policy.

Except for the period before the Second World War the balance of trade of the two economies has shown continuous deficits since 1948,[60] and the deficits have been rising ever since. In 1950 exports had paid for more than 90 percent of imports of Guadeloupe, and 80 percent of imports of Martinique. By 1962 exports were covering only 60 percent of imports of the two economies. The reason for the rising deficit is the policy of economic and social development accelerated by the departmentalization. This deficit is financed by the metropolitan budget which is responsible for the expenditures of the Central Government (Etat), provides the funds to meet the deficit in the budgets of the departments, carries out an extensive investment policy via the FIDOOM (Fond d'Investissements pour les Départements d'Outre-Mer), and gives long-term credits via Caisse des Dépôts et Consignations. From this point of view the economies of Guadeloupe and Martinique are directed by decisions on budgetary policy taken in Paris. These injections of capital have been rather effective as a measure of progress, and it is hoped that the policy of economic expansion will, in the long run, lead to the improvement of the unfavorable situation in the balance of trade.

French Guiana is a vast territory mostly covered by jungle. It is impenetrable except for limited strips along the shores of the rivers; consequently it has not been exploited. Furthermore, few of the great variety of trees appear to lend themselves to exploitation. Agriculture is developed to a very limited extent. Some rice is cultivated near Sinnamary (on the coast, northwest of Cayenne), sugarcane and bananas are grown in the lowlands, and pineapple and cacao in the highlands. Mineral exploitation is practically nonexistent.[61] The population is concentrated in the capital city of Cayenne and its environs (91 percent). Around 40 percent of the population is estimated to be in the labor force. About 30 percent of the population is in the subsistence sector, and another 15 percent in the marginal economies. There is considerable amount of underemployment due to the low level of local production and the primitive organization of enterprises.[62]

Agriculture is very unimportant. It provides mainly the cane for the three distilleries. Its share in the gross domestic product is only 6 percent. On the other hand, services constitute more than 70 percent of the gross domestic product. This is due, again, to the importance of the role of government and of external trade. Wages and salaries paid by government alone account for 25 percent of the total output, and trade and transport provide 38 percent, which shows that the economy is dependent on the external sector. Since agriculture is unimportant, mining is almost nonexistent, and industry insufficient to meet even the needs of the local market, exports of commodities form only 7 percent of the gross product while imports make around 50 percent. Consequently, exports are able to finance only a minimal portion of total imports (14 percent in 1960), and the deficit in the balance of trade is met by public transfers from metropolitan France. In 1960, for instance, the total amount of public transfers was even greater than the deficit in the balance of trade.

Thus the economy and its growth depend entirely upon the push provided by the foreign sector. The growth in agriculture is a function of external decisions. There is a close tie between exports and the metropolitan consignment of rum. The little amount of gold that is produced is bought entirely by France. Growth in construction and public works is a function mainly of public investments which are financed by metropolitan France; and provision of educational facilities again depend upon the political and social orientation of public authorities. The public sector paying 70–80 percent of total salaries and providing 50–80 percent of total capital formation thus acquires an exceptional importance.

The public sector has been the main contributor to the growth in the aggregate output in all the three oversea departments. Aggregate output has doubled between 1952 and 1962. Basically the departmentalization has not caused a fundamental change in the economic structure over the decade. By nature of their products the oversea departments have remained a "colonial" economy closely dependent on that of France. They still depend as much on agriculture and trade as they did before or immediately after the assimilation. Gross values added in agriculture, trade and transportation, and other industries have grown at about the same rate as total output. But the contribution of the public sector has exceeded it by far. The greatest rate of growth is observed in public enterprises (3.5- to 4-fold); for instance out of the Ant. f37 billion spent by France between 1946 and 1956 on public investments via FIDOM, Ant. f3 billion have been used for social purposes such as education, health, and housing, and these expenditures have grown further with the application of later plans. (It is to be remembered that public enterprises are defined to include education and health.) Another 15 billion have been spent on the construction of roads, ports, and airports (France, Commissariat General du Plan, B, 27–28.) This means that three-fourths of all public investments have been devoted to social, cultural, and infrastructure purposes.[63] It is inevitable then that these expenditures would entail further increases in current expenditures on maintenance and operation.

If the rate of growth in output is to be maintained in the future, that of agricultural output will have to be sustained as well. Current conditions in the markets of banana and sugar do not appear to permit such high rates of growth. Moreover, due to the less favorable natural conditions and relatively insufficent mechanization and high labor costs,[64] unit costs of production of these products are higher than in neighboring territories. Diversification of the economy is, therefore, stressed by all interested groups. Unfortunately the possibilities of creating new activities are not very great. The territories are limited (except for French Guiana); there are no mineral resources (except possibly in French Guiana); there is no possibility for developing hydraulic energy; the local markets are small and the large external markets are too far and too costly to penetrate, because of unfavorable transportation conditions. The situation is all the worse because of the relative prosperity of some of the neighboring islands. The rate of growth in Puerto Rico has been sustained at a high rate since 1950, new enterprises are springing up in Trinidad and Barbados consequent upon the decisive actions of their Government.

The emphasis on diversification starts with the second development plan[65] (1954–57) which advocated that all new enterprises that present an essential advantage to the development of the economy be temporarily exempt from all direct taxes, a recommendation which has been enforced. However, despite their emphasis on diversification, neither the second nor the third plan (1958–61) have given it strong impetus. The fourth development plan (1962–

65) once again emphasized social, cultural, and infrastructural investments. In 1962 total funds available for public investments in Martinique amounted to NF76 million. Nineteen percent of this amount was used to aid production directly, 41 percent was used for education, health and housing, and 40 percent for roads and other transportation. The estimates for 1963, 1964, and 1965 show that even smaller proportions are provided to stimulate production (France. Dept. de la Martinique, B, 21–22). The highest growth is envisaged in the expansion of traditional primary crops, such as sugar and its by-products, bananas, pineapple, etc. In addition to traditional products the plan emphasizes the development of complementary industries such as vanilla and essential oil-bearing plants, food crops, livestock, handicrafts, medium scale industries, and tourism.

A brief word now on the financial and monetary framework within which the oversea departments operate, before we enter the analysis of the tax pattern and the burden of taxation. The money in circulation is the French franc which is at par and freely exchangeable with the French metropolitan franc. It is issued by L'Institut d'Emission des Départements d'Outre-Mer,[66] with its headquarters in Paris. It performs the classical function of central banking, of issuing money, and of rediscounting short-term commercial securities and Treasury bills. It also provides short-term credit for the private banks under special circumstances.

The issue of local currency is limited by the size of the active balance of payments between the Government of France and the departments themselves, i.e., by the financial transfers of the French Treasury to the oversea departments on the one hand and by the Institute's portfolio of discounted short- and medium-term securities of private commercial banks on the other.

Private banks are in principle free to determine the amount of short-term credits. In reality their operations are subject to strict regulations of the National Credit Council concerning terms of installment purchases, obligations to make a financial report yearly, and the maintenance of a sufficient coefficient of liquidity. They cannot engage in medium-term credit operations without having first obtained the consent of the Institut d'Emission. This consent depends upon the economic and social advantages of the investment to be undertaken.

The bulk of the long-term credits is handled by a number of financial institutions the sources of which are almost exclusively metropolitan. The most important of these institutions are FIDOM and SATEC (Société d'Assistance Technique et de Crédit). FIDOM plays the role of an exchange office as well as a lending institution. It gives credit to public authorities for housing and social and economic development. SATEC provides, in addition to long-term lending, short- and medium-term credits in the areas of agriculture, handicrafts and light industries.

II. The general tax pattern and the burden of taxation

In this section we will have first a brief look into the general features of the yield of taxes that make up the tax system and then turn our attention to the burden of taxation.

On the basis of available information it was impossible to combine aggregate revenue of all levels of government without double counting. Central, departmental, and local government tables, indicate roughly that in Guadeloupe and Martinique, the Central Government collects around 60 percent of all the taxes. In French Guiana, on the other hand, it is the local government which collects approximately one-half of the total tax yield, Central Government collecting 36 percent and the department 14 percent. The second feature is the heavy reliance on indirect taxation and the small role played by taxes on income. In French Guiana taxes on income proper (i.e., the individual income tax and the company tax), provided around 12 percent of the global tax revenue in 1959. In Guadaloupe the share was 16 percent, and in Martinique 18 percent. Within the budget of the Central Government taxes on income provide about one-third of the total tax revenue. The greatest portion of these taxes comes from personal income taxation (75–80 percent). Company taxation is unimportant, because of the economic structure of the islands; it probably will continue to be insignificant in the future due to the introduction of industrial tax exemptions. The major source of revenue appears to be the value added tax which alone provides close to 40 percent of the total Central Government tax revenue, and close to 60 percent of the socalled direct taxes. A third feature of the revenue system is the significant share of transfers from other levels of government in the budgets of the departments. This is especially significant in the case of Martinique and French Guiana. In the former, on the average of 73 percent, and in the latter, 80 percent of department revenues were provided by such transfers, the greatest portion of which is provided by the Central Government. In Guadaloupe the ratio is about 30 percent. This low ratio is to be explained by the lesser significance of the Government in the island's economy compared with Martinique and French Guiana.

And now we turn our attention to the problem of the burden of taxation. This raises two problems. The first is a conceptual one of the way in which tax burdens can be studied and calculated meaningfully. Students of public finance are quite aware of the recent arguments relating to the feasibility of such calculations. Let us merely indicate that tax incidence has acquired an entirely new aspect with Musgrave's discussion of incidence as changes brought about in overall real distribution of income (The Theory of Public Finance, ch. 10). In addition, there is the question raised by Prest concerning the validity of the assumptions underlying incidence calculations, that direct taxes remain where they are imposed but that indirect taxes are shifted fully to the consumer (art. in Economica, vol. 22). Even if we were to undertake such a calculation under shaky assumptions, there still remains the second problem, i.e., the availability of statistical information which will enable us to allocate taxes to the recipients of different income levels. This requires detailed information on income distribution by size and the pattern of consumption expenditures within each income level so that direct and indirect taxes can be allocated to the appropriate income groups.

With the assumptions that economic development should be accompanied by an amelioration in the overall income pattern, and that the fiscal system can be used to this end, the study of tax burdens becomes extremely important. In this respect, a study of the distribution of tax burdens must be supplemented with an analysis of the incidence of the benefits arising from expenditure by the public sector, the size of which shows a tendency to expand, as will be borne out by the anaylsis of the subsequent section.

Both aspects of incidence—tax and expenditure—are out of the question in the French Antilles where there are no household budget surveys to indicate consumption patterns and saving behaviors, and no information on the overall distribution of income. Faced with limited data we can only attempt to give an indication of the global tax burden; i.e., look at the total taxes collected to the aggregate output of each territory.

The ratio of total taxes to gross domestic product in 1960 was 15 percent in Guadeloupe, 19 percent in Martinique, and 11 percent in French Guiana, as opposed to approximately 37 percent in France. It appears, therefore, that the tax burden in these departments is considerably lower than in metropolitan France. This calculation does not take into consideration the declining marginal utility of incomes; obviously a 20-percent tax on an income of, say, $100 does not signify the same sacrifice as a 20-percent tax on an income of $400. There is no way of knowing the utility schedules, but a simple calculation based on weighting the tax burden by per capita gross domestic product yields an entirely different result.[67] Table 2 compares weighted and unweighted tax burdens presented in the form of an index where the tax burden of France is equated to 100 in both cases.

TABLE 2.—*Relative tax burdens*

	Unweighted	Weighted
France	100	100
Martinique	51	188
Guadeloupe	40	160
French Guiana	30	96

It is clear that both in Martinique and Guadeloupe the tax burden is considerably heavier than in France; in French Guiana it is at best equal to that of the metropole. A number of fiscal advantages have been recognized in these areas in the form of rate reductions and exemptions; nevertheless these advantages do not appear to be sufficient to equate the relative tax burden of the metropole to that of its oversea departments in the Caribbean. No further comment can be made on tax burdens in view of complete absence of relevant data. We should add, however, that a similar calculation made among nine Caribbean countries[63] shows that the tax burden is heaviest in British Guiana and Surinam and lowest in Puerto Rico, while the French Caribbean departments rank in between (Caribbean Organization, B, 138 and 143).

III. Taxes and economic development

The main emphasis of this part is on the problems of financing government expenditure. We shall not be concerned with its optimum size and composition, for its determination is more of a political matter than an economic one. Nor will we elaborate the merits of development planning and the role the government should play in fostering economic growth. We shall only analyze the present financial situation of the French Antilles. In so doing we shall examine briefly the nature and breakdown of government expenditure. This will be followed by the analysis of the relative growth in public spending and its reasons. Finally we shall consider the adequacy of the tax system in financing the growth in government expenditure. Table 3 below gives the percentage breakdown in 1960.

It would appear at first sight as if the point brought out by Prest—that the proportion of total expenditure devoted to current plus capital

TABLE 3.—*Percentage of government expenditure, 1960*

	Martinique	Guadeloupe	French Guiana
Current goods and services	30.2	31.8	49.1
Capital formation	21.4	26.9	17.0
Social transfers	44.8	35.8	22.9
Transfers to business	1.9	3.6	2.5
Net loans	1.4	.9	2.5
Other	----------	1.0	6.0
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0

goods is considerably higher in the underdeveloped than in the developed countries (Prest, B, 21)—is not borne out in the case of the French oversea departments. For social transfers constitute a very high percentage of total government expenditure, a percentage which in the case of Martinique and Guadaloupe is higher than the one prevalent in developed countries; and the weighted average of the proportion of current and capital purchases, though somewhat higher than the one in developed countries, is around 55 percent, i.e., less than the one prevalent in many other underdeveloped countries. This appearance is partly due to the conceptual basis of the statistics. It must be remembered that the education system and hospitals have been treated by SEDES as public enterprises, the services of which are ficticiously purchased by households which receive an equal fictitious amount in the form of transfers from the public budget. This procedure does not change aggregate government expenditures, but reduces the expenditure on current goods and services and swells that on current transfers. In reality, therefore, total expenditure devoted to current plus capital goods is indeed considerably higher than in developed countries. This is even more apparent in French Guiana where government salaries constitute one-fourth of total output.

The second aspect, i.e., the greater importance of capital expenditure, is manifested in the present case. The weighted average of the proportion of capital expenditure in total public spending is in the order of 23 percent as opposed to the 6 percent given by Prest for developed economies. This is clear evidence of the role played by the government in the working of the economy. In fact, the share of public fixed capital formation in total capital formation varies from 35 percent in Martinique and Guadeloupe to 62 percent in French Guiana.

The functional classification tables bring out the overwhelming importance of expenditure on social services (education, housing, health, labor, and social security), at the central and departmental levels. Data are not available for the same years for all the oversea departments, but it appears that in Martinique social expenditure constitutes approximately 70 percent of total expenditure of the department and 64 percent of that of Central Government. In Guadeloupe, the proportions are around 40 and 60 percent, respectively. French Guiana devotes 45 percent of its departmental expenditure and 40 percent of it central expenditure on social services.[69] On the local level expenditure on economic services (roads, industry, and commerce, public works) play a relatively more important role.

Certainly the departments of Martinique, Guadeloupe, and French Guiana constitute no exception to the general rule of long-term pressure on government spending which is observed in so many underdeveloped countries. This pressure is even greater in recent years with the intensive application of plans which strive for rapid development of the infrastructure. Over the 11 years from 1949–60 government expenditure (central, departmental, local) has grown by 3.3 times in Martinique and 4.7 times in Guadeloupe, while the growth in gross domestic product in market prices has been around 2.5 times and 3 times, respectively. In other words, the rate of growth in gross domestic product has fallen short of the growth of public spending. In French Guiana the case has been the reverse. While government expenditure rose by 35 percent between 1952 and 1960, gross domestic product increased by 75 percent. The explanation for this situation can be found in the fact that while public capital formation stagnated and social transfers rose rather slowly, some of the industrial sectors have enjoyed considerable expansion.

The major contributor to the growth in government expenditure has been the rise in social services and transfers. In Martinique these expenditures have risen by approximately 8 times over the years in question. The Central Government alone has doubled its expenditures on education between 1956 and 1960. In Guadeloupe, where data are available for a greater number of years on expenditures by functional categories, expenditure on social services and transfers have risen by 6.4 times over the indicated 11 years. Between 1950 and 1962 Central Government expenditures on education witnessed a rise of more than 9 times, those on health of more than 10 times. In French Guiana expenditures on social services and transfers have risen by about 20 percent between 1952 and 1960. However, expenditures on education by Central Government have approximately doubled between 1956 and 1960.

One reason for the considerable growth in government expenditure, especially in social services, is the extension of the metropolitan social and educational legislation to all the oversea departments at the time of their assimilation into the French Union. The application of this legislation has not been immediate but rather gradual; nevertheless it has brought with it services such as family allowances, social aid, medical aid, and medical care, old-age pensions, and an educational system which is formally an almost identical replica of the metropolitan system. This has been reinforced by the growth of population sustained at an average of 3 percent since 1950 which has more than proportionately enhanced the needs for housing, waterways, roads, sewers, hospitals, and education (in all three departments the literacy rate is almost 100 percent).

A second reason for the expansion of the public sector is the lack of those facilities which can only be provided by the Government and are considered to be the duty of the Government. The development plan gives a predominant role to the Government in overcoming the lack in economic and social investments, in constructing ports and airports, powerplants, schools, hospitals, sanitary installations, etc.

If we consider the case of Guadeloupe alone, for which we have the breakdown of Central Government expenditure by functional categories into current and capital, we find that, even ignoring the expenditures arising from the plan, the growth of capital expenditure has been overwhelmingly faster than the growth of current expenditure, whether considered on the whole or by individual categories; thus, total current expenditure of the Central Government rose by 7.5 times between 1950 and 1963 while capital expenditure rose by 24 times, mainly because they stood at such a low level initially. Current spending on education increased around 5 times while capital expenditure on this item rose by 16 times. The cases of public works and transportation, and agriculture are similar with very much slower rise in current compared with capital expenditure. All these reflect the lack of infrastructure facilities at the beginning of the "fifties" and enhance the role of the Government in the development of these countries and thereby raise aggregate public spending.

A third reason is a familiar one and is related to the one above. Since there is an acute shortage of capital because of the extreme weakness of the local financial market and the incapacity of the savings of individuals to meet the demand for investments (an appreciable quantity of private savings is transferred to France),[70] it is the Government in the last resort that has the means and resources with which to meet the growing demand for improvements in living standards—education, housing, etc. All of these are accompanied naturally by a rise in services which are to administer,[71] provide, and develop the apparatus with which to carry out the envisaged targets.

The corollary of the spectacular growth of the public sector has been the sharp growth of budget deficits. Despite their expansion, revenues have not been sufficient to meet the growth in expenditures. In Guadeloupe the deficit in the consolidated account has grown by almost 10 times between 1959 and 1960; in Martinique and French Guiana the growth has been less spectacular. In Martinique the revenues of the Central Government rose from Ant. f3,732 million to Ant. f5,580 million between 1956 and 1959, while expenditures rose from Ant. f5,515 million to Ant. f8,254, increasing the deficit for the said years from Ant. f1,783 million to Ant. f2,674 million. The same tendency is observed in Guadeloupe. In 1955 the current revenue of the Central Government stood at Ant. f2,708 million and current expenditures at Ant. f4,225 million, yielding a deficit of Ant. f1,517 million to which capital expenditures must be added to the amount of Ant. f813 million. By 1962 the deficit had risen to Ant. f5,388 million when the Central Government had collected Ant. f6,202 million as revenue and spent

Ant. f11,589.4 million on current operations and capital expenditures had risen to Ant. f2,900 million. The budget of the Central Government of French Guiana also has a continuing deficit; between 1956 and 1959 the deficit fluctuated around an average of Ant. f1,600 million.

On the departmental and local levels the picture is very much the same. In all three territories in question expenditures exceeded revenues. In the case of Martinique and Guadeloupe, departmental expenditures were 2 to 3 times as high as their proper revenues, while in French Guiana they stood at around 4 times as high. Ultimately the deficits on the departmental and local levels are financed out of transfers from the budget of the Central Government. These transfers constitute a very high proportion of total department revenues (including the said transfers)—around 73 percent in Martinique, 80 percent in French Guiana, and 30 percent in Guadeloupe. The deficit of the Central Government should not be viewed as a deficit in the strict sense of the word, but rather as the difference between what the Central Government collects and spends in these oversea departments.

From an overall point of view it appears that aggregate taxes collected by the three levels of government in the three oversea departments of France have grown at a faster rate than their respective gross domestic products, and, with the exception of Guadeloupe, at a faster rate than their respective aggregate expenditure (see table 4). This faster growth in tax yield,[72] however, is somewhat deceptive, for two reasons. The first relates to the base year 1949, which was only 3 years after the formal assimilation of the departments into the French Union and 1 year after the effective introduction of a completely new tax system into the ex-colonies. The tax yield in this year is, therefore, unusually low. The second reason relates to the distribution of the collection of various types of taxes between the three levels of government. Since the Central Government collects more than 60 percent of all taxes and since Central Government taxes differ from those of the departments and local governments, the relevant analysis into the adequacy of the tax system to meet expenditures should be made at each governmental level.

The major taxes collected by the Central Government are the income tax on individuals and companies, the value-added tax ("taxe sur la valeur ajoutée"—referred to as TVA hereafter), and the custom duties which altogether provided 73.3 percent of central tax revenue in Martinique, 73.1 percent in Guadeloupe, and 53.4 percent in French Guiana. In Martinique, between 1956 and 1959, gross domestic product increased by 43 percent while the income tax yield rose by 82 percent, the TVA by 46 percent, and the custom duties by 31 percent. In Guadeloupe, between 1955 and 1959, gross domestic product rose by 78 percent, while income tax rose by 151 percent, the TVA by 43 percent, and the custom duties by 74 percent. In French Guiana, while gross domestic product expanded by only 30 percent between 1956 and 1959, the yield of the income tax declined by 10 percent and that of custom duties stagnated. We do not maintain that the figures for the various tax yields are entirely correct; it is quite possible that they include tax arrears, penalties, and so forth. But it seems that while the tax on individual and corporate income varies, as expected, more than proportionately with the gross domestic product, the yield of the indirect taxes in question varies at best with total output. Since income tax provides around 30 percent of the total Central Government tax revenue, some elasticity is introduced into the tax system at this level.

Tᴀʙʟᴇ 4.—*Relative growth in tax yield, expenditure, budgetary deficit, and gross domestic product*

Year	Tax yield (Ant. f mil.)	Index	Expenditure	Index	Deficit (Ant. f mil.)	Index	Gross domestic product (Ant. f mil.)	Index
				Martinique				
1949	2,475	100	5,310	100	2,670	100	17,840	100
1960	9,220	373	17,760	334	8,065	302	48,160	159
				Guadeloupe				
1949	1,695	100	3,208	100	750	100	15,625	100
1960	7,350	434	15,010	468	7,350	980	47,695	305
				French Guiana				
1952	291	100	3,554	100	2,453	100	4,011	100
1960	793	273	4,706	132	3,459	141	7,092	177

Source: SEDES, (A), 48; (B), 56 and 72; (C), 46.

A similar statement cannot be made at the departmental level. Total departmental tax yield rose by 25 percent in Martinique between 1955 and 1959 (as opposed to a 54-percent growth in gross domestic product), and by 76 percent in Guadeloupe between 1955 and 1960 (as opposed to a 91-percent growth in gross domestic product). In French Guiana the tax yield declined between 1956 and 1960 as opposed to a 41-percent growth in gross domestic product. The relatively poor performance of departmental and local tax revenue can be expalined by three major factors: the structure of the tax system, the method of assessment, and the degree of evasion.

As far as the stucture of the tax system is concerned, in all the three departments 70–80 percent of total tax revenue stems from indirect taxation, the rest comes from the fictitious assessment of small business incomes and of property incomes from land and buildings. It is very difficult to make comparative statements when data are not available for all three departments for the same years and over a sufficiently long period. It appears, however, that the productivity of neither type of taxation has been great enough to keep pace with the growth in domestic output, let alone with that of public spending. The yield of indirect taxation has either stagnated or grown at slower rates. The same can be said for the yield of "anciennes contributions directes."

Within the sphere of indirect taxation the tax on performance of services ("taxe sur prestations de services") and major taxes on specific commodities constitute part of the Central Government taxes. The sales tax collected by the departments and local authorities is levied on those transactions which are not subject to the TVA. Also, numerous exemptions provided with the hope of fostering economic development shrink the base of these taxes. And, despite differential rates for some of these taxes, transactions which are subject to higher rates (such as services of beauty parlors, restaurants, movie admissions), are not in sufficient demand, given the structure of the economies and low levels of per capita income, to contribute a large portion of the yield of these taxes.

The same low rate of development is observed in the case of the "old direct taxes" which are real income taxes (as opposed to personal) assessed on external indicia. Leaving aside the problem of effective collection, their productivity depends on the one hand on the number of "centimes" voted and on the other on the assessment of the tax base. The number of centimes voted determines the rate of these taxes. Since this number varies from year to year according to the exigencies of the public authorities, the rate also varies accordingly. More important is the aspect of the tax base, which does not automatically change with the output of the economy but with decisions of "Conseil Général" and "Conseil Municipal." Centimes are levied on the rental value of buildings, the rental value of land, on furnished premises, and business licenses. All of them are hindered by the outdated bases of assessment and exemptions which reduce the number of taxpayers.

No revision of the base of the tax on rental value of buildings has been made since 1941. A series of permanent and temporary exemptions are recognized for various types of construction and these apply specifically to those persons who have the ability to pay the tax. Furthermore, it is estimated that about 35 percent of the population in Martinique live in "cases" which by the nature of exemptions fall outside of the scope of the tax (Cotteret, 475). Though we do not have comparable data for Guadeloupe, a look at Point-a-Pitre alone yields a similar impression.

No revision of the tax base on rental value of land has been made since 1948 (with the exception of some minor alterations in 1956 in Guadeloupe). The base is determined "à forfait" according to the revenue per hectare, which is setup by the tax bureaus on the basis of a tariff applied differentially to farms of differing fertility and producing different crops. Since farms with given annual revenues are exempt from the tax, given the unequal distribution of land, a large number of small properties (up to 3 hectares) fall outside the scope of the tax. But in the remainder of the properties it is the inadequacy of an outdated "forfait" regime which erodes the basis of this tax. Thus, in Martinique revenue per hectare in banana plantations is set at Ant. f10,000, when in reality it could be up to Ant. f200,000 in favorable years (Cotteret, 467). A property of 100 hectares in this case will be levied according to an income of Ant. f1 million, when in reality it provides its owner with Ant. f20 million.

The tax on furnished premises is imposed, in addition to clubs and societies, on persons who are reputed to have sufficient means of resources. The mere fact that a large proportion of the population consists of agricultural workers whose per capita income is even lower than per capita domestic output and who moreover do not possess property to rent, limits the number of payers of this tax. On the other hand recent expansion in housing construction would have a contrary effect.

The case of the "patentes" is similar. Their base depends on a fixed rate and a proportional rate. The latter varies with the rental value of business premises which is rigid because of lack of revisions since the forties.

Data on the problem of tax evasion is nonexistent. Our remarks, therefore, are bound to be limited to our observations in Guadeloupe and Martinique and to the statements of many tax officials with whom we have discussed the problem. There is no study or sample survey to measure the degree of evasion and find out where it occurs and how. Nor is there any way of knowing with some certainty the extent of the gap between the tax base as reported in the returns and the same tax base as indicated by adjusted national accounts. At best we can make a rough guess. SEDES (A, 56) gives household and business income arising out of the process of production in Martinique to be Ant. f35 billion in 1958. In this figure is included Ant. f5 billion of undistributed profits, the remainder of Ant. f30 billion representing personal incomes. (This figure excludes Ant. f4 billion of social transfers, the majority of which is nontaxable). INSEE (B, 74), on the other hand, reports that in 1958 total income higher than Ant. f350,000 declared under the surtax amounted to Ant. f7 billion. It appears therefore that only 23 percent of personal incomes was declared. This conclusion would be incorrect because personal incomes of Ant. f30 billion encompass all levels of income, including incomes in kind, while incomes reported for surtax purposes relate only to incomes higher than Ant. f350,000. Ant. f15 billion of the personal income of Ant. f30 billion is indicated to be incomes of less than Ant. f350,000 per annum (SEDES, A, 56). This yields personal taxable incomes of approximately Ant. f15 billion, only half of which appears to be reported. A rough estimate would indicate that the degree of evasion is 50 percent. Evasion, however, does not hit all incomes equally; it is very unequally distributed among the types of income. Out of the Ant. f7 billion reported as the tax base, Ant. f5 billion, or 70 percent, is represented by wages and salaries for which the chance of evasion practically does not exist. A more correct conclusion would be that tax evasion is significantly higher than 50 percent, i.e., to the extent of 80 percent $\left(1-\frac{7-5}{15-5}\right)$. We should hasten to add that this gap is not caused entirely by international underreporting of incomes for tax purposes, but it is also aided by the system of fictitious assessment of incomes. The same calculation for Guadeloupe yields a similar result.

In the sphere of indirect taxation, evasion is somewhat more difficult, though it does exist. An additional problem with respect to taxes collected by the departments and local authorities is not so much evasion, but the inability of the taxpayers to pay their share. We have been repeatedly told in Martinique and Guadeloupe that the public authorities have frequently been able to collect only 25 to 30 percent of the centimes voted due to the genuine inability to pay on the part of the taxpayers.

It is generally maintained that to meet the longrun growth of Government expenditure, it is desirable that the tax system as a whole should be income-elastic in character, so that governments can budget for a sufficient excess of revenue over expenditure to enable private investment to take place without inflationary consequences. This means that either the yield of each individual tax should be elastic with respect to national income changes, or that those taxes whose yield is highly elastic with respect to national income should be predominant in the revenue structure. (Prest, 25–26.)

Income-elasticity of the tax yield alone, however, does not seem to provide an answer to the problem of financing the growth in public spending in the French Caribbean. Considering that public spending has grown faster than gross domestic product, and that the tax yield of the departments and local authorities has failed to accompany the growth in output, it is obvious that the tax system is unable to meet the requirements as stipulated in the budgets and the plans. However, even if the tax system were elastic with respect to changes in national income, its elasticity would at best reduce the budgetary imbalance but not eliminate it, since the expenditure policy in the departments is determined independently of consideration of tax revenues. In other words, the determinants of the tax yields are entirely different from those of public spending.

The idea can be expressed in a slightly different way. The developed countries, having in their possession a highly efficient fiscal administration, are in a position to adjust their revenues to their expenditures, or at best to plan for possible sources of tax revenue when contemplating increases in expenditure. In the underdeveloped countries expenditures are limited by the extent of the governments' ability to raise sufficient funds. Given the political and economic reasons for which developing countries are committed to growth and to an increase in public participation in the social and economic sphere, they are constantly in need of additional revenues. Within this frame of reference the French Caribbean raises an interesting example with respect to territories associated with a metropolitan power. For France is committed to the development of this area and, as we have mentioned in previous pages, to the preparation and execution of their development plans. However deficient these plans may be, they indicate genuine preoccupation by the metropolitan power in the affairs of these territories. However, they are also indicative of the fact that these plans are prepared with no reference to the revenue structure of the areas concerned. We have seen in section III that continuously increasing budgetary deficits of the oversea departments are being regularly met out of the French Treasury. As long as this practice continues, i.e., as long as the deficits are met by France, there is little preoccupation concerning the finance of the development of these islands. But this does not solve the question as to how the tax system, which is a replica of the metropolitan system (with some changes), responds to their needs and requirements. A discussion of a tax reform is beyond the scope of this paper, for as long as the French Caribbean constitutes politically an integral part of the French Republic it is fruitless to raise such a question. It is nevertheless useful to look at the relationship between France and the French Caribbean. We now turn our attention to this matter.

IV. Fiscal and economic relations with France

The analysis of the previous sections leads to the conclusion that public expenditures in all three Caribbean departments constitute a very high proportion of their aggregate output (37 percent in Martinique, 32 percent in Guadeloupe, and 66 percent in French Guiana) and that taxes collected locally are insufficient to meet these expenditures (the ratio of taxes to expenditure is as follows: Martinique, 52 percent; Guadeloupe, 48 percent; French Guiana, 17 percent). Consequently every year increasing amounts of transfers have to be made out of the French Treasury to meet the budgetary deficits. In many years these transfers are higher than the actual deficit in the balance of trade, because of the net outflow of private transfers.

Therefore, revenues created directly or indirectly by the public sector and the effects and incidence of all budgetary decisions assume a significant importance in the economy of these areas. The significance is even greater when one considers that a large portion of these transfers concern capital expenditures which arise out of the implementation of development plans since 1950.

These expenditures, as was pointed out earlier, have emphasized the creation of the badly needed infrastructure and the improvement of the already existing major sector, i.e., agriculture. A few examples will help illustrate the case. Out of a total of NF203 million envisaged as capital expenditure in the fourth plan (1962–65) in Martinique, only 9 percent is cited as aid to production, the rest being social overhead expenditure in which housing has a share of 28 percent of total capital expenditure (France, Dept. de la Martinique, B, 22). A similar philosophy of development is also observable in Guadeloupe where investment expenditures on various types of infrastructure constitute around 70 percent of total capital expenditures of the fourth development plan (Lasserre, 1,040).

Undoubtedly, this type of investment is extremely necessary; no one will question the fact that without a proper infrastructure a proper development of the economy cannot be attained. Nevertheless, given the circumstances of the areas, these investments cause repercussions on the balance of trade, level of prices, creation of employment, and on the economic structure in general.

The emphasis on the improvement in the agricultural sector via transportation and communication facilities and by the introduction of more efficient techniques is undertaken primarily from the standpoint of increasing exports, i.e., of bananas, pineapple, sugarcane, and its products. This in itself raises two questions. The first is that world demand for these products is income inelastic, and that a great expansion in their marketing cannot be expected. The second question is related to the problem of the balance of trade. An increase in exports cet. par. surely helps reduce the deficit in the balance of trade. On the other hand, the same increase in exports generates higher incomes, which, given the low level of living, leaks out almost immediately and entirely in the form of expenditures on imported goods, because of the inexistence of local production. As long as France automatically meets the deficit in the balance of trade, the situation is not as precarious as that of some of the developing nations of today. Despite the fact that increased incomes find their counterpart in an equal amount of imported commodities, i.e., increased demand is matched by an increase in supply, the problem of price increases will remain, because of the high cost of imported commodities on the one hand, and of the investments undertaken by the public sector, on the other, which by their nature have a very high capital output ratio. The policy of public investments does not engender a serious local inflationary pressure, for a large fraction of the public transfers are rapidly sent back to France in the form of imported commodities and private transfers to the metropole. Nevertheless the money supply has risen appreciably. In Martinique, for instance, the money supply has increased by 5 times over the last 10 years (France, Dept. de la Martinique, B, 113). The cost of living index rose by 72 percent between 1950 and 1963. (SEDES, A, 71; B, 23; and France, Dept. de la Martinique, B, 110).

The problem of employment is very hard to analyze because of lack of data. A priori it is not very difficult to see that any improvement in agriculture, as the plans stipulate, will rely upon more capital intensive methods of production. Apart from solving the problem of underemployment which already exists to a large extent, this creates additional unemployment, which is further aggravated by the rapid rate of growth in population. It is estimated that in Martinique public investments have created no more than 400 jobs a year (France, Dept. de la Martinique, C, vol. IV, 54). This is no more than 3.5 percent of those counted as underemployed. Considering that there is already an excess supply of labor,[73] it is evident that investment policy must be oriented toward more labor intensive fields.[74]

The present discussion shows that the development policy determined by France[75] does not appear to comply with the development needs and requirements of her Caribbean departments. "Departmentalization has been an obstacle to, rather than an encouragement of, industrialization" (Lasserre, 1,066). The plans do not strive to change the basic economic structure, but departmentalization superimposes a series of institutions and organizations, such as the fiscal administration, which correspond to an entirely different setup, such as that of France. In the words of Professor Lasserre:

> It is not enough to recognize fiscal and financial advantages in order to encourage industry in the Antilles. A special customs system is needed, which will be liberal in importing primary goods from foreign countries, but protective with respect to infant industries. Can such measures be passed in a Parliament where French industrial and commercial interests predominate? (p. 1,066).

We do not intend here to answer this question. Our purpose was to study the fiscal system of Martinique, Guadeloupe, and French Guiana within their economic structure and within the scope of their development plans. How and in which way the fiscal system needs modification and what should be the contents of the plans, are problems to be properly solved by these areas and France alone.

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2. The Political Status of the French Caribbean

I. The present status of Martinique and Guadeloupe

A. Introduction

On March 19, 1946, the French Parliament voted unanimously that the colonies of Martinique, Guadeloupe, and Guiana in the Caribbean, and the Reunion in the Indian Ocean were to be made oversea departments of France, upon the petition of the Antillean parliamentarians who represented the said colonies in the constituent assembly after the liberation of France, as well as upon the petition of the General Councils of the territories concerned. They were thus assimilated officially into the administrative system of metropolitan France. The analysis which follows is focused on the developments of Martinique and Guadeloupe, but it applies equally to the situation in French Guiana.

To understand the consequences of the assimilation it is indispensable to mention the previously prevailing political patterns, according to which the administrative organizations of Martinique, Guadeloupe, and Guiana were highly decentralized. Legally two separate entities governed the colonies, namely the Governor and the General Council (Conseil Général). The Governor, representing the French Government, was delegated extensive powers. He embodied all the powers of a full executive, he assured law and order and defense, he was responsible for all administrative services, but he also had the special power of promulgating laws, a power which is generally recognized as belonging exclusively to heads of state. The metropolitan legislation did not in general extend to the colonies unless it was explicitly specified by the French Parliament. They were subject to the Senatus Consulate system of May 3, 1854. Accordingly, the head of the state legislated for the oversea colonies by decree.

The General Council, which was elected by the people of the colonies, was considered to be a legal and political entity entirely separate from the Governor. The colonies, at that time, enjoyed, at least theoretically, fiscal autonomy. The General Council could determine the types of taxes to be levied, with the exception of customs duties over which it had no say, and the methods of their collection. In reality, of course, the Governor could always interfere.

The municipalities, on the other hand, had no effective power; they did not even have the limited autonomy which the metropolitan municipalities enjoyed.

B. Consequences of the assimilation

(1) THE ADMINISTRATIVE SYSTEM.—The assimilation law modified greatly the administrative branches of the oversea governments of Martinique and Guadeloupe. The Antilles, as French departments, lost whatever fiscal autonomy they previously had. Their administrative regime is now modeled on the highly centralized French one.

The immediate effect of this transformation was the atomization of local administration. While previously all government departments were directly and exclusively responsible to the Colonial Governor, after the departmentalization they became responsible to the appropriate ministries in Paris. Naturally changes were not carried out overnight and a series of laws and decrees from 1946 up to 1960 finally shaped the present administrative setup of the oversea departments. One of the last major changes was on February 13, 1959, which, in order to give greater coherence and provide a greater degree of centralization, placed the administrative system of the oversea departments directly under the Ministry of Overseas Departments and Territories.

The administrative setup is composed of three separate entities: The Prefecture, the General Council, and the Municipalities.

a. *Prefecture.*—With assimilation, governors disappeared and, like in all the departments of metropolitan France, prefects were appointed[76] (decree of July 7, 1947) to head the oversea departments. They are employees of the Ministry of Interior, but are named by the President of the French Republic with the unanimous consent of the Cabinet. This unanimity makes the nomination of a prefect highly political. With coalition governments—and this was the usual form of government in the Fourth Republic—to each political party was reserved a given number of prefectures. The prefecture of Guadeloupe, e.g., was for a long time, and still is the fief of the French Socialist Party (Section Française de l'Internationale Ouvrière, SFIO).

In principle, the prefects of the oversea departments have the same powers as their equivalent in metropolitan France. However, given the peculiar situation of the Antilles (great distance from the metropolitan country, low standard of living, etc.), the prefects of the Antilles have certain special powers (decrees of Aug. 25, 1947; Mar. 30, 1948; Apr. 26, 1960). In addition to the ordinary and normal duties of a prefect, they also control the local armed forces, and they can declare martial law on their own responsibility without having to obtain the permission of the necessary authorities in France, but the Central Government must be informed immediately. Moreover, in their relations with foreign consulates, they perform certain diplomatic functions.

It must be mentioned in this connection that the extensive powers of the oversea prefects have not escaped the criticism of the opposition parties, as well as of some independent scholars, since in many respects the institution of the prefecture in the oversea departments is to them nearly a copy of the previous colonial governorship.

b. *The General Council.*—The members of the General Council are elected (34 in Guadeloupe and 36 in Martinique). Their role has lessened considerably under departmentalization, at least in theory and as compared to the period before the Fifth Republic. In principle, the General Council concerns itself only with administrative activities. It has definite jurisdiction over departmental property, planning all works to be carried out with departmental funds, social welfare services, prorating departmental participation in expenses of projects shared with the townships or the Central Government; and all other matters upon which it is called to deliberate by laws, decrees or regulations, and generally on all matters of departmental interest which have come before it, either through a prefect's proposal or through the initiative of one of its members.

The deliberations of the General Council are executory within 10 days of the end of the session, provided the prefect does not ask for their annulment due to an excess of power or the violation of a disposition of the law or a regulation of public administration. The appeal formulated by the prefect in turn must be made known to the president of the General Council. If there is no repeal within 6 weeks from the notification date, the deliberation becomes executory. This repeal can only be declared by a decree given in the form of a public regulation.

When the deliberations of the General Council require approval, either by ministerial decision or by decree, they become fully executory if no decision is reached on them within 3 months after they have been received by the ministers concerned. Nevertheless, concerning bills granting privileges under exclusive rights or for a period of more than 3 years of large-scale departmental services, this term is extended to 6 months. The General Council gives its opinion on the changes proposed of the territorial division of departments and townships. Moreover, it is forbidden to the General Council to express any political desires.

The General Council has always rebelled against these excessively restrictive laws which are designed to exclude it from any participation in the political life of the Antilles. Whenever the occasion arose, it has not failed to express its opinion on matters of general interest to the oversea departments. Thus, after the riots which took place on December 20, 1959,[77] the General Council of Martinique voted unanimously (33 members were present, 3 absent) to protest against the brutal repression exercised by the Republican Security Forces (Compagnie Républicaine de Sécurité, CRS) and the police forces. It declared that these demonstrations were the result of the discontent arising from the arrogance and racism of some metropolitan Frenchmen, massive unemployment, excessive taxes, low wages, economic stagnation, and the failure of the French Government to keep its promises. It demanded, among others, the retreat of the CRS and of the undesirable racist elements, immediate measures to fight unemployment, the extension of social security benefits, establishment of vocational centers and professional schools, and the consideration of the status of Martinique to provide for a greater participation by her people into her affairs.[78]

This protest contained a real political program for Martinique. It showed that the General Council had no intentions of restricting itself to purely administrative tasks. And the French Government learned its lesson well. Not only did it seek to implement the Council's recommendations, but it also extended the Council's powers.

Two decrees of April 26, 1960 (4 months after the 1959 riots) extended the powers of the General Council (and those of the prefects as well). Thus, since that date the opinion of the General Council has been consulted on all projects of laws and decrees seeking to adapt legislation to their particular situation. Besides, the Council can apprehend the Government for any proposal tending toward the interference of special dispositions motivated by the peculiar situation of the oversea departments.

In the same way, the Chamber of Commerce and Industry and the Chamber of Agriculture are consulted on all legal projects dealing with their activities.[79]

The General Council has functioned, at least according to the law, like a real local assembly since 1960. The prefect gives it a special and detailed report every year on the situation of the department and the state of the various public services. In his report the prefect usually emphasizes the efforts made by the Government to improve the conditions of living in its department. Special emphasis is given to education and unemployment. The prefect also makes public what he intends to do during the next year and lists the main points of his program and the more urgent problems to be solved. The Council exercises some rights to check the prefect's conduct. The system itself is excellent but it can be corrupted by the fact that almost all the members of the General Council are also mayors. But the latter administer their municipalities under the financial tutelage of the prefect. It could happen that from this fact a "give and take" policy may arise, so that the prefect will be soft in carrying out his tutelary powers vis-a-vis the mayors on condition that they uphold the prefect's actions in the General Council.

c. *Municipalities.*—While the municipalities had no real power under the colonial regime, with departmentalization, they were raised to the same level of autonomy as their counterparts in metropolitan France.

Municipality is the smallest politico-administrative division in France. It is administered by an elected municipal council which in turn elects the mayor who is assisted by a given number of aides. According to the 1962 census, there were 34 municipalities in Martinique.[80]

The municipal council, which has had its autonomy increased under departmentalization, is a deliberating organ charged with the administration of municipal interests. The mayor, who represents the government at the local level, is the head of the municipal council. By rule and regulation, or when petitioned by the higher administration, the municipal council legislates through resolutions which it has agreed upon. In effect, it expresses its wishes on all matters of local interest and may protest the levy of taxes assigned to the municipality. The mayor must send resolutions of the municipal council to the subprefect or prefect for action. The resolutions of the municipal council are fully void when they bear on a matter outside its power or reached in violation of a law or regulation. The final decision on declaring these resolutions void rests with the prefect. When the prefect or the subprefect vetoes a resolution, the municipal council has the right to appeal to the Minister of Interior. If neither approved or vetoed the resolutions become effective after various periods of time specified by law.

The mayor, who is elected, as indicated above, by the municipal council by absolute majority or, after the third ballot, by simple majority has the responsibility of preparing the budget, regulating local commerce, and in general carrying out the decisions of the municipal council. The police who are responsible for maintaining the law and order in the municipality are responsible to the mayor who in turn, in this aspect, is supervised by the higher administration.

In sum, all the administrative machinery of the oversea departments was greatly modified by the assimilation law. Administrative services in Martinique and Guadeloupe are organized almost exactly like those of metropolitan France, with the exception of special powers granted to the prefect and the General Council of the oversea departments. From the immigration and emigration services to the organization of justice and customs, everything on the administrative level is a copy of the existent services in the departments of metropolitan France.

(2) THE LEGISLATIVE SYSTEM.—Following assimilation, all laws voted upon by the French Parliament, comprised of the National Assembly and the Senate, apply to the metropolitan departments as well as to the oversea departments, unless the law itself stipulates the contrary. The deputies of the National Assembly are elected by direct suffrage; the senators, by indirect suffrage.

Guadeloupe, Martinique, and French Guiana are represented in the French Parliament by 3 deputies and 2 senators each; that means 1 deputy for every 100,000 inhabitants and 1 senator for every 150,000 inhabitants.

The parliamentarians from Guadeloupe are the following:[81]

In the Senate:	
Lucien Bernier	Socialist.
Rene Toribio	Socialist.
In the National Assembly:	
Medard Albrand	Socialist.
Gaston Feuillard	Socialist.
Pierre Monerville	Radical Socialist.

Those from Martinique are the following:

In the Senate:	
Saul Symphor	Socialist.
G. Marie-Anne	Pro-De Gaulle (but not Union pour la Nouvelle République, UNR).
In the National Assembly:	
Aimé Césaire	Progressist (Popular Progressive Movement).
Emmanuel H. Very	Socialist.
Victor Sablé	Radical Socialist.

The parliamentarians from the Antilles have exactly the same rights and duties as their metropolitan colleagues in the French Parliament.

The 1958 Constitution of France assigns to the Parliament and the Central Government, in addition to the generally accepted obligations and responsibilities of a National Government, such as definition of citizenship, civil rights, foreign affairs, national defense, the following affairs, such as regulation of criminal law and criminal procedures, regulation and control of the judicial organization, regulation of the electoral system for local and parliamentary assemblies, and the determination of fundamental principles of French education.

In summary, the legislative system of the oversea department is similarly assimilated to that of metropolitan France. The only difference is that, in the oversea departments since the decree of April 26, 1960, the General Council is consulted on all projects of laws and decrees seeking to adapt legislation to their particular situation, as has been previously indicated.

C. Concluding comments

The broad outlines have been traced of the consequences of the assimilation law on the administrative and legislative regimes of Guadeloupe and Martinique. The prefect's role, the prerogatives of the General Council and powers of the municipalities have been analyzed, and it has been shown that the prefect and the General Council in the oversea departments, particularly after the decree of April 1960, were granted powers much more extensive than those of their counterparts in metropolitan France.

Still regarding the administrative branch, the present organization of municipalities has been analyzed, and it has been shown that departmentalization has raised the municipalities of Guadeloupe and Martinique to the same level of autonomy as those in metropolitan France. This constitutes a great progress in comparison with the organization of municipalities under the colonial regime.

Of course, there is administrative control which is exercised by the prefect. In the normal and regular functioning of institutions, at least under a democratic regime, the power to control is indispensable in preventing abuses or carelessness. It is also indispensable that the prefect himself does not misuse the authority given him and is not influenced by personal or political considerations. In reality, there are many examples that indicate that the prefects in the oversea departments have used their power and all the weight of their authority either to please a "departmentalist" mayor, or to obstruct the activities of an "autonomist" mayor.

Those who ask for autonomy in the Antilles, as will be referred to subsequently, strongly criticize what they call the "excessively wide" powers exercised by the prefect in the oversea departments. For them this means that the oversea departments are not and can not be like their metropolitan counterparts. This is true, but only in part. For the remoteness of the oversea departments from France indisputably requires that the representative of the Central Government have the necessary authority to insure the normal functioning of the institutions and the administrative machinery. However, the prefect is also to be responsible to an elected local assembly. The General Council could well be that local assembly. This is somewhat in the spirit of the April 1960 decree. But the system has been corrupted by the fact that almost all the members of the General Council are also mayors. How can they, as members of the General Council, effectively control the activities of the prefect when the prefect controls them as mayors? In this realm, an institutional reform seems desirable to separate the mayoralty from the General Council. One may even go further and add that the office of the Mayor should not be held by a person holding any other legislative, local or national, office.

Even without any legal support, the General Council in the oversea departments tends to want to control increasingly the actions of the prefect. The adaptation of the departmental system to the Antilles and the need to make the Antillean participate in the decisionmaking process of their country require the transformation of the General Council into a real deliberating local assembly to which the prefect would be accountable. Article 73 of the Constitution of the French Republic does not preclude such a reform.

If such a reform is to be carried out, then the legislative system of the oversea departments must, of course, be modified too. It may no longer be necessary for the representatives of the Antilles to be in the National Assembly or in the Senate of France. In addition to granting the General Council the power to legislate for their own departments, all laws passed in France ought to require the approval of the General Council before being applicable to their departments.

This reform would essentially demand a change in the minds of those who favor the continuation of the departmental system. They must stop considering that any wish to adapt the political institutions of the Antilles to their geographical, cultural and economic realities is necessarily a desire to separate themselves from France. The Antilleans in the oversea departments feel themselves to be French, in heart and mind; they are strongly attached to the culture of France. Nevertheless, such an attitude does not imply a renouncement to be themselves. They want to be French without, at the same time, losing their identity and their own personality.

II. The political situation and the demand for autonomy

"The Antilles cannot and do not want to be anything other than French. They are French in mind, in heart, in blood * * * What other nation can boast of having inspired such love!"[82] This opinion expresses, perhaps in too extravagant a style, a profound truth: the attachment of the people of Martinique and Guadeloupe to France. They indeed carry the stamp of French culture. Nevertheless, such an attachment to France does not imply a denial of existing problems or efforts to find rational and realistic solutions to them. Unfortunately, this aspect of the problem has been frequently misstated in the Antilles; some people, in good faith, come to consider traitors to France those who assert that the time has come to change the political status of Martinique and Guadeloupe for a greater autonomy.

But, who are those who ask for autonomy? What do they really want? What objections have been raised against them? What is the French Government's position? Would it be possible to create a third alternative which could reconcile the autonomist and the departmentalist theses?

A. The autonomist argument

Among those who demand autonomy for the French Antilles one can distinguish the Communists, the non-Communist liberals, and some youth organizations.

(1) THE COMMUNISTS.—The Communist Parties of Martinique and Guadeloupe insistently demand a change in the political status of the French Antilles. During its First Congress in 1957 at Lamentin, the Communist Party of Martinique (Parti Communiste de la Martinique, PCM) stated its position clearly. Already in 1955 they had given top priority to widening the powers of the General Council, and now they were asking for the management of the affairs of Martinique by the people of Martinique.[83]

The PCM thus claims an autonomy which would return to the people of Martinique the administration of its own affairs so that their legitimate and permanent interests could be fulfilled. In the eyes of the Communists, such an autonomy is very easily realized. It would allow the French Antilles to develop harmoniously through the application of a well-studied program by the party.[84]

This program was prepared for Martinique, but with some minor changes the Communist Party of Guadeloupe (Parti Communiste de la Guadeloupe, PCG) supports a similar program. The party program embodies agrarian reform (redistribution of land,[85] nationalization of big sugar and banana concerns) and diversification of agriculture, immediate steps to reduce unemployment, technical and financial aid to local craftsmen, and reduction of the powers of big private monopolies in trade and transportation. They also argue that the autonomous state of Martinique must carry out trade negotiations with the neighboring countries.

It must be noted here that the Communist Party of both Guadeloupe and Martinique are fairly strong and can command quite a high popular response. E.g. the Communist Party in Martinique had 60 percent of the total votes in 1946 and 65 percent in 1951. Yet in the October 1962 referendum 85 percent of the voters voted in favor of De Gaulle, which could be interpreted indirectly as "no" to a change of status if it were not for the enormous personal prestige of De Gaulle. In Guadeloupe the Communist Party's position in terms of votes remained more or less unchanged between 1951 and 1962, with 45 percent of the votes in 1951 as opposed to 52 percent in 1962. But there too the referendum showed 83 percent in favor of De Gaulle. These figures must be studied against a background of electoral fraud and a great degree of abstention which are extremely common on both islands. Nevertheless even the Communists recognize that the mass of the people does not follow them on the issue of the autonomy.[86]

(2) THE NON-COMMUNISTS.—Besides the Communists, other political groups also believe that a change in the status of the Antilles is mandatory if the economic and social problems besetting these islands are to be faced. Among the political parties and the non-Communist groups, are the Progressive Party of Martinique (Parti Progressiste de la Martinique, PPM) and the Martinique Federation of the Unified Socialist Party (Parti Socialiste Unifié, PSU), in Martinique, and the Association for the Organization of a Round Table (Association pour l'Organization d'une Table Ronde, AOTR), in Guadeloupe.

The PPM is the party of Mr. Aimé Césaire, deputy and mayor of Fort-de-France, and an internationally known writer. He formed the party in 1956, when he resigned from the Communist Party. For over 6 years now, the PPM has clearly stated its position on the political status of the French Antilles. It favors an administrative autonomy by which the islands could conduct their own local affairs within the French constitutional structure.

In March 1964, Aimé Césaire delineated his position vis-à-vis the Antillean discontent during General de Gaulle's visit to the island. In his speech at the Town Hall in Fort-de-France, welcoming the French Head of State, Césaire declared:

> We can no longer avoid facing a problem that obsesses our youth: the problem of the necessary remodeling of our institutions (I refer to our local institutions)

> so that they will be better suited to our Antillean conditions; so that they are more respectful of our personality and our obvious peculiarity; so that they are more flexible, less petty, more democratic, giving greater recognition to local initiative, local responsibility; so that we may no longer have the feeling, the most depressing feeling that a group of poor but proud men can experience, the feeling that they helplessly look upon the unfolding of their own history, the feeling that they submit to history instead of making it; in short, the feeling of being frustrated about their future.[87]

After De Gaulle's visit, when a German reporter asked Césaire to define autonomy, he answered by saying that the best way to define autonomy is to oppose it to departmentalization and independence.[88]

The Martinique Federation of the Unified Socialist Party plays also a very active role in the struggle for autonomy. It makes its position clear through its journal, "Présence Socialiste." It supports the union of all anticolonialist forces in the struggle for autonomy. Considering the local psychology and the international context, the status of internal autonomy is claimed to be the best suited to the political, social, and economic development of Martinique. The PSU aims to play an important role in the rapprochement of the leftist parties, and PSU candidates have always been willing to step down in order to assure the election of a better placed candidate.[89]

It is not only in Martinique that the proautonomy forces are trying to realign themselves. A similar effort is taking place in Guadeloupe with the formation of the Association for the Organization of a Round Table. The aim of the members of this association is to convince the Central Government to participate in a roundtable discussion to review the political status of Guadeloupe. They argue that discussion and convincing are far superior to using violence. They affirm that there is a political discontent in Guadeloupe which is closely linked to the present status. This dissatisfaction is essentially caused, according to them, by the gap between the aspirations of the population, the moral material problems of their individual and collective lives on the one hand, and the means available for the solution of these problems within the existing framework on the other.[90] The AOTR is not a political party, but accepts the support of all political parties which are sympathetic to the idea of autonomy.

Another nonpolitical voice which has made some impact on Guadeloupe as well as in France is a group of metropolitan professors who call themselves the Group of 31. In their manifesto of 1964 they openly support the AOTR. They argue that there is a profound discontent in Guadeloupe and it will be dangerous to deny it. They maintain that due to electoral fraud the majority of the elected local leaders are not the legitimate representatives of the people of Guadeloupe, and a debate, aiming to solve the status problem, between the true representatives of the people and the French Government would be a happy decision. The manifesto was simply signed as 31 Professors, because, in their own words, "let no one be surprised to see that our signatures have been omitted at the end of this declaration: the present status (of Guadeloupe) denies us the freedom to express our opinion publicly, a freedom we would have in a metropolitan department." [91]

The governmental and departmental sectors have acted against the AOTR and against the manifest of the 31. Nevertheless, this has not prevented everyone from asking himself if the time is not ripe to open up the discussion, especially vis-à-vis the mounting impatience of the young people.

(3) YOUTH ORGANIZATIONS.—Martinique is a country of young people; 50.6 percent of the population are under 20 years; 30 percent have less than 10 years: the average age of the population is 25 years. In Guadeloupe 49.5 percent of the population is of 20 years or younger.[92] Like young people elsewhere, those in the Antilles hope to have a say in the future of their country. Among them, there are some who accept the status quo, because there is no better alternative, they say; but in fact they fear the unknown. They do not want to sacrifice what they consider to be their present comfort to some vague promises of happiness. They also fear that the traditional politicians, once they see the Antilles on the verge of getting their autonomy, will become the staunch defenders of autonomy. This idea is enough to frighten them. Thus they prefer the control and tutelage of France.

There are others, however, who are intent on fighting for their country's autonomy. They have formed associations and founded a review in which to express their viewpoints. These associations are: Organization of Anti-Colonialist Youth of Martinique (Organization de la Jeunesse Anti-Colonialiste Martiniquaise, OJAM), the General Student Association of Guadeloupe (Association Générale des Etudiants Guadeloupéens, AGEG), and the General Student Association of Martinique (Association Générale des Etudiants Martiniquais, AGEM). The review of the Antillean students is called "Matouba." There is also the Federation of Antillo-Guianese Catholic Students (Fédération Antillo-Guyanaise des Etudiants Catholiques, FAGEC) that has its own review called Alizes.

Almost all the student associations have their main offices in metropolitan France. Generally speaking, they are slightly to the left of the political parties. When they do not ask for independence, their demands are for autonomy and are more precise, and also more menacing and violent.

In December 1963, 18 young Martiniquans, members of OJAM were arrested and charged with conspiracy against the security of the State. Their trial was held in Paris. Various Antillean and European personalities acted as witnesses in favor of the accused. The court had difficulty finding articles in the penal code under which they could be condemned. Thirteen were acquitted and 5 received sentences ranging from 18 months to 3 years in jail. Embarrassed by the arguments of the defense, which sought to prove that there had been neither a conspiracy nor an attempted overthrow, the court answered "with an alarming subtlety that the ideas of the accused supported neither the attempted overthrow nor the conspiracy, but that they lay between the free expression of ideas and the eventual start of an undefined conspiracy." But this curious judgment, as Roland Suvélor put it—

> has surprised and stunned everyone. Too strong (five sentences) or too weak (thirteen acquittals) it will displease both partisans and adversaries. From the legal point of view it established, on the positive side, that the demand for a change in status is perfectly lawful and, therefore, cannot be prosecuted on that account.[93]

On the whole, all these parties and movements discussed above are unified in denouncing the status quo as the chief cause of the Antillean discontent, and in supporting autonomy. In a motion made public in Paris during the trial of the 18 youths from Martinique, representatives from various political and labor groups in Guadeloupe, Martinique (and the Reunion) declared:

> Despite the numerous infringements on freedom, the pressures, and the electoral frauds, the popular masses of these countries have expressed and express in their majority their trust in the organizations and in the persons who ask for the replacement of the present *status by a status of administrative autonomy* which recognizes the rights of the people to govern themselves and the affairs of their country.
>
> Such a status should aim, in each of these countries:
>
> —towards the election of a deliberating assembly chosen through a universal, free, and secret suffrage.
>
> —towards the installation of an executive responsible to the assembly.
>
> —towards the establishment of an organ securing the cooperation of representatives from France, Martinique (The Reunion), and Guiana.[94]

Thus, can be summed up the position of those who support autonomy for Guadeloupe and Martinique. Their point of view seems to be fairly realistic. Nevertheless, in the present state of affairs, the referendum held in 1962 (see p. 16) seems to indicate that the majority of the people would favor the continuation of the departmentalization. To come to the conclusion that the people of Guadeloupe and Martinique reject autonomy outright would be an overgeneralization for the following reasons. First of all, as recognized by independent observers, such as Prof. Descamps de Bragelongne[95] and 31 Professors, not to mention some of the Guadeloupeans and Martiniquans themselves, there is considerable fraud in the elections. Secondly, a certain degree of apathy exists toward elections and it is not unusual to observe an absention of sometimes up to 65 percent.[96] Thirdly, the referendum has never been put in terms of departmentalization versus well-defined autonomy. Hence the results of the referendum mentioned above would not surprise anyone. Moreover, the strength of the other parties which are against autonomy must also be taken into consideration. With this remark we turn our attention to the objections raised to autonomy.

B. Objections to autonomy: Arguments and counterarguments

The principal political parties opposing autonomy are the SFIO and the UNR. The SFIO, which up until recently has been united in its support of De Gaulle, contrary to the policy of the metropolitan counterpart, is in fact the party which "governs" the oversea departments and sends the most delegates to the National Assembly in the sense that usually the prefects are affiliated with it. Recently, the position of the SFIO in the Antilles has been weakened by the fact that it is divided over the issue of reelection for De Gaulle. As a result of this division the UNR, General de Gaulle's party which has been weak up until now especially in Guadeloupe, is now presenting a strong challenge to the number one political party position. Therefore, it is difficult to predict whether SFIO will continue to dominate the political scene in the Antilles after the next national elections of December 1965.

Those who oppose autonomy, the departmentalists, seek by all possible means to maintain the present state of departmentalization. They claim that Martinique and Guadeloupe are two French departments and each time that there is a riot or excitement, they affirm their indefectible attachment to the mother country.

(1) First Objection.—What the departmentalists have chiefly against the autonomists is that these are "separatist," "traitors" to France. They institute proceedings against the autonomists, charging that the demand for autonomy is a mere front. They claim that the demand for autonomy automatically leads to demand for independence. In reality no one officially asks for independence except for a very small group of students in Paris.[97]

Since the departmentalists denounce the autonomists as enemies of France, the autonomists are forced, in every occasion, to declare themselves "convinced Frenchmen" before discussing the merits of autonomy. Aimé Césaire, for example, repeats publicly that there are two ways to be French: the departmentalist way and the autonomist way. The "manifesto" for the Round Table states that the safeguarding of the social, political, and cultural achievements of our population, as well as their consolidation and development depend on the maintenance of the close constitutional ties between Guadeloupe and France.

Even the Communists in their program support the autonomy that gives the people of Martinique and Guadeloupe the democratic governing of their own country "in a union with France." The Unified Socialist Party (Martinique Federation) also criticizes those who believe that autonomy is unpatriotic.

(2) SECOND OBJECTION.—A second objection raised against the autonomists is that even if the autonomy does not contain the desire for independence, it inevitably leads to it. Thus, examples are called to mind: independence within interdependence (North Africa) and the loi-cadre (Black Africa). Tunisia and Morocco are examples for the first type of relationship. In 1954 they acquired self-autonomy, but with respect to defense, foreign and monetary affairs, they remained within the French control. In even this, however, they became entirely independent by 1956 in all respects of political, social, and economic life. As far as Black Africa is concerned, the countries within this region acquired in the Fourth Republic local autonomy in terms of electing their local assembly to which the French Governor was responsible. Under the Fifth Republic they became members of the French community with full self-local government, with the President of France remaining the president of the community. France was in control of only defense and foreign affairs. Since 1960 all of these countries have become entirely independent.

But, as Aimé Césaire put it, the Antillean and African situations are not strictly comparable. Besides, he says, the example of Black Africa should not arouse any fears. The loi-cadre could have lasted 50 to 60 years. But there were external factors precipitating the early independence of Africa. He similarly refutes the argument according to which autonomy is the antechamber to independence. On the contrary, examples from recent years show that it is the policy based on the nonrecognition of local peculiarities that eventually leads to independence.

The existence of autonomous territories in the Caribbean, namely Puerto Rico, Netherlands Antilles, and Surinam show the formula of autonomy to be a viable one. The people of the French islands seem to be quite interested in finding out; e.g., how the autonomy vis-à-vis the U.S. functions within the Commonwealth status of Puerto Rico.

(3) THIRD OBJECTION.—According to the departmentalists, if autonomy is granted, France's contributions to the Antilles economy in terms of public-investments would automatically come to an end. Mr. Victor Sablé, deputy of Martinique, writes:

> Could Guadeloupe and Martinique, left to their own resources, secure the financing of the social reforms after their liberation? Would industrial output, agricultural resources, general trade revenue, taxation possibilities, everything,

in short, that constitutes the islands' economic potential, be allowed to keep an autonomous budget at a par with the expenses considered indispensable for French citizens?[98]

This argument is important because the population avoids systematically taking any risks of possibly sacrificing the standard of living they have achieved under departmentalization; but it has been taken up so often, under different disguises that it has become a reproach which could provoke the Antilleans to react in an unexpected way. Césaire's answer to this argument is that the problem facing the Antilleans is one of decolonization. Valuable as they may be in considering the decolonization process, economic factors are sometimes neither the most important nor the most decisive. Psychological factors often come first.[99]

(4) FOURTH OBJECTION.—Another argument which is often raised against the autonomists, though not against autonomy itself, is that those who most forcefully demanded assimilation in 1946 are the same who denounce departmentalization and advocate autonomy for Guadeloupe in Martinique today.[100]

This reversal of attitude can be explained by the fact that the Communists and non-Communists alike had agreed that assimilation or departmentalization, was a sign of considerable progress in 1946, compared to the colonial status. Thus they had not hesitated in making their choice at the time. Moreover, the fact that Communist ministers were then in the French Government had led the Antillean Communists to believe that this was the dreamed-of occasion to have the workers in the Antilles profit from the compensations given to workers in France. The Communists argue that "since reality is in constant change, watchwords, ways of fighting, strategies, and Communist tactics also change, so that a new platform need not condemn the previous one, which corresponded to a different set of circumstances." [101]

Consequently today Communists and non-Communists alike agree that autonomy constitutes a progressive step compared to departmentalization.

From 1946 to our day, the African Continent has been largely decolonized; almost all the Caribbean territories have reached either complete independence or internal autonomy. It is thus becoming difficult for the people of Martinique and Guadeloupe to be citizens of the "remnants of colonization" that are their countries.

C. The position of the French Government

The various French governments have generally practiced a policy of indifference toward the oversea departments. This attitude has always been criticized, even by the defenders of departmentalization, such as Mr. Victor Sablé.[102] Since the demands for autonomy have been gaining strength, however, the French Government has been recently increasingly interested in the political, social, and economic problems of the oversea departments.

For the French Government, Guadeloupe and Martinique are departments of France under the same title as the metropolitan departments. Officially, therefore, the problem of decolonization in the Antilles has been solved through assimilation. Thus, according to French officials, what has been called the Antillean discontent can be explained by purely economic reasons. Consequently, one has only to raise the standard of living in the Antilles to that of the metropolitan departments and the so-called discontent will disappear. Thus, government action is principally concerned with economic and social measures (see the Economic Study on French Antilles) with, of course, some political ones now and then.

Economic measures alone however, do not suffice when the political aspects of the Antillean discontent are so important. Those that persist in thinking that the discontent is merely economic, and that it is necessary just to solve the economic and social problems (unemployment, population pressure, among others) of the oversea departments, so that no one dares mention the political problem, should similarly ask themselves if it would be possible to solve these economic problems within the existing political framework. It is not necessary to try to—

> mitigate or "depoliticize" the discussion of the Antillean problem, seeking—as some do—to separate the economic aspects from the political ones. Fruitless task: in a decolonization conflict the given economic and political circumstances are mutually conditioned.

* * * as Robert Bosc [103] has quite rightfully written.

The French Government knows this. On the political side it has tried to use tactics of appeasement and/or repressive measures. Among the appeasement tactics taken in the oversea departments, the nomination of a Martiniquan Prefect, Raphael Petit, in Fort-de-France (October 1963) was one of the most noted ones, although it is argued in some circles that his nomination to the prefecture has nothing to do with his origin. On the whole, the press in Martinique greeted the news warmly. An article in the journal, "Le Sportif," of November 2, 1963, sets the tone:

> So the government of the Republic has chosen a born Martiniquan to pull the commanding levers of our department. This decision seems to respond to a particular concern: to erase the impression of a metropolitan monopoly in the higher administrative echelons of the Antilles. It follows other less important initiatives taken along the same lines not too long ago. Without too great a risk

> of error, we can see here the wish of the central powers to acknowledge certain more or less bitter criticisms formulated against the departmentalization policy. One can hope that once the take-off has been accomplished, the effort will be continued without the mistakes and weaknesses that could lead to new recriminations.

This was followed by the appointment of another Martiniquan as director of the Ecole Normale of Fort-de-France.

It is rather significant that the same thing did not happen in Guadeloupe, where the political atmosphere is generally less tense.

Another tactic of appeasement taken by the French Government was the withdrawal of the Republican Security Troops from Martinique after the bloody events of December 1959, upon the petition of the General Council. The troops were hardly loved by the people.

Next to these appeasement measures, chosen among many others, the French Government frequently employs repressive measures against those who, rightly or wrongly, it considers perilous to the security of the state or to its territorial integrity. Countless scholarships have been canceled because the administration considered the recipient students too turbulent or dangerous. An order issued in October 1960, gives the prefects of the oversea departments the power to forbid any officers "capable of upsetting the public order" from staying in Guadeloupe or Martinique. This is why, e.g., Mr. Alain Plenel, former Vice Rector at Fort-de-France, is forbidden to sojourn in Martinique. Mr. Mainville, a lawyer from Martinique, is not allowed to leave France. Recently, when he wanted to go to Black Africa to attend to personal business, he was refused permission to leave France. The same thing holds for another Martiniquan, Mr. Eduard Glissant, winner of the Goncourt Prize for his novel "La Lézarde" (The Crack). He can no longer leave metropolitan France because he joined Mr. Mainville and others in forming the Antillo-Guianan Front for Autonomy (Le Front Antillo-Guyanais pour L'Autonomie). In 1963, a group of young people were arrested and deported to Paris. Confronted with the Antillean discontent, police authorities find the time ripe for all kinds of arbitrary actions. As the French National Assembly on October 5, 1961, Aimé Césaire was already denouncing the existing conditions:

> The normal state of the Antilles has become a state of siege that dares not speak its name. The truth is that from now on, in the Antilles, nothing but the worse is sure. There is no longer a constitution, nor human and citizenship rights; there is no more political liberty. There is but one rule: the prefect's whim. Henceforth, nothing is safe from arbitrariness: neither employment, nor residence, nor the human person.

Jean-Marie Domenach, director of the review Esprit, writes about the situation with an irony that recalls the recent history of French colonial policy in Algiers.[104]

> Are the French going to cling foolishly to the remnants of an empire? The more policemen the more prisons will be needed, until the day comes when, next to a lake * * *

D. The possibility of a third alternative

We have shown the position of the autonomists, the arguments they use to support their theses, the objections raised against them by the departmentalists, and, lastly, we have tried to point out the position of the French Government vis-à-vis the autonomist demands.

We have to examine yet if the positions adopted by the various groups are mutually exclusive, or if, on the contrary, it would be possible to find a middle ground, a third force, on which the opposing theses could be reconciled, if only temporarily.

The notion of a third position is a fairly recent one. Without categorically affirming the date when it came into being, we could safely believe it was Raymond Barillon who first spoke of it officially. He wrote:

> Many Antilleans demand a decentralization allowing for the expression of their own character without, however, being apparent separatists. In short, they believe that many of the autonomist demands can be accommodated within a legal framework that does not involve breaking off all ties with France.
>
> Thus they wonder if it would be possible to form a kind of third force, free from the most extreme autonomists (which is by no means to say all the communists) as well as from the departmentalists who do not sincerely believe in an arrangement allowing the people of Martinique and Guadeloupe to express and reach their own personality.[105]

It is chiefly in Martinique that this concept is strongest. It has been attributed to Mr. Valère, a young lawyer, who while rejecting autonomy, believes that the departmentalist status could be adapted to the Antillean situation by a greater administrative decentralization.

The idea of the third force is not very strong, because it is so new. The adherents are quite cautious as yet and have not published significant documents to clarify their position. Moreover, as soon as the possibility of a compromise solution between autonomy and assimilation was expressed, it was attacked immediately by both autonomists and departmentalists.

The first to launch an attack were primarily the defenders of departmentalization. In an article entitled, "A Third Force and Force of Circumstance", the Guadeloupe journal Match of April 15, 1964, wrote the following:

> The current attempts to find a solution half-way between autonomy and departmentalization can no longer be taken seriously.
>
> The idea of a third force can seem tempting, but in reality it does not stand up to test * * *

> A "departmentalist," even if he defends decentralization to the end, cannot, and does not, conceive of any government other than the government of France. An "autonomist," even if he is all for curtailing the prerogatives of sovereignty, cannot, and does not conceive of any government other than the government of Guadeloupe.

It is too early to try to foresee what the chances of a successful third force will be. The idea is tempting enough. It could attract many Antilleans who would not like to sacrifice the socioeconomic development of the oversea departments by insisting too much on a political status, which a large segment of the population is not ready or able to support, and which the French Government is not decided on granting either.

III. Conclusion

Now that the Antillean region has been "discovered," it is fitting to hope for an arrangement of the existing status of the oversea departments in recognition of the Antillean personality.

After his Brazzaville speech, General de Gaulle has been known for his anticolonialist ideas. As H. Deschamps has written:[106]

> From the beginning, General de Gaulle has paved the way for a special status in the Antilles by welcoming the locally-elected leaders, particularly Mr. Cesaire, and by sending Mr. Malraux over[107] * * * The decree of April 26, 1960, coincided with his trip to the islands. For everything concerning overseas and Europe, there is no more of an integrationist than General de Gaulle.

De Gaulle outlined his Antillean policy in a decree of September 24, 1958, that created an administrative secretary-general for the oversea departments. This reads:

> The secretary-general for the administration of the oversea departments will study and propose, together with the concerned central administrations and after consultation with, or upon the proposal of, the local authorities and assemblies, any measures promoting administrative deconcentration and decentralization, to account for the constraints due to the remoteness and the peculiar character of these departments.[108]

Some might ask if the right to autonomy or self-government is a moral right which is due even if the majority of the population does not claim it or does not even want it. Maybe it will be the right of tomorrow, but today we are still at the stage where people have the right to determine their own future as they wish.

Thus De Gaulle perhaps may not be criticized for opposing the assertion of the Antillean personality. Nevertheless, it must be underlined that the officials of the Central Government in the Antilles have not always respected De Gaulle's philosophy concerning the policies to be followed in the oversea departments and territories.

However, even the goodwill of the French President is not enough. The Antillean leaders must also know what they want precisely, expose this in positive terms to the public opinion of the oversea departments and persuade the population of the feasibilitiy of a concrete alternative. The real problem, and it is a very delicate one, is the indifference of the great majority of the population that wants to stay French and avoid taking any risks possibly sacrificing the standard of living they have achieved under departmentalization. This segment of the population has not yet been "motivated" enough by its leaders; Aimé Césaire has come closest. Faced with the passivity of the masses and their sentimental attachment to France, some leaders have wished for an internationalizing of the Antillean discontent. They hope that the nonaligned nations would then take it upon themselves to bring the Antillean case before the United Nations. However, until now the United Nations have not taken any steps concerning the French Antilles.

GREAT BRITAIN

1. Jamaica, Trinidad-Tobago, and the British West Indies [109]

The peaceful breaking up of the British Empire in the Caribbean has been frustratingly slow and fraught with false starts and failures, but it has produced two fairly stable young nations thus far and will probably produce one and perhaps two more during the coming year. Originally this empire contained almost twenty colonial units scattered throughout the Caribbean from British Honduras on the east coast of Central America, through the Greater and Lesser Antilles, to British Guiana on the northeast coast of South America. The British flag, sugarcane, the English language, and a vague African heritage were the common denominators in most of these Caribbean colonies but these were not enough to surmount the geographical isolation in which the unique personality of each island thrived; for example, making the Bajan feel more Barbadian than West Indian.

Since as early as the last half of the 19th century Great Britain has been sporadically and far too slowly moving toward some type of federation of its West Indian possessions. At first this interest in federation was motivated almost solely by the anticipated economies of a more centralized colonial administration. Stimulated by the riots and strikes of the depression of the late thirties and morally obligated by the pressure of world opinion after the Second World War, the British colonial office began haltingly to implement the recommendation of the Moyne Commission (1938–39) that a West Indian Federation be formed at a dominion level and as an integral part of the British Commonwealth of Nations.

The West Indian Federation which ultimately came into existence in 1958 was to have a very short life. In spite of the aggressive encouragement of the British colonial office, which in the opinion of some [110] contributed rather to its demise, and inspite of the personal enthusiasm and interest on the part of the prime ministers of Trinidad-Tobago and of Jamaica, by far the two largest and most important entities in the Federation, the West Indian Federation ceased to exist after scarcely 4 years of operation. Different levels of economic progress, population imbalances and pressures, and personality clashes between politicians were all problems faced by the new nation, but these and other obstacles could have been surmounted had there existed among individuals in the British West Indies a deep common feeling of interest and sympathy as West Indians rather than as Trinidadians, Jamaicans, Antiguans or Barbadians.

In a referendum on September 19, 1961, Jamaica voted to pull out of the Federation; and as Dr. Eric Williams, Prime Minister of Trinidad-Tobago, so adroitly said: "One taken away from ten leaves zero." The dissolution of the Federation was a hard blow for the British since it destroyed the mechanism by which they had hoped to be relieved of some of their more burdensome colonies in the Caribbean. Although the West Indian Federation may be dead, the West Indies still lives with its ghost.

In August of 1963, within a year after the failure of the West Indian Federation, Jamaica and Trinidad-Tobago became full-fledged and completely independent members of the British Commonwealth of Nations. In April of 1966 British Guiana under the new name of Guyana will join that group and, although no date has been set, Barbados hopes to follow the road to independence also. The destiny of the other remaining colonies is still undecided and unclear.

These newly independent nations led for the most part by new leaders are facing new problems which require new and untried formulas for solution and progress. In Jamaica and Trinidad-Tobago, recently relieved of their burden of the white man, racial tensions no longer polarize around the black-white extremes, but appear unexpectedly and sometimes violently, as in British Guyana, between the black and the East Indian, or other minorities. Once the cry for land reform could always be counted on to secure for the politician an enthusiastic following, but now the new leaders of the West Indies speak of industrialization and mechanization as means to achieve the better society. Finally, if the old style empire is disappearing from the British Caribbean, there is abundant evidence to indicate that new yet certainly much smaller power blocs and spheres of influence are filling the vacuum.

For the most part the exclusively white private clubs typical of the colonial era have disappeared from the British Caribbean, but racial tensions have not disappeared. In fact, in the southeastern part of the Caribbean they have intensified as the white administrator and mediator has withdrawn. In September 1965, the ghetto of West Kingston erupted with violence, touched off by a racial incident between a Chinese proprietor and a Negro employee. Jamaica, proud of its motto: "Out of many, one people" is quite predominantly Negro but there are minorities and one of the largest of these is the Chinese, some 10,000 mostly occupied as small entrepreneurs.

The bloody violence which broke out in Georgetown, British Guyana, in February 1962, has left a profound chasm between the African and East Indian populations of that country. The East Indian is in the majority with approximately 330,000 of a 640,000 estimated population. The African numbers about 200,000 with another 70,000 identified as of mixed descent. The remaining 40,000 are divided unequally among the Amerindian, Chinese, and European. In September of 1965, an International Commission of Jurists, composed of a distinguished man of law from Ireland, Greece, and Australia, was named to study the charges of racial discrimination in areas of government responsibility and to make recommendations to eliminate such discrimination and racial imbalance which might be found in government offices. Whether the recommendations of this impressive group can fuse together a divided society remains to be seen.

In Trinidad, still spared the agony of violence, the same dissident racial elements exist but in reverse proportions. The African barely holds on to a rapidly diminishing plurality of the estimated 1 million population. There are an estimated 350,000 East Indians and perhaps 390,000 Africans with another 140,000 identified as of mixed descent. The remaining 100,000 are Chinese, European, or Middle Eastern. The party in power is led by the brilliant Negro historian, Dr. Eric Williams, and the opposition is led by an equally brilliant East Indian mathematician, Dr. Rudranath Capildeo. It is only a question of time before the fastgrowing East Indian population, mostly in the rural rice and sugarcane areas, will outnumber the urban and industrial Negro, and thus allow an East Indian-oriented party to replace the Peoples National Movement as the party in power. Dr. Williams has endeavored to broaden the racial base of his party and government, but the degree of success in this effort is as yet very hard to measure. The best which can be said is that racial violence has been avoided, but racial tension exists, waiting for an ugly incident such as that in Jamaica to cause an explosion.

As the British colonial areas of the Caribbean have achieved independence or have come closer to it, more and more emphasis has been placed upon industrialization. An agriculturally based economy has been to long associated with a colonial status, and sugar and exploitation have been almost synonymous in the minds of most of the West

Indians. Trinidad-Tobago and British Guyana began to develop their mineral resources in the post-World War I period, but Jamaica has been mining bauxite scarcely 15 years. The government is pushing plans for a nuclear powerplant which will allow the intermediate step of converting bauxite into alumina to be carried out on the island. The Canadian aluminum company operating in Jamaica already has this step in operation, but the three American firms are reluctant to follow since they risk provoking a suspended U.S. tariff of alumina. A nuclear powerplant would make the case too strong to resist and thus provide more industrial jobs for Jamaicans.

The other smaller islands have no mineral resources to exploit and have been dependent up to now on sugar, bananas, and spices, but even on these islands a concentrated drive for industrialization is being carried out. On Antigua the final touches are being carried out on an oil refinery which, when production starts near the end of 1965, will produce 10,000 barrels a day. On densely populated Barbados, which has produced sugar almost exclusively for over 300 years, an intensive industrial development program has shown negligible results so far. Even the small and scattered British Virgin Islands with an estimated population of less than 8,000 has an agency for industrial development, even though rum and the lucrative tourist industry are the only ones present on the islands.

In spite of the unbalanced attention given to industrial development to the neglect of agriculture, it is in the latter area where some immediate economic improvement could have an important effect. Both Trinidad-Tobago and Jamaica have registered growing trade deficits since independence. In itself, as an economist might observe, this deficit in the balance of trade is not too alarming. But when a sizable amount of this foreign spending secures foodstuff for islands with important agricultural enterprises, then there is some cause for alarm. In Trinidad-Tobago it has been recently estimated that much of the $90 million spent yearly to import food products could be saved by developing more intensely the dairy, meat, and poultry production of the island. Up until now most government attention has been directed toward the increase of food production per acre through improved and intensified cultivation. There is still much to be done in this direction, particularly on an island like Antigua which is now entering its fifth year of intense drought. Here government action to build up water reserves during the rainy season is long overdue. But further intensification of cultivation on an island such as Barbados, where every square foot of land is already preciously guarded and protected, would produce little advantage. In Barbados, British Guyana, and Jamaica the attention given agriculture must take a new approach by seeking to increase production per worker instead of per acre. This change in direction is extremely difficult to bring about, particularly in countries with sizable blocks of the population unemployed like Barbados, where recently 500 people applied in person at a company which announced temporary work for 100 laborers, or Jamaica with an estimated 150,000 unemployed. Nevertheless, the production of both sugar and rice will require mechanization if these basically agricultural countries are to remain competitive.

Some support from outside the Caribbean is received by these islands. The most significant financial support comes from Canadian sources. Canada has made available to Jamaica alone $2,375,000 (Canadian dollars) during 1964–65. Under Canada's Dominion Caribbean Assistance Programme, a half million dollars has been loaned to Jamaica for bridge construction and just recently Canada granted $400,000 to St. Vincent for the expansion of its water system. Other examples of Canadian support are the subsidized steamships, the Maple and the Palm, which ply regularly among all of the West Indian Islands. The United States' AID office in Trinidad-Tobago has been closed down and further support to that country is contingent on administrative reforms to increase the effectiveness of any funds invested. It should be noted that three U.S. professors of business and public administration have been appointed to the Trinidad division of the University of the West Indies. But in Jamaica a small AID mission is maintained, providing technical assistance for the training of sanitary engineers, of personnel in urban renewal projects, of persons in educational television, produce marketing and the dairy industry.

More financial support should be forthcoming from the United States because the West Indies buy heavily from the United States. In the newly independent states the level of these purchases has increased. For example, Jamaica during the 1950's bought a steady 40 percent or more of its imports from the British Commonwealth; however, since independence this has dropped to below 25 percent and the nation to profit most from this drop has been the United States.

After the collapse of the West Indian Federation the islands and their leaders have endeavored to seek their own independent path. Alexander Bustamente, the Prime Minister of Jamaica, shoulders more responsibility than any other single politician for the collapse of the Federation. His cousin and political adversary, Norman Manley, failed to secure the majority vote in favor of remaining in the Federation. After the plebescite, as was expected, Manley resigned from office and in the subsequent election lost to Alexander Bustamente, who then took Jamaica on to its independence. Bustamente is now over 80 years of age, practically blind, and has already had one coronary attack. He has turned over the day-by-day task of running the Government to younger men, notably the acting Prime Minister, Donald B. Sangster. The party is strong and the reason for this strength can be found in the young leaders Bustamente has allowed to come into the forefront. Sangster, backed by the Minister of Development and Welfare, E. Seaga, and the Minister of Trade and Industry, R. Lightbourne, may feel sufficiently safe to hold elections in 1966 on their own merits and without the sheltering shadow of the tired old Bustamente. Manley's opposition party has grown weaker mainly because the younger elements are vying for the position of leadership which Manley refuses to relinquish.

Except for an occasional trade mission to the eastern Caribbean and British Guyana, Jamaica has directed little attention to her former cohorts in the Federation. Her decision to go it alone is being strictly carried out. Jamaica could use the rice of British Guyana, but the Government is reluctant to force the change in consumer tastes just to accommodate a potential friend. Thus Forbes Burnham, Prime Minister of British Guyana, has been forced to continue the trade agreement of the former Prime Minister, Cheddi Jagan, with Fidel Castro in Cuba.

The attitude of Trinidad-Tobago after the dissolution of the Federation was completely different from that of Jamaica but because of the forcefulness with which this policy was expressed the end result has been just about the same. Eric Williams was convinced that the West Indian Federation failed because the power of the Federal Government was weaker than that of its component parts. Therefore, he made known his continued commitment to the concept of West Indian nationhood to be realized through the unification of the islands of the eastern Caribbean with the Government of Trinidad-Tobago. This proposal for a unified state under the leadership of Trinidad-Tobago found few sympathizers in the other islands. Only Grenada, whose surplus population has spilled over into Trinidad since the discovery of oil in the latter island, expressed a willingness to consider seriously this invitation. Trinidad-Tobago has done little to acknowledge Grenada's acceptance since the prospect of uniting with a predominantly Negro population has been blocked by the sizable East Indian minority in Trinidad.

The obvious solution of this impasse would be to accept into the state the predominantly East Indian British Guyana. Forbes Burnham, a leftwing Socialist, holds the reins of Government in British Guyana only through an uneasy coalition with a John Birchite type minority party led by wealthy rum producer Peter d'Aguiar. Between Williams and Burnham there is a great degree of agreement in philosophy and interest but a petty personality clash has come to the point where the two are no longer on speaking terms. Thus Trinidad-Tobago, with the patiently waiting Grenada, stands just about as alone as Jamaica in splendid isolation.

The prospects for cooperation among the rest of the islands is not much brighter. Barbados took the initiative to continue conversations with the other island leaders concerning the possibility of organizing a federation which was originally called the Little Eight. With the negative response of Grenada, the Little Eight was reduced to the smaller Little Seven. If Great Britain had shown the same enthusiasm she had demonstrated for the larger federation and agreed to underwrite the expenses of the operation during its first years of existence then the federation of the Little Seven (Antigua, St. Kitts and Nevis, Dominica, St. Lucia, St. Vincent, Montserrat, and Barbados) would have been a reality. This guarantee was inexcusably delayed several years (1962–65) and in the meantime the enthusiasm of the islands waned and politicians began to argue over the nature of the federation. The federation which had originally been conceived as a strongly centralized one soon began to lose support as the island politicians became reluctant to yield local power. Mr. Vere Bird of Antigua has been the most active leader in this process of eroding the proposed power of the Federal Government. His reluctance to cooperate has increased since the Antiguan economy, bolstered by tourism and an industrialization program, has given strong signs of continued self-sufficiency in spite of the disastrous drought which curtailed the sugar production.

Barbados, which is also economically independent of support from Great Britain, has also become impatient with the delay in the plans for the Eastern Caribbean Federation. Prime Minister Errol Barrows announced in the fall of 1965 the decision of his Government to secure separate independence within the British Commonwealth of Nations. In spite of the fact that two ministers resigned from the Cabinet as a result of this announcement, Barbados is sticking by the decision. Thus, in the words of Sir Arthur Lewis, the distinguished St. Lucian economist now at Princeton University, the prospects for a federation in the West Indies are nil for at least a generation by which time the present leaders will probably be replaced by more cooperative ones.[111]

There is one glimmer of hope. As Dr. Eric Williams indicated at the early date of January 1962, any federation of the West Indies must be accompanied by the creation of a cooperating economic community. As far as Trinidad-Tobago and Dr. Williams are concerned no significant success has been realized in this direction. In spite of the fact that erudite Williams places the blame on foreign interference,[112] much of the responsibility is his own. Progress toward economic cooperation is being made, to the detriment of Trinidad-Tobago, by other communities of the Caribbean. In October 1965, the Prime Ministers of British Guyana, Barbados, and Antigua signed a general agreement concerning the structure of a Caribbean Free Trade Area (CAFTA) to which in time other communities may find reason to join.

In summation, and again paraphrasing the scholarly Dr. Williams, the people of the West Indies have been either freed or are in the process of liberating themselves from colonialism, but a society has not been formed. In the place of a great and powerful federation of close to four million people, one finds today the sad spectacle of insignificant power blocs built around the personality of small-island politicians, each jealousy jostling the other for a small advantage for his island community.

2. *Prospects for Federation in the British Leeward and Windward Islands*

The Windward Islands

The Windward Islands is a group of dependent British possessions in the eastern Caribbean. The islands making up this group are situated between 12° and 16° north latitude and 60° and 62° west longitude. The islands form part of the chain of volcanic islands known as the Lesser Antilles, with the Caribbean Sea to the west and the Atlantic Ocean to the east. There is a group of smaller islands lying between St. Vincent and some are part of Grenada.

The Windward Islands cover the total land area of 821 square miles and are inhabited by 312,295 persons.[113] From a north to south direction the islands are: Dominica, 305 square miles, with a population of 86,194; St. Vincent, 150 square miles in area, and a population of 80,005; and Grenada, 133 square miles in area, and a population of 86,617. Each colony has its own institutions, law, revenue, and tariff; but the islands unite for certain common purposes—broadcasting and banana production.

The Windward Islands Government was constituted by Letters Patent in 1885. At that time three islands formed the group: St. Lucia, St. Vincent, and Grenada; Dominica joined the group in 1940. The Windward Islands Government as constituted was neither a federation, a confederation, or unitary form of government. Rather it seemed to have been the usual colonial office device to administer a group of poverty-stricken islands whose size and economy did not warrant a separate Governor's Secretariat for each of them. Hence the formation of the Windward Islands Government in 1885 and its persistence until 1959. When it became necessary as a result of the West

Indies Federation to grant a constitutional status, the Governor's Secretariat was abolished and the administrator for each colony was designated the crown's representative.

Constitutionally the territories of the Windward Islands enjoy a semiautonomous form of government. This was introduced in January of 1960. It provides for an administrator appointed by the Crown, an executive council which has the general control and direction of the government of the country, and a legislative council with a large majority of elected members—elected by adult suffrage—presided over by a speaker. The executive council is controlled by elected ministers appointed on the advice of the chief ministers. This constitution sets up the framework for the operation of the party system and in each island the idea of the political party and its functions are being recognized. In each island except Dominica—where there are three parties—two political parties compete for control of the government.

Technically the new constitution introduced in 1959 dissolved the constitutional links among the four territories. However, their long association has developed a great deal of common interest among them, and these should tend to perpetuate closer ties. The dissolution of the West Indies Federation in 1962 darkened the future of the islands. When this unfortunate incident occurred and Jamaica and Trinidad became independent states, the Windward Islands had three possible alternatives: First, there was the possibility of continued association with Great Britain, though this alternative was not seriously considered; second, there was the possibility of an Eastern Caribbean Federation mooted and supported by all the Windward Islands except Grenada—the federation of the seven remaining territories is still in its formative stage; the third alternative, Union in a Unitary State with Trinidad attracted the Grenadians. There have been a number of studies calculated to decide what would be the best approach to implement the integration of the two territories. Professor Archibald Singham in a study on Grenada made the point that:

> The issue of the Union with Trinidad has not yet been resolved. After a year of negotiations there is considerable interest but no commitment so far from the Trinidad Government. There are some political complications in regard to Grenada's Union with Trinidad. The government in power in Trinidad draws its support primarily from the Negro population. The opposition is supported primarily by the East Indians. If Grenada united with Trinidad, the Government would greatly increase its majority if the racial pattern of voting persists. Thus the opposition in Trinidad has been skeptical about Grenada's entry. Furthermore, there are growing doubts expressed in Trinidad about the desirability of subsidizing a poor Grenada. The Prime Minister of Trinidad however is committed to the idea of a West Indian community and has suggested a broader Union of the islands in the area.[114]

Since it would be necessary for constitutional amendment in Trinidad before the Union could become a reality, one could anticipate further difficulties. The opposition party (according to Professor Singham) might well refuse to cooperate in amending the constitution. As if mindful of this possibility, the economic commission in its report to the Prime Minister stated:

> It might be recognized that the means of the economic development of Grenada are neither economic integration nor political and constitutional change of whatever direction. These are only conditions some might argue, preconditions which enhance or diminish possibilities of economic development.[115]

Prospects for federation

The idea of closer union in the British Caribbean has had a checkered history. For analytical purposes this history, punctuated by the attempts and failures at effecting closer union in the British Caribbean, can be broken down into four periods: (1) The pre-World War I period—when the closer union idea was used as an instrument of economy in administering the colonies; (2) the interwar period characterized by a cautious approach to closer union; (3) the post-World War II period (1947–62) when federation was seen as a means of granting self-government to the colonies. This period saw the rise and fall of the first West Indies Federation; (4) 1962–65—the attempt at a new Caribbean federation (the Federation of the Seven).

From the beginning of settlements in the Caribbean the British Government had always been inclined to unite two or more of the smaller territories for administrative purposes. The main inducements for this line of approach were the economies of scale which accrued from it. Thus from the 17th century onward we find various groups of islands sharing the same Governor, but with the exception of the Leeward Islands Federation (1871–1957) there was little unification in practice. The Windward Islands until recently shared the same Governor. Barbados at different times shared the same Governor with other islands of the Lesser Antilles; while Jamaica and British Honduras were similarly linked for some time.

The attempt to establish a federal union (similar to the Leeward Islands') between Barbados and the Windward Islands in the 1870's, was foiled by the so-called confederation riots in Barbados in 1876.[116] Despite this failure, the idea of federal union still had great appeal to British officials and visiting Royal Commissions, but 70 more years were to pass before anything tangible was done. The Royal Commission of 1882–83 (whose assignment was to inquire into financial conditions, with a view to the more economical administration of Jamaica, the Leeward Islands, the Windward Islands, and Tobago) recommended the closer union of all the British territories in the Caribbean with a federal union as the ultimate goal. Again in 1894 a Royal Commission sent to Dominica to inquire into the affairs of that island went out of its way to recommend an administrative union of all the British Antilles under one Governor General.[117]

During the interwar period, though there was still great interest in the economies of large-scale administration, official policy and action as regards closer political union in the British Caribbean reflected a deliberate caution. This deliberate caution arose from the reluctance of the British Government to grant the necessary constitutional reform—self-government—which closer political union might have entailed and which the West Indian nationalists had been advocating.

In 1921 Lord Halifax had clearly stated in his report on constitutional reform, that social conditions were too underdeveloped for self-government; while the state of public opinion and communications were not yet good enough to make federation practicable. Throughout the twenties and thirties and early forties there was a constant refrain in all the reports of Royal Commissions to the effect that West Indians were not ready for federation. Thus the closer Union Commission (prompted by the need for economy in administration) of 1932–33 in effect rejected political federation and recommended the sharing of a Governor by the Windward and Leeward Islands. The Moyne Commission (1938–39) though not rejecting the idea, felt that federation was not immediately possible. However the commissioners felt political federation was the ideal to which policy should be directed, and that every effort should be made to eliminate local prejudices against federation, both by an exposition of its theoretical advantages and by testing these in practice through the amalgamation of some of the smaller units.

In this respect the Moyne Commission was heeded in official circles; and subsequent to the publication of its recommendations, action, which resulted in the establishment of the Colonial Development and Welfare Organization, was taken. This organization's prime task was to promote regional development and cooperation. With this same end in view the Caribbean Commission [118] was setup in 1942. The domination of that body by the metropolitan countries militated against its effectiveness as an instrument of regional development.[119] However, its research council (established in 1943) did provide the colonies with useful information, and its West Indian conferences were especially significant in contributing to the development of a West Indian community.

Another significant prefederal institution was the Regional Economic Committee. Its members were the governments of the various territories, represented at ministerial or comparable rank. This body provided a forum for the politicians of the area to discuss and understand the nature of the problems which affected the area as a whole and which needed the most rational cooperation for effecting their solution. The committee concerned itself with such matters as the trade commissioners in Canada and the United Kingdom; interisland shipping, civil aviation, local borrowing, and economic surveys.

Despite these praiseworthy attempts at laying the foundations of Caribbean integration, one cannot excuse the more or less negative attitude on the part of Britain as regards implementation of political federation. The argument that the people in these societies were too illiterate, and socially too immature is not enough to justify such conservatism. For though literacy and social maturity are necessary conditions for the granting of constitutional reform in a democratic society, they are by no means sufficient conditions. And it seems that a more sympathetic ear could have been given to the voices of West Indian nationalists in their representation of the aims and aspiration of West Indians.

To many of these West Indian nationalists the economic reason for federation was not the overriding one. For them federation was the framework within which a national consciousness could develop. Federationists like T. Albert Marryshow—

> had envisaged a local art and culture with its own character, not a feeble copy of European models. Already in the work of a few writers like Mittelholzer, Lamming, Mais, Selvon, and others, in the spontaneous folk music of the calypsonians and the steelband, in the West Indian version of the African dances there were evidences of great artistic talent. Freed from the colonial stigma, full of a new feeling of national pride and self respect they could hold up their heads as West Indians. Their flag may be new and without history, but to them it has great symbolic meaning, for it indicates that they are nearing the end of a long journey from slavery through colonialism to genuine national independence and a place however modest among the nations of the world.[130]

In other words they thought that by seeking the political kingdom of federation everything else would be easily achieved.

At the end of the Second World War there was a universal preoccupation with political self-determination. Democracy had triumphed over fascism. Britain, being one of the leading democratic states and possessing a vast colonial empire in parts of which less than democracy prevailed, could do no more than join the vanguard of the movement for democracy and political self-determination. A more progressive attitude was adopted toward West Indian Federation. For since Great Britain was committed to political self-determination and democracy, since the majority of the Caribbean territories were considered too small to achieve separate political independence and economic viability and since perpetual crown colony status would have been unacceptable to the growing local nationalist movement, it was decided that political federation was the best way out.

West Indian national consciousness and togetherness reached their high point during and immediately after the war. The war situation provided opportunities for united action at many levels, and promoted too the expansion of transport facilities which are invaluable instruments for promoting unity among territories so widely separated. Mr. Norman Manley of Jamaica was impressed by this fact in 1945 when he said:

> It is a misfortune that during the war when the forces of cohesion might almost easily have developed the limitations of transport denied us access to each other. As the war years recede so it will become harder and harder to build the foundations of new structure requiring unity for their success.[121]

Too many postwar years were allowed to go by before West Indian consciousness—reaching its "peak of emotional fervor" in September 1949 at the historical Montego Bay Conference—was harnessed and used for laying the foundations of political structures requiring unity for their success. The interval between the historical Montego Bay Conference in 1947 and the agreement to federate reached on February 23, 1956, was characterized by a series of conferences and committees, reports and resolutions, as well as the decline of enthusiasm for the Federal idea from its high pitch (in 1947) to a level of indifference and cool acceptance of federation.

Not even the logical and erudite profederation argument of Dr. Eric Williams of Trinidad could recoup the situation. Delay in bringing about political union had proven to be dangerous. Dr. Williams in a speech to the Trinidad public raised all the essential points why federation was not only the correct approach to the solution of West Indian problems, but the only available approach:

> Federation, he said, is a simple matter of common sense. The organization of the British Caribbean territories dates from the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries * * * the age of small countries and small states. He pointed to Germany with as many states as there were days in the year; Switzerland, a collection of cantons and independent cities; Italy, a geographical expression; England and Scotland, with difficulty united in 1707.
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> In this context it was a mark of progress for Barbados to aspire to be a free state, as was said in 1651, and it was possible for Nevis to request in 1667 to be separated from the government of Barbados on the ground that the Barbadian planters viewed with jealousy the development of the sugar industry in Nevis and wanted to restrain it * * *
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> But we no longer live in the eighteenth century. The first proposals for British Caribbean Federation followed logically from two important consequences of the industrial revolution and large scale production in the nineteenth century. The first was the growth of large scale central governments—the unification of Germany, the Unification of Italy, the attempt of Bonaparte to set up a world empire, the Civil War in the United States to prevent the division of the country into two parts, the federation of Australia and Canada, the growth of the ideal of Pan Americanism. The second was the improvement in the method of trans-

> portation and communication—internally by the railway, externally by the steamship and telegraph.
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> These trends to larger units of government have become even more pronounced in the twentieth century. Look around the world today and try to find a community of 700,000 people in size of Trinidad and Tobago playing any important role in world affairs. There is none. There can be none. The units of government are getting larger and larger. Whether federation is more costly or less costly, whether federation is more efficient or less efficient federation is inescapable if the British Caribbean territories are to cease to parade themselves to the twentieth century world as eighteenth century anachronisms. It is from this point of view, and only from this point of view that I have frequently stated that any federation is better than no federation.[122]

Not even Williams' eloquent plea for Caribbean unity could have stemmed the tide of insular nationalism [123] which was gaining steady momentum and eroding whatever was left of West Indian consciousness.

In the case of Jamaica, the economic and consttiutional changes had created the general feeling that Jamaica had very little to gain from uniting with a group of islands which was economically and constitutionally inferior. Moreover the communication between the western and eastern Caribbean was so poor that it tended to reinforce that isolationist view. By 1952 Jamaica's bauxite industry had been established. The industrialization program had begun to take shape. And in 1953 the island was granted a greater measure of self-government. These factors coupled with the narrowness in communication served to develop a Jamaican nationalism which triumphed over the more desirable West Indian national in the referendum which brought the first West Indian Federation to its end.

In the case of Trinidad the expanding oil industry was providing the base for the growing national economy, which was attracting a substantial amount of industrial capital. By 1961 Trinidad had gained internal self-government. And at the time of the desertion of Jamaica, when Trinidad was expected to provide the political and moral leadership of the eastern Caribbean with which it had been closely associated, insular nationalism was again triumphant.

As we shall note later even among the other eastern Caribbean territories, this type of nationalism is steadily gaining ground. The nationalist movement in this part of the British Caribbean had always been West Indian in scope and orientation, especially from the early 1920's to the late 1940's. Then it was not identifiable with any particular island or organization. One of its chief architects was T. A. Marryshow—a Grenadian legislator and afterwards Federal senator—who founded and edited a newspaper which he deliberately called the West Indian. The conclusion we are forced to make is that the timing of the Federal project in the West Indies had been unfortunately inaccurate.

Such was the predominance of insular nationalism that the Federal Government the territories finally agreed to setup in 1958 was merely the shadow and not the substance of the type of Federal Government needed to solve West Indian problems.

Strong local loyalties and intercolonial suspicions and jealousies prevented anything better than a constitution which provided a strictly limited amount of central authority. The Federal Government's ability to marshal and allocate the national resources was severely limited because it was at the mercy of the units, depending as it did on a mandatory levy for its financial existence.

The Federal Government was also (constitutionally) in an inferior position vis-à-vis some of the units. This stemmed from the colonial limitations embodied in the constitution. These included the powers reserved to the Queen in council on the matter of foreign affairs, the discretionary powers of the Governor General in the appointment of senators, and his position as president of the Council of State. Some of the units had attained while others were about to be granted full internal self-government.

While the Federal Government suffered from constitutional anemia, there were demands for the type of constitutional reform which would give it vitality to function effectively. The Trinidad Government led this movement for constitutional reform. The Peoples' National Movement publicly declared that the Federal constitution should be based on a clear-cut and comprehensive conception aimed at securing the following objectives: (1) national independence and security, (2) the development of a national spirit, (3) the basic human freedoms, including freedom of religion, (4) the economic development and integration of the area.

The PNM would strengthen the Federal Government, and increase its powers as against the powers of the units giving it particular powers of taxation in all fields (the portion of revenue to be refunded to the units being arranged by agreement with the unit governments). The Federal Government would also have the final word in legislation and other matters affecting planning and development of all kinds, including banking and the raising of external loans.[124]

In the booklet entitled "The Economics of Nationhood," the PNM set out its concept of the type of Federal Government that was needed in the area; this document was blessed by the Trinidad Legislative Council in a debate which concluded with the passing of a resolution endorsing the principle of a strong independent Federation vested with the appropriate powers and responsibilities, and giving a mandate to the Trinidad and Tobago delegation to seek the support of the other units for such amendments to the Federal constitution as would be necessary to achieve this goal and enable the West Indies to take its place in the Commonwealth and in the United Nations.[125]

The position taken by Trinidad was diametrically opposed to that of Jamaica. Jamaica wanted the weakest of federal governments, one that would not be able to control industrial development, taxation on income and profits, excise duties, and consumption taxes. Jamaica also proposed that there should be machinery which would allow units to give the Federal Government control over their internal affairs, as they saw fit, while it would allow a unit like Jamaica to control those matters which were crucial to her own development. The positions taken up by the two leading participants in the Federation were irreconcilable and could not be accommodated in the same constitutional framework. The other territories preferring to have a weak Federation rather than no Federation at all, conceded substantially to Jamaica's demands. Not withstanding these concessions, the other territories woke up on the morning of September 20, 1961, to find that Jamaicans had voted to leave the Federation.

Federation of the seven

When the West Indian Federation was formally dissolved, the remaining eight territories immediately began discussions with a view of establishing some form of political union. After almost 3 years of discussions and negotiations among seven of the eight territories, a draft Federal scheme has been produced. The contents of this document have engendered a great deal of dissatisfaction on the part of some territories. The dissatisfaction arises over the question of the role of the proposed Federal Government in economic and financial matters, as well as the sources from which the Federal Government should get its revenue.

According to the draft Federal scheme, the Federal Government would have concurrent powers with the territorial governments as regards industrial development and income taxation, while customs revenue is to be exclusively under Federal control. In connection with the utilization of revenue accruing to the Federal Government from customs duties, the draft scheme recommends that the Federal Government shall pay to the unit governments 65 percent or such other proportionate part as the legislature may from time to time prescribe by any law passed under the provisions in the constitution for the amendment of the entrenched provisions of the constitution, so that each unit government shall receive a share proportionate to the amount of the proceeds of import duties derived from that unit for the financial year.

Concerning these provisions there are two sets of arguments which are not unlike those of Trinidad and Jamaica in respect to the First (and now defunct) Federal Government. On the one hand the St. Lucian Government has condemned and rejected the draft Federal scheme on the ground that it (the draft scheme) proposes to set up a "weak and anemic" Federal Government which would be bound hand and foot by seven self-governing territories—a state without the ability to formulate policy, without any powers for economic planning, without any powers for uniform taxation, without any powers for lifting the remaining territories from the morass of economic neglect and providing the people with some acceptable standard of economic well-being.[126]

The St. Lucia Government has also reserved its position on the question of sources and disposition of Federal revenue. In a speech to the legislature on these matters the Chief Minister said:

> * * * the prime source of federal revenue will be from custom duties. The St. Lucia Government derives its revenue primarily from that source. In 1965 * * * we budgeted for an expenditure of just over ten million dollars and from custom duties we expect to derive a little under 50 percent of that amount. The Draft Federal Plan calls for a surrender of 30 percent of these revenues to the Federal Government. It means that St. Lucia's contributions to the Federal Government—taking figures as they are today—will be 1.5 million dollars or in percentage of total revenue just a little under 10 percent. This picture is the same for the other Windward Islands that depend primarily on the exports of agricultural produce for the payment of imports or all or most of their necessities. Compared with Barbados, Barbados' contribution in relation to total revenue is just about 6 percent. The Leeward Islands' contribution taken in totality will be just over 6.5 percent. So you see as far as the Federal Plan is concerned on a percentage basis, the burden of supporting this federal superstructure will fall more heavily on the Windward Islands than on any other territory.[127]

As a result of the above contention the St. Lucia Government has made the following proposals: (*a*) That if the Federal Government is to be financed from custom duties, any surplus from Federal revenue should be returned to the territories not on a derivation basis, but on a per capita basis; (*b*) that the Federal Government should collect income tax and return it to the territories not on a derivation basis but on a per capita basis; and (*c*) that any surplus revenue should be used to finance territorial services—education—on an equalization basis.[128]

On the other hand, there is Antigua with a line of thought which is not unlike that adopted by Jamaica during the period of negotiations and discussions for revising the constitution of the First Federal Government. Antigua has shown signs of attracting outside capital. The island has a potentially good tourist trade. And it has been chosen as the site for a $50 million oil refinery. Thus, though the Chief Minister of that island in 1947 expressed the view that (any) federal government (of the West Indies) should be in a position to influence economic development through regional planning, in 1965, Mr. Bird (with Antigua showing some signs of economic prosperity) would prefer a federal government that does not have the upper hand in matters of economic development.

This strange type of nationalism has been and is still undermining West Indian unity. It is directly responsible for the fact (according to Mr. John Compton, St. Lucia's Chief Minister) that between 1962 and 1964 "there have been nine meetings of the Regional Council of Ministers * * * we have fought and toiled through nine meetings and * * * we have caught nothing." [129]

Federation is a matter of commonsense, said Trinidad's Eric Williams. But the question arises as to whether the political elites in the British Caribbean are approaching it from the commonsense point of view. There seems to be grave doubts as to whether they are. For one thing they have been and are attempting to establish a pre-World War II federal government to administer a post-World War II society. As long as the political elites (wittingly or unwittingly) preoccupy themselves with this line of approach, federation is doomed and indeed it would take a long time before it is realized.

The classical concept of a federal system of government conceives it as comprising a general government and several regional governments being limited in their own sphere and within that sphere independent of each other. Given the social and economic transformations which have taken place since World War II, the condition (laid down in the classical statement of the Federal principle) that both the general and regional governments should be independent of each other, cannot be satisfied.

Indeed, older federations—United States, Canada, and Australia—which were established within the framework of the classical concept, have all undergone great changes by reason of the exigencies of large-scale social and economic development. Thus, in all three of the older federations, the Central Government substantially controls income tax as a source of revenue. The regional or state governments are more dependent on Federal payments or grants than they were before the war—the Australian States derive 60 percent of their general revenue from Federal sources, Canadian Provinces (apart from Quebec) get about 30 percent, and in the United States Federal grants now contribute about 20 percent of total State revenue as against 12 percent before the war. In all three countries Federal payments now give a disproportionate amount of aid to the poorer states. Finally, through social welfare, which is constitutionally within the sphere of the states, it is now largely controlled by Federal legislation and financed from Federal funds.[130] Thus, in practice, state governments are not independent of the Federal Government, as they derive a considerable part of their revenue from Federal payments.

Whereas the guiding principle of 18th and 19th century federalism was the rather rigid compartmentalization of State and Federal authority, the guiding principle of mid-20th century federalism is the emphasis on cooperation between them. The trouble with the British Caribbean Federal proposals is that they reflect a desire for the modern cooperative federalism, yet a reluctance to work out general agreements for its establishment.

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[1] See Joshua: p. 214 footnotes are used only to refer to other sections of this study where the matter has been elaborated in greater detail and depth.

[2] See Economic Background of the French Antilles, pp. 113ff and 144ff.

[3] See Joshua, p. 213.

[4] See Joshua, p. 216.

[5] See Joshua, pp. 217 and 218.

[6] See Government and Politics of the Netherlands Antilles, p. 89.

[7] See Economic Background of the Netherlands Antilles, pp. 41 and 48.

[8] See Economic Background of Surinam, p. 55.

[9] See Charter of the Kingdom of the Netherlands, p. 86.

[10] See Charter of the Kingdom of the Netherlands, pp. 79–80.

[11] See Government and Politics of the Netherlands Antilles, p. 92.

[12] See Political Conditions of Surinam, p. 99.

[13] See Political Conditions of Surinam, p. 102.

[14] See Government and Politics of the Netherlands Antilles.

[15] See the Charter of the Kingdom of the Netherlands, pp 81–83.

[16] See Economic Background to French Antilles, p. 147.

[17] See Economic Background to French Antilles, p. 144.

[18] See Economic Background of French Antilles.

[19] See Economic Background of French Antilles, p. 128.

[20] See Economic Background, p. 147.

[21] See Latortue, p. 191.

[22] See Joshua, p. 222.

[23] See Joshua, p. 224.

[24] See Government and Politics of the Netherlands Antilles, p. 600.

[25] On Dec. 30, 1965, 2 months after this study was presented to the Commission, the British Government announced that six of the former members of the West Indian Federation (Antigua, Dominica, St. Lucia, St. Vincent, Grenada, and St. Kitts) were eligible to become autonomous states in association with Great Britain. Each would be in control of its internal affairs, be able to amend its own constitution and declare itself completely independent if it so desired. Great Britain would retain responsibility for external affairs and defense. To date four of the six islands have accepted this offer.

[26] De jure population at end of 1963.

[27] $1=NAf1.89.

[28] Total national income of the Caribbean region (excluding Haiti, Cuba, and Santo Domingo) is estimated conservatively to be $3,875 million. Netherlands Antilles contribute about 4.5 percent of this total. Puerto Rico, Jamaica, Trini-

dad, and Tobago contribute more than 70 percent. The rest (approximately 25 percent) is divided among the remaining 15 countries (Caribbean Organization, 13).

[29] Official estimates became available at the time that this report goes to press. Indeed, they disclose that income has been declining since 1958, but not at the rate stated. Between 1958 and 1964 national income in current prices remained relatively stable, but declined by 5 percent in real terms, owing to the rise in prices. Real national income per head declined by 13 percent during the same period.

[30] The Curacao Petroleum Co. was established in 1915. In 1925 its name was changed to Curacao Petroleum Industry Co. The present name stems from 1959. In Aruba a refinery was built in 1925 by the Eagle Oil Co. owned by the Mexican Eagle Oil Co., a subsidiary of Royal Dutch Shell; it discontinued its operations in 1953. The present Lago Oil & Transport Co. was established in 1927 and is now a subsidiary of the Standard Oil Co. of New Jersey.

[31] The tax exemption ordinance dates from 1953.

[32] Because of the highly decentralized administrative structure of the country, whereby the island governments are autonomous in carrying out a number of important public functions, development planning falls within the responsibility of island governments as well. The central government may contribute separate projects to these plans. Collaboration among the individual administrative units is realized by a central programing bureau forming part of the central government machinery. It coordinates the island programs, supplements them with projects to be carried out at the national level, and assists the smaller islands in establishing their development programs.

[33] Association of the Netherlands Antilles with the European Economic Community became possible at the end of 1961 after the problem of oil imports into EEC was solved in a provisionally acceptable basis and an agreement was reached on a duty-free import quota, with the reservation of the right by the EEC to raise important duties in case of market disturbances.

[34] There are two censuses: Aug. 1, 1921, and Oct. 31, 1950. Only the results of the 2d census have been published.

[35] $1=Sur. f1.89. Population figures for 1954 and 1962 have been inter- and extrapolated on the basis of population growth between 1950 and 1960.

[36] Deflated by the cost of living index which registered a 19.6-percent increase from 1954 to 1962 (A.B.S. Statistische Berichten).

[37] Tax data on income distribution are deficient, because among other reasons, they exclude incomes in kind, they do not consider tax exempt incomes (e.g., persons whose incomes are lower than the legally recognized personal exemption allowance remain outside their scope), and they recognize a series of deductions to compute net taxable income. An added factor, of crucial importance in the case of Surinam, is the great degree of tax evasion. One way to show the deficiency of the tax data with respect to the distribution of income is to compare per capita incomes obtained from the national income accounts with that from tax data. For 1956 the latter figure is Sur. f3,372 ($1,784) while per capita gross domestic product at factor cost (inclusive of capital consumption allowances and of factor incomes which flow abroad) reaches only Sur. f515 ($272). In other words incomes reported under the income tax are higher, and in 1956 they represented only one-half of national income at factor cost.

[38] Despite their deficiency, tax data still point to a relatively high degree of inequality with a concentration ratio (R) of 0.62.

[39] 1 ha. (hectare) =2.471 acres.

[40] A classification of land holdings by ethnic groups shows that the East Indians are the most important agricultural group and owns 50 percent of the farms and 45 percent of the land. They are followed in importance by Indonesians who own 38 percent of the farms, but only 10 percent of the land, because of the very small size of their land holdings (on the average 2 ha.). The Creoles do not seem to play an important role in agriculture, though they do possess some of the larger plantations, which, however, are not being operated. The remaining ethnic groups possess 1 percent of the farms, but 31 percent of the land (van Dusseldorp, 219).

[41] Between 1650 and 1863, i.e., between colonization and abolition of slavery, Surinam provided in its profitable plantations agricultural produce for the European Market and consituted an important source of income for the Netherlands. Around 1820 there were no less than 416 plantations producing coffee (176), sugar (122), cotton (72) and mixed crops (46). (Stichting Planbureau, 1962, 32–33.) After the abolition of slavery plantation agriculture began its downward trend, mainly because of the difficulty of obtaining labor, the opening of the Suez Canal which shifted the interest of European entrepreneurs toward the East, and plant diseases.

[42] Stichting Industrie Ontwikkeling Suriname (Surinam Industrial Development Bureau) investigating industrial possibilities was set up in 1961. The investment ordinance providing moderate rates of taxation and special allowances for new investments dates from 1960.

[43] Between 1954 and 1962 commodity exports rose by 83 percent, while commodity imports grew by 112 percent. There was actually a decline in exports from 1960 to 1962.

[44] The original 10-year plan was drawn up in 1951–52, but was revised after reexamination of the needs with respect to public housing, network of roads, opening up of new agricultural areas and their method of financing (Stichting Planbureau, 1954, 13).

[45] Since the time of writing this report, changes have been made in development planning. The 1963–72 plan was not executed. Instead, due to the financial difficulties described below, transitional plans have been approved for 1963, 1964, and 1965, and a new plan for 1966–75 has been drawn up. This new plan, which in its basic characteristics is not very different from the previous one, is currently submitted to the Dutch Government for their approval.

[46] This was not the case with respect to the first plan. For instance, out of a total public capital expenditure of Sur. f32.4 million in 1961, only Sur. f21 million were slated as expenditure arising out of the implementation of the 10-year plan. A variety of other expenditures, such as preparation of land for public housing, procurement of heavy equipment for a number of public services, were outside its scope (Ministerie van Financien, 1962, 29).

[47] Import duties on beer, wine, other alcoholic beverages, tobacco, and automobiles have been raised as of Aug. 1, 1962 (Ministerie van Financien, 1963, 20).

[48] Expenditures specifically designed to increase employment rose from Sur. f0.9 million in 1958 to Sur. f3.4 million in 1962, i.e., by 3.7 times, while annual additions to employment rose from 835 persons to 2.112, i.e., by 2.5 times (Ministerie van Financien, 1962, 18).

[49] Marie Galante, approximately 30 kms. east; St. Martin and St. Barthelemy, approximately 180 kms. north; Les Saintes, 12 kms. south; and La Desirade, 12 kms. east.

[50] See the following table:

	Population (1961) (in thous.)	Percent	Area (km²)	Percent
Martinique	292.0	47.9	1,100	1.2
Guadeloupe	283.3	46.5	1,780	1.9
French Guiana	33.5	5.6	91,000	96.9
Total	608.8	100.0	93,880	100.0

Source: Caribbean Organization, B, 69; Institute of Caribbean Studies, 7-8; INSEE, 1, 7.

[51] Antillean wages are adjusted to French wages, but minimum wage raises are applied very much later than in France; family allowances are lower; there is no unemployment insurance; longer hours have to be worked in the Antilles to be eligible for assistance under health or maternity insurance (Lasserre, 1,057).

[52] In French Guiana it is estimated that in 1959–60 only 40 percent of workers registered with the social security had jobs which qualified them to pay contributions; among these 40 percent only one-half had full-year employment (SEDES, C, 8). In Guadeloupe and Martinique occasional workers constitute a large portion of all workers in agriculture; this is accompanied by unemployment in other sectors of the economy. The rate of unemployment is unknown (Lasserre, 1,013; France. Dept. de la Martinique, B, 110).

[53] For instance, in Guadeloupe in 1957 the number of establishments with more than 20 employees did not even reach 100 (Lasserre, 1,011). In French Guiana it was estimated that only 55 enterprises had more than 10 employees (SEDES, C, 8).

[54] All the figures for the product accounts are taken from the publications of SEDES. The concept and breakdown of the domestic product are somewhat different from the traditional usage. E.g., public enterprises are defined so as to include social security administration, post and telecommunications, schools and hospitals. Expenditures on the latter two categories are imputed to the household sector as part of the private consumption expenditures; their counterpart is to be found in the public sector under the rubric of social transfers.

[55] In Guadeloupe in 1958 there were 13 sugar mills out of which 5 were subsidiaries of the 3 big ones (SIAPAP, SOM, BEAUPORT) dominating the markets; 62 percent of the cane milled in these 3 refineries came from their own plantations. In Martinique in 1962 there were 10 sugar mills, 4 of which produced more than half of the total output, and 9 pineapple canning factories which absorbed almost the entirety of the production; out of these 9, 3 were the most important.

[56] The ratio of exports to gross domestic product in selected countries was as follows: Trinidad—65 percent; Barbados—49 percent; Grenada—32 percent; Puerto Rico—48 percent; U.S.A.—4 percent; United Kingdom—16 percent (Prest, A., 14, except for Puerto Rico).

[57] In Guadeloupe 99 percent of the tonnage of exports consist of sugar, rum, molasses, and bananas; in Martinique 95 percent of the same tonnage consist of bananas, sugar, rum, and pineapple.

[58] The French Caribbean was granted a U.S. quota of 32,581 short tons for 3 years, 1962–64, at a premium price reduced 10 percent the first year, 20 percent the second year, and 30 percent the third (U.S. Department of Agriculture, 11).

[59] E.g., jute bags for the sugar industry can now be imported from India, rice can be imported from Surinam, and certain types of meat (pork and goat) can be brought in free of licensing.

[60] During a short period between 1945 and 1947 there was a favorable balance of trade due to the release of stocks accumulated during the war years when the French Antilles remained faithful to the Vichy regime and, therefore, was subjected to an economic blockade by the Allies.

[61] Annual gold production varies between 500–700 kg. There is great hope in bauxite in the Kaw Mountains. SOGEBAU, a French-American company, has restarted drillings and hopes to start exploitation soon.

[62] This is aggravated by the attitude of the tribal population which works only to obtain a needed sum of money and accepts remuneration to the extent of one-third of the legal minimum.

[63] In French Guiana the situation was somewhat different. There it was the question of prospecting the underground and surface wealth of the country. One-half of the available funds was used for that purpose.

[64] E.g., the discrepancy between the official minimum wage level in France and that of the Caribbean departments was only 2.5 percent on January 1, 1963 (France, Dept. de la Martinique, B, 110).

[65] Development plans for the oversea departments are prepared by the National Planning Board (Commissariat General du Plan) which is directly responsible to the Prime Minister. The board bases its work on the reports received from technical departments and the central planning committee for oversea departments located at the board's headquarters in Paris. At the local level there is a planning committee in each department. It is composed of the representatives of the government, the private sector, local municipal bodies and labor unions. Local committees have only consultative status. The plan, after a series of technical handlings, is submitted to the French Parliament; once ratified by the Parliament it becomes law and carries compulsory powers. The plans are financed mainly by two sources; FIDOM and CCCE (Caisse Centrale de Cooperation Economique). The resources of FIDOM are provided by the French Government through yearly appropriations. The oversea departments may apply to FIDOM for funds for development projects and to CCCE for long-term development financing. There is a 3d source of funds: The European Fund for Oversea Development with its headquarters in Brussels. It has a lesser importance and provides funds for specific projects.

[66] This privilege, prior to 1944, rested with La Banque de la Guadeloupe, La Banque de la Guyane, and La Banque de la Martinique. It was transferred to Caisse Centrale de la France d'Outre-Mer in 1944, but is in the hands of the Institut d'Emission since Oct. 1, 1959.

[67] This method was used first by Peacock and Hauser, p. 19–20.

[68] Trinidad and Tobago, French Guiana, Guadeloupe, Martinique, Netherlands Antilles, Surinam, Jamaica, Puerto Rico, British Guiana.

[69] These percentages are taken with respect to aggregate expenditure which includes items such as "transfers to other levels of government" and "debt repayment." In relation to net expenditure they would therefore be somewhat higher.

[70] Out of an estimated Ant. f1.8 billion private household savings in Martinique in 1958, Ant. f1.5 billion was transferred abroad. Out of Ant. f3.7 billion business savings Ant. f1.4 billion was also transferred abroad in the same year (SEDES, A, 46 and 101). The situation was similar in Guadeloupe.

[71] For instance, the fifth development plan proposes the creation of an economic development bureau which would carry out economic and technical research, provide information for potential investors, and aid them in every possible way (France. Dept. de la Martinique, IV, 41–42).

[72] A regression analysis between total tax revenue and gross domestic product yielded the following equations:

Martinique: $Y=0.212X-1{,}293.9 \quad r^2=0.97$
Guadeloupe: $Y=0.181X-830.9 \quad r^2=0.98$
French Guiana: $Y=0.1418X-156.3 \quad r^2=0.79$

where Y=total tax yield and X=gross domestic product.

[73] It is expected that in Martinique the gap between the demand for and supply of jobs will be to the order of 2,700 persons per year. (France. Dept. de la Martinique, C, vol. VII, 54.)

[74] The report of the subcommittees to the fifth plan recommends the following graduation of investment subsidies, which are oriented towards encouraging labor intensive industries:

New investment key employment created (NF)	*Subsidy rate (percent)*
0–10,000	25–30
10–20,000	20–25
20–40,000	15–20
40–60,000	10–15
Above 60,000	0–10

(France. Dept. de la Martinique, C, vol. IV, 47.)

[75] One of the common complaints in the sphere of industrial promotion is that even the simplest affairs have to be decided in Paris (Titina, 27).

[76] With powers defined by the law of Feb. 18, 1800, as subsequently amended.

[77] After a traffic accident in Fort-de-France which involved a Negro and a white man, the Negroes, who supported their Negro fellow, were very angry at the white driver. The arriving police wanted to disperse them. They protested and attacked the policeman and other white men. The consequences were three killed, many more injured and arrested.

[78] Quoted from Gilbert Gratiant, "L'ile fédérée française de la Martinique," Paris: Editions Louis Solanges, pp. 103–105.

[79] Département de la Martinique. Préfecture. "La Martinique," Fort-de-France, p. 8.

[80] In contrast to 37,962 in France.

[81] It is extremely difficult to specify their exact political views. With the exception of A. Césaire, they all lean toward socialism and De Gaulle.

[82] Victor Sablé, "La transformation des îles d'Amérique en départements français," Paris: Editions Larousse, 1955.

[83] "Against colonialism, for human dignity, freedom and peace," Report of PCM's 1st Cong., Sept. 21–22, 1957, p. 15. See also "Against colonialism unity of the people of Martinique," 2d Cong. of PCM.

[84] The program of autonomy, 3d Cong. of the PCM (Morne Rouge), Dec. 27–29, 1963, pp. 7ff.

[85] Eighty percent of the cultivable land belongs to ten beke (white man born in Martinique) families.

[86] H. Descomps de Bragelogne, "Le problème du statut des départements d'Outre-Mer: Guadeloupe et Martinique", Revue Juridique et Economique du Sud-Ouest, Nos. 1–2, 1964, pp. 104ff.

[87] See Le Progressiste, Monday, Apr. 6, 1964.

[88] The PPM leaders we met in Fort-de-France expressed a vivid desire to study in depth the political status of Puerto Rico in order to see how far a similar status would be applicable to the French Antilles.

[89] Présence Socialiste, Feb. 29, 1964. See also Note sur l'économie de la Martinique, PSU, documents, No. 1.

[90] Le Cri de L'AOTR, No. 1, Mar. 1964 and No. 2, May 1964.

[91] A propos d'une initiative en faveur de la révision du statut actuel, Manifesto signed by 31 metropolitan professors, Point-à-Pitre, 1964.

[92] Guy Lasserre, La Guadeloupe, Bordeaux: Union Française d'Impression. 1961, vol. II, p. 1003.

[93] "La fin d'un procès", Présence Socialiste, 6 janvier, 1964.

[94] For the complete text of the motion, see Présence Socialiste, Jan. 6, 1964.

[95] H. Descamps de Bragelonge, op. cit., pp. 105–106.

[96] Idem.

[97] It is difficult to estimate the exact size of the group, but according to all sources, no more than 150 students are members of that group.

[98] V. Sablé, "Nos Antilles et leurs problèmes," Match (Point-à-Pitre) Apr. 15, 1965.

[99] "Le Progressiste," Apr. 6, 1964.

[100] See V. Sablé, op. cit.

[101] 1st Cong. of the Communist Party, op. cit., p. 14.

[102] See V. Sablé, op. cit.

[103] "L'avenir des Antilles Françaises," Revue de L'Action Populaire, novembre 1963.

[104] Les Antilles avant qu'il soit trop tard.

[105] Le Monde, May 7–13, 1964.

[106] Henri Descamps de Bragelogne, op. cit., p. 232.

[107] In 1958 Malraux declared in Guadeloupe: "Guadeloupe, linked to France for centuries, has kept, in its loyalty to the fatherland, its own originality, a product of its history and its geography. That is why the Republic, following the monarchy, intends to preserve the traditional freedoms in the Antilles. Within the new institutions the French are going to establish, the elected in Guadeloupe should be able to participate in adapting our laws to local conditions." See H. Descamps de Bragelogne, op. cit., p. 234.

[108] * * * their particular situation will be first submitted for consultation to the General Councils of the oversea departments for the attention of the Ministry of State. The General Councils of the oversea departments can, through the Ministry of State, seize the governing of all proposals dealing with the interference of special arrangements motivated by the particular situation of their department. Their proposals should not infringe upon the principles stated in the Constitution. See H. Descamps de Bragelogne, op. cit., p. 232.

[109] This chapter is a somewhat modified form appeared in the January 1966, issue of Current History under the title: "The West Indies after Federation."

[110] Amitai Etzioni, "Political Unification," Holt, Rinehart & Winston, Inc., New York, 1965. See ch. 5 on the West Indian Federation.

[111] Sir Arthur Lewis: "The Agony of the Eight," Advocate Commercial Printery, Barbados, West Indies, no date but probably September of 1965.

[112] See "The Nation" of Trinidad-Tobago, Sept. 24, 1965.

[113] 1960 Census.

[114] Singham, A. W. "Political Crisis and Electorial Change in a Colonial Society." University of the West Indies, Mona, Jamaica. Paper prepared for delivery at the 1963 annual meeting of the American Political Science Association, New York City, Commodore Hotel, Sept. 4–7, 1963.

[115] Report of the Economic Commission on Unitary State, January 1965.

[116] Hugh Springer, "Reflections on the Failure of the First West Indian Federation," Occasional Papers in International Affairs, No. 4, July 1962. Harvard University, Center for International Affairs.

[117] Ibid., p. 2.

[118] Caribbean Organization in 1961.

[119] For this reason the Organization was abandoned by the leading contracting parties.

[120] Morley Ayearst, op. cit., p. 242.

[121] Hugh Springer, op. cit., p. 6.

[122] Eric Williams, Lecture delivered at Woodford Square, Jan. 5, 1956, in Federation, Two Public Lectures, Trinidad, 1956, pp. 11–12. Quoted from Hugh Springer, op. cit., pp. 10–11.

[123] Especially in the case of Jamaica.

[124] Hugh Springer, op. cit., p. 15.

[125] Ibid., p. 15.

[illegible] Chief minister, John Compton's speech on draft Federal scheme. Issued by the public relations officer, Mar. 31, 1965. pp. 1–2.

[127] Ibid., p. 3.

[128] Ibid., p. 3.

[129] Ibid., p. 2.

[130] A. H. Birch, "Federalism, Finance and Social Legislation in Canada, Australia and U.S.A.," Oxford at the Clarendon Press, 1957. p. 290.

TOWARD A BALANCE SHEET OF PUERTO RICAN MIGRATION

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I. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

Puerto Rico and the conterminous United States have both had a long history of migration. Both have experienced periods during which the stream of persons seeking better economic opportunities was toward it and others in which it reversed itself. The size of the streams has differed, of course, between the two areas because of their size, their natural resources, and the development of their economies.

Puerto Rico, in its early days, was the scene of a "gold rush," until gold was exhausted. Then restrictions were placed on out-migration. The 19th century saw a return to some in-migration, largely because of the turmoil in other Spanish colonies in the Western Hemisphere and the peaceful states of Puerto Rico.[1]

A. UNITED STATES EXPERIENCE

Table I shows U.S. immigration experience since records were first kept in 1820, by decades. It will be noted that from the 1871–80 decade to the onset of the "Great Depression" almost 50 years later, the decennial inflow was well over the 1951–60 figure. The 1901–10 total rose to about 3½ times that of the most recent decade.

A review of the movement of people to and from the United States and the vast internal movements which have characterized its history will put the Puerto Rican migration in perspective.

TABLE I.—*Immigrants to the United States, 1820–1965*

Period	Immigrant aliens (thousands)	Period	Immigrant aliens (thousands)
1820–30	152	1911–20	5,736
1831–40	599	1921–30	4,107
1841–50	1,713	1931–40	528
1851–60	2,598	1941–50	1,035
1861–70	2,315	1951–60	2,515
1871–80	2,812	1961	271
1881–90	5,247	1962	284
1891–1900	3,688	1963	306
1901–10	8,795	1964	292

Source: Annual Report, Immigration and Naturalization Service, 1964, table I.

Much of the immigration of the recent past, however, was not the voluntary movement of persons in search of better economic opportunities. It consisted mostly of refugees and displaced persons, of whom there are still millions in the world. Many of the ancestors of the present population of the United States also made their journey because of man's inhumanity to man; because someone or some institution did not like their religion, their political ideas, or their ancestry; and a significant number because of slavery.

B. THE IMMIGRATION PATTERN

Most immigration to the United States was voluntary and was economic in motivation. Study after study has demonstrated that immigrants came in response to better economic opportunities. With some exceptions, due primarily to involuntary emigration, "the number of arrivals increases in prosperity and falls in depressions," according to the most recent study.[2]

C. RETURN FLOW

It astonishes many persons to learn that there has always been a return migration from the United States in connection with the voluntary migrations. This was noted in the 1860's, for example, when sizable numbers of textile workers from Lancashire, iron moulders from Scotland, and iron and coal miners from other parts of the United Kingdom were reported "returning home."

The return movement has been measured only since the 1870's. Kuznets and Rubin report that:

> For 1878–1897 the ratio of departures to arrivals was about 17 percent; in the period 1808–1914, * * * it exceeded 30 percent. After 1918 it was even higher. For a short period during the depression of the 1930's departures even exceeded arrivals. In general, the number of departures follows a course opposite that of arrivals, falling in prosperity and rising in depressions. The study indicates that foreign labor supply, under conditions of a free in-outflow, might well be regarded as a sort of stabilizing reservoir moderating the business cycle.[3]

D. SEASONAL MIGRATION

Little noted, and not quantified, were the number of workers who came to the United States for short peak seasons of work and then returned to their homes when the demand fell off. This included thousands of British building trade mechanics who "became frequent 'Atlantic migrators', coming to America for the boom months of the year."[4]

Even seasonal farm workers came from Italy, returning in October and November after 8 or 9 months of work. According to one document:

> * * * they form a stream of workers that ebbs and flows from Italy to America in instant response to demand * * * More than 98,000 Italians—laborers and others, but chiefly laborers—went back to Italy in 1903. In 1904, owing to a temporary lull in our prosperity * * * the demand slackened * * * In the end, more than 134,000 Italians returned to Italy within the year, and we were saved the problem of an army of unemployed.[5]

E. IMMIGRATION RESTRICTION

Two social phenomena which are ageless and universal are ethnocentrism and xenophobia. Both were deeply involved in the restrictive legislation which was passed by the U.S. Congress in 1924. Ethnocentrism is a generalized emotional feeling that one's own group knows the correct and only really moral ways of living and that "strangers," with different manners and morals, are inferior. Many aboriginal tribes called themselves by a word meaning "people"; all others were, by implication, "non-people." When man seldom met anyone from another ethnic group, this attitude was not viciously antisocial. But as the number of people in the world increased from small groups scattered around the globe to over 3 billion at the present time, ethnocentrism becomes an antisocial guide to action. Xenophobia, the pathological intensification of ethnocentrism, is defined by psychiatrists as a "morbid fear of strangers." The combination of ethnocentrism and xenophobia which has most often expressed itself in the United States is racist feeling, the idea that it is the so-called "white" race which has made the only contributions of any value to the building of civilization. It easily gets confused with religion, social customs, manners, dress, personal habits, and other matters which are in no way intrinsically related to race.

Racism, a witches' brew of false analogies between animal and plant genetics and human inheritance, of spurious reasoning from the mythical history of a nonexistent "Nordic race", of Brahmin endeavor to maintain social status, of misinterpreted Darwinism, and of amateurish anthropology, flavored with wartime hysteria and postwar xenophobia, was written into the Federal statutes by the national origins and quota laws.

The first was vetoed by Wilson in his final days in office but was signed by Harding. The flood tide of racism is represented by the Immigration Act of 1924, fixing annual quotas at 2 percent of each foreign-born group resident in the United States in 1890. The Immigration and Naturalization Service "Monthly Review" in January 1947 pointed out that:

> In its broader sense the National Origins Plan was intended to preserve the racial composition of the United States through the selection of immigrants from those countries whose traditions, language, and political systems were akin to those in this country.

The tragedy of racist thinking and political action based on ideas of "racial composition" lies not only in the pervasive damage it does in human relations. Tragedy lies also in the damage it does to thinking honestly and effectively. The scientific method gives no support whatsoever to the myth that there are any racial "traditions, languages (or), political systems," or any other human behavior which is biologically determined. Race has no scientific meaning except as a biological concept. Specifically, the meaning of skin color for human beings resides exclusively in the reaction of other persons to that color, and never in the color itself. An exact analogy is the color of one's hair; skin color has neither more nor less intrinsic meaning.

In spite of attempts by the restrictionists, the Western Hemisphere was not included in the national origins plan. Thus, except for the special war and postwar charity cases of displaced persons, refugees, etc., a large part of immigration in recent years has come from Canada and Latin America. This was an unforeseen consequence of restriction. Another unforeseen consequence was the speeding up of internal population redistribution throughout the United States. The Puerto Rican who migrates to the conterminous United States is part of that movement.

F. INTERNAL POPULATION REDISTRIBUTION

A sizable proportion of the population of the United States has been moving in search of better economic opportunity since the first immigrants arrived early in the 1600's. The first handful, only 210 in 1610, were gradually replenished by new waves of immigrants until the 3 million square miles of the conterminous area were occupied according to the carrying capacity of the land. But that carrying capacity varies according to its innate qualities plus the technology which is applied to it by its occupants. Farming land "wears out," in the old "laissez faire" phrase; translated this means that the soil was abused and has lost its fertility or even that poor farming practices have resulted in loss of the top soil itself through erosion. Coal, iron, and other minerals and metals are mined out. Technology changes transportation practices, and cities in which large populations depended on the servicing and repair of steam locomotives now are only passenger stops for diesel engines. Economic change, which benefits some and harms others, has been built into modern industrial civilization and only those few who are isolated from the main currents of present-day life are immune to its effects.

People move primarily in response to imbalances in the economic system which result in fewer job opportunities in one place and labor scarcities in another. There are other reasons, of course, but unless persons are in the pre- or post-productive stage of life, jobs are the magnet which determines most moves. Our own experience shows that there are almost invariably four major factors present in voluntary migrations. They are: ambition, courage, hope, and differential economic opportunities.

Only the last can be quantified, tabulated, and put on graphs, at least in the present state of our knowledge. Anyone who has ever worked with migrants, however, cannot doubt the strength of the human factors.

The movements of internal migrants, as distinguished from immigrants, who cross national boundaries in their journeys, have been recorded in the United States since 1850.[6]

Close to one person in five of the total population has changed his residence from one State to another, according to each census count since 1850. The exact percentages and numbers are shown in table II. It will be noted that the ratios in 1950 and 1960 were closer to one in four who had moved; i.e., 23.5 and 24.8 percent. And the actual number is now over 10 times what it was in 1850.

The decennial census state-of-birth data may well underestimate considerably the actual migration in the United States. Persons may move to Illinois from Kentucky, for instance, in the year following the census and return to their old home the year before the next census. They may, indeed, move back and forth several times. Or, they may migrate to their new home and die before the next census is taken.

Table II.—*Internal migrants, by State of residence: 1850–1960, by decades*

Census year	Total population	Born in other State	Born in other State as percent of total population
1850	19,987,563	4,251,250	21.3
1860	27,489,561	5,774,434	21.0
1870	38,558,371	7,657,320	19.9
1880	50,155,783	9,592,764	19.1
1890	62,622,250	11,094,108	17.7
1900	75,994,575	13,501,045	17.8
1910	91,972,266	16,910,114	18.4
1920	105,710,620	20,274,450	19.2
1930	122,775,046	25,388,100	20.7
1940	131,669,275	26,905,986	20.4
1950	150,216,110	35,284,210	23.5
1960	178,466,732	44,263,882	24.8

Source: 1960 Census of Population, "State of Birth." Final Rept. PC(2)-2A, p. 1.

It is for this reason that data on internal migration have been collected annually since 1949. Each recent year over 30 million persons have moved their homes (see table III). Most move within the same county; around 20 million. About 5 million migrate across county lines but stay within the same State. Around another 5 million mi-

TABLE III.—*Movers and Migrants 1948–49 to 1964–65*

[In thousands]

Year	Total	Persons moving their homes		
		Within same county	From one county to another in same State	From one State to another
1948–49	27,127	18,792	3,992	4,344
1949–50	27,526	19,276	4,360	3,889
1950–51	31,158	20,694	5,276	5,188
1951–52	29,840	19,874	4,854	5,112
1952–53	30,786	20,638	4,826	5,322
1953–54	29,027	19,046	4,947	5,034
1954–55	31,492	21,086	5,511	4,895
1955–56	33,098	22,186	5,859	5,053
1956–57	31,834	21,566	5,192	5,076
1957–58	33,263	22,023	5,656	5,584
1958–59	32,804	22,315	5,419	5,070
1959–60	33,811	22,564	5,724	5,523
1960–61	35,535	24,289	5,493	5,753
1961–62	34,364	23,341	5,461	5,562
1962–63	35,411	23,059	5,712	6,640
1963–64	36,327	24,089	6,191	6,047
1964–65	37,866	25,122	6,597	6,147

Source: U.S. Census Bureau, "Current Population Reports," Series P–20, No. 150, Apr. 14, 1966. Surveys made immediately following V–J Day showed quite similar results.

grate across State boundaries. Usually about two-thirds of the interstate migrants move their homes between noncontiguous States.

The States vary widely in their migration experience, as do the counties within the States. A majority of the States have lost population through migration during the past two census periods. Over half of the 3,072 counties in the United States lost population during the 1950–60 decade. Five of the nine major geographical divisions of the continental United States have lost population in recent years: New England, Middle Atlantic, West North Central, East South Central and West South Central. The four which have gained are Pacific, Mountain, South Atlantic and East North Central. These are also the four in which the greatest expansion in employment opportunities has been taking place.

G. RURAL-URBAN MIGRATION

The migration from farms to cities in the United States is equally noteworthy. The first census in 1790 showed 5 percent of the population living in urban areas. The Nation is now 75 percent urban. The first census reported 24 localities classified as urban; the 1850 census, 236; and that of 1900 found 1,737. By 1950 there were 4,741; and by 1960 there were 6,015. Urban population rose 30 percent between 1950 and 1960, but the rural population showed its first absolute decline in the history of the United States, about 1 percent.

The growth of cities is a worldwide phenomenon; what has been called the "flight from the land" is also worldwide. Urban concentrations of people are nothing new in world history, but the rapidity, extent and size of the present growth and the decline of the importance of agriculture as a source of employment is new.

A recent survey by the International Labor Office showed declines in the absolute numbers of persons employed on the land in 15 of the 25 major nations for which adequate data were available, plus relative declines in all the others.[7]

The 1820 U.S. census found 72 percent of the labor force working on farms, which is close to India's present-day percentage of 74. The U.S. proportion today is below 10 percent. Many factors have been listed as leading to the great increase in urban populations: increased division of labor, specialization which heightened technological development has both demanded and fostered, the use of man's nonhuman "slaves" for producing and using energy, what economists call economies of scale and external economies, etc.[8]

The most significant factor from our standpoint is that jobs increased in the urban areas while they decreased in the rural areas. In addition, lower levels of schooling resulted in higher rural birth rates even though employment opportunities were contracting. Young men and young women thus became one of the major "farm crops" for export to the cities on demand. Generally, throughout the United States farms annually produce a "surplus" of at least 40 percent of the young men who reach working age.[9] Such States as North and South Carolina and New Mexico produce an even larger annual "surplus."

Whether the people who cannot find a means of livelihood, move to the city or not, depends primarily on whether job opportunities are becoming available in the city. Otherwise, they stay in the rural areas and share the poverty.

H. EUROPE'S RECENT MIGRATION EXPERIENCE

These generalizations about rural-urban migration in the United States find an echo in recent reports on the migration from the less-developed areas of Europe to that Continent's industrialized, urbanized northwest. A New York Times headline puts the story succinctly: "4 Million Workers Migrate in Europe." The article explains that:

> From the Mediterranean countries for the most part—from Italy and Spain at first, then from Portugal and Greece, from Algeria for political reasons, and now from faraway Turkey and Yugoslavia—millions of men and women have moved north and west.

The flow is quantified as follows:

> The current migration began in the mid-nineteen-fifties, but it did not really soar until about five years ago, when the booming North had absorbed virtually all of its unemployment and could go no further without new manpower. South-

> ern Italy, Sicily and Spain, historically poor and traditionally sources of emigration to North and South America, provided the needed supply.
>
> The spectacular growth shows in the following figures on Italian migration to West Germany—from 6500 in 1954 to 144,000 in 1960 and an estimated total of 372,000 this year.
>
> Italy continues to be by far West Germany's biggest supplier. It is an even greater supplier to Switzerland—almost 450,000. Swiss construction foremen must speak Italian to be understood, a builder says.
>
> Turkey supplied no labor at all to West Germany before 1960. There are 12,000 Turks here now, ranking fourth after Italy, Greece and Spain.
>
> In fifth place is Yugoslavia, with 64,000.[10]
>
> "Surplus" population on the farms of Eastern and Southern Europe is an old story; outlets for it have been few since the doors of the classic immigrant-receiving countries began to close wiith the restrictive legislation in the United States in the mid-1920's, followed by similar moves in other nations, and the worldwide depression of the 1930's. It was not until the war and postwar periods had been traversed that immigration possibilities began to open. Then, ironically, the immigrant-receiving countries turned out to be the major emigration areas of the past.[11]

The difficulties of country and small town people in the big cities of northwestern Europe sound most familiar to anyone conversant with the immigration history of the United States and with recent internal migration experience here. Housing is almost universally listed in first place. Then follow questions related to absence from family, hostile reactions on the part of some local inhabitants, lack of recreation facilities, different foods, adjustment to time clocks and punctuality rules and other aspects of industrial discipline, proper disposal of waste, etc.[12]

Migration as a temporary expedient in cases of overpopulation when sources of employment exist within a feasible distance is again proving its utility to both the sending and receiving countries.

II. Puerto Rico's Migration Background

Puerto Rico's population contains an even smaller proportion of its original inhabitants than does that of the United States. Almost everyone is a descendant of an immigrant. The national strains, however, are not nearly as numerous and thus the immigration histories differ somewhat.

A. RURAL-URBAN MIGRATION

Internal migration differs in scope, of course, but the patterns are quite similar. Some of the island's "municipios" have gained; others have lost population. And, of course, the urban population has grown rapidly.

The decade 1930–40 found 54 of the 77 municipios losing population. Thirty-three lost 10 percent or more of their 1930 population and 6 lost 20 percent or more.[13]

Data do not seem to be available for the 1940–50 period, but the 1950–60 decade showed a loss by 39 municipios; 12 of them lost more than 10 percent of their 1950 population. Seven gained 25 percent or more: Bayamon, Carolina, Catano, Guaynabo, San Juan, Toa Baja, and Trujillo Alto. It is significant that all seven are actually part of the San Juan metropolitan area. Ponce made a small gain in population but Mayagüez and Arecibo, the other two of the first four cities lost.[14]

There are now 55 cities in Puerto Rico, compared with 17 in 1899. The urban proportion of the population has risen as follows:

	Percent
1899	14.6
1910	20.1
1920	21.8
1930	27.7
1940	30.3
1950	40.5
1960	44.2

The 1960 figure probably heavily understates the proportion living under urban conditions, since "urbanizaciones" many times extend beyond the official city limits.

The general pattern of decline in rural population shows the heaviest losses in the coffee region and the eastern offshore islands. However, a total of 38 municipios had a smaller rural population in 1960 than they had in 1950. Rural people were 0.4 percent fewer in 1960 than at the start of the decade, while urbanites increased by 16.1 percent, compared with a rise in the total population of 6.3 percent. Since fertility is higher in rural than in urban areas in Puerto Rico, as it is in most parts of the world, and since most of the new industries are in urban areas, it is obvious that out-migration is one of the solutions to the economic problems of the ruralite here as it is elsewhere. In addition, technology is reducing the number of workers needed to plant, cultivate, and harvest farm products. Average annual employment in agriculture in 1964 was 90,000 less than in 1940. The total value of farm products, however, rose from $84 million in 1940 to $280 million in 1960.[15]

B. EMPLOYMENT AND THE GROWTH OF SAN JUAN

It has been seen that the most spectacular urban growth has taken place in the San Juan area. The previous statement which have stressed that it is job opportunities which determine the flow of migration are borne out by the statistics on the growth of population and employment in the San Juan metropolitan area between 1940 and 1960 (see table IV).

The 1960 census data probably understate the number of employees working in the San Juan metropolitan area, since they do not include what is likely to be a sizable number who live outside the area and commute to work.

TABLE IV.—*Population and number of employees living in the San Juan metropolitan region*

Item	Census 1940	Census 1950	Census 1960
Population	338, 537	508, 570	647, 979
Employed	91, 551	137, 544	180, 028
Ratio of population to employment	3. 7	3. 7	3. 6

Source: "1961 Economic Report to the Governor." Santurce: Puerto Rico Planning Board, p. 80.

C. METROPOLIS AND HINTERLAND

Economic and social realities often disregard political action. Arturo Morale Carrión has shown how Spanish exclusivism was finally worn down and defeated by Puerto Rican insistence on trading with the 13 Colonies of the British Empire which were situated on the eastern coast of what is now the United States.[16] It was from them that the Puerto Ricans could secure the flour and other commodities they needed. A sizable commerce had sprung up even before the formation of the United States. Such commerce, it might be expected, would lead to the movement of persons as well as food. It did. Two "straws in the wind" give us an idea even though we cannot quantify the movement until the early years of the 20th century. "By May, 1816," writes Morales, "83 immigrants had arrived from Louisiana," under a new colonialization law.[17] Ernst reports the existence in New York City in the 1830's of a "Spanish Benevolent Society" supported by Cuban and Puerto Rican merchants.[18]

Over the years a metropolis grew in what had been the 13 Colonies based on both commercial relationships with most of the world and the movement of persons from much of the world. Just as San Juan has grown by contributions of people born and raised in its hinterland—the remainder of Puerto Rico—so has the United States grown by contributions of people born and raised in its hinterland—which includes Puerto Rico as a whole. And of course, within the United States as a whole there is a metropolis-hinterland relationship between many urban centers and rural areas. The essence of this relationship is reciprocity. The metropolis offers economic opportunities which are superior to those of the hinterland, and often other opportunities such as education.

Thus we find indications early in this century, of migration of Puerto Ricans to the United States. The first census to give any data was in

1910; 1,513 persons born in Puerto Rico living in 39 States of the Union, plus several times that number in the Territory of Hawaii.

Forty-five States reported the presence of Puerto Rican-born persons in 1920 and all 48 did so in the 1930, 1940, and 1950 censuses. The 1960 census found Puerto Ricans in all 50 States. The number and increase over the decade have been as follows, by censuses:[19]

		Percent
1910	1, 513	----
1920	11, 811	680
1930	52, 774	347
1940	69, 967	33
1950	226, 110	223
1960	615, 384	172

D. IMMIGRATION TO OTHER COUNTRIES

News articles now and then attest to the existence of small communities of Puerto Ricans in some of the American republics. An attempt at colonization of Puerto Ricans in the Mexican state of Tabasco, about 1907 or 1908, has been mentioned. Inquiry in the state capital, Villahermosa, did not yield further information. Recruitment for cane cutting in Cuba was carried on in December 1919, and January 1920. Representatives of a private employment agency enlisted 671 persons to work in the Central Preston. Central Rio Cauto had recruited 16 in October 1919. No other indication of Cuban recruitment was found.

Central Montellano of the Dominican Republic took 10 mechanics in July 1920. Five years later two fairly small groups were recruited to work on the Santa Marta coffee plantation in Colombia. No notice of other organized recruitment programs has been found aside from those for the continent, Hawaii and St. Croix.[20] Neither of the latter appears to offer opportunities for large numbers of migrants in the future.

No sizable migration has developed to Latin America and the chances are great that none will develop. The Latin American nations almost all have serious restrictions on immigration and require either a high degree of skill for certain specialized jobs or the investment of a fairly substantial sum of money by the immigrant. Mexico even has a sliding scale geared to the size of the city in which the immigrant would live!

Many hundreds of farm colonization failures and a handful of successes have proved that two prerequisites for success are always found: (1) A heavy investment per family and (2) exceedingly careful selection of the participants. The successful Dutch farm colonies in Brazil in the 1940's required an investment of $12,000 to $14,000 per family.[21] Undoubtedly the cost has risen.

Even more serious than these handicaps is the fact that Latin America is the fastest growing region in the world and it is having great difficulties expanding its economy fast enough to keep pace with population growth.[22] Aside from specialized occupations and from farm labor, which their own people increasingly refuse to perform, the natural growth of the population more than supplies labor needs. And all of the Latin American republics have lower levels of living than Puerto Rico.

The prospects for the future are not bright in most Latin American countries. The area's rate of population growth is above that of Puerto Rico: 2.7 percent per year. United Nations population figures and projections give an idea of what lies ahead for 20 republics with peoples at least two-thirds of whom are "ill-fed, ill-housed, or ill-clothed:"

	Million
1950	163
1960	206
1970	265
1975	303
2000	592

The 20 republics will face during the next 25 years the enormous task of finding jobs for 90 million new members of the labor forces, according to Prebisch. About 25 million will replace those who die or retire, but it will be necessary to create 65 million new jobs.

Even Mexico, which is making greater industrial advances than any other Latin American nation, and has greater natural resources than most of them, has in recent years sometimes fallen behind in per-capita income. It also is faced with such a high rate of unemployment that it had been forced to "export" some 400,000 braceros a year to the United States for seasonal farm work until such work was almost stopped by new farm legislation in 1964–65. And Mexico has the immense advantage of having gone through its agrarian revolution. This formidable task still faces many of the Latin American countries. If the landowners are capable of learning anything from the French, Russian, Mexican, and Cuban revolutions, this may not result in the bloodshed and destruction which wracked Mexico for 11 years and left it exhausted for many more.

Mexico still has more than half its people illiterate. Therefore the birth rate is high, one of the highest in Latin America: 45 per thousand. And Mexico contains only a small proportion of the 80 million illiterates in Latin America.

It is clear why there has been little Puerto Rican immigration to Latin America. Prospects for the future do not seem encouraging. Let us turn, therefore, to Puerto Rico's one major external job market of the past.

III. PUERTO RICAN MIGRATION TO THE UNITED STATES

A. THE TIMING OF THE MIGRATION

Two of the most important factors in the Puerto Rican migration to the United States are (1) the numbers involved and (2) the timing of phases of the movement. Timing is of the greatest importance in understanding the migration and will be dealth with first. Year after year, since statistics were first kept (in the fiscal year 1908–09), the net migration to the United States has risen during times of low unemployment and fallen in times of high unemployment. The Columbia University study in 1948 computed the coefficient of correlation between the business cycle on the mainland and the ebb and flow of the migration stream at 0.73, an exceedingly high correlation for any two series of social statistics.[23]

The annual average net migration grouped by years shows the phenomenon:

Years	*Per year*
1909–1930	1,986
1931–1940	984
1941–1950	18,794
1951–1960	41,212
1961–1964	1,200

It is obvious that the depression decade of the 1930's cut the average by more than 50 percent. As a matter of fact, the year-by-year record from 1909 to 1965 shows that there have been 14 years in which there was a net return flow to Puerto Rico: 1909, 1910, 1911, 1912, 1913, 1916, 1921, 1922, 1931, 1932, 1933, 1934, 1961, and 1963. These were all years of high unemployment in the United States.

TABLE V.—*Puerto Rico: Net migration, to and from the conterminous United States, 1944–65*

1944	11,000	1955	45,464
1945	13,000	1956	52,315
1946	39,911	1957	37,704
1947	24,551	1958	27,690
1948	32,775	1959	29,989
1949	25,698	1960	16,298
1950	34,703	1961	[1]−1,754
1951	52,899	1962	11,664
1952	59,103	1963	[1]−5,479
1953	69,124	1964	1,370
1954	21,531	1965	16,678

[1] The minus figure represents a net outflow from the United States to Puerto Rico.

Source: U.S. Immigration and Naturalization Service, San Juan office.

The year of the largest net migration was 1953 but the recession which developed late that year resulted in a 69 percent drop in the migration between 1953 and 1954. There was a net migratiton to Puerto Rico in 1961 of 1,754 persons and in 1963 of 5,479 persons, according to the statistics of the U.S. Immigration and Naturalization Service, which has been the sources of all the statistics from 1908–09 to the present. We will return to questions about these statistics later. First, we must clear up a point which has aroused a great deal of emotion.

B. THE QUESTION OF "DUMPING"

One of the disquieting aspects of migration universally is the community hostility with which newcomers are so often met. This has been true throughout the history of the United States, but it is by no means confined to the United States.[24] Nor does it apply only to Puerto Ricans, of course. What concerns us now is the specific charge that Puerto Rico feels that "it must dump hundreds of thousands—eventually, millions—of unwanted sons and daughters on the continent, or elsewhere."[25]

The generally excellent critique of certain publications of the planning board by a Minnesota sociologist is marred by this emotional reference. Two comments seem in order. First, Puerto Rico has no means of dumping people on the continent or anywhere else, except that used by Germany, England, and Ireland in the past to scoop up inmates of debtors' and other prisons or almshouses and pay their passage to the United States. Puerto Rico has not done this.

No one in the Puerto Rican Government has indicated any inclination to carry out such a program. It would be contrary to the general Puerto Rican belief in the inherent dignity of the individual, even if the economic means to do so were available. As a matter of fact, the law governing the subject states that the Government will "neither encourage nor discourage migration."

Second, the evidence is overwhelming that the vast majority of the Puerto Ricans who come to the United States came because they were needed in the economic machinery of the areas to which they went and they went when they were needed. A few years ago, for example, the economist for the local utility company in New York City estimated that about 3 million of the city's 8-million inhabitants depended, directly or indirectly, on the needle trades for a livelihood. And the Harvard study of the economy of the New York Metropolitan region found the needle trades and other industries heavily dependent on the Puerto Rican migrant for a reliable and capable labor supply. It reported that:

The rate of Puerto Rican migration to New York is one of the factors that determine how long and how successfully the New York metropolitan region will retain industries which are under competitive pressure from other areas. To the extent that some of these industries have hung on in the area, they have depended on recently arrived Puerto Rican workers, who have entered the job market of the New York area at the rate of about 13,000 each year. But the New York area is beginning to lose its unique position as the first stopping-off place for Puerto Rican in-migrants; this stream of migration is now spreading to other mainland areas as well, and the spread promises to accelerate.[26]

C. THE DISTRIBUTION OF PUERTO RICAN SETTLEMENT

New York's share of the Puerto Rican migration to the continental United States has varied with the requirements of the labor market. Since 1910 the following have been the percentages of Puerto Rican-born persons in the United States living in New York City:

	Number	Percent
1910		
1920	554	37
1930	7,364	62
1940	44,908	81
1950	61,463	88
1960	187,420	83
	429,710	70

Where else did Puerto Ricans live in 1960? Table VI names the top 20 States and shows how the numbers of Puerto Rican-born persons increased in each one from 1950 to 1960. Hawaii, ranked as the last of the 20 States in Puerto Rican population, once had the largest concentration of Puerto Ricans living away from their island. Some 6,000 sugarcane workers had been brought to Hawaii in 1900 and 1901 to work in the cane fields there. They were shipped by boat to New York, taken by train to San Francisco, and transshipped again to reach Hawaii. Some decided they had traveled enough by the time they reached the west coast; they formed the nucleus of a Puerto Rican community in California. Some returned to San Francisco from Hawaii. Most of them stayed, but recent years have seen the Puerto Rican population disappearing from the census returns. Census definitions include only first- and second-generation migrants. More and more of those of Puerto Rican origin are third generation and thus are no longer counted.[27] Hawaii was the only important State in 1960 where the second generation outnumbered the first.

Every major study of internal, voluntary migration in the United States has found that overwhelmingly it is the "pull" of job opportunities which is the major factor in the dynamics of migration. And that "pull" is selective. It attracts those who are most needed at the time and place involved.

Neither the verb "dump" nor the adjective "unwanted" is justified in the quotation cited from "The Predictive Process." There are, of course, prejudiced persons in every community; an exception would have to be made in their case with reference to the adjective "unwanted."

D. THE FAMILY INTELLIGENCE SERVICE

The Puerto Rican family is, in general, a closely-knit group and usually includes the extended compadrazgo. It is the family which serves to gear together the demand for additional workers in an area and the flow of Puerto Ricans to that area. The family is responsible for the high coefficient of correlation between employment and migration.

TABLE VI.—*Persons born in Puerto Rico, by States, 1950 and 1960; by numerical rank in 1960*

State	1950	1960
New York	191,305	448,585
New Jersey	4,055	39,779
Illinois	3,000	25,843
California	5,495	15,479
Pennsylvania	2,560	14,659
Florida	3,090	14,245
Connecticut	900	11,172
Ohio	1,710	9,227
Indiana	1,520	4,781
Texas	1,210	3,869
Massachusetts	775	3,454
Wisconsin	230	2,552
Michigan	1,120	2,175
Virginia	850	2,031
Maryland	925	1,904
Georgia	475	1,737
North Carolina	230	1,300
Washington	505	1,280
Louisiana	715	1,204
Hawaii	3,092	1,197

Source: 1960 Census of Population, State of Birth, PC(2)2A; Puerto Ricans in the United States, PC(2) 1D.

The Department of Labor of Puerto Rico since 1948 has worked with the U.S. Employment Service to discover those areas of the mainland where labor shortages were developing and where workers from Puerto Rico could make a contribution to the solution of such shortages. Its activities will be touched on later. Let me record here the role played by "the family intelligence service." Time after time, the Migration Division of the Puerto Rico Department of Labor located jobs for a group of workers in some town or city and found, a few years later, that the original group of 30 or 40 had grown to a community of 2,000 to 3,000 Puerto Ricans! Upon inquiry, the same mechanism would always be found at work. The foreman of the plant, needing more workers and impressed by the productivity of the Puerto Rican workers would ask one, "Are there any more at home like you?"! Within a few days, a brother or uncle or "compadre" would appear to fill the waiting job! The most dramatic illustration known to the authors of the power of this system involves a young mechanic from Lares who went to work in a garage in a small New York town. Within 2 years, there were about 900 Larenos in that and nearby towns—and they all came from the same barrio! Dozens of sizable Puerto Rican communities have grown in exactly this manner.

The division has also seen the reverse of this process operating. It has found jobs, through the U.S. Employment Service, for anywhere from 50 to 100 workers in a town and then learned that new jobs did not open up; the community therefore did not grow. In two cases, some of the original jobs eventually disappeared and the Puerto Rican community lost members.

A recession leads to the same experience. Youngstown, Ohio, which had about 3,000 Puerto Ricans in early 1953 had only about 900 a year later because of the recession, or "rolling readjustment," depending on one's politics. The remainder largely returned to Puerto Rico to wait for word that their jobs were again open. The 1960 census reported 1,820 persons of Puerto Rican birth in Youngstown.[28]

E. SELECTIVITY OF MIGRATION

All migrations are selective in one respect or another. But there are no general laws of selectivity which apply to all streams of migration. Generally, migrations are selective of the younger adult population. Often there is an educational and occupational selection. The latter was found to be true for the internal migration in Puerto Rico between 1935 and 1940, for example. Professional and semiprofessional persons were found in the migrant stream far out of proportion to their percentage of the population (migrants, 7.0 percent; total, 2.8 percent). Service personnel were also represented to a far higher degree among the migrants, but the opposite was true of farm laborers and farmers.[29] This, of course, was to be expected, since it is conditions in the receiving labor market which largely determine the flow, including its size and its composition.

A more recent study of internal migration in Puerto Rico found another aspect of selectivity: that among farm workers. Peter Gregory reports on a study of a sample of workers in new industries in Puerto Rico as follows:

> Those who had left agriculture were not forced to do so to escape a marginal existence. Indeed, our sample of workers appear to have been among the elite in the agricultural wage labor force * * * these were the most employable of the agricultural workers; not those marginal to that work force.[30]

Many studies have shown the relation between labor market conditions in the receiving area and educational selectivity. The conclusions reached by one such study, of Weakley County, Tenn., are particularly relevant:

> It is evident that the level of education of migrants from the county changed considerably with changes in business conditions. During the full-employment years—1946–51—education was not significantly associated with migration from farms in Weakley County. This implies, of course, that out-migration before 1946 was strongly biased in favor of the better educated. With the exception of the war years, most of the period before 1946 covered in this study was one of depression. This strongly suggests that there is a causal relationship between levels of employment and educational characteristics of off-farm migration from the county. The tendency for only the better educated farm youths to migrate during the period prior to 1946 was apparently associated with a lack of employment opportunities in industry for those with little education. With the coming of full employment in the period of postwar prosperity, the educational selectivity in off-farm migration disappeared.[31]

F. SELECTIVITY OF THE PUERTO RICAN MIGRATION

Not enough is known about the selectivity process in the Puerto Rican migration, but enough is known to enable us to affirm that there is such a process and to give some of the results. The first evidence came in 1948 from the Columbia study of the Puerto Ricans in New York City.[32] The employment background in Puerto Rico of the migrants to New York City is especially revealing of the selectivity in those days. Only 5 percent of the migrants in the labor force had ever worked in agriculture, for example, although in the 1950–51 fiscal year 34 percent of the labor force in Puerto Rico was engaged in agriculture. Comparisons of the four major sectors is given in tabular form below:

	Migrants (percent)	Puerto Rico (percent)
Agriculture	5	34
Manufacturing and processing	48	23
Trade and transportation	14	21
Services	33	23

Skill levels are also most revealing. Comparisons of the migrant labor force with the Puerto Rican labor force at home in 1940 give a rough idea of this aspect of the selection process:

	Migrants (percent)	Puerto Rico (percent)
White collar	21	25
Skilled	18	5
Semiskilled	35	20
Unskilled	26	50

Literacy among the migrants was 93 percent in 1948, compared with about 74 percent in Puerto Rico. Urban background was 91 percent, contrasted with 40 percent on the island. The overwhelming majority of the migrants (82 percent) came from the island's three largest cities and had been born and raised in those cities. A big majority had been employed for at least 2 years before they left Puerto Rico and most of them left jobs to go to the States.

The 1940 census gives us a few more facts about selectivity. Persons of Puerto Rican birth living in the States were found to have over twice the average years of schooling completed by Puerto Ricans living in Puerto Rico. This ratio was reduced during the 1950–60 decade. Our hypothesis is that this reflects the effect of family solidarity which resulted in the "pioneers" bringing to the United States more "followers" as they got settled and were able to support persons younger and not in the labor force. It also reflects the increased proportion of migrants from rural areas. In any case, the 1960 census showed the characteristics of first- and second-generation Puerto Ricans in the United States as compared with the population of Puerto Rico found in table VII.

One other factor might be noted in passing. Each census in recent years has shown that the migration is more heavily white than in the population of the island. The 1950 census figure was 7.7 percent nonwhite for migrants in the United States as a whole while the proportion in Puerto Rico was listed as 20.3 percent. The New York City proportion was listed in the respective censuses as 11.7 percent nonwhite in 1940; 9.6 percent in 1950; and 4 percent in 1960.[33]

We do not know whether this selective factor works through a process in which fewer nonwhite persons leave the island or whether the out-migration is more or less representative of the color composition of the island but that more nonwhites return proportionately than do whites. That the latter was true of at least the specific migration organized by the War Manpower Commission during World War II was indicated by a study of that group in 1946.[34]

G. "RAMP SURVEY" DATA ON SELECTIVITY

The inadequacies of the "net migration" approach, to which we shall return, led to the institution of a survey of outgoing and incoming passenger at International Airport which began in 1957 and was terminated in 1962.[35] The ramp survey distinguished between residents and visitors.

Age

Much data on selectivity is available in the results of the ramp survey. Age, as would be expected, is the most obvious. The net out-migration of residents from 1957 through 1960 contained 73.1 percent of persons of the most productive age; i.e., between 15 and 44. The 1961 data, which are reported with a slightly different age breakdown, contained 76 percent between 15 and 24.

TABLE VII.—*Characteristics of Puerto Ricans in the United States and in Puerto Rico: 1960*

Item	United States			Puerto Rico
	Total	Puerto Rican birth	Puerto Rican parentage [1]	
Total population				
Males per 100 females	100.0	99.3	101.8	98.0
Median age	21.4	27.9	5.9	18.4
Persons 14 years old and over				
Median years of school completed:				
Male	8.4	8.2	10.3	6.1
Female	8.2	8.0	10.8	5.6
Percent in labor force:				
Male	79.6	80.6	70.2	65.7
Female	36.3	36.3	36.0	20.0
Median income	$2,533	$2,513	$2,868	$819
Percent single:				
Male	31.1	29.2	48.8	37.4
Female	21.9	20.1	39.2	28.6
Percent widowed or divorced:				
Male	3.0	3.1	2.5	4.2
Female	10.6	11.1	5.1	12.5
Percent enrolled in school:				
Persons 5 to 24 years old	59.8	50.8	77.5	55.4
Persons 16 and 17 years old	61.2	58.0	74.9	47.1

[1] Born in the United States, of one or both Puerto Rican-born parents.

Source: 1960 Census of Population, "Puerto Ricans in the United States," PC(2)1D, 1963, p. viii.

Sex

Sex has had a varied significance as a factor in selectivity. The Columbia study found that the earlier migration to New York City had been heavily weighted toward the female side.[36] This probably was a reflection of the greater job opportunities for women in New York City's needle trade industries. The ramp survey indicated that recent years have seen a swing toward a male surplus in the net out-migration. The years 1957–61 saw 283,600 males in the net outflow of residents to 222,100 females.

Residence

An extremely important shift has taken place in the area of origin of the out-migrants. The Columbia study found that 82 percent of the migrants in New York City had originated in the island's three largest cities, as follows:

	Percent
San Juan	50
Ponce	20
Mayagüez	12

The 1958–61 ramp survey found around 33 percent from the San Juan Metropolitan area, but Ponce and Mayagüez accounted for only about 6 percent and 4 percent respectively. The migration of these years was much more widely representative of the island geographically than it was in 1948 and previous years.

Labor Force

Industrial and occupational selectivity may now be less adverse to Puerto Rico than formerly if we may judge by a comparison of the major industrial and occupational groupings of employed persons in the 1960 census with the affiliations of the 1960 in- and out-migrants. They are given in tables VIII and IX, in percentages.

TABLE VIII.—*Industrial groupings of 1960 Puerto Rican employed persons and 1960 in- and out-migrants*

Industry	Puerto Rico	Out-migrants	In-migrants
Agriculture, fishing, and forestry	24.7	17.1	18.9
Commerce	17.7	7.5	7.9
Manufacture	17.1	8.6	9.4
Construction	8.9	1.9	1.4
Professional and semiprofessional	11.1	4.3	5.2
Transportation, communication, and public utilities	7.1	1.8	2.0
Domestic and personal service	6.6	2.2	2.1

It seems clear that in no industrial grouping was there higher proportion than the "share" that industry had in the employed labor force. The only category which comes even close is that of agriculture and it has a slightly larger percentage returning than leaving. However, when absolute numbers are compared, a difference appears which is masked by the proportions.

It is thus seen that in each of the six major industrial groupings, there has been a net loss of workers. An idea of the kinds of workers within the industrial categories who migrated in 1960 may be secured from a similar comparison by occupations, with the net loss and the percentage that loss was of the total reported in the 1960 census:

TABLE IX.—*Occupational groupings of 1960 Puerto Rican employed persons and 1960 in- and out-migrants*

	Out-migrants	In-migrants	Loss	Percentage
Professional and semiprofessional	12,700	10,000	−2,700	6
Owners and managers except farm	12,400	11,000	−1,400	4
Clerical, sales, and kindred workers	10,700	5,700	−5,000	6
Craftsmen, foremen, and kindred workers	5,200	1,900	−3,300	5
Operatives and kindred workers	15,700	7,600	−8,100	8
Domestic service	1,000	400	−600	3
Other services	5,700	2,300	−3,400	13
Farm laborers	33,400	19,400	−14,000	13
Other laborers	2,600	900	−1,700	5

There may be indications of shortages ahead in these figures. Forecasts for 1975, when compared with the 1960 census data and the above table indicate that there may be pinches in the following fields: Professional and semiprofessional; clerical, sales, and kindred workers; craftsmen, foremen, and kindred workers; operatives; and service workers.[37] They may be avoided, of course, in either one of two ways, or a combination of both: increased educational efforts or increased return migration of workers in those occupations. Only the former is subject to any degree of control, however.

Educational

Around a quarter of the out-migrants in 1960–61 had gone to high school (23.5 and 26.2 percent respectively). Those who had gone to college represented 7.3 and 8.6 percent, respectively. From 3 to 4 percent in recent years have done graduate work. The returnees have shown a slightly smaller proportion with some high school education, but considerably higher percentages with college and graduate work.

Ability to read and write shows an interesting pattern. The 1960 census found 83 percent of the population 10 years and older with this ability. The 1960 out-migrants 10 years or older surpassed the total population with 94.7 percent, or a difference of 11.7 points. The in-migrants, however, fell far below, with 55.8 percent able to read and write. It may be that this seeming anomaly is a function of the fact that education had been completed for many of the previous out-migrants when they left and that they had not continued their schooling in the United States. Meanwhile, of course, the level of education in Puerto Rico has risen rapidly.

Ability To Speak English

Differences tending in the expected direction are found, however, in data on ability to speak English. The 1960 census reported that 37.7 percent of the population 10 years or older said they were able to speak English. This compares with previous census findings as follows:

	Percent
1960	37.7
1950	26.1
1940	27.8
1930	19.4
1920	9.9
1910	3.6

The in- and out-migrants 10 years or older in recent years have given the following proportions speaking English:

	Out-migrants	In-migrants
1957	45.1	51.9
1958	47.2	51.4
1959	46.6	53.8
1960	43.4	57.7
1961	50.6	63.1

Those who are leaving speak English to a much greater extent than does the population as a whole (43.4 percent to 37.7 in 1960, but 50.6 percent in 1961). Of course those who return speak English to an even greater extent. This, as we shall find later, raises problems as well as helping increase the bilingual proportion of the population.

H. LATER DATA ON SELECTIVITY

Methodological questions were raised in 1962 about the validity of of the ramp survey. It was decided to suspend the survey and work out another method of studying the characteristics of the out-migrants as well as those returning from a period of residence in the United States. Two surveys were made using an islandwide sample of households; the first during the months of November and December 1962, and January 1963, and the second during April 1964. Questions about the migration of household members were asked of the migrant's family. The results, where comparable, will be given in the same order as the results of the ramp survey reported on pp. 713–717.[38]

Age

Somewhat more than half (54 percent) of the out-migrants during the 12 months previous to the survey and about whom data were collected were between 15 and 24 years of age.

Sex

Fifty-eight percent of the migrants were males; 42 percent females.

Residence

Almost two-thirds of those moving to the United States (62 percent) came from the rural areas of Puerto Rico.

Education

Illiteracy among the migrants showed a drop when compared with previous data, in spite of the increase in the rural population represented. Only 4.2 percent were reported as unable to read and write; the median years of school completed was 7.3 for the migrants 14 years of age or older, compared with 5.8 for Puerto Rico as a whole.

Comparisons between the ramp survey results and those of the household sample indicate no major discrepancies in the areas of age, sex, rural-urban residence or education. There had been a substantial shift toward rural origin since the earliest reports, however, as was previously noted. This might well reflect itself in more differences in education, occupations and ability to speak English, but the data necessary for judgment on these questions are not available.

I. SOME PROBLEMS OF MIGRATION MEASUREMENT

The ramp survey was instituted to overcome some of the problems arising from the use of the net migration figures alone in the measurement of the ebb and flow of the migratory stream. When movement back and forth was fairly limited, say before 1945, the subtraction of the gross movement one way from the gross movement the other way may not have been too crude as a measure of the annual movement. The total number of persons leaving the island between 1909 and 1945, for example, was 679,772; the number returning was 599,280. The balance was 80,492, or an average of 2,175 per year. The annual average varies with the business cycle in the United States.

The number leaving between 1946 and 1964 (fiscal years) was 8,047,985, or an average of 422,420 per year. These figures include a multitude of tourists, of business men or business trips, and others who flew back and forth several times a year. An enlightening comparison of the gross movement each way and the net is provided by the 5-year period 1960–64. A total of 4,423,408 passengers arrived in the United States from Puerto Rico, but a total of 4,402,173 left the United States for Puerto Rico. The net was 20,235, or 4,049 per year during that period. During 2 years (1961 and 1963) there were greater net flows to Puerto Rico, totaling 1,754 and 5,479, respectively.[39]

The figures are published on a monthly and annual basis. Each monthly figure is not especially significant by itself, since many who came to Puerto Rico during 1 month did not return to the States until the next. Usually, however, they cleared themselves out of the one-way total by the end of the year. However, as the Puerto Rican community in the States grew in numbers and affluence, the attraction of holidays with family and friends grew and resulted in a great increase in Puerto Rican tourism to Puerto Rico. Since the greatest family holiday usually involves both Christmas and Three Kings' Day (Jan. 6), this meant that large numbers would come to the island one calendar year and return the next. This influenced the annual figures on a calendar-year basis to such an extent that they were distorted as a measure of migration. Those who had always advocated fiscal years as a basis of measurement were justified in their criticism of the use of the calendar year. However, starting in 1948, a new factor appeared which has complicated accounting on a fiscal-year basis. The farm labor program, which began to function in an organized fashion in that year, has been responsible for a total of 196,855 workers going to the States under an agreement reached between the employer and the Puerto Rico Department of Labor. The annual number fluctuated between 4,598 in the lowest year to 14,969 in the highest (see table X). There may have been almost twice as many involved in the total farm labor movement in recent years, since many workers "learned the ropes" while coming to the States under the agreement and then came on their own. They usually have returned to the same employer if they have experienced fair treatment at his hands.

The workers have gone to the States in the spring or early summer (in 1 fiscal year) and returned in the late summer or fall (in the next fiscal year). Thus, they also distorted the annual figures when calculated on a fiscal-year basis. This distortion still exists in the published figures. An increase in summer tourism has functioned in much the same manner.

J. THE TWO MIGRATIONS

The Puerto Rican migration is best seen as consisting of two major but interrelated streams. One flows up in the spring and back in the fall. Its main component are the seasonal farmworkers under the auspices of the program just mentioned. (Occasionally, another group goes north as part of an organized program, e.g., railroad maintenance-of-way workers, steelworkers, etc., but this is not a regular movement.)

TABLE X.—*Number of agricultural workers referred to U.S. mainland—1948–64*

1948	4,906	1957	13,214
1949	4,598	1958	13,067
1950	7,602	1959	10,012
1951	11,747	1960	12,986
1952	12,277	1961	13,765
1953	14,930	1962	13,526
1954	10,637	1963	13,116
1955	10,876	1964	14,628
1956	14,969		

Source: Bureau of Employment Security, Commonwealth of Puerto Rico Department of Labor.

The largest numbers are those who go because of the messages sent by way of the family intelligence service, already described. However, it is obvious that this is secondary migration. Somebody must have gotten there first before messages could be transmitted back.

K. WHO GOES FIRST?

One of the many unsolved questions about voluntary migrations in general and this one in particular is "Who goes first?". We know the answers only in some cases. The Puerto Rican community in Hawaii, as has been stated above, is based on recruitment by the cane growers there. The San Francisco community, the second largest in the Nation until 1950, also grew out of the Hawaiian recruitment. The Puerto Rican-born population of the San Francisco-Oakland metropolitan area alone was given as 4,068 in the 1960 census. This probably means a total of about 6,500 if the proportion between first and second generation, found in Los Angeles, applies in the San Francisco Bay area.

Scattered groups in the Southwestern States largely are due to a spectacularly unsuccessful recruitment of about 1,200 persons in 1926 to cultivate and pick cotton in Arizona.[40]

Sizable communities in Lorain, Ohio, and Gary, Ind., arose out of recruitment in Puerto Rico and the filling of job orders by the Puerto Rico Employment Service. Other communities grew around placements by the Migration Division from unemployed workers in nearby cities: e.g., Cleveland and Youngstown, Ohio, and Milwaukee, Wis. Still others have arisen in connection with the seasonal farm labor stream. The experience of Buffalo illustrates the mechanism.

The summers of 1951 and 1952 were periods of labor shortages in Buffalo. A farm labor camp only 30 miles away became a recruiting area for the industrial employers. To use the terms the farmers used, Buffalo sent out "pirates" to "steal" their workers. Something similar happened in eastern Pennsylvania, in industrial areas such as Allentown, Bethlehem, and Reading, and in southern New Jersey towns and cities.

The shift in the rural-urban proportions of the net migration to the United States is undoubtedly connected with the farm labor program. The proportion of workers returning to Puerto Rico in the fall varies with the fluctuations of labor demand in urban areas near farms on which Puerto Rican workers are used during the growing and harvesting season. And of course once workers from rural areas in Puerto Rico are settled at year-round work, the family intelligence network operates to bring other family members and neighbors if jobs become available.

Another unsolved question of the Puerto Rican migration, especially that of the earlier days, is the mechanism through which Puerto Ricans reached 39 States by 1910, 45 by 1920, and all 48 by 1930. To this might well be added the question of how Puerto Rican-born persons became residents of all but one of the 101 standard metropolitan statistical areas of over 250,000 population in the United States. Duluth-Superior is the only one in which Puerto Ricans were not found by the 1960 census.[41] Thirty-seven of the 101 had 500 or more Puerto Ricans. They were:

Allentown-Bethlehem-Easton	1,059
Baltimore	924
Boston	1,249
Bridgeport	4,371
Buffalo	2,052
Chicago	25,416
Cleveland	3,124
Detroit	1,254
El Paso	665
Fort Lauderdale-Hollywood	811
Gary-Hammond-East Chicago	4,221
Hartford	2,360
Honolulu	930
Jersey City	10,784
Lancaster, Pa	541
Los Angeles-Long Beach	7,214
Miami	8,687
Milwaukee	2,223
Newark	8,958
New Haven	962
New Orleans	718
New York City	429,710
Paterson-Clifton-Passaic	6,641
Philadelphia-Camden	15,735
Reading	508
Rochester	1,493
San Antonio	757
San Diego	648
San Francisco-Oakland	4,068
San Jose	955
Springfield-Chicopee-Holyoke	875
Tacoma	811
Tampa-St. Petersburg	1,008
Trenton	1,559
Washington-Maryland-Virginia	2,427
Wilmington	586
Youngstown-Warren	1,820

We still do not know the answer to the question, "Who goes first and how?" in many localities.

IV. RETURN MIGRATION TO PUERTO RICO

A. WHO RETURNS—AND WHY?

Next we come to an even more difficult question. We know that all voluntary migrations consist of streams running each way. We saw that this was true of immigration to the United States. One of the earliest attempts to arrive at "laws of migration" led E. G. Ravenstein to state in 1885 that, "(1) The net migration in any direction is but a fraction of the gross migration in the same direction, and (2) each main migratory current has associated with it a compensating counter-current."[42]

The word "compensating" should probably be left out of the discussion, since it seems to imply some mechanical or organic correction between the two streams, or even that there should be a rough balance between the two currents. However, there is a mass of data indicating the accuracy of the general statement.

Dorothy Thomas found the relation between the gross and net movements to range from a net gain of 1 out of 4 for a receiving Swedish community in 1895 to 1 in 10 in 1933.[43]

The "efficiency of migration" is a term coined by demographers to denote "the ratio of the net migration to the turnover," which is defined as the sum of in- and out-migrations.[44] Two periods, 1935–40 and 1949–50, show interesting contrasts for interstate migration. The efficiency index, i.e., "the percentage that net migration for an area forms of the sum of its in-migration and out-migration" was 21.0 for 1935–40 and 1.8 for 1949–50.

In other words, in the former period 1 of about each 5 of the total persons migrating stayed put, at least until the census taker came around. In the latter period it took a movement of slightly over 12 persons to leave a residue of 1.

A few other sets of data on internal migration in the United States help us round out the relationship between gross and net migration. One of the earliest studies of rural-urban migration found that a net migration of 6,296,000 persons from farms during the 1920–30 decade was the result of 13,140,000 moves to farms and 19,436,000 moves from farms.[45] Thus there was a total of at least 32,576,000 moves, or, to use Shryock's method of summary statement, an "efficiency index" of 19.3. The 1930–34 period showed a drop to a net movement from farms of 600,000 persons, which might have been expected from our knowledge of the relationship between cityward migration and demand for labor in urban areas. However—

> approximately eight times as many persons actually moved to achieve this result, reflecting the constant interchange of farm and nonfarm population.[46]

Norristown, Pa., in one of the few long-term studies of in- and out-migration to a specific city, was found to have received over 32,000 persons in the 1910–50 period, or 10 times the net gain due to migration.[47]

Motivation can be ascertained either by noting what people do, or they can be asked why they do what they do. Some of each kind of evidence is available to answer our question as to why migrants return. N. L. Sims, a rural sociologist, discovered from census data that by 1900 there was some return flow from the farms of the Great Plains States to the East. He found that prices had become so high in the Midwest even for poor land that farmers began to return to abandoned land in New England.[48]

Tennessee, it has been noted, has been an area of net out-migration for almost a century. A report for the legislature supplies valuable evidence in answer to the question, "Why do migrants return?". It points out that:

> With the exception of the depression decade, 1930–40, one hundred thousand more persons have left the State than have come into it in every decade between 1900 and 1950 * * * When a cyclical downturn strikes such areas, many of these out-migrants return to their former homes in Tennessee where they inflate the State totals of unemployment.
>
> This is shown by the changes in the number of interstate claimants who file for unemployment compensation in Tennessee against former employers in other States. For example, in 1957 during the first 9 months of the year, such persons numbered about 3,000 on the average. In March 1958, there were over 11,000 in this group out of a total of 66,000 insured unemployed.[49]

Sixty-nine workers who had migrated from and returned to the Upper Monongahela Valley of West Virginia gave their reasons for returning as follows:[50]

Work gave out	36
Needed at home	5
Sickness	4
Did not like it away	8
Miscellaneous	16

Thus the return was directly related to collapse of the job opportunity, which presumably led to the migration, in 50.7 percent of the cases.

An early study of Puerto Ricans who returned from jobs on the mainland showed family reasons in first place. Forty-five percent of all who returned to Puerto Rico after a term of work for which they had been recruited by the War Manpower Commission gave "death (or illness) in the family," or simply "I wanted to see my family" as their reason. Second, with 23 percent, was "contract expired"; illness, with only 7 percent, ran a poor third.[51]

Almost half of the 3,000 men recruited (47 percent) had not returned to Puerto Rico, however, and most of those who had returned (81 percent) said that they would go back to the United States if they were offered a permanent job. Forty-five percent said they would go back even if offered only another temporary job.

Two years later the Columbia University study of Puerto Ricans in New York City found that about 8 percent of the sample of migrants interviewed who had been adults when they left Puerto Rico had been trial migrants: i.e., they had previously lived and worked in New York City, had returned to the island and then come back to New York again to stay. The return migration most often was for family reasons.[52]

Sophisticated persons seem often inclined to scoff at such old-fashioned ideas as acute nostalgia for former scenes and former friends. The West Virginia returnees included about 11 percent who "did not like it away". We do not know how the proportion would compare with that among other migrants, but there probably is always at least a small percentage who return for this reason.[53]

Retirement is increasingly given as a reason for returning when New Yorkers born in Puerto Rico are discussing their plans. The Ponce de Leon Federal Savings & Loan Association of the Bronx, for example, does a substantial business in the sale of homes in Puerto Rico for those who are retiring or are preparing for retirement, according to one of its officers.

There is, of course, the fact that Operation Bootstrap had succeeded in establishing some 917 new factories which were operating in June 1964. These, and other facets of economic development, have made life in Puerto Rico considerably more attractive from an economic point of view. Jobs in industry and services are now available in many areas formerly relatively untouched by modern technology.

Employment in manufacturing rose from 55,000 in 1950 to 106,000 in 1964. Unemployment dropped from 88,000 to 80,000 in the same period, or from 12.8 percent to 10.8 percent of the labor force. This was somewhat over twice the rate of unemployment in the United States, but it was still the lowest rate in Puerto Rico in many years.[54] Two important factors must be considered side-by-side with the proportion unemployed. First, the labor force itself has been expanding rapidly; it rose from 625,000 in 1960 to 734,000 in 1964; thus there are more job opportunities in absolute numbers. Second, the duration of unemployment is somewhat shorter in Puerto Rico than in the United States. Short-time unemployment (less than 5 weeks) accounted for 44 percent of U.S. joblessness but 65 percent of that of Puerto Rico in 1963. Medium-term (5 to 14 weeks) unemployment was almost the same (29.6 percent in the United States to Puerto Rico's 29.4 percent), but long-term (15 weeks and over) came to 26.1 percent in the United States and only 5.8 percent in Puerto Rico.[55] Puerto Rico's unemployment would thus seem to be frictional, in economists' terms; i.e., arising out of moving from one job to another. That of the United States, on the other hand, would seem to be more largely structural, involving basic shifts out of declining industries and areas or replacing of old industry with new sources of employment.

There is still another factor which helps alleviate the rigors of unemployment—family solidarity. Urbanization and other aspects of modernization still have not weakened the Puerto Rican family; "one for all and all for one" still is a reality in a large percentage of families.[56]

In short, an economic environment which could compete with at least some sectors of the continental economy is being created. This may well have encouraged return migration considerably, although it is impossible to quantify this with existing statistics. There are also the questions of preferences for a more equable climate and the opportunity to live near relatives which are influential but difficult to measure.

B. THE EXTENT OF RETURN MIGRATION

It will be recalled that data for the migration from Puerto Rico to the conterminous United States are net figures obtained by balancing the numbers of travelers each way. This means that we do not really know from the Immigration and Naturalization Service reports anything directly about return migration. We do know that there have been a number of years in which the balance of passenger movement was toward Puerto Rico. Before tourism and business travel became important, this probably coincided closely with the migration. Today it may or may not. Some data are available from the 1960 census, some from the two Department of Labor household surveys already mentioned, and some which supplement these two sources, from statistics on the movement of school children and on "interstate" cases registered with the local offices of the Puerto Rico Employment Service. The highlights of these data are summarized below.

Persons 5 years old or over found living in Puerto Rico by the 1960 census who had been living in the United States in 1955 numbered 55,824.[57] Data published by the Census Bureau did not differentiate between those born in Puerto Rico and others, however. Therefore a special tabulation was run for a study conducted by José Hernández Alvarez for the Social Science Research Center of the University of Puerto Rico. It showed 34,040 persons of Puerto Rican birth included in those reporting having resided in the United States in 1955.[58] This figure obviously underestimates the total number of Puerto Ricans ever having maintained residence in the United States. First, unless one denies the identification of Puerto Ricans to those of Puerto Rican parentage, they should be added. There seems to be no sound basis for even a guess as to the number involved but if among the returnees there were the same proportion of first and second generations as prevailed among Puerto Ricans in the United States in 1960, about 44 percent should be added for United States born of Puerto Rican parentage, or some 4,765. Part of these would, of course, be included among those under the age of 5, already mentioned as being excluded in the data given. Second, another unknown factor would have to be added to the 34,000 for those who had lived in the United States and had returned prior to 1955.

An estimate of 107,740 migrants from the United States settling in Puerto Rico between 1955 and 1963 is provided by Miguel Echenique of the Puerto Rico Planning Board.[59] The total includes 82,740 persons of Puerto Rican birth and 25,000 of Puerto Rican parentage. The following fiscal year, 1963–64, showed a total of 39,531, first and second generation. Thus there would be a total of 147,271 between 1955 and 1964. It is obvious that this is a quite conservative estimate of the number of Puerto Ricans who have lived in the United States and have returned to Puerto Rico.

C. TEMPORARY RETURN MIGRANTS

Experience with both Puerto Rican and other migrations indicates that some of those remigrating probably would be testing. The

Columbia University study called them trial migrants.[60] These migrants are attracted to Puerto Rico either by direct job opportunities or hearing about openings and are prepared to stay if everything works out satisfactorily or if not, to return.

There is another ingredient which makes the Puerto Rican returnee quite similar to his continental counterpart who moves back "where he came from" during periods of unemployment. This is interstate payments of claims to unemployment insurance. An unemployment insurance account built up in one State by a worker may be called upon by that worker even if he has moved to another State.[61]

One has only to travel through Kentucky, Tennessee, or West Virginia and count Michigan license plates to obtain a rough indication of unemployment in Detroit, Flint, Pontiac, and other automobile manufacturing areas. Unemployment insurance helps the man who has gone home to work on the land during a temporary plant shutdown, or the worker who moved to another State in search of a job when he sees no hope of reemployment where he has been working. This contributes to the high levels of mobility which are considered by economists to be so vital to the prosperity of the United States.

The extent of interstate payments may be judged by their total in the last 3 months of 1964, $25,708,794, and the first 3 months of 1965, $44,210,510.[62] And a rough idea is given of the importance of out-of-State workers to the economy of States in which payments ran over a million dollars in one of the two periods by the following data.[63]

	October-December 1964	January-March 1965
California	$5,275,419	$8,182,760
New York	4,275,271	7,429,067
Illinois	1,713,710	3,207,455
New Jersey	966,214	1,501,019
Pennsylvania	916,365	1,373,577
Washington	879,773	1,281,565
Massachusetts	859,104	1,368,604
Connecticut	799,940	1,224,565
Texas	770,940	1,122,448

Persons in all 50 States plus the District of Columbia and Puerto Rico received payments from other States during the reported 6 months.

It is interesting to note that New York, which outranks California in size of the labor force, is second to that State in amount paid to persons sending claims from outside the State. Data are not at hand to help determine whether this is due to a higher proportion of "outsiders" in the labor force, to size of payments, or to exhaustion of benefits previous to the 6-month period noted. There was only a comparatively small difference in percentage unemployed: New

York, 5.7; California, 6.5 in one period; New York, 5.3; California, 5.5 in the other.

The nine States with the largest interstate payments also have the largest labor force, with two exceptions: Michigan and Ohio. The period of unemployment may have been so extended in these states that individual benefits have been substantially exhausted or they may not have interstate payment agreements with some of the States which are important suppliers of their labor force. The States highest in interstate payments include Washington, which is 6th on the list of out-of-State payments but which is 19th in rank by size of labor force. The explanation for this discrepancy was not immediately available.

Puerto Rico has reciprocal agreements with 35 States of the Union for unemployment insurance payments. Starting in 1957 claimants could register with the Puerto Rico Bureau of Employment Security, which furnished the following figures on registrations per year:[64]

1957	5,350
1958	8,055
1959	9,835
1960	11,915
1961	15,817
1962	17,615
1963	19,446

Adding these figures would, of course, be misleading. There are many indications that a large proportion of those registering return to work when their slack season is over. For example, the New York City needle trades, a large employer of Puerto Rican workers, is highly seasonal. The returnees do represent individual sources of contact with continental ideas and information on the part of Puerto Ricans who have never migrated. However, they also make a sizable but unquantified contribution to Puerto Rico's balance of payments. But a checking of the figures would undoubtedly show thousands of persons registered every year during the "off season."

D. 1960 CENSUS DATA ON RETURNEES

It will be recalled that 34,040 persons born in Puerto Rico, residing in the United States on April 1, 1955, were found by the 1960 census to have returned to Puerto Rico to reside. Almost 42 percent (41.9, or 14,256) were located in the San Juan Standard Metropolitan Statistical Area.[65] The numbers drop drastically for the next four of Puerto Rico's five largest cities:

	Population, 1960	Returnees, 1960
Ponce	145,586	2,168
Mayaguez	83,850	1,352
Caguas	65,098	1,292
Arecibo	69,879	1,084

The "municipio" which received the fewest returnees was Culebra, with 24 returning to a population of 573. Culebra has experienced out-migration for some decades. There were returnees in all 77 municipios.

Hernández found no clearly defined pattern of settlement by groupings of municipios, but when the data were analyzed by rural-urban residence, size of returnee and total populations and levels of family income, there were found to be distinctive patterns in regard to age, sex, income, "lifetime migration," employment, family stability, fertility, education, and ability to speak English. The five major groupings found to give the most significant patterns were: rural farm, rural nonfarm, urban nonmetropolitan, Ponce and Mayagüez, and the San Juan metropolitan area. Within the latter area there was such a wide variation in density of settlement and socioeconomic characteristics that a sevenfold classification of census tracts containing large numbers of returnees was developed. The distribution of returned migrants by ecological and socioeconomic divisions follows:[66]

Division	Returnee population 1960	
	Total	Percentage
Urban fringe, lower class	1,252	8.8
Central city, lower class	2,172	15.2
Central city, upper lower class	2,292	16.1
Central city, middle class	824	5.8
Suburb, middle class	3,436	24.1
Suburb, upper middle class	3,116	21.9
Remainder	1,164	8.2
Total, Standard Metropolitan Statistical Area	14,256	100.0

It is seen that the three largest groups in the San Juan area were middle class: 5.8, 24.1, and 21.9 percent, or 51.8 percent of all the returnees, a slight majority.

The returned migrant who has settled in San Juan, when compared with the one settled elsewhere, is more likely to have been born in other municipios, and to be more highly literate and bilingual. He has a considerably higher income, experiences less unemployment, has a record of lower fertility, and, closely related, has a smaller family, both nuclear and extended. The family is more likely to have migrated as a family and to have had both spouses living at home. Within San Juan, the differences between the six classifications mentioned above in regard to literacy in both Spanish and English is extremely interesting:[67]

	Percentage		*Percentage*
Upper middle suburb	87.6	Upper lower central city	77.5
Middle suburb	84.0	Lower central city	63.3
Middle central city	87.8	Lower urban fringe	60.6

A similar distribution is found in regard to unemployment, income, etc.

Hernández points out that Puerto Ricans in the United States are fairly highly mobile and that moving to new areas in the States is one of the alternatives to returning to Puerto Rico. He ties the return migration to the ebb and flow of employment opportunities in the following generalizations:

> As in the return migration of Mexicans during the era of depression, the economically most vulnerable elements of the Puerto Rican community on the mainland appear to seek refuge in the homeland. Migrants who settle in rural areas and the urban slums may be responding to a shrinking of opportunities in the North—opportunities which attracted them fifteen years ago, before automation, before the "leveling up" of occupations and before the influx of other depressed groups into the labor market of the mainland cities. Stated in other words, the migration toward the United States seems to have reached an economic point of saturation.
>
> At all levels, migrants return to Puerto Rico without definite intentions of remaining * * * Paradoxically, visits of this nature may function to solidify residence on the mainland. Except under extraordinary circumstances, economic opportunities in Puerto Rico are scarcely better than those which prevail on the mainland * * * Upon arrival, a visitor may discover that although life has improved considerably in Puerto Rico, it is still not the ideal which he had imagined. He may also be shocked by a sudden feeling of being a stranger.

E. SCHOOL CHILDREN AND MOBILITY

The child who moves from one school to another, even within the same city, is often beset by anxieties. One study found that "the majority of the children approached revealed concerns, worries, fears, or resentment".[68] But children move not only from school to school in the same city; they are an important part of the total migration in the United States. Every big city school system today has to aid children of newcomers from other parts of the country, especially those from rural areas.[69] In the past the question was of aid to children of immigrants.[70]

Data are available for the decade 1953–54 to 1962–63 to show the experience of the New York City schools in pupil movement into and out of the system (see table XI). It is seen that a system with approximately 1 million pupils admitted 363,011 new pupils from other systems in the decade and discharged 419,375 to other systems. Puerto Rico was the source of 104,388 pupils in the 10-year period and 59,924 were discharged to the Puerto Rican school system. The balance was thus 44,464 Puerto Rican pupils added to the New York City schools. It may surprise some, to note that pupils from foreign countries totaled 44,697 in the same period. A big majority of them (27,405) came from other than European countries and most of them probably were from Western Hemisphere countries. The number of non-Puerto Rican, Spanish-speaking pupils has increased considerably in recent years, partly as a result of upheavals in Cuba and the Dominican Republic.

Total pupil mobility is, of course, much greater than the data in table XI show. Intraborough and interborough transfers must be added. This is done in table XII for the 5-year period, 1958–59 to 1962–63.

The figures in table XII contain the results of many thousands of individual and family decisions. Some move as a result of rising on the occupational ladder and thus being able to move to another neigh-

TABLE XI.—*Day schools—Migration balance in the movement of pupil population to and from places outside New York City, school years 1953–54 to 1962–63*

Geographic area	Pupils admitted		Pupils discharged		Migration balance	Ratio of discharges to admissions
	Number	Percent	Number	Percent		
Area adjacent to New York City:						
Nassau-Suffolk	24,286	6.7	114,926	27.4	[1] 90,640	4.7
Westchester-Rockland	7,547	2.1	22,371	5.3	[1] 14,824	3.0
New Jersey	18,609	5.1	45,979	11.0	[1] 27,370	2.5
Subtotal	50,442	13.9	183,276	43.7	[1] 132,834	3.6
Northeast United States [2]	25,926	7.1	36,577	8.7	[1] 10,651	1.4
Atlantic Coast States [3]	61,710	17.0	42,062	10.0	19,648	0.7
Florida	16,940	4.7	27,897	6.7	[1] 10,957	1.6
Other States in United States	36,234	10.0	46,849	11.2	[1] 10,615	1.3
Total, continental United States	191,252	52.7	336,661	80.3	[1] 145,409	1.8
Puerto Rico	104,388	28.8	59,924	14.3	44,464	0.6
Europe	28,031	7.7	10,739	2.6	17,292	0.4
Other countries	39,340	10.8	11,935	2.8	27,405	0.3
Total, outside continental United States	171,759	47.3	82,598	19.7	89,161	0.5
Not stated	---------	---------	116	---------	[1] 116	---------
Grand total	363,011	100.0	419,375	100.0	[1] 56,364	1.2

[1] An excess of out-migration over in-migration.
[2] Includes New England and New York State except for the counties adjacent to New York City.
[3] Includes Pennsylvania, Delaware, Maryland, Virginia, North Carolina, South Carolina, and Georgia.

Source: 65th Annual Report of the Superintendent of Schools, Statistical Section. New York: Board of Education, table 32, p. 28.

TABLE XII.—*Mobility of pupil population school years 1958–59 to 1962–63*

School year	Pupils transferred intraborough	Pupils admitted			Pupils discharged to—		Total	Total pupil movements
		Interborough transfer	From outside New York City	Total	Interborough transfer	Places outside New York City		
1958–59	59,441	24,484	36,398	60,882	24,484	39,093	63,577	183,900
1959–60	59,666	22,513	34,883	57,396	22,513	42,477	64,990	182,052
1960–61	62,680	25,540	37,432	62,972	25,540	39,864	65,404	191,056
1961–62	66,072	26,206	38,041	64,247	26,206	60,936	67,142	197,461
1962–63	69,843	27,070	39,171	66,241	27,070	42,317	69,387	205,471

Source: 65th Annual Report of the Superintendent of Schools, Statistical Section, School Year 1962–63. New York: Board of Education. Table 44, p. 37.

borhood.[71] Others are forced to move. Rossi lists evictions, destruction of dwelling (fire, urban renewal, public improvements such as highways), or severe income losses. They represented almost a quarter (23 percent) of the reasons for moving among his respondents.[72] A participant in a workshop on recent migrants to a big midwestern city reported the following in this regard:

> One of the biggest problems is housing * * * We are fleecing them in rent. Families shift around trying to find cheaper rent.[73]

Research indicates that pupil mobility has a deleterious effect on pupil performance. Often the results of mobility are attributed to low socioeconomic status, race, or poor performance by schools. One well-known study showed, for example, that pupils in New York's Central Harlem schools dropped in "intelligence quotient" between third and sixth grades.[74] There is a serious methodological error in the study, however. The same pupils were not tested in both grades. In technical terms, it was a cross-sectional and not a longitudinal study. Why should there be a decrease in IQ? The answer undoubtedly lies at least in part in pupil transiency, which is great in all schools in neighborhoods low on the socioecenomic scale.[75]

Several studies in New York City schools have shown substantial differences between schools marked by low transiency and those characterized by high transiency levels in IQ, reading ability, and personal and social adjustment. The advantages of continuous enrollment in the same school are substantial.[76]

A study of pupil mobility in Chicago concludes as follows:

> Pupils who move frequently between educational environments recurringly confront new situations calling for demanding social adjustments—to new authority figures, to new peers, to new organizational idiosyncracies, etc. These adjustments create demands upon students which are incompatible with those of learning and normal progress. High rates of interschool mobility deprive many pupils, especially those of primary school age, of a secure and stable educational environment; constantly recurring social readjustments inhibit the release of their energies toward creative learning and developmental challenges.[77]

The Puerto Rican pupils in the New York City schools had been shown in 1954 and 1955 to suffer from frequency of moving, but also to improve with years of attendance in the city's schools. The factor of reduced mobility with length of residence was not controlled but indications are that it entered the picture. "Intelligence quotients," in spite of the handicaps working against the child born and schooled in Puerto Rico in taking tests based on a culture other than his own, rose as follows:

73.6 for those here less than 2 grades.
79.9 for those here between 2 and 3.9 grades.
83.2 for those here 4 grades or more.[78]

Light is shed on differences between four groups of fourth- and eighth-grade pupils tested in 1954 and 1955 by the following median IQ scores:

	Fourth grade	Eighth grade
A. Puerto Rican born and schooled	96.3	77.9
B. Puerto Rican born but schooled exclusively on the continent	79.6	86.8
C. Born on continent of Puerto Rican parentage	88.4	94.2
D. Pupils of non-Puerto Rican parentage	96.4	93.7

In short, even by the biased measure of group "intelligence tests," group C had done slightly better by the eighth grade than group D.[79]

F. PUERTO RICAN CHILDREN IN NEW YORK CITY SCHOOLS

Children of Puerto Rican birth and of Puerto Rican parentage in New York City's public schools numbered 179,223 on October 31, 1963. The total pupil register was 1,045,554.[80] Their distribution by borough and by school group is shown in table XIII, with comparative figures for children born abroad.

TABLE XIII.—*Puerto Rican and foreign-born pupils, Oct. 31, 1963*

	Total register	Puerto Rican	Foreign born
Borough:			
Manhattan	181,710	57,206	10,088
Bronx	197,322	55,557	7,492
Brooklyn	390,242	60,458	15,580
Queens	240,687	5,060	11,581
Richmond	35,593	942	589
School group:			
Elementary	586,046	116,227	20,002
Junior high	208,177	37,189	9,882
Academic high	204,075	14,727	13,220
Vocational high	40,622	9,147	2,102
Special classes	6,634	1,933	124
Total	1,045,554	179,223	45,330

Source: Facts and figures, 1964–65, p. 37.

Data for May 1947 indicate 24,989 Puerto Rican children in the public schools. Although there was a clustering of 4,853 in 8 schools in East Harlem (in 2 schools they made up 80 and 73 percent, respectively, of the enrollment), the remaining 7,269 in Manhattan were scattered unevenly through 109 of the other 113 schools in that borough.[81]

Brooklyn's 234 public schools enrolled 4,703 Puerto Rican pupils in 165, or 71 percent of its schools. The Bronx had 7,690 Puerto Rican children in 95 of its 116 schools. Queens and Richmond each had a small number: the former with 452 in 102 of its 152 schools, Richmond with 62 in 19 of its 39 public schools.

Thus Puerto Ricans were on the register of 502 of New York City's 666 public schools as early as May 1947. By 1962 there were only 28 elementary schools, out of a total of 588, which had no Puerto Rican pupils. All 127 junior high schools, 57 academic, and 29 vocational high schools had Puerto Ricans enrolled.[82]

Another set of data to supplement those on distribution by borough and school level of the three major ethnic groupings is provided by a similar breakdown of pupils attending high school in 1957 and 1963.

	Academic (percent)		Vocational (percent)		Academic increases (percent)
	1957	1963	1957	1963	
Puerto Ricans	50.6	62.5	49.4	37.5	23.3
Negroes	64.1	74.0	35.9	26.0	15.0
Others	87.5	88.4	12.5	11.6	1.0

If higher aspirations are indicated by choice of academic over vocational high schools, then 23.3 percent more Puerto Ricans displayed them between 1957 and 1963 in comparison with 15.0 percent of the Negroes and less than 1 percent of the others. It should be understood that it is not necessary to go to college to lead a happy and successful life. But the voracious appetite of cybernetics for white-collar jobs indicates that college, which once was looked upon as a luxury, is rapidly becoming a necessity. Virtually the entire Puerto Rican community is organized to convince their children of this fact.

One of the handicaps of most of the Puerto Rican-born children is their unfamiliarity with English, as it was of millions of previous New York City pupils. Two sets of figures, for 1955 and 1963, provide a rough measure of progress. A schoolwide census of English-speaking ability was conducted in New York City in October 1955. It was found that about 50 percent of the 102,500 Puerto Rican children either spoke English "like a native," without an accent, or as fluently as a native but with a slight accent. A third more spoke hesitatingly or haltingly, but well enough for most situations. Seventeen percent either spoke only a few sterotyped phrases or not at all. Fluency had been achieved by 58 percent by 1963–64. This was distributed as follows, by school level:[83]

	Percent
Elementary schools	48
Junior high schools	76
Senior high schools	78

It should be remembered that school turnover among the Puerto Rican pupils is high. Therefore, the pupil population of 1963 may contain only a comparatively small proportion of those in the 1955 population. The Puerto Rican pupil population, in other words, is not a stable entity but one which is constantly losing members, who are replaced by newcomers. The same is true of the adult population, of course. We lack means of measuring this turnover adequately in either case.

Efforts are being made by the New York schools to encourage bilingualism among the Puerto Ricans, in line with the city's tradition of multilingualism.[84]

G. SCHOOL CHILDREN IN THE RETURN MIGRATION

A net outflowing balance from the schools of New York City to those of Puerto Rico was registered for the first time in recent years in 1962–63. Five-hundred-fifty more pupils were recorded as leaving the city's schools to go to Puerto Rican schools than were received.[85] This does not mean, of course, that children had not been transferring from the New York schools to Puerto Rican schools previously; their movement is concealed by the gross figures.

Puerto Rico's own statistics, which include both public and accredited private elementary and secondary schools and movement to and from other areas, are available for the 1952–53 to 1963–64 academic years (see table XIV).

TABLE XIV.—*Pupils transferred to and from mainland school systems, 1952–53—1963–64*

	From Puerto Rico		To Puerto Rico	
	To New York City	To other areas in United States	From New York City	From other areas in United States
1952–53	5,875	473	814	82
1953–54	5,845	480	1,122	153
1954–55	5,141	468	1,284	224
1955–56	6,235	918	1,426	318
1956–57	6,645	879	1,721	344
1957–58	6,176	793	1,870	599
1958–59	6,759	958	2,279	479
1959–60	6,585	1,092	2,805	504
1960–61	5,407	734	2,672	617
1961–62	4,888	920	3,389	892
1962–63	5,141	1,025	3,513	824
1963–64	5,375	1,328	3,345	1,062

Source: Departamento de Instrucción Pública, Sección de Estadísticas.

It will be noted that there was an increase from 896 in 1952–53 to 4,407 in 1963–64 of those transferred from the United States to Puerto Rico. The 12-year period saw 32,338 children transferred to Puerto Rican schools.

A breakdown by "municipios" for the past few years shows that there is not a single one which has not received pupils from U.S. schools. The highest ranking in order of rank are:

1. **Aquadilla**
2. **Fajardo**
3. **Bayamón**
4. **San Juan**
5. **Cabo Rojo**
6. **Caguas**
7. **Carolina**
8. **Mayagüez**
9. **Manati**
10. **Hatillo**

There is little question about the impact of the returnees on the schools throughout the island, but no studies of it are known. Conversations with teachers and school administrators over the past few years have a most familiar ring to one who lived in New York City in the early postwar years. The children who are moving to Puerto Rico are undergoing the same process which resulted in newspaper headlines about two decades ago in the Nation's metropolis. Inability to speak Spanish is one of the keys to their difficulties; the others are the usual ones already mentioned. Fortunately, there are many more bilingual teachers in the Puerto Rican schools than there were in New York's. And those teachers whose assignment is the teaching of English find that they have assistants among their newly arrived pupils.

The contribution they will make to the debate which is going on over the reconstruction of life in Puerto Rico is still in the future. Undoubtedly they will do their share both economically and culturally, just as millions of migrants have in a multitude of other situations. Probably the only generalizations which could be made today would be based on Oscar Handlin's forecast for the future of New York's newest newcomers:

> There is every reason to be optimistic about the future, if the society of which these people have become a part allows them to act freely and as equals within it.[illegible]

There does not seem to be any basis for doubt that Puerto Rico will give its returnees the freedom of action and the equality which are so basic a part of democracy as practiced by the Puerto Ricans.

Now we must turn to a subject which is much more "iffy"—the future of Puerto Rican migration.

V. Puerto Rican Migration in the Future

A. "PUSH-PULL" INADEQUATE

It is well to recall the factors which have been found to be primarily responsible for the ebb and flow of the migration from Puerto Rico to the States. The mechanistic analogy of "push-pull," which has been so widely used in migration studies (including earlier ones by the senior author) has often misled both demographers and the public. It now seems clear that the analogy oversimplifies the process through which the migrant must go in reaching a decision on whether or not to migrate. Even worse, it treats the migrant as if he really does not have a hand in the decision at all. However, it is of the nature of man to make choices. Few of the many empirical studies of areas of out-migration give any support to the idea that the person who migrates could not have chosen to remain in his own area. There are obvious exceptions: Floods, volcanic eruptions, or other natural catastrophes may literally drive people from their homes and make it impossible for them to return. The number of such cases is fortunately relatively small.

Usually we are dealing with decisions which must be made between remaining in one's original locality at a given level of living or migrating to a new locality in the expectation that the level can be raised. The previous discussion of the close direct relationship between the economic cycle and migration indicates the validity of this statement. An illustration from the Puerto Rican experience may be helpful. It has been pointed out that migration from Puerto Rico rose to its highest point in 1953. One has only to compare levels of living on the island in the period 1909–30, when the average annual new out-migration was 1,986, with those of the 1951–60 decade, when the annual average was 41,212, to see that employment opportunities on the mainland are far more decisive than the so-called "push" factor. Death rates, to use one sensitive index to levels of living, always ran around 22 to 24 per 1,000 in the former period, compared with 7 to 10 per 1,000 in the latter.

Analysis of the motivations of the Puerto Rican migrant, made in 1948, found that the subjective feelings of the migrants conform to what would be expected by reasoning from the economic data and the comparison of levels of living as they might influence the flow of migration. It may be recalled that the Columbia University study divided the migrants into "deciders" and "followers". The report comments on the issue under discussion in the following passage:

> The migration of the Puerto Ricans to New York as a whole is to be seen, therefore, as an economic move, particularly among the deciders; their economic frustration on the island is less discernible, subjectively, to them than the rosy promise which they see in New York. New York beckons also to the followers; but they respond not so much to economic opportunity as to the pull exercised by their families already living here. Yet even their motivation has been indirectly economic. They are, after all, responding to the suggestion of some decider in the family, a decider who was most likely to have been economically motivated in making his original decision. Thus the followers are actually responding to someone else's economic motivation rather than their own.
>
> When the deciders declare that they see their move to New York mainly as a response to the city's economic promise, they are, in effect, expressing their decision to search elsewhere for the better jobs, the opportunity, and the wages not accessible to them in Puerto Rico. When the followers explain their emotional

> and financial need to be with their families in New York, they too are expressing, though indirectly, their urge to find elsewhere the security which for them the island cannot provide. Yet, all these groups subjectively experience these impulses not as a deficiency of life on the island, but in terms of the advantages of the metropolis.[57]

Two of the classic studies of Negro migration northward make the same point about that stream. In fact, St. Helena Island, S.C., was chosen for a 1928 study specifically because "Problems of racial friction and lawlessness, often mentioned as important causes of general Negro migration, were absent."[58]

The key to the decision to migrate which must be made by each individual (even most of those labeled "followers" by the Columbia University study) seems to have been well stated by Lively and Taueber in 1936:

> People do not move primarily because the level of living in the area where they are is low but rather because they have become aware of a different level of living which appears more attractive.[59]

These people cite the fact that often large-scale migration has taken place from farming areas such as the Corn Belt, which are far above the national average in wealth and amenities. However, these areas lie within the zone of influence of metropolitan areas which, through mass media, present a picture of another and more attractive way of life, including greater economic opportunities.

B. THE SENSITIZING PROCESS

Puerto Rico has changed tremendously in the past 20 years, per capita and family income have been climbing, and every other index of economic well-being has risen significantly. Death rates, especially the infant mortality rate, have dropped; the expectancy of life is now about equal to that of the United States. It seems paradoxical to some observers that the greatest out-migration has taken place during this period of unprecedented well-being. An old German saying may help in understanding the situation: "The appetite grows with eating!" Puerto Ricans today are more highly literate and better educated in other respects than ever before. They read more newspapers and magazines, listen more often to the radio, view television more frequently. Antonio Pedreira's "insularismo" has been waning. Even more important, "Operation Bootstrap" and its related broad-scale educational efforts have made a deep impression on those whom Franklin D. Roosevelt called "the common man". Many more now feel that there is hope for them to improve their lot in this world.[60]

It is this sense of hope which is the most powerful ingredient in the worldwide "revolution of rising expectations." The Puerto Ricans have improved their ability to take advantage of better economic opportunities through schooling and experience. The widespread vocational school system has helped enormously. And work in the growing number of manufacturing plants has given them added ability to compete in a job market of some 70 million workers with the highest wages in the world. One constantly hears stories of the best workers leaving new plants in Puerto Rico for better paying jobs in the States.

The appetite, then, has been whetted by education, both formal and informal, plus experience. The sensitizing process which is essential to migration, has been under way for several decades. It is this process about which we should speak, instead of using the over-simplified, mechanistic, analogy of "push."

C. THE MAGNET

Aspirations, one of the products of increasing dynamism in a society, are likely to rise faster than the society's ability to fulfill them. Or to return to our German adage, the appetite may grow faster than the person's ability to feed that appetite. New methods of securing sustenance are sought. The mainland labor market has for years appealed to some persons as supplying increased sustenance, as we have seen. But the possibilities were fairly limited until after the immigration restriction acts of the 1920's. They were again limited by the "Great Depression," during which unemployment soared to a horrifying 24.9 percent of the labor force,[91] and later by the transportation difficulties of World War II.

Labor shortages were so severe during and immediately following the war, however, that active efforts were made by continental employers to recruit workers in Puerto Rico. The placements, plus the "family intelligence network," plus increasing job opportunities, resulted in the dramatic rise in the net migration already reported.

The severe labor shortages reflected two phenomena: one short range; one long range. The first was the presence of around 3 million persons in the Armed Forces during a period of high employment. As the Nation began to feel the economically depressing effects of demobilization, the Korean war arrived to counterbalance them.

The long-range factor concerns us more here. It will be recalled that the depression decade brought about a drastic drop in the U.S. birth rate. A net reproduction rate of 984 was registered for the 1930–35 period and a further drop to 978 was recorded for the next half-decade, 1936–40. It was not until 1940 that the line of 1,000, necessary to the reproduction of a population, was crossed and a rate of 1,027 was reached. In terms of crude birth rates, there was a drop from around 23 to 25 per 1,000 in the 1920's to 16.9 in 1935, and a slight rise to 17.9 in 1940 and 19.5 in 1945. The midfifties saw a return to rates around 25 per 1,000. The lower birth rates of the depression years were reflected in the drop in the number of persons in the productive-age categories, available for the labor force some 18 to 20 years later, i.e., from about 1948 to 1950. By the same process, the increase in births late in the 1940's is now beginning to reflect itself in an increase in the number of persons available for the labor force. That this trend will continue upward is indicated by a glance at the following birth and net reproduction rates for recent years:[92]

	Birthrate per 1,000 population	Net reproduction rates
1940	19.4	1,027
1945	20.4	1,132
1950	24.1	1,435
1955	25.0	1,676
1960	23.7	1,715
1961	23.3	1,704
1962	22.4	1,633
1963	21.6	1,564

D. THE PULL WEAKENS

We have seen that recent years have witnessed a substantial decrease in the net out-migration from Puerto Rico. This obviously arises from a reduction in job opportunities in the States for persons with the types of education and training possessed by most Puerto Ricans. To a considerable extent this reflects a "normalization" of the two unusual factors mentioned above. There is another factor, perhaps even more important: there has been a considerable increase in education and experience requirements for getting and holding a job in the States in recent years.

Long has made an analysis of unemployment rates by characteristics of the workers for 1949–50 as:

> When the unemployment rate averaged 5.6 per cent (and the labor force participation rate 58.2 per cent), and 1959–60, when the average unemployment rate was also 5.6 per cent (and the labor force participation rate 58.3 per cent).[93]

Unemployment rates rose for manual, unskilled and domestic service occupations, and for poorly-educated workers. They fell for professional, skilled, clerical, sales, and nondomestic service occupations and for better-educated workers. "The occupational composition of employment altered drastically", according to Long's analysis. Total employment in the manual, unskilled and domestic service occupations "fell" by over a million, but the total in the professional, white-collar, skilled, sales, service, and clerical occupations "rose" by 8½ million.

Unfortunately, most of the migrants from Puerto Rico fall among the "poorly educated" and into those occupations in which jobs are decreasing and unemployment is increasing. This statement, at first glance, does not seem to be consistent with what has previously been said about selectivity. However, it must be recalled that while the migrant is above the average in various respects when compared with his fellows in Puerto Rico, he is not being compared with them in his new environment. He is being compared with workers who grew up in an industrialized environment; for whom problems of "industrial discipline", so knotty in the early days of Fomento, had been solved during their adolescence. He is being expected to fit into an economic complex much larger and much more highly differentiated than the one from which he moved. Generally, one step on the skill ladder was lost in the move, at least temporarily, according to the Columbia University Study.[94]

The same phenomenon was found in the United Kingdom when West Indians migrated there under circumstances closely paralleling those of the Puerto Rican migration.[95]

E. HOW MANY MIGRANTS IN THE FUTURE?

It has been seen that the unusual circumstances which helped bring about the fairly high out-migration rates of the late forties and the fifties had begun to lose their efficacy toward the close of the latter decade. Two additional factors have begun to make their influence felt: Increased educational requirements and increased competition from the "homegrown" labor force as a result of the maturing of the products of the "baby boom".

The result has been an almost uninterrupted annual decline in the net out-migration. This probably was slightly exaggerated in recent years by an increase in Cuban immigration to Puerto Rico by way of the mainland.

The increase in Cuban citizens living in Puerto Rico during the past few years has not been as great as has sometimes been reported, so far as can be determined by official figures. Cubans have reported during the past six annual registrations of aliens as follows:[96]

1959	526	1962	2,963
1960	537	1963	4,377
1961	2,527	1964	6,138

The increase from 1960 to 1964 was thus 5,601. It has been said that the Cuban immigration has accounted for the data showing net migration back to Puerto Rico. Let us examine this assertion. The net migration to Puerto Rico in 1961 was 1,754. The increase in Cubans registered in Puerto Rico during the year 1961 was 1,990. Thus, there might have been a net outflow from Puerto Rico during 1961—of 236 persons. The year 1963 showed a net return flow—5,479 persons. Cuban increase during 1963 was 1,414, according to alien registration. This would have still indicated a net inflow to Puerto Rico—4,065 of non-Cubans.

Given the comparatively small number of Cubans, the nature of migration statistics, and the changing employment situation in both the United States and Puerto Rico, it does not seem that the Cubans have played a highly significant role in the migration balance.

There has also been some immigration in the past few years from the Dominican Republic which has suffered from political upheavals. Data to quantify it is not at hand. There were 1,796 persons born in the Dominican Republic according to the 1960 census which also found 1,092 Cuban-born.[97]

It would be a mistake to try to project the adjusted migration of the past few years as the probable future migration. There are too many unknown variables. A full-scale mobilization for war would again take several million men out of the labor force, employment opportunities probably would increase and out-migration from Puerto Rico would also increase. On the other hand, if "peaceb reaks out", there may well be a decrease in employment and a further increase in unemployment. The dangers of reliance on an inflated projection of migration trends based on a few peak years have been pointed out by Roy G. Francis, in "The Predictive Process," already cited.

VI. Puerto Rico's Economy and Future Migration

A. POPULATION AND LABOR FORCE TRENDS

It may well be helpful in thinking about Puerto Rico's future population trends to study careful population projections on two sets of assumptions worked out by three of Puerto Rico's most highly trained and competent demographers. One utilizes an estimate of 15,000 per year net out-migration for 1960–65, which we have seen is high. They are somewhat higher in estimating the annual loss for 1965–75: 20,000.[98] On this basis, and assuming that recent trends in natural increase do not shift substantially by 1975, a population of 3,218,000 is foreseen for that year, or an increase in total population of 868,000.

Even more important than the figure for the total population, however, is the estimate of the size of the labor force, which would be 915,000, assuming no significant change in the labor force proportion of the migration or in labor force participation rates. This would represent an increase of 287,000 in the 15 years, 1960–75.

They have also made another set of assumptions which should be considered carefully. If there were to be no net out-migration during the 1960–75 period, and no change in the birth and death rates, the population of Puerto Rico would rise by 1,246,000 to a total of 3,596,000. The labor force would increase by 431,000, to 1,059,000.

It is at this point that great care needs to be taken to differentiate between either sentimental or political sloganeering on one hand and solid planning for the future on the other. One cannot disagree with those who frequently respond to the challenge of overpopulation with the pat phrase "People are our greatest resource". Of course the statement is true, but it must be qualified to make it meaningful. One might also say truly, "Water is an indispensable natural resource." Those who live on semidesert land which would produce bountifully if it could receive 50 inches of adequately timed rainfall a year would agree enthusiastically. But if they were to receive from 200 to 250 inches of rain a year they would fervently wish for less generous portions.

People are an invaluable, an obviously indispensable, natural resource, but that is only the beginning of thinking about the relation between economic development and population problems, not the end.

There are other vital elements in the process of production of goods and services to meet peoples' needs, land, and capital goods being the most obvious. There is also the less obvious but equally important necessity to have people prepared for a productive life by being healthy in mind and body and educated for their economic roles as both producers and consumers, as well as for their political and social roles as citizens of that most difficult form of polity—democracy.

We have seen above that increasing amounts of education and training are required to obtain and hold a job in the complex economy of the United States. The same increasing requirements are now being found in Puerto Rico. Here attention will be directed to the rising cost of putting a man to work in the increasingly complex economy of Puerto Rico. When the Government of Puerto Rico started its industralization program during World War II, the capital cost of its first five plants was about $11 million. They employed 992 workers, which makes a per capita investment of approximately $11,111 per worker. Today, the investment per worker is well over $25,000. It is generally figured that one job outside the Fomento program is created for each job in it. But someone must make a capital investment for that job to be created.

Step-by-step with increased capital cost per worker employed, of course, goes greater productivity per worker. Area after area throughout the world finds it difficult to keep up with rapid population growth because it is possible to produce more and more with relatively fewer workers. A study of this phenomenon in two industrializing areas, Puerto Rico and Mexico, has led to the following sobering conclusions:

> As labor utilization improves, national income grows. The workers in a new textile factory produce far more cloth than the one using a hand loom. A motor truck transports more goods and transports them more quickly than an animal-drawn vehicle. And so it goes—virtually every new element introduced as part of the process of economic growth leads to higher labor productivity. This means that there can be substantial increases in national income without any change in the overall level of employment. In fact, national income can double or treble without an increase in the volume of total employment, because the rate of increase in national income is closely related to the rate of increase in labor productivity, while the rate of increase in total employment depends primarily on the size of the labor reservoir.[99]

Let us look at the prospects for employment in 1975 in the light of the fantastically successful record of "Fomento" in getting factories established in Puerto Rico in the past 15 years or so. Its work has deservedly attracted the attention of the world. It has been carried ahead with imagination, initiative, and ability which find few, if any, parallels in history. It had succeeded in securing the establishment of 917 manufacturing plants operating on June 30, 1964. Direct employment was being furnished 64,255 workers.[100] The average employment per plant is thus around 70. The average is misleading, however, since the newer plants hire fewer workers than the older plants, which is consistent with the generalization made above. The average number of workers per plant in the 125 establishments which started operations in the 1961–62 fiscal year was only 44.[101] It will be recalled that the first 5 plants in the industrialization program averaged 238 workers.

The direct and indirect results of the Fomento program and related private investment projects thus have furnished some 128,000 new jobs, in round numbers, during the past some 20 years.[102] Let us compare that figure with the projection of Janer and his colleagues of an increase in the labor force of somewhere between 287,000 and 431,000 between 1960 and 1975. It is obvious that even with an out-migration of some 15,000 per year, the labor force will increase by more than twice the increase in the number of jobs created by 1960; in fact, 224 percent. If no net out-migration takes place, the increase in labor force would be somewhere in the neighborhood of 359 percent.

These are somber facts. How do they compare with Fomento's own assessment of what it will accomplish by 1975? In judging this we have the estimate made by J. Díaz Hernández, director of continental operations of the Economic Development Administration, in July 1962, "2,000 plants by 1975." [103] He believes there is a well-founded hope that 2,000 plants will be in operation by 1975. Let us assume that they will all be of the modern type such as those established during the 1961–62 fiscal year, and thus will employ an average of around 44 workers. Direct and indirect employment would thus rise to 176,000, but the labor force would be somewhere between 915,000 and 1,059,000, depending on our estimate of out-migration. If employment per plant were at the present long-run average of about 70, the number of jobs created, directly and indirectly, would be 292,000, added to the 1960 total of 543,000 jobs, or 835,000 places for a labor force of 915,000 to 1,059,000. At best, there would still be an unemployment rate of 9.1 percent.

Even the exceptional record achieved by Fomento since the 1940's will not be adequate to create the number of new jobs which will be required by the population increase. And, it should be noted, "birth control" or "family planning" is not directly relevant in reducing the 1975 labor force, no matter how vital it may be for the long run. The potential members of the labor force in 1975 have already been born. It is relevant, however, in that the already high dependency ratio in Puerto Rico may increase and thus further burden the productively employed sector of the population. The 1960 dependency ratio (those 15 to 64 years of age to all others) in Puerto Rico was 3.3 to 1, or nearly double that of the United States, 1.7 to 1. Thus a potentially gainfullly employed person must support 3.3 others in Puerto Rico but only 1.7 others in the United States. (This type of difference is found throughout the world between high fertility countries and those in which fertility has been brought under control.)

B. UNEMPLOYMENT AND UNDEREMPLOYMENT TRENDS YESTERDAY AND TODAY

There is another factor which must be added to the picture thus far sketched: Unemployment. The proportion of the labor force without work had been reduced substantially since 1940: From 15 percent (90,000) in that year to 10.8 percent (80,000) 24 years later. Thus far (with the latest data available, those for the first 7 months of the 1965–66 fiscal year), unemployment rates show a tendency to rise. This period showed a monthly average of 97,000 seeking work compared with 89,000 for the first 7 months of 1964–65. However, since the labor force also increased, the unemployment rate rose only from 11.6 percent to 12.2 percent.

An even less auspicious tendency has been an increase in underemployment—defined as a workweek of less than 35 hours. Underemployment accounted for 20 percent of all employment in 1953–54. It dropped to 17 percent in the 1957–61 period.[104] The 1963–64 fiscal year showed a climb to an average monthly rate of 26.3 percent.[105] Thus each month from 150,000 to 232,000 of Puerto Rico's labor force were working less than 35 hours a week in that year. The first 9 months of the 1964–65 fiscal year showed a rate of 29.2 percent, which may or may not have dropped during the next quarter.[106]

It thus seems clear that the economy must cope with three major factors if extremely serious unemployment is to be avoided:

First: Present-day unemployment and underemployment is high.

Second: Unemployment is increasing slightly and underemployment substantially, probably partly because of the recent reduction in net out-migration;

Third: The rate of natural increase is still one of the highest in the world and even if a net out-migration of 15,000 annually could be achieved, has already produced a potential labor force increase of at least 287,000 workers by 1975. And as has been pointed out, this is more than two-and-a-third times the increase in jobs which has been achieved during the entire brilliant history of "Operation Bootstrap".

C. UNEMPLOYMENT AND THE FAMILY STRUCTURE

An unemployment rate of around 5 percent of the labor force, which the United States has approximated in the past few years, has alarmed all but the Nation's most conservative forces. The labor movement and liberal and progressive public officials have been demanding special public works projects, changes in fiscal policy, retraining programs for areas of chronic unemployment, etc. Puerto Rico's rate is now more than double that of the mainland in 1964. It comes close to being as high as that of the United States during 1940 (14.6 percent), the last year of the Great Depression. Comparisons with seven industrialized foreign countries indicate how far both Puerto Rico and the United States have to advance in improving their unemployment rates. The rates in 1964 were: Puerto Rico, 10.8; United States, 5.2; Canada, 4.7; Italy, 2.9; France, 2.15; Great Britain, 2.5; Sweden, 1.6; Japan, 1.0; Germany (Federal Republic), 0.4.[107]

There is, however, a great difference between a high unemployment rate in an almost completely urbanized society such as the United States and one which still has about 40 percent of its people living in rural areas. Social and geographical factors are involved. The Puerto Rican family is less likely to have been disrupted by urbanization, and therefore more likely to give a helping hand to unemployed members. And it includes the "compadrazgo" which widens the circles of help far beyond the limits of the nuclear family more characteristic of urban life. Obviously, families still living on the land can be more helpful, at least in regard to food supplies, than can those living in an urban apartment house. Even a country shack is more flexible in regard to occupancy than many city dwelling units.

These factors may well account for a fair amount of resilience in Puerto Rican labor force. Its behavior since 1940 is indicated by the following statistics: [108]

Year	Labor force (in 1000's)	Participation rate (percent)	Unemployment rate (percent)
1940	602	52.2	15.0
1948	688	51.9	7.6
1950	686	53.3	12.8
1952	679	53.5	15.9
1956	641	48.3	12.9
1960	625	45.2	13.1
1963	695	45.9	12.8
1964	734	46.5	10.8

Out-migration probably was the main reason for the reduction in participation rates during the 1950's. It was complemented by an increase in school attendance. The return migration probably explains the rise between 1960 and 1964. An examination of changes by age lends credence to this belief. The major increases have occurred in those age categories most characteristic of the returnees.[109]

It would seem to be an error to count on an indefinite continuation of the flexibility seen in recent years. It is characteristic of a predominantly rural, "folk", culture and Puerto Rico is moving rapidly away from such a culture.

D. HIGH UNEMPLOYMENT AND JOB OPPORTUNITIES

Neglect of some of the factors just treated might be referred to as the fallacy of overoptimism. There is an opposite fallacy of overpessimism which often has arisen when persons confront a situation or a prospect of extremely high unemployment. It arises out of neglect of the fact that job openings do occur in times of high unemployment, in fact even during depressions. The chances of securing a job are reduced for job seekers as a whole, but there are ways of improving the chances. Education, and often specific job training, is the most important method of improving one's chances of employment. This is made clear by every study of the influence of education on employability. The experience of the past decade, cited by Long, above, is a dramatic illustration in regard to the economy of the United States.

A recent report states that "'Among the unemployed in 1959, the unemployment rate for college graduates was about 1½ percent; for those with some college education, about 2½ percent; for high school graduates, about 4½ percent; for those with less than a high school diploma, about 8½ percent, and for those with only a grade school education, about 12 percent.[110]

Many signs point in the same direction for Puerto Rico. The report of the chancellor of the University of Puerto Rico to the Seventh Pan American Conference of Engineering Societies in August 1962, provides a good example.[111] The University of Puerto Rico during the period 1942–62 graduated some 40,000 students. The number increased from 747 in 1942 to 3,477 in 1962. The number being graduated by all Puerto Rican universities during this time rose from about 900 to 5,000 per year. These graduates have all been absorbed into the economy, either in Puerto Rico itself or on the mainland.

Another report indicates that industrial technicians are not being produced fast enough in Puerto Rico to fill either existing needs or those projected for the future. Present needs among 226 firms surveyed early in 1962 were for 198 technicians, with 461 more estimated as needed by 1964.[112] The Puerto Rico Employment Service, according to a personal interview with Mrs. Petroamérica Pagan de Colón, its director at that time, has several hundred job openings which it cannot fill because of shortages of persons with specific training and experience.

Projections of future manpower requirements have been made by the planning board, which has constantly stressed the need for an increase in both the general educational level and in the number of persons trained from skilled, technical, and professional employment.[113] There can be no doubt of the consensus on the need for greater stress on education and training for the demands of the Puerto Rican labor market. Without sizably greater investments in education and training, the difficulties of "Operation Bootstrap" during the coming years will be immeasurably increased.

VII. THE BALANCE SHEET OF MIGRATION—A POINT OF VIEW

A. THE DEBITS OF MIGRATION

It has been made obvious that migration is a complex phenomenon. However, at the risk of oversimplification, an attempt will now be made to summarize the debits and then the credits of our balance sheet. This effort is difficult only in part because of the complexity of migration, which is one important consideration. Second, it is difficult because many of the factors which should be spelled out in detail are still largely unstudied or are highly resistent to quantitative treatment. Third, and closely allied with the second, is the highly subjective nature of individual reactions to discussions of migration. The subject is liable to lead to quite volatile reactions. An outstanding example is the peroration to a speech on migration at the conference on the subject organized by the University of Puerto Rico in 1956:

> I would rather see Puerto Ricans die in the jungles of Ecuador than in the asphalt jungles of New York City!

Migration undoubtedly is strong medicine! Courage is needed to pull up one's roots, sever the ties of neighborhood, of village, even perhaps of family. Granted that the courage is sometimes that of desperation, it must still be present.

"I miss my family", was the number one reason for unhappiness about life on the continent among the War Manpower Commission recruits, and "I miss my friends and relatives" was the top reason given for dissatisfaction by those who had migrated to St. Croix.[114] The fieldworkers in the farm labor program of the migration division of the Puerto Rico Department of Labor year-after-year have reported family reasons as the major factor in noncompletion of work agreements.

The literature of migration includes many moving accounts of the disorganization of family life which has so often accompanied migration.[115]

A good deal has also been written on the deleterious influence on the family of migration to New York City. Two factors must be considered in this connection. The urbanization process itself has a disruptive effect on family life; migration from the country to the city in Puerto Rico itself may well have more or less the same consequences as migration from Puerto Rico to New York City. Second, it is seldom noticed that migration may be one consequence of family disruption. The Columbia study found, for example, the following contrasting proportions of divorced and separated persons among the migrants, as compared with persons residing on the island:

	Men (percent)	Women (percent)
Migrants	4.0	16.0
Islanders	1.4	6.4

No matter how the issue is qualified, however, migration, especially of working class persons, has led to a good deal of personal suffering and family disruption. No one can put a dollar sign on loneliness and heartache; any attempt to quantify this debit item would be doomed to failure.

The drama of the so-called "Puerto Rican problem" put the group in the headline of New York City newspapers in the late 1940's and early 1950's. The newcomer often was treated as if he were the cause of the difficulties of which he was the victim.[116]

Personal difficulties varied, of course, with age, sex, education, previous occupational history and training, color, religion, marital status rural or urban origin, whether accompanied by family, size and age distribution of the family, etc. Probably more influential than any other single factor is ability to understand and speak English. The Columbia University study concluded "that language proficiency is the most important factor" in its index of adaptation.[117] Sixty-five percent of all Puerto Ricans interviewed during a study of Lorain, Ohio, in 1954 mentioned language as the source of their greatest difficulty.[118]

Studies in New Haven, Conn.; Buffalo, N.Y.; Jersey City and Perth Amboy, N.J.; Philadelphia, Pa., and New York City varied in their emphasis on the needs of the newcomers.[119] That of the Welfare Council of New York probably is the most inclusive:

> The difficulties of these congested Puerto Rican areas may be listed as: (1) need of houses, (2) need of care for children, (3) need of recreation centers, (4) need of more special teaching and handling of school children, especially of the older ones, recently arrived in the schools with many Puerto Rican students, (5) need of training in occupational skills, (6) need of prenatal care and of health care generally, (7) need of education as consumers in the continental environment, and especially in regard to foods, (8) need of information, in Spanish, as to the rights and responsibilities of citizens and the services available to them in New York, through governmental and voluntary agencies, (9) need to build up local understanding of Spanish culture. Finally, (10), in order to meet the non-English-speaking applicant halfway and understand his needs immediately, agencies need Spanish-speaking personnel.[120]

Many agencies tried to carry out the numerous recommendations of the Welfare Council report. Several years later, the Brooklyn Council for Social Planning surveyed the difficulites of the Puerto Ricans as they reported them, to all the social, civic, religious and welfare agencies of that Borough. The 24 organizatons answering reported the following:

Language.—Listed by 19 agencies in first place, by 3 in second place.

Housing.—Listed by 15 agencies in first place, by 7 in second place.

Health.—Listed by only 6 agencies in first or second place, but 18 agencies listed bad health as a prevalent handicap.

Employment.—Listed by only 1 agency in first place, but 13 agencies found that Puerto Ricans have some difficulty in obtaining employment.

Family relations.—Listed by 4 agencies in first place, 12 agencies mentioned this as a difficulty but gave it slighter weight.

Government relations.—Listed by all agencies as a minor difficulty.

Other difficulties.—Three agencies mentioned financial difficulty and two listed "cultural patterns," without specifying which ones.[121]

Many of the agencies were willing to help, but one of the fundamental factors found by the Columbia University study was that "Even in time of need, the migrant is generally reluctant to approach an institution for help. He is accustomed to depending on his friends or relatives, whether the problem is unemployment, lack of funds or family troubles. Even Puerto Ricans who have been in New York a relatively long time continue to rely most strongly on family and other informal assistance, although some do learn to seek agency help." [122]

The schools, as always with newcomers with families, bore a large share of the responsibility for helping integrate the newcomers. A special study was conducted from 1953 through 1957 of the Puerto Rican children, their relations with the other children and their progress in school. The report is a veritable mine of information and suggestions and has resulted in dozens of curriculum bulletins and interpretive materials.[123]

How were the children adapting? A study of 162 pupils in 1 Manhattan school in the 12 months April 1953 to March 1954 brought the following proportion of ratings: [124]

	Percent
Rapidly adjusting	18
Normally adjusting	62
Poorly adjusting	20

One of the problems encountered by the Puerto Rican is that of the widespread discrimination against persons of dark complexion. A whole book would be required to do justice to the theme. Let us here simply quote the Rev. Father Joseph P. Fitzpatrick of the Fordham University sociology department who has been following Puerto Rican affairs and participating in "human relations" efforts on behalf of better understanding of the newest newcomers for many years. Interviewed by Time he said he saw the Puerto Rican migration as a real boon to New York and the United States. Unlike previous immigrants, the Puerto Ricans bring with them a history of racial tolerance and a tradition of social intermingling that lets them marry people of other skin colors, from Negroes to whites. "I did a study last year of the behavior of Puerto Ricans in six Catholic parishes in New York." Father Fitzpatrick reported:

> I found that 25 percent of all the Puerto Rican marriages involved people of noticeably different shades of color. It is my own hope that they will make explicit the principles of human brotherhood, of universal respect for men and women, that have been implicit in their culture. If they do, they will have brought a priceless contribution to the life of the mainland.[125]

One problem in dealing with attempts to evaluate an ethnic group in its early days in a new community is that "everybody knows" the pathology of the group and, of course, the entire group is characterized by the attributes of its most visible persons, i.e., the ones who have the most difficulty adjusting to the new environment. While a minority of the Puerto Ricans may have had serious troubles, the consensus of the social workers, teachers, ministers, labor leaders and others who have worked closely with the Puerto Ricans in New York City is probably found in the words of a veteran of 50 years of work in the settlement house movement who said she was encouraged by the fact that her Puerto Rican neighbors "are being assimilated into the life of the city faster than any previous group, partly through their own impressive efforts and partly because we're learning better how to help the process." [126]

Next, let us look at some of the debit side so far as Puerto Rico is concerned.

Some years ago the senior author attempted to deal in monetary terms with another debit factor: "The cost of raising a man", who was then relinquished to another economy. Using techniques suggested by Louis J. Dublin and Alfred J. Lotka, an estimate was made of the cost of food, clothing, shelter, light and fuel, household equipment, medical care, personal attention, entertainment, transportation, education and vocational education, gifts and contributions which a working class family might have to meet to raise a male child to the age of 18. This, in the 1925–43 period was calculated at around $2,500 in rural areas and about $3,000 in cities. The social costs appeared to total about $500 more.

Obviously this cost would be much greater today, because of (1) an increase in the social costs; (2) an increase in price levels, and (3) a rise in the standard of living as well as in levels of living. It was pointed out at the time that:

> It must be noted that we are not here dealing with the personal intrinsic value of a man as a husband, father, son or friend but solely with the value which may reasonably be assigned him as a factor in the economic life of the island. Data are lacking with which to make an estimate of possible future earnings, which would be a more efficient method of computing value. We must therefore fall back on "cost of production" as a rough measure of the value of a man. Obviously, if future earnings were capitalized, the figure in most cases would be considerably higher than the present estimate.[127]

It has recently been pointed out that the concept used by Dublin and Lotka is a static one which does not take the demographic situation into account. It is suggested that the concept of marginal value be applied in the process of assessing the money value of a man. This would mean that:

> In a society with underemployment and relative scarcity of consumer's goods, an additional person will exert further pressure on the supply of such goods and possibly increase even their price, if he can afford to pay it; as, at the same time, it will not be possible to take advantage of his labor in view of the prevailing underemployment, he will become a liability rather than an asset to society.[128]

This dynamic concept probably is more meaningful than the Dublin-Lotka approach, although obviously it would be exceedingly difficult to apply. The condition described comes uncomfortably close to being that obtaining in Puerto Rico.

Another item on the debit side undoubtedly is the loss by the Puerto Rican economy of initiative and skills which are qualities of a large proportion of the migrants. One can hear repercussions of this loss in meetings of businessmen, especially those connected with recently organized plants. Again and again one has been told over the past 20 years about the "best mechanic we had" who used a bonus payment to buy his airplane ticket to the States, where he went to work immediately at twice or three times his hourly rate in Puerto Rico. Here again it would be extremely difficult, if not impossible, to quantify the movement, but there is no doubt of its existence nor of the general need for more and higher level skills as the economy becomes more highly developed.

There is one debit factor which can be demonstrated quantitively: the effect of migration in increasing the dependency ratio, i.e., the proportion of those in the population who are employed to those who are below and above the productive ages. Comparison of Puert Rico in 1950 and 1960 and comparison between Puerto Rico and the United States will both be helpful in understanding this. There were 2.7 dependents per worker in Puerto Rico in 1950; this had increased to 3.3 in 1960, a rise of 22 percent. The 1960 ratio is almost double that of the United States, which was 1.7. This means that a given increase in productivity must be shared in Puerto Rico with 4.3 persons; in the United States with only 2.7 persons.

Furthermore, the age distribution of the dependents makes the Puerto Rican ratio more expensive to its economy than is the dependency ratio of the United States to its economy. The proportions over 65 years of age are approximately equal: 23 percent in Puerto Rico and 25 percent in the United States. The most expensive dependents are children under 15. Puerto Rico has 185 such children for each 100 employed workers, the United States 84. The heavy concentration of migrants in the young adult age categories plus the high birthrate and low death rate combine to bring about this result.

Finally, it has been charged that dependence upon migration as a solution to the problem of overpopulation exposes the Puerto Rican economy to the risk of a wave of return migration when depressions hit the economy of the United States. This has been true historically, as has been seen. It seems clear, however, that length of residence on the continent has reduced the return flow when unemployment rises. First, the unemployed man now has greater possibilities of local support than in any of the pre-1935 days. Second, the knowledge which he can use in judging whether or not to "stick it out" or return to Puerto Rico is more readily available than ever before. Third, the facilities of the United States Employment Service and of the Migration Division of the Puerto Rico Department of Labor enable him to judge whether another labor market in the United States would afford better opportunities than "going home."

How much each adverse factor sketched above will weigh will depend to a considerable extent on personal predilections. Obviously, judgment on the positive factors also will be subject to the same subjective weighing process. It is somewhat easier to quantify some of the credit factors, however.

B. THE BENEFITS OF MIGRATION

Migration usually benefits the migrant economically. Data gathered in the 1948 study indicate the process. The average weekly cash income of those migrants who came to New York City during the post-World War II period from the island's labor force was: [129]

Last job in Puerto Rico, $14.60.
First job in New York, $28.05.

Average earnings for those who came during the war years were:

Last job in Puerto Rico, $14.00.
First job in New York, $31.43.

Earnings of those who came during the 1930's, the depression years, averaged:

Last job in Puerto Rico, $12.00.
First job in New York, $22.62.

Corresponding earnings for those who came in the prosperity years prior to 1929 were:

Last job in Puerto Rico, $13.00.
First job in New York, $19.04.

Regardless of the period in which they came to New York, the migrants consistently earned more money on their first job in New York than they had earned in Puerto Rico. Those who came prior to 1929 got jobs which paid them about 50 percent more than the jobs they had left in Puerto Rico. Those who came during the depression years increased their income 89 percent. Those who came during the war years more than doubled their Puerto Rican earnings on their first job in New York. Those who came in the immediate post-World War II years did not quite double the wages they had earned on their last job on the island. Data with which to compare living costs are lacking, but personal experience indicates that those in Puerto Rico are not far below those of cities on the Mainland.

The distribution of jobs in New York City among Puerto Rican employed males is given as follows by the 1960 census:

	Percent
Semiskilled (operatives)	41.0
Service	19.2
Clerical and sales	11.5
Craftsmen and foremen	10.5
Professional, managerial, technical, and proprietors	5.4
Unskilled	5.4
Miscellaneous	7.0

Women, of course, are highly concentrated in the operatives category (65.3 percent); followed by clerical and sales (15.3 percent); and then by service trades (7 percent). However, there were only 514 Puerto Rican domestic servants in the entire area. On the other end of the scale there were 2,721 Puerto Rican women listed in professional, technical, managerial, and related fields.

Unfortunately, census data for comparisons of 1950 and 1960 occupational figures for New York City are not available. We do have data, however, for the United States as a whole for first and second generation male Puerto Ricans in 1960. They are given in the following table:

Occupational groupings	Puerto Rican born	Puerto Rican parentage
	Percent	*Percent*
Professional, technical, managerial, etc	5.3	12.4
Clerical and sales	9.3	18.4
Craftsmen, foremen, etc	10.1	16.7
Operatives	40.0	26.4
Service (except domestic)	17.7	10.6
Laborers (except farm and mine)	8.3	7.4
Farm and mine laborers	3.1	1.3
Miscellaneous and not reported	6.2	6.8

It will be noted that the first two groups, which make up the "white-collar" occupations, more than doubled as a proportion of those employed between the first and second generations (from 14.6 to 30.8 percent).

The increase in the white-collar occupations was much sharper among the Puerto Rican women than among the men: first generation, 16.4 percent; second, 57.4 percent. This is slightly above the average for all employed women in the United States, 54 percent. There was a drop of about two-thirds in the "operatives" category: from the first generation's 66.3 to 22.6 percent for the second generation. These data, especially those for the needle trades, will sound familiar to all students of our immigration history.

What incomes do the Puerto Ricans get for their work? Here again, we find increases varying in much the same manner as do those of other workers. Income reported in the 1960 census was $2,533 for the United States as a whole, compared with $1,654 reported in the 1950 census. Those who were farmers reported incomes of $1,434; rural nonfarm dwellers received $1,857 and urban dwellers averaged $2,555.

First- and second-generation differences between 1950 and 1960 incomes reported are as follows:

	Puerto Rican born	Puerto Rican parentage
1950	$1,664	$1,526
1960	2,513	2,868

But there is the factor of age to be taken into account. Earnings increase toward "middle age" and then, except in the case of highly educated professionals, tend to decline. But the average age of the Puerto Rican-born persons in the States is 27.9; that of second generation is 5.9. Obviously, if we are to compare first- and second-generation earnings fairly, we must offset the age factor. This we can do by using the same age group. Let us compare the 25–34 category for the United States as a whole and the four States for which the 1960 census furnishes income data:

	1st generation	2d generation
United States	$2,687	$3,519
California	3,183	3,944
Illinois	3,308	4,042
New Jersey	2,782	3,677
New York	2,631	3,496

Another answer to the question, "Are the Puerto Ricans climbing the economic ladder?" is found in the 1960 census data for median family income for New York City's five counties and three "next door" counties:

New York (Manhattan)	$3,459
Kings (Brooklyn)	3,868
Bronx	4,108
Westchester	4,890
Richmond (Staten Island)	5,136
Suffolk	5,594
Queens	5,756
Nassau	6,665

The median family income in Puerto Rico, as shown by the 1960 census, was $1,082. Since price levels do not vary greatly between New York City and the cities of Puerto Rico for comparable levels of living, the economic advantages are clear.

Consumer goods data from a 1957 marketing survey indicate that in that year 80 percent of the Puerto Rican households in New York City had at least one radio, 79.9 percent owned a TV set, 93.3 percent had an electric refrigerator, and 41.2 percent had their own telephone.[130]

The 1960 census showed 7,396 homes owned by Puerto Ricans in New York City; 18 percent of those in Philadelphia owned their homes.

Of course, "Man does not live by bread alone." There are many indications that life in their new homes is a fruitful, happy one for many thousands of Puerto Rican families. Interviews under many different circumstances and with many different groups indicate that new sights and sounds, new experiences, parks, playgrounds, music, opera, theater—all the advantages of an urban culture—are greatly appreciated. "Maybe I am not going to do so well, but my children will have greater chances for a secure and prosperous future." These words in one form or another are repeated thousands of times. And the children of those who return, having become accustomed to life in a big city, are now freely expressing their loss when they return to Puerto Rico to live. They miss, according to teachers who have discussed the matter with them, "the parks, the playgrounds, the gymnasiums, as well as specific schoolteachers with whom they had become friendly."

It would be easy in attempting to draw up a balance sheet of the migration, to do what prejudiced and bigoted persons in the United States usually do—judge the entire Puerto Rican population in the United States by the small minority which gets into trouble with the formal institutions of the receiving communities. Relief and crime are generally the two areas in which the greatest misunderstandings arise. Report after report has showed that the proportion of Puerto Ricans on relief has varied from around 6 percent to about 11 percent, depending on the business cycle. The past few years have seen the percentage on relief rise to one out of five. Sixty percent of the 20 percent are receiving "supplementary" relief; i.e., they are employed but their income does not suffice to support their family.[131]

Time (June 23, 1958) summarized official information on the New York City situation in the second area as follows: "Puerto Ricans form 8 percent of the population and their share of the crime rate is only slightly more than 8 percent." So far as juvenile delinquency is concerned, a few years ago a broad-scale study of Puerto Rican children in New York City schools found that in two Manhattan school districts which were studied intensively, the court appearances for Puerto Rican children ran 12 per 1,000 pupils compared with 14 per 1,000 for non-Puerto Ricans. Similar studies have showed that in general the Time statement applies to juvenile delinquency as well as adult crime.

Migration is likely to benefit the one who moves to a more complex, more highly productive economy because it enlarges his scope of action, gives him greater opportunities to grasp if he is capable of grasping them. This is obvious in the case of most moves to the United States. There is another factor which plays an important but still largely unanalyzed role in migration. A study in St. Croix found that the Puerto Ricans who had moved to that island were much in demand as more productive workers than the local people.[132] Here there was no question of a more highly developed economy. There was apparently a higher "mobilization" of the energies and abilities of the newcomer since he was facing a crisis in his life and was impelled to put forth greater efforts than his customary and habitual efforts in his former environment. Most people usually operate on a lower level of mobilization of energies than their maximum level, or even of their optimum level, as William James pointed out years ago.[133] In the language of the man on the street, "getting out of an old rut peps you up!"

Closely related to the economic advancement of the Puerto Rican living in the States is the benefit to the entire Puerto Rican economy of their remittances to family and friends. Official figures seriously underestimate the amount of money flowing into the island since they are based on check and money order flows and do not include money sent in bills through the mails or carried in the pockets of those who return, either to visit their old home or to stay. Still, the official figures are most impressive: For the 15-year period 1947–63 such remittances totaled $553,700,000 (see table XV).

Two other sources of income arising out of the migration now contribute sizable sums to the Puerto Rican national income: Social

TABLE XV.—*Personal remittances to Puerto Rico, 1947–63*

[In millions of dollars]

1947	8.3	1956	33.5
1948	9.2	1957	38.4
1949	12.9	1958	34.7
1950	12.6	1959	40.3
1951	17.0	1960	50.7
1952	21.5	1961	59.3
1953	27.9	1962	61.0
1954	29.3	1963	66.0
1955	31.4		

Source: Puerto Rico Planning Board.

security and unemployment insurance payments. It would require a separate study to determine what proportion of the former payments arise out of accounts built up only in Puerto Rico and what arose out of economic activities on the continent. It should be noted that social security payments in Puerto Rico increased from $7.4 million in 1950 to $69.1 million in 1961. By 1963, OASI and disability payments totaled $68,485,000 and unemployment insurance payments were $11,755,000.

No estimates were found of the total of unemployment insurance payments in Puerto Rico on accounts built up in the States, but judging by the experience of some of the Southern States to which workers return when recession strikes, it could run into quite a few million dollars annually.

These direct economic benefits obviously might be considered as repayments on the "cost of production of a man" if we wish to use that concept. There are also some important economic benefits which are not quite so direct in their repercussions. Demographic pressures have been seen to be directly reflected in the high rate of unemployment. Let us see what would have been likely to happen if there had been no out-migration between 1950 and 1960. The population in the latter year would have numbered 2,970,000, instead of 2,350,000 or about 620,000 more inhabitants. It would have been necessary to create 310,000 new jobs more than were created during that period. Otherwise the unemployment rate would have soared far past the extreme danger mark, since only about 100,000 new jobs were created in the entire period 1947–61.

The effect on the per capita income of Puerto Rico would have been most depressing. There are few indications of scarcities of workers serious enough to interfere with production. It would, therefore, seem clear that the removal of the migrant in the labor force would not have affected the level of the national income. This means that if the population had grown by 620,000 more persons during the decade than it actually did, there would have been a proportionate reduction in the per capita income, rather than an increase.

The migration not only removed an average of about 47,000 persons per year in the 1950–60 decade; it also reduced the rate of natural increase. Janer's calculations give birth and death rates and rates of natural increase as follows: [134]

	Birth rate	Death rate	Rate of natural increase
1950	40.0	9.9	30.1
1960	33.5	6.7	26.8

Net out-migration caused shifts in the age and sex structure and reduced the number of women with spouses present. Janer estimates that otherwise the birthrate would have declined only to 38.6. This would have meant a rise in the rate of natural increase from 30.1 in 1950 to 31.9 in 1960, instead of a reduction!

The school system is already striving desperately to keep up with the number of children it must teach as a result of the high rate of natural increase. It can readily be seen what a burden it would have had to carry if it had not been for the out-migration of some thousands of children during recent years. New York City alone received a net of 44,464 children from Puerto Rico in the 10 years, 1953–54 to 1962–63. Some indication of the addition we should have to make if we included children born in the States to those who left Puerto Rico to live and work in the States is given by the New York City public school system report that in the 1964–65 school year it was teaching 190,465 children born in Puerto Rico or born of parents who had been born in Puerto Rico.[135]

We might estimate the number of such children in private and parochial schools in New York City and those attending school in the 100-some towns and cities with Puerto Rican communities as at least 90,000. This would give us a total of approximately 280,000 more children who would probably be attending school in Puerto Rico if it had not been for the migration of recent years! This would require an expansion of over one-third in the capacity of the school system of Puerto Rico. Furthermore, at a per-pupil expenditure of $150, it would mean either an increase of $42 million a year in the education budget or a reduction in school services.

Obviously, the same type of calculations could be made for the additional strain on the economy in the fields of health and welfare, in the absence of migration. The point will not be further labored.

One final point must be listed on the credit side of migration. The U.S. economy and society has served as a vast training school for many Puerto Ricans who have gone to work in its factories and shops. Those who have returned to their homeland are in thousands of cases trained in skilled and semiskilled work and experienced in the industrial disciplines so that they make a real contribution to "Operation Bootstrap."

A comparison of the occupational distribution of returnees for 1960–64 and of all employed persons in 1964 indicates how the two populations compare (see table XVI).

That the returned migrant ranks higher than the resident workers is not surprising in view of their more extended education, already noted. Are they being put to work in Puerto Rico? An attempt to

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TABLE XVI.—*Occupational distribution of returnees 1960–64 and Puerto Rican employment, 1964: percentages*

Occupational grouping	Returnees 1960–64	Puerto Rican employment
Total workers	100.0	100.0
Professionals, technicians and related workers	9.7	7.6
Farmers and farm administrators	1.4	6.6
Other managers, administrators, and owners	10.6	8.7
Office and sales personnel	22.8	15.6
Craftsmen, foremen, machine operators and related workers	34.7	29.2
Domestic workers	------------	2.6
Other service workers	8.7	9.0
Farmworkers and foremen	8.2	13.8
Laborers, except farm and mine	4.2	6.9
Others	.6	------------

Source: "1964 Informe Económico al Gobernador," op. cit., p. 163.

quantify the answer to this question has been made by the planning board. It compares the increase in employment between 1960 and 1964 and the employment of the inmigrants by job categories. The results are shown in table XVII. It will be seen that the potential of the returnee is being used: 18,900 workers occupy jobs in the white collar fields, of the 37,000 created in the 5 years studied.

TABLE XVII.—*Increase in employment and utilization of returnees, 1960–64*

Occupational groupings	Increase in employment	Employment of returnees
Professional and technical	15,000	4,300
Managers and owners	7,000	4,700
Clerical and sales	15,000	9,900
"White collar" jobs	37,000	18,900
Craftsmen, foremen, and machine operators	50,000	15,600
Farmers, laborers, service workers, domestic, and others	6,000	9,500
"Blue collar" jobs	56,000	25,100

Source: "1964 Informe Económico al Gobernador," op. cit. p. 162.

The less-skilled returnees are not being absorbed so readily: only 44 percent of the new jobs in the bottom two categories were filled by them as compared with 51 percent of the "white collar" jobs thus filled.

Again, on their return, the migrants find by experience that education and training are crucial in Puerto Rico as they are in the United States. Academicians can write articles and books proving that this is so; the less educated worker discovers it for himself at the cost of the shoe leather he wears out "pounding the streets."

C. SUMMARY

The elements of a balance sheet involving human beings are obviously less subject to quantification than are those of business accounting. They are similar in one important respect: double-entry bookkeeping always is present. Each move which means a given move toward the credit side involves a present or potential item on the opposite page. And the credits and debits vary in importance depending on who reads the books and what his interest is in the transaction. It is also important whether the interest is longrun or shortrun; whether it is public spirited or strictly for personal power or profit; whether it is informed or uninformed; whether it arises out of reasoning based on facts or out of deep-seated prejudices.

The authors have attempted in this balance sheet to state those facts which seemed to them to be relevant. But relevance is determined by one's outlook on life, by one's philosophy, if you will. Our philosophy is based on faith in man. We believe that man can, by taking thought, add more than a cubit to his stature as a social being. And, of course, thought must involve action to become socially relevant. We believe that social institutions exist to serve man's goals in life and not vice versa. We believe that the struggle to achieve one's goals helps strengthen the person and that groups which are formed by men to aid them in their struggle perform an indispensable social function in building a stronger culture and an indispensable function for their members in enriching their personalities.

We believe that men living in isolation from the main currents of world thought and world action begin to deteriorate, to vegetate. The major centers of cultural growth have always been those which have been involved in the meeting and mixing of diverse peoples; in the exchanging of ideas; in the debating of new concepts; in the learning of new ways while holding to the verities of the past. Contacts between peoples of differing languages, of differing cultures—especially when they take place on a nonexploitative basis—will enrich all the participants. Knowledge is one of the human values which grows with sharing.

It is one the basis of these beliefs that we conclude that, in general, the migration from Puerto Rico has tended to benefit:

1. the migrant and his family;
2. the area in which he comes to live; and
3. the area from which he migrates.

1. We believe our data indicate that the migrant goes where he believes opportunity exists and that usually he is correct in his belief. If he is wrong, he usually returns or moves on to another area. He moves, specifically in the case of the Puerto Rican, not only to assure a more satisfactory life for himself, but a more rewarding future for his children. Life is no "bed of roses", nor does he expect it to be.

He is used to working hard and wants an opportunity to secure an adequate reward for his work, now and in the future.

2. The area from which a man migrates may well be inconvenienced in many ways, but if it suffers from an excess of workers capable of doing the kind of jobs which need being done, if it cannot quickly furnish sources of employment, and if another area needs men to do such jobs, it is economically and socially sound for them to leave.

3. The area which requires the workers obviously benefits because commodities and services are being produced which would not have been. It is not enough to say that perhaps it would be just as well if those foods and services were not produced. It is the responsibility of the social, political, and economic structures of an area to decide such matters. If an area wants to abolish an industry or a service, such a decision should be made after full and free discussion of all the costs and benefits. But if an industry is allowed to exist, it will need personnel. And if the local population does not produce the manpower needed, the alternative to abolition of the industry is in migration of the needed personnel.

The alternative to freedom of movement, within national boundaries, is to adopt the totalitarian system of internal passports. Central direction of where workers can move and which industries can hire or fire might possibly be more efficient. It is certainly not consonant with our democratic way of life. And it might produce more efficient robots for factory jobs. It might even be less troublesome for areas into which newcomers move. But our goal, in our opinion, is not the production of robots but of men who are increasingly more capable of efficient production, consumption, and full citizenship in all its political, economic, and social aspects.

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[1] Estela Cifre de Loubriel, "La Inmigración a Puerto Rico durante el Siglo XIX." San Juan: Instituto de Cultura Puertorriquena, 164. 438 pp.

[2] Simon Kuznets and Ernst Rubin, "Immigration and the Foreign Born." New York: National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. 1954, p. 5. See also, Harry Jerome, "Migration and Business Cycles." New York: National Bureau of Economic Research, 1926, p. 208; Dorothy S. Thomas, "Social and Economic Aspects of Swedish Population Movements, 1750–1933." New York: Macmillan, 1941, pp. 166–169; Brinley Thomas, "Migration and Economic Growth." Cambridge: University Press, 1954, 362 p.

[3] Op. cit., pp. 2–3, 22, 39, 56.

[4] Charlotte Erickson, "American Industry and the European Immigrant, 1860–1865. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1957, pp. 49–50, 216.

[5] John Foster Carr, "The Coming of the Italian", Outlook, LXXXII (1906) pp. 420–22, 426–28.

[6] The official census definition of a migrant is one who moves his residence across at least a county line. He may, of course, move across a State line also.

[7] "Why Labour Leaves the Land." Geneva: International Labour Organization, 1960, 229 pp.

[8] See, for example, Raymond Vernon, "Metropolis, 1985." Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1960, "Passim."

[9] Gladys K. Bowles and Conrad Taeuber, "Rural Males Entering and Leaving Working Ages, 1940–50 and 1950–60. Bureau of the Census, Series Census–AMS (P–27), No. 22, August 1956, 65 pp.

[10] Richard E. Mooney, New York Times, Dec. 23, 1965, p. 1.

[11] For quantification of the excess population on the land, country by country, in the 1930's, see Wilbert E. Moore, "Economic Demography of Eastern and Southern Europe." Geneva: League of Nations, 1945, especially pp. 63–64.

[12] Among the relevant sources of information in this field are: Wilhelm Bickel, "Foreign Workers and Economic Growth in Switzerland," United Nations World Population Conference, Belgrade, 1965, WPC/WP/64 (mimeo.) 5 pp.; G. Beijer, "Rural Migrants in Urban Setting." The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1963, 327 pp.; Irwin Ross, "European Slogan—Go North, Young Man," New York Times Magazine, May 9, 1965, pp. 34–35; Clarence Senior, "Integration Problems of Recent Rural Migrants to United States Cities," United Nations World Population Conference, Belgrade, 1965, WPC/WP/54 (mimeo.) 6 pp.; R. Weber, "The Employment of Aliens in Germany," International Migration, vol. III, No. 1/2, 1965, pp. 35–44; World Council of Churches, Geneva: "Within Thy Gates," 1964, 94 pp.

[13] Frederic P. Bartlett and Brandon Howell, "Puerto Rico y Su Problema de Población." Santurce: Junta de Planificación, Urbanización y Zonificación, 1946, pp. 68–69.

[14] 1960 data, unless otherwise noted, are from the United States Census of Population, 1960, "Puerto Rico: Number of Inhabitants." P. C. (1), 53 A.

[15] "1964 Economic Report of the Governor." Santurce: Puerto Rico Planning Board, pp. A–10 and A–22.

[16] Arturo Morales Carrión, "Puerto Rico and the Non-Hispanic Caribbean." Río Piedras: University of Puerto Rico Press, 1952, 160 pp.

[17] Ibid., p. 142.

[18] Robert Ernst, "Immigrant Life in New York City, 1825–1863." New York: King's Crown Press, 1949, 331 pp.

[19] 1960 Census of Population, "Puerto Ricans in the United States." Table A.

[20] Cf. Clarence Senior, "Puerto Rican Emigration." Río Piedras: University of Puerto Rico Social Science Research Center, 1947, 166 pp., passim.

[21] "Immigration to Brazil." United Nations, 1950.

[22] Raúl Prébisch, Argentine economist who headed the United Nations Economic Commission for Latin America for many years, pointed out that the increase in production per capital had fallen as follows during the late 1950's:

	Percent
1955	3.6
1956	1.8
1958	1.3
1959	0.3

See "Producir y Vivir depende de Latino-America," in Trabajo. Tegucigalpa, Febrero 1962. There has been only spotty improvement in the past few years.

[23] C. Wright Mills, Clarence Senior, and R. K. Goldsen, "The Puerto Rican Journey: New York's Newest Migrants." New York: Harpers, 1950, pp. 43, 185.

[24] The question has been dealt with in some detail with special reference to the Puerto Rican migration in Clarence Senior, "The Puerto Ricans: Strangers—

Then Neighbors." Chicago: Quadrangle Books, 1965. 128 pp. See also C. P. Kindleberger, "Mass Migration, Then and Now." Foreign Affairs. July 1965, vol. 43, No. 4, pp. 647–657.

[25] Roy G. Francis, "The Predictive Process." Rio Piedras: Social Science Research Center, 1960, p. 112.

[26] See Raymond Vernon, "Metropolis, 1985." Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1960. pp. 48–49, 51, 206, 212; and Roy B. Helfgott, et al., "Made in New York." Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1959. pp. 94–98, 115. Vernon pointed out that "the region's capacity to supply its own labor needs, without resort to migration, is growing." P. 212.

[27] For more on the Puerto Ricans in our most cosmopolitan State (in which one agency with a peculiar idea of race counted 169 different racial mixtures a few years ago!) see Andrew W. Lind, "Hawaii's People." Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1955, 116 pp.

[28] 1960 Census of Population, "State of Birth." PC(2)2A, p. 177.

[29] Sixteenth Census of the United States, Puerto Rico: "Migration Between Municipalities," op. cit.

[30] Peter Gregory "The Labor Market in Puerto Rico," in Moore and Feldman, "Labor Commitment and Social Change in Developing Areas." New York: Social Science Research Council, 1960. p. 145.

[31] Joe E. Martin, "Off Farm Migration—Some of Its Characteristics and Effects Upon Agriculture in Weakley County, Tennessee." Knoxville: University of Tennessee, Agricultural Experiment Station, August 1958, pp. 20–21.

[32] "The Puerto Rican Journey," op. cit., pp. 60–65, 146–52, 183, 188.

[33] Color classifications are probably among the least reliable data tabulated by the U.S. Census. Such data were not even gathered in Puerto Rico in 1960. The 1960 Census report, "Puerto Ricans in the United States" warned that "differences between successive censuses in the proportion of nonwhite persons among Puerto Ricans may reflect changes in attitudes about racial classification as well as selective migration. * * *" p. ix.

[34] Clarence Senior, "Puerto Rican Emigration." Rio Piedras: Social Science Research Center, 1947, p. 32.

[35] The reports of the ramp survey were published quarterly and cumulatively by year by the Bureau of Labor Statistics of the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico Department of Labor under the title "Characteristics of Passengers Who Traveled by Air Between Puerto Rico and the United States." Material in this section is derived from these reports unless otherwise noted.

[36] Clarence Senior, "The Puerto Rican Journey," pp. 25–26, 180.

[37] Committee on Human Resources, "Puerto Rico's Manpower Needs and Supply." 1957.

[38] "1964 Informe Económico al Gobernador." San Juan, Junta de Planificación. 1965 Primera Parte, pp. 157–169.

[39] U.S. Department of Justice, San Juan Office, Immigration and Naturalization Service.

[40] "Puerto Rican Emigration," pp. 21–22.

[41] 1960 Census of Population, "State of Birth," PC(2)2A, pp. 172–177.

[42] E. G. Ravenstein, "The Laws of Migration". Journal of the Royal Statistical Society. vol. 48 (June 1885) 167–235; vol. 52 (March 1889) 241–305.

[43] Dorothy S. Thomas, "Social & Economic Aspects of Swedish Population Movements, 1750–1933." New York: Macmillan, 1941, pp. 299–303.

[44] Henry S. Shryock, Jr., "The Efficiency of Internal Migration in the United States", in Report on International Population Conference, International Union for the Scientific Study of Population, Vienna, 1959, pp. 685–694.

[45] C. E. Lively and Conrad Taeuber, "Rural Migration in the United States." Washington: Works Program Administration, 1939, pp. 23, 31–32.

[46] Ibid., p. xvi.

[47] Sidney Goldstein, "Pattern of Mobility, 1910–1950: The Norristown Study." Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1958, 254 pp.

[48] N. L. Sims, "Elements of Rural Sociology." New York: Thomas Y. Crowell, 1934, pp. 289–96.

[49] Robert S. Hutchinson, "Migration and Industrial Development in Tennessee." Nashville: Tennessee Legislative Council Committee, 1958, pp. 160–161.

[50] Willam H. Metzler and Ward F. Porter, "Employment and Underemployment of Rural People in the Upper Monongahela Valley, West Virginia." Morgantown: West Virginia University Agricultural Experiment Station, 1957, p. 58.

[51] Puerto Rican Emigration, p. 32.

[52] Mills, Senior and Goldsen, op. cit., p. 57.

[53] This has been a well-known cause of illness among immigrants for almost three centuries. See H. B. M. Murphy, (ed.) "Flight and Resettlement." Paris: UNESCO, 1955, p. 213. A publication of 1678 describes the "melancholia, insomnia anorexia, weakness, anxiety, palpitations of the heart, smothering sensations," etc., which were found to result from nostalgia.

[54] "1964 Informe Económico al Gobernador." San Juan: Junta de Planificación, 1965. Primera Parte, pp. 147, A–21.

[55] Ibid., p. 154; "Statistical Abstract of the United States, 1964, p. 218.

[56] For a treatment of the transition in which families in Puerto Rico are involved, see Melvin M. Tumin and Arnold Feldman, "Social Class and Social Change in Puerto Rico." Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1961. chs. 15–16. The Columbia University study found that "All adult members of the family are expected to work and to contribute to the support of the house in some way", op. cit., pp. 95–96.

[57] 1960 Census of Population, "Puerto Rico: Detailed Characteristics." PC(1) 53D Puerto Rico, table 77.

[58] José Hernández Alvarez, "Return Migration in Puerto Rico", Rio Piedras: Social Science Research Center, University of Puerto Rico, 1964, p. 6.

[59] Quoted by Hernández, op. cit., pp. 6–8.

[60] Puerto Rican Journey, op. cit., p. 57.

[61] Workers insured have risen from 21.4 million in 1939 to 42.4 million in 1963. Initial claims filed per week have varied with the rise and fall of unemployment from an average of 29,000 in 1944 to 370,000 in 1958. The year 1963 showed an average of 297,000. Average duration of benefits ranged from 7.7 weeks in 1944 to 14.8 in 1958. See "Health Education and Welfare Trends," 1964, part I, p. 89.

[62] Unemployment Insurance Statistics, February 1965, p. 9; May 1965, p. 12.

[63] Ibid.

[64] Quoted by Hernández, op. cit., p. 13.

[65] These and other data from the special tabulation of the 1960 census mentioned above are from Hernández, op. cit., passim. There is a wealth of statistical data and analysis in the manuscript which cannot be included here.

[66] Ibid., p. 52.

[67] Idem., p. 87.

[68] "When Children Move from School to School." Washington: Association for Childhood Education International, 1960, 36 pp.

[69] For an example see H. M. Williams and Joseph W. Dupuis, "Exchanging Cultural Values: A Study of Newcomers in Columbus, Ohio, Public Schools". Columbus Public Schools, June, 1964, 44 pp. (mimeo.) See also the fascinating story of the Southern mountaineer family moving to Detroit during World War II. Harriette Arnow, "The Doll Maker." New York: Collier Books, 1961. 571 pp. The Federal Office of Education has published many aids to school systems facing difficulties in this area. One is "Improving English Skills of Culturally Different Youth in Large Cities," edited by Arno Jewett, Joseph Mersand and Doris V. Gunderson. Washington: Government Printing Office, 1964, 216 pp. Specific programs in Detroit, Philadelphia, Chicago, Houston, and New York City are set forth as possible patterns for other cities.

[70] See the Pulitzer prize-winning treatment of immigration to this country, Oscar Handlin, "The Uprooted." Boston: Little, Brown & Co., 1951. 310 pp., especially pp. 177–179; and something of the experience of the New York City schools in "The First Fifty Years, 1898–1948." 50th Annual Report of the Superintendent of Schools. New York: Board of Education, 1949, 204 pp. One of the many autobiographical accounts of immigrant reactions to the schools is found in J. R. Schwartz, "Orchard Street." New York: Comet Press, 1960, pp. 50–78, 81, and 83.

[71] See Peter H. Rossi, "Why Families Move." New York: Free Press of Glencoe, 1955, 220 pp., for a study of the social psychology of urban residential mobility.

[72] Ibid., pp. 134–136.

[73] "The Southern Mountaineer in Cincinnati." Mayor's Friendly Relations Committee and Social Service Association of Greater Cincinnati, 1954, p. 21.

[74] "Youth in the Ghetto." New York: Harlem Youth Opportunities Unlimited, 1964, pp. 177–179.

[75] Patricia Sexton, "Education and Income." New York: Viking Press, 1961, p. 96.

[76] Blanche Robins Kasindorf, "The Effect of Pupil Transiency on Pupil Functioning," Publications No. 202, March 1963, 127 pp.; Joseph Justman, "Academic Aptitude and Reading Test Scores of Disadvantaged Children Showing Varying Degrees of Mobility", 11 pp.; Edward Frankel and George Forlano, "Pupil Mobility and Variations in I.Q. Trends", 11 pp.; Edward Frankel and George Forlano, "Mobility As a Factor in the Performance of Urban Disadvantaged Pupils on Tests of Mental Ability", 9 pp. New York: Board of Education.

[77] Thomas S. Smith, "Consequences of Pupil Mobility Within the Inter-City". Chicago: University of Chicago: Department of Sociology, Center for Social Organization Studies, 1965, p. 21.

[78] Samuel M. Goodman, Lorraine K. Diamond and David J. Fox. "Who Are the Puerto Rican Pupils in the New York City Public Schools?." New York: Board of Education, 1956, pp. 16, 71, 75, 82. The same general trend was found in reading English and understanding spoken English and in arithmetic.

[79] Ibid., p. 81. Because of the inherently misleading character of what are essentially achievement tests but lay claim to testing "native ability" and because their injustice falls most heavily upon children of minority groups, those from farming areas and those from other cultures, the New York Board of Education in 1964 ordered all group intelligence testing discontinued. An explanation of the move is found in Joseph O. Loretan, "The Discontinuance of Group I.Q. Tests", The Bulletin, National Association of Secondary School Principals. Vol. 49 (January 1965) No. 297, pp. 70–77; Joseph O. Loretan, "The Decline and Fall

of Group Intelligence Testing", Teaching College Record, vol. 67 (October 1965) No. 1, pp. 10–17.

[80] "New York City Public Schools: Facts and Figures", 1964–65, p. 37.

[81] "The Puerto Ricans in New York City." New York: Welfare Council, 1948. pp. 14, 36–38.

[82] Bureau of Educational Program Research and Statistics, unpublished data.

[83] Annual Report of the Superintendent of Schools, 1955–56, Part II, "Puerto Rican Children," New York, pp. 14–15; "Meeting the Needs of Puerto Rican Pupils in New York City Public Schools," Staff Bulletin, Special Supplement, Mar. 23, 1964, p. ii.

[84] This and other special programs to establish better understanding between the Puerto Rican newcomers and the children of longer-term residents are described in Staff Bulletin, op. cit.; John B. King, "From Caguas to New York", San Juan Review, vol. 2 (June 1965) no. 5, pp. 62–64; Jim Douglas, "New York Schools Encourage Bilingualism", San Juan Star, July 23, 1965, p. 16.

[85] Sixty-fifth Annual Report of the Superintendent of Schools, Statistical Section, School year 1962–63. New York: Board of Education, table 35, p. 29.

[86] Oscar Handlin, "The Newcomers: Negroes and Puerto Ricans in a changing Metropolis." Garden City: Doubleday Anchor Books, 1962, p. 118.

[87] Mills, Senior, and Goldsen, op. cit., pp. 52–3.

[88] Clyde V. Kiser, "Sea Island to City." New York: Columbia University Press, 1932, p. 10. See also Louise V. Kennedy, "The Negro Peasant Turns Cityward." New York: Columbia University Press, 1930. 270 pp.

[89] "Rural Migration in the United States," p. 79.

[90] For empirical research indicating this point, see Tumin and Feldman, op. cit., pp. 111–115, 164–184, 450–511.

[91] "Historical Statistics of the United States: Colonial Times to 1957." Washington: Bureau of the Census, 1960, p. 73.

[92] "Statistical Abstract of the United States," 1965, tables Nos. 47, 48, and 55.

[93] Clarence D. Long, "An Overview of Postwar Labor Market Developments", in Proceedings of the Fourth Annual Social Security Conference. Kalamazoo: Upjohn Institute for Employment Research, 1962, pp. 9–23.

[94] Mills, Senior and Goldsen, op. cit., Ch. 4.

[95] Clarence Senior and Douglas Manley, "A Report on Jamaican Migration to Great Britain." Kingston: The Government Printers, 1955, pp. 30–34.

[96] United States Immigration and Naturalization Service.

[97] 1960 Census of Population, Puerto Rico: Detailed Characteristics. PC(1) 53D, 1962, p. 236.

[98] José L. Janer, José L. Vásquez and Nidia R. Morales, "Puerto Rico's Demographic Situation: Some of Its Recent Changes and Their Transfer Value." San Jual: University of Puerto Rico School of Medicine, May 1962. 40 pp. The figures are also given in El Mundo, 10 de mayo, 1962: "Proyección Poblacional de Puerto Rico."

[99] A. J. Jaffe, "People, Jobs and Economic Development." Glencoe, Ill.: The Free Press, 1959, p. 157.

[100] Economic Development Administration, "Data Sheet on the Fomento Program," Nov. 5, 1964.

[101] "1961 Economic Report to the Governor." Santurce: Puerto Rico Planning Board, 1962, p. 88.

[102] Another approach would be to compare overall employment for 1950 and 1964—a 15-year period. There was a rise in employment during that period from 596,000 to 654,000, or 58,000.

[103] "Señala Isla Espera Tener 2,000 Fabricas para 1975," El Mundo, 7 de Julio, 1962.

[104] Vincente Guzmán Sato and Vernon R. Esteves, "El Problema del Desempleo en Puerto Rico." San Juan: Banco Gubernamental de Fomento, 1963, p. 18.

[105] Calculated from the monthly reports of the Puerto Rico Department of Labor: "Employment and Unemployment in Puerto Rico," July 1963–June 1964.

[106] Ibid., July 1964–March 1965.

[107] Arthur F. Neef, "International Unemployment Rates, 1960–64," Monthly Labor Review. March 1965, pp. 256–259.

[108] "1964 Informe Económico al Gobernador," op. cit., p. A–21. It might be noted that the labor force participation rate in the United States in 1960 was 57.4 percent. Projections to 1975 indicate an expectation that it will stay at about 57 percent, according to the Statistical Abstract of the United States, 1964, p. 217.

[109] Ibid., pp. 136–138.

[110] Herbert Bienstock, "Education and Training." New York: Bureau of Labor Statistics, July 22, 1962, p. 9.

[111] "Rector de U.P.R. Revela Hay Mas Oportunidades de Empleo que Graduados Salen Anualmente," El Mundo, 29 de agosto, 1962.

[112] "657 Industrial Technicians Seen Needed Here by 1964," San Juan Star, July 25, 1962.

[113] See "Puerto Rico's Manpower Needs and Supply," 1957.

[114] "Puerto Rican Emigration," op. cit., pp. 18, 31.

[115] Outstanding in its treatment of the human factors in the immigration which built the United States is, "The Uprooted," op. cit.

[116] "The Newcomers: Negroes and Puerto Ricans in a Changing Metropolis," op. cit., draws parallels between the Puerto Rican and his immigrant predecessors.

[117] Mills, et al., p. 146; see also 98–99, 136–38, 141–45 and 203.

[118] Robert W. O'Brien, "A Survey of the Puerto Ricans in Lorain, Ohio." Lorain: Neighborhood House Association, 1954. 77 pp.

[119] Daniel Donchian, "A Survey of New Haven's Newcomers: The Puerto Ricans." New Haven: Human Relations Council of Greater New Haven. May 1959, p. 25; Thomas P. Imse, "Puerto Ricans in Buffalo," Buffalo: Board of Community Relations, 1961, 18 pp.; Fred T. Golub, "The Pureto Rican Worker in Perth Amboy, New Jersey." New Brunswick: Institute of Management and Labor Relations, Rutgers University, March 1956, 18 pp.; Joseph W. Hernández, "The Puerto Rican Section: A Study in Social Transition." Unpublished typescript, 59 pp. questionnaire; "Philadelphia's Puerto Rican Population." Philadelphia: Commission on Human Relations, 1964, 30 pp.; Arthur Siegel, et al., "Puerto Ricans in Philadelphia," Commission on Human Relations, 1954 (see also a revised publication with the same name, prepared by Raymond Metauten, edited by Burton I. Gordin. June 1959, 39 pp.).

[120] "Puerto Ricans in New York City." New York: Welfare Council, 1948, p. 16.

[121] "Report on Survey of Brooklyn Agencies Rendering Services to Puerto Ricans." Brooklyn Council for Social Planning, June 1953, p. 11 (mimeo.).

[122] Mills, et al., op. cit., p. 114.

[123] "The Puerto Rican Study: 1953–57." New York: Board of Education, 1958. 265 pp.

[124] Ibid., p. 131.

[125] Oct. 26, 1959.

[126] For recent data on such aspects of the migration as dispersion, the integration process, education, occupations, incomes, relations with other low-income groups, participation in business, political, and civic and religious activities, see

Clarence Senior, "The Puerto Ricans: Strangers—Then Neighbors." Chicago: Quadrangle Books, 1965, 128 pp.

[127] Puerto Rican Emigration, op. cit., p. 107.

[128] H. V. Muhsam, "Revision of the Concept 'the Money Value of a Man'," in the Proceedings, International Population Conference. Vienna, International Union for the Scientific Study of Population, 1959. pp. 106–111.

[129] Mills, Senior and Goldsen, op. cit., pp. 75–76.

[130] A survey by Pulse, Inc., prepared for Station WHOM.

[131] Philip H. Dougherty, "Family on Relief: A Study in Poverty," The New York Times, Apr. 5, 1964; Moreland Commission on Welfare, "Public Welfare in the State of New York," Albany, N.Y., Jan. 15, 1963; "Public Welfare—Myth vs. Fact," Citizens Committee for Children of New York, Inc., January 1963.

[132] Puerto Rican Emigration. Op. cit., pp. 16–18.

[133] William James, "The Energies of Man" (New York: Dodd, Mead & Co., 1926) and the application of this concept to social affairs in Hans L. Zetterberg, "Social Theory and Social Practice." New York: The Bedminster Press, 1962, pp. 77–80.

[134] Janer, et al., op. cit., p. 13.

[135] "Blueprint for Further Action Toward Quality Integrated Education." New York: Board of Education, Mar. 5, 1965, app. M–1.

SELECTED BIBLIOGRAPHY

This selected bibliography includes only those items which contain significant or fairly extensive references to Puerto Ricans. An attempt has been made to include the major items that were published by July 1, 1965. The bibliography does not include the many useful items published by the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, Department of Labor, Migration Division that describe the work of the division or present official policy statements.

The bibliography is divided into two sections. The first beginning on page 765 contains annotations of articles, essays, reports, speeches, and surveys. The second beginning on page 791 includes annotations of books only. It should be noted that articles or essays about Puerto Ricans which appeared as a chapter or a section of a book are included in the first rather than the second section of this bibliography.

SECTION I. ARTICLES, ESSAYS, REPORTS, SPEECHES, AND SURVEYS

Abrams, Charles. "How to Remedy Our 'Puerto Rican Problems'." Commentary 19: 120–127. February 1955. This material also was included in Charles Abrams' "Forbidden Neighbors." Harper, 1955, ch. 6, "The Puerto Rican Airlift," pp. 56–69.

Abrams sees the "problem" as one primarily related to the fact that mainland Americans tend to refuse to recognize that they force Puerto Ricans to live, generally, under sordid, inadequate conditions. Need to help Puerto Rican migrants establish roots in their new communities. Need to provide more and better housing and employment opportunities, and improved education. Coupled with this, Puerto Ricans need to exert initiative and produce leadership able to cope with the problems.

Abrams, Charles. "New York's New Slums." New Leader. January 1956, pp. 20–23.

Puerto Ricans face a problem of insufficient and inadequate housing. A housing shortage existed in New York City prior to the increased flow of

Puerto Rican migration in the 1940's. The shortage was not caused by the migration. As demand for housing increased, landlords converted housing to smaller, multiple units deriving four to five times the original base rent.

AFL–CIO Community Service Activities. "Our Puerto Rican Fellow Citizens." AFL–CIO. 1960. 44 pp.

The report of a national conference sponsored by the AFL–CIO Community Service Activities in January 1960. The report includes helpful background papers on "Puerto Rican Culture and Organized Social Services" by Joseph Fitzpatrick, S.J., and "Family Customs of Puerto Ricans and Organized Social Service" by Sister Thomas Marie. The discussion groups focused on how government and private agencies could best assist Puerto Rican migrants cope with problems related to living in a complex urban setting with which they are generally unfamiliar. Recommendations for action in the areas of family life and child care, welfare, recreation and leisure time, housing, health and hospital services, and consumer problems were made by the conference participants.

Anastasi, Anne, and de Jesus, Cruz. "Languge Development and Non-Verbal IQ of Puerto Rican Preschool Children in New York City." Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology 48: 357–366. July 1953.

Comparison of 50 Puerto Rican preschoolers with same number of white and Negro preschool children previously tested. The Puerto Rican children equaled the norms of the other two groups despite their low socioeconomic status. The researchers concluded that the considerable adult contact in the home life of the young Puerto Rican children is a positive factor in their early linguistic development. In addition they tentatively conclude that "inferior performance of older Puerto Rican children tested in other studies may result from cumulative effects of very low socioeconomic level, as well as from intellectual and emotional effects of bilingualism. Prior to school entrance when bilingualism has not become a serious problem for such a group, test performance and language development appear to be normal."

Anderson, Virginia. "Teaching English to Puerto Rican Pupils". Tells how this junior high school teacher uses her knowledge of the culture of Puerto Rico to help her students learn English more successfully.

Arter, Rhetta M. "Between Two Bridges: A Study of Human Relations in the Lower East Side of Manhattan, the Area Served by the Educational Alliance". Human Relations Monograph No. 5. Interpretation by Dan W. Dodson. New York University Center for Human Relations, 1956. 32 pp.

Considerable hostility toward Puerto Ricans found among Jews in this research study. However, none of the 479 non-Puerto Rican families interviewed reported any negative experiences of open conflict with a Puerto Rican person. Nearly all negative comments about Puerto Ricans had been based on hearsay or impersonal relationships. On the other hand, the friendly comments were generally based on personal experiences. Major human relations problem as seen by the Puerto Rican families was feeling isolated and rejected. They felt a concern to become accepted. The researchers suggest that the Alliance move from a largely Jewish interest and program to a more multi-ethnic culture agency.

Arter, Rhetta M. "Mid-City". Human Relations Monograph No. 3. New York University, Center for Human Relations Studies. 1953. 32 pp.

A study of human relations in the area of Manhattan served by Christ Church House. Concluded that Spanish-speaking families will participate in community activities when "they become convinced that their participation is desired". Says that Christ Church had been "in the community but not of it". Suggests more community involvement by this and other churches.

Bates, Barbara. "New York and Puerto Ricans". Survey, 85: 487. September 1949.

Puerto Ricans were receiving assistance from many public and private groups in New York City, especially the board of education. Indicates ways that New York City schools, by including the study of various national and ethnic groups, intercultural festivals, and home visits were trying to help Puerto Rican children maintain a feeling of worth and become accepted. Bates believes Federal Government should relocate Puerto Rican migrants in areas of the United States outside of New York City to improve their housing and job opportunities.

Bender, Lauretta and Nichtern, Sol. "The Puerto Rican Boys in New York City". pp. 245–264. In Seward, C. (ed.), "Clincial Studies in Culture Conflict". Ronald Press, 1958.

Two clinical case studies "presented as examples of deviant behavior and sequential pathology arising from culture conflict superimposed on specific aspects of personality development". The boys tended to view the external environment as threatening, to strike back aggressively at persons, and to withdraw into fantasy. The authors report this as fairly common among disturbed children of Puerto Rican origin observed in the children's section of one psychiatric hospital in New York City. This behavior leads to a clinical impression of acute psychosis. However, the authors suggest that the behavior distortions more likely result from language barriers and culture conflicts.

Berger, S. "Puerto Rican Migrants Create Housing Problems". Real Estate News, 33: 265–267. August 1942.

Assumed migrants to be the cause of slum housing conditions. Defends the landlords on the issue of slum conditions in New York City neighborhoods in which Puerto Rican families live.

Berkowitz, Elaine. "Family Attitudes and Practices of Puerto Rican and Non-Puerto Rican Pupils". High Points, vol. XLIII (March 1961) No. 3. pp. 25–34.

Report on a study of junior high school girls in New York City done for the purpose of improving a home economics course. Emphasis on home, family relationships, meal chores, etc. Attitudes held by both groups similar in seven major points; dissimilar in three. Latter seem to arise from classical "second-generationites". "Puerto Rican families share more activities than do non-Puerto Rican families."

Bowman, Leroy. "The Puerto Rican in America". Humanist, 22: 27–29. January–February 1962.

Eighty-five percent of the migrants left jobs in Puerto Rico in search of better jobs on the mainland. By beginning to emerge in politics and trade unions, and forming cultural, social, religious, and fraternal organizations, Puerto Ricans are coping with the problems of economic and housing discrimination and exploitation coupled with those associated with cultural adjustments.

Breisler, B. "Looking for the Promised Land." Saturday Evening Post 231: 18–19+. April 11, 1959.

Emphasizes that Puerto Rican migrants come to the mainland in search of economic opportunity. For most of them the new life is a struggle, and sometimes a disappointment. Author notes ways that some persons and groups on the mainland reach out to assist the migrant and calls on more persons to help them.

Brooks, Tom. "The Puerto Rican Story." Industrial Bulletin, (N.Y.) 39: 6–12. June 1960.

Puerto Rican migrant comes to New York in search of better jobs and greater opportunities. Most come having been semiskilled, skilled, or white-collar workers in Puerto Rico. Over 90 percent come from urban areas. Eighty-five percent to ninety-five percent have always been able to be self-supporting on the mainland.

Carleton, R. O. "New Aspects of Puerto Rican Migration." Monthly Labor Review, 83: 133–135. February 1960.

Author points out the significant return migration to Puerto Rico as demand in Puerto Rico for skilled and semiskilled labor has increased. Increased earnings of Puerto Ricans coupled with substantial reductions in air fare since the end of World War II have made island-mainland visiting and 2-way migration commonplace. Assumes that both will continue.

"Channel Puerto Rican Migration." Commonweal, 47: 484. Feb. 27, 1948.

New York City officials were unprepared for the increased migration from Puerto Rico following World War II. Little was being done about deplorable housing conditions which existed prior to the arrival of the new migrants. Called upon officials and the general population to assist the newcomers adjust to the problems encountered in settling in New York City and relocating elsewhere on the mainland.

"Chicago's Puerto Ricans." New Republic, 130: 3–4. Feb. 22, 1954.

When the recession resulted in increased unemployment in Chicago some Puerto Rican newcomers needed economic assistance before they had met the 1-year residence requirement to receive relief. The residence requirements were not relaxed. The welfare commissioner used relief funds to send some Puerto Ricans back to Puerto Rico. He also went to try to discourage migration. Bitterness resulted. The migration into Chicago of other citizens had not been discouraged. Some persons charged that the commissioner's policy had been unfair to Puerto Ricans.

Clark, Blake. "The Puerto Rican Problem in New York." Reader's Digest, 62: 61–65. February 1953.

Although citing the positive contributions Puerto Ricans make in industry, business, and the arts, Clark focuses on the problems faced by Puerto Ricans in New York City: Exploitation as consumers; crowded, substandard housing; and poor living conditions in general. Assumes, without providing adequate supporting evidence, that Puerto Ricans have a relatively high crime and delinquency rate. Sees Puerto Ricans forging ahead slowly, but suggests that the real solution is for Puerto Rican migrants to bypass New York City and dispense throughout the United States.

Commonwealth of Puerto Rico. Department of Labor, Migration Division. New York City. "Report of the Third Migration Conference." Migration Division, 1958. 12 pp.

A report of the discussions held between 26 New York officials and their counterparts in the Commonwealth Government during January 1958 in Puerto Rico. Many suggestions of ways various Government agencies and official personnel can humanely speed the process of adjustment newcomers make to a metropolitan environment.

Commonwealth of Puerto Rico. Department of Labor, Migration Division. New York City. "A Summary in Facts and Figures: 1964–65 Edition." Migration Division, 1965. 21 pp.

In charts, graphs, and tables basic data on Puerto Rico and Puerto Rican migration is presented. A revised edition of this statistical guide is published annually.

Commonwealth of Puerto Rico. Department of Labor, Migration Division. New York City. "The Jobs We Do." Migration Division, 1952. 16 pp.

A brochure that presents in words and pictures a survey of the wide range of occupations—from unskilled to professional—engaged in by Puerto Ricans on the mainland.

Commonwealth of Puerto Rico. Department of Labor, Migration Division. New York City. "Trade Unions and Puerto Rican Workers." Migration Division, 1952. 22 pp.

Report on a conference of labor leaders and Commonwealth officials held in May 1952. A discussion of ways to facilitate the movement into organized labor of Puerto Rican workers on the mainland.

Community Council of Greater New York. "Manhattan Communities: Summary Statements of Population Charateristics." Community Council of Greater New York. Research Department. 1955. 75 pp.

Presentation of United States Census and other data available at the time on the various neighborhoods, health areas, and communities in the Borough of Manhattan.

Community Council of Greater New York. "Our Changing Community." Community Council of Greater New York. 1957. 45 pp.

Report of a forum dealing with changes in the demographic characteristics of New York City's population. Focus is on the significance of these changes for health and welfare organizations, both public and private. There are references to the data on persons and families of Puerto Rican origin. Participants included Stanley P. Davies, Buel Gallagher, Frank S. Howe, Roscoe, P. Kandle, J. Donald Kingsley, Lawrence M. Orton, Clarence Senior, Harry Shapiro, and Ralph Whelan.

Davis, H. D. "Golden Door." New Statesman, 50: 355–356. Sept. 24, 1955.

Assumes that Puerto Rican migrants generally do not commit themselves to establishing permanent roots on the mainland. Author believes that probably a majority of the migrants would prefer to return to Puerto Rico if they could support their families adequately there. Mentions some of the economic and social problems that confront Puerto Ricans on the mainland. Believes, that "the solution of the Puerto Rican problem" lies in officials and the general public helping the migrants as "fellow citizens" and also assist them in settling throughout the United States.

De Rowan, Josefina. "New York's Latin Quarter: The Story of Our Little-Known Fellow Americans from Puerto Rico Who Live in Manhattan." Inter-American, 5: 10–13+. January 1946.

Estimated that 150,000 to 200,000 persons of Puerto Rican origin were living in New York City in 1946. Though living in many neighborhoods in the city, there were large concentrations in East Harlem, parts of Brooklyn, and Washington Heights. They had to cope with many problems such as poor housing; low paying jobs, often under undesirable conditions; unfamiliarity with the ways of a complex city; and a language barrier. The demand for labor, the influence of friends already here, and the relative ease of transportation tend to draw Puerto Ricans to New York. Once in the city, they try to maintain the customs of their Puerto Rican origin. After a period of adjustment they seem to make economic and social progress.

Donchian, Daniel. "A Survey of New Haven's Newcomers: The Puerto Ricans." Human Relations Council of Greater New Haven (Conn.), May 1959. 36 pp.

A thorough field study done by Spanish-speaking interviewers. The research team used a sample of 888 persons of Puerto Rican origin out of approximately 2,000 Puerto Ricans living in New Haven. Seventy percent migrated in search of self or family betterment; i.e., economic and educational opportunities. Most had migrated to New Haven directly from Puerto Rico. Most migrants were in family groups, young from small towns or rural areas in Puerto Rico, with an educational level among adults above the median level of education in Puerto Rico. Nearly three-fourths planned to remain permanently in New Haven in spite of problems. Major problems were crowded, substandard, high-cost housing; low skill jobs and low family income; and language problems. Donchian urges New Haven residents to find ways to "accelerate their (Puerto Ricans') adjustment."

Eagle, Morris. "The Puerto Ricans in New York City." In Glazer, N., and McEntire, D. (eds.) Housing and Minority Groups. University of California Press, 1960. Ch. 5, pp. 144–177.

Eagle's field research, based on a carefully selected sample of households, demonstrates that Puerto Rican migrants do not create slums. Due generally to low incomes, some discrimination, and the desire of some landlords to make immediate gains, a large proportion of migrants move into already existing slums or deteriorating housing. Over a period of several years the trend among Puerto Ricans is to move into better housing with more adequate space and facilities, and to pay less per dwelling unit than the new arrivals.

"Economic Status of Puerto Ricans: United States and New York, New York." Manpower Report of the President, 1964. U.S. Government Printing Office. 1964. Pp. 115–118.

An interpretation of the 1960 census data on Puerto Ricans in the areas of education, labor force, employment and unemployment, income levels, and occupational distribution. Discusses the difficulties facing the Puerto Rican newcomers. Does point out the significant gains made by second-generation Puerto Ricans on the mainland. Includes the data in tabular form. Incorrectly uses the terms immigrants and immigration in discussing Puerto Ricans moving to the mainland.

"Effect of Labor Costs and Migration on Puerto Rican Economy." Monthly Labor Review, 76: 625–627. No. 6, June 1953.

A summary of articles by Simon Rottenberg and Clarence Senior originally published in The Annals, January 1953. See annotation in this bibliography under Senior.

Fantino, Eileen. "Children of Poverty." Commonweal, 62: 271–274. June 17, 1955.

Points out the ways that some New Yorkers exploit many Puerto Rican migrants. The migrants come in search of improved opportunities. The Welfare Department indicates that Puerto Ricans get off of relief at least as quickly as any other residents and are always eager to work. But the problems related to the intolerable conditions of poverty and slum life lead some to seek escape—both psychological and physical. Refers to drug addition and neuroses. Author does not provide data indicating the extent of problems. Charges social agencies with some indifference to the plight of those Puerto Ricans in poverty.

Ferree, William (Fr.); Fitzpatrick, Joseph (Fr.); Illich, John (Fr.). "Report on the First Conference on the Spiritual Care of Puerto Rican Migrants." Archdiocese of New York. 1955. 228 pp.

The Conference was held in Puerto Rico with an attendance of priests from both the mainland and Puerto Rico. The working papers provide background interpretations of patterns of culture in Puerto Rico and changes on the mainland. A comprehensive presentation of the concerns of the Roman Catholic Church relative to the varied problems of Puerto Rican migrants.

Finocchiaro, Mary. "Puerto Rican Newcomers in Our Schools." Journal of Educational Sociology, 28: 157–166. No. 4, December 1954.

As the schools shifted from the "melting pot" and "assimiliation" approaches to newcomers to that of "cultural pluralism" special education programs were needed. The author describes several of the procedures instituted by the New York City schools to "hasten the process of integration" for the nearly 50,000 children of Puerto Rican origin attending the New York City public schools in 1954. These included curriculum modifications, adjustments in pupil classification, teacher inservice training focusing on the cultural patterns of Puerto Rico and teaching English as a second language. Some suggestions to the classroom teacher are made by the author.

Fitzpatrick, Joseph P. (Fr.). "Delinquency and the Puerto Ricans." Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, Migration Division. 1959. 18 pp.

In an address to the Fordham University School of Business the author provides a historical sketch of earlier groups of newcomers to New York City and the charges of crime made against them. As was true with others "delinquency is not something the Puerto Ricans bring with them."

In the light of cultural conflicts and the problems facing Puerto Rican newcomers "the marvel is not that there has been so much delinquency, but that there has been so little." Urges persons to "receive the Puerto Ricans with understanding, dignity and respect * * *"

Fleischer, Belton M. "Some Economic Aspects of Puerto Rican Migration to the United States." Review of Economics and Statistics, 45: 221–230. No. 3, August 1963.

Based on research for the author's Ph. D. dissertation. The study documents the high correlations during the late 1940's and early 1950's between amount of migration to the mainland and labor demand on the mainland, lowered transportation costs and increase in the population of labor force age in Puerto Rico. Once here the newcomers exerted a pull on others in Puerto Rico. They provided word-of-mouth publicity about job opportunities on the mainland, and helped the migrants finance their transportation, find jobs, and get settled.

Furst, Philip W. "Puerto Ricans in New York City." Puerto Rican Social Services, Inc., New York City. March 1963. 81 pp. + appendices.

A compilation and interpretation of recent data on Puerto Ricans in the areas of education, health, delinquency, migration, housing, employment, and agency programs. Many sources of data were explored—public and private, and official, and unofficial. Emphasizes the indices of social problems that confront Puerto Ricans. However, does point out signs of gains especially by those here longer and the second generation. Concludes that "the hysteria of the late forties has subsided * * *" and the substitution of a more rational approach "to the whole situation." At times, more precise data are needed for the interpretations presented to be considered valid.

Gernes, Arthur C. "Implications of Puerto Rican Migration to the Continent Outside New York City." Address before the Ninth Annual Convention on Social Orientation, University of Puerto Rico, Dec. 10, 1955. Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, Department of Labor. Migration division, New York City, 1956. (Also printed in Spanish.)

Discusses the role of the U.S. Employment Service in influencing the dispersion process. Points out the value of Puerto Rico as a source of manpower for the mainland labor force.

Glazer, Nathan. "New York's Puerto Ricans." Commentary, 26: 469–478. December 1958.

A critical review of three books: Berle, B. "80 Puerto Rican Families in New York City;" Padilla, E., "Up From Puerto Rico;" and, Rand, C., "The Puerto Ricans." Explores several aspects of life among Puerto Rican newcomers in New York City. His assumption that Puerto Rican children were not interested in higher education is unsupported and questionable.

Glazer, Nathan. "The Puerto Ricans." Commentary, 36: 1–9. July 1963. This article appeared in expanded form in Glazer, N., and Moynihan, D. "Beyond the Melting Pot." The MIT Press and Harvard University Press, 1963. Ch. 2, "The Puerto Ricans," pp. 86–136.

Utilizing census data and information from other sources, the author provides a concise analysis of the problems confronting Puerto Ricans in New York City and points out some of the gains made. Refers to the general lack of color prejudice among Puerto Ricans as possibly their most significant, long-run contribution to life in New York City.

Golob, Fred. "The Puerto Rican Worker in Perth Amboy, New Jersey." Occasional Studies: No. 2. Institute of Management and Labor Relations, Rutgers University, March 1956. 18 pp.

A study of employment integration of Puerto Rican workers in Perth Amboy. Conclusions based on "questionnaires sent to local plants, and informal interviews with top management personnel, union leaders, community leaders, and public administrators and officials at all levels of government." About 3,000 Puerto Ricans in Perth Amboy in 1955. Demand for unskilled workers had attracted the newcomers. As new arrivals learned of job openings that encouraged friends and relatives back in Puerto Rico to migrate. Management was generally satisfied with the Puerto Rican workers. "As the Puerto Rican becomes assimilated, his work patterns approach that of the non-Puerto Rican."

Gray, Lois. "The Labor Union and Puerto Ricans in New York City". Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development. December 1963. Reprint No. 147 of the New York State School of Industrial and Labor Relations, Cornell University, Ithaca, N.Y.

A well-documented case study of the variety of programs labor unions in New York City have developed in relation to their Puerto Rican members. Gives special attention to the role of the A.F. of L.–CIO. Central Labor Council in its campaign against some employers and unions who exploit Puerto Rican workers. Points out that more than half of the adult Puerto Rican population in New York City are members of labor unions. Thus what unions do, or fail to do, with respect to their Puerto Rican members is important for the Puerto Rican community in New York City.

Grieser, Normal. "Airborne from San Juan". New Republic, 117: 21–24. Nov. 3, 1947.

Points out that most Puerto Ricans come to New York City in an effort to improve their living standards. Their goal is self-betterment. Upon arrival they meet general hostility and are blamed for the city's slum problems, which actually existed prior to their arrival. Newspaper headlines play up the problems, but do not refer to the largest number who are fully self-supporting, or the shopowning and professional middle- and upper-income groups.

Hammer, Richard. "Report From a Spanish Harlem 'Fortress'". New York Times Magazine, Jan. 5, 1964, pp. 22, 32+.

Reporter's attempt to present the feelings of Puerto Rican youth on one block in East Harlem. States that "most of the young people in Spanish Harlem are bitter and disillusioned". Impressions based on a limited number of interviews with young people, most of whom had dropped out of school.

Helfgott, Roy B. "Puerto Rican Integration in the Skirt Industry in New York City". In Antonovsky, A. and Lorwin, L. (eds.) "Discrimination and Low Incomes". New York State Commission Against Discrimination. 1958. Chapter 8, pp. 249–279.

Postwar expansion in the skirt industry led to over 4,000 job openings filled largely by Latin Americans. These newcomers met some problems of exploitation and discrimination. Helfgott reports on the attempts of one union local to provide an educational program designed to overcome these problems and to integrate Puerto Rican workers into all job levels within the industry, and into some union leadership positions as well. Relatively successful, but "a distance still separates the leadership and the newcomers".

Hernandez Alvarez, José. "Return Migration in Puerto Rico," Rio Piedras: Social Science Research Center, University of Puerto Rico, 1964, pp. 60.

An examination of the 1960 Census material on Puerto Ricans 5 years or over found living in Puerto Rico who had been living in the conterminous United States in 1955. Publication of these data will be completed in a forthcoming book.

Illich, I. (Fr.) "Puerto Ricans in New York". Commonweal, 64: 294–297. June 22, 1956.

Points out why it is an error to regard Puerto Rican migrants as analogous to other previous incoming groups. Believes that their differences should be acknowledged and respected.

Imse, Thomas P. "Puerto Ricans in Buffalo". City of Buffalo, Board of Community Relations. 1961. 18 pp.

The conclusions in this survey are based in part on interviews, discussions, and official sources of data; and in part on general impressions. Puerto Ricans lived in several areas of moderate concentration and were experiencing "nothing that could be called a Puerto Rican problem". They did not feel discriminated against. The problems they had were those that migrants to a new culture have—a new language to cope with, low-skill jobs, low income, and unfamiliarity with the ways of the new culture. Urges "careful and thoughtful behavior by the general population" to speed the process of acculturation. Found that a "rapid 'americanization' is taking place" among the Puerto Rican children.

Jahn, A. V. "Spanish Harlem". Today's Health, 31: 30–34. February 1953.

Maintains that most newcomers from Puerto Rico migrate to New York City in search of a better chance for their children. Once in New York, due to some exploitation of them plus low incomes, Puerto Rican families in Spanish Harlem are faced with relatively high rates of health problems associated with slum life—TB, venereal disease, dysentery, malnutrition, etc. In spite of this, the families face their problems with optimistic attitudes.

Jones, Isham B. "The Puerto Rican in New Jersey: His Present Status". New Jersey State Department of Education, Division Against Discrimination. July 1955. 48 pp.

A survey that includes a discussion indicating the location of Puerto Rican migrants in New Jersey. Also presents some of the community reactions to the migrants, noting that though some were positive and helpful many were antagonistic.

King, John "From Caguas to New York." San Juan Review, 2: 62–64. June 1965.

King, executive deputy superintendent of the New York City public school system, presents a descriptive survey of the approaches taken in the New York City schools to enable children of Puerto Rican background "to achieve the highest possible level of personal and social competence." Indicates emphasis placed on mastery of communication skills in English. Also points out the attempts made to help children of Puerto Rican origin maintain and extend their communication skills in Spanish and to expand their "knowledge and appreciation of Puerto Rican history and culture." Advocates more island-mainland visiting by school administrators and classroom teachers.

Koch, J. E. "Puerto Ricans Come to Youngstown." Commonweal, 59: 9–11. Oct. 8, 1953.

Describes the efforts made by the Youngstown Puerto Rican Social Recreational Center to enable Puerto Rican migrants become fully participating citizens without subjecting them to the humililating problems faced by earlier immigrants. The center was established under the auspices of the Community Chest and Catholic Charities after it was learned that Puerto Rican newcomers were being exploited by some landlords and finance companies, and meeting hostility and prejudice from some Youngstown residents. Some racist literature had been circulated.

"Labor Recruited." Business Week, Apr. 29, 1944, pp. 114.

In cooperation with the War Manpower Commission, three large U.S. firms were recruiting skilled Puerto Rican workers for jobs on the mainland as a partial solution to their manpower shortage problems. The commission expected that more workers would be recruited by other firms.

Lee, Robert. "Protestant Churches in the Brooklyn Heights: A Study of Adaptation." Brooklyn: Brooklyn Division of the Protestant Council of New York. 1954.

A survey of how 10 churches approached the questions arising from entry into their neighborhoods of newcomers from Puerto Rico and from the south.

Lelyveld, J. "Se Habla Espanol?" New York Times Magazine, June 14, 1964. pp. 65–66+.

Tens of thousands of Puerto Ricans have learned English in New York City in order to get along better. In response to the Puerto Rican migration, some New Yorkers, though relatively few, have learned Spanish. These merchants, policemen, ministers, teachers et al., who have learned some Spanish and use it, have discovered that this has tended to improve their relationships with Puerto Ricans. Such efforts lead to mutual understanding and increased respect.

Leviton, Bertha. "Census of Puerto Rican and Foreign-born Pupils." New York City Board of Education, Bureau of Administrative and Budgetary Research, February 1956. 29 pp.

Based on school census of Oct. 31, 1955. The most recent report of this type was done by Miss Leviton and published in May 1964. The reports pre-

sent data on fluency in English, pupils classified NE (non-English speaking), numbers coming from Puerto Rico or born in New York City of Puerto Rican parents, and numbers of foreign born. Data are presented in citywide, boroughwide, and grade-level tables.

Lewis, Oscar. "Mother and Son in Puerto Rican Slum, Part I, Felicita." Harper's, December 1965, pp. 71–84.

Lewis, Oscar, "Portrait of Gabriel: a Puerto Rican Family in San Juan and New York, Part II, Gabriel." Harper's, January 1966, pp. 54–59.

Professor Lewis repeats in Puerto Rico his attention to the "culture of poverty" in the Zolaesque prose which is his hallmark. Great attention was paid to the selection of the most benighted families in Puerto Rico and a sample of those who had relatives in New York City was taken. A concentration of misery was found in San Juan's oldest slum—La Perla (here called La Esmeralda), where a minority of the approximately 900 families "had some history of prostitution." The author chose to select one of these families for intensive dramatization to illustrate "the psychology and inner life of some of the very poor."

The 7-year-old boy's story is appealing, particularly the treatment of his troubles in learning English after he migrated to New York City. His courage comes through with great impact.

It is difficult to understand the author's allusion to "the persistence of a Puerto Rican way of life, especially among the low-income group, even after many years of residence in the United States * * *," since the implication is that the Puerto Ricans differ from other groups in this regard. No evidence is known to the editors to substantiate this position. Also, the statement that "Puerto Ricans made almost a million trips back and forth (in 1960) * * * is misleading when it is used to imply that the Puerto Rican migration is unique in that "it is a two-way rather than a one-way movement." All free migration is a two-way movement. This is particularly true of other internal migrations, e.g., that of the Southern Appalachian Mountaineers.

Lewis, Oscar. "In New York You Get Swallowed by a Horse." Commentary, 38: 69–73. November 1964.

Through the fictionalized conversation between two Puerto Rican friends (one returned from New York City) in a San Juan bar, Lewis interestingly presents the frustrations felt by some Puerto Ricans as they face the problems related to cultural conflicts and low economic status in the complex city of New York. As Lewis says, some Puerto Ricans find New York "the best," others find it too much for them.

Lorge, Irving and Mayans, Frank, Jr. "Vestibule vs. Regular Classes for Puerto Rican Migrant Pupils." Teachers College Record 55: 231–237. February 1954.

Research directed by the authors at the request of the Board of Education of New York City. Done to ascertain whether Puerto Rican children learned English better and adjusted more rapidly when grouped together and separated from other children, or when placed in regular classes with other children. Results favored the regular class setting for both mastery of English and the development of positive relationships with other children. "Despite its possible limitations, the study does suggest that 'stretching' children to understand in the real setting has marked advantages."

Main, Willett S. "Memorandum on 'In-Migration of Puerto Rican Workers,'" Wisconsin State Employment Service, Sept. 3, 1952.

Describes ways in which local offices of the employment service are helpful in speeding up the adjustment process. This memorandum was followed by "In-Migration of Puerto Rican Workers: Progress Report," Dec. 16, 1952, and a collection of English and Spanish materials utilized in the program.

Maldonado, A. W. "The Migration Reverses." The Nation, 198: 255–257. Mar. 16, 1964.

Suggests possible reasons for the decline in annual net migration from Puerto Rico since 1953. Indicates that the decline has a high positive correlation with a relative decline in semiskilled and unskilled job opportunities on the mainland. Also suggests other factors: In general the level of education and training is not sufficient to handle the increasing number of skilled and white collar job opportunities. Some manufacturing plants are leaving New York. Also discusses some of the problems that Puerto Rico must cope with as a result of the decline in net out-migration and the increase in the number of return migrants.

Maldonado, A. W. "The Puerto Rican Tide Begins to Turn." New York Times Magazine, Sept. 20, 1964, pp. 84–85+.

Essentially a restatement of the ideas expressed in "The Migration Reverses." The title is somewhat misleading since Puerto Rican migration is actually a very small part of the annual total internal migration in the United States.

Malzberg, Benjamin. "Mental Disease Among Puerto Ricans in New York City." Journal of Nervous and Mental Diseases, 123: 263–269. March 1956.

After making adjustments for the younger age distribution of Puerto Ricans in New York City relative to the rest of the population, Malzberg discovered a considerably higher annual rate of first admissions to New York City hospitals for mental disturbances among Puerto Ricans than among the rest of the city population. Malzberg concludes that the higher rate is directly related to such difficult problems as language and cultural conflicts, limited occupational choice, and substandard living conditions with which Puerto Ricans are forced to cope. Author reminds the reader that it is not valid to generalize the admission rates for newcomers to the total Puerto Rican population.

McKeon, John. "The Ortiz Family." Jubilee, 1: 22–23. June 1953.

Sketch of a Puerto Rican family that migrated into the new community. The year of publication and the limited evidence presented should be taken into account when considering the following conclusion: "* * * It is doubtful whether any immigrant group, Catholic in culture, tradition and practice, has at any time in our national history faced the contempt and opprobrium that has been the average potion meted the Puerto Rican in his efforts to integrate himself into our society. And far from welcoming the increase to the Faith * * * the reaction of the American Catholic Faith has to date ranged from one of stolid indifference to one of outspoken contempt."

"Mid-Century Pioneers and Protestants. A Survey Report of the Puerto Rican Migration to the United States Mainland and in Particular a Study of Protestant Expression Among the Puerto Ricans of New York City." New York: The Pathfinder Service for the Protestant Churches of New York City and the Division of Home Missions, National Council of Churches of Christ in the U.S.A., 153, 23 pp.

Contains recommendations for programs to overcome the "less than warm welcome on the part of the older New York churches for their new neighbors."

Miller, Henry. "New York City's Puerto Rican Pupils: A Problem of Acculturation." School and Society, 76: 129–132. Aug. 30, 1952.

Puerto Rican migrants are eager to improve their status and get a good education for their children. They face the problems related to learning a new language and color prejudice against them. Schools cannot solve all of the problems facing the newcomers, but they can assist the acculturation process. In 1952, 80 percent of the public schools in New York City had some Puerto Rican enrollment. Points out some of the procedures instituted in the schools to help newcomers—both pupils and their parents. Suggest that school personnel can be especially helpful when they base their programs on the principle that "acculturation proceeds most successfully when it is based on respect for the dignity and values of the minority."

Mintz, Sidney. "Puerto Rican Emigration: A Threefold Comparison." Social and Economic Studies. Jamaica: University College of the West Indies, v. 4 (December 1955), No. 4, pp. 311–325.

Interesting and suggestive comparisons between Puerto Rican migration to New York City, St. Croix, and Hawaii. Further research is needed to account for differential success noted in these areas.

Monserrat, Joseph. "Literacy Tests: Puerto Rican Perspective." New York Herald Tribune Magazine, Oct. 13, 1963, pp. 9–10+.

The author, chief of the migration division of the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, department of labor in New York City, argues that literacy tests have historically been used to deny some persons of their right to vote. Such, he states, is the case now with Puerto Ricans in New York. States that Puerto Ricans do have access to domestic and international news in Spanish, thus those who may not be literate in English can and do become informed on the issues and candidates. Points out the irony involved in the fact that for Puerto Ricans in New York, "tax forms and instructions are available in both English and Spanish, but they can only vote in English."

Monserrat, Joseph. "School Integration: A Puerto Rican View." Address before the Conference on Integration to the New York City Public Schools, Teachers College, Columbia University, May 2, 1963. Included in the conference proceedings published as "Integrating the Urban School," Klopf, G. and Laster, I. (eds.) Bureau of Publications, Teachers College, Columbia University, 1963, pp. 45–60.

Distinguishes between the meaning of segregation for Negroes and for Puerto Ricans. Any school that includes only pupils of Puerto Rican origin is racially integrated. Is distressed with the phrases and words used to label children such as "culturally deprived," etc. No matter how well intentioned, the stigmatism results in damaging the children. For whatever reasons, however, Puerto Rican pupils in segregated schools are adversely affected in that their academic achievement is reduced and also feelings of inferiority are generated. Suggests that the positive features of Puerto Rican culture be utilized in the schools of New York City.

Morgan, T. B. "Real West Side Story—Life of José Rivera." Look, 24: 22–27. Feb. 16, 1960.

Points out that in spite of the difficult problems encountered in the slums of New York's West Side, most Puerto Rican young people are not as those portrayed in "West Side Story," a musical and movie. Most are similar to José, struggling against great odds to cope with the problems. Suggests that the slums need to be broken up so as to restore integrity to the lives of people now demoralized by them.

Moskin, J. R. "Million on the Mainland." Look 25: 44. Jan. 17, 1961.

Brief essay on the problems faced by Puerto Rican migrants and the progress they have made, especially in larger cities. Author suggests, but does not pro-

vide supporting evidence, that they face more prejudice and hostility in smaller communities. Refers to the increasingly effective social and political organization among the Puerto Ricans on the mainland.

"New AFL-CIO Racket Drive." Business Week, June 29, 1957, pp. 149–150.

A report on the attempts of some mob-run locals that prey on Puerto Rican workers in small shops. Evidence of some shakedowns and "sweetheart" contracts. National AFL-CIO leaders were attempting to expel the racketeers after some of the exploited workers had petitioned the NLRB for a representative election.

New York City Board of Education. "A Program of Education for Puerto Ricans in New York City." New York City Board of Education. 1947.

A report by a Committee of Assistant Superintendents. One of the earliest set of recommendations by New York City Public School officials to develop programs specifically designed to facilitate the acculturation of pupils of Puerto Rican origin. In addition to recommendations, the report includes sections on Puerto Rican backgrounds, "migration to the mainland", "problems of assimilation", and "education of the Puerto Rican pupil".

New York City Board of Education. "Ethnic Distribution of Pupils In The Public Schools of New York City". Published by The Board. Mar. 24, 1965. 17 pp.

A presentation of the data showing the changing ethnic composition and distribution of the public school enrollments in New York City. Negro and Puerto Rican enrollments have increased steadily, both numerically and relatively, since 1958–59, the first year for which citywide data on Negro, Puerto Rican, and "Others" (largely white) are available. The number of "Others" has decreased during the same period. Reflecting these changes, there are now more integrated schools than in 1960. (There are 90 fewer predominantly white schools now), but also 69 more schools predominantly Negro and/or Puerto Rican than in 1960. Suggests a variety of measures that might be taken to provide a more balanced ethnic distribution. Charts, tables and graphs supplement the written presentation.

New York City Board of Education. Bilingual Committee of the Junior High School Division. "Tentative Report of the Committee on Classification." Bullentin No. 1. New York City Board of Education, June 1949.

Contains questionnaires for use with newly-arrived pupils and a bibliography for teachers.

New York City Mayor's Advisory Committee on Puerto Rican Affairs. "Puerto Rican Pupils in New York City Schools." Published by The Committee, 1951.

A survey of the elementary and junior high schools in which pupils of Puerto Rican origin were registered. Survey made by the subcommittee on Education, Recreation and Parks of the Mayor's Advisory Committee on Puerto Rican Affairs.

New York State Commission Against Discrimination. "Complaints Alleging Discrimination Because of Puerto Rican National Origin." Published by The Commission, 1958.

A summary report for the period July 1, 1945 to Sept. 1, 1958.

New York State Commission Against Discrimination. "Employment in the Hotel Industry." Published by The Commission, March, 1958.

A thorough research study of the patterns of discrimination used against various groups including Puerto Ricans. Puerto Ricans had found "extensive employment opportunities in both unskilled and skilled jobs" in New York City's leading hotels. But they were infrequently found in white collar and

administrative jobs and most frequently in the behind-the-scene jobs that involved little or no direct contact with hotel guests and the public.

New York State Department of Labor. "Occupations of Puerto Ricans in New York City." Special Labor News Memo No. 50. New York State Department of Labor. June 17, 1954.

A survey, utilizing Department data, of first and second generation Puerto Ricans in New York City compared with the general population in corresponding age groups. Indicates some upward nobility of second generation Puerto Ricans.

Newfield, Jack. "Harlem Si, Tammany No." Commonweal, 75: 10–12. Sept. 29, 1961.

A report on the development of the East Harlem Reform Democratic Club. Anti-Tammany candidate Mark Lane won a State Assembly seat in 1960. Carlos Rios, East Harlem resident, was elected as the first Puerto Rican Democrat Party district leader in New York City. Did so against the opposition of Tammany Hall. The Club attempts to work on problems facing the Puerto Rican residents of "El Banio", a section of East Harlem.

"900,000 Puerto Ricans in U.S.: Their Problems and Progress." U.S. News and World Report, 47: 91–95. Dec. 7, 1959.

Somewhat sensational focus on the problems involving Puerto Rican migrants. Assumes that problems of slum housing, poverty, and crime were being created by the influx of Puerto Ricans. Charges that a crime wave had hit New York involving "many hispanos." Lack supporting data. Points out some signs of progress made by Puerto Ricans. Notes that some of the City agencies had employed Spanish-speaking personnel.

Novak, Robert T. "Distribution of Puerto Ricans on Manhattan Island." Geographical Review, 46: 182–186. April, 1956.

By 1950 New York City had received 83 percent of the Puerto Ricans who had migrated to the mainland. Identifies three major and three minor areas of Puerto Rican concentration in the borough of Manhattan (New York City). Indicates that availability of low cost housing, proximity to a friend or family member who preceded them, and access to cheap public transportation are probably the major reasons that Puerto Ricans move into these six areas.

O'Brien, Robert W. "A Survey of the Puerto Ricans in Lorain, Ohio." Neighborhood House Association of Lorain. 1954. 85 pp.

A field survey done in 1953 by college students under the careful direction of O'Brien and other faculty members of the Department of Sociology, Ohio Wesleyan University. Migration to Lorain began in 1947 with 500 workers recruited by the National Tube Company. 3707 persons of Puerto Rican origin by 1953. The survey is a comprehensive demographic study of these migrants plus their backgrounds in Puerto Rico, aspirations, problems and progress made. The data reveal the migration to have been a family movement rather than one of unrelated individuals. Some problems with housing, some discrimination in employment, inadequate recreational facilities, a language barrier, general discrimination, and in the non-Puerto Rican community some lack of "know-how" in assisting newcomers. However, author concludes that the adjustment of Puerto Ricans in Lorain "has been both rapid and sound".

O'Brien, Robert W. "Hawaii's Puerto Ricans: Stereotype and Reality." Social Process in Hawaii, 23: 61–64. 1959. University of Hawaii.

Early migration from Puerto Rico to Hawaii. Sugar plantation owners recruited nearly 5,000 during 1900–01. A population nearly 10,000 by 1950. An interview survey of a sample of first and second generation Puerto Ricans in Hawaii coupled with other research data led to the following conclusions: A majority of the Puerto Ricans lived in rural and plantation areas, they were over-represented in low-skilled and laborer occupations, had not effectively utilized the educational system (67 percent of those over age 25 had a sixth grade education or less), were over-represented in arrests, divorces, criminal and juvenile court cases (supporting data were not provided for this conclusion), lacked a positive group identification. However, the non-Puerto Rican community was gradually recognizing the achievement of many Puerto Ricans in a number of areas. Also, signs of new Puerto Rican leadership and self-organization were appearing.

O'Gara, J. "Strangers in the City." Commonweal, 57: 7–9. Oct. 10, 1952.

A general discussion of the problems that Puerto Ricans encounter in New York City—color prejudice, poor living areas, the bottom range of the economic and employment ladders, some loss of status by males when the women get better jobs (such as in the garment industry), cultural transition from a slower paced Puerto Rican society to the hectic, urban society in New York. Points out that many agencies and groups were attempting to help them cope with the problems. Also, notes the programs for pupils of Puerto Rican origin instituted by the Board of Education.

O'Neill, George C. and O'Neill, Nena. "Vocational Rehabilitation Needs of Disabled Puerto Ricans in New York City." Puerto Rican Social Services, Inc. 1964. 118 pp.

A pilot research project carried out under a grant from the United States Department of Health, Education, and Welfare. It was designed "to derive hypotheses for further testing or to develop research strategy and priorities." Persons of Puerto Rican origin or who are bilingual carried out the field work. A final sample of 60 persons was studied. Conclusions are: disabled Puerto Ricans need direct assistance from agency personnel who are bilingual and who take a personal interest in the problems they encounter during rehabilitation. High motivation was found among disabled Puerto Ricans during their rehabilitation. They complete "rehabilitation with the same success as non-Puerto Ricans."

Opler, Marvin K. "Dilemmas of Two Puerto Rican Men." In Seward G. (ed.). "Clinical Studies in Culture Conflict." The Ronald Press Co., 1958. Chapter 10, pp. 223–244.

Stresses the importance of male dominance in most social activity in the traditional, rural culture of Puerto Rico. Urban life challenges this value and tends to weaken the male role leading to some personal and family problems—economic, social, and psychological. The essay analyzes from a Freudian point of view, some of these problems as seen in two Puerto Rican young men adversely affected by culture conflicts—one in San Juan, the other in New York City. Concludes, without presenting supporting data, that "these cases appear to be 'typical' among Puerto Ricans."

"Out of the Melting Pot." Economist, 211: 273. April, 1964.

A brief account pointing out some of the gains made by second generation Puerto Ricans in New York—especially in education, types of occupations, and income. Females seem to be improving their status faster than males. Some Puerto Rican leaders point out, however, that the situation is not as desirable as it may seem. Employment, income and education levels are still very low and below those of the non-Puerto Rican population—both white and nonwhite. The leaders seek changes in the educational system. Among other things, they want "Spanish-speaking teachers, compulsory kindergarten, instruction in Puerto Rican history and abolition of vocational high schools."

Pagán de Colón, Petroamérica. "The Status of the Migrant: People With the Same Aspirations." Vital Speeches, 28: 445–448. May 1, 1962.

Utilizing the basic findings of a study by Clarence Senior done for the American Society of Planning Officials, the author points out that all voluntary migration is related to desires for economic and social improvement, and presents some problems—economic, social pressures (among the unaffluent migrants) and in the area of human relationships. Believes that fear of strangers is at the root of the problems. The author believes that the ongoing efforts in human relations and the civil rights action on the mainland, coupled with the work of the Commonwealth in better preparing migrants for the new environment they will enter will lead the settled residents to welcome the newcomers. Believes that future Puerto Rican migrants will increasingly be "more affluent and less visible."

Pakter, Jean; Rosner, H.; Jacobziner, H.; and Greenstein, F. "Out-of-Wedlock Births in New York City." American Journal of Public Health, 51: 683–696, No. 5. May, 1961. Concluded in vol. 51: 846–865, No. 6. June 1961.

A thorough and well-documented study of out-of-wedlock births. Social and medical data are included. Data for non-Puerto Rican, white, nonwhite, and Puerto Rican are included. The rates for all groups are highly related to conditions of poverty. Puerto Rican out-of-wedlock births are only slightly over-represented (Puerto Rican mothers represent 13.6 percent of the total births and about 20 percent of those out-of-wedlock). "The belief that unmarried women on welfare rolls repeat the pregnancy in order to obtain additional grants is erroneous." In addition, "the Puerto Rican unmarried mother was the most likely and the white unmarried least likely to keep and raise her own child". All groups need community assistance to cope with the medical and social problems associated with out-of-wedlock births.

Parker, E. C. "Spanish-Speaking Churches." Christian Century 78: 466–468. Apr. 12, 1961. Also, Cotto-Thomm, A. "Spanish-Speaking: A Reply." Christian Century, 78: 801. June 28, 1961.

A discussion of the controversy about the effectiveness of the Protestant Council of New York City in meeting the needs of Spanish-speaking Protestants in New York City. One group of Spanish-speaking ministers charging the council with disinterest in Spanish-speaking Protestants and lack of concern for "morality," broke away from the council to form a separate organization. They advocated private schools for Puerto Rican children in New York City that would be taught in Spanish, emphasize morality, and develop pride in being Puerto Rican. Some council leaders agreed that the council had not been as effective as it should have been in working with the Puerto Ricans, but believed that a vigorous program would now be developed. Cotto-Thomm asserts that the leaders of the new, separate organization are not the spokesmen for all of the Spanish-speaking Protestant ministers and laymen in the city. He believes the new organization would divide Puerto Ricans rather than unite them.

"Philadelphia's Puerto Rican Population With 1960 Census Data." City of Philadelphia, Commission on Human Relations. March 1964.

A comprehensive descriptive survey of the characteristics of population of Puerto Ricans in Philadelphia. Comparisons of Puerto Ricans with both the white and nonwhite population groups. Though the Puerto Rican newcomers were having problems associated with low family incomes it was "concluded that those Puerto Ricans residing outside the area of greatest Puerto Rican concentration are on the average in a higher socioeconomic bracket. Thus the Puerto Rican migrants are following the pattern of many ethnic groups before them who scattered about the city as they were able to better themselves." The report includes tables and some description of the organizations and agencies providing services available to Puerto Ricans, and others.

"Plea For The Puerto Ricans." Social Science Review, 26: 344. September 1952.

Puerto Ricans, taking an evening course in a New York settlement house, recommend several labor practices that would enable employers to receive increased productivity from Puerto Rican workers: end discriminating practices, treat Puerto Rican workers as individuals rather than as a group, train Puerto Ricans for skilled work, employ some Spanish-speaking foremen. Also, suggested that employers should learn some Spanish.

Protestant Council of the City of New York. "A Report on the Protestant Spanish Community in New York City." Published by the council's department of church planning and research. July 1960. 138 pp.

This report supplements and brings up to date three earlier reports published either by the council or its forerunner, the Greater New York Federation of Churches. The earliest report, "The Puerto Ricans in New York," was published in 1938. In 1947, "The Protestant Church and Puerto Ricans in New York City" was published, followed by "Mid-Century Pioneers and Protestants" in 1953. The most recent report is considered as the first section of a more comprehensive study. The report includes the population data on Puerto Ricans for the city as a whole and on a borough-by-borough basis. It provides historical and contemporary sketches of the approaches to Puerto Rican migrants and other Spanish-speaking groups taken by the various Protestant denominations. Data are included on the number of Protestant churches ministering to Puerto Ricans, size of church membership, types of programs developed by the churches (i.e. youth projects, English classes, Spanish classes, housing clinics, social and medical services, etc.), and names and addresses of the churches. Points out that New York City Protestantism had expanded its efforts to minister to Spanish-speaking persons during the decade prior to this report. Notes that "as official policies become implemented on a local level practical problems arise and the transition from verbal resolution to everyday reality is often difficult, demanding great patience, and a willingness to experiment." One Protestant leader charged that Protestant agencies "have not been very imaginative in devising ways for the Puerto Rican to feel wanted and at home in our ecclesiastical structure."

Public Education Association. "The Status of the Public School Education of Negro and Puerto Rican Children in New York City." Public Education Association (New York City). 1955.

Based upon a survey of the city school system. Concluded that schools with pupil enrollments largely Negro and/or Puerto Rican tended to be inferior in physical facilities, professional staff, and pupil achievement. Recommended changes designed to correct these deficiencies.

"Puerto Ricans and the ILGWU." New Politics 1: 6–17, 1962. 2: 7–27, 1963.

In these articles Herbert Hill, labor secretary of the NAACP, charged the ILGWU with discriminating against Negroes and Puerto Ricans in all phases of the union's activities. Gus Tyler, of the ILGWU, defends the union and presents data intended to refute each charge made by Hill. More supporting data for both the charges and the defense are needed for the average reader to reach a valid conclusion.

"Puerto Rican Community Development Project." Puerto Rican Forum (New York). 1964. 145 pp.

This report was developed as the basis for an antipoverty, economic opportunity project, and is subtitled "A Proposal for a Self-Help Project To Develop the Community by Strengthening the Family, Opening Opportunities for Youth and Making Full Use of Education." The forum is a private agency, with a professional and secretarial staff of New Yorkers of Puerto Rican background. It has received some financial support from foundations to develop self-help projects as well as some public money to develop its proposal. Thus the concern in this report is to highlight the problems—income, housing, education, family, etc.—that confront the Puerto Rican community in New York City, though not all of its population. Data are presented to support the thesis that Puerto Ricans generally are not well off and need to make much more rapid gains in a contemporary technical, urban society such as New York. As a forum summary indicates, the report is advanced as a rationale for a project "which takes into consideration both the problems of poverty in New York City and the complex realities of the cultural community pattern of the Puerto Rican New Yorker." The report is not intended to be a rounded picture of the total Puerto Rican population in New York City. Read from the point of-view of its purpose it is an illuminating study.

"Puerto Ricans in New York City." Geographical Review, 44: 143–144. January 1954.

A brief essay that includes several unsubstantiated assumptions: i.e., that Puerto Ricans migrate as the result of a population push in Puerto Rico; that Puerto Ricans are immigrants; that many Puerto Ricans are slow to Americanize out of a fear of submergence into the American Negro world; and, that by nonassimilation they can maintain a higher status than Negroes. An interesting essay that needs to be carefully read.

"Puerto Ricans in Philadelphia." Philadelphia Commission on Human Relations. April 1959. 39 pp. Prepared by Raymond Metauten and Burton Gordon.

Philadelphia had early experienced migration from Puerto Rico. By 1958 there were 20,000 Puerto Ricans living there. As early as 1953 the private and public agencies in Philadelphia were attempting to gear some of their programs to the needs of the newcomers. This study interprets the problems of and the significant progress made by the migrants in Philadelphia. The following paragraph from the foreword to the report accurately indicates the contents: "The first part of the report contains general background information about Puerto Ricans, their history, their recent migration to the U.S. mainland and brief comments about New York City's Puerto Rican population. The bulk of the report describes the characteristics, size, location, and problems of the Puerto Rican population in Philadelphia. Some of the principal services and facilities concerned with the needs and problems of Puerto Ricans are also described."

"Puerto Ricans in the United States." U.S. Census of Population: 1950. IV. Special Reports, chapter D, 18 pp.

Data similar to those in item immediately below, from 1950 census.

"Puerto Ricans in the United States." U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census. Final Report PC(2)–1D. U.S. Census of Population: 1960 July 1963. III–XIV and 104 pp.

A detailed report which "presents statistics from the 1960 Census of Population on the social and economic characteristics of persons of Puerto Rican parentage in the United States, for the country as a whole and for selected areas." The outstanding and most complete source of reliable data on those Puerto Ricans in the United States in 1959 and 1960. It is still a useful document.

"Puerto Ricans Not Guilty." Economist, 193: 44+. Oct. 3, 1959.

A brief commentary on the problems Puerto Ricans face on the mainland—color prejudice, poor housing, low income, unskilled jobs, and delinquency. A New York City judge had stated that Puerto Ricans were greatly overrepresented in delinquency and crime, and suggested that city officials should discourage them from coming to New York. Examination of available data demonstrated that Puerto Rican youth were not disproportionately involved in delinquency, and that the Puerto Ricans were generally law-abiding citizens.

Raushenbush, Winifred. "New York and The Puerto Ricans." Harper, 206: 13–15, 78+. May 1953.

Describes the shocks that Puerto Rican migrants face in New York City—housing and employment discrimination, color prejudice, and bad relations between the newcomers and police in East Harlem. However, the author believes that Puerto Ricans are optimistic about their future—pointing to improvements in race relations plus their mobility within the city as reasons for the optimism.

Rosten, Norman. "Puerto Ricans in New York." Holiday, 29: 48–49+. February 1961.

A cursory examination of the problems and progress among Puerto Rican migrants. Compares them favorably with immigrants of an earlier era. Points out that Puerto Ricans did not create the problems of urban life. They found them here when they arrived. Says they are dismayed by their treatment as second-class citizens, and will not accept such status.

Robinson, Sophia. "Can Delinquency Be Measured." Columbia University Press. 1936. See pp. 236–249.

This section is a discussion of a group of Puerto Rican children. Illustrative of fundamental considerations this field of research and social action.

Ruiz, Paquita. "Vocational Needs of Puerto Rican Migrants." University of Puerto Rico, Social Science Research Center. 1947. 84 pp.

A research study that includes an investigation of the vocational, social, and educational needs of 3,024 male Puerto Ricans who had migrated to New York City during the years 1940–44. Pointed out several vocational needs of these men that might be met prior to migration—industrial training, higher level of education, improved English literacy, and vocational guidance.

Samuels, Gertrude. " I Don't Think the Cop Is My Friend." New York Times magazine, Mar. 29, 1964, p. 28+.

A human interest account of the problems of human relations said to exist between police and Puerto Ricans on Manhattan's Upper West Side. In light of the insufficient evidence provided in the article to support the title's contention, it does not seem valid to conclude that most Puerto Ricans dislike most police. However, Samuels does point out the kinds of grievances that some police and some Puerto Ricans have against each other. States that some progress is being made in the area between the two groups. Suggests the need for more Spanish-speaking police, and more social work and psychological education in the police academy.

Samuels, Gertrude. "Two Case Histories Out of Puerto Rico." New York Times magazine, Jan. 22, 1956, pp. 26–27+.

A journalistic account of two Puerto Rican families migrating to New York City. Details quickly the problems encountered as migrants—humiliation, some family strains, difficulty for the male jobseeker, low income, etc. Both families migrated in search of a better chance in life; as one family put it, "for the future of the children." The author briefly describes the work of the Migration Division of the Department of Labor (Commonwealth of Puerto Rico) both in New York City and in Puerto Rico as the Division seeks to orient and help the migrants before they leave Puerto Rico and upon arrival on the mainland. The two cases are not assumed to be representative of the total group of migrants.

San Juan. Commonwealth of Puerto Rico. Department of Labor. Bureau of Labor Statistics. "Characteristics of Passengers Who Travel by Air Between Puerto Rico and the United States." Published by the Department of Labor. 1956 and following years.

A series of quarterly and annual reports of statistical data. The series has been discontinued by the Department in as much as the technique and procedures used to make the surveys at the airport may not have yielded reliable and valid data. However, the earlier reports do provide the careful researcher with clues to migration trends.

Sauna, Victor, D., et al. "The Vocational Rehabilitation Problems of Disabled Puerto Ricans in New York City". The Institute of Physical Medicine and Rehabilitation, New York University—Bellevue Medical Center. Rehabilitation monograph XII. 1957.

In addition to the problems that most disabled persons encounter during rehabilitation, Puerto Ricans have a major problem of communication. Points out that agency personnel were as aware of this problem as the Puerto Rican disabled persons. A valuable examination of popular conceptions (and misconceptions) about reaction to pain, educability, ambition, etc., among Puerto Ricans.

Sayers, Raymond. "New York Teachers in Puerto Rican Schools". High Points 39: 5–16. November 1957.

A helpful account of the author's experiences in Puerto Rico as a participant in the Puerto Rico Department of Education's teacher-exchange program.

Schepses, Edwin. "Puerto Rican Delinquent Boys in New York City". "Social Service Review" 23: 51–56. March 1949.

A comparison of first and second generation Puerto Rican boys in Warwick "training school" with those of other groups. "Puerto Rican delinquency, on the whole, is of a milder type." Puerto Rican boys born in New York City are found in a slightly higher proportion in Warwick (2 to 3 percentage points) than are those born in Puerto Rico.

Schmitzler, W. F. "Puerto Rican Workers Get Labor's Help to the Better Life." American Federationist, 67: 6–7. February 1960.

Brief article indicating that the labor movement is trying to break the racket organizations which had exploited Puerto Rican workers. Also, suggests that more aggressive collective bargaining by legitimate labor unions are bringing higher wages and better working conditions. Refers to the labor skills and productive capacity that most Puerto Ricans have.

Seda Bonilla, Edwin. "Patrones de Acómodo del Emigrante Puertorriqueño a la Estructura Social Norteamericana." Revista de Ciencias Sociales. Vol. II (Junio 1958) num. 2. pp. 189–200.

Essay on the difficulties encountered by Puerto Ricans moving to the metropolis from an environment in which race does not have the deleterious consequences which it has in New York City. The analysis of Mills et al., is upheld.

Senior, Clarence. "Migration and Puerto Rico's Population Problem." The Annals, 285: 130–136. January 1953.

Interprets the significance of much data on the nature of the Puerto Rican migration. Indicates that migration was helping to reduce population pressures in Puerto Rico. Raised questions regarding the long-range effects migration would have on the economy and total Puerto Rican society. Contains a table of annual migration as a percentage of natural increase in Puerto Rico's population, 1942–51.

Senior, Clarence. "Migration to the Mainland." Monthly Labor Review 78: 1354–1358. December 1955.

One of several articles written by Senior during the late 1940's and the 1950's that deal with this subject. Supporting evidence is provided for the thesis that Puerto Rican migration is directly related to the employment opportunities on the mainland. More Puerto Ricans migrate than return to Puerto Rico during periods of high employment. During periods of depression or recession few migrate and many on the mainland return. Senior cites the two streams of migration from Puerto Rico—farm laborers and urban settlers. Describes the farm laborer contract program begun in 1947 with mainland farmers in need of seasonal labor. The program has been carefully enforced by Puerto Rican officials since its inception. Includes an account of the extensive work carried out both in Puerto Rico and on the mainland by the Migration Division of the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, Department of Labor.

Senior, Clarence. "Puerto Rican Dispersion in the United States." Social Problems, 2: 93–99. October 1954.

A discussion of the factors related to dispersion of the Puerto Rican population on the mainland. Though considerable concentration in New York City, there is dispersal into many areas of the United States. Includes data.

Senior, Clarence. "Puerto Ricans on the Mainland." Americas, 13: 36–47. August 1961.

In article form the author presents the themes of his book "Strangers—Then Neighbors" (now revised under the title "The Puerto Ricans—Strangers Then Neighbors." Quadrangle Press, 1965), Freedom Books, 1961. See annotation of the revised edition in section II of this bibliography.

Senior, Clarence. "Research on the Puerto Rican Family in the United States." Marriage and Family Living, 19: 32–37. February 1957.

An account of the problems involved in trying to reach valid conclusions regarding Puerto Rican migrant families. Need much more research on the demographic transition of these families, skin color as a factor in the family's adjustment on the mainland, and the family strains related to culture conflict Suggests that cross-cultural studies be made.

Senior, Clarence. "The Puerto Ricans in the United States." In Joseph Gittler (ed.). Understanding Minority Groups. John Wiley, 1956. Ch. VII. Pp. 109–125.

A survey of the material on Puerto Ricans. Analysis of statistical data is included.

Shotwell, Louisa. "Puerto Rican Neighbors." The Presbyterian Tribune, 68: 1–3. September 1953.

A positive, human interest account of Puerto Rican newcomers and the need for "neighborliness" on the part of the receiving communities. Some general suggestions for Protestant congregations including one to adapt "the parish program to neighborhood needs. * * * Most important of all * * * is a cultivation within the congregation of an attitude of acceptance of the Puerto Ricans as human beings of essential dignity and good will."

Siegel, Arthur; Orlans, Harold; and Greer, Loyal. "Puerto Ricans in Philadelphia: A Study of Their Demographic Characteristics, Problems, and Attitudes." Philadelphia Commission on Human Relations. April 1954. 135 pp.

Still one of the few scientific surveys made of Puerto Rican migrants living outside New York City. An excellent source of reliable data.

Simmons, W. R. and Associates. "The Spanish-Speaking Scene: Silhouette on New York City Today." El Diario—La Prensa. February 1963. 60 pp.

A market research study done by Simmons and Associates for El Diario—La Prensa of the publisher's reading audience. A sample of 1,039 "Spanish-speaking persons 15 years of age and over in separate household throughout New York City" was used. Indicates that 1,045,000 Spanish-speaking persons living in the city, 725,000 of them being Puerto Rican. Shows an average family income of $4,472 per year. Suggests that "continuous surveys (of Puerto Rican migrants) show that the migrant * * * is a cut above the average Puerto Rican (on the island) in education and skills." An interesting account of buying habits, ownership of appliances, occupation, employment, etc. Includes data in charts, graphs, and tables.

Slaiman, Donald. "Discrimination and Low Incomes." American Federationist, 68: 17–19. January 1961.

A summary of the types of discrimination in employment which Negroes and Puerto Ricans face in New York as reported originally in studies made by the New York State Commission Against Discrimination and the New School for Social Research. Believes the major responsibility for removing roadblocks resulting from discrimination lies with government officials at all levels. However, calls on business, labor, government, and citizens of minority groups themselves to take action on the problems.

Smart, Pearl. "Experiment in Boston; Services to Puerto Rican Newcomers." Wilson Library Bulletin, 34: 415. February 1960.

Brief account of an effective program developed by a Boston Library designed to teach English to Puerto Rican adults. Other library facilities are now being utilized by a number of Puerto Ricans who had not done so previously.

"State of Birth." U.S. Census of Population, 1950. Special Report, PE No. 4A. 1953. 108 pp.

Gives 1950 census data on Puerto Rican-born persons with age, color, sex, and State of residence.

Strell, Joseph. "Elementary School Principals Visit Puerto Rico." High Points 47: 69–71. February 1965.

During 1963–64 50 New York City elementary school principals and some superintendents visited Puerto Rico. This brief article summarizes the general belief of the New York educators that the "visits were investments in good will. Stereotypes were shattered." The educators were impressed with the high quality of education in Puerto Rico. They felt that the visits had helped them reach a new understanding. "On our return, we saw our children and their parents in a new light. Barriers were broken * * *." Several suggestions for schools and teachers. Raises some important, unanswered questions.

String, Alvin. "Puerto Ricans in New Jersey." Public Health News, August 1962.

A description of the Puerto Rican farm labor program cooperatively developed in New Jersey between farmers and the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico. Indicates some of the problems encountered by the migrant workers and the farmers, and steps being taken by farmers and the Migration Division of the Commonwealth's Department of Labor to overcome the problems. Points out the advantages of the program to both the farmers and the migrant farm laborers.

Stuart, Irving R. "Intergroup Relations and Acceptance of Puerto Ricans and Negroes in an Immigrants' Industry." Journal of Social Psychology, 56: 89–96. 1962.

One of several reports by Stuart based on a research study of the garment industry. Negroes and Puerto Ricans in the ladies garment industry now occupy the low skilled and unskilled positions occupied by the immigrants at the turn of this century. However, Negroes were found to have proportionately a somewhat greater number of the bottom-rank jobs than Puerto Ricans. The newcomers are kept in their subordinate positions by the original workers who are now oldtimers and control the industry plus some apparent unwillingness on the part of the newcomers to compete. Asserts that the ILGWU has encouraged the newcomers to enter training programs for higher skills and improved job opportunities. Says this encouragement has not yet been very effective.

Stuart, Iriving R. "Minorities vs. Minorities: Cognitive, Affective and Conative Components of Puerto Rican and Negro Acceptance and Rejection." The Journal of Social Psychology, 59: 93–99. February 1963.

One of several reports by Stuart based on research in the ladies garment industry. Found considerable animosity between the newcomers to the industry (Negroes and Puerto Ricans) and the oldtimers. The oldtimers tended to feel anxiety over the economic competition from the newcomers. The grievance records illustrated how the Negroes and Puerto Ricans were negatively perceived, i.e., "immoral," "devious," "sly," "combative," "deceitful," etc. The newcomers deeply resented these attitudes of rejection held by the oldtimers—themselves the members of a minority group.

Suchman, Edward A. "Sociomedical Variations Among Ethnic Groups." American Journal of Sociology, 70: 319–331. November 1964.

This research study found that compared with persons of other groups, Puerto Ricans were more suspicious of scientific medical care. They tended to utilize general health services less, and have more limited health horizons.

Talerico, Marguerite, and Brown, Fred. "Intelligence Test Patterns of Puerto Rican Children Seen in Child Psychiatry." The Journal of Social Psychology, 61: 57–66. October 1963.

An examination of the test results on the WISC of 92 Puerto Rican children, ages 6–15, seen in the psychiatric department of a New York City hospital between 1952 and 1961. Though a wide range of intelligence was observed, the tendency was to "dull normal intelligence." Suggests research to determine what factors are operating to bring about this pattern among these and other Puerto Rican children previously studied, most of whom have been from low socioeconomic backgrounds. Data and tables are included.

"Tropics in New York." Americas, 4: 32–33. June 1952.

A journalistic account of Spanish Harlem that highlights the sensational and overromanticizes "El Barrio."

Vandow, Jules E. "Venereal Disease Among Puerto Ricans in New York City." Public Health Reports 70: 1242–1246. December 1955.

Report of a statistical analysis of the incidence of venereal disease among Puerto Ricans done for the New York City Health Department, Division of Social Hygiene. Data are reported, but the most important conclusion was that it is very difficult to draw accurate conclusions from morbidity data about the rate of syphilis for Puerto Ricans.

Vasquez Calzada, José L. "La Emiración Puertorriqueña: ¿Solución o Problema?" Revista de Ciencias Sociales. Vol. VII (December 1963), núm. 4, pp. 323–332.

The out-migration should never have been viewed as anything more than a temporary relief for problems of population pressure. Now that migration balances are toward Puerto Rico the situation of overpopulation must be faced. However, author contends that what is really happening is that there is no net return flow of Puerto Ricans, but an inflow of continental U.S. citizens which gives the impression that there is a return flow of former migrants. Thus far, in any case, this case does not seem to be demonstrated.

Wakefield, Dan. "The Other Puerto Ricans." New York Times Magazine, Oct. 11, 1959, pp. 24–25+.

Because the problems involving some Puerto Ricans have been publicly highlighted, most New Yorkers know little about the many Puerto Rican newcomers who, on their own and in organized groups, are helping other persons. Describes one such woman on Manhattan's Lower East Side who formed a club to help people of Irish, Jewish, and Puerto Rican backgrounds get together.

Wakefield, Dan. "200,000 New Yorkers Can't Vote." Nation, 188: 183–185. Feb. 28, 1959.

A discussion of the controversy over New York State's English-literacy requirement for voting. A law suit on behalf of a citizen of Puerto Rican origin precipitated the controversy. The State courts ruled against him. Stated that resentment among Puerto Ricans against the requirement was increasing. Advocated amending the law to make eligible for voting those literate in Spanish. Many Puerto Ricans felt the law probably would not be changed.

Wagner, Geoffrey. "Puerto Rico in Harlem." New Republic, 131: 16–18. Aug. 23, 1954.

By focusing on an experience he had in Spanish Harlem, the author presents a picture of the positive features found among Puerto Rican New Yorkers. Believes that the Puerto Rican culture brought to New York has enriched the city.

Welfare and Health Council of New York City. "Population of Puerto Rican Birth or Parentage, New York City: 1950." Published by the council. September 1952. 57 pp.

Contains special tabulations of the 1950 U.S. Census of Population. This report, done by the Research Bureau of the Welfare and Health Council, made available the data on the Puerto Rican population for boroughs, health areas, and census tracts. This pamphlet, together with the council's mimeographed bulletin titled "Estimated Net In-Migration to Continental United States From Puerto Rico" (1939–June 1952), gave the most complete and accurate picture available of Puerto Ricans in New York City. Includes maps.

Welfare Council of New York City. "Puerto Ricans in New York City." The Welfare Council. 1948. 60 pp.

A report of the council's Committee on Puerto Ricans in New York City. The survey includes data on the size and locations of the Puerto Rican population; the problems of neighborhood groups of Puerto Rican citizens; education, employment, and health; use of Spanish-speaking personnel in social agencies; and migration and resettlement. The committee recommended ways to reduce the language barrier, the development of special programs within the school system to meet the needs of Puerto Rican pupils, the development of tenant-landlord associations, and a Federal office to deal with Puerto Rican migration. Above all, the committee hoped for a continued increase in mutual understanding between Puerto Ricans and other New Yorkers.

Welfare and Health Council of New York City: Brooklyn Council for Social Planning. "Report on Survey of Brooklyn Agencies Rendering Services to Puerto Ricans." June 1953. 23 pp.

Based on a field study of 89 agencies working in Brooklyn where there were "considerable numbers of Puerto Ricans." Sixty-four agencies cooperated in the study by providing information regarding their programs. Forty-three were rendering services to Puerto Ricans. Twenty-one were not. The survey revealed that only four agencies listed family relations first among "diffculties encountered by Puerto Ricans." Only 12 others considered this even a problem area. Problems with language and housing were regarded as the major difficulties which Puerto Ricans were meeting. The agencies indicated little difficulty in working with Puerto Ricans. Ten agencies said they had none.

Werner, M. R. "The Puerto Ricans: Slum to Slum". Reporter, Sept. 12, 1950, pp. 20–22, and Sept. 26, 1950, pp. 20–23.

A two-part essay that focuses on the problems which Puerto Ricans face upon entering New York City—including the prejudices and resentment of many persons in the receiving community. Indicates that there has been an oversensationalistic coverage of Puerto Ricans by some of the press. Suggests that "planned migration", involvement of Puerto Ricans in the labor unions, and increasing Puerto Rican migration to other countries would help resolve the problems in Puerto Rico and on the U.S. mainland. Does not seem to understand fully the meaning for Puerto Ricans of their full citizenship status.

Wheeler, Helen. "The Puerto Rican Population of New York, New York". Sociology and Social Research, 35: 123–127. November 1950.

Suggests several reasons why Puerto Ricans migrate to New York City—easy and inexpensive transportation; relatively high wages; belief that there is a higher standard of living in the city; influenced by relatives already in New York, and, at times, a low standard of living in Puerto Rico. The essay combines a "push-pull" theory of migration, but emphasizes the "pull".

Woodbury, Clarence. "Our Worst Slum, New York's Spanish Harlem". American Magazine, 148: 30–31+. September 1949.

Cites economic factors as significant rather than political ones in the migration to New York City. Says, without supporting evidence provided, that Spanish Harlem has become United States worst slum. Describes problems related to poverty and discrimination faced by the Puerto Rican migrants. Refers to a program proposed by them—Representative Jacob Javits designed to improve conditions for them. Cites activity that had been undertaken by various groups intended to help. Political reform, better housing, improved sanitation, etc., needed to "eliminate America's worst slum". This exaggerated account of living conditions, crime, and vice in East Harlem incorrectly assumed the neighborhood a potential breeding ground for communism.

"World They Never Made, New York's Puerto Ricans". Time, 55: 24–26, June 12, 1950.

Basically an essay based on the "Columbia study" ("The Puerto Rican Journey," Mills, C. Wright; Senior, Clarence; Goldsen, Rose. Harper & Bros., 1950. 238 pp. See annotation in sec. II of this bibliography).

Yezierska, Anzia. "Lower Depths of Upper Broadway". Reporter 10: 26–29. Jan. 19, 1954.

An enlightening account of ways that some landlords in New York City exploited Puerto Rican newcomers in search of housing. Based on the author's experiences in a rent-decontrolled building in Manhattan that catered to Puerto Ricans and other minority groups.

Yinger, J. M., and Simpson, G. E. "Integration of Americans of Mexican, Puerto Rican and Oriental Descent". The Annals, 304: 124–131. March 1956.

The brief section on Puerto Ricans is a secondary account derived from a variety of studies and reports. Notes various school programs developed in New York City to maintain cultural pluralism. Suggests that differential assimilation of Puerto Ricans is influenced by employment, sex, education, age, and color.

SECTION II. BOOKS

Berle, Beatrice B. "80 Puerto Rican Families in New York City". Columbia University Press, 1958. 331 pp.

An intensive study of health and related problems of 80 Puerto Rican families living in a New York City slum. This group of families is not a sample of the general Puerto Rican population in New York City. It is a sample of some families with problems of sickness. Many of the problems were related to chronic anxiety and frustration that seemed to result "where the discrepancy between an individual's aspirations and the limited employment opportunities open to him due to lack of schooling or special skill cannot be reconciled" (p. 206).

Burma, John H. "Spanish-Speaking Groups in the United States". Duke University Press, 1954. 214 pp.

Includes a thumbnail sketch of "the Puerto Ricans in New York" (pp. 156–187). Burma assumes that there is a fundamental "unity of culture" among diverse groups put together because they speak the same language. In light of the widely differing historical backgrounds which have given rise to different cultures among Spanish-speaking groups the assumption does not seem valid. It did not include the most reliable and recent sources of data available at the time.

Caplovitz, David, et al. "The Poor Pay More". Free Press, 1963. 220 pp.

This book grew out of a "report on the consumer behavior of families living in four low-income public housing projects in New York City." Carefully researched, the study documents the many ways that low-income families, as consumers, are exploited by some unscrupulous salesmen, merchants, and loan sharks. In addition, the study found that "the families who encounter severe consumer difficulties are not apt to have the knowledge or resources to cope with their difficulties". Concluded that Negro and Puerto Rican families tended to encounter more difficulties as consumers than other families studied. The data suggested that "ethnicity of Negroes and Puerto Ricans is penalized in the marketplace". Outlined an extensive consumer education program for low-income consumers.

Chenault, Lawrence. "The Puerto Rican Migrant in New York City." Columbia University Press, 1938. 190 pp.

The one book that puts together data available on the early movements to New York City of Puerto Rican migrants. Includes a discussion of the various ways these movements affect the established community and the migrants.

Cifre de Loubriel, Estela. "La immigración a Puerto Rico durante el siglo XIX." San Juan: Instituto de Cultura Puertorriqueña, 1964. 438 pp.

Dworkis, Martin. "Impact of Puerto Rican Migration on Governmental Services in New York City." New York University Press, 1957. 74 pp.

Under the direction of Professor Dworkis, graduate students in public administration at New York University gathered the data included in this report. The book includes brief chapters on housing, employment, welfare, education, health and hospital services, and crime and delinquency. The data are usually presented with a minimum of interpretation. However, analysis is spotty and contains some unsubstantiated assumptions and conclusions. To cite just one, the discussion on crime and delinquency includes a comment that begins, "the emotional instability of many Puerto Rican youths * * *" yet, "emotional instability" and "many" remain undefined and not supported by evidence.

Fitzpatrick, Joseph P. (Fr.). "Intermarriage of Puerto Ricans in New York City." The American Journal of Sociology, vol. LXXI, No. 4, January 1966, pp. 395–406.

A study of out-group marriages of Puerto Ricans, based on all marriages in which one partner was first- or second-generation Puerto Rican, indicates that assimilation is taking place rapidly. Increases in the rate of out-group marriage among second-generation as compared with first-generation Puerto Ricans in 1949 and 1959 were as great as those found by Drachsler for all immigrants in New York, 1908–12. Out-group marriage was positively correlated with higher occupational status only in the case of brides. Age at marriage drops in second generation. Civil and Catholic ceremonies drop in New York in contrast to Puerto Rica; Protestant ceremonies increase. Catholic ceremonies increased in 1959 over 1949 and in second generation over first.

Handlin, Oscar. "The Newcomers: Negroes and Puerto Ricans in a Changing Metropolis." Harvard University Press, 1959. 171 pp.

One of the series of books that grew out of the New York metropolitan region study done under the auspices of the Regional Plan Association. This well-documented book highlights the nature of the problems and progress of Negroes and Puerto Ricans in New York City compared with those of such groups of immigrants as the Irish, the Germans, the Italians, and the Jews. The analysis is illuminated by the author's deep understanding of the immigration history of this country. Points out the "circular pattern of frustration" of color prejudice, low income, sporadic and low-skill employment opportunities, and limited education that confront Negroes and Puerto Ricans. However, the author concludes that "although the difficulties are genuine and grave, there is every reason to be optimistic about the future, if the society of which these people have become a part allows them to act freely and as equals in it." (P. 117.)

Jaffe, A. J. (ed.). "Puerto Rican Population of New York City." Columbia University, Bureau of Applied Social Research, 1954. 61 pp.

This booklet contains three excellent papers, delivered before the New York area chapter of the American Statistical Association, Oct. 21, 1953: Jaffe, A. J., "Demographic and Labor Force Characteristics;" Weiner, Louis, "Vital Statistics"; Robison, Sophia, "Social and Welfare Statistics." These outstanding authorities in their respective fields presented and interpreted the most recent data that were available. The papers are documented with many statistical tables. Some intragroup (e.g., Puerto Rican birth and Puerto Rican parentage) and intergroup (e.g., Puerto Rican and white, non-Puerto Rican) comparative data are included.

Mills, C. Wright; Senior, Clarence; and Goldsen, Rose. "The Puerto Rican Journey: New York's Newest Migrant." Harper & Bros., 1950. 238 pp.

A carefully researched field study of the Puerto Rican population in two core areas of New York City. The study was done in 1948 by a research team of the bureau of applied social research of Columbia University. Although many of its statistics are now out of date, the book deals with basic concepts, such as the factors in "adaptation," cultural and language differences, and their influence on the progress and problems of the migrants. Includes much data on the characteristics of the Puerto Ricans in the two core areas—family, age, sex, education, occupation, income, etc.

Morrison, J. Cayce. "The Puerto Rican Study: 1953–57." New York City Board of Education, 1958. 265 pp.

This is the final report of the most complete study of the impact of Puerto Rican migration on the public schools of New York City, and how the schools were affecting Puerto Rican children and their parents. Though sponsored by the New York City Board of Education, a matching grant-in-aid of half a million dollars from the Fund for the Advancement of Education made the study possible. Several specialized studies were done within the framework of the large-scale study. These smaller studies focused on the "sociocultural adjustment" of the children and their parents, and digests of them are presented in this final report. In addition, about a third of the book deals with the special non-English-speaking program developed by the city school system. A description of some of the methods and materials developed is included. The study discovered some unresolved problems in the areas of learning, effective grouping of pupils, staffing those schools with Puerto Rican children, and teacher education. The study led to many research and curriculum publications, and 23 major recommendations, all designed to achieve three purposes: "* * * (developing) better understanding of the children being taught, (relating) the teaching of English to the child's cultural-social adjustment, (improving) the integration of ethnic groups through the school's program" (p. 247). With respect to the children, the major conclusion is contained in the following statement: "The children of Puerto Rican background are exceedingly heterogeneous. This is true of their native intelligence, their prior schooling, their aptitude for learning English, and their scholastic ability * * *" (p. 239).

Padilla, Elena. "Up From Puerto Rica." Columbia University Press, 1958. 317 pp.

The only cultural anthropological study of Puerto Rican migrants in New York City. Padilla directed the study made during the mid-1950's in a small section of Manhattan. The research team became acquainted with over 500 residents of the area—not all of them Puerto Rican. After 18 months of observing, conversing, listening, and participating in some of the community life the researchers did a long open-ended questionnaire interview with 48 Puerto Rican family heads. They found Puerto Ricans making a rapid transition from traditional island cultural patterns; to be confronted with many problems, among these being the prejudiced treatment of them by some non-Puerto Rican New Yorkers; and, to feel that the struggle is worth it for the sake of their children. In light of the limited sample and the lack of quantified conclusions, care should be taken not to use the experiences reported in this book as a basis for generalizations about all persons of Puerto Rican origin who were living in New York City in the mid-1950's.

Rand, Christopher. "The Puerto Ricans." Oxford University Press, 1958. 178 pp.

Journalistic report, engagingly written and marked by a real warmth of feeling for Puerto Ricans and Puerto Rico. Marred by playing up the "colorful" and the picturesque. An expanded account of the material first published in The New Yorker, Nov. 30–Dec. 21, 1957. (A series of four articles.)

Reynolds, Lloyd G., and Gregory, Peter. "Wages, Productivity, and Industrialization in Puerto Rico." Homewood, Ill.: Richard D. Irwin, Inc., 1965. 357 pp.

"Omitting men who had been abroad for military service, we found that about one-eighth of both the men and women in our sample (of industrial workers) had lived on the mainland for some time. More than three-quarters of those who had gone to the mainland said they had done so with the express purpose of seeking employment, believing that jobs were more plentiful and better paying than in Puerto Rico. During the relevant time period—the late forties and early fifties—this impression was undoubtedly correct. A large majority of these people (90 percent of the men and 80 percent of the women) were employed in Puerto Rico at the time of emigration. This suggests that the movement was not a desperate effort to escape from unemployment but rather a rational attempt to maximize incomes. Noteworthy also is the relatively high skill level of the returned migrants. Of the men who had had mainland factory experience, 53 percent were in skilled jobs in Puerto Rico at the time of interview. This is well above the 30 percent of skilled men in the sample as a whole. "The hypothetical questions put to all members of the sample revealed a strong latent 'propensity to migrate.' Two-thirds of the men and three-quarters of the women who had never been to the mainland expressed interest in going, and 80 percent of these thought they would like to migrate permanently or to try mainland living with this end in mind. The reasons given were predominantly economic * * * "

Senior, Clarence. "Our Citizens From The Carribbean." McGraw-Hill, 1965. 122 pp.

Deals with interrelated strands of United States and Puerto Rican history, the occupation of the island, and the changes it helped produce. Includes description and interpretation of the political and social evolution, economic development, population problems, and the migration. There is also a chapter on Cuba and Cubans in the United States. Designed for high school students, it is a useful introduction to the subject for any reader.

Senior, Clarence. "Puerto Rican Migration." University of Puerto Rico, Social Science Research Center, 1947. 166 pp.

One of the earliest accounts of Puerto Rican migration and a basis for further research analyses of statistical data and policy formulation.

Senior, Clarence. "The Puerto Ricans: Strangers—Then Neighbors." Quadrangle Books, 1965. 128 pp.

Revised, updated edition of an attempt to draw parallels between past immigrations and present internal migrations on one hand and the migration of the Puerto Ricans on the other. First edition published in 1961. In his foreword, Vice President Hubert Humphrey writes, "This book dispels, with facts, many myths about the Puerto Ricans * * *" An unfortunate publisher's blurb incorrectly contradicts the author's text by calling Puerto Rican migrants "the largest immigrating group in the Nation today."

Sexton, Patricia. "Spanish Harlem: Anatomy of Poverty." Harper & Row, 1965. 208 pp.

Report by a sociologist who spent part of 2 years "getting acquainted" with East Harlem. Shows awareness that she is dealing with the pathologies of a minority of the area's population ("still, the majority of the people are self-supporting"). However, she does not gloss over the problems that confront many of the self-supporting, low-income urban dwellers. The book is informed by the important insight of the need for "the poor" to be involved in working out their destiny.

Thieme, Frederick P. "The Puerto Rican Population: A Study in Human Biology." University of Michigan Museum of Anthropology, 1959. 156 pp. +139 tables and 76 charts.

A field study of 3,562 Puerto Ricans as a sample of the island's population. Reports on blood types, nutrition, anthropometric measurements, dental conditions, intestinal infestations, and other physical aspects. Migrants are measured, directly (in the case of returnees) and indirectly (through same-sex siblings). Compared with sedentes, "shows the migrant to be 'whiter' and less negroid, and to be better nourished, but of comparable age." (p. 149.)

Wakefield, Dan. "Island in the City: Puerto Ricans in New York." Houghton Mifflin Co., 1959. 278 pp.

Journalistic account of "the world of Spanish Harlem." Includes many sophisticated basic insights gained from living in East Harlem. However, tends to overemphasize the more gaudy or sensational aspects such as spiritualism, narcotics rackets, and gang fights.

INVENTORY OF GOVERNMENT DEPARTMENTS

PART I: INVENTORY OF THE DEPARTMENTS, AGENCIES AND INSTRUMENTALITIES OF THE EXECUTIVE BRANCH OF THE COMMONWEALTH OF PUERTO RICO

PART II: INVENTORY OF FEDERAL AGENCIES WITH OFFICES IN PUERTO RICO

by

THE DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION

UNIVERSITY OF PUERTO RICO

PART I: INVENTORY OF THE DEPARTMENTS, AGENCIES AND INSTRUMENTALITIES OF THE EXECUTIVE BRANCH OF THE COMMONWEALTH OF PUERTO RICO

PREFACE

Pursuant to directives of Dr. Luis F. Silva Recio, Director of the School of Public Administration of the University of Puerto Rico, we take pleasure in submitting the following report to the United States-Puerto Rico Status Commission created under the provisions of Public Laws No. 88-271, 88th Congress of the United States (February 20, 1964) and No. 9, Legislature of the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico (April 13, 1964).

The report consists of an inventory of the executive departments, agencies, and public corporations of the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, and of all Federal agencies with offices in Puerto Rico. It is divided in two parts. Part I covers the Commonwealth agencies; part II covers the Federal agencies.

Most of the information was gathered directly from each agency by means of a questionnaire sent by registered mail to each agency head (a copy of this questionnaire is included in the appendix). Personal visits, telephone calls, and letters were used as followups to the original questionnaire. With very few exceptions,[1] the agency heads were generous and very cooperative. We are particularly grateful to the Commonwealth Governor's Office and to the Federal Veterans' Administration office for allowing us to use their answered questionnaires as models for other agencies.

Secondary sources used include the "Directory of the Federal Government Agencies with offices in Puerto Rico, 1964" (Bureau of the Budget, Commonwealth of Puerto Rico); "Manual of Federal Agencies with Offices in Puerto Rico, 1954" (School of Public Administration, University of Puerto Rico); "Manual de Organización de las Agencias del Estado Libre Asociado de Puerto Rico, 1960" (Bureau of the Budget, Commonwealth of Puerto Rico); "Guía de Funcionarios del Estado Libre Asociado de Puerto Rico, 1965" (Bureau of the Budget, Commonwealth of Puerto Rico); "Presupuesto para el año fiscal 1966–67 sometido por el Gobernador a la Asamblea Legislativa del Estado Libre Asociado de Puerto Rico el 11 de enero de 1965" (Department of Finance, Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, 1965).

The report summarizes the main features, and sets forth statistics describing the nature, size, functions, and structural makeup of each agency. Aware of the short time available for the Commission to carry out its task, we tried to make this presentation as concise as possible.

The description of each unit follows, with very few variations, the sequence of the original questionnaire: items I to IV summarize data about the legal basis, lifespan, chief administrator or person in charge, and functions of the agency or office; items V and VI summarize data about the budget, real estate, and personnel.

We organized our inventory of the Commonwealth units following the pattern set in the master organization chart of the executive branch of the Commonwealth government submitted by the Governor in his budget report for 1966–67 (see chart in appendix A). Five agencies discussed in our report are absent in this chart. Four of them: the Public Roads Authority; the Civil Rights Commission; the Caribbean Economic Development Corporation, and the Agricultural Services Administration were created after the budget report was drafted. The Casals Festival Corporation, Inc., is a subsidiary of the Industrial Development Company, but it has so much autonomy that it must be considered as a separate unit.

We have taken into account all significant changes which may have been effected to individual units recently.

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[1] Everyone responded although a few of them failed to submit all the information requested. Data which could not be provided by a given agency or otherwise obtained has been referred to as either "information withheld" or "information not available" according to our judgment in each individual case.

Remarks on Specific Items

Legal basis.—In instances in which various statutes were given by the respondent as legal basis for the establishment of an agency we have mentioned in our report only the ones we considered to be the most relevant.

Chief executive or director and method of selection.—Name of incumbent in top positions is given as well as the way in which he has been selected to the post.

Functions.—In cases in which the responding unit gave us a very detailed account of its functions, we have reported a summary of the most inclusive and important ones only.

Resources.—Budget statistics presented are for fiscal year 1964–65. If some other year had to be selected, this has been duly specified in footnotes or parentheses. Information relating to annual expenses covers office operations and capital improvements. In those cases in which the unit expenses cover only office operations we have noted this in the proper place.

Quantities referring to land owned and/or used are given in "cuerdas" because that was the measure most commonly used by the respondents.

The equivalence is as follows:

$$1 \text{ cuerda} \begin{cases} = 0.97 \text{ acres} \\ = 3{,}930.4 \text{ square meters} \\ = 42{,}306.2 \text{ square feet.} \end{cases}$$

Quantities referring to buildings and office space owned and/or used are given in square feet.

The percentage point computations are intended to convey a quick idea on the relation between the amount of land and/or office space utilized and the amount owned by the Government as well as of the recipients of any rent paid.

Whenever reference is made to the Government of Puerto Rico this should be understood to include its municipalities and instrumentalities.

Personnel.—The median salary was computed according to the following statistical formula

$$Md = L + \frac{\left(\frac{n}{2} - cf\right)i}{f}$$

On page 893 (see appendix) there is a full explanation of the symbols in this formula.

We want to express out gratitude to all agency heads and persons in charge for making this report possible; to Mrs. Minerva V. de Agosto, Miss Carmen N. Rodriguez and Miss María Socorro Ro-

driguez, secretaries in the School of Public Administration; to Mrs. Albilda Berríos de Isern for her excellent work in typing the manuscript for the whole project; very specially to Mr. Marco Antonio Rigau, Jr., for his cooperation as research assistant during the preliminary phase of the project and to Mr. Enrique Rodriguez of the Budget Office of the University of Puerto Rico and Mr. Alfonso Monell Santiago of the School of Public Administration for their help in the English translation of part I of the report.

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GOVERNOR'S OFFICE

GOVERNOR

I. Legal Basis

Article IV of the Constitution of the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico; Public Law (P.R.) No. 104, June 28, 1956; Public Law (P.R.) No. 4, May 24, 1960.

II. Date Agency Started Operations

1952. The Organic Acts of Puerto Rico of 1900 and of 1917 created the post of Governor.

III. Chief Executive or Director; Method of Selection

Mr. Roberto Sanchez Vilella—Governor. Elected directly by the people in general elections held every 4 years.

IV. Summary of Functions

Comply with and implement the prerogatives and duties assigned under article IV of the Commonwealth constitution to the Governor. These faculties and duties are:

a. Obey and execute the laws and cause them to be executed by directing and supervising all the departments, agencies, and instrumentalities of the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico.

b. Present to the Legislative Assembly at the beginning of each regular session, a message concerning the affairs of the Commonwealth and a budget proposal of income and expenditures with the necessary information for the formulation of a program of legislation.

c. Call the Senate or the Legislative Assembly into special session when in his judgment the public interest so requires.

d. Approve or veto the bills and joint resolutions passed by the Legislative Assembly.

e. Appoint all officers whose appointment he is authorized to make in the manner prescribed by the Commonwealth constitution or by law.

f. Act as commander in chief of the militia.

g. Prevent and suppress violations of the law, invasions, insurrections or rebellions.

h. Proclaim martial law when the public safety requires it—in case of rebellion, or invasion or imminent danger thereof.

i. Suspend the execution of sentences in criminal cases and grant pardons, commutations of punishments and total or partial remissions of fines and forfeiture for crimes committed in violation of the laws of Puerto Rico.

j. Approve the rules and regulations of the various governmental agencies, which once approved and promulgated, shall have the force of law.

k. Authorize tax exemption to new industries that meet the legal requirements.

V. Resources

Budget of expenditures for office operations during fiscal year 1964–65	$698, 915
Sources of income for fiscal year 1964–65:	
a. Federal appropriations	0
b. Commonwealth appropriations	698, 915
c. Other sources	0

Total real estate property owned and/or used:		
a. Land facilities:	*Cuerdas*	*Ratio of owned to used, percent*
1. Total used	1. 18	------
2. Total owned by the Government of Puerto Rico	1. 18	100
b. Buildings and office space facilities:	*Square feet*	*Ratio of owned to used, percent*
1. Total used	57, 171	------
2. Total owned by the Government of Puerto Rico	57, 171	100
c. Rental paid for land, buildings and office space facilities used: $0.		

VI. Personnel

	Total
Total number of functionaries and employees	97
Method of selection:	
a. Classified Commonwealth civil service	14
b. Classified under some other merit system	0
c. Other	83
Nationality (place born):	
a. Puerto Rico	97
b. United States	0
c. Other countries	0
Salary:	
a. Annual salary range	$1, 260–$25, 000
b. Annual median salary	$3, 180

AGRICULTURAL COUNCIL

I. Legal Basis

Executive Order of the Commonwealth Governor, No. 324, June 4, 1957.

II. Date Agency Started Operations

1957.

III. Chief Executive or Director; Method of Selection

Mr. Luis A. Mejia Mattei—Executive Secretary. Appointment made by the President of the Council in consultation with the Council and the Governor's approval. The President of the Council is the Secretary of Agriculture.

IV. Summary of Functions

Make recommendations on the goals of the Puerto Rican Agriculture, on such programs and activities to attain those goals; on the priorities of the activities to be carried out by Commonwealth agricultural agencies; and on the budgetary needs for those activities to which the Council assigns priorities.

Request the cooperation of the Federal agricultural agencies operating in Puerto Rico in order to coordinate their activities with those of the Commonwealth agricultural agencies.

Propose to Commonwealth agricultural agencies any action necessary to facilitate the proper execution of programs agreed; receive reports on the progress of such programs; promote similar actions, through joint agreements, among the Federal agencies operating in Puerto Rico.

V. Resources

Budget of expenditures for office operations during fiscal year 1964–65	$147, 700
Sources of income for fiscal year 1964–65:	
a. Federal appropriations	0
b. Commonwealth appropriations	147, 700
c. Other sources	0

Total real estate property owned and/or used:

a. Land facilities:	*Cuerdas*
1. Total used	0
2. Total owned by the Government of Puerto Rico	0

b. Buildings and office space facilities:	*Square feet*	*Ratio of owned to used, percent*
1. Total used	3, 300	------
2. Total owned by the Government of Puerto Rico	3, 300	100

c. Rental paid for land, buildings and office space facilities used: $0.

VI. Personnel

	Total
Total number of functionaries and employees	14
Method of selection:	
a. Classified Commonwealth civil service	[1] 22
b. Classified under some other merit system	0
c. Other	0
Nationality (place born):	
a. Puerto Rico	14
b. United States	0
c. Other countries	0
Salary:	
a. Annual salary range	$1, 800–$13, 200
b. Annual median salary	$4, 000

[1] At the time of the survey there were 8 positions vacant.

BUREAU OF THE BUDGET

I. Legal Basis

Public Law (P.R.) No. 213, May 12, 1942, as amended.

II. Date Agency Started Operations

1942.

III. Chief Executive or Director; Method of Selection

Mr. Guillermo Irizarry—Director. Appointed by the Governor of Puerto Rico.

IV. SUMMARY OF FUNCTIONS

Advise the Governor on matters pertaining fiscal policy, administrative management and in the appraisal of governmental programs.

Draft the budget of expenditures that is submitted by the Governor to the Legislative Assembly every year.

Collaborate with all other government agencies in their budget administration and in their efforts to improve administrative techniques.

Administer the program for the disposal of public documents in the executive branch.

V. RESOURCES

Budget of expenditures for office operations during fiscal year 1964–65	$508,660
Sources of income for fiscal year 1964–1965:	
a. Federal appropriations	0
b. Commonwealth appropriations	508,660
c. Other sources	0

Total real estate property owned and/or used:

a. Land facilities:	*Cuerdas*
1. Total used	0
2. Total owned by the Government of Puerto Rico	0

b. Buildings and office space facilities:	*Square feet*	*Ratio of owned to used, percent*
1. Total used	8,142	------
2. Total owned by the Government of Puerto Rico	8,142	100

c. Rental paid for land, buildings and office space facilities used: $0.

VI. PERSONNEL

	Total
Total number of functionaries and employees	[1] 82
Method of selection:	
a. Classified Commonwealth civil service	87
b. Classified under some other merit system	0
c. Other	4
Nationality (place born):	
a. Puerto Rico	82
b. United States	0
c. Other countries	0
Salary:	
a. Annual salary range	[2] $1,680–$12,600
b. Annual median salary	$4,919

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[1] At the time of this survey there were 9 positions vacant.

[2] The Director's salary is set by law at $16,000.

FINANCIAL COUNCIL

I. LEGAL BASIS

Executive order of the Commonwealth Governor No. 242, August 9, 1956.

II. DATE AGENCY STARTED OPERATIONS

1956.

III. CHIEF EXECUTIVE OR DIRECTOR; METHOD OF SELECTION

Mr. John H. Mudie—Acting Executive Secretary. Mr. Mudie is the Director of the Department of Economic Studies in the Commonwealth Government Development Bank. That Department serves as Executive Secretariat to the Financial Council and the Secretary of the Commonwealth Treasury Department serves as President of the Council. Both incumbents are designated by the Governor.

IV. SUMMARY OF FUNCTIONS

Recommend to the Commonwealth Governor basic financial policies or changes thereto.

Coordinate financial operations and norms of the Commonwealth departments and agencies.

V. RESOURCES

Budget of expenditures for office operations during fiscal year 1964-65	$30,000
Sources of income for fiscal year 1964-65:	
a. Federal appropriations	0
b. Commonwealth appropriations	30,000
c. Other sources	0
Total real estate property owned and/or used:	
Utilizes the facilities of the Commonwealth Government Development Bank.	

VI. PERSONNEL

The Council consists of 10 members. They are the Secretary of the Treasury Department and the Secretary of the State Department, the President of the Planning Board and the President of the Commonwealth Government Development Bank, the Director of the Bureau of the Budget and the Administrator of the Economic Development Administration, above members are ex officio, the other four are private citizens appointed by the Governor at his will. Each ex officio member of the Council appoints an official representative of his department or agency to collaborate with the Executive Secretary.

MINING COMMISSION

I. LEGAL BASIS

Public Law (P.R.) No. 9, August 18, 1933, as amended in 1954, 1957, 1959, and 1963.

II. DATE AGENCY STARTED OPERATIONS

1954.

III. CHIEF EXECUTIVE OR DIRECTOR; METHOD OF SELECTION

Mr. Carlos Vincenty—Executive Secretary. The post is held by the Director of the Industrial Research Department of the Puerto Rico Economic Development Administration.

IV. SUMMARY OF FUNCTIONS

Regulate all activities concerning research, exploration, and the tapping of mineral resources in Puerto Rico.

V. RESOURCES

Budget of expenditures for office operations during fiscal year 1964–65	$25,000
Sources of income for fiscal year 1964–65:	
a. Federal appropriations	0
b. Commonwealth appropriations	25,000
c. Other sources	0

Total real estate property owned and/or used:

a. Land facilities:	*Cuerdas*
1. Total used	0
2. Total owned by the Government of Puerto Rico	0

b. Buildings and office space facilities:	*Square feet*	*Ratio of owned to used, percent*
1. Total owned	1,000	------
2. Total used by the Government of Puerto Rico	1,000	100

c. Rental paid for land, buildings and office space facilities used: $0.

VI. PERSONNEL

	Total
Total number of functionaries and employees	4
Method of selection:	
a. Classified Commonwealth civil service	4
b. Classified under some other merit system	0
c. Other	0
Nationality (place born):	
a. Puerto Rico	4
b. United States	0
c. Other countries	0
Salary:	
a. Annual salary range	$2,880–$10,800
b. Annual median salary	$4,000

OFFICE OF CIVIL DEFENSE

I. LEGAL BASIS

Public Law (P.R.) No. 183, May 1951, as amended.

II. DATE AGENCY STARTED OPERATIONS

1951.

III. CHIEF EXECUTIVE OR DIRECTOR; METHOD OF SELECTION

Mr. Rafael Montilla (colonel)—Director. Appointed by the Governor of Puerto Rico.

IV. SUMMARY OF FUNCTIONS

Prepare and implement general nonmilitary emergency plans and procedures to protect and safeguard life, property and the economic welfare of the inhabitants of Puerto Rico in case of disaster.

Advise the Commonwealth Governor in all matters concerning civil defense.

Coordinate and integrate State plans and programs with similar Federal plans and programs.

V. RESOURCES

Budget of expenditures for office operations during fiscal year 1964-65	$336, 905
Sources of income for fiscal year 1964-65:	
a. Federal appropriations	143, 705
b. Commonwealth appropriations	193, 200
c. Other sources	0

Total real estate property owned and/or used:[1]

a. Land facilities:	*Cuerdas*	*Ratio of owned to used, percent*
1. Total used	[2] 7	------
2. Total owned by the Government of Puerto Rico	0	0

[1] Utilizes land and office space belonging to the Federal and Commonwealth Government and pays no rent for its use.

[2] Included herein the land facilities at Gurabo only.

b. Buildings and office space facilities:	*Square feet*	*Ratio of owned to used, percent*
1. Total used	12, 000	------
2. Total owned by the Government of Puerto Rico	0	0

c. Rental paid for land, buildings and office space facilities used:

Proprietor	*Annual rent*	*Percent*
1. Government of Puerto Rico	0	0
2. Federal Government	0	0
3. Private	$3, 160	100

VI. PERSONNEL

	Total
Total number of functionaries and employees	62
Method of selection:	
a. Classified Commonwealth civil service	62
b. Classified under some other merit system	0
c. Other	0
Nationality (place born):	
a. Puerto Rico	62
b. United States	0
c. Other countries	0
Salary:	
a. Annual salary range	$1, 680-$10, 200
b. Annual median salary	$3, 460

OFFICE OF THE COORDINATOR FOR THE SUGAR INDUSTRY

I. LEGAL BASIS

Administrative Bulletin No. 956-A, June 30, 1964.

II. DATE AGENCY STARTED OPERATIONS

1964.

III. CHIEF EXECUTIVE OR DIRECTOR; METHOD OF SELECTION

Mr. Arturo Roque—Director. Appointed by the Governor.

IV. SUMMARY OF FUNCTIONS

Take all adequate measures that may be needed in order to develop a most effective governmental effort with the joint participation of the private sector, for the development of the sugar industry.

Draft legislative proposals and issue pertinent recommendations deemed necessary for the rehabilitation of the sugar industry on behalf of farmers', workers', and the Commonwealth general economic welfare.

V. RESOURCES

Budget of expenditures for office operations during fiscal year 1964–65	$135, 000
Sources of income for fiscal year 1964–65:	
a. Federal appropriations	0
b. Commonwealth appropriations	135, 000
c. Other sources	0

Total real estate property owned and/or used:

a. Land facilities:	*Cuerdas*
1. Total used	0
2. Total owned by the Government of Puerto Rico	0

b. Buildings and office space facilities:	*Square feet*	*Ratio of owned to used, percent*
1. Total used	1, 000	------
2. Total owned by the Government of Puerto Rico	1, 000	100

c. Rental paid for land, buildings and office space facilities used: $0.

VI. PERSONNEL

	Total
Total number of functionaries and employees	9
Method of selection:	
a. Classified Commonwealth civil service	2
b. Classified under some other merit system	6
c. Other	1
Nationality (place born):	
a. Puerto Rico	8
b. United States	1
c. Other countries	0
Salary:	
a. Annual salary range	[1] $2, 280–$7, 740
b. Annual median salary	$5, 500

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[1] Director's salary is not included.

OFFICE OF THE TRANSIT COORDINATOR

I. LEGAL BASIS

Executive Order of the Commonwealth Governor No. 932, May 15, 1964.

II. DATE AGENCY STARTED OPERATIONS

1964.

III. Chief Executive or Director; Method of Selection

Mr. Santos Brenes La Roche—Coordinator. Appointed by the Governor of Puerto Rico.

IV. Summary of Functions

Take prompt and adequate measures to insure the most effective governmental efforts in transit regulation and control.

Prepare legislative proposals that may be needed in order to consolidate all matters about transit functions under an independent agency.

V. Resources

Budget of expenditures for office operations during fiscal year 1964–65	$56,000
Sources of income for fiscal year 1964–65:	
a. Federal appropriations	0
b. Commonwealth appropriations	56,000
c. Other sources	0

Total real estate property owned and/or used:

a. Land facilities	*Cuerdas*
1. Total used	0
2. Total owned by the Government of Puerto Rico	0

b. Buildings and office space facilities:	*Square feet*	*Ratio of owned to used, percent*
1. Total used	902	------
2. Total owned by the Government of Puerto Rico	0	0

c. Rental paid for land, buildings and office space facilities used: $0.

All space facilities used have been ceded to this agency by the Commonwealth Land Administration who is a lessee to a private proprietor.

VI. Personnel

	Total
Total number of functionaries and employees	8
Method of selection:	
a. Classified Commonwealth civil service	0
b. Classified under some other merit system	0
c. Other	8
Nationality (place born):	
a. Puerto Rico	7
b. United States	0
c. Other countries	1
Salary:	
a. Annual salary range	$1,800–$12,600
b. Annual median salary	$7,000

PLANNING BOARD

I. Legal Basis

Public Law (P.R.) No. 213, May 12, 1942 as amended.

II. Date Agency Started Operations

1942.

III. Chief Executive or Director; Method of Selection

Mr. Ramon Garcia Santiago—President. Appointed by the Governor with the advice and consent of the senate of the Commonwealth.

IV. Summary of Functions

Prepare and execute a master plan for the development of Puerto Rico.

Prepare every year a 4-year economic plan recommending the allocation of public funds for general operations expenditures and capital improvements.

Prepare and implement codes of rules and regulations for urban land use, zoning, and building construction; for the preservation of ancient and historic sites; for the protection of flood-prone areas and neighborhood facilities; for buildings conservation, road posters, and signs.

Revise and approve capital improvement projects for all agencies and municipalities.

Set territorial boundaries to all municipalities and their suburbs ("barrios").

Carry out research on economic planning and statistics.

Organize local planning boards in the municipalities at their mayor's request.

Extend permits for buildings construction and use, for land utilization and development; serve as watchdog for public compliance of the building regulations.

Determine and declare which are slum areas according to law.

V. Resources

Budget of expenditures for office operations during fiscal year 1964–65	$3, 862, 310
Sources of income for fiscal year 1964–65:	
a. Federal appropriations	252, 979
b. Commonwealth appropriations	3, 862, 310
c. Other sources	0

Total real estate property owned and/or used:

a. Land facilities:	Cuerdas	Ratio of owned to used, percent
1. Total used	0. 19	------
2. Total owned by the Government of Puerto Rico	0	0

b. Buildings and office space facilities owned and/or used:	Square feet	Ratio of owned to used, percent
1. Total used	94, 703	------
2. Total owned by the Government of Puerto Rico	0	0

c. Rental paid for land, buildings and office space facilities used:

Proprietor	Annual rent	Percent
1. Government of Puerto Rico	0	0
2. Federal Government	0	0
3. Private	$219, 000	100

VI. PERSONNEL

	Total
Total number of functionaries and employees	645
Method of selection:	
a. Classified Commonwealth civil service	642
b. Classified under some other merit system	0
c. Other	3
Nationality (place born):	
a. Puerto Rico	640
b. United States	0
c. Other countries	5
Salary:	
a. Annual salary range	$1, 680–$19, 000
b. Annual median salary	$3, 590

YOUTH OFFICE COORDINATOR

I. LEGAL BASIS

Executive Order of the Commonwealth Governor No. 931, May 14, 1964.

II. DATE AGENCY STARTED OPERATIONS

1964.

III. CHIEF EXECUTIVE OR DIRECTOR; METHOD OF SELECTION

The post of Coordinator is vacant at present. It is to be appointed by the Governor.

IV. SUMMARY OF FUNCTIONS

Propose and, once accepted, implement governmental policies toward juvenile delinquency.

Coordinate the related activities among the various executive functions and harmonize these with relates judicial functions.

V. RESOURCES

Budget of expenditures for office operations during fiscal year 1964–65	$50, 000
Sources of income for fiscal year 1964–65:	
a. Federal appropriations	0
b. Commonwealth appropriations	50, 000
c. Other sources	0

Total real estate property owned and/or used:

a. Land facilities:	Cuerdas
1. Total used	0
2. Total owned by the Government of Puerto Rico	0

b. Buildings and office space facilities:	Square feet	Ratio of owned to used, percent
1. Total used	1, 000	------
2. Total owned by the Government of Puerto Rico	0	0

c. Rental paid for land, buildings and office space facilities used: $0.

All space facilities utilized have been ceded to this agency by the Commonwealth Land Administration who is lessee to a private proprietor.

VI. Personnel

	Total
Total number of functionaries and employees	6
Method of selection:	
a. Classified Commonwealth civil service	0
b. Classified under some other merit system	0
c. Other	6
Nationality (place born):	
a. Puerto Rico	6
b. United States	0
c. Other countries	0
Salary:	
a. Annual salary range	$2, 400–$12, 600
b. Annual median salary	$3, 500

EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENTS

DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE

I. Legal Basis

Section 6, article IV, Constitution of the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico.

II. Date Agency Started Operations

1917. The forerunner of the present Department of Agriculture was the Department of Agriculture and Labor created by the Organic Act for Puerto Rico (U.S.), 1917.

III. Chief Executive or Director; Method of Selection

Mr. Miguel A. Hernandez Agosto—Secretary. Appointed by the Governor with the advice and consent of the Commonwealth senate.

IV. Summary of Functions

Direct a coordinated agricultural plan geared toward the following goals: to raise and balance agricultural production and to promote an efficient marketing system for farm and cattle produce.

Undertake programs related to the following products and activities: sugar cane, coffee, tobacco, cattle, sale of agricultural equipment; conservation and development of forests, fish and wildlife resources; tenant relocation in rural communities and improvements of such communities; also, low cost housing and the establishment of small farms for needy farmers.

V. Resources

Budget of expenditures for office operations and capital improvements for fiscal year 1964–65	$19, 689, 801
Sources of income for fiscal year 1964–65:	
a. Federal appropriations	695, 347
b. Commonwealth appropriations	11, 693, 051
c. Other sources	7, 291, 413

Total real estate property owned and/or used:

a. Land facilities:	*Cuerdas*	*Ratio of owned to used, percent*
1. Total used	125,133	------
2. Total owned by the Government of Puerto Rico	125,133	100

b. Buildings and office space facilities:	*Square feet*	*Ratio of owned to used, percent*
1. Total used	512,037	------
2. Total owned by the Government of Puerto Rico	422,391	82.4

c. Rental paid for lands, buildings and office space facilities used:

Proprietor	*Annual rent*	*Percent*
1. Government of Puerto Rico	$2,282	2.3
2. Federal Government	0	0
3. Private	98,857	97.7
Total	101,139	100.0

VI. PERSONNEL

	Total
Total number of functionaries and employees	1,434
Method of selection:	
a. Classified Commonwealth civil service	1,411
b. Classified under some other merit system	18
c. Other	5
Nationality (place born):	
a. Puerto Rico	1,414
b. United States	4
c. Other countries	16
Salary:	
a. Annual salary range	$1,680–$19,000
b. Annual median salary	$3,250

DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE

I. LEGAL BASIS

Public Law (P.R.) No. 132, July 19, 1960.

II. DATE AGENCY STARTED OPERATIONS

1961.

III. CHIEF EXECUTIVE OR DIRECTOR; METHOD OF SELECTION

Mr. Jenaro Baquero—Secretary. Appointed by the Governor with the advice and consent of the Commonwealth senate.

IV. SUMMARY OF FUNCTIONS

Study the problems and handicaps facing commerce in Puerto Rico and make recommendations or take all necessary action for their mitigation.

Generate and disseminate information relevant to commerce.

Marshall financial and technical assistance, including counseling, as deemed needed for the various aspects of marketing and commercial practices.

Develop or stimulate the development of programs to train people for the commercial enterprise.

V. RESOURCES

Budget of expenditures for office operations during fiscal year 1964–65	$937, 500
Sources of income for fiscal year 1964–65:	
a. Federal appropriations	0
b. Commonwealth appropriations	937, 500
c. Other sources	0

Total real estate property owned and/or used:

a. Land facilities:	*Cuerdas*
1. Total used	0
2. Total owned by the Government of Puerto Rico	0

b. Buildings and office space facilities:	*Square feet*	*Ratio of owned to used, percent*
1. Total used	19, 638	-----
2. Total owned by the Government of Puerto Rico	0	0

c. Rental paid for land, buildings and office space facilities used:

Proprietor	*Annual rent*	*Percent*
1. Government of Puerto Rico	0	0
2. Federal Government	0	0
3. Private	$71, 440	100

VI. PERSONNEL

	Total
Total number of functionaries and employees	145
Method of selection:	
a. Classified Commonwealth civil service	144
b. Classified under some other merit system	0
c. Other	1
Nationality (place born):	
a. Puerto Rico	142
b. United States	1
c. Other countries	2
Salary:	
a. Annual salary range	$1, 680–$19, 000
b. Annual median salary	$4, 020

DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION

I. LEGAL BASIS

Section 6, article IV, Constitution of the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico.

II. DATE AGENCY STARTED OPERATIONS

1900.

III. CHIEF EXECUTIVE OR DIRECTOR; METHOD OF SELECTION

Dr. Angel Quintero Alfaro—Secretary. Appointed by the Governor with the advice and consent of the Commonwealth senate.

IV. SUMMARY OF FUNCTIONS

Plan and direct the public education system of Puerto Rico at the elementary and secondary school level.

Offer free academic instruction on a regular basis at the elementary and secondary levels; it also provides vocational and adult education.

Regulate and supervise instruction provided by private schools.

Offer library services to urban and rural population; also radio and television services.

Administer the following programs: Public school lunchrooms, shoes, transportation and scholarship for needy pupils.

V. RESOURCES

Budget of expenditures for office operations and capital improvements for fiscal year 1964–65	$133, 692, 466
Sources of income for fiscal year 1964–65:	
a. Federal appropriations	11, 668, 800
b. Commonwealth appropriations	121, 234, 038
c. Other sources	789, 128

Total real estate property owned and/or used:		
a. Land facilities:	*Cuerdas*	*Ratio of owned to used, percent*
1. Total used	7, 647. 58	------
2. Total owned by the Government of Puerto Rico	7, 626. 00	99. 7
b. Buildings and office space facilities:	*Square feet*	*Ratio of owned to used, percent*
1. Total used	10, 605, 505	------
2. Total owned by the Government of Puerto Rico	9, 692, 050	91. 4
c. Rental paid for land, buildings and office space facilities used:		
Proprietor	*Annual rent*	*Percent*
1. Government of Puerto Rico	$17, 000	5
2. Federal Government	0	0
3. Private	325, 053	95
Total	342, 053	100

VI. PERSONNEL

	Total
Total number of functionaries and employees	30, 761
Method of selection:	
a. Classified Commonwealth civil service	10, 872
b. Classified under some other merit sytem	19, 468
c. Other	421
Nationality (place born):	
Information withheld.	
Salary:	
a. Annual salary range	$1, 680–$19, 000
b. Annual median salary	$2, 780

DEPARTMENT OF FINANCE

I. LEGAL BASIS

Section 6, article IV, Constitution of the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico.

II. DATE AGENCY STARTED OPERATIONS

1811. The forerunner of the Department of Finance was "La Intendencia" created by Public Act (P.R.) of 1811 better known as Power's Law of 1811; the Organic Act (U.S.) of 1900 created the post of the Treasurer and the Organic Act (U.S.) of 1917 established a Department of the Treasury.

III. CHIEF EXECUTIVE OR DIRECTOR; METHOD OF SELECTION

Mr. Jorge Font Saldaña—Secretary. Appointed by the Governor with the advice and consent of the Commonwealth senate.

IV. SUMMARY OF FUNCTIONS

Direct the State tax and fiscal policy.

Administer the State tax laws.

Advise the Governor on fiscal matters.

Collect taxes and other moneys due the Commonwealth Treasury.

Keep custody of all public funds and disburse them according to budgetary and fiscal laws.

Exercise control and a priori intervention of all government accounts at the top administrative level, as well as of all departmental and agency accounts; oversee the sales and flow of securities, the banking activity and the insurance business.

Is the administrator of the Puerto Rican Lottery.

V. RESOURCES

Budget of expenditures for office operations during fiscal year 1964-65	$15,911,718
Sources of income for fiscal year 1964-65:	
a. Federal appropriations	0
b. Commonwealth appropriations	15,911,718
c. Other sources	0

Total real estate property owned and/or used:

a. Land facilities:	*Cuerdas*
1. Total used	0
2. Total owned by the Government of Puerto Rico	0

b. Buildings and office space facilities:	*Square feet*	*Ratio of owned to used percent*
1. Total used	445,751	------
2. Total owned by the Government of Puerto Rico	141,338	31.7

c. Rental paid for lands, buildings and office space facilities used:

Proprietor	*Annual rent*	*Percent*
1. Government of Puerto Rico	$20,184	3.5
2. Federal Government	0	0
3. Private	556,618	96.5
Total	576,802	100.0

VI. PERSONNEL

	Total
Total number of functionaries and employees	3, 565
Method of selection:	
a. Classified Commonwealth civil service	[1] 4, 013
b. Classified under some other merit system	0
c. Other	21
Nationality (place born):	
a. Puerto Rico	3, 559
b. United States	3
c. Other countries	3
Salary:	
a. Annual salary range	$1, 680–$19, 000
b. Annual median salary	$3, 230

[1] As of July 31, 1965 there were 469 classified positions vacant.

DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH

I. LEGAL BASIS

Section 6, article IV, Constitution of the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico.

II. DATE AGENCY STARTED OPERATIONS

1912. The forerunner of the Department of Health was originally created by Public Law (P.R.) No. 81, May 14, 1912.

III. CHIEF EXECUTIVE OR DIRECTOR, METHOD OF SELECTION

Dr. Guillermo Arbona—Secretary. Appointed by the Governor of Puerto Rico with the advice and consent of the Commonwealth senate.

IV. SUMMARY OF FUNCTIONS

Render medical services for the preservation of health and provide health and social services to needy persons.

Is responsible for the prevention of disease among the population.

V. RESOURCES

Budget of expenditures for office operations and capital improvements for fiscal year 1964–65	$72, 975, 808
Sources of income for fiscal year 1964–65:	
a. Federal appropriations	17, 045, 875
b. Commonwealth appropriations	55, 929, 933
c. Other sources	0

	Cuerdas	Ratio of owned to used, percent
Total real estate property owned and/or used:		
a. Land facilities:		
1. Total used	1, 124. 11	------
2. Total owned by the Government of Puerto Rico	1, 124. 11	100

	Square feet	Ratio of owned to used, percent
b. Buildings and office space facilities:[1]		
1. Total used	3,408,481	-------
2. Total owned by the Government of Puerto Rico	2,909,237	82

c. Rental paid for lands, buildings and office space facilities used:

Proprietor	Annual rent	Percent
1. Government of Puerto Rico	$37,018	8.4
2. Federal Government	0	0
3. Private	408,399	91.6
Total	445,417	100.0

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[1] Not included herein the T.B. Hospital in Cayey and 3 municipal health units, all property of the Government of Puerto Rico.

VI. Personnel

	Total
Total number of functionaries and employees	13,285
Method of selection:	
a. Classified Commonwealth civil service	13,156
b. Classified under some other merit system	99
c. Other	30
Nationality (place born):	
a. Puerto Rico	13,130
b. United States	15
c. Other countries	140
Salary:	
a. Annual salary range	$1,680–$19,000
b. Annual median salary	$2,460

DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

I. Legal Basis

Section 6, article IV, Constitution of the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico.

II. Date Agency Started Operations

1952.

III. Chief Executive or Director; Method of Selection

Sr. Rafael Hernandez Colon—Secretary. Appointed by the Governor of Puerto Rico with the advice and consent of the Commonwealth senate.

IV. Summary of Functions

Give counsel to the Governor, the members of the cabinet, the legislative assembly, to functionaries, and to Government agencies on legal aspects of their functions.

Represent the Commonwealth government and its functionaries in all claims and legal suits, criminal or civil, before the Supreme Court of Puerto Rico and before all Federal and State officials, boards, and courts, both, lower and appellate.

Represent the Secretary of the Treasury in tax cases before the Commonwealth Supreme Court and before the Tax Section of the Commonwealth Superior Court.

Represent the Commonwealth and its municipalities in all legal expropriations before the Superior and Supreme Courts.

Draft bills of legislation on request by the Governor, department, and agency heads, and the Legislative Assembly; submit the pertinent reports to the Governor and keep him informed about bills passed by the Legislative Assembly.

Investigate complaints about improper conduct among public personnel; guard against violation of the Antimonopoly Act (Public Law (P.R.) No. 77, June 25, 1964). On petition by certain functionaries of the executive branch, give judgement on matters pertaining laws and their interpretation; provide legal help and counsel to 2d and 3d class municipalities; also, provide them advice on the administration of municipal jail houses.

Administer and supervise the Commonwealth penal system, the Pardon Board, the Property Register and the Corporation of Prison Industries. On behalf of the Commonwealth, enter into agreements with other states, for the appearance of mainland prison inmates as witnesses in court and for the supervision of convicts on parole or under suspended sentence.

Appoint the general record keepers of the notarial districts; settle all matters pertaining thereto.

V. RESOURCES

Budget of expenditures for office operations and capital improvements for fiscal year 1964–65	$8,088,262
Sources of income for fiscal year 1964–65:	
a. Federal appropriations	0
b. Commonwealth appropriations	8,088,262
c. Other sources	0

Total real estate property owned and/or used:		
a. Land facilities:	*Cuerdas*	*Ratio of owned to used, percent*
1. Total used	[1] 823	------
2. Total owned by the Government of Puerto Rico	823	100
b. Buildings and office space facilities:	*Square feet*	*Ratio of owned to used, percent*
1. Total used	687,455	------
2. Total owned by the Government of Puerto Rico	606,377	88.2

c. Rental paid for lands, buildings and office space facilities used:

Proprietor	*Annual rent*	*Percent*
1. Government of Puerto Rico	$480	0.40
2. Federal Government	0	0
3. Private	120,272	99.60
Total	120,712	100.00

[1] Lands being utilized by the penal institutions for farming purposes.

VI. Personnel

	Total
Total number of functionaries and employees	1,594
Method of selection:	
a. Classified Commonwealth civil service	1,485
b. Classified under some other merit system	0
c. Other	109
Nationality (place born):	
a. Puerto Rico	1,587
b. United States	1
c. Other countries	6
Salary:	
a. Annual salary range	$1,680–$19,000
b. Annual median salary	$3,160

DEPARTMENT OF LABOR

I. Legal Basis

Section 6, article IV, Constitution of the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico.

II. Date Agency Started Operations

1931. The forerunners of the present Department of Labor were: "The Labor Bureau," later "The Department of Labor, Welfare, and Corrections" created by Public Law (P.R.) No. 84, March 1912; next there was a Department of Labor created by virtue of Public Law No. 677 (U.S.) February 1931 which amended the Organic Act (U.S.) for Puerto Rico of 1917.

III. Chief Executive or Director; Method of Selection

Mr. Alfredo Nazario—Secretary. Appointed by the Governor of Puerto Rico with the advice and consent of the Commonwealth senate.

IV. Summary of Functions

Execute the laws and regulations protecting labor.

Implement and develop a program to enhance the workers' opportunities for fruitful employment; improve their living and working conditions and foster their general welfare.

Devise and put into effect decrees on minimum wages, working hours, maximum work days and other working conditions in manufacturing, commerce, agriculture, and the service industries.

Promote, organize, and supervise apprenticeship training programs in industrial plants.

Mediate, conciliate and arbitrate in labor disputes assisting management and labor to maintain industrial peace; render accounting services to labor organizations.

Administer social security laws and programs covering: public drivers' industrial employment insurance, unemployment compensation in the sugar and tobacco industries, and general social compensation remedies.

Regulate and supervise employment contracts for Puerto Rican workers taken to work outside the Commonwealth and cooperate in the solution of personal adjustment problems among those migrant workers.

Administer, in coordination with the Commonwealth Department of Education, an English instruction program for migrant workers in the agricultural labor camps in the mainland.

Gather, analyze, and publish employment statistics.

V. RESOURCES

Budget of expenditures for office operations for fiscal year 1964–65	$11, 781, 145
Source of income for fiscal year 1964–65:	
a. Federal appropriations	6, 421, 400
b. Commonwealth appropriations	5, 359, 745
c. Other sources	0

Total real estate property owned and/or used:

a. Land facilities:	*Cuerdas*
1. Total used	0
2. Total owned by the Government of Puerto Rico	0

b. Buildings and office space facilities:	*Square feet*	*Ratio of owned to used, percent*
1. Total used	267, 550	------
2. Total used by the Government of Puerto Rico	0	0

c. Rental paid for lands, buildings and office space facilities used:

Proprietor	*Annual rent*	*Percent*
1. Government of Puerto Rico	0	0
2. Federal Government	0	0
3. Private	$408, 945	100

VI. PERSONNEL

	Total
Total number of functionaries and employees	2, 087
Method of selection:	
a. Classified Commonwealth civil service	1, 914
b. Classified under some other merit system	0
c. Other	173
Nationality (place born):	
a. Puerto Rico	2, 071
b. United States	13
c. Other countries	3
Salary:	
a. Annual salary range	$1, 680–$19, 000
b. Annual median salary	$3, 520

DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC WORKS

I. LEGAL BASIS

Section 6, article IV, Constitution of the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico.

II. DATE AGENCY STARTED OPERATIONS

1952. The forerunner of this department was the Department of the Interior established under the Spanish regime.

III. CHIEF EXECUTIVE OR DIRECTOR; METHOD OF SELECTION

Mr. Francisco Lizardi—Secretary. Appointed by the Governor of Puerto Rico with the advice and consent of the Commonwealth senate.

IV. SUMMARY OF FUNCTIONS

Carry out research, design, construction and conservation of roads, bridges, passages and public buildings.

Acquire measure and demarcate all lands to be used for public works.

Keep an inventory of all real estate property of the commonwealth of Puerto Rico.

Provide for traffic control, and regulation in Puerto Rico.

Implement the law regulating the issuance of motor vehicle drivers' licenses.

V. RESOURCES

Budget of expenditures for office operations and capital improvements for fiscal year 1964–65	$68, 626, 800
Sources of income for fiscal year 1964–65:	
a. Federal appropriations	7, 588, 289
b. Commonwealth appropriations	56, 400, 279
c. Other sources	4, 638, 232

Total real estate property owned and/or used:

a. Land facilities:	*Cuerdas*	*Ratio of owned to used, percent*
1. Total used	51. 84	------
2. Total owned by the Government of Puerto Rico	49. 80	96

b. Buildings and office space facilities:	*Square feet*	*Ratio of owned to used, percent*
1. Total used	158, 772	------
2. Total owned by the Government of Puerto Rico	115, 272	72. 6

c. Rental paid for lands, buildings and office space used:

Proprietor	*Annual rent*	*Percent*
1. Government of Puerto Rico	0	0
2. Federal Government	0	0
3. Private	$78, 850	100

VI. PERSONNEL

	Total
Total number of functionaries and employees	2, 929
Method of selection:	
a. Classified Commonwealth civil service	2, 904
b. Classified under some other merit system	0
c. Other	25
Nationality (place born):	
a. Puerto Rico	2, 914
b. United States	0
c. Other countries	15
Salary:	
a. Annual salary range	$1, 680–$19, 000
b. Annual median salary	$2, 970

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

I. LEGAL BASIS

Section 6, article IV, Constitution of the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico.

II. DATE AGENCY STARTED OPERATIONS

1952.

III. CHIEF EXECUTIVE OR DIRECTOR; METHOD OF SELECTION

Dr. Carlos J. Lastra—Secretary. Appointed by the Governor with the advice and consent of both houses of the Commonwealth legislative assembly.

IV. SUMMARY OF FUNCTIONS

Take care of all Commonwealth government protocolary functions and of all local affairs that have to do with the U.S. Federal State Department as well as with foreign states and international organizations.

Distribute information about the Commonwealth in foreign lands.

Plan and organize the celebration of official holidays honoring significant Commonwealth events, as well as international events sponsored by the State Department.

Make studies about international cooperation, and about economic and social affairs in other countries or international associations that may have any bearing on the Commonwealth programs and activities.

Examine and prepare reports on domestic and foreign corporations operating in Puerto Rico.

Keep a record of duly accredited consuls in the island, diplomatic emissaries and public notaries, all persons who qualify before Commonwealth boards of examiners to practice any profession or craft in Puerto Rico. Provide for the efficient operation of said boards.

Keep a file of all legal expropriations and other government documents.

Process all appointments made by the Governor and keep record of them.

Serve as registry and repository of: acts and proceedings of the Commonwealth Public Service Commission, trademarks, licenses, patents, the articles of incorporation of cooperatives, corporations, and associations; the rules and regulations issued by the Commonwealth government agencies.

Promulgate and distribute all laws, codes and other legal documents ratified by the Commonwealth legislative assembly.

Verify and issue certified copies of all executive orders and decrees.

Issue passports to citizens of the United States to travel abroad and charters to foreign corporations willing to establish operations in Puerto Rico.

V. RESOURCES

Budget of expenditures for office operations for fiscal year 1964–65	$1, 767, 860
Sources of income for fiscal year 1964–65:	
a. Federal appropriations	827, 960
b. Commonwealth appropriations	938, 400
c. Other sources	1, 500

Total real estate property owned and/or used:

a. Land facilities:	*Cuerdas*
1. Total used	0
2. Total owned by the Government of Puerto Rico	0

	Square feet	*Ratio of owned to used, percent*
b. Buildings and office space facilities:		
1. Total used	90, 303	------
2. Total owned by the Government of Puerto Rico	79, 969	88. 6

c. Rental paid for lands, buildings and office space facilities used:

Proprietor	*Annual rent*	*Percent*
1. Government of Puerto Rico	0	0
2. Federal Government	0	0
3. Private	$30, 000	100

VI. Personnel

	Total
Total number of functionaries and employees	148
Method of selection:	
a. Classified Commonwealth civil service	146
b. Classified under some other merit system	0
c. Other	2
Nationality (place born):	
a. Puerto Rico	147
b. United States	0
c. Other countries	1
Salary:	
a. Annual salary range	$1, 680–$19, 500
b. Annual median salary	$3, 460

EXECUTIVE AGENCIES

BOARD OF APPEALS ON CONSTRUCTIONS AND SUBDIVISIONS

I. Legal Basis

Public Laws (P.R.) No. 95 of 1959 as amended, and No. 95, June 29, 1963.

II. Date Agency Started Operations

1960.

III. Chief Executive or Director; Method of Selection

Mr. Federico A. Cordero—Acting President. Appointed by the Governor of Puerto Rico.

IV. Summary of Functions

Review on appeal those acts and decisions of the permits officer concerning the granting of licenses for buildings and sewage service construction and land use, as well as on acts and decisions of the Commonwealth planning board on minor land-use cases.

V. Resources

Budget of expenditures for office operations and capital improvements during fiscal year 1964–65	$106, 000
Sources of income for fiscal year 1964–65:	
a. Federal appropriations	0
b. Commonwealth appropriations	106, 000
c. Other	0

13

Total real estate property owned and/or used:

a. Land facilities:	*Cuerdas*
1. Total used	0
2. Total owned by the Government of Puerto Rico	0

b. Buildings and office space facilities:	*Square feet*	*Ratio of owned to used, percent*
1. Total used	3, 480	------
2. Total owned by the Government of Puerto Rico	0	0

c. Rental paid for lands, buildings and office space facilities used:

Proprietor	*Annual rent*	*Percent*
1. Government of Puerto Rico	0	0
2. Federal Government	0	0
3. Private	$8, 700	100

VI. PERSONNEL

	Total
Total number of functionaries and employees	19
Method of selection:	
a. Classified Commonwealth civil service	18
b. Classified under some other merit system	0
c. Other	1
Nationality (place born):	
a. Puerto Rico	18
b. United States	1
c. Other countries	0
Salary:	
a. Annual salary range	$1, 776–$14, 000
b. Annual median salary	$4, 340

BOARD OF TRUSTEES—RETIREMENT SYSTEMS

I. LEGAL BASIS

Articles 15 and 16 of Public Law (P.R.) No. 447, May 15, 1951, as amended, and article 9 of Public Law (P.R.) No. 12, October 19, 1954, as amended.

II. DATE AGENCY STARTED OPERATIONS

1951.

III. CHIEF EXECUTIVE OR DIRECTOR; METHOD OF SELECTION

Mr. Guillermo Irizarry—President. Elected among the five members of the Board.

IV. SUMMARY OF FUNCTIONS

Approve and promulgate regulations for the administration of the retirement systems.

Consider and adopt resolutions on matters referred to it by the Administrator in connection with the norms and/or revisions of the Systems.

Approve the investment of funds proposed by the Administrator.

Investigate and upon appeal of interested parties, settle disputes arising between members of the Systems and the Administrator.

V. RESOURCES

This office is part of the Personnel Office.

VI. PERSONNEL

The Board consists of five members. They are: the Director of the Bureau of the Budget, the Secretary of the Treasury, the Secretary of Labor and two other members appointed by the Governor of Puerto Rico for a term of 3 years each. The members of the Board do not receive remuneration for services rendered in this capacity.

CHILD COMMISSION

I. LEGAL BASIS

Public Law (P.R.) No. 49, July 1956.

II. DATE AGENCY STARTED OPERATIONS

1957.

III. CHIEF EXECUTIVE OR DIRECTOR; METHOD OF SELECTION

President—Position vacant. Appointed by the Governor of Puerto Rico with the advice and consent of the Commonwealth senate. There is one Executive Secretary in charge appointed under provisions of the Commonwealth civil service regulations.

IV. SUMMARY OF FUNCTIONS

Coordinate all child-related activities and services carried out by the departments and agencies of the Commonwealth and its municipalities; undertake on behalf of those agencies studies of legislative and administrative measures that may help in the prevention or mitigation of situations detrimental to the Puerto Rican children, as well as those measures that may foster their general welfare.

Promulgate the necessary bylaws pursuant to the objectives of this statute.

V. RESOURCES

Budget of expenditures for office operations and capital improvements during fiscal year 1964–65	$35,777
Sources of income for fiscal year 1964–65:	
a. Federal appropriations	0
b. Commonwealth appropriations	35,777
c. Other sources	0

Total real estate property owned and/or used:

a. Land facilities:	*Cuerdas*
1. Total used	0
2. Total owned by the Government of Puerto Rico	0

b. Buildings and office space facilities:	*Square feet*	*Ratio of owned to used, percent*
1. Total used	1,773	------
2. Total owned by the Government of Puerto Rico	0	0

c. Rental paid for land, buildings and office space facilities used:

Proprietor	*Annual rent*	*Percent*
1. Government of Puerto Rico	0	0
2. Federal Government	0	0
3. Private	$3,600	100

VI. PERSONNEL

	Total
Total number of functionaries and employees	8
Method of selection:	
a. Classified Commonwealth civil service	8
b. Classified under some other merit system	0
c. Other	0
Nationality (place born):	
a. Puerto Rico	8
b. United States	0
c. Other countries	0
Salary:	
a. Annual salary range	$1,560–$8,700
b. Annual median salary	$4,000

COMMISSION FOR IMPROVEMENT OF ISOLATED COMMUNITIES

I. LEGAL BASIS

Public Law (P.R.) No. 139, July 19, 1960.

II. DATE AGENCY STARTED OPERATIONS

1960.

III. CHIEF EXECUTIVE OR DIRECTOR; METHOD OF SELECTION

Mr. Osvaldo Bonet Fussa—Executive Director. Appointed by the members of the Commission.

IV. SUMMARY OF FUNCTIONS

Plan, organize, direct, and supervise programs and activities needed for the betterment of living conditions in those isolated rural communities that have not had their adequate share of the economic development of Puerto Rico.

V. RESOURCES

Budget of expenditures for office operations and capital improvements during fiscal year 1964–65	$1,703,500
Sources of income for fiscal year 1964–65:	
a. Federal appropriations	0
b. Commonwealth appropriations	1,703,500
c. Other	0

Total real estate property owned and/or used:

a. Land facilities:	Cuerdas
1. Total used	0
2. Total owned by the Government of Puerto Rico	0

b. Buildings and office space facilities:	Square feet	Ratio of owned to used, percent
1. Total used	8,003	------
2. Total owned by the Government of Puerto Rico	0	0

c. Rental paid for land, buildings and office space facilities used:

Proprietor	Annual rent	Percent
1. Government of Puerto Rico	0	0
2. Federal Government	0	0
3. Private	$5,981	100

VI. Personnel

	Total
Total number of functionaries and employees	107
Method of selection:	
a. Classified Commonwealth civil service	0
b. Classified under some other merit system	0
c. Other	107
Nationality (place born):	
a. Puerto Rico	106
b. United States	0
c. Other countries	1
Salary:	
a. Annual salary range	$1,560-$10,800
b. Annual median salary	$4, 880

COMMITTEE FOR THE SETTLEMENT OF MUNICIPAL COMPLAINTS

I. Legal Basis

Articles 2 and 29 of Public Law (P.R.) No. 4, December 7, 1955.

II. Date Agency Started Operations

1956.

III. Chief Executive or Director; Method of Selection

Mr. Juan Enrique Geigel—President. Appointed by the Governor of Puerto Rico with the advice and consent of the Commonwealth senate.

IV. Summary of Functions

Hear complaints raised by the Governor of Puerto Rico, the municipal assemblies or any citizen, thereof, against mayors for reason of immoral conduct or any illegal act while in office. It is empowered to carry out investigations whenever there is a conflict between a municipal assembly and its mayor.

V. Resources

Budget of expenditures for office operations and capital improvements during fiscal year 1964-65	$25, 000
Sources of income for fiscal year 1964-65:	
a. Federal appropriations	0
b. Commonwealth appropriations	25, 000
c. Other sources	0

Total real estate property owned and/or used:

a. Land facilities:	Cuerdas
1. Total used	0
2. Total owned by the Government of Puerto Rico	0

b. Buildings and office space facilities:	Square feet	Ratio of owned to used, percent
1. Total used	64	------
2. Total owned by the Government of Puerto Rico	0	0

c. Rental paid for land, buildings and office space facilities used: $0.[1]

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[1] Space utilized is a privately owned property.

VI. PERSONNEL

	Total
Total number of functionaries and employees	[1] 1
Method of selection:	
a. Classified Commonwealth civil service	1
b. Classified under some other merit system	0
c. Other	0
Nationality (place born):	
a. Puerto Rico	1
b. United States	0
c. Other countries	0
Salary:	
a. Annual salary range	$4,032
b. Annual median salary	n/a

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[1] There are 3 attorneys serving in the Commission in an ad honorem basis.

COOPERATIVE DEVELOPMENT ADMINISTRATION

I. LEGAL BASIS

Public Law (P.R.) No. 4, May 1, 1957, as amended.

II. DATE OFFICE STARTED OPERATIONS

1957.

III. CHIEF EXECUTIVE OR DIRECTOR; METHOD OF SELECTION

Mr. Abimael Hernandez—Administrator. Appointed by the Governor of Puerto Rico with the advice and consent of the Commonwealth senate.

IV. SUMMARY OF FUNCTIONS

Develop an integrated, vigorous cooperative movement.

Foster the development of agricultural, credit, consumer, and service cooperatives in urban as well as rural areas.

Seek compliance with principles and regulations of cooperativism.

Approve or reject charters of incorporation to applicants for cooperatives registration.

V. RESOURCES

Budget of expenditures for office operations and capital improvements for fiscal year 1964–65	$2,781,463
Sources of income for fiscal year 1964–65:	
a. Federal appropriations	0
b. Commonwealth appropriations	2,781,463
c. Other	0

Total real estate property owned and/or used:		
a. Land facilities:	Cuerdas	Ratio of owned to used, percent
1. Total used	0.17	------
2. Total owned by the Government of Puerto Rico	0	0
b. Buildings and office space facilities:	Square feet	Ratio of owned to used, percent
1. Total used	23,932	------
2. Total owned by the Government of Puerto Rico	0	0
c. Rental paid for lands, buildings and office space facilities used:		

Proprietor	Annual rent	Percent
1. Government of Puerto Rico	0	0
2. Federal Government	0	0
3. Private	$35,117	100

VI. Personnel

	Total
Total number of functionaries and employees	[1] 293
Method of selection:	
a. Classified Commonwealth civil service	292
b. Classified under some other merit system	0
c. Other	1
Nationality (place born): [1]	
a. Puerto Rico	261
b. United States	0
c. Other countries	0
Salary:	
a. Annual salary range	$1,680–$16,000
b. Annual median salary	$4,140

[1] Only 261 positions were filled at the time of this survey.

ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT ADMINISTRATION

I. Legal Basis

Reorganization Plan No. 10 of 1950, Public Law (P.R.) No. 423 of 1950.

II. Date Agency Started Operations

1950.

III. Chief Executive or Director; Method of Selection

Mr. Rafael Durand Manzanal—Administrator. Appointed by the Governor of Puerto Rico with the advice and consent of the Commonwealth Senate.

IV. Summary of Functions

Foster the industrial development of Puerto Rico.
Develop tourism for Puerto Rico.
Promote sales of Puerto Rican rum in the mainland market.

V. Resources

Budget of expenditures for office operations and capital improvements for fiscal year 1964–65	$7,929,415
Sources of income for fiscal year 1964–65:	
a. Federal appropriations	0
b. Commonwealth appropriations	7,929,415
c. Other sources	0

Total real estate property owned and/or used:	Cuerdas	Ratio of owned to used, percent
a. Land facilities:		
1. Total used	2.24	------
2. Total owned by the Government of Puerto Rico	1.85	82.6

b. Buildings and office space facilities:	Square feet	Ratio of owned to used, percent
1. Total used	[1] 89, 370	-------
2. Total owned by the Government of Puerto Rico	0	0

c. Rental paid for lands, buildings and office space facilities used: Proprietor	Annual rent	Percent
1. Government of Puerto Rico	$14, 207	4. 7
2. Federal Government	0	0
3. Private	[2] 288, 493	95. 3
	302, 700	100. 0

[1] Included herein 25,498 square feet occupied by offices rented in United States and Canada.

[2] Included herein $165,608 paid as rent for offices in United States and Canada.

VI. Personnel

	Total
Total number of functionaries and employees	490
Method of selection:	
a. Classified Commonwealth civil service	0
b. Classified under some other merit system	290
c. Other	200
Nationality (place born): [1]	
a. Puerto Rico	421
b. United States	17
c. Other countries	3
Salary:	
a. Annual salary range	$1, 680–$19, 000
b. Annual median salary	$4, 320

[1] There are 49 employees under contract whose nationality was not provided.

ECONOMIC STABILIZATION ADMINISTRATION

I. Legal Basis

Public Law (P.R.) No. 97, June 19, 1953.

II. Date Agency Started Operations

1953.

III. Chief Executive or Director; Method of Selection

Mr. Juan Perez Colon—Administrator. Appointed by the Governor of Puerto Rico with the advice and consent of the Commonwealth senate.

IV. Summary of Functions

Is responsible for the execution of the following functions: price control, house and commercial buildings rent control, retail and installment-plan sales control, regulation of credit corporations, inspection of weights and measures; safeguard the flow of staple commodities and general consumer orientation.

V. Resources

Budget of expenditures for office operations during fiscal year 1964–65	$556,000
Sources of income for fiscal year 1964–65:	
a. Federal appropriations	0
b. Commonwealth appropriations	3,000,000
c. Other sources	0

Total real estate property owned and/or used:

a. Land facilities:	*Cuerdas*
1. Total used	0
2. Total owned by the Government of Puerto Rico	0

b. Buildings and office space facilities:	*Square feet*	*Ratio of owned to used, percent*
1. Total used	65,029	------
2. Total owned by the Government of Puerto Rico	0	0

c. Rental paid for land, buildings and office space facilities used:

Proprietor	*Annual rent*	*Percent*
1. Government of Puerto Rico	0	0
2. Federal Government	0	0
3. Private	$95,192	100

VI. Personnel

	Total
Total number of functionaries and employees	146
Method of selection:	
a. Classified Commonwealth civil service	145
b. Classified under some other merit system	0
c. Other	1
Nationality (place born):	
a. Puerto Rico	144
b. United States	0
c. Other countries	2
Salary:	
a. Annual salary range	$1,800–$14,500
b. Annual median salary	$3,460

FIRE SERVICE

I. Legal Basis

Public Law (P.R.) No. 158, May 9, 1942, as amended.

II. Date Agency Started Operations

1942.

III. Chief Executive or Director; Method of Selection

Mr. Raul Gandara Cartagena—Fire Chief. Appointed by the Governor of Puerto Rico with the advice and consent of the Commonwealth senate.

IV. Summary of Functions

Prevent and fight fires.

Prescribe safety rules and regulations for the prevention of fires.

Organize and direct a Firemen Training School.

V. RESOURCES

Budget of expenditures for office operations and capital improvements during fiscal year 1964–65	$1, 787, 735
Sources of income for fiscal year 1964–65:	
a. Federal appropriations	0
b. Commonwealth appropriations	1, 787, 735
c. Other sources	0

Total real estate property owned and/or used:

a. Land facilities:	*Cuerdas*	*Ratio of owned to used, percent*
1. Total used	10	------
2. Total owned by the Government of Puerto Rico	10	100

b. Buildings and office space facilities:	*Square feet*	*Ratio of owned to used, percent*
1. Total used	56, 792	------
2. Total owned by the Government of Puerto Rico	56, 792	100

c. Rental paid for land, buildings and office space facilities used: $0.

VI. PERSONNEL

	Total
Total number of functionaries and employees	640
Method of selection:	
a. Classified Commonwealth civil service	639
b. Classified under some other merit system	0
c. Other	1
Nationality (place born):	
a. Puerto Rico	638
b. United States	1
c. Other countries	1
Salary:	
a. Annual salary range	$1, 440–$14, 000
b. Annual median salary	$2, 970

INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION

I. LEGAL BASIS

Public Law (P.R.) No. 45, April 18, 1935 as amended.

II. DATE AGENCY STARTED OPERATIONS

1935.

III. CHIEF EXECUTIVE OR DIRECTOR; METHOD OF SELECTION

Mr. Rafael Buscaglia, Jr.—President. Appointed by the Governor of Puerto Rico with the advice and consent of the Commonwealth senate.

IV. SUMMARY OF FUNCTIONS

Intervene and settle those cases involving compensation for work-related accidents in which the State insurance fund and the injured party or his beneficiaries cannot reach an accord.

Resolve and decide on cases involving noninsured employers, over which it originally wields jurisdiction.

Upon insured employers' request, review the State Insurance Fund Administrator's decisions regarding fixing premiums for groups of occupations or industries, employers' status, or any other matter objected by the employer.

Review all decisions of the Commonwealth Secretary of Labor related with social security benefits for the public drivers of Puerto Rico.

Deal with the transmittal of tutorship proceedings involving minors and mentally handicapped adults, attendant to the disbursement of compensation awarded by the State Insurance Fund Administrator.

Deal with the transmittal of tutorship proceedings involving minors and mentally handicapped adults, attendant to the disbursement of compensation awarded by the State Insurance Fund Administrator.

Deal with the transmittal of cases involving Puerto Ricans who suffer injuries while working in the mainland and return to the Island before their cases have been adjudicated by mainland compensation boards.

V. RESOURCES

Budget of expenditures for office operations and capital improvements during fiscal year 1964–65	$377, 200
Sources of income for fiscal year 1964–65:	
a. Federal appropriations	0
b. Commonwealth appropriations	0
c. Other sources	377, 200

Total real estate property owned and/or used:		Ratio of owned to used, percent
a. Land facilities:	Cuerdas	
1. Total used	0. 18	------
2. Total owned by the Government of Puerto Rico	0. 18	100
b. Buildings and office space facilities:	Square feet	Ratio of owned to used, percent
1. Total used	7, 133	------
2. Total owned by the Government of Puerto Rico	7, 133	100
c. Rental payment for land, buildings and office space facilities used: $0.	-------	------

VI. PERSONNEL

	Total
Total number of functionaries and employees	73
Method of selection:	
a. Classified Commonwealth civil service	64
b. Classified under some other merit system	6
c. Other	3
Nationality (place born):	
a. Puerto Rico	72
b. United States	0
c. Other countries	1
Salary:	
a. Annual salary range	$1, 680–$14, 500
b. Annual median salary	$2, 170

INSTITUTE OF PRIMARIES AND INTERNAL PARTY ELECTIONS

I. Legal Basis

Public Law (P.R.) No. 62, June 19, 1956 as amended.

II. Date Agency Started Operations

Information withheld.

III. Chief Executive or Director; Method of Selection

Mr. Ernesto Mieres Calimano—General Superintendent of Elections. Appointed by the Governor of Puerto Rico with the advice and consent of the Commonwealth senate.

IV. Summary of Functions

Provide facilities for primary elections among political parties.
Prepare and keep an up to date register of voters for those parties.
Certify election returns to the central directing bodies of the parties concerned.
Establish qualifications and disqualifying criteria for candidates.

V. Resources

Budget of expenditures for office operations during fiscal year 1964–65	$41, 860
Sources of income for fiscal year 1964–65:	
a. Federal appropriations	0
b. Commonwealth appropriations	41, 860
c. Other sources	0

Total real estate property owned and/or used:
Agency utilizes space belonging to the State Board of Elections.

VI. Personnel

At the time of this survey the agency was not fulfilling any particular operation since a new statute (Public Law (P.R.) No. 2, October 1965) provides for a new administrative organization, which will be structured soon.

LABOR RELATIONS BOARD

I. Legal Basis

Public Law (P.R.) No. 130, May 8, 1956; as amended.

II. Date Agency Started Operations

1946.

III. Chief Executive or Director; Method of Selection

Dr. Antonio J. Colorado—President. Appointed by the Governor of Puerto Rico with the advice and consent of the Commonwealth senate.

IV. Summary of Functions

Establish industrial peace in all areas under its legal jurisdiction.
Protect the workers' rights.
Upon petition filed, investigage matters concerning questions of representation.
Determine the representatives designated or elected for purposes of collective bargaining by a majority of the employees in an appropriate unit.
Investigate matters relating to unfair labor practices.

Assist in the enforcement of arbitration awards issued by competent arbitration organizations.

V. RESOURCES

Budget of expenditures for office operations and capital improvements during fiscal year 1964–65	$224, 370
Sources of income for fiscal year 1964–65:	
a. Federal appropriations	0
b. Commonwealth appropriations	224, 370
c. Other sources	0

Total real estate property owned and/or used:

a. Land facilities:	*Cuerdas*
1. Total used	0
2. Total owned by the Government of Puerto Rico	0

b. Buildings and office space facilities:	*Square feet*	*Ratio of owned to used, percent*
1. Total used	5, 500	------
2. Total owned by the Government of Puerto Rico	0	0

c. Rental paid for land, buildings and office space facilites used:

Proprietor	*Annual rent*	*Percent*
1. Government of Puerto Rico	0	0
2. Federal Government	0	0
3. Private	$7, 516	100

VI. PERSONNEL

	Total
Total number of functionaries and employees	34
Method of selection:	
a. Classified Commonwealth civil service	32
b. Classified under some other merit system	1
c. Other	1
Nationality (place born):	
a. Puerto Rico	34
b. United States	0
c. Other countries	0
Salary:	
a. Annual salary range	$1, 680–$14, 000
b. Annual median salary	$3, 860

NATIONAL GUARD

I. LEGAL BASIS

Public Law (P.R.) No. 28, April 12, 1917, as amended.

II. DATE AGENCY STARTED OPERATIONS

1919.

III. CHIEF EXECUTIVE OR DIRECTOR; METHOD OF SELECTION

Mr. Carlos F. Chardon (colonel)—Acting Adjutant General. Appointed by the Governor of Puerto Rico with the advice and consent of the Commonwealth senate.

IV. SUMMARY OF FUNCTIONS

It functions in a dual capacity: (1) As units of the Army National Guard and Air National Guard of the United States its mission is to provide well organized, well trained, and well equipped units ready for call into active military duty in case of a national emergency; (2) As units of the Puerto Rico National Guard its task is to provide enough organizations well trained and equipped, ready for the protection of life and property; for the preservation of peace, order and the public safety, whenever the Commonwealth government so requests.

V. RESOURCES

Budget of expenditures for office operations and capital improvements for fiscal year 1964–65	$9,494,243
Sources of income for fiscal year 1964–65:	
a. Federal appropriations	8,476,431
b. Commonwealth appropriations	1,016,680
c. Other sources	1,132

Total real estate property owned and/or used:

a. Land facilities:	*Cuerdas*	*Ratio of owned to used, percent*
1. Total used	854.6	------
2. Total owned by the Government of Puerto Rico	106.8	12.5

b. Buildings and office space facilities:	*Square feet*	*Ratio of owned to used, percent*
1. Total used	651,003	------
2. Total owned by the Government of Puerto Rico	385,868	47.4

c. Rental paid for lands, buildings and office space facilities used:

Proprietor	*Annual rent*	*Percent*
1. Government of Puerto Rico	$14,617	46.9
2. Federal Government	0	0
3. Private	16,576	53.1
Total	$31,193	100.0

VI. PERSONNEL

	Total
Total number of functionaries and employees	673
Method of selection:	
a. Classified Commonwealth civil service	0
b. Classified under some other merit system	491
c. Other	182
Nationality (place born):	
a. Puerto Rico	655
b. United States	14
c. Other countries	4
Salary:	
a. Annual salary range	$1,680–$18,000
b. Annual median salary	$5,180

OFFICE OF INDUSTRIAL TAX EXEMPTION

I. Legal Basis

Section 5 (b)(1) of Public Law (P.R.) No. 57, June 13, 1963, as amended.

II. Date Agency Started Operations

1947.

III. Chief Executive or Director; Method of Selection

Mr. C. Arzuaga Algarin—Director. Appointed by the Governor of Puerto Rico with the advice and consent of the Commonwealth senate.

IV. Summary of Functions

Administer the laws that grant tax exemption to those industries and hotels established and/or developed under the auspices of the Commonwealth government industrialization program.

V. Resources

Budget of expenditures for office operations and capital improvements during fiscal year 1964–65	$81,200
Sources of income for fiscal year 1964–65:	
a. Federal appropriations	0
b. Commonweatlh appropriations	81,200
c. Other sources	0

Total real estate property owned and/or used:

a. Land facilities:	*Cuerdas*	
1. Total used	0	0
2. Total owned by the Government of Puerto Rico	0	0

b. Buildings and office space facilities:	*Square feet*	*Ratio of owned to used, percent*
1. Total used	2,129	------
2. Total owned by the Government of Puerto Rico	0	0

c. Rental paid for land, buildings and office space facilities used:

Proprietor	*Annual rent*	*Percent*
1. Government of Puerto Rico	0	0
2. Federal Government	0	0
3. Private	3,140	100

VI. Personnel

	Total
Total number of functionaries and employees	19
Method of selection:	
a. Classified Commonwealth civil service	18
b. Classified under some other merit system	0
c. Other	1
Nationality (place born):	
a. Puerto Rico	19
b. United States	0
c. Other countries	0
Salary:	
a. Annual salary range	$1,680–$14,000
b. Annual median salary	$3,860

OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

I. Legal Basis

Public Law (P.R.) No. 345, May 12, 1947.

II. Date Agency Started Operations

1947.

III. Chief Executive or Director; Method of Selection

Mr. Antonio Cuevas Viret—Director. Appointed by the Governor of Puerto Rico with the advice and consent of the Commonwealth senate for a term of six years.

IV. Summary of Functions

Establish and maintain adequate rules for the public personnel administration.

Plan and administer free competitive test programs for the selection of personnel for public service.

Establish and revise periodically classification and compensation plans for Government employees.

Approve and register personnel appointments and changes for employees in the competitive and noncompetitive services.

Develop and administer scholarship and training programs for Government employees.

Administer two retirement systems—one for Commonwealth employees, and another for the judiciary.

Procure and administer medical services plans for the Government employees.

Administer the "Manuel A. Perez" Guerdon Program for meritorious services rendered by public officials and government employees.

Administer a loan program to finance cultural tours of Government employees.

Advise, on matters dealing with personnel administration, all those municipalities desiring to establish local merit systems.

Promulgate and enforce rules of proper conduct for public employees; investigate matters dealing with personnel problems and complaints related to the public service.

V. Resources

Budget of expenditures for office operations and capital improvements during fiscal year 1964–65	$1, 470, 593
Sources of income for fiscal year 1964–65:	
a. Federal appropriations	0
b. Commonwealth appropriations	1, 149, 820
c. Other sources	320, 773

Total real estate property owned and/or used:		
a. Land facilities:	*Cuerdas*	*Ratio of owned to used, percent*
1. Total used	1. 10	------
2. Total owned by the Government of Puerto Rico	. 87	79
b. Buildings and office space facilities:	*Square feet*	*Ratio of owned to used, percent*
1. Total used	42, 141	------
2. Total owned by the Government of Puerto Rico	32, 759	78
c. Rental paid for land, buildings and office space facilities used:		

Proprietor	*Annual rent*	*Percent*
1. Government of Puerto Rico	0	0
2. Federal Government	0	0
3. Private	$13, 200	100

VI. Personnel

	Total
Total number of functionaries and employees	[1] 224
Method of selection:	
a. Classified Commonwealth civil service	223
b. Classified under some other merit system	0
c. Other	1
Nationality (place born):	
a. Puerto Rico	224
b. United States of America	0
c. Other countries	0
Salary:	
a. Annual salary range	[2] $1, 560–$14, 400
b. Annual median salary	$3, 060

[1] Not included herein are 35 positions which were vacant at the time of the survey.

[2] The Director's salary is set by law at $16,000.

OFFICE OF THE COMMONWEALTH OF PUERTO RICO IN WASHINGTON

I. Legal Basis

Public Laws (P.R.) No. 224, May 11, 1945; No. 17, December 5, 1947, and No. 246, May 8, 1950 as amended.

II. Date Agency Started Operations

1945.

III. Chief Executive or Director; Method of Selection

Mr. Jorge Felices Pietrantoni—Director. Appointed by the Governor of Puerto Rico

IV. Summary of Functions

Work jointly with the P.R. Resident Commissioner in Washington furnishing personnel, equipment and other services which may contribute to the best performance of that office.

Exchange information about Puerto Rico with Federal agencies and functionaries.

Prepare and furnish adequate information to industrial and commercial firms, students, foreign governments, and other intities interested in Puerto Rico.

Submit to the Governor or the agencies of the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, pertinent reports on legislation or administrative decisions of the United States Government; and on other matters directly concerning Puerto Rico.

V. Resources

Budget of expenditures for office operations during fiscal year 1964–65	$116, 130
Sources of income for fiscal year 1964–65:	
a. Federal appropriations	0
b. Commonwealth appropriations	116, 130
c. Other sources	0

Total real estate property owned and/or used:

a. Land facilities:	Cuerdas	Ratio o owned to used, percent
1. Total used	.07	------
2. Total owned by the Government of Puerto Rico	.07	100

b. Buildings and office space facilities:	Square feet	Ratio of owned to used, percent
1. Totals used	2.875	------
2. Total owned by the Government of Puerto Rico	2.875	100
c. Rental paid for land, buildings and office space facilities used: $0.		------

VI. Personnel

	Total
Total number of functionaries and employees	9
Method of selection:	
a. Classified Commonwealth civil service	0
b. Classified under some other merit system	0
c. Other	9
Nationality (place born):	
a. Puerto Rico	7
b. United States	0
c. Other countries	2
Salary:	
a. Annual salary range	$1,650–$15,305
b. Annual median salary	$7,500

OFFICE OF TRANSPORTATION

I. Legal Basis

Public Laws (P.R.) No. 49, August 4, 1947 and No. 163, August 12, 1948.

II. Date Agency Started Operations

1948.

III. Chief Executive or Director; Method of Selection

Mr. Enrique Rodriguez Santiago—Director Appointed by the Governor of Puerto Rico with the advice and consent of the Commonwealth senate.

IV. Summary of Functions

Provide a centralized transportation service.

Purchase directly and keep under its jurisdiction, administration and control, all motor vehicles and spare parts assigned to the executive and judicial branches.

Promulgate regulations with the approval of the Governor of Puerto Rico, for the acquisition, use, maintenance, sale and other matters connected with said motor vehicles.

V. Resources

Budget of expenditures for office operations and capital improvements during fiscal year 1964–65	$2,157,000
Sources of income for fiscal year 1964–65:	
a. Federal appropriations	0
b. Commonwealth appropriations	0
c. Other sources	2,157,000

Total real estate property owned and/or used:

a. Land facilities:	*Cuerdas*	*Ratio of owned to used, percent*
1. Total used	9.16	-------
2. Total owned by the Government of Puerto Rico	8.28	90.4

b. Buildings and office space facilities:	*Square feet*	*Ratio of owned to used, percent*
1. Total used	82,078	-------
2. Total owned by the Government of Puerto Rico	69,756	85

c. Rental paid for land, buildings and office space facilities used:

Proprietor	*Annual rent*	*Percent*
1. Government of Puerto Rico	0	0
2. Federal Government	0	0
3. Private	$7,800	100

VI. Personnel

	Total
Total number of functionaries and employees	315
Method of selection:	
a. Classified Commonwealth civil service	0
b. Classified under some other merit system	0
c. Other	315
Nationality (place born):	
a. Puerto Rico	315
b. United States	0
c. Other countries	0
Salary:	
a. Annual salary range	$1,680–$14,000
b. Annual median salary	$2,520

PERSONNEL BOARD

I. Legal Basis

Public Law (P.R.) No. 345, May 12, 1947.

II. Date Agency Started Operations

1947.

III. Chief Executive or Director; Method of Selection

Dr. Guillermo Barbosa—President. Appointed by the Governor of Puerto Rico with the advice and consent of the Commonwealth senate.

IV. Summary of Functions

On appeal, and at the request of interested parties, investigate and decide on controversies arising in connection with the following matters: dismissals, suspensions, lay-offs, demotions, separation of employees during probationary period because of political, religious or racial reasons, rejection of applications for examination, annulment of examination and removal of names from list of eligibles.

Make any investigations which it may consider necessary regarding the public personnel administration, and make pertinent recommendations to the Director of Personnel, the Governor, or the Legislative Assembly.

V. RESOURCES

Budget of expenditures for office operations and capital improvements during fiscal year 1964–65	[1] $20,945
Sources of income for fiscal year 1964–65:	
a. Federal appropriations	0
b. Commonwealth appropriations	20,945
c. Other sources	0

Total real estate property owned and/or used:

a. Land facilities:	*Cuerdas*
1. Total used	0
2. Total owned by the Government of Puerto Rico	0

b. Buildings and office space facilities:	*Square feet*	*Ratio of owned to used, percent*
1. Total used	1,508	------
2. Total owned by the Government of Puerto Rico	1,508	100

c. Rental paid for land, buildings and office space facilities used: $0.

The space facilities used by the Board are property of the Office of Personnel. As such, it doesn't pay rent for their use.

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[1] Included in the budget of the Office of Personnel.

VI. PERSONNEL

	Total
Total number of functionaries and employees	[1] 4
Method of selection:	
a. Classified Commonwealth civil service	4
b. Classified under some other merit system	0
c. Other	0
Nationality (place born):	
a. Puerto Rico	4
b. United States	0
c. Other countries	0

Salary:

The members of the Board receive a per diem allowance of $20 for each day in session up to a maximum of $2,400 per year.

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[1] All four (4) are included in the budget of the Office of Personnel.

POLICE COMMISSION

I. LEGAL BASIS

Public Law (P.R.) No. 77, June 22, 1956.

II. DATE AGENCY STARTED OPERATIONS

1908.

III. CHIEF EXECUTIVE OR DIRECTOR; METHOD OF SELECTION

Mr. Mariano Villaronga—President. Appointed by the Governor of Puerto Rico with the advice and consent of the Commonwealth senate.

IV. SUMMARY OF FUNCTIONS

Hear and adjudicate in public hearing appeals, by members of the police force being penalized by the Police Superintendent. After proper hearing, the commission may confirm, modify or reverse the penalty imposed by the Superintendent.

V. RESOURCES

Budget: The Commission operates within the budget of the police of Puerto Rico.

Total real estate property owned and/or used:		
a. Land facilities:	*Cuerdas*	*Ratio of owned to used, percent*
1. Total used	0.32	------
2. Total owned by the Government of Puerto Rico	.32	100
b. Buildings and office space facilities:	*Square feet*	*Ratio of owned to used, percent*
1. Total used	2,800	------
2. Total owned by the Government of Puerto Rico	2,800	100

c. Rental paid for land, buildings and office space facilities used: $0.

VI. PERSONNEL

	Total
Total number of functionaries and employees	5
Method of selection:	
a. Classified Commonwealth civil service	5
b. Classified under some other merit system	0
c. Other	0
Nationality (place born):	
a. Puerto Rico	5
b. United States	0
c. Other countries	0
Salary:	
a. Annual salary range	$1,680–$5,040
b. Annual median salary	$3,500

POLICE OF PUERTO RICO

I. LEGAL BASIS

Public Laws (P.R.) of January 31, 1901, and No. 77 of 1956, as amended.

II. DATE AGENCY STARTED OPERATIONS

1901.

III. CHIEF EXECUTIVE OR DIRECTOR; METHOD OF SELECTION

Mr. Salvador T. Roig—Superintendent. Appointed by the Governor of Puerto Rico with the advice and consent of the Commonwealth senate.

IV. SUMMARY OF FUNCTIONS

Protect personal life and property.

Maintain the public order.

Prevent, detect, and repress crime.

Compel obedience to the laws, municipal ordinances and rules and regulations issued pursuant to law.

V. RESOURCES

Budget of expenditures for office operations and capital improvements during fiscal year 1964–65	$22,720,400
Sources of income for fiscal year 1964–65:	
a. Federal appropriations	0
b. Commonwealth appropriations	22,720,400
c. Other sources	0

Total real estate property owned and/or used:

a. Land facilities	*Cuerdas*	*Ratio of owned to used, percent*
1. Total used	77.89	------
2. Total owned by the Government of Puerto Rico	57.44	73.7

b. Buildings and office space facilities:	*Square feet*	*Ratio of owned to used, percent*
1. Total used	487,301	------
2. Total owned by the Government of Puerto Rico	216,462	44.2

c. Rental paid for land, buildings and office space facilities used:

Proprietor	*Annual rent*	*Percent*
1. Government of Puerto Rico	$3,900	1.8
2. Federal Government	1,350	.7
3. Private	209,326	97.5
Total	214,576	100.0

VI. PERSONNEL

	Total
Total number of functionaries and employees	5,765
Method of selection:	
a. Classified Commonwealth civil service	765
b. Classified under some other merit system	5,000
c. Other	0
Nationality (place born):	
a. Puerto Rico	5,764
b. United States	0
c. Other countries	1
Salary:	
a. Annual salary range	$1,680–$18,000
b. Annual median salary	$3,020

PUBLIC RECREATION AND PARKS ADMINISTRATION

I. LEGAL BASIS

Reorganization Plan No. 2 of 1950; Public Laws (P.R.) No. 16, No. 174 and No. 429 of 1951; No. 7 and No. 75 of 1953; No. 98 of 1954; Joint Resolution No. 37 of 1957; Public Law (P.R.) No. 132 of 1958; Joint Resolution No. 54 of 1961; and Public Laws (P.R.) No. 123 of 1961 and No. 56 of 1962.

II. DATE AGENCY STARTED OPERATIONS

1950.

III. CHIEF EXECUTIVE OR DIRECTOR; METHOD OF SELECTION

Mr. Octabio Wys—Administrator. Appointed by the Governor of Puerto Rico with the advice and consent of the Commonwealth senate.

IV. SUMMARY OF FUNCTIONS

Promote, develop and regulate amateur and professional sports excepting horse racing.

Foster and develop public recreation.

Design, build and preserve recreation facilities.

Promote and provide for the physical embellishment of public places.

Develop a cultural improvement program for industrial workers.

V. RESOURCES

Budget of expenditures for office operations and capital improvements for fiscal year 1964–65	$4,722,575
Sources of income for fiscal year 1964–65:	
a. Federal appropriations	0
b. Commonwealth appropriations	4,722,575
c. Other sources	0

Total real estate property owned and/or used:	Cuerdas	Ratio of used to owned, percent
a. Land facilities:		
1. Total used	1,684	79.9
2. Total owned by the Government of Puerto Rico	2,111	------

	Square feet	Ratio of owned to used, percent
b. Buildings and office space facilities:		
1. Total used	37,211	------
2. Total owned by the Government of Puerto Rico	37,211	100

c. Rental paid for land, buildings and office space facilities used: $0.

VI. PERSONNEL

	Total
Total number of functionaries and employees	900
Method of selection:	
a. Classified Commonwealth civil service	884
b. Classified under some other merit system	0
c. Other	16
Nationality (place born):	
a. Puerto Rico	889
b. United States	0
c. Other countries	1
Salary:	
a. Annual salary range	$1,680–$14,000
b. Annual median salary	$1,830

PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION

I. LEGAL BASIS

Section 13, article VI, Constitution of the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico; Public Laws (P.R.) No. 4, August 6, 1952, and No. 109, June 28, 1962.

II. DATE AGENCY STARTED OPERATIONS

1917. Under the provisions of Organic Act (U.S.) for Puerto Rico of 1917.

III. CHIEF EXECUTIVE OR DIRECTOR; METHOD OF SELECTION

Mr. Joaquín Gallart Mendía—President. Appointed by the Governor of Puerto Rico with the advice and consent of the Commonwealth senate.

IV. SUMMARY OF FUNCTIONS

It is a quasi-legislative, quasi-judicial agency responsible for the regulation and supervision of the public services; grant licenses, rights, privileges, and concessions to persons or private entities for the operation of public or semipublic services.

Inspect the public service enterprise and investigate complaints raised against them; examine their accounts to determine rates to be charged.

V. RESOURCES

Budget of expenditures for office operations during fiscal year 1964–65	$775, 900
Sources of income for fiscal year 1964–65:	
a. Federal appropriations	0
b. Commonwealth appropriations	775, 900
c. Other sources	0

Total real estate property owned and/or used: [1]		
a. Land facilities:	*Cuerdas*	*Ratio of owned to used, percent*
1. Total used	0. 51	------
2. Total owned by the Government of Puerto Rico	0	0
b. Buildings and office space facilities:	*Square feet*	*Ratio of owned to used, percent*
1. Total used	17, 600	------
2. Total owned by the Government of Puerto Rico	17, 600	100
c. Rental paid for lands, buildings and office space facilities used:		
Proprietor	*Annual rent*	*Percent*
1. Government of Puerto Rico	0	0
2. Federal Government	0	0
3. Private	$23, 542	100

[1] At the time of this survey they were scheduled to move into another building with one "cuerda" of land, to be rented at $45,000 per year.

VI. PERSONNEL

	Total
Total number of functionaries and employees	[1] 140
Method of selection:	
a. Classified Commonwealth civil service	0
b. Classified under some other merit system	170
c. Other	3
Nationality (place born):	
a. Puerto Rico	139
b. United States	1
c. Other countries	0
Salary:	
a. Annual salary range	$1, 680–$16, 000
b. Annual median salary	$3, 350

[1] At the time of this survey there were 33 positions vacant.

PUERTO RICAN GERIATRICS COMMISSION

I. Legal Basis

Public Law (P.R.) No. 16, May 22, 1962.

II. Date Agency Started Operations

1962.

III. Chief Executive or Director; Method of Selection

Mrs. Luisa Lefebre de Trinidad—Director. Appointed by the Commission.

IV. Summary of Functions

Exercise leadership in programs related to the senior citizen.

Coordinate the activities and services among the various government agencies and voluntary associations on matters related to the welfare of old aged people and foster the establishment of such activities and services.

Activate public conscience toward awareness of the needs and potentialities of the elder population, and serve as a center for the compilation and distribution of information about plans, services and activities.

V. Resources

Budget of expenditures for office operations and capital improvements during fiscal year 1964–65	$49, 200
Sources of income for fiscal year 1964–65:	
a. Federal appropriations	0
b. Commonwealth appropriations	49, 200
c. Other sources	0

Total real estate property owned and/or used:

a. Land facilities:	*Cuerdas*
1. Total used	0
2. Total owned by the Government of Puerto Rico	0

b. Buildings and office space facilities:	*Square feet*	*Ratio of owned to used, percent*
1. Total used	2,136	------
2. Total owned by the Government of Puerto Rico	0	0

c. Rental paid for land, buildings and office space facilities used:

Proprietor	*Annual rent*	*Percent*
1. Government of Puerto Rico	0	0
2. Federal Government	0	0
3. Private	$3, 396	100

VI. Personnel

	Total
Total number of functionaries and employees	8
Method of selection:	
a. Classified Commonwealth civil service	8
b. Classified under some other merit system	0
c. Other	0
Nationality (place born):	
a. Puerto Rico	8
b. United States	0
c. Other countries	0

Salary:	Total
a. Annual salary range	$1, 680–$7, 800
b. Annual median salary	$4, 000

RACING SPORTS ADMINISTRATION

I. LEGAL BASIS

Public Law (P.R.) No. 149, July 22, 1960.

II. DATE AGENCY STARTED OPERATIONS

1960.

III. CHIEF EXECUTIVE OR DIRECTOR; METHOD OF SELECTION

Mr. Agustin Mercado Reveron—Administrator. Appointed by the Governor of Puerto Rico with the advice and consent of the Commonwealth senate.

IV. SUMMARY OF FUNCTIONS

The agency consists of two units: The Racing Board and the Office of the Administrator.

The three members composing the Racing Board are appointed by the Governor of Puerto Rico with the advice and consent of the senate. It is empowered to establish the requirements that race tracks of Puerto Rico must meet; to grant, suspend or cancel licenses thereto; to prepare the racing calendar; to regulate pari-mutuel betting, and impose fines and administrative penalties. It is a quasi-legislative and quasi-judicial agency.

The Racing Administrator has the task to seek compliance of laws, rules and regulations, orders and decrees of the Board; to supervise all personnel engaged in the administration of each race; investigate and punish rule violations and foster a sense of honesty among employees and functionaries for the protection of the racing fan.

The Administrator is the Chief Executive and Administrator of all of the racing enterprise.

V. RESOURCES

Budget of expenditures for office operations and capital improvements for fiscal year 1964–65	$420, 025
Sources of income for fiscal year 1964–65:	
a. Federal appropriations	0
b. Commonwealth appropriations	420, 025
c. Other sources	0

Total real estate property owned and/or used:		Ratio of owned to used, percent
a. Land facilities:	Cuerdas	
1. Total used	0. 64	------
2. Total owned by the Government of Puerto Rico	0	0

	Square feet	Ratio of owned to used, percent
b. Buildings and office space facilities:		
1. Total used	11, 576	------
2. Total owned by the Government of Puerto Rico	0	0

c. Rental paid for lands, buildings, and office space facilities used:

Proprietor	Annual rent	Percent
1. Government of Puerto Rico	0	0
2. Federal Government	0	0
3. Private	$20, 484	100

VI. PERSONNEL

	Total
Total number of functionaries and employees	94
Method of selection:	
a. Classified Commonwealth civil service	50
b. Classified under some other merit system	0
c. Other	44
Nationality (place born):	
a. Puerto Rico	94
b. United States	0
c. Other countries	0
Salary:	
a. Annual salary range	$1, 680–$14, 000
b. Annual median salary	$3, 100

STATE BOARD OF ELECTIONS

I. LEGAL BASIS

Public Law (P.R.) No. 79, June 25, 1919 as amended.

II. DATE AGENCY STARTED OPERATIONS

1919.

III. CHIEF EXECUTIVE OR DIRECTOR; METHOD OF SELECTION

Mr. Ernesto Mieres Calimano—General Superintendent. Appointed by the Governor of Puerto Rico with the advice and consent of the Commonwealth senate.

IV. SUMMARY OF FUNCTIONS

Direct and supervise the general elections held every four years in November.
Direct referendums and general inscriptions.
Examine and certify the inscription of political parties by petition.
Prepare, revise and correct the voting lists.
Count votes cast in the elections and report the results.

V. RESOURCES

Budget of expenditures for fiscal office operations and capital improvements during fiscal year 1964–65	$241, 400
Sources of income for fiscal year 1964–65:	
a. Federal appropriations	0
b. Commonwealth appropriations	241, 000
c. Other sources	0

Total real estate property owned and/or used:

a. Land facilities:	Cuerdas	Ratio of owned to used, percent
1. Total used	0. 51	------
2. Total owned by the Government of Puerto Rico	0	0

	Square feet	Ratio of owned to used, percent
b. Buildings and office space facilities:		
1. Total used	26,000	------
2. Total owned by the Government of Puerto Rico	0	0

c. Rental paid for lands, buildings and office space facilities used:

Proprietor	Annual rent	Percent
1. Government of Puerto Rico	0	0
2. Federal Government	0	0
3. Private	$30,000	100

VI. Personnel

	Total
Total number of functionaries and employees	103
Method of selection:	
a. Classified Commonwealth civil service	0
b. Classified under some other merit system	0
c. Other	103
Nationality (place born):	
a. Puerto Rico	103
b. United States	0
c. Other countries	0
Salary:	
a. Annual salary range	$1,200–$16,800
b. Annual median salary	[1] $1,510

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[1] Included herein the salaries of 75 employees who worked an average of 6 months during fiscal year 1964-1965.

STATE INSURANCE FUND

I. Legal Basis

Public Law (P.R.) No. 45, April 18, 1935, as amended.

II. Date Agency Started Operations

1935.

III. Chief Executive or Director; Method of Selection

Mr. Ulpiano Velez—Administrator. Appointed by the Governor of Puerto Rico with the advice and consent of the Commonwealth senate.

IV. Summary of Functions

Insure all employers covered by law.

Levy and collect the premiums of the insurance policies issued.

Investigate occupational accidents; determine physical or mental incapacity resulting thereof and pay compensations.

Provide medical assistance, hospital care, and physical rehabilitation to injured workmen.

V. Resources

Budget of expenditures for office operations and capital improvements during fiscal year 1964–65	$7,726,589

Sources of income for fiscal year 1964–65:

a. Federal appropriations	0
b. Commonwealth appropriations	0
c. Other sources	7, 726, 589

Total real estate property owned and/or used:

a. Land facilities:	*Cuerdas*	*Ratio of used to owned, percent*
1. Total used	3. 48	20
2. Total owned by the Government of Puerto Rico	17. 36	------
b. Buildings and office space facilities:	*Square feet*	*Ratio of used, to owned percent*
1. Total used	147, 374. 6	------
2. Total owned by the Government of Puerto Rico	43, 070. 9	29. 2

c. Rental paid for land, buildings and office space facilities used:

Proprietor	*Annual rent*	*Percent*
1. Government of Puerto Rico	$5, 820	3. 9
2. Federal Government	0	0
3. Private	141, 281	96. 1
Total	147, 101	100. 0

VI. PERSONNEL

	Total
Total number of functionaries and employees	1, 170
Method of selection:	
a. Classified Commonwealth civil service	1, 169
b. Classified under some other merit system	0
c. Other	1
Nationality (place born):	
a. Puerto Rico	1, 163
b. United States	0
c. Other countries	7
Salary:	
a. Annual salary range	$1, 600–$13, 800
b. Annual median salary	$2, 730

SUGAR BOARD

I. LEGAL BASIS

Public Law (P.R.) No. 426, May 13, 1951, as amended.

II. DATE AGENCY STARTED OPERATIONS

1951.

III. CHIEF EXECUTIVE OR DIRECTOR; METHOD OF SELECTION

Mr. Elias Rivera Cidraz—President. Appointed by the Governor of Puerto Rico with the advice and consent of the Commonwealth senate for a term of 4 years.

IV. SUMMARY OF FUNCTIONS

Regulate the relations between the sugar refining companies and sugar cane growers.

Seek the compliance of those regulations and settle controversies between the two parties.

V. RESOURCES

Budget of expenditures for office operations and capital improvements during fiscal year 1964–65	$181,195
Sources of income for fiscal year 1964–65:	
a. Federal appropriations	0
b. Commonwealth appropriations	181,195
c. Other sources	0

Total real estate property owned and/or used:

a. Land facilities:	*Cuerdas*
1. Total used	0
2. Total owned by the Government of Puerto Rico	0

b. Buildings and office space facilities:	*Square feet*	*Ratio of owned to used, percent*
1. Total used	4,300	------
2. Total owned by the Government of Puerto Rico	0	0

c. Rental paid for lands, buildings and office space facilities:

Proprietor	*Annual rent*	*Percent*
1. Government of Puerto Rico	0	0
2. Federal Government	0	0
3. Private	$6,000	100

VI. PERSONNEL

	Total
Total number of functionaries and employees	39
Method of selection:	
a. Classified Commonwealth civil service	35
b. Classified under some other merit system	0
c. Other	4
Nationality (place born):	
a. Puerto Rico	39
b. United States	0
c. Other countries	0
Salary:	
a. Annual salary range	$1,680–$14,500
b. Annual median salary	$3,050

TEACHERS' RETIREMENT BOARD

I. LEGAL BASIS

Public Laws (P.R.) No. 62, September 5, 1917; No. 68, May 8, 1928; No. 161, May 10, 1945, and No. 218, May 6, 1951, as amended.

II. DATE AGENCY STARTED OPERATIONS

1918.

III. CHIEF EXECUTIVE OR DIRECTOR; METHOD OF SELECTION

Mr. Diego I. Hernandez—Director. Appointed by the Board.

IV. SUMMARY OF FUNCTIONS

Keep an account for each teacher member of the system, crediting his monthly retirement quotas.

Pay insurance to teachers covered by the plan upon death in active service and/or in use of sick leave.

Refund all contributions accrued to members who cease as such.

Grant life annuities for years of service and on account of age or physical disability.

Grant house mortgage and salary loans.

V. RESOURCES

Budget of expenditures for office operations during fiscal year 1964–65	$21,145,902
Sources of income for fiscal year 1964–65:	
a. Federal appropriations	0
b. Commonwealth appropriations (contributions as employer)	6,284,502
c. Other sources (teachers' contributions to the retirement and pension funds, interests, and other miscellaneous sources)	14,861,400

Total real estate property owned and/or used:

a. Land facilities:	*Cuerdas*	*Ratio of owned to used, percent*
1. Total used	0.15	------
2. Total owned by the Government of Puerto Rico	0	0

b. Buildings and office space facilities:	*Square feet*	*Ratio of owned to used, percent*
1. Total used	8,576	------
2. Total owned by the Government of Puerto Rico	0	0

c. Rental paid for land, buildings and office space facilities used:

Proprietor	*Annual rent*	*Percent*
1. Government of Puerto Rico	0	0
2. Federal Government	0	0
3. Private	$17,700	100

VI. PERSONNEL

	Total
Total number of functionaries and employees	93
Method of selection:	
a. Classified Commonwealth civil service	93
b. Classified under some other merit system	0
c. Other	0
Nationality (place born):	
a. Puerto Rico	93
b. United States	0
c. Other countries	0
Salary:	
a. Annual salary range	$1,680–$11,400
b. Annual median salary	$2,970

URBAN RENEWAL AND HOUSING ADMINISTRATION

I. LEGAL BASIS

Public Law (P.R.) No. 88, June 22, 1957; No. 109, June 26, 1958 and No. 48, June 6, 1963.

II. DATE AGENCY STARTED OPERATIONS

1957.

III. CHIEF EXECUTIVE OR DIRECTOR; METHOD OF SELECTION

Mr. Carlos Alvarado—Administrator. Appointed by the Agency Board of Directors.

IV. SUMMARY OF FUNCTIONS

Undertake social, economic and "physical" research in the fields of housing and urban renewal.

Provide planning and programing of housing and urban renewal for Puerto Rico.

Engage in the promotion and construction of low cost private housing, including programs under the cooperative system.

V. RESOURCES

Budget of expenditures for office operations during fiscal year 1964–65	$436, 056
Sources of income for fiscal year 1964–65:	
a. Federal appropriations	110, 099
b. Commonwealth appropriations	279, 205
c. Other sources	46, 753

Total real estate property owned and/or used:

a. Land facilities:	*Cuerdas*
1. Total used	0
2. Total owned by the Government of Puerto Rico	0

b. Buildings and office space facilities:	*Square feet*	*Ratio of owned to used, percent*
1. Total used	6, 868	------
2. Total owned by the Government of Puerto Rico	6, 868	100

c. Rental paid for land, buildings and office space facilities used: $0.

VI. PERSONNEL

	Total
Total number of functionaries and employees	[1] 50
Method of selection:	
a. Classified Commonwealth civil service	50
b. Classified under some other merit system	0
c. Other	0
Nationality (place born):	
a. Puerto Rico	49
b. United States	0
c. Other countries	1
Salary:	
a. Annual salary range	$1, 680–$12, 600
b. Annual median salary	$4, 000

[1] Fifteen temporary employees not included herein.

PUBLIC CORPORATIONS

AGRICULTURAL EXPERIMENT STATION

I. LEGAL BASIS

Joint Resolution (P.R.) No. 13 of May 28, 1914; Public Laws (P.R.) No. 29 of 1917 and No. 25 of 1931; Joint Resolution (P.R.) No. 3 of 1933; Public Laws (P.R.) No. 221 of 1938, No. 135 of 1942, No. 98 of 1945, No. 228 of 1946, No. 137 of 1950, No. 104 of 1951 and No. 127 of 1953.

II. DATE AGENCY STARTED OPERATIONS

1914.

III. CHIEF EXECUTIVE OR DIRECTOR; METHOD OF SELECTION

Dr. Miguel A. Lugo Lopez—Acting Director. Appointed by the Chancellor of the University of Puerto Rico with the approval of the Superior Educational Council.

IV. SUMMARY OF FUNCTIONS

Develop new agricultural techniques for the better utilization and economic improvement of farms, new industrial techniques for food elaboration and packing and for rum production. Improvement of seed stock ("foundation stock") for the Agricultural Service Administration Seeds Program.

V. RESOURCES

Budget of expenditures for office operations and capital improvements during fiscal year 1964–65	$3,943,493
Sources of income for fiscal year 1964–65:	
a. Federal appropriations	1,185,621
b. Commonwealth appropriations	2,332,791
c. Other sources	2,960

Total real estate property owned and/or used:

a. Land facilities:	*Cuerdas*	*Ratio of owned to used, percent*
1. Total used	2,244.13	------
2. Total owned by the Government of Puerto Rico	2,189.13	97.6

b. Buildings and office space facilities:	*Square feet*	*Ratio of owned to used, percent*
1. Total used	42,780	------
2. Total owned by the Government of Puerto Rico	34,280	80.1

c. Rental paid for land, buildings and office space facilities used:

Proprietor	*Annual rent*	*Percent*
1. Government of Puerto Rico	$2,109	7.1
2. Federal Government	7,179	92.9
3. Private	0	0
Total	9,288	100.0

VI. PERSONNEL

	Total
Total number of functionaries and employees	678
Method of selection:	
a. Classified Commonwealth civil service	426
b. Classified under some other merit system	0
c. Other	252

	Total
Nationality (place born):	
a. Puerto Rico	653
b. United States	13
c. Other countries	12
Salary:	
a. Annual salary range	$1, 680–$14, 000
b. Annual median salary	$2, 960

AGRICULTURAL EXTENSION SERVICE

I. LEGAL BASIS

Joint Resolution No. 3 of August 16, 1933 and Public Law (P.R.) No. 221, May 15, 1938.

II. DATE AGENCY STARTED OPERATIONS

1934.

III. CHIEF EXECUTIVE OR DIRECTOR; METHOD OF SELECTION

Mr. Roberto Huyke—Director. Appointed by the Chancellor of the University of Puerto Rico with the approval of the Superior Educational Council and with the consent of the Federal Extension Service Administrator.

IV. SUMMARY OF FUNCTIONS

Educate and provide technical help to farmers and their families in the use of better farming practices and in the improvement of home economics.

Develop programs for the improvement of agricultural products marketing and for the orientation of consumers.

Foster a soil conservation and water natural reservoirs protection programs in coordination with the Federal Soil Conservation Service.

Cooperate with other Commonwealth agencies orienting the rural population on the available governmental services offered, especially those services rendered by agricultural agencies.

V. RESOURCES

Budget of expenditures for office operation and capital improvement during fiscal year 1964–65	$3, 183, 513
Sources of income for fiscal year 1964–65:	
a. Federal appropriations	1, 834, 033
b. Commonwealth appropriations	1, 272, 105
c. Other sources	77, 375

Total real estate property owned and/or used:

a. Land facilities: Information regarding this matter was not furnished by the agency. Reported not available.

	Square feet	*Ratio of owned to used, percent*
b. Buildings and office space facilities:		
1. Total used	118, 986	------
2. Total owned by the Government of Puerto Rico	119, 619	16. 5

c. Rental paid for land, buildings and office space facilities used:

Proprietor	*Annual rent*	*Percent*
1. Government of Puerto Rico	$2, 144	2. 7
2. Federal Government	0	0
3. Private	76, 100	97. 3
Total	78, 244	100. 0

VI. PERSONNEL

	Total
Total number of functionaries and employees	631
Method of selection:	
a. Classified Commonwealth civil service	238
b. Classified under some other merit system	0
c. Other	393
Nationality (place born):	
a. Puerto Rico	626
b. United States	0
c. Other countries	5
Salary:	
a. Annual salary range	$1, 680–$13, 080
b. Annual median salary	$4, 490

AGRICULTURAL SERVICES ADMINISTRATION

I. LEGAL BASIS

Public Law (P.R.) No. 64, June 21, 1965.

II. DATE AGENCY STARTED OPERATIONS

1965.

III. CHIEF EXECUTIVE OR DIRECTOR; METHOD OF SELECTION

Dr. Guillermo Serra—Executive Director. Appointed by the Commonwealth Secretary of Agriculture.

IV. SUMMARY OF FUNCTIONS

The agricultural development programs of the Land Authority, of the Department of Agriculture, and of the Experimental Station were transferred to the Agricultural Services Administration. This agency renders services and special incentives directed to foster agricultural development in the Commonwealth.

V. RESOURCES

Budget of expenditures for office operations and capital improvements during fiscal year 1965–66	$1, 468, 333
Sources of income for fiscal year 1965–66:	
a. Federal appropriations	0
b. Commonwealth appropriations	1, 468, 333
c. Other sources	984, 000

Total real estate property owned and/or used:		
a. Land facilities:	*Cuerdas*	*Ratio of owned to used, percent*
1. Total used	850	------
2. Total owned by the Government of Puerto Rico	30	3. 5

	Square feet	*Ratio of owned to used, percent*
b. Buildings and office space facilities:		
1. Total used	9,500	------
2. Total owned by the Government of Puerto Rico	0	0

c. Rental paid for land, buildings and office space facilities used:

Proprietor	*Annual rent*	*Percent*
1. Government of Puerto Rico	0	0
2. Federal Government	$42,350	68
3. Private	19,800	32
Total	62,150	100

VI. Personnel

	Total
Total number of functionaries and employees	[1] 141
Method of selection:	
a. Classified Commonwealth civil service	0
b. Classified under some other merit system	0
c. Other	141
Nationality (place born):	
a. Puerto Rico	141
b. United States	0
c. Other countries	0
Salary:	
a. Annual salary range	$1,620–$15,000
b. Annual median salary	[2] $3,250

[1] Temporary and part time personnel (9), not included.

[2] Wages of temporary and part time personnel are not included.

AQUEDUCT AND SEWER AUTHORITY

I. Legal Basis

Public Law (P.R.) No. 163, May 3, 1949. Its forerunner was the Puerto Rico Aqueduct and Sewer Service, created by Act No. 40 of May 1, 1945.

II. Date Agency Started Operations

1945.

III. Chief Executive or Director; Method of Selection

Mr. Orlando Gonzalez—Chief Executive. Appointed by the Governing Board of the agency.

IV. Summary of Functions

Own, operate, maintain and develop all water and sewer systems in Puerto Rico. Provide the inhabitants of Puerto Rico with adequate water and sewer services, and any other services or facilities incidental or appropriate thereto.

V. Resources

Budget of expenditures for office operations and capital improvements during fiscal year 1964–65	$43,513,606
Sources of income for fiscal year 1964–65:	
a. Federal appropriations	1,161,537
b. Commonwealth appropriations	6,907,000
c. Other sources	35,445,069

Total real estate property owned and/or used:

a. Land facilities:

	Cuerdas	Ratio of used to owned, percent
1. Total used	401.5	88.7
2. Total owned by the Government of Puerto Rico	[1] 452.5	------

b. Buildings and office space facilities:

	Square feet	Ratio of owned to used, percent
1. Total used	[2] 65,088	------
2. Total owned by the Government of Puerto Rico	[3] 35,156	55

c. Rental paid for land, buildings and office space facilities used:

Proprietor	Annual rent	Percent
1. Government of Puerto Rico	$402	0.4
2. Federal Government	921	1.0
3. Private owner	89,840	98.6
Total	91,163	100.0

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[1] Does not include public domain pathways.

[2] Covers only San Juan metropolitan area. Information about area in offices of Aguadilla, Cayey, Coamo, Fajardo, Manatí, Mayagüez and Utuado (the total is rented), was not available.

[3] Metropolitan area of San Juan only. Area in offices of Arecibo, Caguas, Guayama, Humacao, Ponce, Vieques and Yauco are owned by the Authority, but no information thereto was available.

VI. PERSONNEL

	Total
Total number of functionaries and employees	2,536
Method of selection:	
a. Classified Commonwealth civil service	0
b. Classified under some other merit system	2,521
c. Other	15
Nationality (place born):	
a. Puerto Rico	2,536
b. United States	0
c. Other countries	0
Salary:	
a. Annual salary range	$1,692–$19,000
b. Annual median salary	$3,080

BANK OF COOPERATIVES

I. LEGAL BASIS

Public Law (P.R.) No. 209, May 3, 1951.

II. DATE AGENCY STARTED OPERATIONS

1952.

III. CHIEF EXECUTIVE OR DIRECTOR; METHOD OF SELECTION

Mr. Jose Arroyo Riestra—Director. Appointed by the Board of Directors of the Agency.

IV. SUMMARY OF FUNCTIONS

Offer credit facilities to duly organized cooperative associations in Puerto Rico.

V. RESOURCES

Budget of expenditures for office operations during fiscal year 1964–65	$281,541
Sources of income for fiscal year 1964–65:	
a. Federal appropriations	0
b. Commonwealth appropriations	150,000
c. Other sources	326,205

Total real estate property owned and/or used:

a. Land facilities:	*Cuerdas*
1. Total used	0
2. Total owned by the Government of Puerto Rico	0

b. Buildings and office space facilities:	*Square feet*	*Ratio of owned to used, percent*
1. Total used	3,000	------
2. Total owned by the Government of Puerto Rico	0	0

c. Rental paid for land, buildings and office space facilities used:

Proprietor	*Annual rent*	*Percent*
1. Government of Puerto Rico	0	0
2. Federal Government	0	0
3. Private	$7,200	100

VI. PERSONNEL

	Total
Total number of functionaries and employees	19
Method of selection:	
a. Classified Commonwealth civil service	0
b. Classified positions under some other merit system	0
c. Other	19
Nationality (place born):	
a. Puerto Rico	18
b. United States	0
c. Other countries	1
Salary:	
a. Annual salary range	$2,520–$13,500
b. Annual median salary	$4,250

CARIBBEAN ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION

I. LEGAL BASIS

Public Law (P.R.) No. 37, June 15, 1965.

II. DATE AGENCY STARTED OPERATIONS

1965.

III. CHIEF EXECUTIVE OR DIRECTOR: METHOD OF SELECTION

Dr. Luis A. Passalacqua—Executive Director. Appointed by the Board of Directors of the Agency.

IV. SUMMARY OF FUNCTIONS

Foster the commercial, economic and cultural exchange among the countries of the Caribbean area.

V. Resources

Budget of expenditures for office operations and capital improvements during fiscal year 1965–66	$200, 350
Sources of income for fiscal year 1965–66:	
a. Federal appropriations	0
b. Commonwealth appropriations	200, 000
c. Other sources	350

Total real estate property owned and/or used:

a. Land facilities:	*Cuerdas*
1. Total used	0
2. Total owned by the Government of Puerto Rico	0

b. Buildings and office space facilities:	*Square feet*	*Ratio of owned to used, percent*
1. Total used	9, 288	------
2. Total owned by the Government of Puerto Rico	0	0

c. Rental paid for land, buildings and office space facilities used:

Proprietor	*Annual rent*	*Percent*
1. Government of Puerto Rico	0	0
2. Federal Government	0	0
3. Private	$36, 000	100

VI. Personnel

	Total
Total number of functionaries and employees	19
Method of selection:	
a. Classified Commonwealth civil service	0
b. Classified under some other merit system	0
c. Other	[1] 22
Nationality (place born):	
a. Puerto Rico	19
b. United States	0
c. Other countries	0
Salary:	
a. Annual salary range	$1, 800–$12, 000
b. Annual median salary	$3, 670

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[1] Included herein are 3 positions vacant.

CASALS FESTIVAL, INC.

I. Legal Basis

Under the provision of Public Law (P.R.) No. 188, 1942 as amended, the Economic Development Administrator authorized its creation by Resolution No. 740 of 1958.

II. Date Agency Started Operations

1958.

III. Chief Executive or Director; Method of Selection

Mr. Carlos M. Passalaqua—President. Appointed by the board of directors of the agency.

IV. Summary of Functions

Organize the celebration of chamber and symphonic musical concerts.

Organize the concerts season of the Symphonic Orchestra of Puerto Rico.

Direct the Musical Conservatory, which is engaged in developing musical talent by means of theoretical and practical upper level courses, to its student members.

V. Resources

Budget of expenditures for office operations and capital improvements during fiscal year 1964–65	$727, 750
Sources of income for fiscal year 1964–65:	
a. Federal appropriations	0
b. Commonwealth appropriations	490, 000
c. Other sources	237, 750

Total real estate property owned and/or used:		
a. Land facilities:	*Cuerdas*	*Ratio of owned to used, percent*
1. Total used	1. 70	0
2. Total owned by the Government of Puerto Rico	[1]	------
b. Buildings and office space facilities:	*Square feet*	*Ratio of owned to used, percent*
1. Total used	21, 340	0
2. Total owned by the Government of Puerto Rico	[1]	------
c. Rental paid for land, buildings and office space facilities used:		
Proprietor	*Annual rent*	*Percent*
1. Government of Puerto Rico	$3, 315	9. 2
2. Federal Government	0	0
3. Private	32, 720	90. 8
	36, 035	100. 0

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[1] Not determined.

VI. Personnel

	Total
Total number of functionaries and employees	49
Method of selection:	
a. Classified Commonwealth civil service	0
b. Classified under some other merit system	0
c. Other	49
Nationality (place born):	
a. Puerto Rico	32
b. United States	10
c. Other countries	7
Salary:	
a. Annual salary range	$2, 217–24, 000
b. Annual median salary	$5, 360

CIVIL RIGHTS COMMISSION

I. Legal Basis

Public Law (P.R.) No. 102, June 28, 1965.

II. Date Agency Started Operations

This agency is still in process of organization.

III. Chief Executive or Director; Method of Selection

The Commission will select a chairman among its members. Besides, the Commissioners will appoint an executive director. All five members of the Commission are appointed by the Governor with the advice and consent of the Commonwealth senate.

IV. Summary of Functions

Educate the citizens in the use and understanding of their civil rights.

Investigate activities in the Commonwealth government and the private enterprise in order to determine the civil rights status; and, also, investigate complaints of civil rights violations filed by individuals.

Make recommendations to the Governor and the Legislature for the continuous and effective protection of the civil rights.

V. Resources

Budget of the expenditures for office operations during fiscal year 1965–66	$50, 000
Sources of income for fiscal year 1965–66:	
a. Federal appropriations	0
b. Commonwealth appropriations	50, 000
c. Other sources	0

VI. Personnel and Organization

The Governor of Puerto Rico appointed the Commission members. They are as follows:

Mr. Raul Serrano Geyls
Mr. Lino J. Saldaña
Mr. Marcos A. Ramirez
Mr. Enrique Cordova Diaz
Mr. Max Goldman
(All are lawyers)

The Commission will establish and organize an office attached to the Department of Justice. This office shall use the Department administrative services it may consider necessary for its proper functioning, but it will not be a part of the Department of Justice.

The executive director designated by the Commission will be responsible for the organization and the direction of the office. With previous approval of the Commission, he shall designate the office personnel, who will not be subject to the dispositions of the rules and regulations of the Commonwealth Personnel Office.

COMMERCIAL DEVELOPMENT COMPANY

I. Legal Basis

Public Law (P.R.) No. 29, June 11, 1962.

II. Date Agency Started Operations

1962.

III. CHIEF EXECUTIVE OR DIRECTOR; METHOD OF SELECTION

Mr. Miguel A. Gonzalez—Executive Director. Appointed by the Secretary of Commerce with the approval of the Governor of Puerto Rico.

IV. SUMMARY OF FUNCTIONS

Stimulate the private capital to initiate, promote and maintain in operation all kinds of commercial activities.

May participate in commercial activities on its own initiative or through participation in any adequate manner with other private or government entities; or, through the investment of funds belonging to others in enterprises owned by the company.

Will see that the Commonwealth commercial development be accomplished in a most integrated way along with the island development.

Will give preference to cooperatives, voluntary commercial chain associations, small businesses, market places, common markets, specialized commerce, and those businesses that may effectively contribute to promote the island commercial development.

Is empowered to foster and pursue such activities as will tend to promote the investment of residents' capital in commercial enterprises.

V. RESOURCES

Budget of expenditures for office operations and capital improvements during fiscal year 1964–65	$3,031,487
Sources of income for fiscal year 1964–65:	
a. Federal appropriations	0
b. Commonwealth appropriations	1,010,000
c. Other sources	2,021,529

Total real estate property owned and/or used:		
a. Land facilities:	*Cuerdas*	*Ratio of owned to used, percent*
1. Total used	30.3	-------
2. Total owned by the Government of Puerto Rico	30.3	100
b. Buildings and office space facilities:	*Square feet*	*Ratio of owned to used, percent*
1. Total used	2,700	-------
2. Total owned by the Government of Puerto Rico	2,700	100
c. Rental paid for land, buildings and office space facilities used:		
Proprietor	*Annual rent*	*Percent*
1. Government of Puerto Rico	$64,356	100
2. Federal Government	0	0
3. Private	0	0

VI. PERSONNEL

	Total
Total number of functionaries and employees	18
Method of selection:	
a. Classified Commonwealth civil service	0
b. Classified under some other merit system	0
c. Other	18

Nationality (place born):	Total
a. Puerto Rico	18
b. United States	0
c. Other countries	0
Salary:	
a. Annual salary range	$2,520–$15,600
b. Annual median salary	$4,670

COMMUNICATIONS AUTHORITY

I. Legal Basis

Public Law (P.R.) No. 212, May 12, 1942.

II. Date Agency Started Operations

1942.

III. Chief Executive or Director; Method of Selection

Mr. Carlos A. Janer—General Administrator. Appointed by the board of directors of the agency.

IV. Summary of Functions

Operate and manage the entire telegraph system of Puerto Rico.

Operate and manage a telephone service in those municipalities not served by the private enterprise.

Operate and manage radio-telegraph and radio-telephone services in Vieques and Culebra.

V. Resources

Budget of expenditures for office operations and capital improvements during fiscal year 1964–65	$4,533,116
Sources of income for fiscal year 1964–65:	
a. Federal appropriations	0
b. Commonwealth appropriations	1,152,725
c. Other sources	[1] 3,380,391

Total real estate property owned and/or used:

a. Land facilities:	Cuerdas	Ratio of owned to used, percent
1. Total used	5.14	------
2. Total owned by the Government of Puerto Rico	3.61	70.2

b. Buildings and office space facilities:	Square feet	Ratio of owned to used, percent
1. Total used	86,027	------
2. Total owned by the Government of Puerto Rico	52,289	60.8

c. Rental paid for land, buildings and office space facilities used:

Proprietor	Annual rent	Percent
1. Government of Puerto Rico	$558	13.2
2. Federal Government	0	0
3. Private	3,675	86.8
Total	4,233	100.0

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[1] Income received for services rendered and loans granted.

VI. PERSONNEL

	Total
Total number of functionaries and employees	[1] 847
Method of selection:	
a. Classified Commonwealth civil service	0
b. Classified under some other merit system	0
c. Other	847
Nationality (place born):	
a. Puerto Rico	844
b. United States	3
c. Other countries	0
Salary:	
a. Annual salary range	$1, 320-$17, 000
b. Annual median salary	$2, 290

[1] Regular employees.

FARM CREDIT CORPORATION

I. LEGAL BASIS

Public Law (P.R.) No. 68 of 1960 as amended by Public Law (P.R.) No. 25 of 1965.

II. DATE AGENCY STARTED OPERATIONS

1961.

III. CHIEF EXECUTIVE OR DIRECTOR; METHOD OF SELECTION

Mr. Jose R. Hernandez—Acting President. Appointed by the corporation board of directors.

IV. SUMMARY OF FUNCTIONS

Provide credit facilities for the development of farm and animal industries and other activities related with the agriculture of Puerto Rico.

V. RESOURCES

Budget of expenditures for office operations and capital improvements during fiscal year 1964-65	$329, 000
Sources of income for fiscal year 1964-65:	
a. Federal appropriations	0
b. Commonwealth appropriations	235, 000
c. Other sources	[1]154, 448

[1] Interest on granted loans.

Total real estate property owned and/or used:

	Cuerdas	
a. Land facilities:		
1. Total used	0	
2. Total owned by the Government of Puerto Rico	0	

	Square feet	Ratio of owned to used, percent
b. Buildings and office space facilities:		
1. Total used	3, 500	------
2. Total owned by the Government of Puerto Rico	0	0

c. Rental paid for land, buildings and office space facilities used:

Proprietor	*Annual rent*	*Percent*
1. Government of Puerto Rico	0	0
2. Federal Government	0	0
3. Private	$8, 650	100

VI. Personnel

	Total
Total number of functionaries and employees	48
Method of selection:	
a. Classified Commonwealth civil service	0
b. Classified under some other merit system	0
c. Other	48
Nationality (place born):	
a. Puerto Rico	48
b. United States	0
c. Other countries	0
Salary:	
a. Annual salary range	$2, 520–$12, 000
b. Annual median salary	$4, 330

GOVERNMENT DEVELOPMENT BANK

I. Legal Basis

Public Laws (P.R.) No. 252, May 13, 1942 and No. 17, September 23, 1948, as amended.

II. Date Agency Started Operations

1942.

III. Chief Executive or Director; Method of Selection

Mr. Juan Labadie Eurite—President. Appointed by the board of directors of the bank.

IV. Summary of Functions

Act as fiscal and disbursing agent and as financial adviser of the Commonwealth government, its agencies and instrumentalities, its municipalities, and its public corporations.

Lend money to the Commonwealth government and its agencies, instrumentalities, municipalities and public corporations.

Lend money to any person, firm, corporation or organization whenever such loans are used to promote the economy of Puerto Rico.

Invest its funds in direct debentures under the guaranty of the U.S. Government, or guaranteed debentures of any agency, instrumentality or municipality of Puerto Rico, or debentures guaranteed under the housing laws of the United States.

Lend money or securities and discount negotiable instruments to any bank or trust company, organized by, or subject, to the banking law jurisdiction.

Act as depositary of the current account of the Commonwealth Finance Department and of any other account that the latter may establish.

Act as a central clearinghouse to all commercial banks of the metropolitan area for checks and notes exchange and compensation.

V. RESOURCES

Budget of expenditures for office operations and capital improvements during fiscal year 1964–65	$4, 828, 246
Sources of income for fiscal year 1964–65:	
a. Federal appropriations	0
b. Commonwealth appropriations	0
c. Other sources	4, 828, 246

Total real estate property owned and/or used:		
a. Land facilities:	*Cuerdas*	*Ratio of used to owned, percent*
1. Total used	0	0
2. Total owned by the Government of Puerto Rico	.30	------
b. Buildings and office space facilities:	*Square feet*	*Ratio of owned to used, percent*
1. Total used	[1] 27, 402	------
2. Total owned by the Government of Puerto Rico	0	0
c. Rental paid for land, buildings and office space facilities used:		
Proprietor	*Annual rent*	*Percent*
1. Government of Puerto Rico	0	0
2. Federal Government	0	0
3. Private	[2] $105, 421	------

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[1] Includes 2,450 square feet of office facilities used in New York.

[2] Includes rental of $22,500 paid on account of office space facilities used in New York.

VI. PERSONNEL

	Total
Total number of functionaries and employees	135
Method of selection:	
a. Classified Commonwealth civil service	0
b. Classified under some other merit system	135
c. Other	0
Nationality (place born):	
a. Puerto Rico	128
b. United States	5
c. Other countries	2
Salary:	
a. Annual salary range	$2, 500–$19, 000
b. Annual median salary	$5, 070

HIGHWAY AUTHORITY

I. LEGAL BASIS

Public Law (P.R.) No. 74, June 23, 1965.

II. DATE AGENCY STARTED OPERATIONS

1965.

III. CHIEF EXECUTIVE OR DIRECTOR; METHOD OF SELECTION

Mr. Victor M. Labiosa—Executive Director. Appointed by the agency governing board.

IV. SUMMARY OF FUNCTIONS

Carry on the Commonwealth program of providing the inhabitants of Puerto Rico with a first-rate highway system.

Facilitate motor vehicle traffic mobility.

Alleviate the dangers and difficulties caused by traffic congestion on the highways.

Meet the increasing demand for greater and better transit facilities that the economic growth of the country requires.

V. RESOURCES

Budget of expenditures for office operations and capital improvements during fiscal year 1965–66	$81, 159, 270
Sources of income for fiscal year 1965–66:	
a. Federal appropriations	7, 514, 266
b. Commonwealth appropriations	9, 250, 000
c. Other sources	64, 395, 004

Total real estate property owned and/or used:

a. Land facilities:	*Cuerdas*
1. Total used	0
2. Total owned by the Government of Puerto Rico	0

b. Buildings and office space facilities:	*Square feet*	*Ratio of owned to used, percent*
1. Total used	5, 500	------
2. Total owned by the Government of Puerto Rico	0	0

c. Rental paid for land, buildings and office space facilities used:

Proprietor	*Annual rent*	*Percent*
1. Government of Puerto Rico	0	0
2. Federal Government	0	0
3. Private	$26, 000	100

VI. PERSONNEL

	Total
Total number of functionaries and employees	50
Method of selection:	
a. Classified Commonwealth civil service	0
b. Classified under some other merit system	0
C. Other	50
Nationality (place born):	
a. Puerto Rico	50
b. United States	0
c. Other countries	0
Salary:	
a. Annual salary range	$1, 800–$15, 000
b. Annual median salary	$4, 000

INDUSTRIAL DEVELOPMENT COMPANY

I. LEGAL BASIS

Public Laws (P.R.) No. 188, May 11, 1942, as amended, No. 28 of 1946; Reorganization Plan No. 10 of 1950; Public Law (P.R.) No. 38 of 1951; Joint Resolution No. 92 of 1957; Public Law (P.R.) No. 63 of 1957; Joint Resolution No. 26 of 1958; Public Law (P.R.) No. 35 of 1959; Joint Resolution No. 72 of 1963.

II. DATE AGENCY STARTED OPERATIONS

1942.

III. CHIEF EXECUTIVE OR DIRECTOR; METHOD OF SELECTION

Mr. Manuel Sanchez Rivera—President. Appointed by the Economic Development Administrator with the approval of the Governor of Puerto Rico.

IV. SUMMARY OF FUNCTIONS

Provide facilities to manufacturing and tourist industries and under certain circumstances, to some commercial enterprises operating in Puerto Rico.

Grant loans to industrial enterprises, governmental and other nonprofit cooperative concerns; invest in stocks, bonds or other securities in other companies, entities or corporations.

V. RESOURCES

Budget of expenditures for office operations and capital improvements during fiscal year 1964–65	$36, 271, 400
Sources of income for fiscal year 1964–65:	
a. Federal appropriations	0
b. Commonwealth appropriations	2, 055, 000
c. Other sources	34, 216, 400

Total real estate property owned and/or used:	*Cuerdas*	*Ratio of owned to used, percent*
a. Land facilities:		
1. Total used	6, 707. 70	------
2. Total owned by the Government of Puerto Rico	6, 707. 70	100

b. Buildings and office space facilities:	*Square feet*	*Ratio of owned to used, percent*
1. Total used	42, 588	------
2. Total owned by the Government of Puerto Rico	2, 300	5. 4

c. Rental paid for land, buildings and office space facilities used:

Proprietor	*Annual rent*	*Percent*
1. Government of Puerto Rico	0	0
2. Federal Government	0	0
3. Private	$60, 092	100

VI. PERSONNEL

	Total
Total number of functionaries and employees	325
Method of selection:	
a. Classified Commonwealth civil service	0
b. Classified under some other merit system	325
c. Other	0
Nationality (place born):	
a. Puerto Rico	321
b. United States	2
c. Other countries	2

Salary:	*Total*
a. Annual salary range	$2, 200–$19, 000
b. Annual median salary	$5, 640

INDUSTRIES OF THE BLIND CORPORATION

I. Legal Basis

Public Law (P.R.) No. 207, May 14, 1948.

II. Date Agency Started Operations

1948.

III. Chief Executive or Director; Method of Selection

Dr. Angel Quintero Alfaro—Secretary of Education.

IV. Summary of Functions

Provide employment opportunities to Puerto Rican blind persons after training them in such crafts as the manufacture of brooms, mops, baskets, and straw-thatched upholstery.

The Corporation also serves as a vocational and training evaluation center of Puerto Ricans and foreigners coming to Puerto Rico sponsored by the Commonwealth Department of State.

V. Resources

Budget of expenditures for office operations and capital improvements during fiscal year 1964–65	$121, 707
Sources of income for fiscal year 1964–65:	
a. Federal appropriations	0
b. Commonwealth appropriations	0
c. Other sources	121, 707

Total real estate property owned and/or used:		
a. Land facilities:	*Cuerdas*	*Ratio of owned to used, percent*
1. Total used	1. 8	------
2. Total owned by the Government of Puerto Rico	1. 8	100
b. Buildings and office space facilities:	*Square feet*	*Ratio of owned to used, percent*
1. Total used	3, 500	------
2. Total owned by the Government of Puerto Rico	3, 500	100

c. Rental paid for land, buildings and office space facilities used: $0.

VI. Personnel

The corporation regular staff personnel belongs to the vocational rehabilitation division of the Commonwealth Department of Education. Also, there is a regular employee filling a civil service (exempted) position with a salary of $1,680 per year. During fiscal year 1964–65 there were an average of 34 blind laborers receiving wages ranging from $2.75 to $5.20 per day.

INSTITUTE OF PUERTO RICAN CULTURE

I. Legal Basis

Public Law (P.R.) No. 89, June 21, 1955, as amended.

II. Date Agency Started Operations

1955.

III. Chief Executive or Director; Method of Selection

Mr. Ricardo E. Alegria—Director. Elected by the agency board of directors. The board is appointed by the Governor of Puerto Rico.

IV. Summary of Functions

Study and preserve the cultural heritage of Puerto Rico.

Foster, promote and stimulate the different manifestations of the Puerto Rican culture.

Keep the Commonwealth General Archive and its musical and word archives; also, a specialized library.

Administers a program for the preservation of zones, monuments, and places of historic value.

Foster the commemoration of illustrious Puerto Ricans and significant events and promote the arts, the theater and the handcraft work.

Foster the cultural advancements in the municipalities of Puerto Rico and organize cultural centers in said municipalities.

Maintain an editorial program.

Administer a program for economic assistance and scholarships.

V. Resources

Budget of expenditure for office operations and capital improvements during fiscal year 1964–65	$965, 000
Sources of income for fiscal year 1964–65:	
a. Federal appropriations	0
b. Commonwealth appropriations	965, 000
c. Other sources	54, 338

Total real estate property owned and/or used:		
a. Land:	*Cuerdas*	*Ratio of owned to used, percent*
1. Total used	146. 29	------
2. Total owned by the Government of Puerto Rico	146. 29	100
b. Buildings and office space facilities:	*Square feet*	*Ratio of used to owned, percent*
1. Total used	95, 201	62. 6
2. Total owned by the Government of Puerto Rico	152, 276	------
c. Rental paid for land, buildings and office space facilities used: *Proprietor*	*Annual rent*	*Percent*
1. Government of Puerto Rico	0	0
2. Federal Government	0	0
3. Private	$3, 000	100

VI. PERSONNEL

	Total
Total number of functionaries and employees	[1] 103
Method of selection:	
a. Classified Commonwealth civil service	126
b. Classified under some other merit system	0
c. Other	1
Nationality (place born):	
a. Puerto Rico	102
b. United States	0
c. Other countries	1
Salary:	
a. Annual salary range	$1, 600–$14, 000
b. Annual median salary	$2, 780

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[1] At the time of this survey there were 24 positions vacant.

INSTITUTE OF PUERTO RICAN LITERATURE

I. LEGAL BASIS

Joint Resolution No. 19 of the Legislature of Puerto Rico, April 28, 1933; Public Laws (P.R.) No. 10 of 1938, No. 135 of 1938, as amended and No. 101 of 1942 as amended; Reorganization Plan No. 6 of 1950.

II. DATE AGENCY STARTED OPERATIONS

1933.

III. CHIEF EXECUTIVE OR DIRECTOR; METHOD OF SELECTION

Dr. Angel Mergal—Acting President. Elected by the eight (8) members of the agency board.

IV. SUMMARY OF FUNCTIONS

Stimulate and foster the cultivation of literature in Puerto Rico. Award an annual prize for the best book published in Puerto Rico.

V. RESOURCES

Budget of expenditures for office operations during fiscal year *1964–65*	*$15, 000*
Sources of income for fiscal year 1964–65:	
a. Federal appropriations	0
b. Commonwealth appropriations	15, 000
c. Other sources	0

Total real estate property owned and/or used:

a. Land:	*Cuerdas*	
1. Total used	0	------
2. Total owned by the Government of Puerto Rico	0	------

b. Buildings and office space facilities:	*Square feet*	*Ratio of owned to used, percent*
1. Total used	430	------
2. Total owned by the Government of Puerto Rico	430	100

c. Rental paid for land, buildings and office space facilities used: All the space used by this agency is property of the University of Puerto Rico. No rent is paid for its use.

VI. PERSONNEL

	Total
Total number of functionaries and employees	[1] 1
Method of selection:	
a. Classified Commonwealth civil service	0
b. Classified under some other merit system	0
c. Other	1
Nationality (place born):	
a. Puerto Rico	1
b. United States	0
c. Other countries	0
Salary:	
a. Annual salary range	(2)
b. Annual median salary	n/a

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[1] Not included herein the 9 members of the Board, all working ad honorem.

[2] Less than $2,000.

LAND ADMINISTRATION

I. LEGAL BASIS

Public Law (P.R.) No. 13, May 16, 1962.

II. DATE AGENCY STARTED OPERATIONS

1962.

III. CHIEF EXECUTIVE OR DIRECTOR; METHOD OF SELECTION

Mr. Felix Mejias—Executive Director. Appointed by the agency governing board.

IV. SUMMARY OF FUNCTIONS

Facilitate the efficient utilization of land and the development of new land areas.

Preserve the natural and historic value of lands, forests, landscapes and beaches.

Prevent the concentration of lands in order to avoid speculation.

Hold and reserve land for the benefit of the Commonwealth inhabitants.

Help the Commonwealth government in the attainment of its public policy dealing with housing, industrial and commercial development.

V. RESOURCES

Budget of expenditures for office operations and capital improvements during fiscal year 1964–65	$10, 498, 120
Sources of income for fiscal year 1964–65:	
a. Federal appropriations	0
b. Commonwealth appropriations	33, 000, 000
c. Other sources	288, 000

Total real estate property owned and/or used:	Cuerdas	Ratio of used to owned, percent
a. Land facilities:		
1. Total used	0	0
2. Total owned by the Government of Puerto Rico	2, 956. 13	------

b. Buildings and office space facilities:	Square feet	Ratio of owned to used, percent
1. Total used	13, 378	------
2. Total owned by the Government of Puerto Rico	0	0

c. Rental paid for land, buildings and office space facilities used: Proprietor	Annual rent	Percent
1. Government of Puerto Rico	0	0
2. Federal Government	0	0
3. Private	$24, 080	100

VI. PERSONNEL

	Total
Total number of functionaries and employees	55
Method of selection:	
a. Classified Commonwealth civil service	0
b. Classified under some other merit system	0
c. Other	55
Nationality (place born):	
a. Puerto Rico	54
b. United States	0
c. Other countries	1
Salary:	
a. Annual salary range	$1, 872–$19, 000
b. Annual median salary	$3, 940

LAND AUTHORITY

I. LEGAL BASIS

Public Law (P.R.) No. 26, April 12, 1941, as amended.

II. DATE AGENCY STARTED OPERATIONS

1941.

III. CHIEF EXECUTIVE OR DIRECTOR; METHOD OF SELECTION

Mr. Gabriel Rivera Hernandez—Executive Director. Appointed by the governing board of the agency with the approval of the Governor of Puerto Rico.

IV. SUMMARY OF FUNCTIONS

Implement the Commonwealth land policy.

Take all necessary measures to eliminate corporate "latifundia" and prevent its reappearance in the future.

To safeguard individual land possession.

Assist in the development of new farmers.

Facilitate the best utilization of land under efficient and economic production plans, including the industrial processing of farm products.

Provide means for the acquisition of ground-plots to build homes for slum dwellers and farm tenants.

Make all necessary surveys and investigations directed toward the most efficient, economic and scientific use of the lands by the Puerto Ricans.

V. RESOURCES

Budget of expenditures for office operations and capital improvements during fiscal year 1964–65	$19,777,426
Sources of income for fiscal year 1964–65:	
a. Federal appropriations	0
b. Commonwealth appropriations	1,070,000
c. Other sources	16,642,368

Total real estate property owned and/or used:		
a. Land facilities:	*Cuerdas*	*Ratio of used to owned, percent*
1. Total used	69,073	84.1
2. Total owned by the Government of Puerto Rico	82,158	------

b. Buildings and office space facilities:	*Square feet*	*Ratio of owned to used, percent*
1. Total used	825,336	------
2. Total owned by the Government of Puerto Rico	825,336	100

c. Rental paid for land, buildings and office space facilities used:

Proprietor	*Annual rent*	*Percent*
1. Government of Puerto Rico	0	0
2. Federal Government	0	0
3. Private owner	15,595	100

VI. PERSONNEL

	Total
Total number of employees	365
Method of selection:[1]	
a. Classified Commonwealth civil service	183
b. Classified positions under some other merit system	0
c. Other	270
Nationality (place born):	
a. Puerto Rico	360
b. United States	0
c. Other countries	5
Salary:	
a. Annual salary range	$1,680–$19,000
b. Annual median salary	$3,420

[1] At the time of this survey there were 88 positions vacant.

MANPOWER DEVELOPMENT ADMINISTRATION

I. LEGAL BASIS

Public Law (P.R.) No. 140, July 19, 1960.

II. DATE AGENCY STARTED OPERATIONS

1960.

III. CHIEF EXECUTIVE OR DIRECTOR; METHOD OF SELECTION

Mr. Luciano Fuertes de la Haba—Executive Director. Appointed by the agency board of directors.

IV. SUMMARY OF FUNCTIONS

Must assess the amount of surplus labor supply in the Commonwealth.

Provide appropriate incentives for the employment of this unused working force; and utilize it in profitable and socially useful work projects.

V. RESOURCES

Budget of expenditures for office operations and capital improvements during fiscal year 1964–65	$3, 080, 000
Sources of income for fiscal year 1964–65:	
a. Federal appropriations	0
b. Commonwealth appropriations	3, 080, 000
c. Other sources	1, 879

Total real estate property owned and/or used:

a. Land facilities:	*Cuerdas*
1. Total used	0
2. Total owned by the Government of Puerto Rico	0

b. Buildings and office space facilities:	*Square feet*	*Ratio of owned to used, percent*
1. Total used	4, 362	------
2. Total owned by the Government of Puerto Rico	0	0

c. Rental paid for land, buildings and office space facilities used:

Proprietor	*Annual rent*	*Percent*
1. Government of Puerto Rico	0	0
2. Federal Government	0	0
3. Private	$8, 664	100

VI. PERSONNEL

	Total
Total number of functionaries and employees	47
Method of selection:	
a. Classified Commonwealth civil service	46
b. Classified under some other merit system	0
c. Other	1
Nationality (place born):	
a. Puerto Rico	47
b. United States	0
c. Other countries	0
Salary:	
a. Annual salary range	$1, 680–$11, 000
b. Annual median salary	$3, 240

METROPOLITAN BUS AUTHORITY

I. LEGAL BASIS

Public Law (P.R.) No. 5, May 11, 1959 as amended.

II. DATE AGENCY STARTED OPERATIONS

1942. It initiated operations as part of the Transportation Authority, now extinct.

III. CHIEF EXECUTIVE OR DIRECTOR; METHOD OF SELECTION

Mr. Herminio Fernandez Torrecillas—Executive Director. Designated by the agency board of directors.

IV. SUMMARY OF FUNCTIONS

Administer and operate passenger land transportation facilities, on a cash basis, covering all areas in and around San Juan metropolitan area, fringe zones of nearby municipalities included.

May provide transportation services to other places of the Commonwealth not covered by any regularly chartered transportation enterprise.

V. RESOURCES

Budget of expenditures for office operations and capital improvements during fiscal year 1964–65	$7,308,721
Sources of income for fiscal year 1964–65:	
a. Federal appropriations	0
b. Commonwealth appropriations	0
c. Other sources	7,308,721

Total real estate property owned and/or used:		
a. Land facilities:	*Cuerdas*	*Ratio of owned to used, percent*
1. Total used	18.7	------
2. Total owned by the Government of Puerto Rico	14.7	78.7
b. Buildings and office space facilities:	*Square feet*	*Ratio of owned to used, percent*
1. Total used	21,623	------
2. Total owned by the Government of Puerto Rico	21,623	100
c. Rental paid for land, buildings and office space facilities used:		
Proprietor	*Annual rent*	*Percent*
1. Government of Puerto Rico	0	0
2. Federal Government	$3,400	100
3. Private	0	0

VI. PERSONNEL

	Total
Total number of functionaries and employees	1,248
Method of selection:	
a. Classified Commonwealth civil service	0
b. Classified under some other merit system	0
c. Other	1,248
Nationality (place born):	
a. Puerto Rico	1,244
b. United States	2
c. Other countries	2
Salary:	
a. Annual salary range	$2,600–$17,000
b. Annual median salary	$3,070

PORTS AUTHORITY

I. Legal Basis

Public Law (P.R.) No. 125, May 7, 1942, as amended.

II. Date Agency Started Operations

1942.

III. Chief Executive or Director; Method of Selection

Mr. Ruben Sanchez Echevarria. Appointed by the Economic Development Administrator, with the approval of the Governor of Puerto Rico.

IV. Summary of Functions

Develop and improve, acquire, own, operate, and regulate throughout the Commonwealth: airports, ports, docks, and all types of transportation facilities into and from the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico.

V. Resources

Budget of expenditures for office operations and capital improvements during fiscal year 1964–65	$17, 923, 000
Sources of income for fiscal year 1964–65:	
a. Federal appropriations	1, 525, 000
b. Commonwealth appropriations	289, 000
c. Other sources	16, 109, 000

Total real estate property owned and/or used:

a. Land facilities:	*Cuerdas*	*Ratio of owned to used, percent*
1. Total used	2, 649. 07	------
2. Total owned by the Government of Puerto Rico	2, 291. 77	86. 5

b. Buildings and office space facilities:	*Square feet*	*Ratio of owned to used, percent*
1. Total used	48, 997	------
2. Total owned by the Government of Puerto Rico	23, 545	48. 1

c. Rental paid for land, buildings and office space facilities used:

Proprietor	*Annual rent*	*Percent*
1. Government of Puerto Rico	0	0
2. Federal Government	0	0
3. Private	$660	100

VI. Personnel

	Total
Total number of functionaries and employees:	
Method of selection:	
a. Classified Commonwealth civil service	0
b. Classified positions under some other merit system	0
c. Other	554
Nationality (place born):	
a. Puerto Rico	546
b. United States	2
c. Other countries	6
Salary:	
a. Annual salary range	$1, 941–$18, 000
b. Annual median salary	$3, 900

PRISON INDUSTRIES CORPORATION

I. LEGAL BASIS

Public Law (P.R.) No. 505 of 1946.

II. DATE AGENCY STARTED OPERATIONS

1946.

III. CHIEF EXECUTIVE OR DIRECTOR; METHOD OF SELECTION

Mr. Francisco Rodriguez Martinez—Administrator. Appointed by the Commonwealth Secretary of Justice.

IV. SUMMARY OF FUNCTIONS

Establish industries to provide employment to inmates in the various penal and correctional institutions of the island, offering them the opportunity to learn some useful trade that may equip them afterwards with some means of livelihood for them and their families, and at the same time giving them the opportunity to save some money while on detention.

V. RESOURCES

Budget of expenditures for office operations and capital improvements during fiscal year 1964–65	$652, 786
Sources of income for fiscal year 1964–65:	
a. Federal appropriations	0
b. Commonwealth appropriations	0
c. Other sources	652, 786

Total real estate property owned and/or used:		
a. Land facilities:	*Cuerdas*	*Ratio of owned to used, percent*
1. Total used	2. 25	------
2. Total owned by the Government of Puerto Rico	2. 25	100
b. Buildings and office space facilities:	*Square feet*	*Ratio of owned to used, percent*
1. Total used	1, 200	------
2. Total owned by the Government of Puerto Rico	1, 200	100

c. Rental paid for lands, buildings and office space facilities used: $0.

VI. PERSONNEL

	Total
Total number of functionaries and employees	26
Method of selection:	
a. Classified Commonwealth civil service	25
b. Classified under some other merit system	0
c. Other	1
Nationality (place born):	
a. Puerto Rico	26
b. United States	0
c. Other countries	0
Salary:	
a. Annual salary range	$1, 920–$6, 500
b. Annual median salary	$2, 950

PUBLIC BUILDINGS AUTHORITY

I. LEGAL BASIS

Public Law (P.R.) No. 56, June 19, 1958, as amended by Public Law (P.R.) No. 51, June 13, 1961.

II. DATE AGENCY STARTED OPERATIONS

1960.

III. CHIEF EXECUTIVE OR DIRECTOR; METHOD OF SELECTION

Mr. Ulises Barros Loubriel—Executive Director. Appointed by the agency board of directors.

IV. SUMMARY OF FUNCTIONS

Provide buildings and office space facilities for the Commonwealth offices, departments, agencies, instrumentalities or municipalities.

Obtain, rent, construct, equip, restore, finance and operate the physical facilities it may acquire.

V. RESOURCES

Budget of expenditures for office operations and capital improvements during fiscal year 1964–65	$919,000
Sources of income for fiscal year 1964–65:	
a. Federal appropriations	0
b. Commonwealth appropriations	919,000
c. Other sources	34,000

Total real estate property owned and/or used:		
a. Land facilities:	*Cuerdas*	*Ratio of used to owned, percent*
1. Total used	0	0
2. Total owned by the Government of Puerto Rico	43.2	-------
b. Buildings and office space facilities:	*Square feet*	*Ratio of used to owned, percent*
1. Total used	5,643	91
2. Total owned by the Government of Puerto Rico	6,210	-------
c. Rental paid for land, buildings and office space facilities used:		
Proprietor	*Annual rent*	*Percent*
1. Government of Puerto Rico	0	0
2. Federal Government	0	0
3. Private	$11,551	100

VI. PERSONNEL

	Total
Total number of functionaries and employees	56
Method of selection:	
a. Classified Commonwealth civil service	0
b. Classified under some other merit system	0
c. Other	56

	Total
Nationality (place born):	
a. Puerto Rico	46
b. United States	3
c. Other countries	7
Salary:	
a. Annual salary range	$1,860–$15,000
b. Annual median salary	$5,090

PUERTO RICO HOUSING BANK

I. Legal Basis

Public Law (P.R.) No. 146, June 30, 1961.

II. Date Agency Started Operations

1962.

III. Chief Executive or Director; Method of Selection

Mr. Lorenzo Muñoz Morales—President. Appointed by the agency board of directors.

IV. Summary of Functions

Grant loans to low-income individuals to build, improve, reconstruct, enlarge or repair their homes.

Administer a savings plan among families living in public housing projects so that they may be able to save for the down payment in the purchase of their own houses.

V. Resources

Budget of expenditures for office operations and capital improvements during fiscal year 1964–65	$352,711
Sources of income for fiscal year 1964–65:	
a. Federal appropriations	0
b. Commonwealth appropriations	2,000,000
c. Other sources	417,636

Total real estate property owned and/or used:

a. Land facilities:	Cuerdas
1. Total used	0
2. Total owned by the Government of Puerto Rico	0

b. Buildings and office space facilities:	Square feet	Ratio of owned to used, percent
1. Total used	5,389	------
2. Total owned by the Government of Puerto Rico	0	0

c. Rental paid for land, buildings and office space facilities used:

Proprietor	Annual rent	Percent
1. Government of Puerto Rico	0	0
2. Federal Government	0	0
3. Private	$9,996	100

VI. PERSONNEL

	Total
Total number of functionaries and employees	54
Method of selection:	
a. Classified Commonwealth civil service	0
b. Classified under some other merit system	0
c. Other	54
Nationality (place born):	
a. Puerto Rico	52
b. United States	1
c. Other countries	1
Salary:	
a. Annual salary range	$2, 640–$17, 000
b. Annual median salary	$3, 350

RECREATIONAL DEVELOPMENT COMPANY

I. LEGAL BASIS

Public Law (P.R.) No. 114, June 23, 1961.

II. DATE AGENCY STARTED OPERATIONS

1962.

III. CHIEF EXECUTIVE OR DIRECTOR; METHOD OF SELECTION

Mr. Octavio Wys—General Manager. The Public Recreation and Parks Administrator serves as general manager of the recreation development company.

IV. SUMMARY OF FUNCTIONS

Develop physical and other recreation facilities such as public parks, beaches, athletics fields, summer resorts, gymnasiums, yachting resorts, restaurants, swimming pools, fishing and hunting sports, sail and motorboats, for the people of Puerto Rico.

V. RESOURCES

Budget of expenditures for office operations and capital improvements during fiscal year 1964–65	$5, 417, 477
Sources of income for fiscal year 1964–65:	
a. Federal appropriations	0
b. Commonwealth appropriations	0
c. Other sources	5, 417, 477

Total real estate property owned and/or used:

	Cuerdas	Ratio of owned to used, percent
a. Land facilities:		
1. Total used	824. 08	------
2. Total owned by the Government of Puerto Rico	811. 88	98. 6

	Square feet	Ratio of owned to used, percent
b. Buildings and office space facilities:		
1. Total used	1, 720	------
2. Total owned by the Government of Puerto Rico	0	0

c. Rental paid for land, buildings and office space facilities used:

Proprietor	Annual rent	Percent
1. Government of Puerto Rico	$500	100
2. Federal Government	0	0
3. Private	0	0

VI. PERSONNEL

	Total
Total number of functionaries and employees	20
Method of selection:	
a. Classified Commonwealth civil service	0
b. Classified under some other merit system	0
c. Other	20
Nationality (place born):	
a. Puerto Rico	20
b. United States	0
c. Other countries	0
Salary:	
a. Annual salary range	$1, 680–$14, 000
b. Annual median salary	$2, 400

SERVICE CORPORATION OF THE MEDICAL CENTER OF PUERTO RICO

I. LEGAL BASIS

Public Law (P.R.) No. 106, June 26, 1962.

II. DATE AGENCY STARTED OPERATIONS

1956. (The planning of this project was started at this date.)

III. CHIEF EXECUTIVE OR DIRECTOR; METHOD OF SELECTION

Mr. Julio A. Perez—Administrator. Appointed by the agency board of directors.

IV. SUMMARY OF FUNCTIONS

Operate and administer auxiliary medical services—including commercial type services; centralize administrative services for their common use by all the institutional organizations which compose the Medical Center; plan the construction of all buildings and facilities necessary for any other service that may be incorporated.

This corporation also coordinates medical and hospital services, educational, and research endeavors of all member organizations of the medical center of Puerto Rico.

V. RESOURCES

Budget of expenditures for office operations and capital improvements during fiscal year 1964–65	$6, 413, 683
Sources of income for fiscal year 1964–65:	
a. Federal appropriations	2, 572, 548
b. Commonwealth appropriations	3, 407, 124
c. Other sources	434, 011

Total real estate property owned and/or used:

a. Land facilities:	*Cuerdas*	*Ratio of owned to used, percent*
1. Total used	227	------
2. Total owned by the Government of Puerto Rico	227	100

b. Buildings and office space facilities:	*Square feet*	*Ratio of used to owned percent*
1. Total used	30, 000	65
2. Total owned by the Government of Puerto Rico	46, 754	------

c. Rental paid for land, buildings and office space facilities used: $0.

VI. Personnel

	Total
Total number of functionaries and employees	932
Method of selection:	
a. Classified Commonwealth civil service	0
b. Classified under some other merit system	931
c. Other	1
Nationality (place born):	
a. Puerto Rico	932
b. United States	0
c. Other countries	0
Salary:	
a. Annual salary range	$1, 680–$17, 280
b. Annual median salary	$2, 510

UNIVERSITY OF PUERTO RICO

I. Legal Basis [1]

Public Laws (P.R.) of March 12, 1903 as amended and No. 135, May 7, 1952, as amended.

II. Date Agency Started Operations

1903.

III. Chief Executive or Director; Method of Selection

Mr. Jaime Benítez—Chancellor. Appointed by the superior educational council. The council is appointed by the Governor of Puerto Rico.

IV. Summary of Functions

Foster the development of public education and promote the progress of learning, research, and knowledge in and outside of Puerto Rico.

Make scientific research in the various fields of learning.

Provide higher education.

Extend to the people the benefits of culture.

Prepare public servants.

---

[1] On January 20, 1966 a new statute rescinding previous laws was approved. The new provisions alter drastically much of the university structure.

V. RESOURCES

Budget of expenditures for office operations and capital improvements during fiscal year 1964–65	$40,803,477
Sources of income for fiscal year 1964–65:	
a. Federal appropriations	$5,894,456
b. Commonwealth appropriations	27,448,046
c. Other sources	9,988,045

Total real estate property owned and/or used:		
a. Land facilities:	*Cuerdas*	*Ratio of used, to owned percent*
1. Total used	621.73	49.7
2. Total owned by the Government of Puerto Rico	1,250.74	------
b. Buildings and office space facilities:	*Square feet*	*Ratio of owned to used, percent*
1. Total used	[1] 2,624,822	------
2. Total owned by the Government of Puerto Rico	2,624,822	100
c. Rental paid for land, buildings and office space facilities used:		
Proprietor	*Annual rental*	*Percent*
1. Government of Puerto Rico	$4,253	2.2
2. Federal Government	0	0
3. Private	184,455	97.8
Total	188,708	100.0

[1] The Regional College of Humacao is not included. These figures should be considered as an estimate

VI. PERSONNEL

	Total
Total number of functionaries and employees	4,944
Method of selection:	
a. Classified Commonwealth civil service	1,775
b. Classified under some other merit system	2,998
c. Other	171
Nationality (place born):	
a. Puerto Rico	4,394
b. United States	260
c. Other countries	290
Salary:	
a. Annual salary range	$1,680–$22,500
b. Annual median salary	$3,840

URBAN RENEWAL AND HOUSING CORPORATION

I. Legal Basis

Public Law (P.R.) No. 88, June 22, 1957, as amended.

II. Date Agency Started Operations

1938. It started as the Puerto Rico Housing Authority.

III. Chief Executive or Director; Method of Selection

Mr. Carlos Alvarado—Executive Director. Appointed by the agency board of Directors.

IV. Summary of Functions

Study and appraise construction, technical, social, and economic problems involved in housing and urban renewal.

Make long range plans for urban renewal and promote the construction of low-cost private housing projects.

V. Resources

Budget of expenditures for office operations and capital improvements during fiscal year 1964–65	$46, 925, 000
Sources of income for fiscal year 1964–65:	
a. Federal appropriations	20, 368, 000
b. Commonwealth appropriations	11, 378, 000
c. Other sources	15, 179, 000

Total real estate property owned and/or used:		
a. Land facilities:	*Cuerdas*	*Ratio of used to owned, percent*
1. Total used	7, 555. 69	81. 1
2. Total owned by the Government of Puerto Rico	9, 320. 24	------
b. Buildings and office space facilities:	*Square feet*	*Ratio of owned to used, percent*
1. Total used	605, 247	------
2. Total owned by the Government of Puerto Rico	559, 387	92. 4
c. Rental paid for land, buildings and office space facilities used:		
Proprietor	*Annual rent*	*Percent*
1. Government of Puerto Rico	0	0
2. Federal Government	0	0
3. Private	$101, 900	100

VI. Personnel

	Total
Total number of functionaries and employees	1, 668
Method of selection:	
a. Classified Commonwealth civil service	155
b. Classified under some other merit system	0
c. Other	1, 513
Nationality (place born):	
a. Puerto Rico	1, 646
b. United States	5
c. Other countries	17
Salary:	
a. Annual salary range	$1, 680–$19, 000
b. Annual median salary	$3, 080

WATER RESOURCES AUTHORITY

I. Legal Basis

Public Laws (P.R.) No. 83, May 2, 1941, and No. 19, April 8, 1942, as amended.

II. Date Agency Started Operations

1941.

III. Chief Executive or Director; Method of Selection

Mr. Rafael V. Urrutia—Executive Director. Appointed by the governing board of the agency.

IV. Summary of Functions

Produce, transmit, distribute, and sell electric power in Puerto Rico.

Administer the Government irrigation services in Puerto Rico.

V. Resources

Budget of expenditures for office operations and capital improvements during fiscal year 1964–65	$125,170,000
Sources of income for fiscal year 1964–65:	
a. Federal appropriations	1,759,000
b. Commonwealth appropriations	2,637,000
c. Other sources	120,774,000

Total real estate property owned and/or used:		
a. Land facilities:	*Cuerdas*	*Ratio of owned to used, percent*
1. Total used	28,812	------
2. Total owned by the Government of Puerto Rico	8,617	29.9
b. Buildings and office space facilities:	*Square feet*	*Ratio of used to owned, percent*
1. Total used	75,075	34.6
2. Total owned by the Government of Puerto Rico	217,111	------
c. Rental paid for land, buildings and office space facilities used:		
Proprietor	*Annual rent*	*Percent*
1. Government of Puerto Rico	$12,400	8.78
2. Federal government	400	0.28
3. Private	128,300	90.94
Total	141,100	100.0

VI. Personnel

	Total
Total number of functionaries and employees	[1] 8,689
Method of selection:	
a. Classified Commonwealth civil service	0
b. Classified positions under some other merit systems	4,427
c. Other	4,262
Nationality (place born):	
a. Puerto Rico	8,654
b. United States	5
c. Other countries	30
Salary: [2]	
a. Annual salary range	$3,623–$18,000
b. Annual median salary	$5,200

[1] 4,262 nonregular employees are included.

[2] Only the salaries of regular employees are considered.

APPENDIX

QUESTIONNAIRE FOR INVENTORY OF DEPARTMENTS, AGENCIES AND INSTRUMENTALITIES OF THE EXECUTIVE BRANCH OF THE GOVERNMENT OF THE COMMONWEALTH OF PUERTO RICO

Please answer all the questions:

I. Name of the agency:

II. Name of Chief Executive Officer or Director:

III. Method of Selection of the Chief Executive Officer or Director:

IV. Legal basis (The provisions which authorize the establishment of the agency):

V. Date the agency started operations:

VI. Functions of the agency:

VII. Resources:

A. Total budget of expenditures (office operations and capital improvements) for fiscal year 1964-65:[1]

$____________________

1. Total income from Commonwealth appropriations

$____________________

2. Total income from Federal appropriations

$____________________

3. Total income from other sources

$____________________

B. Real Estate:

1. The lands, buildings, and office space occupied by this agency are:

Totally
- Federal Government Property ☐
- Commonwealth Property ☐
- Private Property ☐

Partly
- Federal Government Property ☐
- Commonwealth Property ☐
- Private Property ☐

2. This agency pays annual rent for the land area and building space it occupies belonging to:

	Annual Amount Paid
Federal Government	$____________________
Government of the Commonwealth	$____________________
Municipal Government	$____________________
Private owner	$____________________

---

[1] If agency was created in 1965, please include budget for fiscal year 1965-1966.

C. Land Area:

1. Total amount, if any, of land area *USED* by this agency is: (Choose *any one* of the following measures)
    - Cuerdas: ____________
    - Acres: ____________
    - Square meters: ____________
    - Square feet: ____________
2. Total amount, if any of land area *OWNED* by this agency is: (Choose *any one* of the following measures)
    - Cuerdas: ____________
    - Acres: ____________
    - Square meters: ____________
    - Square feet: ____________

D. Buildings and office space:

1. Total area, in square feet, of rooms and office space *USED* by this agency is:
   ____________ square feet
2. Total area, in square feet, of rooms and office space, *OWNED* by this agency is:
   ____________ square feet

VIII. Organization:

Please submit to us an Organization Chart of the agency. We need four copies preferably size 8½" x 11".

IX. Personnel

A. Total number of functionaries and employees of the agency: ____________

B. Methods of Selection:

1. Executive positions ____________
2. Classified positions under Commonwealth Civil Service System ____________
3. Classified positions under some other merit system ____________
4. Positions not classified ____________

C. Nationality of Employees—(Place of Birth) *Number born*

1. In Puerto Rico ____________
2. In U.S.A. ____________
3. In other countries ____________

D. Wages and Salaries:

1. Indicate lowest annual salary scale $____________
2. Indicate highest annual salary scale $____________

E. Level of Salaries: Number of employees in the following annual salary level:

1. Less than $2,000	[2] 45
2. $2,000 or more but less than $4,000	[2] 95
3. $4,000 or more but less than $6,000	[2] 223
4. $6,000 or more but less than $8,000	[2] 120
5. $8,000 or more but less than $10,000	[2] 64
6. $10,000 or more but less than $12,000	[2] 36
7. $12,000 or more but less than $14,000	[2] 14

---

[2] See "Remarks."

8. $14,000 or more but less than $16,000	[2] 13
9. $16,000 or more	34
N=	[2] 644

X. Remarks:

Distribution above is provided in order to illustrate the formula utilized for computing the median salary:

$$Md = L + \frac{\left(\frac{n}{2} - cf\right) i}{f}$$

$L = \$4{,}000$

$\frac{n}{2} = 322$

$cf = 140$

$f = 223$

$i = \$2{,}000$

$Md = \$5{,}630$ (rounded to the nearest 10 dollar)

XI. After you have filled out this questionnaire, please return it to:

Mr. Norbert Rivera Morales
Assistant Director
School of Public Administration
University of Puerto Rico
Río Piedras, P.R.

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[2] See "Remarks."

PART II: INVENTORY OF FEDERAL AGENCIES WITH OFFICES IN PUERTO RICO

PREFACE

Pursuant to request made by the director of the School of Public Administration of the University of Puerto Rico, Dr. Luis F. Silva Recio, we have the pleasure to submit the following report to the United States-Puerto Rico Status Commission.

The report consists of an inventory of the executive departments, agencies, and public corporations of the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico and of the Federal counterparts with offices in Puerto Rico. It has two parts. Part I covers the Commonwealth agencies; Part II covers the Federal agencies.

Most of the information was gathered directly from each agency through a questionnaire sent by registered mail to each agency head (copy of the questionnaire is included in the appendix). Personal visits, telephone calls and letters were used as followups to the original questionnaire. We are pleased to say that, with very few exceptions[1] the agency heads were generous and very cooperative. We are particularly grateful to the Commonwealth Governor's Office and to the Federal Veterans' Administration Office for allowing us to use their answered questionnaires as models for other agencies.

Secondary sources used include the "Directory of the Federal Government Agencies with Offices in Puerto Rico, 1964" (Bureau of the Budget, Commonwealth of Puerto Rico); "Manual of Federal Agencies With Offices in Puerto Rico, 1954" (School of Public Administration, University of Puerto Rico); "Manual de Organización de las Agencias del Estado Libre Asociado de Puerto Rico, 1960 y Guía de Funcionarios del Estado Libre Asociado de Puerto Rico, 1965" (Bureau of the Budget, Commonwealth of Puerto Rico); "Presupuesto para el año fiscal 1966–67 sometido por el Gobernador a la Asamblea Legislativa del Estado Libre Asociado de Puerto Rico el 11 de enero de 1965."

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[1] All the agencies responded and only a few ones failed to submit all the information requested. Data which could not be provided by a given agency or otherwise obtained has been referred to as either "information withheld" or "information not available" according to our judgement in each individual case.

The report summarizes main features and statistics descriptive of the nature, functions and structural makeup of each agency. Aware of the short time available for the Commission to carry out its task, we tried to make this presentation as concise as possible.

Description of each agency follows, with very few variations, the sequence of the original questionnaire: items I to IV summarize data about the agency head or person in charge, legal basis, and age and functions of the agency; items V to VII summarize data about budget, real estate, personnel, and organization. The "Directory of Federal Agencies," mentioned above, was used as benchmark for inventory of units in Puerto Rico.[2] Offices are grouped in alphabetical order under each department or executive agency. We have taken into account all recent changes, including additions, consolidation or suppression of offices. There are several banks or credit associations listed in the directory which we have omitted because they are not Federal agencies.

REMARKS ON SPECIFIC ITEMS

Chief executive or director and method of selection.—Name of incumbent in top position is given. There are several offices without any director or chief executive. In such cases we mention the name of the official or agent in temporary charge. We did not include the names of all the local post office heads, although we have them at our disposal.

Legal basis.—In instances in which various acts were offered as legal basis mention has been made of the ones judged to be most relevant.

Functions.—In some cases in which the agency gave a very detailed account of its functions, only the most inclusive and important ones have been mentioned.

Resources.—Budget statistics are for fiscal year 1964–65. If some other year was selected it has been duly specified in footnotes. In cases where other substantial expenses are incurred by a given agency for purposes other than office operations and capital improvements, as for example, services and other payments made to veterans or social security recipients, the amounts are stated separately.

Quantities referring to real estate used and/or owned are given in acres when it refers to land, and in square feet when it refers to buildings and office space.

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[2] There exists no coordinating organism for the complex of Federal agencies operating in Puerto Rico. Even in cases of numerous low-level subunits of the same major unit, like the municipal post offices, all organizational operations are controlled directly by mainland regional centers. Thus, contrary to the case of the Puerto Rican agencies, we did not have a general organization chart or scheme by which to check for absolute certainty that no agency may have been left out.

The equivalence is as follows:

$$1 \text{ acre} \begin{cases} =1.03 \text{ cuerda} \\ =4{,}046.9 \text{ square meters} \\ =43{,}560 \text{ square feet} \end{cases}$$

The percentage computations are intended to convey a quick idea on the relation between the amount of land/or office space utilized and the amount owned, as well as of the recipients of any rent paid.

Personnel.—The Median Salary was computed according to the following statistical formula:

$$Md = L + \frac{\left(\frac{n}{2} - cf\right)i}{f}$$

On page 973 (see appendix) all the above symbols are explained.

We want to express our gratitude to all agency heads and persons in charge for making this report possible; to Mrs. Minerva V. de Agosto, Miss Carmen N. Rodriguez, and Miss Maria Socorro Rodriguez of the School of Public Administration pool of secretaries; to Mrs. Albilda Berrios de Isern for her excellent collaboration in typing the manuscript of the whole project; and very especially to Mr. Marco Antonio Rigau, Jr., for his cooperation as research assistant during the preliminary phase of the report.

NORBERT RIVERA MORALES,
M.A.P., M.A. Soc.

LUIS E. BAERGA DUPREY,
M.A.P.

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DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE

AGRICULTURAL STABILIZATION AND CONSERVATION SERVICE

(Caribbean Area Office)

I. LEGAL BASIS

Memorandum No. 1446, Supplement 2, U.S. Secretary of Agriculture (April 9, 1961).

II. DATE OFFICE STARTED OPERATIONS IN PUERTO RICO

1934. The predecessor of this agency was the Agricultural Adjustment Administration and Commodity Stabilization Service which started operations in 1934. In 1961 its name was changed to the present one.

III. CHIEF EXECUTIVE OR DIRECTOR; METHOD OF SELECTING HIM

Mr. Carlos G. Troche. Appointed by the Administrator of the Agricultural Stabilization and Conservation Service at Washington, D.C., in accordance with U.S. Civil Service regulations.

IV. SUMMARY OF FUNCTIONS

The agency is responsible for the administration of the Sugar Act of 1948, as amended, and the Agricultural Conservation Program of the Caribbean Area.

V. Resources

Budget of expenditures for office operations during fiscal year 1964–65	[1] $753,056
Sources of income for fiscal year 1964–65:	
a. Federal appropriations	753, 056
b. Commonwealth appropriations	0
c. Other sources	0

Total real estate property owned and/or used:

a. Land facilities:	*Acres*
1. Total used	0
2. Total owned by Federal Government	0

b. Buildings and office space facilities:	*Square feet*	*Ratio of owned to used, (percent)*
1. Total used	16, 365	------
2. Total owned by Federal Government	0	0

c. Rental paid for land, buildings and office space facilities used:

Proprietor	*Annual rental paid*	*Percent*
1. Federal Government	0	0
2. Puerto Rican Government	0	0
3. Private	$22, 872	100

[1] Does not include money paid to farmers under the Sugar and Agricultural Conservation Program, totaling $14,016,180.

VI. Personnel

	Total
Total number of employees	109
Method of selection:	
a. Classified civil service	107
b. Excepted service positions	2
c. Other	0
Nationality (place born):	
a. United States of America	4
b. Puerto Rico	103
c. Other countries	2
Salary:	
a. Annual salary range	$3, 385–$13, 090
b. Annual median salary	$5, 330

ANIMAL HEALTH DIVISION

I. Legal Basis

State-Federal Cooperative Agreement in accordance with Congressional Act of May 29, 1884.

II. Date Office Started Operations in Puerto Rico

1934.

III. Chief Executive or Director; Method of Selecting Him

Mr. Forest E. Henderson—Veterinarian in Charge. Selected under the provisions of the Federal civil service regulations with final recommendation for appointment by the division director.

IV. SUMMARY OF FUNCTIONS

In collaboration with the local government, the division is responsible for the control and eradication of any contagious infections or communicable disease of livestock.

Inspects and quarantines imported and exported animals. Acts as a representative to the Caribbean.

V. RESOURCES

Budget of expenditures for office operations during fiscal year 1964–65	$512,174
Sources of income for fiscal year 1964–65:	
a. Federal appropriations	512,174
b. Commonwealth appropriations	0
c. Other sources	0

Total real estate property owned and/or used:

a. Land facilities:	Acres
1. Total used	0
2. Total owned by Federal Government	0

b. Buildings and office space facilities:	Square feet	Ratio of owned to used, percent
1. Total used	2,471	0
2. Total owned by Federal Government	0	0

c. Rental paid for land, buildings and office space facilities used:

Proprietor	Annual rental paid	Percent
1. Federal Government	0	0
2. Commonwealth or municipal government	0	0
3. Private	$9,762	100
Total	9,762	100

VI. PERSONNEL

	Total
Total number of employees	49
Method of selection:	
a. Classified civil service	34
b. Excepted service positions	1
c. Other	14
Nationality (place born):	
a. United States of America	8
b. Puerto Rico	40
c. Other countries	1
Salary:	
a. Annual salary range	$4,005–$15,015
b. Annual median salary	$5,960

THE EXPERIMENT STATION

I. LEGAL BASIS

31 U.S. Stat. at L. 199, chapter 355; 31 U.S. Stat. at L. 935 chapter 805.

II. DATE OFFICE STARTED OPERATIONS IN PUERTO RICO

1901

III. CHIEF EXECUTIVE OR DIRECTOR; METHOD OF SELECTING HIM

Mr. Murray H. Gaskins—Officer in Charge. Appointed by the director, Crops Research Division, Agriculture Research Service, under the regulations of the Federal civil service.

IV. SUMMARY OF FUNCTIONS

Agricultural Research.

V. RESOURCES

Budget of expenditures for office operations and capital improvements during fiscal year 1964–65	$460,000
Sources of income for fiscal year 1964–65:	
a. Federal appropriations	400,000
b. Other sources	60,000

Total real estate property owned and/or used:

	Acres	Ratio of owned to used, percent
a. Land facilities:		
1. Total used	400	------
2. Total owned by Federal Government	[1] 400	100

	Square feet	Ratio of owned to used, percent
b. Buildings and office space facilities:		
1. Total used	43,000	------
2. Total owned by Federal Government	43,000	100

c. Rental paid for land, buildings and office space facilities used: $0.

---

[1] Land deeded to U.S. Government for agricultural purposes, will revert to people of Puerto Rico if used for other purposes.

VI. PERSONNEL

	Total
Total number of employees	66
Method of selection:	
a. Classified civil service	58
b. Excepted service positions	0
c. Other	8
Nationality (place born):	
a. United States of America	9
b. Puerto Rico	56
c. Other countries	1
Salary:	
a. Annual salary range	$2,537–$13,335
b. Annual median salary	$3,890

FARMERS HOME ADMINISTRATION

I. LEGAL BASIS

Public Law 731, the Bankhead-Jones Farm Tenant Act of August 1946.

II. DATE OFFICE STARTED OPERATIONS IN PUERTO RICO

1946. Predecessors of the present agency were the Emergency Crop and Feed Loan Office in 1935 and the Farm Security Administration in 1938.

III. CHIEF EXECUTIVE OR DIRECTOR; METHOD OF SELECTING HIM

Mr. Celestino Matta Dueño. Appointed by the administrator, Farmers Home Administration (Selective Appointment).

IV. SUMMARY OF FUNCTIONS

Provides credit (supplements, but does not compete with credit from other lenders), and management aid for eligible family farmers to establish sound farming systems, increase their incomes, raise their living standards, and enable them to make full contribution to the economic strength of their communities.

V. RESOURCES

Budget of expenditures for office operations during fiscal year 1964-65	[1] $653,542
Sources of income for fiscal year 1964-65:	
a. Federal appropriations	[2] 646,789
b. Commonwealth appropriations	0
c. Other sources	0

Total real estate property owned and/or used:

a. Land facilities:	*Acres*
1. Total used	0
2. Total owned by Federal Government	0

b. Buildings and office space facilities:	*Square feet*	*Ratio of owned to used, percent*
1. Total used	17,872	
2. Total owned by Federal Government	(3)	(3)

c. Rental paid for land, buildings and office space facilities used:

Proprietor	*Annual rental paid*	*Percent*
1. Federal Government	0	0
2. Puerto Rican Government	0	0
3. Private	$29,041	100

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[1] Does not include funds allotted for credit assistance purposes.
[2] Approximate amount.
[3] Unspecified.

VI. PERSONNEL

	Total
Total number of employees	[1] 180
Method of selection:	
a. Classified civil service	94
b. Excepted service positions	86
c. Other	0
Nationality (place born):	
a. United States of America	2
b. Puerto Rico	174
c. Other countries	4
Salary:	
a. Annual salary range	$4,005-$15,640
b. Annual median salary	$4,275

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[1] There are 79 part time employees with salaries unspecified.

FOOD DISTRIBUTION DIVISION

I. LEGAL BASIS

Information withheld.

II. DATE OFFICE STARTED OPERATIONS IN PUERTO RICO

Information withheld.

III. Chief Executive or Director; Method of Selecting Him

Mr. Virgilio Rabainne—Officer in Charge. Appointed by the director, Consumer Food Programs, Washington, D.C., under the provisions of Federal Civil Service regulations.

IV. Summary of Functions

Administer in Puerto Rico and the Virgin Islands those programs applicable to this subarea (mainly, School Lunch and Direct Distribution) through State-Federal working agreements (the Commonwealth Department of Education for the School Lunch Program and the Commonwealth Department of Health for the Direct Distribution—welfare, public health, government and private nonprofit hospitals and institutions; the Virgin Islands Department of Education for the School Lunch Program and the V.I. Department of Social Welfare for the Direct Distribution—welfare, government and private nonprofit hospitals and institutions).

V. Resources

Budget and sources of income: Information withheld.

Total real estate property owned and/or used:

a. Land facilities:	*Acres*
1. Total used	0
2. Total owned by Federal Government	0

b. Buildings and office space facilities:	*Square feet*	*Ratio of owned to used, percent*
1. Total used	1,000	------
2. Total owned by Federal Government	0	0

c. Rental paid for land, buildings and office space facilities used:

Proprietor	*Annual rental paid*	*Percent*
1. Federal Government	0	0
2. Puerto Rican Government	0	0
3. Private	$1,500	100

VI. Personnel

	Total
Total number of employees	6
Method of selection:	
a. Classified civil service	6
b. Excepted service positions	0
c. Other	0
Nationality (place born):	
1. United States of America	0
2. Puerto Rico	6
Salary:	
a. Annual salary range	$5,085–$13,445
b. Annual median salary	$8,000

FRESH PRODUCTS INSPECTION

I. Legal Basis

By cooperative agreement between the U.S. Department of Agriculture and the Puerto Rican Department of Agriculture.

II. DATE OFFICE STARTED OPERATIONS IN PUERTO RICO

1951.

III. CHIEF EXECUTIVE OR DIRECTOR; METHOD OF SELECTING HIM

Mr. Daniel H. Hancock. Appointed by the Director of Fruit and Vegetable Division, Washington, D.C.

IV. SUMMARY OF FUNCTIONS

Make inspections and issues certificates on shipments of fresh fruits and vegetables imported into Puerto Rico or exported from Puerto Rico. Inspections are made as to quality and condition of the products and are on a voluntary basis except the inspection of mangoes which is mandatory.

Sample, checkload and checkweigh shipments of rice, corn meal and flour purchased in Puerto Rico for needy families by the U.S. Department of Agriculture.

V. RESOURCES

Budget of expenditures for office operations and capital improvements during fiscal year 1964–65		$11, 232
Sources of income for fiscal year 1964–65:		
a. Federal appropriations		0
b. Commonwealth appropriations		0
c. Other sources		16, 194
Total real estate property owned and/or used:		
a. Land facilities:	*Acres*	
1. Total used	0	
2. Total owned by Federal Government	0	
b. Buildings and office space facilities:	*Square feet*	*Ratio of owned to used, percent*
1. Total used	800	------
2. Total owned by Federal Government	0	0

c. Rental paid for land, buildings and office space facilities used; $0. Property used belongs to the government of Puerto Rico.

VI. PERSONNEL

	Total
Total number of employees	7
Method of selection:	
a. Classified civil service	1
b. Excepted service positions	0
c. Other	6
Nationality (place born):	
a. United States of America	1
b. Puerto Rico	6
Salary:	
a. Annual salary range	$2, 400–$10, 000
b. Annual median salary	$5, 000

GENERAL COUNSEL

I. Legal Basis

Special directive of the Office of the Solicitor in February 1942.

II. Date Office Started Operations in Puerto Rico

1942.

III. Chief Executive or Director; Method of Selecting Him

Mr. Lemuel Marques, Jr.—Attorney in Charge. Appointed by the General Counsel, U.S. Department of Agriculture, Washington, D.C.

IV. Summary of Functions

Give legal assistance to the Farmers Home Administration and all other agencies of the U.S. Department of Agriculture in Puerto Rico and the Virgin Islands.

V. Resources

Budget and sources of income: No specific information was available. All expenditures come from federal appropriations.

Total real estate property owned and/or used:

a. Land facilities:	*Acres*
1. Total used	0
2. Total owned by Federal Government	0

b. Buildings and office space facilities:	*Square feet*	*Ratio of owned to used, percent*
1. Total used	1, 003	------
2. Total owned by Federal Government	0	0

c. Rental paid for land, buildings and office space facilities used:

Proprietor	*Annual rental paid*	*Percent*
1. Federal Government	0	0
2. Puerto Rican Government	0	0
3. Private	$2, 701	100

VI. Personnel

	Total
Total number of employees	3
Method of selection:	
a. Classified civil service	2
b. Excepted service positions	1
Nationality (place born):	
a. United States of America	0
b. Puerto Rico	3
Salary:	
a. Annual salary range	$4, 545–$13, 335
b. Annual median salary	$8, 000

OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GENERAL

I. LEGAL BASIS

Unknown.

II. DATE OFFICE STARTED OPERATIONS IN PUERTO RICO

1938.

III. CHIEF EXECUTIVE OR DIRECTOR; METHOD OF SELECTING HIM

Mr. Pedro Franco Román—Special Agent. Appointed under the provisions of Federal civil service regulations.

IV. SUMMARY OF FUNCTIONS

Audits and investigates all activities and complaints involving the Department of Agriculture of the United States.

There are 7 regional offices throughout the United States with a total employee staff of approximately 600. The Southeast Regional Office located in Atlanta, Ga., has a staff of approximately 110 employees, including professional and clerical, and is assigned the responsibility for all work performed in the 7 southeastern States, Puerto Rico, and the Virgin Islands.

Work assignments are prepared in the Atlanta regional office and forwarded to the Puerto Rico office.

V. RESOURCES

Budget and sources of income: None directly.

Total real estate property owned and/or used:

a. Land facilities:

	Acres
1. Total used	0
2. Total owned by Federal Government	0

b. Buildings and office space facilities:

	Square feet	*Ratio of owned to used, percent*
a. Total used	340	------
b. Total owned by Federal Government	0	0

c. Rental paid for land, buildings and office space facilities used:

Proprietor	*Annual rental paid*	*Percent*
1. Federal Government	0	0
2. Puerto Rican Government	0	0
3. Private	$1, 400	100

VI. PERSONNEL AND ORGANIZATION

There is one employee of Puerto Rican nationality selected under the regulations of the Federal civil service; with an annual salary of $9,535 plus cost-of-living allowance.

The office located in Puerto Rico is a suboffice of the Atlanta office. It has been established only to provide working area for the official assigned to Puerto Rico, and provide him with a base of operations. While only one employee is assigned to Puerto Rico, there is a supplementary staff from the Atlanta office assigned for periods of short duration when excessive work assignments prevail.

INSTITUTE OF TROPICAL FORESTRY

I. Legal Basis

The Organic Act of Puerto Rico of 1898; Proclamation of the Luquillo Forest Reserve in January 1903; The McSweeney-McNary Act of May 1928 (the latter establishing "a tropical forest research center in Puerto Rico").

II. Date Office Started Operations in Puerto Rico

1939.

III. Chief Executive or Director; Method of Selecting Him

Dr. Frank H. Wadsworth. Appointed by the Chief of the Forest Service, Washington, D.C., under the provision of Federal civil service regulations.

IV. Summary of Functions

Research, demonstration, and training in the establishment, management, administration and utilization of tropical forests.

V. Resources

Budget of expenditures for office operations and capital improvements during fiscal year 1964–65	$558,404
Sources of income for fiscal year 1964–65:	
a. Federal appropriations	558,275
b. Other sources	------

Total real estate property owned and/or used:

a. Land facilities:	*Acres*	*Ratio of owned to used, percent*
1. Total used	28,006	------
2. Total owned by Federal Government	27,916	99.7

b. Buildings and office space facilities:	*Square feet*	*Ratio of used to owned, percent*
1. Total used	21,420	77
2. Total owned by Federal Government	28,000	------

c. Rental paid for land, buildings and office space facilities used: $0. No rent paid for some property used which belongs to private owner and some belonging to the Government of Puerto Rico.

VI. Personnel

	Total
Total number of employees	37
Method of selection:	
a. Classified civil service	25
b. Excepted service positions	12
Nationality (place born):	
a. United States of America	7
b. Puerto Rico	30
Salary:	
a. Annual salary range	$2,683–$16,130
b. Annual median salary	$5,000

MEAT INSPECTION DIVISION

I. Legal Basis

Federal Meat Inspection Act of 1906.

II. Date Office Started Operations in Puerto rico

1935.

III. Chief Executive or Director; Method of Selecting Him

Mr. Clarence S. Marvin—Inspector in Charge. Appointed under the provisions of the Federal civil service regulations.

Summary of Functions

Inspects all meat and meat food products imported into Puerto Rico from foreign countries.

Refuses entry on all products found to be unhealthful or unfit for human consumption.

Conducts inspection at official establishments on meat products prepared for interstate or foreign commerce.

V. Resources

Information on Budget and Sources of income: Withheld.

Total real estate property owned and/or used:

a. Land facilities:	*Acres*
1. Total used	0
2. Total owned by Federal Government	0

b. Buildings and office space facilities:	*Square feet*	*Ratio of owned to used, percent*
1. Total used	360	------
2. Total owned by Federal Government	0	0

c. Rental paid for land, buildings and office space facilities used:

Proprietor	*Annual rental paid*	*Percent*
1. Federal Government	0	0
2. Puerto Rican Government	0	0
3. Private	$1, 440	100

VI. Personnel

	Total
Total number of employees	3
Method of selection:	
a. Classified civil service	3
Nationality (place born):	
a. United States of America	2
b. Puerto Rico	1
Salary:	
a. Annual salary range	$6, 050–$9, 830
b. Annual median salary	$8, 500

PLANT QUARANTINE DIVISION

I. LEGAL BASIS

Plant Quarantine Act of 1912 as amended.

II. DATE OFFICE STARTED OPERATIONS IN PUERTO RICO

1925.

III. CHIEF EXECUTIVE OR DIRECTOR; METHOD OF SELECTING HIM

Mr. Harold D. Bowman—Inspector in charge. Appointed under the provisions of Federal Civil Service regulations.

IV. SUMMARY OF FUNCTIONS

To administer the scientific operation and business management of a plant quarantine program to prevent the entry or spread of plant pests by enforcing plant quarantines regulating the movement of plants and plant products into Puerto Rico from foreign areas and from Puerto Rico into the mainland United States. Also, plant products being exported are inspected to meet the sanitary import requirements of destination countries.

V. RESOURCES

Budget of expenditures, office operations and capital improvements during fiscal year 1964–65	$45, 000
Sources of income for fiscal year 1964–65:	
a. Federal appropriations	45, 000
b. Other sources	0

Total real estate property owned and/or used:

a. Land facilities:	*Acres*
1. Total used	0
2. Total owned by Federal Government	0

b. Buildings and office space facilities:	*Square feet*	*Ratio of owned to used, percent*
1. Total used	3, 776	------
2. Total owned by Federal Government	0	0

c. Rental paid for land, buildings and office space facilities used:

Proprietor	*Annual rental paid*	*Percent*
1. Federal Government	0	0
2. Puerto Rican Government	0	0
3. Private	$3, 660	100

VI. PERSONNEL

	Total
Total number of employees	21
Method of selection:	
a. Classified civil service	21
Nationality (place born):	
a. United States of America	9
b. Puerto Rico	12
Salary:	
a. Annual salary range	$5, 230–$12, 075
b. Annual median salary	$7, 900

PROCESSED PRODUCTS STANDARDIZATION AND INSPECTION BRANCH OF THE FRUIT AND VEGETABLE DIVISION

I. LEGAL BASIS

Agricultural Marketing Agreement Act of 1937, as amended; memorandum of agreement between consumer and marketing service, U.S. Department of Agriculture and the Department of Agriculture and Commerce of Puerto Rico, November 1949.

II. DATE OFFICE STARTED OPERATIONS IN PUERTO RICO

1949.

III. CHIEF EXECUTIVE OR DIRECTOR; METHOD OF SELECTING HIM

Mr. Kenneth B. Riley—Officer in Charge. Appointed under the provisions of Federal Civil Service regulations.

IV. SUMMARY OF FUNCTIONS

To inspect, grade, and perform related services on processed fruits and vegetables and other processed products assigned to the fruit and vegetable division for inspection purposes.

V. RESOURCES

Budget of expenditures for operations during fiscal year 1964–65	$17,476
Sources of income for fiscal year 1964–65:	
a. Federal appropriations	6,731
b. Commonwealth appropriations	0
c. Other sources	10,745

Total real estate property owned and/or used:

a. Land facilities:	*Acres*	
1. Total used	0	
2. Total owned by Federal Government	0	
b. Buildings and office space facilities:	*Square feet*	*Ratio of owned to used, percent*
1. Total used	600	------
2. Total owned by Federal Government	0	0

c. Rental paid for land, buildings and office space facilities used: $0. Property used belongs to the Government of Puerto Rico.

VI. PERSONNEL

One employee selected under the provisions of Federal Civil Service regulations. U.S. nationality; annual salary, of $10,000 approximately.

SOIL CONSERVATION SERVICE

I. LEGAL BASIS

Public Law 46, 74th Congress, 1935.

II. DATE OFFICE STARTED OPERATIONS IN PUERTO RICO

1935.

III. Chief Executive or Director; Method of Selecting Him

Mr. Harry M. Chambers—Director. Selected by the Administrator of the Soil Conservation Service, Washington, D.C., under the provisions of Federal Civil Service regulations.

IV. Summary of Functions

The Soil Conservation Service is the technical soil and water conservation agency of the U.S. Department of Agriculture. It administers programs through which technical assistance is provided to farmers and other land owners and operators in soil conservation districts, provides technical and financial assistance for watershed protection and flood prevention, and is responsible for conducting the national cooperative soil survey. In short, the Service provides technical leadership and assistance in programs to develop, protect, and improve soil, water, and wildlife resources to assure an efficient agriculture. The Service also gives technical assistance in establishing outdoor recreation and non-Federal lands.

V. Resources

Budget of expenditures for operations during fiscal year 1964–65	$886, 753
Sources of income for fiscal year 1964–65:	
a. Federal appropriations	879, 872
b. Commonwealth appropriations	0
c. Other sources	6, 881

Total real estate property owned and/or used:

a. Land facilities:	*Acres*
1. Total used	0
2. Total owned by Federal Government	0

b. Buildings and office space facilities:	*Square feet*	*Ratio of owned to used percent*
1. Total used	17, 599	------
2. Total owned by Federal Government	(1)	(1)

c. Rental paid for land, buildings and office space facilities used:

Proprietor	*Annual rental paid*	*Percent*
1. Federal Government	0	0
2. Puerto Rican Government	0	0
3. Private	$21, 685	100

VI. Personnel

	Total
Total number of employees:	105
Method of selection:	
a. Classified civil service	81
b. Excepted service positions	24
Nationality (place born):	
a. United States of America	9
b. Puerto Rico	92
c. Other countries	[2] 4
Salary:	
a. Annual salary range	[3] $2, 746–$16, 620
b. Annual median salary	$6, 720

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[1] Not specified.

[2] All have U.S. citizenship.

[3] C.O.L.A. not included.

SOIL AND WATER CONSERVATION RESEARCH DIVISION

I. Legal Basis

Information withheld.

II. Date Office Started Operations in Puerto Rico

1952.

III. Chief Executive or Director; Method of Selecting Him

Mr. José Vicente Chandler—Project Supervisor. Appointed under the provisions of the Federal civil service regulations.

IV. Summary of Functions

Research in soil and water management and in water management and watershed engineering.

V. Resources

Budget of expenditures, office operations and capital improvements during fiscal year 1964-65: Information withheld.

Sources of income for fiscal year 1964-65:

a. Federal appropriations	$68,800
b. Commonwealth appropriations	20,000
c. Other sources	0

Total real estate property owned and/or used:

	Acres	Ratio of owned to used, percent
a. Land facilities:		
1. Total used	[1] 43	------
2. Total owned by Federal Government	0	0

	Square feet	Ratio of owned to used, percent
b. Buildings and office space facilities:		
1. Total used	1,897	------
2. Total owned by Federal Government	0	0

c. Rental paid for land, buildings and office space facilities used: $0. Property used belongs to the Government of Puerto Rico.

[1] Approximate.

VI. Personnel

	Total
Total number of employees	6
Method of selection:	
a. Classified civil service	5
b. Excepted service positions	0
c. Other	1
Nationality (place born):	
a. United States of America	0
b. Puerto Rico	6
Salary:	
a. Annual salary range	$5,990–$15,150
b. Annual median salary	$8,000

DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE

DEPARTMENT OF AERO SPACE STUDIES [UNIVERSITY OF PUERTO RICO]

I. LEGAL BASIS

Public Law (88–647). Agreement between the University of Puerto Rico and the Secretary of the Air Force (under the authority of secs. 40–47C of the National Defense Act of 1916).

II. DATE OFFICE STARTED OPERATIONS IN PUERTO RICO

1952.

III. CHIEF EXECUTIVE OR DIRECTOR; METHOD OF SELECTING HIM

Lt. Col. Craig L. Jackson, (U.S. Air Force). Selected by Commandant of Air Force ROTC with concurrence of University of Puerto Rico Officials.

IV. SUMMARY OF FUNCTIONS

Train Air Force ROTC cadets as future commissioned officers in the U.S. Air Force.

V. RESOURCES

Budget of expenditures for office operations during fiscal year 1964–65	$2, 688
Sources of income for fiscal year 1964–65:	
a. Federal appropriations	54, 508
b. Commonwealth appropriations	0
c. Other sources	8, 010

Total real estate property owned and/or used:

	Acres	
a. Land facilities:		
1. Total used	0	
2. Total owned by Federal Government	0	

	Square feet	*Ratio of owned to used, percent*
b. Buildings and office space facilities:		
1. Total used	4, 800	
2. Total owned by Federal Government	0	0

c. Rental paid for land, buildings and office space facilities used: $0. All the space used belongs to the University of Puerto Rico. No rent is paid.

VI. PERSONNEL

	Total
Total number of employees	11
Method of selection:	
a. Classified civil service	0
b. Excepted service positions	0
c. Other	11
Nationality (place born):	
a. United States of America	7
b. Puerto Rico	3
c. Other countries	1
Salary:	
a. Annual salary range	$2, 160–$9, 512
b. Annual median salary	$5, 500

SENIOR ADVISER TO THE PUERTO RICO AIR NATIONAL GUARD

I. LEGAL BASIS

Not available.

II. DATE OFFICE STARTED OPERATIONS IN PUERTO RICO

1948.

III. CHIEF EXECUTIVE OR DIRECTOR; METHOD OF SELECTING HIM

Mr. Wendell H. Whitehouse, Lieutenant Colonel USAF. Assigned under Department of Air Force Regulations.

IV. SUMMARY OF FUNCTIONS

To advise the Puerto Rico Air National Guard in all matters pertaining to U.S. Air Force.

V. RESOURCES

Budget and sources of income: Amount not specified. All money spent allocated as part of the U.S. Air Force Department budget.

Total real estate property owned and/or used:

a. Land facilities:	*Acres*
1. Total used	0
2. Total owned by Federal Government	0

a. Buildings and office space facilities:	*Square feet*	*Ratio of owned to used, percent*
1. Total used	500	-------
2. Total owned by Federal Government	0	0

c. Rental paid for land, buildings and office space facilities used: $0. Space belongs to Government of Puerto Rico.

VI. PERSONNEL

	Total
Total number of employees	3
Method of selection:	
a. Classified civil service	0
b. Excepted service positions	0
c. Other	3
Nationality (place born):	
a. United States of America	3
b. Puerto Rico	0
Salary:	
a. Annual salary range	$5, 000–$11, 000
b. Annual median salary	$6, 000

72D BOMB WING (SAC) RAMEY AIR FORCE BASE

I. LEGAL BASIS

Specific authority unknown.

II. DATE OFFICE STARTED OPERATIONS IN PUERTO RICO

1939. The 72d Bomb Wing was established per General Order No. 32, SAC 1952.

III. CHIEF EXECUTIVE OR DIRECTOR; METHOD OF SELECTING HIM

Col. T. J. Dacy, Jr. Assigned by Commander in Chief Strategic Air Command under the regulations of U.S. Air Force.

IV. SUMMARY OF FUNCTIONS

Strategic bombardment operations and performance of such special missions as directed by higher headquarters along with logistic support and training necessary for such functions.

V. RESOURCES

Budget of expenditures for operations during fiscal year 1964-65	$9, 841, 000
Sources of income for fiscal year 1964-65:	
a. Federal appropriations	9, 841, 000
b. Commonwealth appropriations	0
c. Other sources	0

Total real estate property owned and/or used:

a. Land facilities:	Acres	Ratio of owned to used, percent
1. Total used	4, 169	------
2. Total owned by Federal Government	4, 131	99. 1

b. Buildings and office space facilities:	Square feet	Ratio of owned to used, percent
1. Total used	3, 911, 073	------
2. Total owned by Federal Government	3, 911, 073	100

c. Rental paid for land, buildings and office space facilities used: Commonwealth and municipal properties leased or licensed at a $1-a-year fee.

VI. PERSONNEL

	Total
Total number of employees	3, 914
Method of selection:	
a. Classified civil service	448
b. Excepted service positions	221
c. Other	3, 245
Nationality (place born):	
a. United States of America	3, 080
b. Puerto Rico	822
c. Other countries	12
Salary:	
a. Annual salary range	$1, 955-$16, 275
b. Annual median salary	$4, 800

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY

ANTILLES COMMAND

I. LEGAL BASIS

Constitution of the United States; joint statutes by the U.S. Congress and the Puerto Rican Legislature.

II. DATE OFFICE STARTED OPERATIONS IN PUERTO RICO

1898.

III. Chief Executive or Director; Method of Selecting Him

Col. Daniel A. Nolan. Appointment by Department of the Army, Washington D.C., with concurrence of Commander, U.S. Army Forces Southern Command, Fort Amador, Canal Zone.

IV. Summary of Functions

Command and support Active Army Units in the Antilles.

Command and support the Army Reserve. Supervise and support the Army National Guard and ROTC.

Provide logistical support to the U.S. Air Force and U.S. Navy in accordance with Cross-Service Agreements.

Operate the Armed Forces Examining and Induction Station.

Operate the U.S. Army Training Center.

Conduct disaster relief operations.

Conduct operational planning.

V. Resources

Budget of expenditures office operations and capital improvements year 1964–65	$11,000,000
Sources of income for fiscal year 1964–65:	
a. Federal appropriations	$11,000,000
b. Other sources	0

Total real estate property owned and/or used:		
a. Land facilities:	*Acres*	*Ratio of owned to used, percent*
1. Total used	14,660.54	------
2. Total owned by Federal Government	14,660.54	100
b. Buildings and office space facilities:	*Square feet*	*Ratio of owned to used, percent*
1. Total used	3,568,388	------
2. Total owned by Federal Government	3,568,388	100

c. Rental paid for land, buildings and office space facilities used: $0.

VI. Personnel

	Total
Total number of employees	1,442
Method of selection:	
a. Classified civil service	1,442
b. Excepted service positions	0
c. Other	0
Nationality (place born):	
a. United States of America	82
b. Puerto Rico	1,359
c. Other countries	1
Salary:	
a. Annual salary range	$1,788–$18,580
b. Annual median salary	$4,240

CORPS OF ENGINEERS

I. Legal Basis

River and Harbor Act of 1899 (33 U.S.C. 403). Section 3038 Title 10 U.S.C. Delegation of authority dated 25 July 1947 from Office, Chief of Engineers.

II. Date Office Started Operations in Puerto Rico

1902. Civil works has been in effect since 1902; military construction, since 1939. Office was reorganized in 1951.

III. Chief Executive or Director; Method of Selecting Him

Luis C. Méndez, Area Engineer. Appointed by the District Engineer, Department of the Army, Jacksonville District.

IV. Summary of Functions

Acquisition of real property and interests therein for civil and military construction projects, which includes execution, operation, maintenance, and control of river and harbor and flood-control improvements and the administration of laws for the protection and preservation of navigation and navigable waters of the United States.

V. Resources

Budget of expenditures for office operations and capital improvements year 1964–65	$9, 677, 000
Sources of income for fiscal year 1964–65:	
a. Federal appropriations	9, 677, 000
b. Commonwealth appropriations	0
c. Other sources	0
Total real estate property owned and/or used:	
a. Land facilities:	*Acres*
1. Total used	5. 49
2. Total owned by Federal Government	5. 49

b. Buildings and office space facilities: Information withheld.

c. Rental paid for land, buildings and office space facilities used: $0.

VI. Personnel

	Total
Total number of employees	21
Method of selection:	
a. Classified civil service	21
Nationality (place born):	
a. United States of America	5
b. Puerto Rico	16
Salary:	
a. Annual salary range	$3, 598–$14, 117
b. Annual median salary	$6, 430

INSTRUCTOR GROUP ROTC
[UNIVERSITY OF PUERTO RICO]

I. Legal Basis

Land Grant Act of the United States.

II. Date Office Started Operations in Puerto Rico

1919.

III. Chief Executive or Director; Method of Selecting Him

Col. José A. Andino, U.S. Army. The Department of the Army in consultation and approval by the chancellor of the University of Puerto Rico.

IV. Summary of Functions

The primary mission of the U.S. Army ROTC program is to train junior officers, who by their education, training and inherent qualities of leadership, are suitable for continued development as officers in the U.S. Army Reserve Corps. The aim of this program is to provide a basic military education, and in conjunction with other college disciplines, to develop individual character and attributes essential to an officer in the U.S. Army or for any career. Recruitment of officers is not the primary purpose but the development of the student by means of military training and the regulation of his conduct in accordance with disciplinary principles.

V. Resources

Budget of expenditures, office operations and capital improvements year 1964–65	$127, 790
Sources of income for fiscal year 1964–65:	
a. Federal appropriations	161, 300
b. Commonwealth appropriations	12, 390
c. Other sources	3, 186

Total real estate property owned and/or used: Land, buildings and office space facilities belong to the University of Puerto Rico. Total amount of space used is 105.6 square feet. No rent is paid.

VI. Personnel

	Total
Total number of employees	25
Method of selection:	
a. Classified civil service	2
b. Excepted service positions	1
c. Other	22
Nationality (place born):	
a. United States of America	6
b. Puerto Rico	19
Salary:	
a. Annual salary range	$1, 680–$14, 000
b. Annual median salary	$5, 860

DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE

BUREAU OF PUBLIC ROADS

I. Legal Basis

Act Extending Federal Aid to Puerto Rico, June 23, 1936 (49 Stat. 1891).

II. Date Office Started Operations in Puerto Rico

1937.

III. Chief Executive or Director; Method of Selecting Him

Mr. Manuel A. Pietrantoni—Division Engineer. Appointed by the Federal Highway Administration according to U.S. Civil Service regulations.

IV. Summary of Functions

Administer the Federal-aid highway program in Puerto Rico in cooperation with the Commonwealth. Assure that Federal interests are fully considered and protected. Provide leadership, advice, and assistance to the Commonwealth in Federal-aid highway matters, including planning, research, design, engineering, and construction of highways, bridges and other highway structures, right-of-way and utilities, hydraulics, materials, and financial management.

V. RESOURCES

Budget of expenditures for office operations and capital improvements year 1964–65	[1] $8, 226, 866
Sources of income for fiscal year 1964–65:	
a. Federal appropriations	[1] 8, 226, 866
b. Commonwealth appropriations	0
c. Other sources	0

Total real estate property owned and/or used:

a. Land facilities:	*Acres*
1. Total used	0
2. Total owned by Federal Government	0

b. Buildings and office space facilities:	*Square feet*	*Ratio of owned to used, percent*
1. Total used	2, 528	-------
2. Total owned by Federal Government	0	0

c. Rental paid for land, buildings and office space facilities used:

Proprietor	*Annual rental paid*	*Percent*
1. Federal Government	0	0
2. Puerto Rican Government	0	0
3. Private	$10, 112	100

[1] Comprises $182,000 for office administrative operations and the rest, $7,044,866 paid to the Commonwealth Government for road construction and maintenance operations.

VI. PERSONNEL

	Total
Total number of employees	16
Method of selection:	
a. Classified civil service	16
Nationality (place born):	
a. United States of America	5
b. Puerto Rico	11
Salary:	
a. Annual salary range	$4, 680–$15, 640
b. Annual median salary	$11, 670

ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT ADMINISTRATION

I. LEGAL BASIS

The Public Works and Economic Development Act of 1965.

II. DATE OFFICE STARTED OPERATIONS IN PUERTO RICO

1962. The office started operations under the name of Area Redevelopment Administration until August 1st, 1965.

III. CHIEF EXECUTIVE OR DIRECTOR; METHOD OF SELECTING HIM

Mr. Hector Alejandro, Field Coordinator (for Puerto Rico and Virgin Islands). Appointed by the Director of Economic Development, Economic Development Administration

IV. SUMMARY OF FUNCTIONS

To provide planning and financial assistance for public works and economic development projects, public or private, in areas of substantial and persistent unemployment and underemployment of the United States, including Puerto Rico on both local and regional basis, thereby helping such areas to help themselves in the improvement of their economies.

V. RESOURCES

Budget and sources of income: Information withheld.

Total real estate property owned and/or used:

a. Land facilities	*Acres*
1. Total used	0
2. Total owned by Federal Government	0

b. Buildings and office space facilities:	*Square feet*	*Ratio of owned to used, percent*
1. Total used	311	------
2. Total owned by Federal Government	0	0

c. Rental paid for land, buildings and office space facilities used:

Proprietor	*Annual rental paid*	*Percent*
1. Federal Government	0	0
2. Puerto Rican Government	0	0
3. Private	$1, 244	100

VI. PERSONNEL

	Total
Total number of employees	2
Method of selection:	
a. Classified civil service	2
Nationality (place born):	
a. United States of America	0
b. Puerto Rico	2
Salary:	
a. Annual salary range	[1] $4, 930–$13, 335
b. Annual median salary	n/a

[1] C.O.L.A. excluded.

FIELD SERVICES OFFICE

I. LEGAL BASIS

5 U.S.C. 591; 15 U.S.C. 171, 175; Reorganization Plan No. 5 of 1950, Department of Commerce.

II. DATE OFFICE STARTED OPERATIONS IN PUERTO RICO

1963.

III. CHIEF EXECUTIVE OR DIRECTOR; METHOD OF SELECTING HIM

Mr. I. Paul de Pedraza. Appointed under the provisions of Federal civil service regulations.

IV. Summary of Functions

Serves as the field representative of the Bureau of International Commerce, BDSA, and other Bureaus and Offices of the Department of Commerce in making the information and services of the Department readily available to businessmen at the local level.

V. Resources

Budget of expenditures for operations during fiscal year 1964–65	$44, 500
Sources of income for fiscal year 1964–65:	
a. Federal appropriations	44, 500
b. Commonwealth appropriations	0
c. Other sources	0

Total real estate property owned and/or used:	
a. Land facilities:	*Acres*
1. Total used	0
2. Total owned by Federal Government	0

Buildings and office space facilities: Specific information withheld. Office occupies office space belonging to the Puerto Rican Government. No rent is paid.

VI. Personnel

	Total
Total number of employees	4
Method of selection:	
a. Classified civil service	4
Nationality (place born):	
a. United States of America	1
b. Puerto Rico	2
c. Other countries	1
Salary:	
a. Annual salary range	$5, 080–$15, 640
b. Annual median salary	$6, 670

GEOPHYSICAL OBSERVATORY

I. Legal Basis

Not known.

II. Date Office Started Operations in Puerto Rico

1903.

III. Chief Executive or Director; Method of Selecting Him

Mr. Moisés Vázquez, Observer-in-charge. Appointed by the Director, U.S. Coast and Geodetic Survey, Washington, D.C.

IV. Summary of Functions

Operation of a geophysical observatory for the collection and interpretation of geomagnetic and seismological data.

V. Resources

Budget of expenditures for office operations and capital improvements year 1964–65	$30, 103
Sources of income for fiscal year 1964–65:	
a. Federal appropriations	30, 103
b. Commonwealth appropriations	0
c. Other sources	0

Total real estate property owned and/or used:		Ratio of owned to used, percent
a. Land facilities:	Acres	percent
1. Total used	32	
2. Total owned by Federal Government	32	100
b. Buildings and office space facilities:	Square feet	Ratio of owned to used, percent
1. Total used	9, 785	------
2. Total owned by Federal Government	9, 785	100

c. Rental paid for land, buildings and office space facilities used: $0.

VI. PERSONNEL

	Total
Total number of employees	4
Method of selection:	
a. Classified civil service	2
b. Excepted service positions	2
Nationality (place born):	
a. United States of America	1
b. Puerto Rico	3
Salary:	
a. Annual salary range	$2, 600–$10, 900
b. Annual median salary	n/a

WEATHER BUREAU

I. LEGAL BASIS

Act approved on March, 1898 (30 U.S. Stat. at L. 340); act approved on March, 1899 (30 U.S. Stat. at L. 958).

II. DATE OFFICE STARTED OPERATIONS IN PUERTO RICO

1898.

III. CHIEF EXECUTIVE OR DIRECTOR; METHOD OF SELECTING HIM

Dr. José A. Colón, Meteorologist-in-charge. Appointed by the Administrator, Environmental Science Services Administration, Washington, D.C.

IV. SUMMARY OF FUNCTIONS

Prepares high altitude, area, international air route and terminal forecasts, including winds at various flight levels, prognostic charts and pictorial presentations used in pilot briefing for international aircraft operations from Caribbean airdromes to points in North and South America, Europe, West Africa, and other areas in the Caribbean under the international civil aviation organization procedures.

Prepares and disseminates advisories and warnings of hurricanes in the Eastern Caribbean area including the Leeward and Windward Islands, Puerto Rico, Virgin Islands, Hispaniola, and adjacent ocean areas.

Supervises the climatological service for these areas. Compiles and publishes pertinent data.

Maintains a network of synoptic weather reporting stations in the Antilles for international aviation, and general weather services.

Maintains liaison with Puerto Rican Government and United States military officials in matters pertaining to meteorology.

Coordinates hurricane emergency procedures with the Civil Defense, Red Cross, State Police, and other local hurricane disaster committees in Puerto Rico.

V. RESOURCES

Budget of expenditures for office operations and capital improvements year 1964–65	$522,515
Sources of income for fiscal year 1964–65:	
a. Federal appropriations	522,515
b. Commonwealth appropriations	0
c. Other sources	0

Total real estate property owned and/or used: a. Land facilities:	*Acres*	*Ratio of owned to used, percent*
1. Total used	2.80	------
2. Total owned by Federal Government	2.63	94

b. Buildings and office space facilities:	*Square feet*	*Ratio of owned to used, percent*
1. Total used	10,276	------
2. Total owned by Federal Government	7,775	75.7

c. Rental paid for land, buildings and office space facilities used:

Proprietor	*Annual rental paid*	*Percent*
1. Federal Government	0	0
2. Puerto Rican Government	[1] $1.00	100
3. Private	0	0

[1] Nominal rent.

VI. PERSONNEL

	Total
Total number of employees	[1] 51
Method of selection:	
a. Classified civil service	42
b. Excepted service positions	9
Nationality (place born):	
a. United States of America	22
b. Puerto Rico	23
c. Other countries	6
Salary:	
a. Annual salary range	$1,132–$14,660
b. Annual median salary	$7,720

[1] Including 9 part-time employees.

DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH, EDUCATION AND WELFARE

COMMUNICABLE DISEASE CENTER

I. LEGAL BASIS

A Congressional Act of 1798 which created the U.S. Public Health Service.

II. DATE OFFICE STARTED OPERATIONS IN PUERTO RICO

1898.

III. CHIEF EXECUTIVE OR DIRECTOR; METHOD OF SELECTING HIM

Mr. Frederick F. Ferguson. Appointed by Chief, Technology Branch, under provisions of Federal civil service regulations.

IV. SUMMARY OF FUNCTIONS

Research in the biology, and control of the snail born disease, bilharzia.

V. RESOURCES

Budget of expenditures for operations during fiscal year 1964–65	$66, 000
Sources of income for fiscal year 1964–65:	
a. Federal appropriations	66, 000
b. Commonwealth appropriations	0
c. Other sources	0

Total real estate property owned and/or used:		Ratio of owned to used, percent
a. Land Facilities:	Acres	
1. Total used	[1]1	-------
2. Total owned by Federal Government	[1]1	100
b. Buildings and office space facilities:	Square feet	Ratio of owned to used, percent
1. Total used	4, 000	-------
2. Total owned by Federal Government	4, 000	100

Rental paid for land, buildings, and office space facilities used: $0.

[1] Approximate.

VI. PERSONNEL

	Total
Total number of employees	10
Method of selection:	
a. Classified civil service	7
b. Excepted service positions	0
c. Other	3
Nationality (place born):	
a. United States of America	2
b. Puerto Rico	8
Salary:	
a. Annual salary range	$3, 800–$14, 500
b. Annual median salary	$5, 330

FOOD AND DRUG ADMINISTRATION

I. LEGAL BASIS

The Federal Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act as amended.

II. DATE OFFICE STARTED OPERATIONS IN PUERTO RICO

1960.

III. CHIEF EXECUTIVE OR DIRECTOR; METHOD OF SELECTING HIM

Mr. Dennis B. Miracky—Resident Inspector-in-charge. Appointed under the merit promotion plan, Federal civil service regulations.

IV. SUMMARY OF FUNCTIONS

Enforcement of the provisions of the Federal Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act as amended, Federal Tea Importation, Import Milk, Filled Milk, Caustic Poison and Hazardous Substance Labeling Acts.

V. RESOURCES

Budget of expenditures for office operations and capital improvements during fiscal year 1964–65	$16, 195
Sources of income for fiscal year 1964–65:	
a. Federal appropriations	16, 195
b. Commonwealth appropriations	0
c. Other sources	0

Total real estate property owned and/or used:

a. Land facilities:	*Acres*
1. Total used	0
2. Total owned by Federal Government	0

b. Buildings and office space facilities:	*Square feet*	*Ratio of owned to used, percent*
1. Total used	637	------
2. Total owned by Federal Government	0	0

c. Rental paid for land, buildings and office space facilities used:

Proprietor	*Annual rental paid*	*Percent*
1. Federal Government	0	0
2. Puerto Rican Government	0	0
3. Private	$1, 943	100

VI. PERSONNEL

Total number of employees:	*Total*
Method of selection: a. Classified civil service	2
Nationality (place born):	
a. United States of America	2
b. Puerto Rico	0
Salary:	
a. Annual salary range	$8, 650–$10, 250
b. Annual median salary	n/a

LABORATORY OF PERINATAL PHYSIOLOGY

I. LEGAL BASIS

The agency was established under an agreement between the Director, NINDB and the Chancellor of the University of Puerto Rico.

II. DATE OFFICE STARTED OPERATIONS IN PUERTO RICO

1956.

III. CHIEF EXECUTIVE OR DIRECTOR; METHOD OF SELECTING HIM

Dr. Ronald E. Myers—Director. Appointed by the Director of the National Institutes of Health.

IV. SUMMARY OF FUNCTIONS

The Laboratory of Perinatal Physiology studies the problem of perinatal brain damage using the monkey as experimental animal. In addition the laboratory operates three free ranging colonies of monkeys for the study of social and reproductive behavior as well as studies of primate dynamics.

V. RESOURCES

Budget of expenditures for office operations and capital improvements during fiscal year 1964–65	$741, 000
Sources of income for fiscal year 1964–65:	
a. Federal appropriations	741, 000
b. Commonwealth appropriations	0
c. Other sources	0

		Ratio of owned to used, percent
Total real estate property owned and/or used:		
a. Land facilities:	*Acres*	
1. Total used	(1)	(1)
2. Total owned by Federal Government	[1] 1, 943	(1)

	Square feet	*Ratio of owned to used, percent*
b. Buildings and office space facilities:		
1. Total used	18, 135	-------
2. Total owned by Federal Government	0	0

c. Rental paid for land, buildings, and office space facilities used:

Proprietor	*Annual rental paid*	*Percent*
1. Federal Government	0	0
2. Puerto Rican Government	$8, 925	71. 3
3. Private	3, 600	28. 7
Total	12, 525	100. 0

[1] The totality of land is in process of transfer from the Puerto Rico Medical Center.

VI. PERSONNEL

	Total
Total number of employees	68
Method of selection:	
a. Classified civil service	66
b. Excepted service postions	2
Nationality (place born):	
a. United States of America	10
b. Puerto Rico	56
c. Other countries	2
Salary:	
a. Annual salary range	$1, 428–$17, 030
b. Annual median salary	$4, 270

[PUBLIC HEALTH SERVICE] OUTPATIENT CLINIC

I. LEGAL BASIS

Section 321 of the Public Health Service Act Public Law 410—78th Congress.

II. DATE OFFICE STARTED OPERATIONS IN PUERTO RICO

1899.

III. CHIEF EXECUTIVE OR DIRECTOR; METHOD OF SELECTING HIM

Dr. Marvin S. Cashion—Medical Director. Appointed by Headquarters, Office of Personnel Public Health Service, Washington, D.C.

IV. SUMMARY OF FUNCTIONS

To provide medical and dental care to PHS beneficiaries: American seamen, Coast Guard officers and enlisted personnel, Federal employees injured at work, and other designated beneficiaries.

V. RESOURCES

Budget of expenditures for office operations and capital improvements during fiscal year 1964–65	$217, 774
Sources of income for fiscal year 1964–65:	
a. Federal appropriations	217, 774
b. Commonwealth appropriations	0
c. Other sources	0

Total real estate property owned and/or used:		
a. Land facilities:	Acres	Ratio of owned to used, percent
1. Total used	5	-------
2. Total owned by Federal Government	5	100
b. Buildings and office space facilities:	Square feet	Ratio of owned to used, percent
1. Total used	18, 020	-------
2. Total owned by Federal Government	18, 020	100

c. Rental paid for land, buildings and office space facilities used: $0.

VI. PERSONNEL

	Total
Total number of employees	18
Method of selection:	
a. Classified civil service	13
b. Excepted service positions	0
c. Other	5
Nationality (place born):	
a. United States of America	4
b. Puerto Rico	14
Salary:	
a. Annual salary range	$3, 619–$20, 161
b. Annual median salary	$6, 400

[PUBLIC HEALTH SERVICE] QUARANTINE STATION

I. LEGAL BASIS

Sections 325 and 326, Public Health Service Act (Public Law 410—78th Congress).

II. DATE OFFICE STARTED OPERATIONS IN PUERTO RICO

1899.

III. Chief Executive or Director; Method of Selecting Him

Dr. Marvin S. Cashion—Medical Director. Appointed by Headquarters, Office of Personnel, Public Health Service, Washington, D.C.

IV. Summary of Functions

Under Foreign Quarantine regulations prevent the introduction of communicable diseases by the performance of quarantine inspection of vessels and aircraft arriving from foreign countries, including passengers and crews.

V. Resources

Budget of expenditures for office operations and capital improvements during fiscal year 1964–65	$212, 018
Sources of income for fiscal year 1964–65:	
a. Federal appropriations	212, 018
b. Commonwealth appropriations	0
c. Other sources	0

Total real estate property owned and/or used:

a. Land facilities:	*Acres*
1. Total used	0
2. Total owned by Federal Government	0

b. Buildings and office space facilities:	*Square feet*	*Ratio of owned to used, percent*
1. Total used	3, 250	------
2. Total owned by Federal Government	0	0

c. Rental paid for land, buildings and office space facilities used: $0. Facilities used belong to the Government of Puerto Rico.

VI. Personnel

	Total
Total number of employees	16
Method of selection: a. Classified civil service	16
Nationality (place born):	
a. United States of America	8
b. Puerto Rico	8
Salary:	
a. Annual salary range	$3, 723–$9, 425
b. Annual median salary	$8, 400

[SOCIAL SECURITY ADMINISTRATION] BUREAU OF HEARINGS AND APPEALS

I. Legal Basis

Public Law No. 271, August 14, 1935 (49 U.S. Stat. at L. 260), as amended by Public Law No. 734, August 28, 1950 (64 U.S. Stat. at L. 447) and Concurrent Resolution No. 1 of the Puerto Rican Legislative, September 22, 1950.

II. Date Office Started Operations in Puerto Rico

1950.

III. Chief Executive or Director; Method of Selecting Him

Mr. José J. Saul—Administrative Hearing Examiner. Appointed by the Director, Field Division, Washington, D.C.

IV. SUMMARY OF FUNCTIONS

The purpose of the old-age, survivors and disability insurance (OASDI) is to provide continuing income for individuals and their families as partial replacement of earnings lost through old-age or disability retirement or death. Entitlement to benefits is determined from the insured status of the individual and his dependents; the application for such benefits; and in the case of disability benefits, the extent and expected duration of disability. Benefits are payable monthly in amounts related to the average monthly earnings of the insured person. A lump sum death benefit in payable under certain conditions. The Bureau of Hearings and Appeals provides impartial and independent hearings and reviews to persons who wish to contest determinations as to their rights made in the usual course of the Administration's operations.

The hearing examiners of the bureau are independent of and not responsible to any regional or headquarters official of any component organization of the Social Security Administration other than those of the Bureau of Hearings and Appeals. They are located in space separate from SSA district offices.

V. RESOURCES

Budget and Sources of Income: Information withheld.

Total real estate property owned and/or used:

a. Land facilities:	*Acres*
1. Total used	0
2. Total owned by Federal Government	0

b. Buildings and office space facilities:	*Square feet*	*Ratio of owned to used, percent*
1. Total used	1,060	------
2. Total owned by Federal Government	0	0

c. Rental paid for land, buildings, and office space facilities used:

Proprietor	*Annual rental paid*	*Percent*
1. Federal Government	0	0
2. Puerto Rican Government	0	0
3. Private	$4,240	100

VI. PERSONNEL

	Total
Total number of employees	10
Method of selection:	
a. Classified civil service	7
b. Excepted service positions	0
c. Other	3
Nationality (place born):	
a. United States of America	3
b. Puerto Rico	7
Salary:	
a. Annual salary range	$4,480–$15,150
b. Annual median salary	$6,000

[SOCIAL SECURITY ADMINISTRATION]
ARECIBO DISTRICT

I. LEGAL BASIS

Section 210 (a), (b), and (i) of the Social Security Act of 1935, as amended (42 U.S.C. 410 (a), (h), and (i)).

II. DATE OFFICE STARTED OPERATIONS IN PUERTO RICO

1955.

III. CHIEF EXECUTIVE OR DIRECTOR; METHOD OF SELECTING HIM

Mr. Herman Agostini—District Manager. Appointed under the merit promotion plan by the social security by regional representative, Charlottesville, Virginia.

IV. SUMMARY OF FUNCTIONS

Administers a program of social insurance which provides old-age, survivors, disability, hospital and medical insurance benefits as basic security for the Nation's people and their families.

V. RESOURCES

Budget of expenditures for office operations and capital improvements during fiscal year 1964–65	$204, 286
Sources of income for fiscal year 1964–65:	
a. Federal appropriations	204, 286
b. Commonwealth appropriations	0
c. Other sources	0

Total real estate property owned and/or used:

a. Land facilities:	Acres
1. Total used	0
2. Total owned by Federal Government	0

b. Buildings and office space facilities:	Square feet	Ratio of owned to used, percent
1. Total used	5, 047	
2. Total owned by Federal Government	0	0

c. Rental paid for land, buildings and office space facilities used:

Proprietor	Annual rental paid	Percent
1. Federal Government	0	0
2. Puerto Rican Government	0	0
3. Private	$16, 300	100

VI. PERSONNEL

	Total
Total number of employees	30
Method of selection: a. Classified civil service	30
Nationality (place born):	
a. United States of America	0
b. Puerto Rico	30
c. Other countries	0
Salary:	
a. Annual salary range	$3, 680–$10, 250
b. Annual median salary	$6, 000

[SOCIAL SECURITY ADMINISTRATION] CAGUAS DISTRICT

I. LEGAL BASIS

Section 210 (a), (h), and (i) of the Social Security Act of 1935, as amended (42 U.S.C. 410 (a), (h), and (i).

II. DATE OFFICE STARTED OPERATIONS IN PUERTO RICO

1955.

III. CHIEF EXECUTIVE OR DIRECTOR; METHOD OF SELECTING HER

Mrs. Isabel M. Rivera—District Manager. Appointed under the merit promotion plan by the social security regional representative, Charlottesville, Va.

IV. SUMMARY OF FUNCTIONS

Administers a program of social insurance which provides old-age, survivors, disability, hospital and medical insurance benefits as basic security for the Nation's people and their families.

V. RESOURCES

Budget of expenditures for office operations and capital improvements during fiscal year 1964–65	$211, 049
Sources of income for fiscal year 1964–65:	
a. Federal appropriations	211, 049
b. Commonwealth appropriations	0
c. Other sources	0

Total real estate property owned and/or used:

a. Land facilities:	*Acres*
1. Total used	0
2. Total owned by Federal Government	0

b. Buildings and office space facilities:	*Square feet*	*Ratio of owned to used, percent*
1. Total used	4, 885	
2. Total owned by Federal Government	0	0

c. Rental paid for land, buildings and office space facilities used:

Proprietor	*Annual rental paid*	*Percent*
1. Federal Government	0	0
2. Puerto Rican Government	0	0
3. Private	$18, 241. 05	100

VI. PERSONNEL

	Total
Total number of employees	26
Method of selection: a. Classified civil service	26
Nationality (place born):	
a. United States of America	0
b. Puerto Rico	26
Salary:	
a. Annual salary range	$3, 680–$10, 250
b. Annual median salary	$6, 170

[SOCIAL SECURITY ADMINISTRATION] MAYAGUEZ DISTRICT

I. LEGAL BASIS

Section 210 (a), (h), and (i) of the Social Security Act of 1935 as amended.

II. DATE OFFICE STARTED OPERATIONS IN PUERTO RICO

1952.

III. CHIEF EXECUTIVE OR DIRECTOR; METHOD OF SELECTING HER

Mrs. Edith Penny—District Manager. Appointed by the social security regional representative, Charlottesville, Va., under the provisions of Federal civil service regulations.

IV. SUMMARY OF FUNCTIONS

Administers a program of social insurance which provides old-age, survivors, disability, hospital and medical insurance benefits as basic security for the Nation's people and their families.

V. RESOURCES

Budget of expenditures for office operations and capital improvements during fiscal year 1964–65	$202, 091
Sources of income for fiscal year 1964–65:	
a. Federal appropriations	202, 091
b. Commonwealth appropriations	0
c. Other sources	0

Total real estate property owned and/or used:

a. Land facilities:	*Acres*	
1. Total used	0	
2. Total owned by Federal Government	0	

b. Buildings and office space facilities:	*Square feet*	*Ratio of owned to used, percent*
1. Total used	3, 999	------
2. Total owned by Federal Government	0	0

c. Rental paid for land, buildings and office space facilities used:

Proprietor	*Annual rent*	*Percent*
1. Federal Government	0	0
2. Puerto Rican Government	0	0
3. Private	$15, 365	100

VI. PERSONNEL

	Total
Total number of employees	25
Method of selection: a. Classified civil service	25
Nationality (place born):	
a. United States of America	1
b. Puerto Rico	24
Salary:	
a. Annual salary range	$3, 680–$10, 250
b. Annual median salary	$6, 090

[SOCIAL SECURITY ADMINISTRATION] PONCE DISTRICT

I. LEGAL BASIS

Section 210 (a), (h), and (i) of the Social Security Act of 1935 as amended.

II. DATE OFFICE STARTED OPERATIONS IN PUERTO RICO

1952.

III. CHIEF EXECUTIVE OR DIRECTOR; METHOD OF SELECTING HIM

Mr. José A. Abdelnoor—District Manager. Appointed by the social security regional representative, Charlottesville, Va., under the provisions of Federal civil service regulations.

IV. SUMMARY OF FUNCTIONS

Administers a program of social insurance which provides old-age, survivors' disability, hospital and medical insurance benefits as basic security for the Nation's people and their families.

V. RESOURCES

Budget of expenditures for office operations and capital improvements during fiscal year 1964–65	$226, 210
Sources of income for fiscal year 1964–65:	
a. Federal appropriations	226, 210
b. Commonwealth appropriations	0
c. Other sources	0

Total real estate property owned and/or used:

a. Land facilities:	*Acres*
1. Total used	0
2. Total owned by Federal Government	0

b. Buildings and office space facilities:	*Square feet*	*Ratio of owned to used, percent*
1. Total used	5, 022	------
2. Total owned by Federal Government	0	0

c. Rental paid for land, buildings and office space facilities used:

Proprietor	*Annual rental paid*	*Percent*
1. Federal Government	0	0
2. Puerto Rican Government	0	0
3. Private	$17, 075	100

VI. PERSONNEL

	Total
Total number of employees	30
Method of selection: a. Classified civil service	30
Nationality (place born):	
a. United States of America	0
b. Puerto Rico	30
Salary:	
a. Annual salary range	$3, 680–$10, 250
b. Annual median salary	$6, 000

[SOCIAL SECURITY ADMINISTRATION] SAN JUAN DISTRICT

I. LEGAL BASIS

Sections 210 (a), (h), and (i) of the Social Security Act of 1935 as amended.

II. DATE OFFICE STARTED OPERATIONS IN PUERTO RICO

1950.

III. CHIEF EXECUTIVE OR DIRECTOR; METHOD OF SELECTING HIM

Mr. Howard A. Davison—District Manager. Appointed by the Commissioner, Social Security Administration under the provisions of Federal civil service regulations.

IV. SUMMARY OF FUNCTIONS

Administers a program of social insurance which provides old-age, survivors, disability, hospital and medical insurance benefits as basic security for the Nation's people and their families.

V. RESOURCES

Budget of expenditures for office operations and capital improvements during fiscal year 1964–65	$472, 655
Sources of income for fiscal year 1964–65:	
a. Federal appropriations	472, 655
b. Commonwealth appropriations	0
c. Other sources	0

Total real estate property owned and/or used:

a. Land facilities:	*Acres*
1. Total used	0
2. Total owned by Federal Government	0

b. Buildings and office space facilities:	*Square feet*	*Ratio of owned to used, percent*
1. Total used	12, 150	-------
2. Total owned by Federal Government	0	0

c. Rental paid for land, buildings and office space facilities used:

Proprietor	*Annual rental paid*	*Percent*
1. Federal Government	0	0
2. Puerto Rican Government	0	0
3. Private	$58, 980	100

VI. PERSONNEL

	Total
Total number of employees	70
Method of selection: a. Classified civil service	70
Nationality (place born):	
a. United States of America	0
b. Puerto Rico	70
Salary:	
a. Annual salary range	$3, 680–$14, 170
b. Annual median salary	$6, 110

DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR

BUREAU OF SPORT FISHERIES AND WILDLIFE

I. Legal Basis

Specific information not available (see functions below).

II. Date Office Started Operations in Puerto Rico

1962.

III. Chief Executive or Director; Method of Selecting Him

Mr. Ricardo Cotte Santana—Game Management Agent.

IV. Summary of Functions

Provides information and education on wildlife conservation.

Undertakes biological research.

Coordinates with the Commonwealth Fish and Wildlife Agency in the enforcement of Federal, international, and local laws and regulations chief among which are: Lacey Act of 1900, as amended, Migratory Bird Treaty Act of 1918 as amended, Black Bass Act of 1926, as amended, Migratory Bird Conservation Act of 1929, as amended, Migratory Birds Hunting Stamp Act of 1934, as amended and the Bald Eagle Act, 1940, as amended.

V. Resources

Budget of expenditures for office operations during fiscal year 1964–65	$28, 700
Sources of income for fiscal year 1964–65:	
a. Federal appropriations	28, 700
b. Commonwealth appropriations	0
c. Other sources	0

Total real estate property owned and/or used:

a. Land facilities:	*Acres*
1. Total used	0
2. Total owned by Federal Government	0

b. Buildings and office space facilities:	*Square feet*	*Ratio of owned to used, percent*
1. Total used	312	------
2. Total owned by Federal Government	0	0

c. Rental paid for land, buildings and office space facilities used:

Proprietor	*Annual rental paid*	*Percent*
1. Federal Government	0	0
2. Puerto Rican Government	0	0
3. Private	$1, 248	100

VI. Personnel and Organization

Only one employee, Puerto Rican nationality, appointed under the provisions of Federal civil service regulations; with an annual salary of $10,400 including C.O.L.A.

NATIONAL PARK SERVICE—SAN JUAN NATIONAL HISTORIC SITE

I. Legal Basis

Secretary of Interior's Order, of February 14, 1949.

II. Date Office Started Operations in Puerto Rico

1949.

III. Chief Executive or Director; Method of Selecting Him

Mr. Julio Marrero Nuñez—Superintendent. Appointed by the southeast regional director, Richmond, Va., under the provisions of Federal civil service regulations.

IV. Summary of Functions

Administer, preserve and interpret the San Juan National Historic Site for the inspiration and enjoyment of present and future generations.

V. Resources

Budget of expenditures for office operations and capital expenditures during fiscal year 1964–65	$218, 181
Sources of income for fiscal year 1964–65: a. Federal appropriations	218, 181

Total real estate property owned and/or used:	Acres	Ratio of owned to used, percent
a. Land facilities:		
1. Total used	37. 6	------
2. Total owned by Federal Government	37. 6	100

	Square feet	Ratio of used to owned, percent
b. Buildings and office space facilities:		
1. Total used	0	0
2. Total owned by Federal Government	27, 083	------

c. Rental paid for land, buildings and office space facilities used: $0.

VI. Personnel

	Total
Total number of employees	31
Method of selection: a. Classified civil service	31
Nationality (place born):	
a. United States of America	1
b. Puerto Rico	30
Salary:	
a. Annual salary range	$2, 891–$11, 315
b. Annual median salary	$3, 550

PUERTO RICO COOPERATIVE GEOLOGIC MAPPING PROJECT (GEOLOGICAL SURVEY)

I. Legal Basis

Act of March 3, 1879 (20 Stat. 394; 43 U.S.C. 31), as amended.

II. Date Office Started Operations in Puerto Rico

1952.

III. CHIEF EXECUTIVE OR DIRECTOR; METHOD OF SELECTING HIM

Mr. Reginald P. Briggs—Project Chief. Appointed by chief, branch of regional geology in the eastern states, U.S. Geological Survey, Washington, D.C.

IV. SUMMARY OF FUNCTIONS

The classification of the public lands and the examination of the geological structure, mineral resources, and products of the National domain.

The project has as its goal the completion of large-scale geologic maps of Puerto Rico and its adjacent islands and the preparation of detailed reports on the various aspects of the geology of Puerto Rico.

V. RESOURCES

Budget of expenditures for operations during fiscal year 1964–65	$98, 785
Sources of income for fiscal year 1964–65:	
a. Federal appropriations	49, 785
b. Commonwealth appropriations	49, 000
c. Other sources	0

Total real estate property owned and/or used:		
a. Land facilities:	*Acres*	*Ratio of owned to used, percent*
1. Total used	0. 02	------
2. Total owned by Federal Government	0	0
b. Buildings and office space facilities:	*Square feet*	*Ratio of owned to used, percent*
1. Total used	1, 000	------
2. Total owned by Federal Government	0	0

c. Rental paid for land, buildings and office space facilities used:

Proprietor	*Annual rental paid*	*Percent*
1. Federal Government	------	------
2. Puerto Rican Government	$1, 500	100
3. Private	0	0

VI. PERSONNEL

	Total
Total number of employees	7
Method of selection:	
a. Classified civil service	6
b. Excepted service positions	0
c. Other	1
Nationality (place born):	
a. United States of America	5
b. Puerto Rico	2
Salary:	
a. Annual salary range	$3, 780–$16, 620
b. Annual median salary	$9, 500

WATER RESOURCES DIVISION, CARIBBEAN DISTRICT (GEOLOGICAL SURVEY)

I. Legal Basis

Act of March 3, 1879 (20 Stat. 394; 43 U.S.C.).

II. Date Office Started Operations in Puerto Rico

1957.

III. Chief Executive or Director; Method of Selecting Him

Mr. Dean B. Bogart. Assigned by water resources division headquarters.

IV. Summary of Functions

To assay and to report on the fresh-water availability and potential of Puerto Rico and the U.S. Virgin Islands, with respect to the quantity of water, to the quality of the water, to the variability of its occurrence, and to its geographic location.

V. Resources

Budget of expenditures for office operations and capital improvements during fiscal year 1964–65	$301, 800
Sources of income for fiscal year 1964–65:	
a. Federal appropriations	157, 000
b. Other sources	144, 800

Total real estate property owned and/or used:		
a. Land facilities:	*Acres*	*Ratio of owned to used, percent*
1. Total used	0. 28	------
2. Total owned by Federal Government	0	0
b. Buildings and office space facilities:	*Square feet*	*Ratio of owned to used, percent*
1. Total used	3, 280	------
2. Total owned by Federal Government	0	0
c. Rental paid for land, buildings and office space facilities used:		
Proprietor	*Annual rental paid*	*Percent*
1. Federal Government	------	------
2. Puerto Rican Government	0	0
3. Private	$6, 600	100

VI. Personnel

	Total
Total number of employees	22
Method of selection: a. Classified civil service	22
Nationality (place born):	
a. United States of America	7
b. Puerto Rico	14
c. Other countries	1
Salary:	
a. Annual salary range	$4, 000–$13, 000
b. Annual median salary	$5, 830

DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

THE DISTRICT ATTORNEY

I. Legal Basis

Section 34 Organic Act of Puerto Rico, April 1900; Section 41 of the Organic Act of Puerto Rico, March 1917, Public Law No. 600 (64 Stat. 319).

II. Date Office Started Operations in Puerto Rico

1900.

III. Chief Executive or Director; Method of Selecting Him

Mr. Francisco A. Gil, Jr.—U.S. Attorney. Appointed by the President with the advice and consent of the Senate (28 U.S.C.A. 501).

IV. Summary of Functions

Prosecute for all offenses against the United States.

Prosecute or defend, for the government, all civil actions, suits or proceedings in which the United States is concerned.

Appear in behalf of the defendants in all civil actions, suits or proceedings pending in his district against collectors, or other officers of the revenue or customs for any act done by them or for the recovery of any money exacted by or paid to such officers, and by them paid into the Treasury.

Institute and prosecute proceedings for the collection of fines, penalties and forfeitures incurred for violation of any revenue law unless satisfied upon investigation that justice does not require such proceedings.

Make such reports as the attorney general shall direct.

The attorney general has supervision over all litigation to which the United States or any agency thereof is a party, and has direction of all U.S. Attorneys and their assistants in the discharge of their respective duties (28 U.S.C. 507).

V. Resources

Budget of expenditures for office operations during fiscal year 1964–65	$87,243
Sources of income for fiscal year 1964–65:	
a. Federal appropriations	87,243
b. Commonwealth appropriations	0
c. Other sources	0

Total real estate property owned and/or used:

	Acres		
a. Land facilities:			
1. Total used	0		
2. Total owned by Federal Government	0		
		Square feet	*Ratio of owned to used, percent*
b. Buildings and office space facilities:			
1. Total used		2,535	------
2. Total owned by Federal Government		2,535	100

c. Rental paid for land, buildings and office space facilities used: $0.

VI. Personnel

	Total
Total number of employees	10
Method of selection:	
a. Classified civil service	6
b. Excepted service positions	3
c. Other	1
Nationality (place born):	
a. United States of America	0
b. Puerto Rico	10
Salary:	
a. Annual salary range	$4, 480–$16, 500
b. Annual median salary	$5, 120

THE DISTRICT COURT

I. Legal Basis

Foraker Act of 1900; Jones Act of 1917; and sections 4 and 5 of Public Law No. 600, July 3, 1950 (64 U.S. Stat. at L. 319).

II. Date Office Started Operations in Puerto Rico

1903.

III. Chief Executive or Director; Method of Selecting Him

Mr. Clemente Ruiz Nazario—Chief Judge. Appointed by the President of the United States with the advice and consent of the Senate.

IV. Summary of Functions

Limited (Federal) jurisdiction on civil and criminal cases.

V. Resources

Budget and Sources of income: Specific amount not specified. All money spent comes from Federal appropriations to the Administrative Office of the United States Courts.

Total real estate property owned and/or used:

	Acres	
a. Land facilities:		
1. Total used	0	
2. Total owned by Federal Government	0	
	Square feet	**Ratio of owned to used, percent**
b. Buildings and office space facilities:		
1. Total used	16, 861	------
2. Total owned by Federal Government	16, 861	100

c. Rental paid for land, buildings and office space facilities: $0.

VI. Personnel

	Total
Total number of employees	20
Method of selection:	
a. Classified civil service	0
b. Excepted service positions	20

	Total
Nationality (place born):	
a. United States of America	3
b. Puerto Rico	17
Salary:	
a. Annual salary range	$4,500-$35,000
b. Annual median salary	$7,330

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

I. Legal Basis

Public Law 477, March 4, 1911 (36 Stat. 1225), and Public Law 389, March 4, 1921 (41 Stat. 1410).

II. Date Office Started Operations in Puerto Rico

1940.

III. Chief Executive or Director; Method of Selecting Him

Mr. Wallace F. Estill—Special agent-in-charge. Selected by the Director of the FBI at Washington, D.C.

IV. Summary of Functions

Investigates violations of the laws of the United States.

Collects evidence in cases in which the United States is or may be a party in interest, and performs other duties imposed by law.

Under Presidential Directives of 1939, 43 and 50, is responsible for investigation of espionage, sabotage, and subversive activities.

V. Resources

Budget of expenditures for operations during fiscal year 1964-65	$976,749
Sources of income for fiscal year 1964-65:	
a. Federal appropriations	976,749
b. Commonwealth appropriations	0
c. Other sources	0

Total real estate property owned and/or used: Specific information withheld. The agency occupies space in the Banco Popular Building, a privately owned structure under a lease entered into by the U.S. General Services Administration, which pays the rent.

VI. Personnel

Information withheld.

IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION SERVICE

I. Legal Basis

U.S.C. title 5, chapter 5, section 342.

II. Date Office Started Operations in Puerto Rico

1901.

III. Chief Executive or Director; Method of Selecting Him

Mr. Donald G. Brown—District Director. Selected by the Commissioner, Immigration and Naturalization Service, Washington, D.C.

IV. Summary of Functions

Administer U.S. Immigration and Nationality Law concerning the admission of persons seeking to enter the United States from any foreign port or place, and the exclusion, deportation, and naturalization of aliens.

V. Resources

Budget of expenditures for office operations and capital improvements during fiscal year 1964–65	$548, 639
Sources of income for fiscal year 1964–65:	
a. Federal appropriations	548, 639
b. Commonwealth appropriations	0
c. Other sources	0

Total real estate property owned and/or used:

a. Land facilities:	*Acres*
1. Total used	0
2. Total owned by Federal Government	0

b. Buildings and office space facilities:	*Square feet*	*Ratio of owned to used, percent*
1. Total used	9, 917	------
2. Total owned by Federal Government	0	0

c. Rental paid for land, buildings and office space facilities used:

Proprietor	*Annual rent*	*Percent*
1. Federal Government	-------	------
2. Puerto Rican Government	[1] 0	0
3. Private	$22, 096	100

[1] 4800 sq. feet of office space belonging to Puerto Rican Government, are used rent free.

VI. Personnel

Total number of employees	45
Method of selection:	
a. Classified civil service	42
b. Excepted service positions	3
Nationality (place born):	
a. United States of America	26
b. Puerto Rico	18
c. Other countries	1
Salary:	
a. Annual salary range	$4, 005–$16, 130
b. Annual median salary	$7, 570

DEPARTMENT OF LABOR

LABOR-MANAGEMENT AND WELFARE-PENSION REPORTS

I. Legal Basis

The Secretary of Labor's Order No. 24–63, August 8, 1963, pursuant to merger of previous agencies (Bureau of Labor management reports and the office of welfare and pension plans) which existed since 1958 and 1959.

II. Date Office Started Operations in Puerto Rico

1960.

III. CHIEF EXECUTIVE OR DIRECTOR; METHOD OF SELECTING HIM

Mr. George E. Frank—Area Director. Appointed by the director of the office of labor management and welfare-pension reports, U.S. Department of Labor under Federal civil service regulations.

IV. SUMMARY OF FUNCTIONS

Administers and enforces the provisions of the Welfare and Pension Plans Disclosure Act (72 Stat. 997, as amended; 29 U.S.C. 301 note), and the Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959 (73 Stat. 519; 29 U.S.C. 401 note) for which the Secretary of Labor has authority and responsibility.

V. RESOURCES

Budget of expenditures for office operations and capital improvements during fiscal year 1964–65	$53, 322
Sources of income for fiscal year 1964–65:	
a. Federal appropriations	53, 322
b. Commonwealth appropriations	0
c. Other sources	0

Total real estate property owned and/or used:

a. Land facilities:	*Acres*
1. Total used	0
2. Total owned by Federal Government	0

b. Buildings and office space facilities:	*Square feet*	*Ratio of owned to used, percent*
1. Total used	1, 095	------
2. Total owned by Federal Government	0	0

c. Rental paid for land, buildings and office space facilities used:

Proprietor	*Annual rent*	*Percent*
1. Federal Government	0	0
2. Puerto Rican Government	0	0
3. Private	$4, 654	100

VI. PERSONNEL

	Total
Total number of employees	5
Method of selection: a. Classified civil service	5
Nationality (place born):	
a. United States of America	0
b. Puerto Rico	5
Salary:	
a. Annual salary range	$4, 480–$15, 640
b. Annual median salary	$9, 000

OFFICE OF THE SOLICITOR OF LABOR

I. LEGAL BASIS

Fair Labor Standards Act (29 U.S.C. 201) as amended.

II. DATE OFFICE STARTED OPERATIONS IN PUERTO RICO

1940.

III. CHIEF EXECUTIVE OR DIRECTOR; METHOD OF SELECTING HIM

Mr. Morton J. Marks. Appointed by the solicitor of labor, Washington, D.C., under the provisions of Federal civil service regulations.

IV. SUMMARY OF FUNCTIONS

Has responsibility for all legal activities of the Department of Labor.

Represents the Secretary of Labor in the institution and prosecution of all civil court actions involving the Fair Labor Standards Act (29 U.S.C. 201).

The office also performs legal services in connection with the Walsh-Healey and Public Contracts Act (41 U.S.C. 35), the Labor Management Reporting and Disclosure Act (29 U.S.C. 401 et seq.), Welfare Pension Plans Disclosure Act (29 U.S.C. 301), veterans reemployment statutes (50 U.S.C. 1013), Work-Hours Act of 1962 (5 U.S.C. 673), various laws setting wage standards for federally financed or assisted construction work, and various matters connected with programs and functions of the Bureau of Employment Security of the U.S. Department of Labor (i.e., Manpower Development and Training Act, Neighborhood Youth Corps, etc.), as well as all other bureaus of the U.S. Department of Labor having business in Puerto Rico and the Virgin Islands.

V. RESOURCES

Budget of expenditures for office operations during fiscal year 1964–65	[1] $93, 021
Sources of income for fiscal year 1964–65:	
a. Federal appropriations	[1] 93, 021
b. Commonwealth appropriations	0
c. Other sources	0

Total real estate property owned and/or used:

a. Land facilities:	*Acres*
1. Total used	0
2. Total owned by Federal Government	0

b. Buildings and office space facilities:	*Square feet*	*Ratio of owned to used, percent*
1. Total used	1, 892	------
2. Total owned by Federal Government	0	0

c. Rental paid for land, buildings and office space facilities used:

Proprietor	*Annual rental paid*	*Percent*
1. Federal Government	0	0
2. Puerto Rican Government	0	0
3. Private	$8, 021	100

[1] Includes, only, salaries and payments for office rent.

VI. PERSONNEL

	Total
Total number of employees	8
Method of selection:	
a. Classified civil service	3
b. Excepted service positions	5
Nationality (place born):	
a. United States of America	3
b. Puerto Rico	5
Salary:	
a. Annual salary range	$5, 330–$17, 600
b. Annual median salary	$10, 400

VETERANS EMPLOYMENT SERVICE

I. Legal Basis

Title IV, Public Law 346, 78th Congress.

II. Date Office Started Operations in Puerto Rico

1945.

III. Chief Executive or Director; Method of Selecting Him

Mr. Oscar L. Bunker—Representative. Appointed by the chief, Veterans Employment Service under the provisions of Federal civil service regulations.

IV. Summary of Functions

Supervises the registration of veterans in local employment offices and for placing veterans in employment; assists in obtaining and maintaining current information as to available employment; promotes the interest of employers in employing veterans; maintains regular contact with employers and veterans organizations to keep employers informed of veterans available for employment and veterans informed of opportunities for employment, and assists in every possible way in improving work conditions and advancing the employment of veterans.

V. Resources

Budget of expenditures for office operations and capital improvements during fiscal year 1964–65	$22, 500
Sources of income for fiscal year 1964–65:	
a. Federal appropriations	22, 500
b. Commonwealth appropriations	0
c. Other sources	0

Total real estate property owned and/or used:

a. Land facilities:	Acres
1. Total used	0
2. Total owned by Federal Government	0

b. Buildings and office space facilities:	Square feet	Ratio of owned to used, percent
1. Total used	300	-----
2. Total owned by Federal Government	0	0

c. Rental paid for land, buildings and office space facilities used: $0. Rent for private property used is paid by the Puerto Rican Bureau of Employment Security.

VI. Personnel

	Total
Total number of employees	2
Method of selection: a. Classified civil service	2
Nationality (place born):	
a. United States of America	0
b. Puerto Rico	2
Salary:	
a. Annual salary range	$6, 500–$15, 000
b. Annual median salary	n/a

WAGE AND HOUR AND PUBLIC CONTRACTS DIVISION

I. LEGAL BASIS

Section 4. Fair Labor Standards Act (29 U.S.C. 201–219).

II. DATE OFFICE STARTED OPERATIONS IN PUERTO RICO

1939.

III. CHIEF EXECUTIVE OR DIRECTOR; METHOD OF SELECTING HIM

Mr. Ralph S. Myers—Regional Director. Appointed by the Administrator, under the provisions of Federal civil service regulations.

IV. SUMMARY OF FUNCTIONS

Enforcement of the Fair Labor Standards Act and the Walsh-Healy Public Contracts Act in Puerto Rico, Virgin Islands, and Panama, Canal Zone; conducts economic surveys and studies.

V. RESOURCES

Budget of expenditures for operations during fiscal year 1964–65	$580, 545
Sources of income for fiscal year 1964–65:	
a. Federal appropriations	580, 545
b. Commonwealth appropriations	0
c. Other sources	0

Total real estate property owned and/or used:

a. Land facilities:	*Acres*
1. Total used	0
2. Total owned by Federal Government	0

b. Buildings and office space facilities:	*Square feet*	*Ratio of owned to used, percent*
1. Total used	7, 983	------
2. Total owned by Federal Government	0	0

c. Rental paid for land, buildings and office space facilities used:

Proprietor	*Annual rental paid*	*Percent*
1. Federal Government	0	0
2. Puerto Rican Government	0	0
3. Private	$31, 720	100

VI. PERSONNEL

	Total
Total number of employees	[1] 45
Method of selection:	
a. Classified civil service	44
b. Excepted service positions	0
c. Other	1
Nationality (place born):	
a. United States of America	4
b. Puerto Rico	40
c. Other countries	1
Salary:	
a. Annual salary range	$5, 085–$17, 600
b. Annual median salary	$8, 500

[1] Does not include 113 persons serving temporarily on industry committees.

DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY

CARIBBEAN SEA FRONTIER—10TH NAVAL DISTRICT

I. Legal Basis

Presidential Proclamation No. 1, March 1899; Public Act No. 160, March 1903; Navy Department General Order No. 128; Executive Order No. 8984, December 1941.

II. Date Office Started Operations in Puerto Rico

1940.

III. Chief Executive or Director; Method of Selecting Him

Rear Admiral Richard S. Craighill—U.S. Navy. Appointed by the Department of the Navy.

IV. Summary of Functions

The 10th Naval District Commandant is the senior representative of the Secretary of the Navy in the area in all matters concerning the naval shore establishment.

The Commander, Caribbean Sea Frontier, is responsible for the naval defense of the area, and for the preparation of war plans, and the execution of war tactics.

V. Resources

Budget of expenditures for office operations and capital improvements during fiscal year 1964–65	$43, 544, 894
Sources of income for fiscal year 1964–65:	
a. Federal appropriations	43, 544, 894
b. Commonwealth appropriations	0
c. Other sources	0

Total real estate property owned and/or used:

a. Land facilities:	Acres	Ratio of owned to used, percent
1. Total used	44, 249	------
2. Total owned by Federal Government	44, 186	99. 9

b. Buildings and office space facilities:	Square feet	Ratio of owned to used, percent
1. Total used	6, 074, 042	------
2. Total owned by Federal Government	6, 073, 838	99. 6

c. Rental paid for land, buildings and office space facilities used:

Proprietor	Annual rental paid	Percent
1. Federal Government	0	0
2. Puerto Rican Government	$12	0. 3
3. Private	3, 661	99. 7
Total	3, 673	100. 0

VI. PERSONNEL

	Total
Total number of employees	5,777
Method of selection:	
a. Classified civil service	1,616
b. Excepted service positions	1
c. Other	[1] 4,160
Nationality (place born):	
a. United States of America	3,679
b. Puerto Rico	2,002
c. Other countries	96
Salary:	
a. Annual salary range	$1,511–$16,103
b. Annual median salary	[2] $3,510–$ 3,700

[1] Includes 3,561 military personnel.

[2] Total, civilian only.

POST OFFICE DEPARTMENT

POSTAL INSPECTORS

I. LEGAL BASIS

Section 8, Organic Act of Puerto Rico, April 1900; Postmaster General Order No. 1023, August 1900.

II. DATE OFFICE STARTED OPERATIONS IN PUERTO RICO

1900.

III. CHIEF EXECUTIVE OR DIRECTOR; METHOD OF SELECTING HIM

None is authorized.

IV. SUMMARY OF FUNCTIONS

Investigative work for the Post Office Department, including investigations of all violations of the postal laws and regulations, such as mail frauds, thefts from the mails, etc.; keeping the Postmaster General advised of the needs and conditions of the postal service; handling emergencies such as natural catastrophes, casualties involving mail conveyances, airplanes, etc.; inspection of post offices of all classes; investigation of service problems requested by the regional office.

V. RESOURCES

Budget of expenditures for office operations and capital improvements during fiscal year 1964–65	[1] $58,704
Sources of income for fiscal year 1964–65:	
a. Federal appropriations	[1] 58,704
b. Commonwealth appropriations	0
c. Other sources	0

Total real estate property owned and/or used:

a. Land facilities:	*Acres*
1. Total used	0
2. Total owned by Federal Government	0

[1] A rough approximate.

	Square feet	Ratio of owned to used, percent
b. Buildings and office space facilities:		
1. Total used	1, 600	------
2. Total owned by Federal Government	1, 600	100

c. Rental paid for land, buildings and office space facilities used: $0.

VI. Personnel

	Total
Total number of employees	4
Method of selection: a. Classified civil service	4
Nationality (place born):	
a. United States of America	1
b. Puerto Rico	2
c. Other countries	1
Salary:	
a. Annual salary range	$6, 875–$14, 900
b. Annual median salary	$10, 000

POST OFFICES

There are in Puerto Rico 102 independent post offices together with 12 classified stations and 339 contract stations and branches.

I. Legal Basis

39 U.S.C. 701; 705; Postmaster General Order No. 1023, August 1900.

II. Date Office Started Operations in Puerto Rico

Information not available for individual stations. (See Postal Inspectors' Office, p. 141.)

III. Chief Executive or Director; Method of Selecting Him

Mr. Sean Keating—Regional Director. Appointed (selective) by the Deputy Assistant Postmaster General. Individual postmasters are presidential appointees pursuant to Federal civil service regulations as provided in Public Law 720 (39 U.S.C. 3311)

IV. Summary of Functions

Provide postal services in accordance with existing laws and regulations.

V. Resources

Budget and Sources of income:

Specific information not available. The Budget is from Federal appropriations. No attempt is made to segregate the appropriations or expenditures by States or territories. The 102 offices had a gross postal revenue of $9,756,379 for fiscal year 1963–64.

	Acres	Ratio of owned to used, percent
Total real estate property owned and/or used:		
a. Land facilities:		
1. Total used	27. 36	-------
2. Total owned by Federal Government	22. 00	80. 4

b. Buildings and office space facilities:	*Square feet*	*Ratio of owned to used, percent*
1. Total used	388, 308	-------
2. Total owned by Federal Government	144, 495	37. 2

c. Rental paid for land, buildings and office space facilities used:

Proprietor	*Annual rental paid*	*Percent*
1. Federal Government	0	0
2. Puerto Rican Government	0	0
3. Private	$317, 185	100

VI. PERSONNEL

	Total
Total number of employees	1, 470
Method of selection: a. Classified civil service	1, 470

Nationality (place born): Information withheld by office.

Salary:

a. Annual salary range	$3, 945–$15, 220
b. Annual median salary	$6, 600

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

PEACE CORPS—FIELD TRAINING OFFICE

I. LEGAL BASIS

Congressional Peace Corps Act, Sept. 22, 1961.

II. DATE OFFICE STARTED OPERATIONS IN PUERTO RICO

1961.

III. CHIEF EXECUTIVE OR DIRECTOR; METHOD OF SELECTING HIM

Mr. Alfred P. Fain. Appointed by office personnel (Talent Research) under the directorship of Mr. Sargeant Shriver, Director, U.S. Peace Corps.

IV. SUMMARY OF FUNCTIONS

Administer field training for Peace Corps trainees with a focus of field training.

V. RESOURCES

Budget of expenditures for office operations and capital improvements during fiscal year 1964–65	$150, 000
Sources of income for fiscal year 1964–65:	
a. Federal appropriations	150, 000
b. Commonwealth appropriations	0
c. Other sources	0

Total real estate property owned and/or used:

a. Land facilities:	*Acres*
1. Total used	0
2. Total owned by Federal Government	0

b. Buildings and office space facilities:	Square feet	Ratio of owned to used, percent
1. Total used	1, 200	------
2. Total owned by Federal Government	0	0

c. Rental paid for land, buildings and office space facilities used:

Proprietor	Annual rental paid	Percent
1. Federal Government	0	0
2. Puerto Rican Government	0	0
3. Private	$3, 600	100

VI. Personnel

	Total
Total number of employees	9
Method of selection: a. Classified civil service	9
Nationality (place born):	
a. United States of America	7
b. Puerto Rico	2
Salary:	
a. Annual salary range	$4, 000–$12, 000
b. Annual median salary	$7, 250

TREASURY DEPARTMENT

ALCOHOL AND TOBACCO TAX DIVISION OF THE INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE

I. Legal Basis

Sec. 5314, IRC, 1954, as amended by Public Law 85–859, title II, Sec. 201; Federal Alcohol Administration Act (Act of August 29, 1935); National Firearms Act (secs. 5845, 5853, 5861, and 5862, 1954 IRC); Federal Firearms Act, chapter 18 of Title 15, U.S.C.; 26 U.S.C. 7805; 26 CFR Part 275, Importation of * * * Tobacco Products.

II. Date Office Started Operations in Puerto Rico

1923.

III. Chief Executive or Director; Method of Selecting Him

Mr. Francis R. Nohrden—Supervisor in Charge. Appointed by Regional Commissioner of Internal Revenue, North-Atlantic Region.

IV. Summary of Functions

Supervises the production, storage, and denaturation of alcohol, and use of denatured alcohol in Puerto Rico, to meet legal requirements for taxfree entry of denatured alcohol and articles into the United States from Puerto Rico.

Maintains compliance with Federal Alcohol Administration Act requiring that producers, importers and wholesalers of alcoholic beverages obtain permits and refrain from certain unfair competition, and practices, including commercial bribery, as well as misleading labeling, packaging and advertising of alcoholic beverages; enforces provisions of chapter 53 of the Internal Revenue Code (formerly National Firearms Act) and, to a limited extent, the provisions of the Federal Firearms Act;

Supervises lading and tax determination of cigars for shipment from Puerto Rico to the United States.

V. RESOURCES

Budget of expenditures for office operations and capital improvements during fiscal year 1964–65	$126, 266
Sources of income for fiscal year 1964–65:	
a. Federal appropriations	[1]
b. Commonwealth appropriations	[1]
c. Other sources	[2]

Total real estate property owned and/or used:

a. Land facilities:	Acres
1. Total used	0
2. Total owned by Federal Government	0

b. Buildings and office space facilities:	Square feet	Ratio of owned to used, percent
1. Total used	2, 290	------
2. Total owned by Federal Government	2, 290	100

c. Rental paid for land, buildings and office space facilities used: $0.

VI. PERSONNEL

	Total
Total number of employees	12
Method of selection: a. Classified civil service	12
Nationality (place born):	
a. United States of America	1
b. Puerto Rico	11
Salary:	
a. Annual salary range	$4, 480–$13, 445
b. Annual median salary	$8, 570

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[1] Not specified.

[2] Reimbursed under Sec. 5314(a)(4), IRC.

COAST GUARD, GREATER ANTILLES SECTION

I. LEGAL BASIS

Section 2 of title 14, United States Code.

II. DATE OFFICE STARTED OPERATIONS IN PUERTO RICO

1915.

III. CHIEF EXECUTIVE OR DIRECTOR; METHOD OF SELECTING HIM

Captain Robert Wilcox—Commander. Appointed by Commandant, U.S. Coast Guard, Washington, D.C.

IV. SUMMARY OF FUNCTIONS

Enforce or assist in enforcement of all applicable Federal laws upon the high seas and waters subject to the jurisdiction of the United States.

Administer laws and regulations for the promotion of safety of life and property on the high seas and on waters subject to the jurisdiction of the United States.

Develop, establish, maintain and operate aids to maritime navigation and rescue facilities for the promotion of safety on and over the high seas and waters subject to the jurisdiction of the United States.

V. RESOURCES

Budget of expenditures for operations during fiscal year 1964–65	$720,650
Sources of income for fiscal year 1964–65:	
a. Federal appropriations	$720,650
b. Commonwealth appropriations	0
c. Other sources	0

Total real estate property owned and/or used:[1]

a. Land facilities:	*Acres*	*Ratio of owned to used, percent*
1. Total used	260.42	------
2. Total owned by Federal Government	260.42	100

b. Buildings and office space facilities:	*Square feet*	*Ratio of owned to used, percent*
1. Total used	95,281	------
2. Total owned by Federal Government	95,281	100

c. Rental paid for land, buildings and office space facilities used:

Proprietor	*Annual rental paid*
1. Federal Government	0
2. Puerto Rican Government	$1
3. Private	36

---

[1] Agency reports paying a nominal annual rent of $1 for Puerto Rican Government property and $36 for private property used. This suggests an error of computation in the relationship "real estate property owned and/or used".

VI. PERSONNEL

	Total
Total number of employees	333
Method of selection:	
a. Classified civil service	48
b. Excepted service positions	0
c. Other	[1] 285
Nationality (place born):	
a. United States of America	236
b. Puerto Rico	92
c. Other countries	5
Salary:	
a. Annual salary range	$2,150–$13,613
b. Annual median salary	$4,700

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[1] Military personnel.

CUSTOMS SERVICE

I. LEGAL BASIS

48 U.S. Code 740.

II. DATE OFFICE STARTED OPERATIONS IN PUERTO RICO

1900.

III. CHIEF EXECUTIVE OR DIRECTOR; METHOD OF SELECTING HIM

Mr. R. A. Torrens—Acting Collector of Customs. Appointment under the provisions of Federal civil service regulations. (Pursuant to President's Reorganization Plan No. 1 of 1965.)

IV. SUMMARY OF FUNCTIONS

The assessment and collection of duties and taxes on imported merchandise and baggage.

The entry and clearance of vessels and aircraft.

The issuance of documents and signal letters to vessels of the United States.

The admeasurement of vessels.

The collection of tonnage taxes on vessels engaged in foreign commerce.

The supervision of the discharge of imported cargoes.

The inspection of international traffic.

The control of customs warehousing of imports.

The determination and certification for payment of the amount of drawback due upon the exportation of articles produced from duty-paid imports.

The enforcement of the antidumping and export control acts.

The regulation of the movement of merchandise into and out of foreign trade zones.

The enforcement of laws and other regulations of other Government agencies affecting imports and exports.

The prevention of smuggling, undervaluations, and frauds on the customs revenue.

The apprehension of violators of the Customs and navigation laws.

V. RESOURCES

Budget of expenditures for operations during fiscal year 1964–65	$2, 690, 000
Sources of income for fiscal year 1964–65:	
a. Federal appropriations	0
b. Commonwealth appropriations	0
c. Other sources	[1] $19, 407, 166

[1] Duty collections.

Total real estate property owned and/or used:

a. Land facilities:	Acres	Ratio of owned to used, percent
1. Total used	3. 23	-------
2. Total owned by Federal Government	3. 02	93. 4

b. Buildings and office space facilities:	Square feet	Ratio of owned to used, percent
1. Total used	102, 905	-------
2. Total owned by Federal Government	89, 633	87. 1

c. Rental paid for land, buildings and office space facilities used:

Proprietor	Annual rental paid	Percent
1. Federal Government	0	0
2. Puerto Rican Government	$660	100
3. Private	0	0

VI. PERSONNEL

	Total
Total number of employees	268
Method of selection:	
a. Classified civil service	268
b. Excepted service positions	0
c. Other	0

	Total
Nationality (place born):	
a. United States of America	22
b. Puerto Rico	244
c. Other countries	2
Salary:	
a. Annual salary range	$3, 016–$17, 600
b. Annual median salary	$6, 910

DIVISION OF DISBURSEMENT

I. Legal Basis

Presidential Executive Orders No. 6166 of June 1933, and No. 7034, May 1935, as amended.

II. Date Office Started Operations in Puerto Rico

1935.

III. Chief Executive or Director; Method of Selecting Him

Mr. Carlos A. Santiago—Branch Disbursing Officer. Appointed under the provisions of Federal civil service regulations.

IV. Summary of Functions

Preparing, signing, and releasing checks in payment of vouchers.

Mailing or delivery of checks prepared by New York regional office and other disbursing offices in the United States.

Liaison with administrative agencies served regarding payment transactions and programs.

V. Resources

Budget of expenditures for office operations during fiscal year 1964–65	$20, 450
Sources of income for fiscal year 1964–65:	
a. Federal appropriations	20, 450
b. Commonwealth appropriations	0
c. Other sources	0

Total real estate property owned and/or used:

a. Land facilities:	Acres
1. Total used	0
2. Total owned by Federal Government	0

b. Buildings and office space facilities:	Square feet	Ratio of owned to used, percent
1. Total used	1, 075	-----
2. Total owned by Federal Government	1, 075	100

c. Rental paid for land, buildings and office space facilities used: $0.

VI. Personnel

	Total
Total number of employees	3
Method of selection: a. Classified civil service	3
Nationality (place born):	
a. United States of America	0
b. Puerto Rico	3
Salary:	
a. Annual salary range	$4, 275–$8, 935
b. Annual median salary	$6, 500

INTERNATIONAL OPERATIONS OF THE INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE

I. Legal Basis

Internal Revenue Code Section 3360(b)(2) (A), (B), (C), and (D).

II. Date Office Started Operations in Puerto Rico

1922.

III. Chief Executive or Director; Method of Selecting Him

Mr. David M. Rayner. Appointed by the chief, collection division, with the consent of the Director of International Operations under the provisions of Federal civil service regulations.

IV. Summary of Functions

Performs the full scope of Internal Revenue Service functions in the administration of the Internal Revenue Code as they apply to Puerto Rico and Virgin Islands.

V. Resources

Budget of expenditures for office operations and capital improvements during fiscal year 1964–65	$527, 255
Sources of income for fiscal year 1964–65:	
a. Federal appropriations	527, 255
b. Commonwealth appropriations	0
c. Other sources	0

Total real estate property owned and/or used:

a. Land facilities:	*Acres*
1. Total used	0
2. Total owned by Federal Government	0

b. Buildings and office space facilities:	*Square feet*	*Ratio of owned to used, percent*
1. Total used	9, 252	------
2. Total owned by Federal Government	0	0

c. Rental paid for land, buildings and office space facilities used:

Proprietor	*Annual rental paid*	*Percent*
1. Federal Government	0	0
2. Puerto Rican Government	0	0
3. Private	$20, 817	100

VI. Personnel

	Total
Total number of employees	73
Method of selection: a. Classified civil service	73
Nationality (place born):	
a. United States of America	5
b. Puerto Rico	67
c. Other countries	1
Salary:	
a. Annual salary range	$4, 005–$15, 855
b. Annual median salary	$5, 920

SECRET SERVICE

I. LEGAL BASIS

18 U.S.C. 3056.

II. DATE OFFICE STARTED OPERATIONS IN PUERTO RICO

1951.

III. CHIEF EXECUTIVE OR DIRECTOR; METHOD OF SELECTING HIM

Mr. Charles L. Gittens—Special Agent in Charge. Appointed by the Chief, U.S. Secret Service, Washington, D.C.

IV. SUMMARY OF FUNCTIONS

Protection of the President and Vice President of the United States.

Safeguarding of the currency and other securities of the United States (avoiding counterfeiting).

Investigate forgery or alteration of Treasury checks and Government bonds.

Investigate violations of other laws as specified in 18 U.S.C. 3056.

V. RESOURCES

Budget and sources of income: Information withheld.

Total real estate property owned and/or used:

a. Land facilities:	*Acres*
1. Total used	0
2. Total owned by Federal Government	0

b. Buildings and office space facilities:	*Square feet*	*Ratio of owned to used, percent*
1. Total used	1, 200	-----
2. Total owned by Federal Government	1, 200	100

c. Rental paid for land, buildings and office space facilities used: $0.

VI. PERSONNEL

	Total
Total number of employees	(1)
Method of selection: All classified civil service positions.	
Nationality (place born)	(1)
Salary:	
a. Annual salary range	$6, 340–$10, 250
b. Annual median salary	(1)

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[1] Information withheld.

ADMINISTATIVE AGENCIES

ATOMIC ENERGY COMMISSION

I. LEGAL BASIS

The Atomic Energy Act of 1954 as amended.

II. DATE OFFICE STARTED OPERATIONS IN PUERTO RICO

1957.

III. CHIEF EXECUTIVE OR DIRECTOR; METHOD OF SELECTING HIM

Mr. Floyd P. Trent. Appointed by the manager, Oak Ridge Operations Office, U.S. Atomic Energy Commission.

IV. SUMMARY OF FUNCTIONS

The Puerto Rico area office assists in the development and direction of programs incident to the operation of the Puerto Rico Nuclear Center and the construction and operation of the BONUS nuclear plant. This involves administration of contracts for design, engineering, construction and operation of the research and training facilities and the nuclear power demonstration plant; and such other contracts as assigned.

The area office directs or accomplishes assigned functions within established AEC policy consistent with supplementary policies and program goals established by the manager of operations and within authority delegated to the area manager. Matters of mutual concern are coordinated with the Oak Ridge staff, and special staff services of Oak Ridge divisions are used as appropriate to supplement local staff services.

In the administration of contracts, the area office has a specific responsibility to assure that adequate provision is made for the health and safety of Government and contractor personnel, and of the general public, and for further assuring that functions carried out under contracts are executed in a manner that protects Government and contractor personnel and the general public against atomic energy induced radiation and all other health and safety hazards arising from the performance of the contract work.

V. RESOURCES

Budget of expenditures for office operations and capital improvements during fiscal year 1964-65	$4,761,000
Sources of income for fiscal year 1964-65:	
a. Federal appropriations	4,761,000
b. Other sources	0

Total real estate property owned and/or used:

a. Land facilities:	*Acres*	*Ratio of owned to used, percent*
1. Total used	[1] 15	------
2. Total owned by Federal Government	[1] 10	66

b. Buildings and office space facilities:	*Square feet*	*Ratio of owned to used, percent*
1. Total used	113,365	------
2. Total owned by Federal Government	112,135	98.9

c. Rental paid for land, buildings and office space facilities used:

Proprietor	*Annual rental paid*	*Percent*
1. Federal Government	0	0
2. Puerto Rican Government	0	0
3. Private	$4,800	100

---

[1] Approximately.

VI. PERSONNEL

There are 367 persons working under the auspices of the Puerto Rican area office of the Atomic Energy Commission.

The AEC has no direct administrative control over 360 of them for the latter work for 2 AEC contractors which are:

The Puerto Rico Nuclear Center (under direct jurisdiction of the University of Puerto Rico) which hires 300 persons.

The BONUS nuclear plant (under direct jurisdiction of the Puerto Rico Water Resources Authority) which employs 60 persons.

The seven persons under direct jurisdiction of the Puerto Rican area office of the AEC:

a. All occupy excepted service positions.
b. Five are U.S.A. Nationals (place born); two are Puerto Rican nationals (place born).
c. Their salary ranges $4,500 to $21,000.
d. Their median salary is $11,000.

CIVIL SERVICE REPRESENTATIVE

I. Legal Basis

Public Law approved January 16, 1883 (22 U.S. Stat. at L. 403). Civil Service Circular No. 624, March 15, 1950.

II. Date Office Started Operations in Puerto Rico

1952.

III. Chief Executive or Director; Method of Selecting Him

Mr. Anibal Rolon—Representative. Appointed by the Director, Atlanta Region, U.S. Civil Service Commission.

IV. Summary of Functions

Represents the Director, Atlanta Region, in Puerto Rico and the Virgin Islands. As such, reviews and evaluates Federal agencies' personnel management programs, instructs, supervises and assists the Boards of U.S. Civil Service Examiners in San Juan and Ramey Air Force Base, concerning their operations.

Provides advice and assistance to management officials on phases of personnel administration and management.

V. Resources

Budget of expenditures for office operations during fiscal year 1964–65	$18, 054
Sources of income for fiscal year 1964–65:	
a. Federal appropriations	18, 000
b. Commonwealth appropriations	0
c. Other sources	0

Total real estate property owned and/or used:

a. Land facilities:	*Acres*
1. Total used	0
2. Total owned by Federal Government	0

b. Buildings and office space facilities:	*Square feet*	*Ratio of owned to used, percent*
1. Total used	490	-------
2. Total owned by Federal Government	490	100

c. Rental paid for land, buildings and office space facilities used: $0.

VI. PERSONNEL

	Total
Total number of employees	2
Method of selection: a. Classified civil service	2
Nationality (place born):	
a. United States of America	0
b. Puerto Rico	2
Salary:	
a. Annual salary range	$4,506–$13,548
b. Annual median salary	n.a.

FEDERAL AVIATION AGENCY

I. LEGAL BASIS

Federal Aviation Act of 1958.

II. DATE OFFICE STARTED OPERATIONS IN PUERTO RICO

1941. The Federal Aviation Act of 1958 brought together functions formerly performed by the Civil Aeronautics Administration and the Airways Modernization Board.

III. CHIEF EXECUTIVE OR DIRECTOR; METHOD OF SELECTING HIM

Mr. Jaime D. Serra—Area Manager. Appointed by the Director, Southern Region, Federal Aviation Agency.

IV. SUMMARY OF FUNCTIONS

To insure air safety.
To promote air commerce.
To promote national security.

V. RESOURCES

Budget of expenditures for office operations and capital improvements during fiscal year 1964–65	$2,865,700
Sources of income for fiscal year 1964–65:	
a. Federal appropriations	2,865,700
b. Other sources	0

Total real estate property owned and/or used:

a. Land facilities:	Acres
1. Total used	0
2. Total owned by Federal Government	0

b. Buildings and office space facilities:	Square feet	Ratio of owned to used, percent
1. Total used	17,818	------
2. Total owned by Federal Government	0	0

c. Rental paid for land, buildings and office space facilities used:

Proprietor	Annual rental paid	Percent
1. Federal Government	0	0
2. Puerto Rican Government	$29,733	91.7
3. Private	2,690	8.3
Total	32,423	100.0

VI. PERSONNEL

	Total
Total number of employees	212
Method of selection:	
a. Classified civil service	212
b. Excepted service positions	0
c. Other	0
Nationality (place born):	
a. United States of America	136
b. Puerto Rico	70
c. Other countries	6
Salary:	
a. Annual salary range	$3, 850–$17, 030
b. Annual median salary	$8, 750

FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION

I. LEGAL BASIS

Section 4(g) of the Communications Act of 1934, as amended.

II. DATE OFFICE STARTED OPERATIONS IN PUERTO RICO

1937.

III. CHIEF EXECUTIVE OR DIRECTOR; METHOD OF SELECTING HIM

Mr. Eugene W. Klein—Engineer in Charge. Appointed under the provisions of Federal civil service regulations.

IV. SUMMARY OF FUNCTIONS

The San Juan district office is 1 of 24 district offices and 4 subdistrict offices maintained by the Field Engineering Bureau of the Federal Communications Commission. It is responsible for conducting interference investigations, suppressing clandestine radio operations, inspecting radio stations, conducting operator examinations and issuing permits to those found qualified, and carrying out other investigative activities to insure compliance with the Commission's rules and regulations. It serves Puerto Rico and the Virgin Islands.

V. RESOURCES

Budget of expenditures for office operations and capital improvements during fiscal year 1964–65	$47, 119
Sources of income for fiscal year 1964–65:	
a. Federal appropriations	47, 119
b. Commonwealth appropriations	0
c. Other sources	0

Total real estate property owned and/or used:

a. Land facilities:	Acres
1. Total used	0
2. Total owned by Federal Government	0

b. Buildings and office space facilities:	Square feet	Ratio of owned to used, percent
1. Total used	1, 225	------
2. Total owned by Federal Government	1, 225	100

c. Rental paid for land, buildings and office space facilities used: $0.

VI. PERSONNEL

	Total
Total number of employees	3
Method of selection: a. Classified civil service	3
Nationality (place born):	
a. United States of America	2
b. Puerto Rico	1
Salary:	
a. Annual salary range	$6,155–$10,960
b. Annual median salary	$8,000

FEDERAL HOUSING ADMINISTRATION

I. LEGAL BASIS

National Housing Act 1934.

II. DATE OFFICE STARTED OPERATIONS IN PUERTO RICO

1939.

III. CHIEF EXECUTIVE OR DIRECTOR; METHOD OF SELECTING HIM

Mr. Robert B. Miller—Director. Appointed by the Commissioner of the Federal Housing Administration, Washington, D.C.

IV. SUMMARY OF FUNCTIONS

The principal purposes of the Federal Housing Administration under the National Housing Act, as amended, are to improve home financing practices, to stabilize the mortgage market, to encourage improved housing standards and conditions, to facilitate home ownership, and aid in the elimination of slums and blighted conditions, and the prevention of deterioration of residential properties. These objectives are accomplished through the insurance of loans and investments made by private financial institutions and investors to finance the production, purchase, repair and improvement of residential properties.

V. RESOURCES

Budget of expenditures for office operations and capital improvements during fiscal year 1964–65 [1] $667,491

Sources of income for fiscal year 1964–65: Information not available.

Total real estate property owned and/or used:

	Acres	
a. Land facilities:		
1. Total used	0	
2. Total owned by Federal Government	0	
b. Buildings and office space facilities:	Square feet	Ratio of owned to used, percent
1. Total used	8,719	-------
2. Total owned by Federal Government	0	0
c. Rental paid for land, buildings and office space facilities used:		
Proprietor	Annual rental paid	Percent
1. Federal Government	0	0
2. Puerto Rican Government	0	0
3. Private	$29,781	100

---

[1] The first 9 months of the fiscal year.

VI. PERSONNEL

	Total
Total number of employees	94
Method of selection: a. Classified civil service	94
Nationality (place born):	
a. United States of America	4
b. Puerto Rico	89
c. Other countries	1
Salary:	
a. Annual salary range	$4, 005–$16, 130
b. Annual median salary	$7, 400

GENERAL SERVICES ADMINISTRATION

I. LEGAL BASIS

Administrator's decision by Federal Property and Administrative Services Act of 1949 as amended.

II. DATE OFFICE STARTED OPERATIONS IN PUERTO RICO

1961.

III. CHIEF EXECUTIVE OR DIRECTOR; METHOD OF SELECTING HIM

Mr. Albert R. O'Clare—Representative and Area Manager. Appointed by the Administrator of General Services Administration, Washington, D.C. (selective appointment).

IV. SUMMARY OF FUNCTIONS

The General Services Administration provides the following services support to other Federal agencies: Supply Service, Defense Materials Service, Public Buildings Service, Transportation and Communications Service, Utilization and Disposal Service, and National Archives and Records Service.

V. RESOURCES

Budget of expenditures for office operations and capital improvements during fiscal year 1964–65	$1, 170, 381
Sources of income for fiscal year 1964–65:	
a. Federal appropriations	1, 170, 381
b. Commonwealth appropriations	0
c. Other sources	0

Total real estate property owned and/or used:		
a. Land facilities:	*Acres*	*Ratio of used to owned, percent*
1. Total used	0	0
2. Total owned by Federal Government	[1] 28	------

[1] On these 28 acres will be constructed a 280,000 sq. ft., 9-story building which will house all civilian agency activities except the Federal Aviation Agency, the Public Health Services, Atomic Energy Commission, the Social Security Administration and the Veterans' Administration offices. Also a 800-vehicle motor pool and a 100,000 sq. ft. warehouse for supplies will be built at this site.

Expected date of occupancy: 1969.

Expected cost: $12,000,000.

	Square feet	Ratio of owned to used, percent
b. Buildings and office space facilities:		
1. Total used	[2] 24, 000	------
2. Total owned by Federal Government	24, 000	100

c. Rental paid for land, buildings and office space facilities used: $0.

[2] Utilized starting Sept. 30, 1965.

VI. PERSONNEL

	Total
Total number of employees	12
Method of selection:	
a. Classified civil service	8
b. Excepted service positions	0
c. Other	4
Nationality (place born):	
a. United States of America	2
b. Puerto Rico	10
Salary:	
a. Annual salary range	$2, 470–$10, 015
b. Annual median salary	$6, 500

HOUSING AND HOME FINANCE AGENCY

I. LEGAL BASIS

Reorganization Plan No. 3, dated July 27, 1947, 61 Stat. 954; U.S.C. 133y–16, note (1946 ed., supp. 1).

II. DATE OFFICE STARTED OPERATIONS IN PUERTO RICO

1954.

III. CHIEF EXECUTIVE OR DIRECTOR; METHOD OF SELECTING HIM

Mr. José E. Febres Silva—Regional Administrator. Appointed by the Administrator in Washington, D.C.

IV. SUMMARY OF FUNCTIONS

Administer and coordinate the various housing programs enacted under the National Housing Act of 1949, as amended. This includes the following activities: Urban renewal, slum clearance, urban planning assistance, open land and open space programs, loans for college housing, and public facilities, advances for public works planning, senior citizens housing, and Federal and non-Federal school construction.

V. RESOURCES

Budget of expenditures for office operations and capital improvements during fiscal year 1964–65	$841, 000
Sources of income for fiscal year 1964–65:	
a. Federal appropriations	841, 000
b. Commonwealth appropriations	0
c. Other sources	0

Total real estate property owned and/or used:

	Acres
a. Land facilities:	
1. Total used	0
2. Total owned by Federal Government	0

	Square feet	*Ratio of owned to used, percent*
b. Buildings and office space facilities:		
1. Total used	10, 735	------
2. Total owned by Federal Government	0	0

c. Rental paid for land, buildings and office space facilities used:

Proprietor	*Annual rental paid*	*Percent*
1. Federal Government	0	0
2. Puerto Rican Government	0	0
3. Private	$33, 057	100

VI. Personnel

	Total
Total number of employees	69
Method of selection:	
a. Classified civil service	65
b. Excepted service positions	4
Nationality (place born):	
a. United States of America	3
b. Puerto Rico	65
c. Other countries	1
Salary:	
a. Annual salary range	$3, 680–$19, 590
b. Annual median salary	$8, 820

NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD

I. Legal Basis

Public Law 101, 80th Congress.

II. Date Office Started Operations in Puerto Rico

1947.

III. Chief Executive or Director; Method of Selecting Him

Mr. Raymond J. Compton. Appointed by General Counsel of the Board.

IV. Summary of Functions

Administer the Labor Management Relations Act of 1947, as amended.

V. Resources

Budget of expenditures for office operations during fiscal year 1964–65	$400, 000
Sources of income for fiscal year 1964–65:	
a. Federal appropriations	400, 000
b. Commonwealth appropriations	0
c. Other sources	0

14A

Total real estate.property owned and/or used:

a. Land facilities:	*Acres*
1. Total used	0
2. Total owned by Federal Government	0

b. Buildings and office space facilities:	*Square feet*	*Ratio of owned to used, percent*
1. Total used	6, 000	------
2. Total owned by Federal Government	0	0

c. Rental paid for land, buildings and office space facilities used:

Proprietor	*Annual rental paid*	*Percent*
1. Federal Government	0	0
2. Puerto Rican Government	0	0
3. Private	$26, 040	100

VI. Personnel

	Total
Total number of employees	35
Method of selection: a. Classified civil service	35
Nationality (place born):[1]	
a. United States of America	9
b. Puerto Rico	24
Salary:	
a. Annual salary range	$4, 005–$21, 555
b. Annual median salary	$8, 500

[1] Two positions vacant at time of survey.

PUBLIC HOUSING ADMINISTRATION

I. Legal Basis

United States Housing Act of 1937, and subsequent amendments.

II. Date Office Started Operations in Puerto Rico

1938.

III. Chief Executive or Director; Method of Selecting Him

Mr. Felipe Gorbea Fernandez—Regional Director. Appointed by the Commissioner of the Public Housing Administration in Washington, D.C.

IV. Summary of Functions

To administer the low-rent public housing provisions of the U.S. Housing Act in Puerto Rico and to furnish technical and financial assistance to Local Housing Authorities in order to provide adequate, safe, and sanitary housing to low-income families.

V. Resources

Budget of expenditures for office operations and capital improvements during fiscal year 1964–65	$540, 940
Sources of income for fiscal year 1964–65:	
a. Federal appropriations	540, 940
b. Commonwealth appropriations	0
c. Other sources	0

Total real estate property owned and/or used:

a. Land facilities:

	Acres
1. Total used	0
2. Total owned by Federal Government	0

b. Buildings and office space facilities:

	Square feet	*Ratio of owned to used, percent*
1. Total used	7, 000	------
2. Total owned by Federal Government	0	0

c. Rental paid for land, buildings and office space facilities used:

Proprietor	*Annual rental paid*	*Percent*
1. Federal Government	0	0
2. Puerto Rican Government	0	0
3. Private	$23, 940	100

VI. PERSONNEL

	Total
Total number of employees	46
Method of selection: a. Classified civil service	46
Nationality (place born):	
a. United States of America	8
b. Puerto Rico	38
Salary:	
a. Annual salary range	$4, 005–$17, 600
b. Annual median salary	$10, 000

SELECTIVE SERVICE SYSTEM

I. LEGAL BASIS

Section 10(a)(2) of the Universal Military Training and Service Act as amended.

II. DATE OFFICE STARTED OPERATIONS IN PUERTO RICO

1940.

III. CHIEF EXECUTIVE OR DIRECTOR; METHOD OF SELECTING HIM

Mr. Luis Torres Massa, Colonel, U.S. Army. Appointed by the President of the United States on the recommendation of the Governor of Puerto Rico.

IV. SUMMARY OF FUNCTIONS

Procuring manpower for the active and reserve components of the armed services through voluntary and involuntary means.

Evaluating and determining the availability of the Standby Reserve for recall to active duty in an emergency.

Channeling registrants into occupations, skills, professions, and similar activities in the national interest through the medium of deferment classification.

Classifying young men registering at 18 years of age, as soon as possible after registration, so those determined to be available for military service can be forwarded promptly to the Armed Forces for examination.

Maintaining a current inventory of military manpower resources to assure the best national posture in an emergency and simultaneously planning the System's continuing operation under any circumstance or contingency which the future may present.

V. Resources

Budget of expenditures office operations and capital improvements during fiscal year 1964–65	$915, 235
Sources of income for fiscal year 1964–65:	
a. Federal appropriations	915, 235
b. Commonwealth appropriations	0
c. Other sources	0

Total real estate property owned and/or used:

a. Land facilities:	*Acres*
1. Total used	0
2. Total owned by Federal Government	0

b. Buildings and office space facilities:	*Square feet*	*Ratio of owned to used, percent*
1. Total used	54, 187	------
2. Total owned by Federal Government	16, 253	30

c. Rental paid for land, buildings and office space facilities used:

Proprietor	*Annual rental paid*	*Percent*
1. Federal Government	0	0
2. Puerto Rican Government	$4, 680	10
3. Private	42, 586	90
Total	47, 266	100

VI. Personnel:

	Total
Total number of employees	148
Method of selection:	
a. Classified civil service	144
b. Excepted service positions	0
c. Other	[1] 4
Nationality (place born):	
a. United States of America	1
b. Puerto Rico	143
c. Other countries	4
Salary:	
a. Annual salary range	$2, 795–$15, 284
b. Annual median salary	$3, 540

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[1] Military.

SMALL BUSINESS ADMINISTRATION

I. Legal Basis

Section 4(a), Public Law 163, 83d Congress, July 1953, as amended.

II. Date Office Started Operations in Puerto Rico

1956.

III. Chief Executive or Director; Method of Selecting Him

Mr. Antonio Yordán, Regional Director. Appointed by the Administrator, Small Business Administration, Selective Appointment.

IV. Summary of Functions

To help small firms obtain financing, overcome the effects of disaster, sell to or buy from Federal Government, and to strengthen their management and production capabilities.

V. Resources

Budget of expenditures for office operations and capital expenditures during fiscal year 1964–65	$599, 673
Sources of income for fiscal year 1964–65:	
a. Federal appropriations	599, 673
b. Commonwealth appropriations	0
c. Other sources	0

Total real estate property owned and/or used:

a. Land facilities:	*Acres*
1. Total used	0
2. Total owned by Federal Government	0

b. Buildings and office space facilities:	*Square feet*	*Ratio of owned to used, percent*
1. Total used	13, 693	------
2. Total owned by Federal Government	0	0

c. Rental paid for land, buildings and office space facilities used:

Proprietor	*Annual rental paid*	*Percent*
1. Federal Government	0	0
2. Puerto Rican Government	0	0
3. Private	$31, 835	100

VI. Personnel

	Totals
Total number of employees	60
Method of selection:	
a. Classified civil service	58
b. Excepted service positions	2
Nationality (place born):	
a. United States of America	54
b. Puerto Rico	5
c. Other countries	1
Salary:	
a. Annual salary range	$4, 650–$19, 800
b. Annual median salary	$8, 370

VETERANS ADMINISTRATION

I. Legal Basis

Administrator's Decision by virtue of Executive Order No. 5398 issued by President Herbert Hoover on July 21, 1930, under the provisions of Public Law 536 of July 3, 1930, as a amended.

II. Date Office Started Operations in Puerto Rico

1930. The Bureau of the Veterans established a suboffice in Puerto Rico in 1923 with very limited administrative functions.

III. Chief Executive or Director. Method of Selecting Him

Dr. José Chaves Estrada—Director, Appointed by Administrator of Veterans Affairs, Washington, D.C. (selective appointment).

IV. SUMMARY OF FUNCTIONS

Administer the program of benefits and services for veterans, their dependents, and beneficiaries provided by law, following policies and directives issued by the Administrator, Chief Medical Director, and Chief Benefits Director.

V. RESOURCES

Budget of expenditures for office operations and capital improvements during fiscal year 1964–65	[1] $5, 720, 000
Sources of income for fiscal year 1964–65:	
a. Federal appropriations	[1] 5, 720, 000
b. Commonwealth appropriations	0
c. Other sources	0

Total real estate property owned and/or used:		
a. Land facilities:	*Acres*	*Ratio of owned to used, percent*
1. Total used	[2] 46. 60	------
2. Total owned by Federal Government	[2] 46. 60	100

b. Buildings and office space facilities:	*Square feet*	*Ratio of owned to used, percent*
1. Total used	142, 076	------
2. Total owned by Federal Government	132, 538	98. 3

c. Rental paid for land, buildings and office space facilities used:

Proprietor	*Annual rental paid*	*Percent*
1. Federal Government	0	0
2. Puerto Rican Government	0	0
3. Private	$12, 800	100

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[1] The Veterans Administration also disbursed $25,002,000 for direct services to veterans for a total expenditure of $30,722,000.

[2] This includes 27.2 acres of land ceded by the Puerto Rican government for the construction of the Veterans Hospital, which will have a capacity of 720 beds and will cost $18 million. Construction has already started.

VI. PERSONNEL

	Total
Total number of employees	644
Method of selection:	
a. Classified civil service	644
Nationality (place born):	
a. United States of America	24
b. Puerto Rico	609
c. Other countries	11
Salary:	
a. Annual salary range	$1, 726–$22, 865
b. Annual median salary	$5, 630

APPENDIX

QUESTIONNAIRE FOR INVENTORY OF FEDERAL AGENCIES WITH OFFICES IN PUERTO RICO

Please answer all the questions:

I. Name of Office:

II. Name of Chief Executive Officer or Director:

III. Method of Selection of the Chief Executive Officer or Director:

IV. Legal Basis (the provisions which authorize the establishment of the agency in Puerto Rico):

V. Date the office started its functions in Puerto Rico:

VI. Functions of the agency:

VII. Resources:

1. Total budget of expenditures office operations and capital improvements for fiscal year 1964–65:
   $__________
2. Sources of income (fiscal year 1964–65). Specify:
   Amount
   - a. Federal appropriations $__________
   - b. Other $__________
3. Real Estate:
   - a. The area, buildings, and office space occupied by this agency is:
     - Totally:
       - Federal Government property ☐
       - State and/or municipal property ☐
       - Private property ☐
     - Partly:
       - Federal Government property ☐
       - State and/or municipal property ☐
       - Private property ☐
   - b. This agency pays rent for the area and building space it occupies belonging to:
     Annual amount paid
     - Federal Government $__________
     - State and/or municipal government $__________
     - Private owner $__________
4. Land area:
   - a. Total amount, if any, of land area *USED* by this agency in (choose *any one* of the following measures):
     1. Acres: __________
        or
     2. Square meters: __________
        or
     3. Square feet: __________

b. Total amount, if any of land area ***OWNED*** by this agency in (choose *any one* of the following measures):

1. Acres: ___________

or

2. Square meters: ___________

or

3. Square feet: ___________

5. Buildings and office space:

a. Total area, in square feet, of room and office space ***USED*** by this agency:

___________ square feet.

b. Total area, in square feet, of room and office space, ***OWNED*** by this agency:

___________ square feet.

VIII. Structure and Organization:

Please submit to us an organization chart. We need four copies of your organization chart, preferably size 8½" x 11".

VIII.

IX. Personnel:

1. Total number of employees: ___________

2. Methods of selection:

	Total
a. Federal civil service positions	___________
b. Excepted service positions	___________
c. Appointments other than civil service and excepted service	___________

3. Nationality of Employees—Place of birth:

	Number born
a. In Puerto Rico	___________
b. In United States	___________
c. In other countries	___________

4. Wages and salaries:

a. Indicate lowest annual salary scale $___________

b. Indicate highest annual salary scale $___________

5. Level of salaries: Number of employees in the following annual salary level:

	Number of employees
a. Less than $2,000	45
b. $2,000 or more but less than $4,000	95
c. $4,000 or more but less than $6,000	223
d. $6,000 or more but less than $8,000	120
e. $8,000 or more but less than $10,000	64
f. $10,000 or more but less than $12,000	36
g. $12,000 or more but less than $14,000	14
h. $14,000 or more but less than $16,000	13
i. $16,000 or more	34
	[1] 644

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[1] See "Remarks."

X. Remarks:

Distribution above is provided to illustrate the formula utilized for computing the median salary:

$$Md = L + \frac{\left(\frac{n}{2} - cf\right)i}{f}$$

$L = \$4{,}000$

$\frac{n}{2} = 322$

$cf = 140$

$f = 223$

$i = \$2{,}000$

$Md = \$5{,}630$ (rounded to the nearest 10 dollars)

XI. After you have filled out this questionnaire, please return it to:

Mr. Norbert Rivera Morales
Assistant Director
School of Public Administration
University of Puerto Rico
Río Piedras, P.R.

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